



EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Public hearing  
on  
security policy in Europe

Situation and prospects

Brussels, 18 and 19 December 1985

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## Foreword by Mr Roberto Formigoni

Chairman of the  
European Parliament's  
Political Affairs Committee

There are basic truths which are so obvious and repeated so often that we gradually lose sight of their importance. They are like the main girder of a building: after a while we think of it as a gratuitous embellishment rather than as a vital structural support and believe that the building could dispense with it altogether.

This is a very apt metaphor for the role of defence in Europe: defence has provided a very stable structure to support the fragile equilibrium which made Europe a haven of peace and freedom for the last 40 years.

Forty years — the space of a generation — are only a brief moment in history but long enough for memories to grow dim: the longer peace lasts, the more incongruous and unacceptable the 'preparations for war' needed to preserve peace will appear. It thus becomes indispensable not only to explain to the public the real significance of defence but to enable each citizen to perceive it as an integral part of public life.

This is, of course, a matter for politicians and the most straightforward and natural way for them to do this is by appealing to solidarity. Once the citizens of Europe become fully aware that they share common interests based on a common identity they will quickly understand the direct link between democratic freedom and the defence of this freedom in a world in crisis. They will then have grasped a fundamental principle, namely that defence can only be justified as a component of security, a political idea with far-reaching implications for the Community.

The founding fathers of the European institutions had understood this when they tried to set up the European Defence Community. It is symptomatic that this initiative failed primarily for political reasons.

In 1954 memories of the recent conflict between the States of Europe and the task of the reconstruction of the international community obscured the need for European solidarity in matters of security.

This was more than a momentary oversight: for more than three decades security remained taboo in the Community institutions, notably in the European Parliament where it occasioned several notorious clashes between those who thought that the Community should deal with defence matters and those who considered that it was exclusively a matter for the Member States and defence organizations dominated by them.

While the need for European solidarity in security matters is now generally recognized in principle, there are still a number of major problems which must be solved before such a policy can be implemented, notably the question of determining the policies of each of the Member States in a scenario of inter-bloc confrontation, the dependence of Europe on the United States' defence aid and the multiplicity of threats to Europe. These threats change very rapidly owing to various factors such as the development of new technologies — implying a constant reassessment of the very idea of defence — and the internationalization of local conflicts, the principal cause of the rise of terrorism which is directed mainly at Europe both because of its influence in the world and the freedom it offers.

This is why efforts to obtain recognition of the Community's competence in security matters have been gathering momentum. I should like to take the opportunity here to pay tribute to my predecessors, most of whom are still members of our institution: it is due to their increasing initiatives during the last parliamentary term that the Political Affairs Committee was able as soon as it was reconstituted in 1984, to set up a Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament in recognition of this development.

It is this subcommittee which prepared the public hearing held by the Political Affairs Committee on 18 and 19 December 1985, the main acts of which are published in this brochure.

The high standard of this hearing and all the work undertaken by the subcommittee confirm that in setting up this subcommittee we have made an investment for the future, an investment which we entrusted from the very outset to the dynamic chairmanship of Hans-Gert Poettering who has written the following introduction to this brochure.



## The need for a European security policy

**Introduction by Mr Hans-Gert Poettering, Chairman of the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament**

The institution of European political cooperation (EPC) in 1970 endowed the Community with a coordinating mechanism which has on many occasions lent momentum to the process of integration of the EEC Member States in a political community. From the start it was acknowledged that political cooperation also involved security policy matters. This view was reflected clearly in the Report on European Union<sup>1</sup> drawn up at the end of 1975 on behalf of the European Council by the then Prime Minister of Belgium, Leo Tindemans, which declared that security policy was necessarily a part of the responsibilities of the European Union. In consequence, the report called on the EEC Member States to institute regular exchanges of opinions on their specific security problems. The London Report on European Political Cooperation,<sup>2</sup> adopted in October 1981 by the Foreign Ministers of the 10 Member States, confirmed that this call did not go unheeded. This report laid down that the flexible and pragmatic approach which in the past had made it possible to examine the political aspects of security in the framework of EPC would be retained in the future.

In signing the Solemn Declaration on European Union on 19 June 1983, the Heads of State or Government of the Member States confirmed this responsibility for security policy. The document on which this declaration was based (the Genscher/Colombo Act) expressed the

<sup>1</sup> Supplement 1/76 — Bull. EC.

<sup>2</sup> PE 75.249, 20.10.1982.

desire to take measures in the framework of EPC on the coordination of the positions of the Member States on the political and economic aspects of security.

With the signature of the Single European Act by the Heads of State or Government early in 1986, the Member States of the European Community, now 12 in number, again undertook to attach due importance to cooperation in security policy matters. The preamble to this document revising the Community Treaties stresses that the Signatory States should act with consistency and solidarity to protect their common interests and together make their own contribution to the preservation of international peace and security. In order to carry out this self-imposed duty, the High Contracting Parties assert that they are ready to coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security and are determined jointly to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security. They openly acknowledge the significance of close security policy cooperation for the process of integration, stressing that the development of a foreign-policy identity for Europe will be fostered precisely by this type of cooperation.

If it can now and in future be taken as read that cooperation on security policy between the Member States is a firmly established element in Community policies, it should not be forgotten that this development would not have been possible without the constant and determined advocacy of the idea of a Community security policy by the European Parliament. To say that Parliament was the driving force behind this development would be no exaggeration.

Back in April 1973 the EP adopted a resolution, on the basis of a report<sup>1</sup> drawn up by Mr Mommersteg on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee, on political cooperation and political union in Europe,<sup>2</sup> a main premise of which was that cooperation in the foreign policy sphere could in practice very rarely be separated from defence and security policy.

Parliament took new initiatives in 1975 to promote security policy cooperation. It adopted a resolution<sup>3</sup> submitted on the basis of a report by Mr Bertrand<sup>4</sup> on European Union, which expressed the intention of strengthening cooperation in the field of security and including security policy in the powers of a future European Union. A resolution on the

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<sup>1</sup> Doc. 12/73.

<sup>2</sup> OJ C 26, 30.4.1973.

<sup>3</sup> OJ C 179, 6.8.1975.

<sup>4</sup> Doc. 174/75.

effects of a European foreign policy on defence questions<sup>1</sup> adopted at the end of 1975 deplored the fact that there had been no progress towards the harmonization of the defence policies of the Member States of the European Community and called on them to strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance by developing their own specifically European effort and to rationalize their production of defensive armaments. This last proposal was taken up in more detail in the resolution on European armaments procurement cooperation adopted in June 1978,<sup>2</sup> which called on the Commission to submit a European action programme for armaments cooperation within the framework of a common industrial policy.

A further milestone on the path to security policy cooperation between EEC Member States was the adoption by the EP in July 1981 of the resolution on European political cooperation and the role of the European Parliament,<sup>3</sup> which stressed the significance of the decision taken by the Foreign Ministers in May 1981 to include European security matters covered by European political cooperation and at the same time called for a continuation and expansion of this security policy cooperation.

A further resolution was adopted in December 1981,<sup>4</sup> this time on the surveillance and protection of shipping routes for supplies of energy and strategic materials for the countries of the European Community.

In January 1983 the European Parliament adopted by a large majority a resolution dealing directly with the connection between European security and European political cooperation,<sup>5</sup> which was to prove central to the further development of security policy cooperation. Based on an analysis of the joint security interests of the EC Member States, it called for a European peace and security concept to be drawn up and put into practice, based on the principles of détente, arms control and peaceful coexistence between all States and peoples.

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<sup>1</sup> OJ C 7, 12.1.1976.

The resolution was based on a report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee by Lord Gladwyn (Doc. 429/74).

<sup>2</sup> OJ C 163, 10.7.1978.

The resolution was based on a report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee by Mr Klepsch (Doc. 83/78).

<sup>3</sup> OJ C 234, 14.9.1981.

The resolution was based on a report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee by Lady Elles (Doc. 1-335/81).

<sup>4</sup> OJ C 327, 14.12.1981.

<sup>5</sup> OJ C 42, 14.2.1983.

The resolution was based on a report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee by Mr Haagerup (Doc. 1-946/82).

The adoption of the resolution on arms procurement within a common industrial policy and arms sales<sup>1</sup> (23 October 1983) was a further significant initiative to promote security policy cooperation between Member States.

The calls for the adoption of a common position on security matters and for the development of a European security concept were again taken up in a resolution on the shared European interests, risks and requirements in the security field.<sup>2</sup> This resolution, based on a report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee by Mr Klepsch,<sup>3</sup> was adopted by the European Parliament on 11 April 1984 by 136 votes to 67 with 8 abstentions. The report and resolution proved highly significant for the future of cooperation on security policy.

They examined a number of issues, including East-West negotiations on arms control, the CSCE follow-up conferences, the role of the European Parliament in security policy matters and the relations between the EEC and NATO. The resolution also called on the Political Affairs Committee of the EP to 'establish a permanent subcommittee on the political and economic aspects of security'. When this was then done after the EP direct elections in June 1984, one could justly speak of a breakthrough in the EP's activity on security policy matters.

The Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament has 19 members and usually meets once a month. It has already drawn up six reports on security matters, most of which are now before the parliamentary committees, namely:

- (a) arms control and disarmament and their importance to the European Community (rapporteur: Sir Peter Vanneck);
- (b) the problems raised by chemical and biological weapons for European security (rapporteur: Mrs Piermont);
- (c) Western European security (rapporteur: Mr Bernard-Reymond);
- (d) the role of Europe in the defence of the Mediterranean basin (rapporteur: Mr Gawronski);
- (e) the consequences for the Community of the CSCE and MCSD Conferences (rapporteur: Mr Boesmans);

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<sup>1</sup> OJ C 322, 28.11.1983.

The resolution was based on a report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee by Mr Fergusson (Doc. 1-455/83).

<sup>2</sup> OJ C 155, 27.6.1983.

<sup>3</sup> Doc. 1-80/84.

(f) political aspects of a European security strategy (rapporteur: Mr Galluzzi).

The subcommittee is planning to draw up reports on a number of other topics for 1986/87, including (provisionally) aspects of regional security, armaments cooperation, the harmonization of national security concepts and the role of Western Europe in disarmament and arms control negotiations.

Apart from its work in drawing up parliamentary reports and motions for resolutions, the subcommittee has also been active in other ways, repeatedly putting oral questions on security policy cooperation to the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation and holding hearings of experts. The first debate with the Foreign Ministers, on 10 July 1985 in Luxembourg,<sup>1</sup> on the basis of an oral question from the subcommittee, was a breakthrough. In the resolution winding up the debate, adopted on 11 July 1986 by a large majority (105 votes to 43 with 8 abstentions), the Foreign Ministers were called upon to define European security interests and to represent them in the security policy bodies.<sup>2</sup>

The same concern was also reflected in the plenary debate of the European Parliament on European security matters in May 1986, which examined two oral questions to the Foreign Ministers of the Member States.<sup>3</sup> A number of contributors emphasized the need for the EEC to regard itself as a security community as well as an economic one, and to accept with resolution the commitment to security policy cooperation in the framework of EPC as laid down in the Single European Act. This would involve both drawing up a comprehensive disarmament and arms control concept which did full justice to European interests and devising specific measures to promote armaments cooperation between the Member States of the EEC. The resolution adopted by a large majority at the end of the debate<sup>4</sup> expressed regret at the fact that EPC had not hitherto

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<sup>1</sup> cf. Oral question tabled by Mr Poettering and others on behalf of the Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament on political and economic aspects of European security (Doc. B2-595/85).

<sup>2</sup> cf. Resolution tabled by Mr Poettering and others on the political and economic aspects of European security, adopted by Parliament on 11 July 1985 (Doc. B2-632/85).

<sup>3</sup> cf. (a) Oral question tabled by Mr Toussaint and others on a European strategic defence programme (Doc. B2-170/86 / 0-176/85).

(b) Oral question tabled by Mr Poettering and others on behalf of the Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament on political and economic aspects of European security (Doc. B2-171/86 / 0-213/86).

These two questions were the subject of a thorough debate at the plenary sitting of 14 May 1986.

<sup>4</sup> Doc. B2-219/86, 15.5.1986.

been capable of pushing ahead with cooperation on security policy in order to make Europe's own contribution to peace and disarmament. In connection with this, the resolution called on the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve meeting in EPC to develop an independent European position on the various disarmament initiatives, putting this forward with a single voice as a genuinely European position. The Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament is planning to discuss security problems with the Foreign Ministers during each presidency on the basis of oral questions.

The public hearing on the situation and prospects of security policy in Europe held in December 1985 was particularly noteworthy.<sup>1</sup> It provided an opportunity for intensive dialogue between the members of the subcommittee/Political Affairs Committee and eminent experts in the field of security policy and analysis. The main conclusion arising from the speeches and discussions was the need for the European Parliament to continue to press for a European security policy, so that in future European political cooperation is concerned even more closely with security matters. This brochure contains the speeches made at this hearing.

The European Parliament will therefore continue to make every effort to assist in spelling out European positions and European proposals for maintaining peace. This desire can clearly be seen in the marked increase in the number of parliamentary initiatives on security matters since the signature of the Single European Act, which provides a new legal basis for the examination of security policy issues. Thus following the major debate on security policy at the May 1986 part-session, Parliament expressed its views on security policy, and during the June 1986 part-session resolutions on SALT II<sup>2</sup> and chemical weapons<sup>3</sup> were adopted.

All these initiatives clearly reveal that the examination of economic and political aspects of security has become an essential part of the work of the European Parliament. This means that much has been achieved, yet still more remains to be done. Accordingly, the EP must, in view of the numerous security policy challenges of our time, make even greater efforts in future to ensure that its voice is heard. The unambiguous provisions of the Single European Act (Title III, Article 30(4)) covering

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<sup>1</sup> See PE 103.051, 28.1.1986.

<sup>2</sup> Doc. B2-401/86 and Doc. B2-416/86, 12.6.1986.

<sup>3</sup> Doc. B2-375/86 and compromise amendment to Docs B2-402 and B2-412/86, 12.6.1986.

European political cooperation give grounds for hope that this will be possible: the High Contracting Parties 'shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration' with regard to the foreign policy issues which are being examined within the framework of political cooperation.

Europe must give high priority to assuming greater responsibility for its own security. It must become more aware of the possibilities open to it for firmly representing its own security interests. It should continue to develop this security policy within the NATO framework. In future the USA should no longer be obliged to discuss policy individually with each European capital. Western Europeans should undertake comprehensive joint analyses of all important issues in the field of defence, arms control and détente policy, define basic principles and formulate specific demands and proposals to be harmonized with the US Administration. Washington should be able to rely on a Europe speaking with one voice. This would make Europe a reliable and predictable, but above all an equal, partner in the field of security policy. NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) and the European Parliament are not alternative fora for a process of emancipation of this type. They should rather have a cumulative function, reinforcing one another in the pursuit of a common goal.

Political reinforcement of the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance would also create a sound 'grand design' for transatlantic partnership which the vast majority of the population on both sides of the Atlantic could endorse.

In particular, by speaking with one voice Europe would be able to assert its interests *vis-à-vis* its ideological and geo-political challenger, the Soviet Union, more calmly and more consciously. This would also be in the Soviet Union's interests, since Western Europe would become a more predictable partner.

True détente policy would thereby be given a much better chance of success.

**The European Parliament's public hearing on security policy in Europe  
(Brussels, 18 and 19 December 1985)**



**Hans-Gert Poettering**  
Chairman of the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament

**Jonathan Alford**  
Deputy Director, IISS

**Sir Peter Vanneck**  
Vice-Chairman of the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament

# Statement by Ambassador David M. Abshire

## US Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

When I arrived at NATO just over two years ago, NATO's most serious problems were readily apparent. The gap between the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, especially at the conventional level, was widening. As a consequence, the adequacy of flexible response was being thrown into question by ongoing trends that suggested the Soviets were developing the capability to respond more effectively in a crisis and conflict than NATO. Deterrence must rest on a triad of NATO forces — conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear — that give the Alliance a variety of possible responses to aggression at the appropriate level.

At the conventional level, NATO's problem is not that it is universally weak, but that its strength is uneven. There were — and are — some weak points in NATO's conventional forces as well as critical shortages. Those weaknesses are disturbing, especially in light of Moscow's growing emphasis on operational manoeuvre groups and other concepts of deep penetration. Warning time has been reduced.

Nuclear power is blackmail power, but its military utility tends to be questionable. This is not true of conventional forces. They are flexible and usable. Furthermore, their use is far more subject to miscalculation — an especially dangerous consideration in view of the fact that a future major conflict is likely to begin at the conventional, not the nuclear, level.

Reducing the vulnerability of NATO forces and giving them requisite flexibility, however, is more expensive than ever. Alliance nations confront a traditional difficulty of harmonizing costly security requirements with other important social claims.

These pressures exacerbate what defence analyst Thomas Callaghan has termed NATO's 'structural disarmament' — fewer weapons systems with ever higher unit costs, producing limited readiness, and more limited combat capability.

