

# COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

COM(75) 11 final

Brussels, 17 January 1975

Commission Communication to the Council  
concerning the second installment  
of the Community contribution  
to the emergency operation

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## I. The situation of the most seriously affected countries (MSA)

Information published in the second half of 1974 by the various specialized institutions (OECD, IBRD, IMF, UN) has unfortunately confirmed the diagnosis made by the Commission in its communication of 20 March 1974.

Between 1972 and 1974 thirty-two of the poorest developing countries witnessed a deterioration in their terms of trade, leading to a net loss for 1974 alone of the order of \$ 3 600 million, approximately half of which was attributable to increased oil prices and the other half due to the increased prices of food products, fertilizers and other manufactured products.

Without emergency aid intervention and the special facilities granted by the IMF those countries would in 1974 have had an intolerable balance of payments deficit estimated at almost \$ 2 900 million. It was possible to reduce this deficit to \$ 1 000 million by means of these aids and facilities. The rest could be borne only at the cost of a severe decrease in the exchange reserves of most of the countries concerned. On average their reserves covered only two months' imports at the end of 1974.

As a result these countries are entering 1975 without any room for manoeuvre while it is foreseen that their cumulated balance of payments deficit for that year will exceed \$ 2 300 million. It should further be pointed out that these estimates were made at a time when it could still be reasonably hoped that the economic trend in the major industrialized countries would pick up again by the end of the first quarter. If, as must be feared, this does not happen, the MSA countries risk having their export earnings considerably reduced in 1975, which would further aggravate their balance of payments difficulties.

While in some cases the existence of such a deficit means that their imports of capital goods will be reduced, and thus their investment effort slowed down and growth halted, in most cases the consequences will be more tragic.

People are dying in their tens of thousands in Bangladesh and in India, because their countries are unable to buy essential provisions. In the same countries, and also in Somalia and Tanzania, others will die tomorrow because their governments have been unable to obtain the fertilizers, the insecticides, and so on whose use will determine the yield of the coming harvests. All these countries are plunged by the crisis affecting them into a marginal state of existence such that their situation must assume catastrophic proportions at the slightest accident of nature or following any political difficulties which might arise.

At the end of December 1974 the FAO estimated 6.2 million metric tons to be the MSA immediate cereal requirements (needed before 30 June 1975) which are not covered by commercial purchases (8 million metric tons in 1974-75) or food aid commitments (2.8 million metric tons).

The tonnages that are not covered correspond to a total expenditure of nearly \$ 1 500 million, which most MSA countries will be unable to bear. Bangladesh in particular is, as confirmed by a recent telegram from Dr Boerma (see annex), in a critical situation : it must import 200 000 metric tons of food products every month to meet the basic needs of the population until the June harvest.

In this country, which no longer has any exchanges reserves, the available resources of the public food distribution system will be practically exhausted in February.

## II. Emergency aid contributions

While the diagnosis made by the Commission, and accepted by the Community, in early 1974 of the situation of the MSA countries has unfortunately been confirmed and even overtaken by the natural disasters that hit certain of these countries in 1974, there is on the other hand a positive element in this sorry picture - namely the somewhat unexpected success of the emergency operation launched by the Sixth Special Session of the United

Nations General Assembly, in which operation the Community has been associated from the outset. The target of \$ 3 000 million, which was proposed by the Commission, has almost been reached. To date, emergency aid contributions to the MSA countries amount to approximately \$ 2 500 million (1) paid in 1974 or to be paid in the first half of 1975.

### 2.1. OPEC countries

According to a recent OECD report (DD 403 of 6 December 1974), the OPEC countries have entered into bilateral aid commitments vis-à-vis the MSA countries totalling \$ 2 700 million in 1974. Of this total, project aid, which does not always meet the criteria of the emergency operation, accounts for \$ 400 million. Payments in 1974 and 1975 are estimated by the report to amount to \$ 1 400 million. To this must be added payments into the United Nations special account, totalling \$ 170 million, and the part of contributions made to various regional funds which is earmarked for the MSA countries. Specific details as to this last item are not in all cases available, except as regards the Special Arab Fund for Africa, to which \$ 185 million has already been credited ; of this amount, nearly \$ 110 million has been allocated to various MSA countries in Africa south of the Sahara. Lastly, the emergency aid, according to UN criteria, to the Arab and Islamic MSA countries which passes through the OAPEC special account is estimated at \$ 80 million. According to the OECD, the emergency aid payments actually made by the OPEC countries for the MSA countries in 1974 and 1975 and which strictly satisfy the criteria laid down by the U.N. and the Community, will total \$ 1 760 million

This figure is not final. Other regional funds, the recipients of which are not yet known with certainty, have received contributions from OPEC sources which will have to be taken into consideration. It appears, moreover, that emergency aid provided by certain oil-producing countries is not yet recorded satisfactorily. It was only recently that countries like Saudi

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(1) Excluding the American contribution (see below) and the second instalment of the Community contribution.

