Department of Political Studies - University of Catania

Jean Monnet Chair of European Comparative Politics



Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics


Dimitris N. CHRYSSOCHOOU

University of Exeter

 

Democracy and Integration Theory in the 1990s:

A Study in European Polity-Formation

 


June1998 - JMWP 14.98



 

'[I]t is certainly arguable that the EU is already the most

complex polity that human agency...has ever devised'.

P. C. Schmitter - 1996

Setting the Analytical Scene

Every theoretical journey has its own rewards. These may stem either from the exercise of determining the defining properties of complex phenomena, or from wider methodological concerns about the setting of an appropriate research agenda in the discipline concerned. Theorising about the European Union (EU), and of European integration more generally, is no exception. On the contrary, it is through the conceptual and analytical lenses of 'integration theory' that one may develop a greater understanding of the structural properties, behavioural characteristics and operational dynamics of what it often referred to as 'the emerging European polity'. In many respects, the term 'polity' offers an appropriate point of departure: it is ideologically free from the insights offered either by micro-analyses of specific policy sectors, or by the classical state-centric and federalist approaches to European integration, as it is capable of avoiding the equally biased interpretations embedded in a supranationalist conception of European regional life. But also, it offers the analyst the possibility of not complying with any specific categorisation of the Union's internal political arena.

By 'polity' is meant a system of governance capable of producing authoritative political decisions over a given population. The characterisation of the Union as an 'emerging polity', compound yet easily identifiable as a collectivity, refers to no less. In fact, it is now possible to contemplate the idea of replacing the rather deterministic concept of 'integration' with that of 'polity-formation': the making of a large-scale system of collective governance composed of highly interdependent 'bodies politic'. Integration theory may then become part of a wider evolution - conceptual as well as analytical - linking the constitutive elements of a composite political arrangement to governance structures operating at a level larger than the traditional state. Although 'integration' remains a useful term in the vocabulary of EU studies in so far as it attempts to explain the coming together of previously separate or independent entities under a new regional centre (or a supranational political authority) 'polity-formation' captures the constitutive character of Union governance: its component state/citizen parts. It is around this problematique that a new research agenda has begun to emerge.

To begin our theoretical journey, students of European 'polity-formation' are confronted with a fundamental theoretical challenge: to conceptualise the emerging patterns of interaction between the collectivity and the segments by taking into account the intersection of different theoretical approaches. The aim is to enhance our understanding of the structural properties and operational dynamics of European governance after the formal conclusion of yet another formal treaty revision. However one classifies the end-product of the 1996/97 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the following set of questions warrant our attention. What is new about European integration in the 1990s? Is it possible to classify the emerging European polity under a comprehensive model of governance? If 'yes', then what conceptual and analytical lenses should be used? What are the limits and possibilities of an 'ever closer union' among distinct, yet highly interdependent, polities? Has a terminal state of integration become discernible? Finally, what is the dominant character of the relationship between democracy (as indirect demos control) and integration (as polity-formation)?

These questions form part of a wider research agenda which revolves around a plurality of interrelated issues: the future of the European state system; the viability of democratic arrangements within and across pre-established borders; novel forms of large-scale community-building, multiple identity-holding and formal constitutional engineering; the locus of sovereignty over an ever expanding array of transnational activities; the relationship between the functional scope, territorial scale and integrative level of joint decision-making; the institutionalisation of new avenues of political communication, and the question of citizen identification with EU structures. The above list may well be extended to cover most areas of regional political life, cutting across the conventional disciplines in the study of the EU. In this article, such an ensemble of concepts and ideas is treated within the wider theoretical laboratory of European 'polity-formation': the creation of a profound locking together of distinct culturally defined and politically organised units within a larger, purposive whole.