These problems exist at a time when NATO's political strategy has been functioning well. The INF consultations, the work of the special consultative group, the links between the Geneva negotiations and the North Atlantic Council — all these were a model of Alliance interaction. Through these efforts the Alliance denied the Soviets their goal of splitting NATO.

Once INF deployments began, however, the concern arose that the INF burden was being used by some as an argument, and an excuse, not to look at conventional defence problems. Meanwhile, important members of the US Congress were growing increasingly frustrated over NATO's inability or unwillingness to confront those problems. Some, such as long-time NATO supporter Senator Sam Nunn, complained that NATO did not have flexible response but an extended trip-wire, that nuclear risks were being kept too high.

Many conventional defence problems could be solved by more money. However, the Alliance is not providing the necessary resources, as many of the allies fall short of the goal of 3% annual increases in defence spending. Furthermore, the Alliance has been investing as much in defence as the Warsaw Pact and getting less output for that investment.

In the last 18 months, the Alliance has focused detailed attention on conventional defence needs and has recognized the requirement for a resources strategy. The concept of a resources strategy has featured as an important element in the last two defence ministerial communiqués.

It is ironic that NATO had lost sight of the concept of strategy as a way to marshal and manage resources for the achievement of specific goals. Business schools have adopted such a concept of strategy; development economics have incorporated it; even sports teams talk about it. These ideas all came from a concept that was originally military. NATO, however, did not have a strategy for the effective use of its resources, and the lack of a resources strategy put its military strategy, even its deterrent strategy, at risk.

Recently, NATO has moved aggressively to put the framework for such a strategy in place. The goal of NATO's resources strategy is simple: to improve NATO's conventional defence effectiveness, and to do so by getting improved output for our investment, whether dollar, pound, mark, franc, guilder, etc. This is a classical approach to strategy dealing with the harmonization of means and ends.

NATO's resources strategy should not be viewed as a stereotyped plan, like the Schlieffen Plan or the US industrial mobilization plan of 1940. It is, above all, an attitude and an approach that examines creatively all trade-offs, multiplier effects, investment advantages and incentives, and all basic resources that are available to NATO for bolstering its deterrent such as emerging technology and highly trained manpower (both civilian and military). It emphasizes long-range, integrative thinking and integrates and harmonizes categories that are normally isolated, truncated, or compartmentalized. Finally, it stresses raising key issues to the political level where hard choices and difficult trade-offs must be made.

## **THE ELEMENTS OF A RESOURCES STRATEGY**

### **1. The conceptual military framework**

The starting point of NATO's resources strategy is having a central concept of what must be done. In the past, NATO's planning horizon has been relatively short-term, 5 to 8 years or so. As a consequence, when creative ideas emerged, new technologies became available, and novel operational concepts were advanced, NATO was not fully equipped to capitalize on their potential. West German Defence Minister Manfred Woerner expressed his frustration with this problem when he felt barged by a host of new ideas — airland battle, follow-on forces attack, emerging technologies and others. How did all of these things fit together? Woerner asked. How did they relate to what NATO was already doing? Clearly, NATO needed a better intellectual and conceptual framework to guide NATO's thinking, direct its planning, and discipline its resources management.

NATO's defence ministers charged the Military Committee, together with the major commanders, to respond to Minister Woerner's challenge. The committee and Supreme Allied Commander General Bernard Rogers have done so with a bold, innovative approach looking 15-20 years into the future. Their conceptual military framework is designed to discipline NATO's military thinking, tactics, and technologies to the battlefield of the 1990s and beyond.

That conceptual military framework for the 1990s became the first element, the core, of what I call a resources strategy.

The conceptual military framework defines the tasks required of Alliance forces. Their definition — and agreement by ministers as to their importance — provides the base from which NATO's efforts to maximize the impact of Alliance resources can begin. NATO's first requirement is defeat of the lead echelon of the attacking force. This is at the heart of NATO's concept of forward defence. However, it is not enough. There must also be the capacity to attack follow-on forces, control the sea and air, project maritime power, protect allied shipping, and safeguard rear areas.

## **2. The estimate: NATO vs. the Warsaw Pact**

In order to know whether NATO can really do the things that the conceptual military framework calls for, the Alliance must also determine how it stacks up against the potential adversary. Thus, a dynamic estimate of the military balance is the second element of the resources strategy.

Based on a variety of NATO assessments, allies — at the ambassadorial and ministerial level — have reached agreement on a better estimate of the threat. Clearly, NATO's ability to perform the vital tasks defined in the conceptual military framework is, in some areas at least, questionable.

NATO's assessment does not play down the magnitude of the problem, as some estimates have done in the past. Moreover, the allies have realized that if NATO is to have an effective resources strategy, it does little good to generalize about the threat. Therefore, allies have focused on specific problems in order to solve them.

## **3. Critical deficiencies**

A major part of NATO's efforts over the last six years has been to determine its critical deficiencies in very specific terms. This is the third component of my resources strategy. Among the most serious problems are:

NATO's shortfall in standing ground forces provides the Alliance with only a limited ability to prevent a breakthrough. This shortcoming exacerbates the old Alliance problem of depending on adequate warning and the question of how the Alliance will respond to ambiguous warnings.

There are too many differences in the levels of training, equipment, manning and availability of mobilizable reserve forces. Some are simply not

adequate to the task. Nor does NATO have effective enough means to defeat, disrupt or destroy the enemy's reserves.

There are serious deficiencies in the numbers of suitable aircraft, modern munitions, and supporting systems for effective offensive counter air operations. Moreover, a favourable air situation depends on early reinforcement, and NATO has not had sufficient infrastructure to receive the airplanes and support coming from the United States. Furthermore, NATO would find it difficult to distinguish between friendly and hostile aircraft.

The capabilities of Portugal, Greece and Turkey are another serious deficiency.

In the maritime area, anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and mine countermeasures are the most critical problems.

Finally, the Alliance does not have enough stocks of simple, but essential things, such as ammunition and petrol. NATO must work toward a 30-day war reserve stock in such critical commodities.

A unique problem, which some people would not include in a list of conventional shortcomings, is chemical warfare and an effective deterrent to the use of chemical weapons. In the absence of a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons to which NATO is fully committed, NATO forces under attack would face the very real probability of having to conduct conventional combat operations in a chemical environment. NATO forces are thus ill prepared and equipped to survive and sustain operations should the Warsaw Pact initiate chemical warfare. NATO needs not only good defensive chemical capabilities, but also a chemical deterrent. Today, with no deterrent in kind for preventing the use of chemical weapons, NATO would have to consider a nuclear response to a chemical attack. At a time when all of NATO's efforts are designed to push back as far as possible the moment at which nuclear weapons would be called for, this situation is unacceptable.

Earlier this year NATO achieved consensus agreement on these areas as needing immediate attention. The Alliance knows what its problems are. The question is: what does NATO do about them?

Already there have been some concrete results. At the December 1984 ministerial meeting infrastructure funding was doubled. That decision will enable NATO to take care of 90% of the minimum operational requirements and 70% of the shelters needed to protect aircraft reinforce-

ments coming from North America. Ministers also agreed to expand critical ammunition stocks. The agreement between Secretary of Defence Weinberger and Defence Minister Woerner on a system for the identification of friends and foes represents an important move in the resolution of that problem.

#### **4. Goals, priorities and planning**

Better planning is the link between knowing critical problems and taking effective action to resolve them. It is the fourth element of my resources strategy. Above all, it means better linkage between NATO and national planning.

Efforts to improve NATO planning were intensified at the spring 1985 defence ministers meeting in Brussels. Ministers adopted comprehensive recommendations constituting a plan of action for the Alliance. They agreed to give special emphasis to deficiencies, both in national and Alliance planning.

Of course, while giving special emphasis to key deficiencies, nations and the Alliance must continue to maintain adequate capabilities in other areas. NATO cannot allow additional deficiencies to develop. Consequently, ministers also issued the 1985 ministerial guidance, NATO's major political directive, which, in particular, gives direction for the preparation of NATO's force goals.

At this stage, NATO's action plan is essentially a plan for an action plan. Devising specific remedial actions and then implementing them requires imagination and considerable political determination. Some tough questions lie ahead, but there are also opportunities. Exploiting those opportunities is the next important step in the resources strategy.

#### **5. Coalition solutions for coalition problems**

As an alliance, NATO must think about fighting, working, and planning as a coalition. Of course, NATO would prefer not to fight, but to deter. Deterrence, however, is also a coalition demand. Coalition solutions for coalition problems is the fifth component of my resources strategy.

An effective coalition is not just the sum of individual nations planning, programming, budgeting, provisioning, training and commanding. Rather, it is all of the allies doing those things together so that a synergy among their efforts is created, and the whole becomes greater than the sum of the parts.

A good example of what a coalition approach can accomplish is the NATO airborne early warning and control programme. Thirteen members of the then-fifteen national alliance joined together to acquire an advanced surveillance, detection and command/control capability for air defence operations. The allies bought the system and delivered the aircraft together, and are flying them with multinational flight and maintenance crews from what in all aspects is a NATO airbase at Geilenkirchen, West Germany. This exceptional programme came together because allies put Alliance needs for air defence and political solidarity above purely nationalistic demands.

While common funding might be the best approach for the large, expensive requirements, other approaches should not be ruled out to meet other needs. Another coalition approach, for example, is common production. Perhaps the consolidated European production of the imaging infra-red maverick and the multiple launch rocket system will become excellent examples of collaborative production.

Another example could be a European initiative to develop a modern automated facility for the production of ammunition. Today several European nations are producing their own rounds at decidedly different prices for the same round. Yet, ammunition shortages remain NATO's most dramatic deficiency. If the Europeans joined together, exploiting advances in robotics and other technologies, they could greatly increase their efficiency and provide a significantly enhanced wartime production surge capability and mobilization potential.

Another approach toward coalition solutions is specialization. NATO already has specialization to a certain degree in the maritime field where the United States and Britain provide blue-water capabilities and other allies concentrate on shallow-water tasks. Under budgetary pressures, however, the Alliance may be moving toward a kind of *de facto* specialization as individual allies decide that they can no longer afford to assume particular roles or missions.

Rather than specialization by default, NATO must examine possibilities for specialization systematically and exploit each ally's 'comparative advantage'. There is also a synergy between specialization in military roles and specialization of industrial capability. NATO should take a look at the positive benefits in that direction.

## 6. Technology management

Technology is one of the West's greatest assets, and effective technology management is the sixth element of my resources strategy. It would be a poor strategy that did not exploit technology to the maximum. Unfortunately, NATO has not.

NATO has neither protected its technology adequately nor shared it effectively. There are a myriad of examples of the rather poor record in leaking technology to the East. The flow of vital Western technology to the East that aids the Soviets in their military build-up in turn forces NATO to take more expensive measures in response. That is hardly an effective use of resources.

Equally, NATO may also be paying a price if an overemphasis on protection prevents allies appropriately sharing technology. Severely restricting technology sharing reduces the rate at which the West can incorporate beneficial technology into operational systems on the battlefield on an Alliance-wide basis. That, too, is not effective resources strategy.

It is imperative, therefore, to harmonize technology protection and technology sharing.

The job, however, does not end there. NATO must also exploit new technologies more effectively. First, relatively mature technology must be introduced into the battlefield as effectively as possible. Through Secretary of Defence Weinberger's emerging technologies initiative three years ago, NATO is examining how to do that. It has identified a group of 16 projects in areas such as standoff weapons, battlefield and rear echelon surveillance capability, and a NATO identification system. The goal of this effort is to determine how NATO, on a joint basis, can expeditiously incorporate these high-leverage systems and technologies into Alliance inventories.

The second task is to look farther into the future. NATO has a mandate from its ministers to examine technologies at the leading edge of science — bio-technology, artificial intelligence, and many more — in order to determine how these technologies can help meet expected needs beyond the year 2000. The goal is to put together cooperative ventures in bringing these technologies to a level of maturity so that, in 5 to 15 years, NATO could use them in future weapons development.

## 7. Armaments cooperation

An important area that combines coalition solutions and effective technology management is armaments cooperation, the seventh element of my resources strategy.

Armaments cooperation has been recognized as perhaps the best long-term way to insure better resource use. The United States executive branch has moved remarkably to get its house in order. It began with Secretary Weinberger's strong commitments at the December 1983 ministerial meeting and crystallized in his memorandum to all elements in the Pentagon in which he describes the US goal as 'greater integration of military requirements with Alliance-wide defence industrial cooperation'. A Defence Department steering group has been formed, under the chairmanship of Deputy Secretary of Defence Taft, whose goal is to promote more allied arms cooperation.

Congress has become a partner in this effort. Last year Congressman Sam Stratton introduced legislation in the House and this year Senator Quayle introduced it in the Senate that will help cut through some of the bureaucratic red tape when cooperative armaments projects are involved. Moreover, recent legislation introduced by Senators Sam Nunn, John Warner, and William Roth represents a further critical opportunity for the Alliance.

### THE NEW 'NUNN AMENDMENT'

One year ago, Senator Nunn offered an amendment that threatened the withdrawal of American forces from Europe if NATO did not improve its conventional defence. That amendment was a measure of Senate frustration with the Alliance and Capitol Hill's perception of NATO's unwillingness to meet fundamental responsibilities. When Senator Nunn visited NATO last March, he was impressed by the turnaround in its attitude and the commitment to solving its problems. That visit prompted him to offer an amendment that fences off USD 50 million for each of the American armed services to be used *only* for collaborative projects. Another USD 50 million will be used for side-by-side competitive testing between American and European systems.

The importance of the amendment is not just the money; it is the precedent. It is part of our resources strategy of producing incentives for better Alliance-wide resource use.

Senator Nunn's amendment is designed to provide an incentive for America's military services to collaborate at an early point in the weapons development process. Examples of what the services could do include initiating cooperative research programmes on high-leverage technologies such as remote sensors and computer software, sharing costs for feasibility studies of the most promising joint projects, or participating beyond the feasibility study in the NATO frigate replacement programme.

While the US military was one of Congress's targets, Europe was another. NATO's European members must consider pooling their individual national resources to collaborate with the United States. Such a development would encourage both greater rationalization of Europe's technological capabilities and more efficient use of its resources.

In Europe, progress has been slower toward getting its house in order. There is still too much duplication:

- (a) 11 firms in 7 Alliance countries building anti-tank weapons;
- (b) 18 firms in 7 countries designing and producing ground-to-air weapons;
- (c) 16 companies in 7 countries working on air-to-ground weapons.

There is too much nationalism. A recent *Financial Times* editorial asked whether the European fighter aircraft would become a 'political aircraft'. An unhappy compromise in which the overriding aim will not be to satisfy military requirements, but to meet the aspirations of national defence lobbies. This question captures the dynamic all too often at work in the NATO procurement process.

There is not enough collaboration. Collaboration, if managed efficiently, can yield substantial economies. An example was recently pointed out by former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Admiral Wesley McDonald. Admiral McDonald said that the development of NATO's proposed frigate for the 1990s, now in the design stage, would increase naval standardization and result in lower building costs. If this project is brought to fruition, NATO could build as many as 125 frigates for the price of about 100 that could be built otherwise. Despite these problems, things at NATO are changing. Secretary General Carrington is committed to getting action. NATO has begun a re-examination of the arms cooperation process to decide whether the conference of national armaments directors is doing its business as effectively as possible, how the process can be improved, and where important changes could be made.

Just last week, NATO foreign ministers approved a plan to identify specific projects as candidates for intensified collaboration. NATO is planning a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council reinforced by deputy defence ministers to focus solely on enhancing the arms cooperation progress. This reinforced NAC will be similar to the one held in mid-November, the first of its kind since 1950.

Developments within the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) are another positive sign. The IEPG's recent Chairman, Dutch State Secretary Jan Van Houwelingen, has made the group a real player in the armaments cooperation area. No one believed the IEPG would ever meet at the ministerial level, but IEPG defence ministers completed their second meeting in June 1985 and have additional meetings scheduled.

In the long term, will Europe respond to enhanced arms cooperation? Or will politics and national economic interests get in the way? Will the fear of European politicians over jobs and national market shares show that nothing is really changed?

The US Congress is watching and waiting. If the Alliance does not respond to the challenge and the opportunity that has been presented, we will have another punitive amendment. I am convinced that the next time such an amendment is offered, it would easily pass the Congress if led by someone like Senator Nunn.

## **8. Economics and security**

The eighth component of my resources strategy is a better understanding of the relationship between economics and security. Europe's general economic situation makes its resource choices more difficult. European decision-makers are faced with unemployment, sluggish job creation, slow growth, disaggregated markets, an inadequate high technology sector, and extremely demanding social welfare burdens.

A strong economy is a prerequisite for a strong defence, and Europe's lagging economic recovery and its basic structural economic problems are impediments to increasing defence expenditures. A high technology gap is developing between the USA and Japan on one side, and Europe on the other. The problem is not so much Europe's basic science or its technological creativity. Rather, it is Europe's inability to organize its technological resources efficiently. Of course, any such organization must be on a non-protectionist basis.

## PARTNERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP

If Europe is to experience both sustained economic growth and enhanced security, the governments of all Alliance members must make tough decisions. Perhaps those decisions will be easier if those making them realize that one of their greatest advantages is the strength and cohesion that derives from membership in the Atlantic Alliance. Partnership and leadership, then, are the last elements in the resources strategy. We must do the job together, not just those of us whose daily business is Alliance security — in defence ministries, foreign ministries, or foreign policy research institutes. I also mean finance and trade ministries; legislators throughout the Alliance have an important role, but for that they need to know what NATO is doing and the progress we have made. To generate the fundamental public support that will ultimately determine our success or failure, we have to get NATO's story to NATO's people.

Those of us at NATO intend to demonstrate that we are better stewards of our resources than we have been in the past. In doing so, we can then, justifiably, ask for the additional resources we will need in the future. We can also rebuild the defence consensus on a bipartisan, indeed multi-partisan basis. NATO has new ideas, a process for implementing them, an emerging resources strategy, and momentum. We cannot let up.

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In reply to questions put by Sir Peter Vanneck (ED, UK), Mr Bernard-Reymond (EPP, F) and Sir James Scott-Hopkins (ED, UK), Mr Abshire said that there had been a dramatic change in the attitude of Europeans to the conventional defence of Europe.<sup>1</sup> This helped to counter protectionist trends in Congress; transatlantic deals between private firms were very numerous.

Mr Abshire did not think that Western European Union (WEU) undercut NATO: while the North Atlantic Council did not want an alternative arms control forum, suspicions of WEU had not been fulfilled.

The Rogers Plan concerned resources strategy and high technology. The 1985 Nunn amendment would help to develop coordinated systems to counter the dif-

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<sup>1</sup> Abbreviations used to denote political groups — Socialist: Soc.; European People's Party: EPP; European Democrat: ED; Communist and Allies: Comm.; Liberal and Democratic Reformist: Lib.; European Democratic Alliance: EDA; European Right: ER; Rainbow: Arc.

ficult situation in the 1990s created by a Soviet build-up, reduced warning times and the slow rate of NATO reinforcement.

Mr Abshire believed that joint arms procurement could only be achieved at political level; for example NATO Defence Ministers were now meeting in the North Atlantic Council to discuss joint procurement.

Responding to questions put by Mr Romualdi (ER, I), Mr Newens (Soc., UK) and Mrs Piermont (Arc., FRG), Mr Abshire said that the Soviet Union had rejected the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. Europe had been unwilling to provide sufficient conventional forces to defend itself and the US nuclear umbrella had thus become essential. This in turn aggravated the US budget deficit.

# Statement by General Gerd Schmückle

Federal Republic of Germany

My subject, 'Conditions and prospects for European security', brings me immediately to the Geneva Summit organized jointly by General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan in November 1986. I should like to make a comment on this as a European: at a 'summit' 30 years ago the representatives of Great Britain and France would still have been sitting round the superpowers' table. On this occasion Europe was not offered a seat. It had no voice in Geneva. It was not even referred to, either in the press conferences or in the 'joint declaration' published by Reagan and Gorbachev. There was no president of a 'United States of Europe' present at the negotiating table.

We are all quite well aware that the history of summit meetings over the last 50 years has been nothing more than a series of misunderstandings and it has been Europe which has had to pay the price. The Geneva meeting once again did nothing more than confirm our dependence on the two superpowers, and particularly our dependence in security matters. All the passages which are of some political significance in the two statesmen's joint declaration deal with security matters, and this includes our security. There was a high pressure Soviet media campaign in Geneva which started with a press conference given by Colonel General Chervov. It had a single objective: to bring the American defence initiative, SDI, to a halt. It failed. Now, after Geneva, there is a new wave of Soviet information activity in the West. They are trying to do now what they did not manage in Geneva, namely to get rid of SDI. Soviet embassies are sending out brochures attacking SDI in English, German, French and Italian — and the target is clear. Soviet pressure directed against Western security measures is nothing new. For the purposes of our subject, it is important to remember that the West is refused similar opportunities in the East. It is thus a one-way effort to bring influence to bear, to turn people in the West against the West's own security measures. This is the price which an open society has to pay and something with which it must learn to live.

What positive good did Geneva achieve? First of all, a written statement in the 'joint declaration' that a nuclear war between the two world

powers cannot be won. This is not any great novelty. However, that the two most powerful men in the world should have together put this down in writing for the first time is something new. It also contradicts previous Soviet military doctrine which saw, and still does see, atomic weapons as instruments of victory. If Gorbachev does intend to break with this doctrine, this is an important step forward towards preventing war in Europe.

A second important passage in the 'joint declaration' emphasizes that neither side is seeking military superiority. This too is new because it means Soviet recognition of the principle of the balance of power. A military balance is not, however, compatible with Soviet thinking on security matters over the past few decades. For what are, partly, quite understandable reasons, Moscow has been seeking military superiority. Of course, Brezhnev used to speak about balance, as we know, but his actions, in building up his arsenal of SS 20s, were in blatant breach of this principle. Is there a real change in Soviet thinking on security now taking place under Gorbachev?

The final important point in the joint declaration was the news that efforts were to be made to prevent armament in space, to limit or to end it on Earth and to reduce atomic weapons. These phrases signify a willingness to bring the process of armament under control. The arms race is, of course, partly an expression of two rival political systems. And Gorbachev left no one in doubt during his press conference that this rivalry would continue. One may conclude from this with all due caution that the Soviet statesman is aiming to calm the military situation without defusing the rivalry between the systems. This is probably as far as Gorbachev could go, given the domestic situation in the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.

*The armament dialectic:* Over the past 40 years there has been a dialectic on armaments between East and West. It is present in three main areas: naval weapons, nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. This dialectic conditions European security.

*Naval armament:* The Soviets have succeeded with an impressive feat of strength in turning a kind of coastguard into an instrument of global maritime power within the space of 25 years — presumably partly as a reaction to Krushchev's defeat in the Cuba crisis, for, at that time, the originator of the crisis lacked the high seas fleet with which he could have seen through his game of poker. This new superpower navy is

causing new problems, particularly for us Europeans, since, for more than a decade, it has been practising how, in the event of war, it could prevent reinforcement coming into Europe from overseas.

We can still deal with this threat today, should the need arise. And yet even today Western navies would receive a bloody nose. Whether the situation will still be the same in 10 or 20 years' time, no one can predict. But one thing will still be certain: Western Europe could not withstand a crisis without overseas reinforcements and Western Europeans cannot protect these reinforcements without the aid of the American fleet. The relative size of European navies has fallen to a lower level than has ever been the case before in the history of Europe. In other words: in naval terms we have become dependent on the two superpowers to a degree never known before.

At regular intervals the Soviet fleet establishes a naval corridor in the North Sea which is intended to impress and which is indeed impressive. These exercises are intended to extend the Soviet naval glacis westwards in order to be able to send their submarines out from there into the Atlantic. In actual fact, for all its strength, their navy does have a dangerous weakness: its shore bases are inadequate in relation to its worldwide mission. Some of it lies behind the North Cape, while other fleets are hemmed in in the Baltic and the Black Seas. Moscow would have a difficult job to bring these three fleets together in time of war.

Western experts fear as a result that the Soviet navy could take Soviet foreign policy in tow to be on the outlook for better harbours in the West. If it were to gain a single large base on the Atlantic, its political importance would increase many times over.

Be that as it may, Soviet naval policy, which also takes in its merchant fleet, is a worry to the West. Its creator, Admiral Gorschkow, always wanted a navy of the offensive kind. The admiral, whose genius cannot be denied, is now to be replaced. It remains to be seen whether Gorbachev can impose a new naval policy and how the Russian admiralty will react. Whatever happens now, the Soviet fleet has inescapably become one of the factors conditioning European security, but what is equally certain is that it is swallowing up huge financial resources for its construction and expansion. Whatever view one takes of this, the building up of this fleet is one of the most amazing events of modern times. With breathtaking speed Russia, traditionally a continental power, has turned itself into a worldwide sea power.

NATO practises how it can most effectively counter the Soviet naval corridor in the North Sea and the Atlantic at equally regular intervals. It reacts to each large-scale Soviet exercise by organizing its own mammoth manoeuvres in the same region. Each side tries to outdo the other and thus, over the last decade, a dialectic of naval forces has arisen around the coast of Europe, the like of which has never been seen before.

*Atomic weapons:* The dialectic which arose between the construction of the SS 20 arsenal and the subsequent Western armament programme is a familiar one. What is less well-known in Europe is that the Americans today consider their land- and air-based second strike ability to be in jeopardy. The accurate Soviet SS 18 and SS 19 missiles are causing American experts to fear that their own long-range missiles could fall victim to a surprise attack and they would be denied the possibility of mounting an adequate counter-attack. At the same time Soviet air defence has been disposed in such depth that an American air counter-attack could be ineffective. These are America's concerns, for which opinions about facts are — as ever — more important than the facts themselves.

It is interesting in retrospect to see that the Americans managed to get the ABM Treaty through in 1972, drastically limiting anti-missile defence, only in the face of considerable Soviet scepticism. Soviet representatives were reported to have said: 'How are we supposed to explain to our people we are no longer permitted to defend them?' The signing of this Treaty established the policy of 'mutually assured destruction'. The Americans supposed before its adoption, that the Soviets would also exercise restraint in future with regard to offensive missiles. They even added a unilateral declaration to the Treaty in which it was stated that the nuclear potentials would be reduced. This was self-deception. Today the Soviets have almost six times as many nuclear warheads which could be used against American atomic missile sites as the US negotiators had accepted in 1982.

What has happened since the ABM Treaty? Let me give a few rough figures. The Americans have reduced the number of their nuclear warheads from 28 000 to 26 000 but increased their destructive potential from some 4 000 to 4 200 megatons TNT. They have enormously improved the accuracy of their missiles, which is as good as further increasing their destructive potential. Since the ABM Treaty the Soviets have increased the number of their warheads from some 10 000 to 25 000 and increased their destructive potential from 4 000 to 9 000 megatons TNT.

The accuracy of their missiles will be as good as the Americans' by the end of this decade. This more or less is the result of the ABM Treaty slightly more than a decade after its signing.

As far as this nuclear destructive potential is concerned, of course every State has the right and the duty to defend itself against an attacker. However, no government can be granted the right to blow up our planet in a war. New ways must therefore be sought to supersede maximum deterrence. To avoid any misunderstanding: deterrence is still today the decisive factor in ensuring peace in Europe and between the two world powers. It has meant — for the first time in human history — that war has been ruled out as a means of pursuing policy. This *pax atomica* has, it is true, not created an ideal peace but it has created a zone of peace in America, Europe and the Soviet Union which has enjoyed greater prosperity than other regions of the globe. Thanks to this change in the thinking of politicians, diplomats and soldiers, Europe has been preserved from war, and that is the positive side of the deterrence policy. It is something to be valued highly.

Now Gorbachev and Reagan have indicated in Geneva that they want to reduce their nuclear potential. Encouraging though this may be, we Europeans do not need to be grateful to the superpowers, since it is nothing more than the final redeeming of an obligation existing under the Non-proliferation Treaty. The European signatories of this Treaty have respected it, but the two world powers have not. If they were really to reduce their nuclear arsenals, then they would be doing no more than what they have for a long time been obliged to do.

Of course, the negotiations on arms control undertaken so far do not provide grounds for any great hopes. Naturally the nuclear potential could be reduced by half on both sides and the policy of mutually assured destruction would remain intact. And yet it is perhaps in the essence of this policy that neither side will trust the other to exercise restraint. It was this factor which led in the first place to the quantitative and then to a qualitative nuclear arms race.

*Conventional weapons:* This dialectic too is a familiar one: the West has matched Soviet superiority with higher quality. Policy on conventional armaments has followed a straightforward series: 'Mark 1' is succeeded by an improved 'Mark 2', and after this there comes in turn an even more perfect 'Mark 3'. This was and is the rather unimaginative plan for arma-

ments on which the military and industrial lobbies have always been able to agree. Too much importance was placed on weapon systems suitable for an attack or a counter-attack, both in the East and in the West. This had nothing to do with governments' willingness to mount an attack, but with habitual ways of thinking. In earlier times wars were waged out of a thirst for glory or greed for land and always in the expectation that one's own position would be improved after the war. For this weapons were needed which were suitable for attack. Now these factors no longer hold true in Europe. And yet the conventional arms planners still carry this baggage from the past around with them. Nevertheless, the war in Europe foretold by the prophets of doom has not yet broken out. Conventional weapons have become elements of deterrence without, it is true, being designed with this, their true task in view.

*Prospects for European security:* Our European security too will be decided by what Reagan and Gorbachev can make out of their Geneva Summit. Are they strong enough to hold the desired course in the face of their power establishments? Probably this will be an especially difficult task for Gorbachev since he has to overcome opposition from many quarters at home, alter established military doctrines and stimulate new political thinking.

By comparison the US President has an easier job. He too is attempting to break through established modes of thinking. Through his SDI defence initiative he is having research undertaken into new possibilities for security. Should they be feasible, they will have a profound effect on European security. It is difficult to imagine that, if the superpowers were to give up the strategy of deterrence they have followed so far, Europe would cling to its own. It is generally known that Reagan hopes that it will be possible firstly to reduce the offensive danger of nuclear missiles by technological means, secondly, then to reduce the number of these 'sword' weapons drastically, thirdly to share the results of SDI research with the Soviets, fourthly to gradually transform the policy of 'mutually assured destruction' into one of 'mutually assured security'.

The Soviets immediately rejected this idea, even though before concluding the ABM Treaty they had been thinking along the same lines. Thus on this point the Soviets and Americans had exchanged places. This is however far from being the last word: either in Moscow or Washington. In Geneva Soviet representatives insisted the SDI would not work. Why then should it be dangerous? And why are the Soviets maintaining — in

complete conformity with the Treaty — a missile defence system around Moscow at great expense? Moscow will not be protected against American long-range missiles by a Potemkin defence system! Furthermore it ought to be amusing for the Soviet Government to see America spending so much money on so much useless stuff like SDI. No, none of this could be the reason for their rejection. Not even the charge that SDI would lead to a new arms race since the old one is still in full swing without any end being at present in sight. One might rather suspect that the Soviets do not want to grant their American rivals something they already possess themselves and can research into further. This is not forbidden in politics. It is rather one of the finest diplomatic victories successfully to dissuade the other party from something which one intends to have oneself.

The European reaction was not any less sceptical even if it was not so blunt as the Soviet rejection. There was a reversal of ideas in Europe too: those who had previously decried the policy of mutually assured destruction now wanted to have it retained. A missile defence system could not work 100%, it was said. But that had never been suggested by SDI apologists. They wanted rather to find out how high the percentage of interceptible missiles had to be in order to make it financially impossible for an opponent to build up an offensive missile ability against it. The objective of the research work is to make defence systems cheaper in price than offensive missiles can be. So far nobody knows whether this will succeed and whether a policy of mutually assured destruction could in fact be replaced by a better policy equally able to maintain the peace.

It is highly probable that the results yielded by American research will have a considerable bearing on Europe's defence capability. But the nature of this defence is something we Europeans must decide on for ourselves. We are under threat from quite different weapons than the North Americans. Only the overseas troops are in the same boat as ourselves as far as this threat is concerned. What concerns all of us in the first place are the weapons which are particularly suited for an offensive in Europe such as tanks, combat aircraft, submarines and missiles up to intermediate range.

Instead of moaning about American SDI, it would be more sensible for us to begin research in good time which could lead to a Euro-American SDI. We must technologically strengthen the defence against those weapons which could support an offensive in such a way that we too

could move over from a policy of deterrence to one of restraint as soon as this process has begun within the two world powers. In other words, defence must be turned technologically into the stronger form of combat, in such a convincing way that it will make any attack in Europe seem senseless. This armament process would have to be introduced on both sides — in West and East. Then the relationship between weapons suited principally for defence and those suited principally for attack would take on a new decisive importance — and would be brought into the negotiations on arms control. It would be important that — as in America — the European defence system should also become cheaper than offensive weapons. In such a case, those who armed themselves for offensive purposes would be mis-arming themselves in political, military and economic terms.

What matters therefore is to adapt Reagan's basic idea for use in Europe. The American President has formulated a sensational new approach in this connection: to share his research results with the Soviets in such a way that neither side should fall into a position of weakness during the conversion process. In Europe this idea is usually not discussed or not taken seriously. Of course it would be wrong to conceive of a European SDI in contrast to the American defence initiative. There should rather be Euro-American cooperation at this stage on devising and developing the concept. Otherwise the cohesion of the alliance could suffer. The European section of this scheme would probably be technically easier to set up than the complicated American section. The technological progress which has been made in the last 10 years in sensors, computers, lasers and other developments would enable the European section to get going relatively quickly. It is true it would require political courage and energy to pursue such a programme in a consistent manner. The military and industrial lobbies would have to be resisted, as would the pressure for awarding arms contracts in accordance with constituency interests.