Arabia and Abu Dhabi agreed to collaborate in the notification system established for the United Nations Emergency Operation (UNEO). Information obtained in those two countries in December 1974 suggests that the amount of emergency aid that they will have paid to MSA countries between mid-1974 and mid-1975 will actually be \$ 435 million more than had been realized.

All in all, it is clear that the gross amount of emergency aid from the OPEC countries will be nearly \$ 2 000 million.

It will be necessary to wait until early February, when the preparatory documents for the next meeting of the countries contributing to the United Nations Emergency Operation will be published, to know more clearly exactly what share the OPEC countries have provided in this exercise in international solidarity and to be able to assess the grant element (1).

## 2.2. The industrialized countries

Total contributions to the emergency operation, as announced by the industrialized countries, amounted at end 1974 to \$ 546 million. This includes the first instalment of the Community contribution i.e. \$ 150 million, and direct contributions from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Denmark amounting to \$ 65 million.

Other contributions have been announced or promised for the beginning of the 1975 financial year, in particular by Austria and Switzerland.

In the United States the situation was for a long time uncertain on account of the failure of Congress to pass the Foreign Assistance Act for the 1974/75 financial year and the Ford Administration's hesitation over the amount to be provided for the food aid programme.

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(1) In this respect, it can already be seen that loans granted by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to MSA countries usually bear interest at the rate of between 2 and 2.5 %, have a grace period of 10 years and are normally for a duration of 20 to 30 years.

The first of these two elements of uncertainty was partly removed when Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act (which was signed by President Ford on 30 December 1974). This Act authorizes foreign aid commitments of \$ 2 697 million for the year ending 30 June 1975.

The Bill placed before Congress provided, inter alia, for development aid commitments vis-à-vis the MSA countries totalling \$ 1 000 million, an increase of \$ 222 million over the corresponding figure for the preceding tax year. Aid to the MSA countries includes project aid totalling \$ 331 million, which cannot strictly speaking be considered as a contribution to the emergency operation.

The above information was given to the United Nations in October 1974. However, unlike the firm contributions announced by other countries, it was not published on account of the uncertainty as to the final decision of Congress on the Administration's requests.

In amending the original Bill Congress reduced considerably the amounts earmarked in particular for military assistance and reconstruction in South Vietnam but left unchanged the volume of financial aid for the MSA countries. Moreover, Congress insisted that the Administration reserve for the MSA countries at least 70 % of the \$ 891 million set aside for food aid (PL 480)(1). This should result in a further increase in the rate of growth of American emergency aid to the MSA countries (2).

Lastly, it should be noted that in September 1974 President Ford formally assured the United Nations General Assembly that as regards food aid his country would endeavour during the current tax year to supply more than the minimum provided for by the Foreign Assistance Act. This was reiterated by Ambassador Scali at the first meeting of the countries contributing to the emergency operation and was further confirmed in the US Administration's replies to Dr Prebisch's questionnaires.

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- (1) In the initial Bill more than 50 % by value of the food aid was linked to the security assistance policy and was intended for Vietnam, Korea, Israel, Jordan and Chile.
  - (2) The precise consequences of this decision by Congress on the volume of aid to the MSA countries will become known during January. Upon first examination the redistribution suggests an increase of around \$ 180 million.

Various sources suggest that a decision on this point is imminent and that President Ford will choose from alternative proposals fixing total food aid expenditure for the 1975 tax year at \$ 1 000 million minimum and \$ 1 400 million maximum. Expenditure already voted would therefore be increased by between \$ 110 million and \$ 510 million.

A total of \$ 1 400 million is essential today if the actual quantities of food aid are to be maintained at the level provided for in April 1974 (when the aid Bill was submitted). Failing a favourable decision on this amount, the tonnage of food aid delivered by the United States would again drop in 1975, following the 50 % reduction recorded in the 1974 tax year as against 1973 and the 20 % reduction in 1973 as against 1972. It is clear that, with the World Food Conference just over, it would be particularly inopportune for this declining trend to continue, and the US Administration evidently desires to avoid this.