On Theory and its Uses

Four decades of uninterrupted theorising about European integration have produced a situation where arguably little remains to be said. This is not an attempt to evade the task of developing a greater understanding of the forces that shape the transnational system. It is only to state that the theory of such a polycemous concept as 'integration' appears to have reached a plateau in its West European context. Not that theorists should start looking for new regional experiments of comparable analytical potential in other parts of the globe. Rather, the idea is that the new challenges facing the study of European integration do not take place in a theoretical vacuum: they are an extension, if not a refinement, of older ones. Legitimately though, one may also ask whether Puchala's cynical prophesy that integration theory will amount to 'a rather long but not very prominent footnote in the intellectual history of twentieth century social science' (1984:198) will prove as accurate as the author would have us believe. A first response might be that theory matters, whether or not its conceptual findings and qualifications are to be evenly appreciated by scholars and practitioners alike. For, familiarity with theory helps to test our analytical tools and appreciate their relevance in real situations: 'Each theory...leads to unique insights which are valid starting points for the purpose of comparison and evaluation'. (Taylor, 1971: i) Or, alternatively, 'Attempts to avoid theory...not only miss interesting questions but rely on a framework for analysis that remains unexamined precisely because it is implicit' (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1990: 284). True, a great deal has still to be accomplished. But as long as theory-building activities occupy a prominent role in the various research agendas, important possibilities are deemed to be explored. But what might constitute such 'possibilities'? How are they to be explored? What is the appropriate methodological line to that end? First, substantive progress in the field requires the transcendence of descriptive approaches about the form and functions of European polity-formation and the resolution of fundamental conceptual problems confronting a discipline that has become subject to diverse interpretation. This requires 'structured ways of understanding changing patterns of interaction' (Church, 1996: 8), free from the inherently fragmented boundaries of micro-analysis: to project a macroscopic view of the nascent EU polity based on systematic conceptual explanation: 'We need to be aware of the conceptions we use since they determine our perception of things' (Ibid). This methodological path to the study of the EU allows higher access to reality, or offers the basis for 'a hierarchy of realities' to emerge (Taylor, 1971: 149).

The analytical validity of these presuppositions is justified further when trying to establish a link between continuity and change in a system of multinational shared rule; when aiming at throwing additional light on the dialectical union between a highly interactive society of nations and new centres of collective decision-making; and when engaging in a process of investigating the allegedly 'part-formed' and/or sui generis physiognomy of a 'union' composed of distinct politically organised states and demoi, where the dynamics of intrastate policy-making intermesh with those of large-scale polity-formation with enormous complexity, producing interlocking authority structures. Theory helps us to conceptualise the European polity and assess the nature of sovereignty within its governance structures (Bellamy and Castiglione, 1997). But even more difficult is to critically evaluate an ever expanding corpus of literature dealing with such a rich kaleidoscope of relations. Whatever the lessons to be learnt from the process of bringing together a cluster of consolidated democracies under a larger management system, this article would have made a contribution if it has offered an opportunity to communicate the major concerns underlying the nature of European polity-formation. For existing theories of integration, even when taken in a complementary manner, fall short of capturing the relationship between the region and the sub-units. In particular, Mitrany's functionalism, Haas's neo-functionalism, and the many federalist approaches to integration, ranging from the American model of 'dual federalism' to the German system of 'co-operative federalism', find it difficult to reconcile the preservation of high levels of segmental autonomy within a nascent, but still politically uncrystallised, structure of mutual governance. That is, to capture the dynamics of two complementary objectives: strengthening the political viability of separate constitutional orders through the institutionalisation of joint sovereignty.

The point to make here is that we are currently witnessing the reversal of the Mitranian logic to integration: instead of 'form follows function' (1943: 72-3), it is increasingly the case that the structural properties of the system dictate the pace and range of joint integrative schemes. Thus, an additional concern has become manifest: the extension of the 'scope' (range) and 'level' (depth) of integration do not necessarily coincide. Since the coming into force of the Single European Act (SEA) (1987) and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (1993), both the functional scope (new policies) and territorial scale (new members) of European integration may well be extended, if not at the expense of its level (ways of management), without either altering the locus of sovereignty, or having any significant impact on the way in which the central institutions exercise political authority. The extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) by the SEA on largely non conflict-prone areas (Article 100A) and the introduction of a complex co-decision procedure by the TEU (Article 189b) illustrate this point. And so does the sensibly arranged reform package agreed at Amsterdam.