President Reagan has given evidence that he has this courage, in his dealings with the Soviet General Secretary as elsewhere. That Gorbachev did not insist in Geneva that SDI should be abolished before there could be any further talks, shows political sense. Apparently he has a better understanding of the American vision than the Soviet propagandists who were still talking in Geneva in the same old tone. He also knows of course what a great research effort is going on in his own country to enable a Soviet SDI to be produced.

No one can seriously be against the idea that one day in Europe, instead of two drawn swords facing one another, there should be two shields, so toughened as to allow the swords to be drastically reduced in size and remain sheathed.

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### Answers to questions by various Members

It was impossible to distinguish between military and civilian objectives within the problems of SDI. Asked how the Europeans could play an active part, he believed that strong defences should be built up against Russian superiority in tanks and their submarines. He assumed that it would take between 10 and 20 years to change the strategy, and again stressed the need to retain the old strategy in the meantime. Otherwise, and not because of the SDI, destabilization would occur. SDI and deterrence both continued inherent contradictions. To a question on President Reagan's U-turn on sharing research results (COCOM list), he pointed out that the Russians' pride would probably prevent them from accepting such an offer anyway.

Turning to the offensive policy pursued by Admiral Gorschkow and the Russian navy, General Schmückle believed he had detected more defensive tendencies in his successor Admiral Chernassin.

The different tasks assigned under a Euro-American SDI would logically follow from the different sources of concern to Americans and Europeans (for the Federal Republic of Germany the main perceived threat would be from Russian tank superiority, while for Norway it would be Russian maritime superiority). He repeated that it would be easier for the Europeans to work on the SS 20s which in fact were threatening them.

By contrast with the past, today a genuine policy of balance could be pursued. Disruption of what he regarded as the best system in international politics would trigger war which, in its present form, even if 'only' conventional weapons were used, would mean the end of everything.

Initially the policy of deterrence would continue, and he too felt that a permanent dialogue was necessary to establish a balance between East and West, but failure of the policy also had to be considered. The necessary basis of security could never be abandoned. Defence as General Schmückle envisaged it would be much cheaper. If the Russians did not accept the invitation 'to visit the laboratory' they could be expected to copy the West, which would amount to the same thing.

# Statement by Mr Frank Blackaby

Director of SIPRI

(International Peace Research Institute), Stockholm

This is a short presentation on a very large subject. So I have tried to pick out one main point which is, in my view, the central point to make about European security. The main question I wish to ask, and try to answer, is this: what would a more secure Europe look like? That is, I assume, a common objective. Then, having tried to answer that question, I want to consider various ways in which we might move towards that desired goal.

What would a more secure Europe look like? The term 'security' is a broad one — perhaps too broad for our purposes. I assume the concern is not with internal security issues, but simply with international security — that is security from aggression by another nation. A more secure Europe, I suggest, can be defined fairly simply. It is one in which, in all countries in Europe, the use of armed force is no longer on the agenda of possible action for settling international disputes. It would be a Europe in which, when disputes occur (as of course they inevitably will) it never occurs to political leaders in any country to summon the chiefs of staff to Cabinet meetings. The use of armed force is off the agenda of political action.

I don't think this is a particularly Utopian picture. It is, after all, already the case between many individual pairs of States in Europe or indeed between groups of States. There have been, and will undoubtedly continue to be, disputes between Sweden and Denmark, or Sweden and Norway. There have been, and no doubt will continue to be, disputes between France and West Germany. There is an obvious and continuous cause of dispute between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Yet in all these cases it is, I suggest, now unthinkable that any of these States would consider the use of armed force as a way of dealing with these disputes. It is not on the agenda of political action. A more secure Europe, therefore, would be one in which practices already observed between a number of pairs of States, or individual groups of States, are generalized to Europe as a whole.

It is worth noting what is needed — and more particularly what is not needed — for the development of oases of security of this kind. One thing that is not needed is a military balance. There is no military balance between Sweden and Norway. There is certainly no military balance between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Nor is there any need for some change in national character. What is needed is a phenomenon which I think is best described by the phrase ‘the de-militarization of political relations’.

What does that mean? It means that military considerations cease to play a role in the relations between those countries. Comparisons of forces are just not relevant: in any discussions or negotiations between the countries, nobody refers to them. When Mrs Thatcher and Mr Fitzgerald were discussing what to do about Northern Ireland, Britain’s total military superiority had nothing to do with the case. Nobody looked up details of military deployment in the Military Balance. Between these two countries, that is, political relations have been demilitarized. The relative size of military forces ceases to be a factor of any importance.

The problem of European security, I suggest, can be defined as the problem of generalizing the ‘demilitarization of international political relations’ — and in particular, of course, extending it to the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe.

Here, there is a long way to go. Europe is in a curious position, security-wise. There are standing armies of unprecedented peace-time size on either side of the dividing line in Europe. There is great military activity, new weapons, new deployments, new strategies. On both sides, in their manoeuvres the armies vigorously prepare for war. Any visitor from another planet, viewing this scene, would conclude that there must be unresolved issues of immense importance between the parties on either side of that central division.

Yet, of course, that is not the case. There is no major European political issue now between the two sides. For 20 years, there has been nothing which could have been a *casus belli*. There is no evidence that any nation has any intention of attempting to change the borders between the two sides by the use of armed force. In this respect, there is absolutely no comparison between Europe in 1985 and Europe in 1935. There is thus a major discrepancy between the military situation in Europe, and the political situation. The position is well encapsulated in the famous words of Professor Michael Howard, when he was confronted with various

scenarios of the possible course of war in Europe; he asked 'What is this war supposed to be about?'

This view, that neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO are likely to resort to the use of armed force, is widely held also by military experts. So the proponents of continued assiduous attention to military deployments fall back on a second line of defence. This is that a country gains great political advantages from some form of military superiority, even if it has no intention of using it. We hear a great deal about the political uses of military power.

This is, I suggest, one of the great unexamined clichés of our time. Military force is a factor in political affairs if the country possessing it is prepared either to use it, or to threaten to use it in such a way that it is believed. Otherwise, it is not a factor at all. For it to be a factor, there has to be some explicit or implicit reference to the possibility of it being used. If there is no such reference, then it does not matter. Britain and France are both nuclear-weapon powers. Has this in any way enabled them to do better than they otherwise would have done in the various negotiations with their partners in the European Economic Community? Not at all.

This belief that military expenditure and military deployments can be used, in some vague and unspecified way, for political ends, has most unfortunate consequences. It leads to a development which is the exact opposite of the one required for a secure Europe — it leads to the militarization of international political relations. It leads to military deployments which have no conceivable military purpose. It also leads to an excessive concentration on military competition. The long-term consequence of developments in that direction is that the use of military force gets put back on the agenda of possible action as a way of settling disputes. If countries invest enormous sums in their military sector, and bring the military into the central process of decision-making about international relations, then sooner or later they will look for a return on their investment. The militarization of international political relations leads in the long run to the suggestion of military solutions to international political disputes.

To sum up so far, we observed that in those groups of countries, or pairs of countries, where the possibility of the use of armed force is off the agenda for political action (a good definition of security), in those countries political relations can be said to be 'demilitarized'. That is, the

relative state of the armed forces in those countries is considered as irrelevant to any political matters under discussion between them. That is the state of affairs which we need to generalize in Europe. I have three comments about the way in which it might be done.

First, there is need for a much broader and better understanding of the nature of international security. Many politicians, and many members of the public, still have a very primitive picture in their minds. That picture goes something like this. There are bad countries which possess military power. They will conquer the good countries (ourselves, of course) unless we stop them by spending as much on the military as they do. So long as we do that, the bad countries will be stopped, and all will be well. We will be secure. I imagine I do not need on this occasion to stress the inadequacy of that primitive picture. Security is not a function of military spending. Indeed most decisions to change military structure, strategies, or weapons deployment — decisions which Ministries of Defence and Chiefs-of-Staff are making all the time, because they have nothing else to do — these decisions serve to increase security by their action-reaction consequences. Military expenditure and security are inversely correlated — as the first goes up, the second goes down. The idea that military expenditure buys security dies hard: but if we are to make any progress in Europe, it is an idea which has to die.

Secondly, there is a whole array of specific measures which can help in the direction of the demilitarization of international political relations in nations in Europe. Any measure which reduces vulnerability, or reduces the threat of surprise attack, or any measure which reduces the perception of threat, works in the right direction. Any and every limit or constraint on the military sector is an advantage. Further, any move in this direction, however small, may make further moves possible; it sets in motion a process leading towards the necessary down-grading of the importance of military deployments.

At the Stockholm Conference, it is now reasonable to hope for an agreement — but a very modest agreement. There will be some more notification of manoeuvres and movements, and some more observation; and in exchange, as it were, there will be a declaration in some form on the non-use of force. It is just possible there may be a constraint on the total size of manoeuvres, though that is uncertain. The problem now is to think what might be the next appropriate step in Europe. At least we have a large inventory of suggestions — nuclear weapon-free zones or cor-

ridors, chemical weapon-free zones, examinations of the possibilities of military deployments that are more obviously defensive, and so on.

Perhaps one of the main needs is to build up stronger interest groups who are concerned with arms control issues in Europe as a whole. Up to now the movements in Europe have been preoccupied with nuclear weapon issues; it is difficult to get broad general interest in questions such as measures to reduce the possibilities of surprise attack. There is also a need to build up the interest groups concerned with arms control in the national bureaucracies themselves. In most countries in Europe there are enormous departments concerned with the process of adding to the stock of weapons, devising the new European fighter and so on. (The new European fighter is a good example of the mindless preoccupation with military hardware — the automatic assumption that new models must go on replacing old for ever and always.) We find on the other side of the fence just a small handful of functionaries in foreign offices faced with the problem of thinking about constraints. The interest groups concerned with new weapons developments are strong and powerful, and in order to make any progress in arms control in Europe some forms for countervailing power have to be found.

The third comment I have is this. If Europe — that is the area from the Atlantic coast to the Polish border with the Soviet Union — were a self-contained entity, it might not be all that difficult to establish a secure Europe — defining security in the way this paper has done. There is not much bellicism in Europe now, to borrow Professor Michael Howard's coinage: that is, those small groups which want to produce border changes in Europe have little support in the general population, whose main concern is to live a quiet life. However, Europe is not a self-contained entity: there is substantial foreign military presence on both sides of the dividing line. So we are faced with the question — how far is it possible to make moves towards a more secure Europe if the Soviet Union and the United States are engaged in a global confrontation?

On this most difficult issue, total European passivity is inappropriate. Obviously the global confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union limits the freedom of manoeuvre of European States — much more so for Warsaw Pact countries than for European NATO countries. However, some freedom of manoeuvre remains, and it should be exploited and extended. There can be no security in Europe with these vast standing armies on either side of the dividing line. Security in Europe will come, if it ever comes, when military deployments play no

significant role in the pattern of relations between countries in Western und Eastern Europe. That must be the objective for those with the proper understanding of the nature of security.

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Questions were put by Mr CiccioMessere (Non-attached, Italy) Mr Boesmans (Soc., Belgium), Mr Pelikan (Soc., Italy), Mr Plaskovitis (Soc., Greece), Mr Segre (Com., Italy), Mr Blumenfeld (EPP, FRG), Mr Hutton (ED, UK), Mr Newens (Soc, UK), Mr Tzounis (EPP, Greece), Mr Wedekind (EPP, FRG), Mr Romualdi (ER, Italy) and Mrs Piermont (Arc, FRG).

Mr Blackaby replied on the general issue of security that ideologically homogeneous States were not necessarily essential for the demilitarization of international relations, that in fact heterogeneity had to be accepted, and that it would be this acceptance that would lead to liberalization in Eastern Europe. Moreover the USSR was not an expansive but a status quo power in Europe. European security could be strengthened by more economic ties and improved bilateral ties such as those now being fostered between the two Germanies. It would not be strengthened if Europe was dragged into 'out-of-area' disputes between the super-powers.

On the Stockhom Conference, Mr Blackaby noted that the relationship between confidence-building and demilitarization was a two-way one. He argued that agreements tended to follow other agreements as they had done in the 1970s, but conceded that nothing had come from the unilateral Western chemical weapon disarmament. He confirmed that any declaration on no use of force would apply within the military pacts as well as between them. However, the question of nuclear-free zones was not on the Stockholm agenda because a consensus for it was lacking. The Ten had tended not to take collective action.

# Statement by Colonel Jonathan Alford

Deputy Director, IISS

(International Institute for Strategic Studies), London

I have been asked to direct my remarks to 'the general situation in Europe with regard to deployment and balance of military forces'. *Deployment* is not difficult, if by that we mean who has got what and where. I trust we do have a fairly clear idea about the numbers in Europe of men, weapons, formations, ships and aircraft. It is not easy now to keep these things hidden. In the Military Balance each year my institute provides, as accurately as we know how, a version of the military catalogue. Others do the same and none of us are offering widely different accounts of the numbers.

On the other hand 'the general situation — with regard to — balance', sets a task which I regard as impossible. We can — and do — compare total numbers of things on the NATO side with the total of like things in the Warsaw Pact. If that were the 'balance', well and good. In a purely mechanistic sense, I can tell you that, if you care to add together all NATO's tanks and measure them against all the Warsaw Pact's tanks, you will find an adverse ratio of 1:2.59. That statement certainly conceals much more than it reveals — and the things that it conceals could, if they could be evaluated, tell you at least as much (and probably more) about capability as raw numbers. Even a preliminary list of things contributing to the total capability of any tank force would have to include training, ammunition stock levels, age, performance, maintenance condition and repair facilities, morale and motivation. Moreover, even if you could find a way — which you cannot — of qualifying tank numbers by taking each of these factors into account, it would still not tell you much of what you want to know because war is most unlikely to consist of a duel between tanks. So I am going to tell you that I do not know what the military balance *is*. It is best that you should realize that there is no way known to man of scoring total military capabilities in such a way as to provide a convincing account of the state of the military balance between East and West. There are some ways of achieving a closer approximation than raw numbers but none are sufficiently refined to be at all useful in a predictive sense.

I must tell you also that I do not know what the balance *ought* to be for stability. I simply do not know what figures calculated in what way would be reassuring or encouraging and what would be alarming to either side. What I am quite certain of is that what may well serve to deter may not be enough to win if deterrence fails. What deters is a particular view of the state of the military equation heavily qualified by politics and a sense of larger risks and opportunities. Thus I would certainly assume that perceptions of the state of the military balance is but one factor among many in contributing to stability in Europe. But if that stability (for whatever reason) breaks down, NATO might have to be a lot stronger than is needed to deter if it is to deny the Warsaw Pact any significant military gains.

I will assume that NATO does now possess adequate military capability for the less demanding purposes of deterrence. But deterrence may (for whatever reason and in whatever manner) fail and NATO has to address itself to the more demanding requirements of defence. This permits me to move forward onto the rather more solid ground of options and vulnerabilities and to worry less about national balances. We can say with a degree of confidence what could cause one side in war to lose. It will lose if it runs out of ammunition before the other side. It will lose if it cannot keep its air force in the air and operating through the closure or degradation of its bases. It will lose if the number and quality of its reserve forces and the rate of incorporation of these reserves into its forces are significantly less than on the other side. It will lose if it cannot maintain the integrity of its command structure and essential communications. Any alliance may well lose if its political cohesion evaporates under the stress of crisis. *This* alliance is likely to lose if it cannot defend certain key strategic areas: northern Norway, the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, the Dardanelles, the disembarkation ports. *This* alliance is likely to lose if it loses its eyes and ears. *This* alliance is likely to lose if it cannot generally shield its mobilization and reinforcement with standing forces, naval forces and airpower.

Are there *significant* asymmetries that we ought to worry about? If there are, this should suggest some priorities for the allocation of scarce resources.

NATO is now paying much more attention to stocks of all kinds and it must continue to do so if it wishes to retain the option of fighting a longer war. There is not much that one can say with certainty about war which is, as Voltaire noted 'like medicine; murderous and conjectural',

but one can say that you can fight no longer if the guns fall silent for lack of ammunition. Calculations about the rate at which ammunition would be expended in war are hard to make but we have at least a series of historical judgments to call upon which indicate that things always get used up faster than people anticipate. It is best to err on the conservative side in deciding how much ammunition and how many spares are 'enough'. These things are costly and it is tempting to skimp. Please don't.

NATO is sensibly anxious about the protection of its (too few) main air-force operating bases. I would certainly put more money into airfield defence and I am prepared to listen very carefully to those who argue that part of this protection comes from an ability to put enemy airbases out of action and to keep them out in order to reduce the number of sorties that an enemy can mount to manageable proportions — manageable, that is, by air defences. But I suggested that we ought now also to be thinking about the non-nuclear missile threat to airbases (which pushes one in the direction of ATBM defences) and the chemical threat which, in my experience, politicians prefer to ignore. Again I shall do no more than state that he who loses his airpower will probably lose the war.