To sum up, it is still not possible to calculate exactly the extra amount of emergency aid contributed in 1974-75 by the United States to the MSA countries, but there are already indications that following a set of redistribution operations, the volume of aid provided in 1974-75 will be up by some \$ 400 million (1). This excludes food aid allocations to be fixed shortly.

## II. The context of the emergency operation

The MSA countries have a total population of between 850 and 900 million. The countries most seriously affected by the upheavals in the world economy over the last two or three years are, with a few exception, among the poorest and among the most dependent on external aid for financing their growth. They collectively received \$ 1 800 million (average annual payments) (2) in 1972-73, or the paltry figure of \$ 2 per person per year, in official development aid from the DAC countries.

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(1) \$ 222 million originally proposed by the Foreign Assistance Bill, and approximately \$ 180 million resulting from the redistribution operations ordered by Congress.

(2) Of which 44 % comes from the Community countries and 33 % from the USA.

They nearly all belong to the group of developing countries whose income per capita, according to the World Bank, will show a negative growth rate (0.4 % decrease) between 1974 and 1980 if the financial flows to the developing countries do not increase at a distinctly faster rate than was still being hoped for in 1973. At that time ODA flows were expected to increase from \$ 10 000 million in 1973 to \$ 17 000 million in 1980 - which seemed optimistic.

For these countries to have a modest annual growth-rate in the region of 2 % (GNP per capita), all financial flows to the developing countries would in fact have to increase by more than 60 % in 5 years. This presupposes a fundamental reorganization of the world aid system, a reorganization in which the oil-exporting countries will have a major responsibility, at least in the short term. This is not so much because they are rich - on average they are less rich than the industrialized countries - but because, on pain of jeopardizing their own development prospects, and in some cases their political existence, they must put back into the mainstream of the world economy the liquid assets they cannot use productively in the immediate future, transferring such assets as a priority to the countries which most need them.

According to the OECD, the OPEC countries' official development aid commitments (1) vis-à-vis the developing countries as a whole amounted at the end of November 1974 to \$ 9 600 million for 1974 alone. Actual disbursements for the same year are estimated at \$ 2 600 million, or approximately 2 % of the total GNP of the oil-producing countries (2).

To these aid flows must be added non-concessionary financial flows, such as purchases of World Bank bonds (\$ 1 100 million in 1974) or contributions to the IMF oil facility (\$ 3 200 million in 1974), contributions other than development aid (\$ 1 000 million in 1974), and means of financing that pass through a whole set of new financial institutions and which it is not yet possible to quantify. All in all, over 10 % of 1974 oil surpluses will have been recycled to developing countries in one way or another.

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(1) Comprising a grant element of at least 25 %

(2) The percentage is as much as 6 % in the case of Kuwait.



The geographical distribution of these flows is clearly more influenced by national political considerations, or even religious ones, than by an evaluation of the needs of the most seriously affected countries (1). This is why it is vital that the industrialized countries should for their part keep up their efforts in real terms to assist the developing countries and thus have available sufficient means to launch a geographical redistribution of aid flows in favour of the poorest countries and those receiving the least aid.

Here the real trend is not encouraging. In 1973 and 1974 net official development aid disbursements by the DAC countries as a whole dropped in real terms. The OECD estimates that the real value of net ODA payments by the Community countries dropped by 6.75 % in 1973. In 1974 the Community countries made a special effort to assist the MSA countries both through bilateral aid and on a Community basis (first instalment). Since their net payments increased by only 14 % in money terms, however, there was at the best stagnation in real terms.

This is understandable in a period of inflation and overemployment such as we experienced in 1973 and, as regards certain Member States, in the first half of 1974. However, the economic difficulties which all the Community countries will experience in 1975 should not warrant a slowdown in their aid efforts. This is no doubt contrary to public opinion, but if it is legitimate in a period of full employment to regard aid as a transfer of real resources drawn from domestic consumption and investment, it must also be accepted that in a period of underemployment aid is on the contrary a non-inflationary means - perhaps the only one - of stimulating export demand which does not involve a drain on domestic consumption. Moreover, in the case of aid - such as the emergency aid operation - which finances the immediate import capacity of the beneficiary countries, there is no unfavourable impact on the payments balances of the donor countries.