I do not think that NATO is taking its reserve structures seriously enough nor is it prepared to take steps to utilize effectively the very large reserve potential that exists. Reserves are a relatively inexpensive form of combat power and they are likely to be relatively more effective in defence than in attack. And they are an important component in the balance, whatever the balance is. There will be casualties in the standing forces and casualties must be replaced. Most countries rely to a critical degree on reservists for many vital logistic functions. And reservists can quite simply provide a framework of territorial defence. Yet I am often distressed to find that many countries underfund their reserve structures, do not allocate enough money for their training and simple equipment, do not meet their own stated obligations. Mobilization exercises in NATO countries are rare indeed. Reserves may not do all that much for deterrence; I suggest that they can do a great deal for defence. While stocks of munitions and air defences do now seem to be getting a reasonable priority in NATO, I sense that reserves still are not.

This leads to the North Atlantic. Given that NATO could win a short war but lose a longer one, reinforcements from the Continental United States become important for it is in that time frame that they begin to be significant. Clearly the ability to fly in the men of divisions based in the

USA to link up with equipment stockpiled in Europe is a most welcome reinforcing option but after that the Atlantic bridge takes over for the bulk of the transfer and it seems to me essential that NATO can beat back or contain the Soviet submarine threat. It is here that the defence of northern Norway assumes what I regard as a critical importance. If the airfields of northern Norway were to fall into Soviet hands, not only would defence of Soviet interests in the far North be greatly simplified but the offensive threat to NATO's maritime interests and to the United Kingdom — as a vital link in the reinforcing chain — would greatly increase. The struggle to control the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap would, under such circumstances, be very much more difficult for NATO. This is not to deny that the Central Front is the most important region for the West. Lose there and not much else matters. But hold there initially and losses elsewhere would begin to bear very heavily in NATO's ability to hold the centre in the longer run. That is why the flanks matter strategically and militarily if they did not also matter politically. NATO cannot as an alliance be selective about what countries matter.

In a short introductory statement there is much that I have not said. Unexpectedly, perhaps, I have not spoken about technology nor about money. That is because I assume that new technology will be abundant and money short. It is not to suggest that NATO can afford to ignore technological developments. It never has; it will not now. But put the two together and NATO, it seems to me, will not be able to afford an accelerated replacement programme which incorporates anything like all the technology that can be made available. Nor should we believe that technology can solve security dilemmas. It can only help to solve some of them. I must say also that I remain very sceptical about some of the new technological ideas in vogue at the moment. What the public (and, it must be said, many politicians) tend all too often to forget is that we have a stock of equipment which we cannot afford to change anything like as rapidly as technology is changing.

We can only afford to change about 5% of it each year, assuming at least a 20-year operational life for the equipment that we buy. Thus we are condemned to permanent obsolescence. I think that what this means is that we are bound from now on to see evolutionary and not revolutionary changes in weapon systems.

To be frank, I cannot give the answer that most are seeking. I cannot tell you with any precision where we are today; nor can I tell you where we

ought to be. My not very helpful judgment is that NATO might hold the Warsaw Pact for a time if everything went right for NATO and some of the things which could so easily go wrong for the Warsaw Pact were to go wrong for them. Evidently NATO could lose rather quickly if a number of things went wrong for them and most things went right for the Warsaw Pact. It is in that zone of uncertainty in which we seem to reside and I doubt if we shall ever be able to move through this zone to the sunlit uplands of unqualified security and complete confidence in NATO's defensive capability. But equally I do not see why NATO need slip into a slough of despond, for the conquest of Europe is unlikely to seem easy to the leaders of the Warsaw Pact. Nor can they ever afford to discount the real risks of any major war escaping control. What I have suggested here is that the Alliance ought not to find it difficult to do what it is necessary to do to close off most of the most dangerous Soviet options in war and to reduce its obvious vulnerabilities by prudent attention and investment in sensible things.

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Responding to questions by Mr Hutton (ED, UK), Mr Mallet (EPP, France) and Mr Normanton (ED, UK), Colonel Alford stated, in regard to *reserve forces*, that they offered a nation the means of rapidly increasing its military power without maintaining large armed forces in time of peace. Whereas UK reserve forces could quickly reinforce the British Rhine Army, NATO's continental States could incorporate their reserves, based on conscription, into their territorial structure. On the other hand, reserve manpower could only be used effectively within three years of full-time service.

On *chemical warfare*, Colonel Alford believed that it was necessary to try effectively to ban chemical weapons, to secure which both verification and on-site inspection were essential. The existence of stocks of chemical weapons on both sides in Europe in World War II had acted as an effective deterrent. The performance of an airbase could be degraded up to 85% by use of chemical weapons, which thus rendered adequate deterrence essential in his view. Binary chemical weapons were preferable as a deterrent.

Replying on *NATO finances*, Colonel Alford explained that the 1978 NATO target of 3% of the GNP of each State had set a standard to which to aspire. Since 1979 the average had been 2.4% in all NATO countries, but it would be less in the next seven years, especially in the UK. Also the US Congress would only

permit an increase of defence expenditure less than the rate of inflation. But although there would thus be less real money available for NATO funding, the existing funds were being used more efficiently.

Answering a question on NATO's *southern flank* Colonel Alford said that because it was very much separated from the central sector and northern flank, coherent defence of the southern flank was difficult. The key to command of the Mediterranean area was land-based air power; Greece and Turkey required assistance from the Twelve for the modernization of their forces.

Turning to NATO *preparedness*, it was Colonel Alford's view that, although some countries were not even making a minimal contribution, the military side were more serious about working together, and in the coming seven years of restricted funds for NATO, would move towards joint procurement in order to maintain adequate forces.

Colonel Alford then replied to questions posed by Mr Tzounis (EPP, Greece), Mr Newens (Soc., UK), Mr Bernard-Reymond (EPP, France), Mrs Piermont (ARC, FRG) and Mrs Charzat (Soc., France). As regards *verification of chemical weapons*, he was 'moderately optimistic' that this could be achieved with a reasonable chance of being observed.

Turning to *defence and deterrence*, Colonel Alford expressed the view that, because a nuclear war was impossible to fight, it was important to deter an enemy who might decide to attack with conventional weapons.

The effectiveness of deterrence might be broken down in a crisis or by accident. It was essential to be able to defend the West without resort to nuclear weapons and unthinkable that the West would use the latter if defeated in a conventional war.

As regards *chemical weapons*, Colonel Alford held the view that their use should be deterred by stocking chemical weapons. The European allies of the USA must be consulted and must agree before binary chemical weapons could be used. Some consultation had taken place at official level before authorization had been given for the production of binary weapons in the USA. Production of these would take 3-4 years and they would be stored in the USA.

In reply to questions about the application to deterrence of *high technology*, Colonel Alford said that he was very sceptical about Star Wars I and fairly sceptical about Star Wars II, as the technology would not be available at affordable cost and as it could be countered. For example, sensor technology could be relatively easily overcome as, if one small link was broken, its efficacy would be removed.

In general, every NATO State must do enough to retain the goodwill of others, e.g. Denmark must provide air defence of its airfields. The more Western European countries joined NATO, the easier it would be to solve political problems.

# Statement by Mr Pierre Lellouche

Deputy Director of IFRI

(French Institute for International Relations), Paris

Thank you, Mr Chairman. It is a pleasure and an honour to have this opportunity of addressing you, ladies and gentlemen, but before I start, may I by way of introduction draw your attention to the fact that I do not represent official circles in France, that I am deputy director of a private research institute, which obviously has close links with those who are responsible for French policy, both in the majority and the opposition, but that our studies are independent ones. You must not be surprised therefore, if the reflections which you will hear do not follow the line normally taken by French official circles. This will also explain why I am more free in my criticism of certain people who are not French, but who are our European partners, as well as certain lines of thought on questions of European defence.

I should like to go on to deal with three points: firstly to set out France's role and strategy in European security; then to show how, in my view, that strategy and that doctrine are increasingly out of line with the geo-strategic situation in which we live — I think that we must move towards increased *rapprochement* between France and her European allies, and also between the European allies and France, as I shall explain later; and finally, I shall deal with possible ways of trying to resolve the new political, technological and strategic problems which have arisen in connection with European security.

First a review of French policy and thinking.

Quite simply, France's defence policy is based on two ideas, independence and solidarity. Independence, in that France's defence doctrine is based on nuclear weapons and early deterrence on a massive scale. One could say that it is the purest form of deterrence, because France says, 'We are not going to fight, we are not going into battle, we are going to escalate the situation immediately by a passive strike against the population'. A defence policy like this obviously implies that the decision to fire nuclear weapons is a purely national one. Hence the idea of France's independence in taking decisions which have to do with matters

of defence policy. It was this concept of independence, which, combined with the logical decision to acquire a nuclear force in 1960, led General de Gaulle, six years later, to withdraw French forces from the Alliance, and therefore from Saceur's command, and to place them under genuinely French control, but subject to the second idea, that of solidarity. Certainly France recognizes that she is part of the Alliance: she did not leave the Alliance in 1966, she continued to be a member of the political organizations, she says that France's security is still bound to that of her allies, and particularly that of Germany. For that purpose a number of cooperation agreements were signed at military level, the agreements in 1967. The French forces in Germany remain in Germany — you know that we have 50 000 men stationed in Federal Germany — but within the framework of a Franco-German agreement. And finally, in the event of a crisis the French Government may or may not decide to place French forces under the command of the allied commander, i. e. Saceur, in which case the French forces would act as the Alliance's reserve in times of crisis.

Those are the dispositions, if you like, as they were made in the 1960s and as they are today, 20 years later. There are obvious advantages from the French point of view. Firstly it provides political independence *vis-à-vis* the United States, as well as offering the possibility of independent policies at East-West level *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. Then, at military level, it provides a basic insurance should the United States decide against nuclear escalation, which, as we shall see shortly, has in fact happened with the passage of time. And finally, there is also a domestic advantage, in that the creation of a purely national defence policy with its appeal to public opinion has, after 20 years, resulted in a very strong consensus on defence policy in France, and a kind of resistance, what one might call immunity, to the pacifist phenomenon which has appeared in some of our neighbours, including those on the other side of the Atlantic in the United States.

It also has obvious disadvantages. First of all within the Alliance, since, clearly, it does pose a continuing problem with our neighbours, especially with Federal Germany, which in turn helps those people, particularly in Germany, who do not believe in French support, and say so openly.

The problem is further complicated by the role of tactical nuclear weapons, especially plutonium ones, which have the rather embarrassing characteristic of landing on the soil of the German Federal Republic, our

principal ally and our principal political and economic partner. It is therefore difficult to assert that we are making a contribution to Germany's security, when we have arms which are capable of destroying the Germans. Which people like Egon Bahr use as an argument for saying that in a crisis Germany would be destroyed twice over, first by the Russians, and then by the French. Which is obviously — I shall come back to the Americans in one moment, Madam — problematical.

On the military side, I believe that this situation, this doctrine, also poses a problem in that we do in fact have in Europe two very different doctrines existing side by side.

The doctrine of the Alliance is one of combat; the entire doctrine of the flexible response, which was adopted by the Atlantic Alliance in 1967, is a doctrine which accepts the idea of a relatively prolonged conventional conflict, with the possibility of nuclear escalation, which Colonel Alford, Mr Abshire and probably all NATO circles, agree should be deferred for as long as possible.

Whereas the French doctrine is the opposite. The French doctrine, I repeat, rejects combat. Mr Hernu has said so very clearly, and his predecessors as well. There is no question of France's fighting at the traditional level, and therefore if there were a battle in Europe the role of the French forces would merely be to act as a signal, if you like, a final warning signal to the Soviets before the nuclear strike.

Which produces another military problem. We are asking the first French army, which is deployed on both sides of the Rhine, to play a dual role with a double function, i. e. to act as a reserve within the Alliance, which is what we say as well, but also to act as a test force ahead of the nuclear strike. It is very difficult to do the two things simultaneously, because if the French forces are in fact to act as a reserve within the Alliance, they must have advanced conventional equipment at least equivalent to that of the Bundeswehr and a *modus operandi* similar to that of the Bundeswehr, and there must be very close cooperation with the forces of the Alliance from the start if this combat reserve is to be possible. But that does not apply to the French forces, whose role, I repeat, is essentially to act as a signal before the nuclear escalation is launched. The trouble with this policy, in addition to the difficulties I have just mentioned, and this is the point about this doctrine which I criticized at length in a recent work is the fact that this doctrine, this defence policy, goes back some 25 years. It is a political doctrine which was

conceived at the end of the 1950s, beginning of the 1960s, in a strategic and technological environment radically different from that in which we are living today.

In fact, the idea of the national sanctuary, of nuclear protection for France with the weak deterring the strong from making a massive response, is thinkable only in a world in which nuclear arms on both sides are very inaccurate, rudimentary even, and where the only possible targets are cities. When the Soviets' only possible targets in France were the large conurbations, France's threat to erase Moscow or Leningrad from the map was, to my mind, credible.

But as soon as the Soviets were equipped with more options for selective nuclear strikes, and tomorrow's non-nuclear chemical and conventional weapons, with extremely accurate, fast ballistic missiles, then one has to ask how far in times of crisis the President of the French Republic would be pushed into a situation of doubt which would ruin the efficiency of the system.

The system is also based on the axiom that our relations with Germany, France's principal economic partner, would remain stable and secure in the context of an American anti-nuclear war within the framework of NATO, because, despite what Colonel Alford said just now, NATO seeks to shelter under the nuclear umbrella, i. e. the American nuclear umbrella.

Unfortunately, however, the trend in the balance of power and the trend of the technological situation in Europe have tended to be, and this is something which I must emphasize, to weaken the American nuclear, American anti-nuclear, umbrella for Germany and Europe, thereby creating a strategic situation which, to my mind, reverses the status quo in Europe and the facts of French defence policy.

Very quickly, this is my second point, what are the new factors in the strategic situation in Europe? At the moment there are three trends: firstly, a trend towards a balance of forces; then the trend of public opinion in the West, faced with the nuclear deterrent; lastly, the trend of nuclear technology towards a diminution of the role of nuclear weapons. These three currents are combining to call in question the strategy of nuclear weapons as the fundamental pivot of the security system in Europe.

I shall pass over the question of the balance of forces quickly and say simply that the problem of the credibility of nuclear weapons for the defence of Europe has been around since the 1950s, or since the point at which the United States became vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear strike against its own territory. It is therefore an old problem. In the 30 years since then the problem has only worsened in fact, in so far as we have tried, within the context of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance, to offset the Soviet Union's local superiority in conventional arms by means of local, regional, nuclear arms in Europe and the American strategic nuclear weapons.

Over the years this doctrine of the flexible response, which was based on the United States' control of escalation, has gradually been vitiated as the Soviet Union has achieved strategic parity with the United States, meaning *de facto* neutralization of the American strategic nuclear capability to defend anything but the United States itself, and as the Soviet Union has added to its conventional superiority in Europe a nuclear superiority which increasingly threatens to provide a counter-offensive capability, with the result that the control of escalation has switched camps.

It is no longer the Americans who have control over the first use of atomic weapons, the control has gone over to the Soviet side, and we are now, today, living in the situation where NATO has never been so dependent on American nuclear weapons, and where the first use of American atomic weapons in Europe's defence has never been so lacking in credibility, and so complex. May I cite as evidence the discovery by all the strategic and political circles in America that it has become far too dangerous for the United States to use nuclear weapons for the defence of Europe at an early stage of the conflict. Henry Kissinger, in 1979, followed by Liberals like McNamara, and members of the Reagan administration like Freddy Clay, Mr Weinberger's deputy, all say the same thing, in association with the American bishops, the American pacifists and the European pacifists. What do they say? That NATO can no longer rely on the first use of American nuclear weapons in the event of a crisis, and that in any case there should be a movement at least towards 'no early use', towards the latest possible use of nuclear weapons, and better still, towards 'no use at all'. The best thing would be to use conventional American weapons as a deterrent to Soviet conventional weapons, and when I listened to my colleague, Colonel Alford, say here this morning that nuclear arms are a deterrent only to nuclear arms, and that

Europe must equip itself with conventional means of defence, he was only voicing what has become the new philosophy of the Atlantic Alliance, and what is for me a major revolution, because it means that the nuclear cornerstone of the Alliance is gradually being removed.

The second trend which is being added to this is the attitude of the European and the American public to the nuclear problem. There is not time to go into this here, but we can return to it during question time — it is a phenomenon which my institute has studied at length, and it is very interesting that Western opinion, particularly in Europe, is now anti-nuclear. There are many reasons for it, some are the result of national characteristics, but there are certain basic elements which are common throughout. I would say that there is increasing public awareness — basically people feel less and less that the United States provides absolute security, and that the price of that security has become too high, whether in terms of relations with the Soviet Union, or in terms of risk.

There is increasing awareness in Europe that the risks which nuclear weapons, especially the new generation of nuclear weapons such as the Pershing and Cruise missiles, pose for Europe have become intolerable and that it would be better not to have to depend on these weapons. The same phenomenon of the nuclear risk is occurring in the United States, and it is that risk which lies behind President Reagan's SDI policy. When President Reagan proposed to the American people on 23 March 1983 that they close the nuclear age and go on to a new post-nuclear era, he was exploiting the pacifist ideal, and indeed making it legitimate, by saying that nuclear weapons were dangerous and that a non-nuclear defence system was needed.