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(1) Approximately 60 % of the bilateral commitments entered into in 1974 have been vis-à-vis non-oil producing Arab countries.

It is therefore both possible and desirable for the Community countries to step up their aid effort in real terms in 1975 and to combine these expanded means as far as possible with those of the oil-producing countries in order to speed up the redistribution of the oil surpluses to the most seriously affected poor countries.. This could, moreover, be an important issue in the discussions between the oil-producing countries and the two groups of consumer countries.

#### IV. Proposals for Community action in 1975

Reorganization of the world aid system to embrace the oil countries and their regional institutions is a complex operation which cannot be carried out in a matter of months.

However, the MSA countries cannot wait, at least those which are not best placed to tap the aid financed by the oil surpluses which is just beginning to flow.

This is the reason for the United Nations Emergency Operation : a one-off rescue operation giving immediate assistance, which is to provide the time needed to set up a new development aid system adapted to the new situation in the size of its funds, and in the origin and the destination of its flows.

In the particular case of the Community, which has taken a decision in principle to provide itself with the means of a world-scale cooperation policy, its own contribution to the emergency action is also taking on the character of an essential transitional measure.

The Council has decided to determine the final amount of the Community contribution by 31 January 1975.

The Commission considers that the information available today on the situation of the most seriously affected countries and on the response to the appeal made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations from the

rich countries as a whole confirms the need for and justifies the total amount of \$ 500 million initially proposed by the Commission, conditionally accepted by the Council, and as such notified to the world community.

Of this total, \$ 150 million has already been committed following the decision taken by the Council on 30 October, when the Council also agreed to "take into account when assessing eligibility for assistance within the emergency operation those bilateral Community aids which met the criteria laid down by the United Nations".

Action under the European Development Fund in favour of the MSA countries cannot be taken into consideration where the payments made in 1974 were carried out in pursuance of decisions taken prior to the launching of the emergency operation. Moreover, it is unlikely that new payments will be made under the fourth EDF before the end of the first half of 1975.

In the field of food aid total deliveries, valued at world prices, were increased from 1973 to 1974. In particular, deliveries intended for the MSA countries were increased by \$ 67 million in 1974, against which they will fall slightly, by \$ 4 million in 1975<sup>1</sup>. It is possible that the average annual increase in food aid expenditure for the period 1974-75, i.e. \$ 42 million, may be taken into account as a contribution to the emergency operation in the period mid-1974 to mid-1975, which is covered by this operation.

Moreover, an additional food aid programme to provide beef is planned. On 12 December, following proposals made by the Commission, the Chairman of the Permanent Representatives Committee suggested a compromise solution which the Commission would be able to support. It involves proposing the supply of 7 500 t of beef, which would be financed partly by the EAGGF and partly charged against the second instalment of the emergency operation. In view of the requests made by the MSA countries (300 t), either directly or through the WFI, the amount which could be charged against emergency aid would be 13.35 million u.s. (approximately \$ 16 million).

<sup>1</sup> This was the sequel to the completion of the Sahel programme and the implementation of 1974 projects from appropriations carried over.

The Commission feels that this is in any case totally inadequate to meet the urgent requests presented by the most needy countries. It recalls that in its Memorandum of March 1974 on a Community food aid policy, it drew the Council's attention to the Community's responsibilities in respect of the pressing need for food products in the developing countries, particularly in those most seriously affected by the consequences of the rise in import prices. The Commission continues to believe that rapid adoption of this Memorandum would be a major step towards implementing the resolutions of the World Food Conference and would be in line with statements made in Rome by the representatives of all the Member States and taken up by leading European personalities in their respective countries. Finally, FAO Director-General Dr. Boerma took the initiative just a few months ago in drawing the attention of the industrialized countries, particularly the cereal-exporter countries, to the urgency and scale of the short-term needs of certain developing countries which in present circumstances are quite unable to import the food products and especially the cereals, which are absolutely vital to them.

Moreover, the Council had also planned "to examine the conditions under which national bilateral aid projects might be incorporated in the Community's overall contribution".

Three Member States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark, announced to the United Nations bilateral contributions totalling  $\pounds$  65 million. Other Member States of the Community increased their development aid payments to the MSA countries in 1974 and did not declare them to the United Nations since they were uncertain whether the total amount of those additional payments would meet the criteria for eligibility laid down by the United Nations. According to information at present available to the Commission the additional payments amount to approximately  $\pounds$  130 million (1).

Overall, the bilateral aid payments made by the Community to the MSA countries are stated to have increased by about  $\pounds$  200 million in 1974, i.e. a rise of 24% compared with 1973 (2).

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(1) i.e.  $\pounds$  46 million by France and  $\pounds$  84 million by the Federal Republic of Germany, according to statements made orally by their representatives to Commission staff.

(2) The corresponding amounts for the other Member States are not known.

If the Council were to decide that all these national measures should be incorporated in the total figures for the Community contribution, it would be objected that this would not necessarily be in line with the undertaking given by the Community; for the Commission is not in a position to give a precise estimate as to the volume of those national measures which comply strictly with the criteria for eligibility laid down by the United Nations.

It is therefore necessary to consider how these national aids should be incorporated in the total figures. The Commission intends to start working on this immediately with the relevant Member States. After that, the Community will be in a position to take a final decision on the content of the Community's second instalment. In any case, the Commission proposes that a decision be taken immediately to commit  $\$$  100 million as financial aid to the AEA countries. If the Council takes up the Commission's proposal, a preliminary draft supplementary budget will be tabled.

It should be noted here that, as the Commission has stressed on two occasions, at the Council session on the budget and before the European Parliament, a supplementary budget will be necessary following the amputation of 210 million u.a. which the Commission had earmarked for this purpose in Chapter 98 of its preliminary draft budget for 1975. It should also be noted that this supplementary budget could be adopted very quickly since the Council and the Commission both regard the emergency operation as "expenditure necessarily resulting" and Parliament's last word on the rate of increase of expenditure under Article 203(8) of the Treaty does not apply here.

ANNEX I

The flow of resources from the OPEC  
countries to the developing  
countries

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(Tables taken from OECD document  
No DD 403 dated 6 December 1974)

Editors Note: This annex includes Tables 2, 4, 5 and 6 from the original OECD document. The pagination is that of the OECD document.

Tableau 2

Engagements d'aide souscrits par les pays Membres de l'CEEP, et estimation des versements en 1974  
(millions de dollars)

Pays donneurs	Engagements				Estimation des versements					
	Dilatégramme	Dilatégramme- Euros	Total	en % des		Dilatégramme	Multilaté- Total	en % des		
				rec. du PSE	du FMB			rec. du PSE	du FMB	
Algérie	31	100	139	3,8	1,7	15	45	60	1,1	0,7
Iran	2802	173	2975	17,1	10,1	600	2	602	3,4	2,0
Irak	222	53	280	4,1	2,9	80	35	115	1,7	1,2
Koweït	397	304	1341	19,1	15,3	460	70	530	7,6	6,2
Libye	178	241	419	5,5	3,4	45	60	105	1,4	0,9
Nigéria	1	16	17	0,2	0,2	1	15	16	0,2	0,1
Qatar	97	60	157	9,8	7,4	40	20	60	3,7	2,8
Arabie Saoudite	2568	453	3021	15,1	13,4	650	115	765	3,8	3,4
Emirats Arabes Unis	295	182	477	11,6	(10,0)	120	45	165	4,0	(3,5)
Vénézuéla	20	726	746	7,0	3,6	20	165	185	1,7	0,9
Total	7172	2401	9573	12,1	8,2	2031	572	2603	3,3	2,2

Note : Ces chiffres sont sujets à révision. En particulier, certains des estimations des versements présentent un caractère très incertain.  
Les chiffres relatifs aux recettes pétrolières et au FMB sont des estimations du Secrétariat.  
Le total indiqué du FMB, et celui des recettes pétrolières, portent sur les pays indiqués à l'exclusion du Nigéria.