And finally, the third factor which has to be added to this questioning attitude — I am sorry to gloss so quickly over these social phenomena, which are important, and I shall be happy to return to them — is the technological aspect. It seems to me that we are going through a very fundamental technological change in the game, and that the 1980s are likely to be just as revolutionary as the 1950s were, with the major revolutions brought about by thermo-nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines and ballistic missiles.

The 1980s are likely to bring a technological revolution which is just as great. This time, though, it will be in the sphere of non-nuclear, rather than nuclear, weapons. It is the field of conventional, or space weapons. And what we are witnessing in fact is, if you like, a pincer movement,

with conventional 'smart' weapons underneath and space weapons on top, rendering the use of nuclear arms less and less necessary.

The dream of a traditional form of defence, using weapons which do the same job as nuclear arms, but without the same risks, is again becoming thinkable, if not possible, and this is what is behind the debate which Jonathan Alford mentioned just now, on 'smart' weapons and space weapons. These three currents, then — public opinion, technology and the balance of forces — seem to me to pose a fundamental question about the nuclear phenomenon in the Atlantic Alliance. What then are the implications for us Europeans, and for us French?

Let me say for myself, that as a European I find this trend disquieting, and I know that some people here will disagree with me, but I, for my part, am convinced that it is the only thing which restrains the Soviet Union from the direct use of force in Europe — let me say I think the Soviet Union's strategy in Europe is a strategy of intimidation and political exploitation of the balance of military forces, and that the Soviet Union has no military ambitions in Europe which cannot be achieved at the political level, but that in the event of crisis and internal problems in the Soviet Union I think the Soviet Union could be seduced by more or less limited military action and that the only thing which has dissuaded the Soviet Union from taking the short-cut to history hitherto is precisely the nuclear deterrent and all that it implies, in terms of the uncontrollability of nuclear warfare.

A point which has just been discussed and which the Soviets recognize. At this level therefore, anything which might affect that fundamental doubt, that fundamental uncertainty, would seem to me to be extraordinarily dangerous for Europe. As a European, the trend which we can see on both the American and the Soviet side towards conventionalization of warfare, towards regional limitation of conventional and nuclear risks, seems to me to be a very dangerous thing. Whether it be the debate over 'smart' weapons, the SDI debate, or the debate over short- and medium-range nuclear weapons, these are apparently dangerous trends, and for me, as a European, the real challenge is certainly to equip with conventional resources capable of convincing the Soviets that they would not win easily, but above all to maintain at the top of the Soviet political and military hierarchies awareness of the risk of uncontrollable escalation.

I consider this to be a fundamental point. It is at precisely this level that I think the role of American nuclear weapons will diminish in future as

the importance of French and British nuclear weapons increases. May I add another point: I would say that for Europe the danger of this new technological phase is that we may be led increasingly towards Balkanization and marginalization in relation to major technological developments — not because our engineers are any worse than any others, but because there is an enormous financial gap between us, the United States and Japan, which can also be explained by the Balkanization of our markets — and that we therefore run the risk of falling behind very rapidly, unless we join the technological race, whether it be in space weapons, or conventional weapons.

In any case, where France is concerned I think it is now clear to everyone in France and elsewhere, and the opinion polls and statements by the political parties show it as well, that there is a very marked tendency here: it is clear that in France France's security is closely associated with that of its European partners. In France non-aggression and armed neutrality are not a viable option and France's defence policy is increasingly dictated by what is happening elsewhere, particularly in Federal Germany. I should just like to say — this is my final point and I shall try to hurry, I have been asked to speak quickly — in recent years, let's say over the last 10 years, there has been a great deal of discussion in France over how to modify France's military doctrine, so as to make a positive contribution to the overall security of the Continent, and of Federal Germany in particular. The debate started with Mr Giscard d'Estaing and gathered speed with Mr Mitterrand, and I think over the last few years there have been a number of initiatives which are worth mentioning, albeit briefly. Of these the position which France took alongside the FRG in the matter of Euro-missiles was very important politically. Secondly, the reactivation of the 1963 Elysée agreement and the resumption of military cooperation between France and Germany. Thirdly, the creation of the rapid strike force, which may not have had a revolutionary effect on the course of France's strategic policy, but which has certainly altered it. For me these are all leading in the same direction, even if, as I have pointed out, they do have their inadequacies. This applies particularly to the rapid strike force, which does indeed provide France with the means to react quickly in the frontline, as our German partners wish, but in my opinion does not resolve the basic contradiction which I mentioned at the beginning of this speech, between the role of the first army, a nuclear role, and the contribution of these forces to the Atlantic Alliance especially in Federal Germany.

There are clearly also inadequacies where a number of diplomatic initiatives are concerned, notably Eureka, which to my mind is a truncated response to the strategic and technological problems posed by SDI, and something which I would have preferred to have seen described as a military matter.

There are also inadequacies, but this is more the fault of our partners than of us, in the way in which France's very precise overtures in space matters have repeatedly been rejected by our German partners.

Where is this speech leading, what conclusions are to be drawn?

It seems to me as a European that there are several things which must be understood: first, it is now clear, and the Americans, be they of the Right, or the Left, or liberal conservatives, have made it quite clear to us, that we can no longer rely blindly on the American nuclear umbrella, except as a kind of last resort, but an extremely theoretical one, particularly as we are moving towards deployment of a defensive rocket system, the SDI. I believe that in this case we shall be heading towards regionalization of the conventional and nuclear threat in Europe, and that in that context only short-range Soviet and American nuclear weapons would be used, with extremely grave consequences for Europe.

First conclusion, therefore, as Europeans, we must rescue what remains of the nuclear deterrent in Europe, we must have in this continent the means to strike at the Soviet Union itself if we want to continue to deter it. Second point, as regards traditional weapons, we obviously have to equip with conventional resources, because in the absence of that we shall probably come up against a wave of opinion in the United States, which will be increasingly hostile to the continued presence of American forces in Europe. Helmut Schmidt made proposals on this point. I see that unfortunately they were not taken up by either French or German political circles. But there is no one reason, no ineluctable demographic or historical circumstance, why France, Germany and the other Europeans should be incapable of putting up a number of divisions large enough to pose a problem for the Soviet military authorities.

Third conclusion, in the debate over European defence and what should be done to improve European cooperation, I believe that we must not create artificial problems, which is what I think institutional problems are. I do not think it matters whether it is the WEU, or the EP, or the Atlantic Assembly, it is positive things which matter. They can be achieved. This is what I said in my book, and it generated a certain amount of

interest, because it has the advantage of being positive and feasible. It seems to me that France has to choose between two possible defence policies. The first is the one which we have now and which consists of waiting for the Russians at the Rhine. To wait for the Russians at the Rhine would, I believe, be a guarantee of serious political Balkanization in Europe. We have a choice between waiting for the Russians at the Rhine or going to join the collective defence in the front line. And that is why I have proposed that our defence, notably the second army, be deployed at the front on terms to be negotiated between France and Germany, but along the lines of what the Germans want. On the other hand, and this is less popular in Germany, I believe that this redeployment of the French forces in Germany would also lead to the redeployment of French nuclear forces in Germany with the ability to strike deep into the Warsaw Pact forces, which means that Federal Germany and the Germans must consider very carefully the idea of nuclear weapons and how much of the nuclear deterrent they wish to retain in their system. It is my impression, and I say this without malice or arrogance, that the Germans, the silent majority in Germany, are tending increasingly towards the non-nuclear opinion.

If that is the concept of German defence in the future, I think that there are going to be problems for France and for European security in general. What I fear in fact is that if this trend continues to gain support in Germany, if Germany is interested only in traditional weapons and leaves nuclear and space weapons for the superpowers on the assumption that they are nothing to do with Germany, then, I think, it will be increasing the risk to itself and France will in any case choose a different terrain and a different road. And I should simply like to tell our German friends here that whether Germany elects to produce a joint observation satellite with France or not, whether or not it elects to go along with France's space policy, France will go ahead. France will quite simply use the limited funds which are at its disposal, which will lead to further cuts in its conventional forces, and a German decision not to join a joint European space project would inevitably result in a weakening of the conventional resources which France could make available to Federal Germany.

I shall end there, and say that for me the danger in Europe at the moment lies in the removal of the nuclear deterrent, the regionalization and conventionalization of warfare in Europe and the technological and political Balkanization of our respective defence policies.

I think it imperative for our Heads of State, and public opinion as well, to take note of these challenges and for us to stop deluding ourselves with escapist policies which either believe that technology is the supreme resource, which is the American approach (SDI, Rogers Plan, 'smart' weapons), or, what one hears in Europe, that negotiation with the Soviets is the answer to everything.

I hope that I shall be given the opportunity during question time to say what I think about arms control negotiations and the wholly illusory nature of them as far as any concrete relationship between them and our security is concerned. I shall finish there.

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Questions were put by Mr Bernard-Raymond (EPP, France), Lady Elles (ED, UK), Mrs Charzat (Soc., France), Mr Plaskovitis (Soc., Greece), Mr Segre (Com., Italy), Mr Penders (EPP, Netherlands), Mr Mallet (EPP, France), Mrs Piermont (ARC, FRG) and Mr Vgenopoulos (Soc., Greece).

Mr Lellouche replied that new funds and a better industrial policy were needed in order to rehabilitate the run-down of French conventional forces. (Only 3  $\frac{1}{2}$ % of GDP was spent per year on defence as opposed to 6% in the early 1960s.) West European governments had to find money to intensify the European new technology research, just as the Pentagon had in the USA. He argued that the UK and French nuclear deterrents would have to be gradually Europeanized. He thought that the SDI would have no effect at all on concepts of deterrence. He was also dismissive of the concept of nuclear-free zones.

Mr Lellouche agreed that there was a certain illusionary quality about the French public consensus on defence policy and that this tended to be focused only on the more symbolic elements of deterrence.

Finally he expressed scepticism on arms control, believing that it would bear very little fruit and would lead to arms races in weapons not covered by agreements. He predicted that the process started at Geneva would lead to an accord on INF weapons which might be contrary to European interests.

# Statement by Professor Stefano Silvestri

Vice-Chairman of the IAI  
(Institute for International Affairs), Rome

I shall endeavour to be brief, in the hope that I shall be able to make good any omissions at a later stage in response to any questions or doubts expressed regarding this concise statement of my views. As regards European security in the Mediterranean, I think it should be made clear in the first place that the Mediterranean is an area with special features which certainly exert a powerful influence on Europe but in which the balance of power and security problems do not take the same form as in Central Europe. To start with, in Europe there are various simultaneous and overlapping conflicts — regional, sub-regional, national, international, East-West and North-South — and any other kinds one may care to think of. The security relationships in the Mediterranean area are not so much relationships between Mediterranean countries themselves as alliances between individual Mediterranean States and countries outside the region: for instance, between Greece and the United States, Yugoslavia and the United States, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, but not between Yugoslavia and Greece or Yugoslavia and Italy. There are no unifying factors at that level; it is an area in which countries share common borders rather than a unified area, one in which countries are opposed to, rather than united with, one another — in short there is no unifying factor, and that is either because there is no capacity for cohesion amongst the various States or else because there is no external hegemonic power capable of unifying the whole area. This is true from the political and strategic point of view, but less so from the economic point of view. From the economic point of view, genuine integration exists in the Mediterranean, centred above all upon the European Economic Community and in part upon the Arab oil-exporting countries; they in turn have relations with the European Community and for that reason it may be said in general that there exists a degree of economic integration centred on the European Community's principal pole of attraction. There is therefore a contradiction between the absence of a system for managing power crises operating, if you will, at strategic level, and the existence of a system of integration at economic and commercial level. Inherent in that contra-

diction is a whole series of threats, of which that posed by terrorism is the most obvious, and they aggravate the defence problems of the Alliance and of Europe in the Mediterranean.

The military situation in the Mediterranean is changing — I shall merely give a brief outline — as a result of the sharp increase in the technological capacity of the Soviet Union to threaten the Mediterranean and to intervene militarily there (longer-range aircraft, a more efficient navy); the United States and the countries of Europe are finding it more difficult to control local conflicts and there is therefore a risk that the Mediterranean will become elusive, so to speak, and that indirect threats may assume greater significance than direct threats, so we should think not so much in terms of outright world war but rather of progressive destabilization and an increasing number of localized conflicts which are difficult to control.

Since its inception the Atlantic Alliance has had virtually no experience in the Mediterranean of what we may term collective crisis management capacity or, as the English-speaking people describe it, 'coalition warfare'. Apart from this lack of experience and tradition, there is a lack of geographical continuity between the various theatres of operations; there is sometimes a lack of political cooperation between a number of States, an exaggeration of the importance of national political priorities — Greece and Turkey come to mind, but we should not forget Spain and Portugal, countries which both have an extremely self-centred and nationalistic conception of their own defence problems, which is coordinated to only a limited extent with that of their allies. All this means that there is only one element holding security together in the Mediterranean, only one common factor, namely the American presence. Every country has a direct relationship with the United States, a situation which aggravates the problems of political management because it heightens resentment and leads to more serious problems, and at the same time it impedes the emergence of a European consensus or a consensus between European allies which could in some way take the place of the consensus — should it cease to exist — on which the alliance with the United States is based.

Following on from that, and moving on rapidly towards the conclusion, let me say that a distinction may in any case be drawn between the Western Mediterranean and the Eastern Mediterranean. Security is, relatively speaking, better in the Western Mediterranean than in the Eastern Mediterranean. The problem is that of moving the strategic security axis in the Mediterranean eastwards, which is seriously complicated by the

menace of Soviet technology, on the one hand, and, on the other, by the political problems of the Alliance and of the European Community in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Can Europe play a role in all this? There is certainly a tendency in Europe to pay more attention to the Mediterranean; there are a number of ways and means, above all mobile forces and greater emphasis on naval forces and sea-based air power, but there is also an almost total lack of operational integration amongst the air forces in the Mediterranean, except for the defence of the individual national theatres of operations. It is also becoming more difficult for American forces to thrust eastwards in the Mediterranean in times of crisis without substantial reinforcements which, in the event of a general crisis, would probably not be available and in any case the fact remains that none of this resolves the problem of minor crises such as terrorism and threats, or of minor conflicts which might give rise to problems for European countries; we continue to rely upon systems of national management when faced with international crises and are therefore confronted by grave problems of mutual weakness and confusion. One need only look at relations between Italy and the United States during the *Achille Lauro* crisis or the incredible Malta incident to see how national management of international crises may lead to the most serious disasters, and these were minor crises — far more complicated and serious crises may arise. The trouble is that it is practically impossible to solve this problem simply within the framework of bilateral relations with the United States, again because even though one or two Mediterranean countries might contrive to come to a direct arrangement with the United States Government, it would be difficult for that arrangement to be the same for all the Mediterranean countries — hence their objective should be to establish a degree of coordination amongst the countries of Europe, at least those of southern Europe, and European States in general, in order to achieve more consistent management and then to agree with the Americans upon a common political line, an approach which is very doubtful but which might work. The difficulties involved in such an approach derive above all from the excessively nationalistic features of attitudes towards defence and from the ways in which the threat is perceived, which at times reach almost absurd proportions, as in the case of the two members of the Atlantic Alliance who each think of one another, rather than of the external foe, as their worst enemy or the case of the country which I hope will remain a member of the Atlantic Alliance and which purports above all to be a friend of the Arabs in the Mediter-

anean but at the same time asserts that the only threat against its territory and its security is precisely the threat posed by the Arab countries.

These are typical of the contradictions inherent in national perceptions of security; they are a hangover, if you like, from the situation and the anarchy which previously existed in the Mediterranean and which perhaps Europe could help to eliminate.

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**Questions were put by:**

Mr Ephremidis (COM, GR), Mr Penders (EPP, NL), Mr Flanagan (RDE, IRL), Mr Mallet (EPP, F), Mr Amadei (S, I), Mr Segre (COM, I), Mr Newens (S, UK), Mr CiccioMessere (NI, I) and Mrs Piermont (ARC, D).

In his replies Professor Silvestri first expressed the view that Mediterranean memories of historical national antagonisms might stretch too far back; he admitted that this was difficult to overcome, but regarded the whole thing as fairly pointless. He referred to Jean Monnet and the foundation of the ECSC, describing Europe as the best means of resolving disputes. Asked about the dispute between Greece and Turkey, he described Turkey as historically on the offensive, but felt that Greece was also going too far.

However, a solution to this and other endogenous problems required willingness to compromise.

Asked about the key role of the USA, Professor Silvestri favoured action by the European NATO countries, as the question of nuclear weapons was less important in the Mediterranean.

The possible effects of EEC enlargement on non-Community countries (e. g. Morocco) had to be considered, as they might have repercussions on Spain, for example. Adjustments to trade arrangements were not enough. Economic crises could spread and escalate. A comprehensive Mediterranean policy was required. This idea lay at the root of the Euro-Arab dialogue, which had unfortunately petered out.

In reply to a question on Malta, Professor Silvestri said that the situation was not ideal, but could improve, especially after Mintoff.

It was unrealistic to expect a solution to the Middle East problem with the PLO as a partner, as the latter's organization was too weak. He preferred to involve

Jordan and Syria. He doubted the presumption that an international conference could solve the present problems, but did not rule out positive efforts. He did feel that a more flexible Israeli approach was required first.

Europe would finally have to adopt a political stance, and certainly assume more responsibilities; the Community could not remain the dominant power in economic terms only.

Examining the narrower security policy aspects, Professor Silvestri felt that the Warsaw Pact countries had increased their presence since 1977. At the moment this was not a direct challenge, but could hamper or interrupt NATO's logistics.

On a question on the SDI, Professor Silvestri regarded the present situation as far less acute than it was six months previously. At all events there had to be a common (Western) European solution to the problem of technical cooperation. There was a dearth of significant European projects, and he felt that in its present form Eureka was fairly pointless.

In his opinion the Community was regarded by non-EEC countries simply as a channel for contacting the Americans. The Community would remain an intermediary until EPC was intensified and it had a genuine security policy. He felt that an industrial development policy should be one of the short-term aims, and he wanted above all to see protectionism pushed back.

# Statement by Professor Constantin Vlad

Director of the IPS

(Romanian Institute of Political Science), Bucharest

The present-day situation in Europe makes more acute than ever the necessity to ensure the security of all States, to achieve security and peace on the Continent. This goal of ensuring security and peace requires a close and many-sided cooperation between States, groups of States, among peoples. This is the perspective in which I view, in my introductory paper, cooperation, including cooperation between East and West.

I believe that such cooperation is both necessary and entirely feasible. It is necessary because, as has been proved by the whole postwar history, a lasting and viable system of security cannot be built on confrontation, on a policy of force and armaments. At any rate, European security cannot be the result of imposing the will of some States or groups of States upon the rest of the States on the Continent. It can only be the effect of agreement and common action of all European States. Such an agreement and common action of the European States, of all the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act can only result from their cooperation, a cooperation between independent and sovereign States enjoying equal rights.

This cooperation is, at the same time, perfectly feasible. An analysis of the realities on the Continent reveals that the European States, all the States participating in the CSCE process, have certain common basic interests pertaining to security. Indeed, such common security interests exist in spite of the differences between the European States provided by their size, social and political order, by their belonging or not to military alliances, etc. Objectively speaking, the fate of security and peace unites the countries and peoples on the Continent, as does the prospect of their continued existence in a Europe, in a world, able to halt the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and to maintain peace; or, on the contrary, they may face the same fate — the alternative of being destroyed, of being annihilated in case a nuclear conflict breaks out. Without these common security interests, the initiation and follow-up of the CSCE process, would have been inconceivable. Moreover, without these common interests, all hopes connected with the establishment of a system of

security on the Continent should be given up. I refer to a system in which States would feel protected from interferences and pressures, from aggression, a system capable to meet the security requirements of different groups of States, to secure all peoples on the Continent the right to choose freely their way to development.

A broad and systematic cooperation directed toward accomplishing the goals of security is also facilitated by the existence in international life of numerous frameworks within which such cooperation can be implemented. Among these frameworks I mention: bilateral contacts between the States of the Continent, between all the States participating in the CSCE process, contacts that actually constitute a broad and systematic dialogue; the joint actions of these States within the UN, on matters aiming at strengthening international security, taking into account the fact that European security is a component of world security; the CSCE process with all its institutionalized forms: the follow-up meetings, reunions, experts' meetings, etc.; and others.

I consider that a study of the possibilities for cooperation in ensuring security on the Continent should start with a thorough analysis of European and world realities, with a clear-sighted understanding of the trends in evolution of these realities in an attempt to reach conclusions on the ways of action meant to curb the negative processes and to encourage positive evolutions which are beneficial to achieving the objectives of security.

Such an analysis highlights the fact that, in the latest years, the international situation has worsened very seriously. Although the world is — according to the figures provided by numerous research institutes specializing in contemporary military phenomena — over-saturated with arms, the arms race — in particular the nuclear arms race — continues at higher and higher levels. Military expenditures increase year by year, efforts are intensified to create, produce and introduce new types of weapons and arms systems, including nuclear weapons and other arms of mass destruction. Efforts are made for militarization of outer space. Such evolutions and especially the prospect of a new escalation of the arms race worries public opinion.

Dangerous threats hover over Europe. The largest forces of annihilation ever known in history are concentrated on our Continent. It is here that the two main military-political alliances — NATO and the Warsaw Treaty — confront each other. Under the circumstances, deployment of

medium-range nuclear weapons systems, in general of new nuclear weapons, increases enormously the nuclear danger.

While the arms race continues and even intensifies, the use of force and the threat of force, the struggle for maintenance and redivision of the spheres of influence, the pressures and interferences in internal affairs of States do not constitute isolated phenomena, but manifestations of certain policies in international life. Under these circumstances, the preoccupation of States, including different groups of States, with ensuring their own security is altogether legitimate.

Security presupposes a balance of forces between States, between different groups of States. In Romania's view such a balance should be achieved at lower levels of armaments, by slowing down the arms race and through adoption of effective disarmament measures, first of all in the field of nuclear disarmament. This Romanian stand — which is concurrent with positions adopted by numerous other States — materializes one of the main conclusions to be drawn from the analysis of the whole postwar history. Namely, the idea that all attempts to achieve a balance 'at higher levels', through new ascending spirals in the development of armaments, have stepped up the arms race, transforming it more and more in a factor of instability and insecurity.

This is not all. As has been warned more and more often by clear-sighted politicians, by numerous scientists of world renown and by prestigious institutions and scientific forums — both in East and in West — the continuation of the arms race at a time when a huge, a horrible overkill capacity has been amassed on both sides, creates serious dangers not only for stability, for security and peace; a war in which nuclear weapons are used — and a world war would inevitably be an all-out nuclear war — would mean the destruction of human civilization, the annihilation of the conditions of life on Earth.

That is why the warnings against the nuclear danger, against the continuation and increase of the arms race should be viewed as a true *memento mori* for mankind. In this light, the statement in the Final Document of the 10th Special Session of the UN General Assembly, dedicated to disarmament to the effect that: 'Mankind is confronted with a choice; we must end the arms race and proceed to disarmament, or face annihilation', is not mere rhetoric, but represents a solemn appeal to reason, to decided action.

In the same spirit, Romania considers that, while an all-out nuclear war could destroy human civilization, man's and people's right to life and existence has become one of the basic human rights. This right pertains — to the same extent — to all peoples in all States whose conditions for life would be denied, destroyed, should a nuclear catastrophe take place. I want to underline the special significance this right acquires for the peoples of small and medium-size countries, even for those of large ones, as they all are potential victims of a nuclear conflict waged mainly by the more powerfully armed States.

In general, the clear-sighted, realist and responsible analysis of the evolution of international relations, including the relations among the European countries, shows that, under the conditions of an increased interdependence between military and non-military factors threatening the security of States, the arms race has a negative effect on interstate relations as a whole.

The policy of armaments poisons the international atmosphere, feeds distrust between States and peoples, and comes altogether into contradiction with the requirements of establishing international relations founded on respect for the principles of independence and sovereignty, equality in rights, non-interference in internal affairs, repudiation of force and the threat of force, of the peaceful settlement of all international differences.

Armaments impede economic development of all States, the European States being no exception in this respect. At a time when the resources mankind has at its disposal are inevitably limited, when mankind is confronted with numerous and serious global problems — overcoming underdevelopment, securing the means for development like energy, raw materials, financial means, eradication of famine, endemic diseases, illiteracy, etc., the arms race represents an intolerable waste of resources. It drastically reduces the capacity of the international community to successfully meet a series of challenges which might have unpredictable consequences for international stability, security and peace.

Placing — to a large extent — scientific and technical progress under its control, the arms race diverts science from its natural purpose, turning brilliant achievements of the human spirit against man. It hinders the concentration of material and human resources toward the promotion of new, top technologies for civilian purposes.

These are some elements inferred from the examination of the present-day situation in the world and on the European continent. They could serve as a starting point in identifying the possibilities for cooperation — including East-West cooperation — in the achievement of security in Europe. I shall attempt next to identify these possibilities. Of course, in view of the character and size of this introductory paper the presentation of the possibilities of cooperation will — inevitably — be limited and its main purpose will be to stimulate an exchange of ideas on this topic.

It is my opinion that cooperation on matters of security among the European States, among all the States participating in the CSCE process, should concentrate on cardinal aspects of the efforts which should be undertaken to ensure security and peace on the Continent and in the whole world. In concrete terms, such cooperation can have a real impact toward achieving security and peace only if it is focused on decisive matters, namely halting the arms race and initiation of a disarmament process, first of all in the field of nuclear weapons.

This view about cooperation on security-related issues ensues from the general conception Romania promotes according to which security and peace can only be achieved as a result of the joint efforts made by all categories of States, small, medium and large, by all clear-sighted, realist forces in the world. Peace and security can only be secured as a result of cooperation, on an equal footing, of all categories of States, and taking into account their security interests.

Materializing her conception on disarmament issues — the sure, radical way of building the security of States, of achieving international security, Romania stated in a position document distributed at the UN in 1975: 'Romania starts out from the premise that disarmament issues concern not only a small group of States and governments, but are of vital interest for all the States and peoples in the world, large or small, irrespective of their military might and the types of weapons they own. It is an imperative that all States participate in the disarmament negotiations in the debate and adoption of measures in this field; the right of each State to defend its legitimate interests of security and development, within any such negotiations, should be secured.'

Of course, while underlining the requirement that all States participate in the halting of the arms race we do not diminish the responsibility the main military powers have in achieving disarmament. On the contrary, as the two main military powers own almost all nuclear weapons,

concentrating in their arsenals huge capacities for annihilation, a particular responsibility is incumbent upon them in halting the arms race, in the first place the nuclear arms race.

Precisely to this effect, the Romanian draft for the 'Declaration on Disarmament' of the Special Session of the UN General Assembly dedicated to disarmament (1978) included among the basic principles which should guide the disarmament negotiations 'securing absolute priority to measures of nuclear disarmament' and 'initiation of the disarmament process by the militarily significant States'.

In fact, in Romania's view and practical action, the responsibility of the big nuclear-weapon States and the requirement that all States participate in the tackling and solving of security issues are complementary, they do not contradict each other.

The same spirit prevails in the above-mentioned document, in all subsequent Romanian proposals presented at the two special sessions of the UN General Assembly dedicated to disarmament, in different UN negotiations forums, as well as in the CSCE process.

I believe that it is precisely in this perspective that the issues of cooperation between the States signatories of the Final Act, a cooperation conducive to European security, should be approached.

I will refer next to the consideration Romania has given and gives to the role different Soviet-American negotiations on issues of nuclear armaments in Europe can play, at the same time promoting ideas and initiatives meant to stir to action, to cooperation toward stopping the arms race on the Continent, all European States.

Thus, while welcoming, like other States, the opening, in November 1981, of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on stopping deployment and the withdrawal of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, Romania has insisted that all States signatories of the Helsinki Final Act should participate — in a way or another — in those negotiations.

When in the fall of 1983, in the circumstances that are known, these negotiations were about to fail, Romania proposed — several times — measures meant to create conditions for their continuation and for their successful conclusion.

Among these proposals I would mention the following: halting of all work being done for the deployment of the American missiles in Europe; storing in silos of the missiles already transported in some European countries; cessation of transportation of other such missiles from the USA. At the same time, a proposal was made that the Soviet Union give up the steps it announced (the countermeasures and its walking out on the negotiations), and all preparations for deployment of new medium-range nuclear weapons. Romania has requested that the USA and the Soviet Union resume the Geneva negotiations with a view to reach a general agreement leading to a halt on the deployment of new medium-range missiles, the withdrawal and destruction of the existing ones.

A point I want to stress is that as early as November 1983 Romania has suggested that a meeting be convened between the Soviet and the American Foreign Ministers and also has advanced the idea of a Soviet-American high-level meeting to be prepared and held as early as possible in 1984.

At the same time, keeping in mind the fact that the issue of the medium-range nuclear weapons is a matter of concern for the countries belonging to both military alliances, for all European countries, Romania has deemed necessary the convening — as early as 1983 — of a consultative meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty countries. Romania has also suggested that, in parallel with the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva a consultative meeting of the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries be held. The meeting was supposed to discuss the proposals advanced by the Soviet Union and the USA and to make a contribution toward reaching an agreement in the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

Several weeks later, the idea of the contribution the other European States could make in curbing a new spiral in the nuclear arms race on the Continent has been expressed in a Joint Declaration signed by the President of Romania Nicolae Ceaușescu and the Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou.

In the aforementioned Declaration the two sides state that ‘in order to halt the worsening of the situation on the Continent and in the world all European States — particularly the countries belonging to the two military alliances — should take a more active stand and make a contribution — in one form or another — to reaching adequate agreements’.

During 1984 Romania was among the countries that actively promoted the idea of negotiations as means of stopping the dangerous course toward tension and confrontation and resuming and consolidating the course toward détente. Like other States, she duly appreciated the opening of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on nuclear and outer-space weapons. Also, the meeting of 19-21 November 1985, between the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mihail Gorbachev and the President of the USA, Ronald Reagan, has been considered, in Romania, a positive event, of high relevance in the existing circumstances.

I would mention that in an appeal of the Romanian Parliament addressed to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the USA, on the eve of their meeting, hope was expressed that they would act with the utmost responsibility to reach ‘. . . a mutually acceptable agreement leading to a reduction in nuclear armaments — on both sides —, to a halt in the deployment and the withdrawal of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, to putting an end to militarization of outer space, to resuming the policy of mutual trust, détente and peaceful cooperation’. I would remind you also that together with the non-aligned countries, Romania has initiated the appeal of the UN General Assembly addressed, on the same occasion, to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the USA.

At the same time, Romania continued to follow a line of conduct aimed at promoting all-European cooperation in halting the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, in Europe.

In this spirit, Romania has repeatedly stated that the European States should not wait passively while the Soviet-American negotiations are carried on and the meeting between the leaders of the two countries takes place. On the contrary, these States, in particular those that belong to NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, should bear a higher direct responsibility, should act more vigorously to convince the two big nuclear-weapon States to take concrete steps leading to a mutually acceptable agreement. Romania has considered and considers that all peoples, in particular those of Europe, should take decisive action for the removal of long-range nuclear weapons and, subsequently, of all nuclear weapons, before proceeding to effective disarmament measures, to the general reduction of troops and armaments, to preventing the militarization of outer space.

The high-level Soviet-American meeting is considered in Romania to have concluded with a series of positive results. In fact, the very convening of this meeting and the adoption of the Joint Declaration are important events in the existing international situation. Romanian public opinion has nourished hopes that this meeting will bring about the decision by the two nuclear-weapon States to halt the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race.

However, the basic problems have not been solved. Under these circumstances, a number of questions are being asked in Romania concerning the future evolution of events. Namely, will the arms race be stopped or will it continue? Will the deployment of medium-range and other nuclear weapons be halted or will it be continued in Europe? Will nuclear-weapon testing cease or will it continue? Will the military budgets of the two big nuclear powers be reduced or will they continue to grow?

In fact, in Romania the prospect of whipping up the arms race is a matter of deep concern, as it represents the most serious danger for the whole mankind.

It would be logical — in our opinion — that while negotiations are being conducted in Geneva, the production, testing and deployment of new nuclear weapons should be ceased, as well as any actions aiming at the militarization of outer space.

In general, Romania considers that the Soviet-American high-level meeting will acquire a real historic significance, fulfilling mankind's expectations of progress toward the goal of disarmament and peace, only if the two parties can reach — as soon as possible — mutually acceptable agreements conducive to nuclear disarmament.

In view of the present international situation, Romania considers that efforts should be intensified by all States, by all peoples for strengthening security and peace in Europe and in the whole world.

Under these circumstances, a meeting of the States belonging to the two military alliances — NATO and the Warsaw Treaty — seems more necessary than ever, as well as the multiplication of the joint actions of all European States meant to halt the armaments, to implement the goals of security.

I have offered for consideration these views and actions undertaken by Romania as I think that such a perspective on the relationship existing

between the Soviet-American negotiations and the commitment of European States is capable to promote cooperation between all the States participating in the CSCE process in achieving the goals of security on the Continent.

I mean a cooperation not directed against the actions undertaken by militarily significant countries, but aiming at supplementing these actions with the active participation of all European States in the debate and solution of the problems pertaining to their security, to the security of the Continent. In other words, a cooperation which does not oppose the special responsibility incumbent upon the militarily significant States to the inalienable and untransmissible right of all other States to be concerned with their own security.

There also exist — in my opinion — real possibilities to cooperate in stopping the increase in military expenditures, in freezing and reducing the military budgets. This cooperation — like cooperation in other fields — could take place both within the CSCE process and within the more general efforts undertaken in the UN framework.

When contending that there are possibilities of cooperation for the freeze and reduction of military expenditures I start from the premise that there exist a series of circumstances conducive to the achievement of such an objective.

For instance, the European States are interested not to increase the burden of military expenditures, but to lessen it. The validity of this argument is enhanced by the ever increasing cost of armaments. In fact, all the countries of the Continent are facing economic problems. I believe that the interest to use the resources released from armaments for solving these problems could be an important factor favouring cooperation of European States in this field.