Tableau 4

Les principaux bénéficiaires de l'aide bilatérale des pays  
de l'OPEP en 1974

Bénéficiaires	Engagements		Estimation des versements	
	millions de \$ En pourcentage du total		millions de \$ En pourcentage du total	
Egypte	3.121	(13.5)	765	37.7
Syrie	(1.003)	(14.0)	325	16.0
Jordanie	(135)	(2.6)	140	6.9
Mauritanie*	(153)	(2.1)	25	1.2
Soudan*	107	1.5	70	3.4
Somalie*	82	1.1	25	1.2
Maroc*	80	1.1	25	1.2
Tunisie	54	0.8	15	0.7
Bahreïn	21	0.3	10	0.5
Rp. arabe du Yémen	19	0.3	15	0.7
Rp. populaire démocratique du Yémen*	12	0.2	10	0.5
Autres pays arabes	3	0.1	8	0.4
Madagascar*	(114)	(1.6)	-	-
Guinée*	16	0.2	5	0.2
Ouganda	12	0.2	2	0.1
Sénégal*	11	0.1	5	0.2
Autres pays africains	79	1.1	46	2.3
Pakistan*	(957)	(13.3)	355	17.5
Inde*	945	13.2	75	3.7
Sri Lanka*	86	1.2	35	1.7
Bangladesh*	82	1.1	50	2.5
Autres pays asiatiques	-	-	-	-
Rép. de Guyane*	15	0.2	15	0.7
Honduras*	5	0.1	5	0.2
Autres pays d'Amérique Latine	-	-	-	-
Malte	5	0.1	5	0.2
Total	7.172	100	2.031	100
Dont pays les plus gravement touchés	2.683	37.4	736	36.2

\* Pays les plus gravement touchés.

Note: Ces chiffres sont sujets à révision. La répartition entre l'Egypte, la Syrie et la Jordanie reste incertaine. Les chiffres relatifs aux engagements souscrits en faveur du Pakistan comprennent 200 millions de dollars, engagement souscrit par l'Arabie Saoudite et le Koweït, qui n'a pas été rendu public, mais dont on pense qu'il est effectif.



Tableau 5

Engagements bilatéraux souscrits par les pays de l'OPEP en 1974

Pays Donneurs	Pays Bénéficiaires	Total	Dons	Prêts	Millions de \$	
					Aide "non- projet"	Aide "projet"
Algérie	Guinée équatoriale	1	-	1	-	1
	Mali*	1	-	1	1	-
	Zambie	1	(1)	-	1	-
	Autres pays africains*	23	22	6	n.d.	n.d.
Iran	Egypte	1.000	-	1.000	230	770
	Inde*	335	-	335	(535)	300
	Pakistan*	647	-	647	580	67
	Syrie	150	-	150	150	-
	Soudan*	64	-	64	n.d.	n.d.
	Sri Lanka*	(57)	-	57	(30)	27
	Maroc	30	-	30	-	30
	Sénégal*	11	-	11	3	3
	Jordanie	3	-	3	(3)	-
Afghanistan	n.d.	-	-	-	-	
Irak	Inde*	110	-	110	110	-
	Bangladesh*	54	25	29	34	20
	Syrie	50	(50)	-	50	-
	Yémen (R.A)*	8	-	8	8	-
Koweït	Egypte	(333)	(230)	53	(280)	53
	Syrie	(200)	(175)	25	(175)	25
	Jordanie	(125)	(125)	-	(125)	-
	Mauritanie*	(111)	n.d.	n.d.	(100)	11
	Sri Lanka*	29	(-)	29	29	(-)
	Pakistan*	(50)	-	(50)	n.d.	n.d.
	Aide Région*	33	-	33	-	33
	Soudan*	15	-	15	-	15
	Guinée*	15	-	15	(-)	(15)
	Yémen (RPD)*	14	-	14	-	14
	Tchad*	3	-	8	n.d.	n.d.
	Tunisie	7	-	7	-	7
	G. Persique	(6)	(6)	-	n.d.	n.d.
	Bahreïn	3	-	3	-	3
Liban	2	2	-	-	2	
Niger*	1	1	-	1	-	
Zaïre*	n.d.	-	-	-	-	
Dahomey*	n.d.	-	-	-	-	

Pays Donneurs	Pays Bénéficiaires	Total	Dons	Prêts	Aide "non-projet"	Aide "projet"
Libye	Nadagascar*	(114)		(114)	-	(114)
	Egypte	(30)	(30)	-	(30)	-
	Syrie	(20)	(20)	-	(20)	-
	Ouganda	12	-	12	-	12
	Gambie	1	n.d.	n.d.	1	-
	Guinée équa.	1	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
	Tchad*	n.d.				
	Lésoto*	n.d.				
Somalie*	n.d.					
Nigeria	Zambie	1	n.d.	n.d.	1	-
Qatar	Egypte	53	n.d.	n.d.	-	53
	Soudan*	14	-	14	14	-
	Tunisie	10	-	10	n.d.	n.d.
	Pakistan*	10	-	10	-	10
	Mauritanie*	9	3	6	3	5
	Bangladesh*	1	1	-	1	-
Arabie Saoudite	Egypte	(1590)	(1190)	500	n.d.	n.d.
	Syrie	(550)	(550)	-	n.d.	n.d.
	Pakistan*	(150)	-	(150)	n.d.	n.d.
	Jordanie	45	45	-	45	-
	Maroc	50	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
	Mauritanie*	22	2	20	2	20
	Tunisie	(19)	-	(19)	-	(19)
	Soudan*	14	(14)	(-)	14	-
	Bangladesh*	10	(10)	(-)	10	-
	Bahrein	3	3	-	-	3
	Malte	5	-	5	5	-
	Yémen*	(5)	5	-	(5)	-
	Niger (RA)*	n.d.				
Libéria	n.d.					
EAU	Pakistan*	100	-	100	(100)	-
	Somalie*	32	30	2	(80)	2
	Egypte	10	-	10	-	10
	Syrie	33	(-)	(33)	-	33
	Tunisie	(17)	(15)	2	(15)	2
	Bangladesh*	17	5	12	17	-
	Bahrein	10	-	10	-	10
	Mauritanie*	11	4	7	4	7
	Jordanie	7	-	7	-	7
	Yémen (RA)*	6	6	-	-	6
Pays du Sahel*	3	3	-	3	-	
Venezuela	Guyane*	15	-	15	n.d.	n.d.
	Honduras*	5	-	5	n.d.	n.d.

\* Pays les plus gravement touchés.

Note : Bien que ce tableau ne donne en principe que la liste des engagements d'aide du type APD, il est fréquemment impossible de faire la distinction entre les flux d'APD et les autres flux de ressources, car les termes de certaines transactions n'ont pas encore été fixés, ou n'ont pas été rendus publics. On trouvera dans la description de l'aide de chaque pays (Section II) des informations plus détaillées sur les transactions indiquées dans ce tableau.

Tableau 6

Engagements et estimations des versements des pays de l'OPDP  
en faveur des organisations multilatérales (cons. de souscriptions  
en capital) en 1974 (millions de dollars)

DEVELOPPEMENT	Orga- nismes	Cote Spécial	IDA	BAFO	SED	FASA	BAGEA	FADES	Cote spécial	CO islami-	F. Sol. islami-	Fonds CPEP	CAGEI	CARIB. OR	ADC	TOTAL
	(1)	(2)							(3)							
ALGERIA	C 0.5	20		9		20	20		(8)	30						107.5
	D 0.5	-		9		20	-	(5)	(2)	-						42.5
IRAN	C 2.5	20										150(4)				172.5
	D 2.5	-														2.5
IRAQ	C 0.5					(20)	30		(8)							58.5
	D 0.5					(20)	-	(7)	(5)							35.5
KUWAIT	C 1.0		27			30	250(2)		(16)	60						384.0
	D 1.0		9			30	-	(15)	(16)	-						71.0
LIBYA	C 1.0			12		30	(40)		(3)	150						241
	D 1.0			12		30	-	(10)	(8)	-						61
NIGERIA	C 0.2			16												16
	D 0.2			16												16
QATAR	C 0.2					10	20		(3)	20						60
	D 0.2					10	-	(2)	(2)	-						20
SAUDI ARABIA	C 12.0	30				40	50	60	(16)	240	5					453
	D 12.0	30				40	-	(15)	(16)	-						113
UAE	C 0.5	10				20	22(3)		(3)	120	2					182.5
	D 0.5	10				20	-	(6)	(2)	-						44.5
YEMEN-YEMEN	C 1.0	80			500							20	40	25	60	726
	D 1.0	30			100								10	5	20	166
TOTAL	C 19.5	150	27	37	500	170	432	60	72	620	9	170	40	25	60	2,401.5
	D 19.5	70	9	37	100	170	-	(60)	72	-	-	-	10	5	20	572.5

NOTE : Abréviations utilisées : FASA (Fonds Arabe spécial pour l'Afrique) ; BAGEA (Banque Arabe pour le Développement Economique en Afrique) ; FADES (Fonds Arabe pour le développement Economique et Social) ; F. SOL. Islamique (Fonds de solidarité islamique) ; CAGEI (Banque pour l'Intégration économique de l'Amérique Centrale) ; ADC (Société Andine de Développement).

Les chiffres entre parenthèses sont des tentatives d'estimation.