As far as Romania is concerned, our interest is genuine to diminish the resources earmarked for national defence, reallocating the funds thus saved for the country's economic development, for the steady rising of the people's material and spiritual standard of living. In fact, Romania spends less than other countries on national defence. For instance, in the current budget 3.3% is earmarked for national defence. I would also mention that, after unilaterally reducing her military expenditures in several consecutive years, Romania has decided to freeze them at the level of those recorded in 1982 for the duration of the present five-year plan, that is up to the end of 1985.

This economic interest could be enhanced by a clear-sighted and realistic understanding of the serious dangers that the unbridled military competition taking place in Europe pose for the Continent: the prospect of unleashing, on its territory, a conflict which — under the present conditions of armaments — could not be limited to a conventional confrontation — as numerous highly authoritative studies have duly demonstrated.

The same circumstances could stimulate the understanding of the necessity to replace the existing 'pattern' of the ways for achieving the balance of forces on the Continent. As long as an overkill capacity exists on both sides, both at the strategic, global and at the continental levels, the futility of and the risks associated with the search for a balance of forces at higher and higher levels of armaments is altogether obvious.

If the conclusion is reached that States' security, European security and general security should not be sought in the continuation but in the halting of the arms race, then the freeze and reduction of military expenditures could be placed in a new, more feasible, perspective. For the limitation and, all the more so, the cessation of all activities could lead to a reduction in military expenditures. In its turn, this reduction could act as a lever for slowing down and ultimately stopping the process of development of new weapons.

I believe that there exist, indeed, possibilities of cooperation between States for stopping expenditures. The proposals put forth in different stages of the CSCE process, by a series of participating States, including the Conference now being held in Stockholm, are particularly relevant in this respect. Mention should also be made of the proposals submitted at the UN, in the special and ordinary sessions of the General Assembly, at the UN Conference on disarmament, as well as the cooperative actions of different States — including European ones — in the adoption of UN resolutions calling on States to stop and reduce military expenditures.

I would mention in this respect the initiative of Sweden concerning the reporting by States of military expenditures under the form of a matrix. Romania has been co-author in this initiative. Also, Romania submitted a draft concerning the principles which should govern the actions of States directed toward freezing and reducing military expenditures. Sweden became co-author of this Romanian proposal.

I think it realistic to assume that, on the basis of the recent decision of the UN Disarmament Commission and through the joint efforts of States,

the process of drawing up the principles concerning the freeze and reduction of military expenditures can be accelerated and concluded, with a view to opening concrete negotiations meant to lead to international agreements in this field. I do not doubt that European States can muster up their initiative resources in reaching these goals.

I want to mention in the same line of thought that Romania is among the 13 UN member States that have submitted to the UN the figures of their 1984 military expenditures, in keeping with the recommendation in Resolution 39/64B (Doc. A/40 1313, 20 May 1985).

Broad possibilities for cooperation among European States exist concerning abandoning force and the threat of force, strengthening confidence and promotion of a policy of settlement of differences between States by peaceful means.

Certainly, there are relatively few situations of tension and conflict in Europe, though some of these do not exclude the risks of a military confrontation, of a concrete manifestation of the policy of force. What is really essential is the fact that the Continent's general condition is being marked by the continuation and intensification of the arms race including the nuclear competition, by the confrontation between the two military alliances, two factors that give rise to serious dangers for peace and security on the Continent and in the whole world. I have presented above some considerations in this regard. Now I just want to underline that armaments and the policy of confrontation represent the most explosive manifestation of the policy of force, of the potential danger of a war breaking out in Europe and in the whole world.

This situation justifies the deep concern in countries of Europe, both East and West, as well as in the entire world, and the intense preoccupations of different States with ensuring repudiation of force and the threat to use force among the States signatories of the Helsinki Final Act, both in their mutual relations and, in general, in their international relations.

I will recall in this respect the fact that, as a result of the preoccupation of the participating States, of the efforts undertaken by them — and among them Romania played a very active role — the Helsinki Final Act inscribes the non-recourse to force or to the threat of force among the principles which should govern the mutual relations among participating States. Now, as it is known, following certain positive evolutions, chances are that agreements may be reached in this respect in the Stockholm Conference.

I will also recall among the initiatives a number of States took at the UN the proposals submitted by Romania, the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization concerning the conclusion of a Treaty on mutual non-use of military force and maintenance of peaceful relations among the States participating in the two military alliances. This Treaty should be open to all European countries, as well as to all other interested States. This proposal has been recently reiterated by the Warsaw Treaty Organization in its Declaration of Sofia.

Important avenues for cooperation on matters of security are opened by alternatives to the policy of force. Such alternatives are real, provided that the arms race is stopped and disarmament measures, first of all in the field of nuclear weapons, are undertaken. They consist in implementation of a whole series of measures aiming at building confidence and understanding, at removing suspicion in the relations among States, and the peaceful settlement of all disputes between States.

Indeed, agreement on and implementation of confidence-building measures (CBM) requires cooperation and, in turn, these measures could substantially stimulate cooperation between States on security-related matters.

I recall in this respect the fact that throughout the CSCE process, the matter of defining and adoption of such measures was given much attention. In fact, the very contents of the CBMs, in their acknowledged meaning, was established in this process, during the first all-European Conference.

The Helsinki Final Act included few CBMs. However, the very numerous proposals advanced by the participating States concerning military aspects of security, the debates they occasioned have marked important progress in the understanding of the confidence issue, of the measures which could lead to building this confidence. The discussions were not mere academic-diplomatic exercises. They approached important aspects of the relations among participating States, expressing the States' genuine concern with ensuring their security, the security of the whole Continent.

The contents of the CBMs concept was enriched at the Madrid meeting, which adopted the acronym CSBM for confidence-building measures. This fact and particularly the convening of the CSBM Conference in Stockholm stand for the progress made in this field within the CSCE process.

The same may be said about the preoccupations with building confidence at the UN particularly at the special sessions of the UN General Assembly dedicated to disarmament, as well as in different negotiations conducted within the UN or in other forums and, last but not least, the interest attached to CBMs in bilateral contacts between the States of the Continent.

Romania considers that CBMs can play an important role in the process of building European security. The fact that they are directly related to the security interests of all States facilitates their approach within the existing multilateral frameworks, it allows the identification, through joint efforts, through cooperation, of the areas where the States' concerns with their security meet, it helps harmonize positions, facilitating compromise and agreement.

Expanding the CBMs agreed upon and implemented by European States could be — in our opinion — an important factor contributing to strengthen security, to develop the States' cooperation in this field. At the same time, any progress in this direction enriches the substance of the military issue on the Continent which is approached and will — hopefully — be solved with participation of all European States. This has a particular importance for the cooperation among States, enhancing the significance of cooperation for European security.

According to Romania's conception embodied in the Romanian proposals, CBMs have a rich contents and a wide range. They aim at meeting the objective requirements of building confidence and security, they contribute to implementation of military disengagement, to make effective the non-recourse to force and to the threat of force, they pave the way for undertaking concrete disarmament measures.

In various instances — both within the CSCE, including the Stockholm Conference, and at the special sessions of the UN General Assembly dedicated to disarmament — Romania has proposed a series of confidence-building measures such as the following:

- (i) prohibition of multinational military manoeuvres carried on near the borders of other States;
- (ii) establishment of border zones, 100-150 km wide, in which large concentrations of troops and armaments are prohibited, only the stationing of small military units being permitted;
- (iii) compulsory notification of all major military manoeuvres carried on land, water and in the air;

- (iv) compulsory notification of a state of military alertness if it involves national troops or foreign troops stationed on the country's territory;
- (v) establishment of an information flow which should contribute to the solution of crisis situations;
- (vi) reduction, and finally, withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other States within national borders;
- (vii) liquidation of military bases from the territory of other States;
- (viii) reduction of military budgets, starting with the budgets of big, militarily significant countries;
- (ix) gradual reduction of troops and armaments from national military forces;
- (x) establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of Europe and the pledge undertaken by nuclear-weapon States not to use nuclear weapons against the States participating in such zones;
- (xi) securing the conditions for dismantlement of military alliances and, finally, for their simultaneous liquidation.

For Romania such measures do not represent mere proposals submitted in various international forums. They are, at the same time, effective stands in her policy, actions that express and implement her policy. I have mentioned above some of these actions, for instance Romania's stand on military budgets, on establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the peaceful settlement of disputes between States. I could also add that Romania rigorously implements the CBMs agreed upon at all- European conferences. On our national territory no foreign bases or troops are stationed. Romania does not accept multinational manoeuvres to be held on her territory and does not participate in such manoeuvres on the territory of other States with the exception of certain general staff exercises. Attached to her national values, prizing particularly those principles that promote the nations' free development and assertion, the Romanian foreign policy is based on consistent observance of the unanimously agreed upon norms of international relations, any kind of manifestation of force, of interference in internal affairs of other countries being alien to its line of action.

By nature of the problems that it intends to solve, cooperation in the field of repudiation of force and the threat with force is interconnected with cooperation for the promotion of the principle of and the establishment of the structures, of the mechanisms for peaceful settlement, through negotiations, of every differences between States. This has been the spirit

that prevailed in the CSCE proceedings, in different efforts undertaken at the UN, it is the spirit numerous States throughout the world have adopted as line of action.

I mention in this respect the complementary character of the Romanian proposals made within the CSCE aimed to render effective the non-recourse to force and of the proposal submitted by Switzerland concerning the adoption of a 'draft convention on establishment of a European system for peaceful settlement of disputes'. The discussion of this draft and of the whole question in the experts' meetings in Montreux and Athens allowed not only the thorough consideration of the issue of peaceful settlement of differences, but also expansion and deepening of cooperation in this field among participating States.

I would also refer to Romania's initiatives at the UN already materialized in the adoption by the General Assembly of a declaration on peaceful settlement of international differences (15 November 1982) as well as the proposal concerning the establishment of a commission for good-offices, mediation and conciliation which is still under consideration by the world organization. I would also mention that, on Romania's initiative, the UN General Assembly adopted — at its 40th session — a solemn appeal to belligerent States urging them to stop without delay military actions and to proceed to solving their problems by means of negotiations. On the same occasion a pledge by UN member States was adopted to the effect that they would solve the situations of tension and conflict, all existing differences, by political means, and would refrain from using force and the threat of force, and from any interferences in internal affairs of other States.

Another field of cooperation might be the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of Europe, conceived as components of the security of the whole continent, as possible steps toward a general process of disarmament. Establishment of such zones in the Balkans, in the northern part of Europe, in the central part of the Continent — along the separation line between the two military alliances — would signify, by their nature, achieving both effective measures of disarmament and measures of building confidence and understanding among States.

I consider that particular attention should be given, in the light of our arguments here, to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in central Europe. The establishment of such a zone would have a special

significance for the entire Continent, and give new substance to the development of a suitable cooperation among European States, of all States participating in the CSCE process, in attaining this objective.

In connection with nuclear-weapon-free zones I would highlight a peculiarity of the Romanian proposal concerning the Balkan area, a proposal advanced as early as 1957 and recently reiterated. The Romanian approach concerning the establishment in the Balkans of a good-neighbourhood-relations zone, a zone of cooperation and peace, without nuclear weapons and foreign military bases, has broad, comprehensive contents. Such a view about the Balkan area is — in my opinion — able to correlate closely security and cooperation — in political, economic, scientific, cultural and other fields. Thus, cooperation in different spheres becomes a factor stimulating cooperation among Balkan States in matters related to security proper both of each Balkan State and of the whole area. In fact, the deepening of the relations of cooperation — both bilateral and multilateral — among the Balkan States gives legal force to the viability and efficiency of such an approach to the security interests of States and the ways of ensuring them.

Finally, among the directions that cooperation for security among the States participating in the CSCE could take, as an overall outcome of this cooperation, I would refer to the goal of creating a united Europe.

The creation of a united Europe cannot take place by denying but by acknowledging the diversity of conditions in different European countries, diversity given by social systems, by different forms of organization of economic and social-political life, by different cultural values.

The foundations of a United Europe rest — on one hand — in the consciousness of the common history of the Continent as a whole. I agree in this respect with Sir Geoffrey Howe, the UK Foreign Secretary who stated last June in The Hague: 'My visit to five East-European countries in the first half of 1985 have brought home to me with fresh force that all Europeans, East and West, have a common heritage' (*Europe Tomorrow*). These bases rest, on the other hand, in the security interests, actual and prospective, of all European States.

Such a Europe can only be achieved as a result of a wide cooperation among all States, a cooperation based on the principles of equality in rights, national independence and sovereignty, abandoning force and the threat to use force, non-interference in internal affairs, as well as on

acknowledgement of the realities existing on the Continent and on consistent observance of the right of every people to freely choose their system of social development, to freely determine their own destiny.

Based on such foundations, cooperation among European countries can be expanded in all fields — in economic development, in commercial exchanges, in industrial production, also for the promotion of technical-scientific progress, in education, culture, human contacts, contacts between peoples. The strict observance — in the relations among the States participating in the CSCE process — of the 'Decalogue' in the Helsinki Final Act, could lead to the development of a spirit of cooperation, and would eliminate the confrontation situations now existing in certain fields which also require cooperation and mutual respect.

Under the circumstances, cooperation among European States can be widely expanded both for the purpose of economic and social development of every people and for keeping up and increasing the lasting contribution that Europe can make to the general progress of mankind. For, we consider that Europe — a cradle of modern civilization — can and should continue to play a significant role in promoting progress in science, in top technologies, that is economic, social and cultural progress of mankind, as a whole.

Building a lasting system of security and cooperation on the Continent would increase the role Europe has to play in international life. Europe could be 'more than an air conditioning system in the relations between the superpowers' as Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Federal Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, put it recently in an interview in *Der Spiegel* (No 32/1985). He mentioned that he was referring to the whole continent of Europe.

The cooperation among European States, among all the States participating in the CSCE process on security-related matters is taking place under the circumstance of the continued existence on the Continent of the two military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

As I have shown above, considering the responsibilities incumbent on the States members of these two alliances, Romania deems that these States can and should act together for stopping the arms race, in particular nuclear competition, on the Continent. In general, Romania considers that the political role of consultation and negotiation of the two alliances should be expanded, at the same time reducing their military activities.

Such evolutions could contribute to prepare the conditions for the simultaneous dismantlement of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

As a matter of principle, Romania considers that the future of European security, the prospects of a united Europe and of world security and peace do not lie in the continuation of military alliances, but in setting Europe — and the whole world — free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, in general from any means for waging war. Implementation of disarmament measures on the Continent and in the world should be associated — in Romania's view — with a profound restructuring of international political relations which means abandoning force and the threat to use force, firmly establishing the principles and norms of international law in the relations among States, development of a broad and multilateral cooperation among countries and peoples.

Viewed from the angle of cooperation among European States, among all States participating in the CSCE process, the creation of a united Europe is not directed against anyone. 'I consider — underlined in this sense the President of Romania Nicolae Ceaușescu — that Europe can engage in a more independent activity and develop a policy of her own in the solution of many international problems. I consider this activity should not be directed against one or the other of the two superpowers, but it should consist of a cooperation with them on equal footing and of a policy of her own representing a contribution to general peace, to a more vigorous development of each nation's life, to securing a lasting peace in the whole world' (interview in the *Toronto Star*, 1 December 1983).

He suggested cooperation, not confrontation in this direction, too. Therefore, all positive, predictable and desirable evolutions on the Continent can be and actually are the outcome of cooperation among the Continent's States, among all the States participating in the CSCE process. It is precisely in this spirit that Romania has acted and acts considering that in this way it can contribute to building security and cooperation in Europe, a Europe permitting all peoples to develop and flourish freely, enjoying alike the benefits of security, peace and prosperity.

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Replying to questions by Mr Tzounis (EPP, Greece), Mr Wedekind (EPP, FRG), Mr Seeler (Soc., FRG), Mr Efrimidis (Com., Greece) and Mr Newens (Soc., UK), Professor Vlad said that the concept of a nuclear-free zone was primarily political, and could contribute to confidence-building measures. Romania had tabled a proposal in 1957 for a Balkan nuclear-free zone, based on multilateral relations there.

Romania did not regard a united Europe as necessarily a confederation, but a Europe which would find its own path to development, based on cooperation. The arms race and the danger of nuclear war both stood in the way of such a development. In this context he found the recent resolution of Parliament on cooperation between East and West Europe based on the Bettiza report to be interesting. Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, had recently emphasized that common values existed in East and West Europe and that the roots of such values were cultural, in the widest sense of the term.

Professor Vlad explained that in 1984 186 books from all over the world had been translated into Romanian, of which 102 were from West Europe and 54 from East Europe.

In relation to the United Nations, Romania had proposed that the permanent members of the Security Council should abstain when they found it impossible to agree. He emphasized that the frontiers of East European countries were natural and had been recognized in international agreements and in the 1975 Final Act of Helsinki.

Romania favoured greater transparency on questions of disarmament and published figures of its military expenditure.

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
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