- (1) Déduit du Tableau 7, y compris un million de dollars destinés par l'Iran aux pays du Sahel et 10 millions de dollars destinés par l'Arabie Saoudite aux victimes des inondations au Bangladesh.
- (2) Y compris un prêt de 200 millions de dollars.
- (3) Y compris 2 millions de dollars pour le Fonds Arabe d'Assistance technique pour l'Afrique.
- (4) Prémis à l'origine pour le fonds de l'OPDP (en projet) ; pourraient être utilisés à d'autres fins multilatérales.

ANNEXE II

SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE OFFICIALLY  
REPORTED AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1974

(Document U.N.E.O. A/9828 du 1 novembre 1974)

N.B. Les chiffres mentionnés dans ce document doivent être complétés ou modifiés comme suit : (information disponible au 31.12.1974)

1. A compléter pour l'Arabie Séoudite

- aides d'urgence bilatérale	75 mio \$
via le PAM	50 mio \$
	<hr/>
	125 mio \$
- prêts de développement aux pays MSA	120 mio \$

Ce montant n'entre pas dans le cadre de l'opération d'urgence bien qu'ayant été entièrement versé

2. A modifier pour les Emirats Arabes Unis

- aides d'urgence bilatérale	300 mio \$
- versement au compte spécial UNEO	10 mio \$
	<hr/>
	310 mio \$

3. Le montant total des engagements et celui des versements prévus avant le 30.6.1975 doit donc être majoré de 308 mio \$, compte tenu des 127 mio \$ déjà enregistrés par UNEO.

On notera toutefois que le chiffre donné par l'Iran est sans doute excessif.

- 2 -

SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE OFFICIALLY REPORTED AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1974  
(in \$US millions)

Contributors	Total Commitments	Grants	Loans	Intended Disbursements in the year ended 30/6/75	Observations
<u>Countries:</u>					
Algeria	51	43	8	51	In addition to \$107 mil. contributed to Arab regional funds and African Development Bank.
Australia	49	49	0	49	Excluding contribution to Papua New Guinea.
Canada	101	85	16	101	Excluding contribution to Jamaica
Denmark	1	1	0	1	In addition to the share in the EEC contribution.
European Community	150	150	0	150	
Finland	11	0	11	11	
Iceland	-	-	-	-	\$40,000 paid into the Special Account.
Iran	1,577	...	...	380	Intended disbursements by the end of 1974.
Japan	100			...	Represents minimum contribution.
Kuwait	...	...	...	...	Has contributed \$65 mil. to Arab regional funds and over \$500 mil. bilaterally.
Netherlands	16	16	0	16	In addition to the share in the EEC contribution.
New Zealand	9	9	0	9	
Norway	17	17	0	17	
Saudi Arabia	30	30	0	30	Has contributed \$90 mil. to Arab regional funds.
Sweden	37	34	3	37	
United Arab Emirates	127	...	...	...	In addition, assistance is given to drought and flood stricken countries.
United Kingdom	48	19	29	48	In addition to the share in the EEC contribution. Emergency assistance disbursed prior to 30/6/74 amounts to \$36.4 mil.
Venezuela	100	80	20	100	
Yugoslavia	7	3	4	...	In local currency.

Contributors	Total Commitments	Grants	Loans	Intended Disbursements in the year ended 30/6/75	Observations
<u>International Agencies:</u>					
African Development Bank					Intended disbursement \$86 mil., provided Arab Fund for alleviation of the effects of high oil prices is transferred to the FA as requested by OAU Council of Ministers.
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development	72			72	Intended disbursements by the end of 1974 from OAPEC special account.
IDA	100			68	
League of Arab States	121			...	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,724</b>	<b>...</b>	<b>...</b>	<b>...</b>	

claude cheysson  
member of the commission of  
the european communities  
brussels

on my return from visit to bangladesh have honour draw your attention to very critical food situation in that country. food imports averaging 200,000 tons monthly are necessary to meet basic needs of population until next harvest around june 1975. present pipeline of supplies for public distribution system will be virtually exhausted in february . since three months or more normally elapse between placement of order and delivery at port of destination it is essential that immediate steps be taken to ensure that food will continue to arrive in bangladesh from february through june. total uncovered requirement for minimum consumption about one million tons. bangladesh foreign exchange reserves almost exhausted. pending measures ease balance of payments deficit comma which is being sought in uneco framework comma eye urge that steps be taken by eec to ensure uninterrupted flow of supplies in particular by responding sympathetically to requests for additional food aid from bangladesh government. any serious break in pipeline can mean widespread starvation and deaths. would appreciate fao being kept informed of further developments. am addressing similar message to governments of australia canada usa and to lardinois. highest consideration =

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