A second area of concern challenging our conventional ways of thinking about integration relates to the question of a 'democratic deficit' in EU structures. In a period when much scholarly debate on this subject focuses on procedural mechanisms and interinstitutional relations, its equally important socio-psychological aspects remain largely unexplored - i.e., the absence of a fully-fledged European demos. The latter point changes our focus from the oft-raised question of 'Who Governs?' to the more demanding one of 'Who is governed?'. This metatheoretical shift in emphasis reflects upon a foundational assumption that democracy presupposes the existence of a demos as the necessary popular infrastructure upon which majority rule is to apply. Equally, n the absence of a European demos, the larger polity will remain in limbo between a system of democratic governments and a democratic system of government, or indeed between a plurality of demoi and a pluralistic demos (Chryssochoou, 1996; 1998).

For the moment, the constituent demoi of the Union, despite their common citizenship status, are still characterised by high levels of political fragmentation, amounting to a 'semisovereign' collection of individuals who lack the means to mark their impact on EU affairs. For we have not witnessed yet witnessed the creation of concrete avenues for the expression of the sovereign power of European citizens in relation to the larger polity. This power does not presuppose a fragmented citizenry in the sense of a 'polycracy': 'a separable multiplicity made up of the unit "each one"' (Sartori, 1987: 22). Rather, it requires a process of democratic self-transformation resulting from the spread of new ideas and ways of relating EU citizens to integration processes and, hence, to an 'inclusive' European polity. Here, the aim is to transform a politically amorphous aggregate of national citizen bodies into a transnational demos, capable of directing its democratic claims to, and via, the central institutions - itself a prerequisite for the development of a common civic identity at the grassroots. So far, it is only among the segment elites that a transnational political culture has emerged, product of the transformation of the concept of national self-determination into one of political co-determination through the common management of merged sovereignties.

New Conceptual Lenses

Embarking on the search for a clear model of Union governance, or indeed for a less nebulous one, it is argued that the concept of 'Confederal Consociation' is a promising analogy in filling the gap between classical state-centric and traditional federalist approaches to European integration (Chryssochoou, 1994, 1995, 1997). Central to a structured analysis of the Union is a theory drawn from the domain of comparative politics, namely, consociationalism. The model also offers an account of the current state of democracy in the European polity. Our premise that since the mid-1980s, the dynamics of EU constitutional change, far from leading to a diffusion of national sovereignty, have maintained the ability of the member governmnets to manage the increased levels of interdependence, and enhancing the domestic power base of their dominant political elites. The result is the emergence of a system of political interconnectedness co-existing with high levels of segmental autonomy. Similarly to Puchala's 'Concordance System', the model represents what is 'coming into being "out there" in the empirical world' (Puchala, 1972: 277). The term 'Confederal' refers to the structural properties of the EU - its treaty-based nature and the absence of a sovereign European political body. 'Consociation' refers to co-operative joint decision-making. All four defining features of a 'normal' consociation can be found in the Union: a fair separation of the segments; its domination by what Dahrendorf called a 'cartel of elites'; a proportional representation of the component states to the central institutions; and a qualified right of mutual veto for the protection of minority interests.

Consociationalism allows the governing elites of the constituent units to resist the forging of horizontal links among their r publics, and promote vertical integration so as to retain ultimate authority within their internal political arenas. This results in an increasing determination on the part of the segment elites to exercise managerial control over integration, whilst enabling them to 'mediate between the conflicting dynamics of cooperative confederalism and entrenched territorialism' (Bulmer, 1996, p. 32). The operational code adopted by the members of the Council of Ministers and the European Council despite the reality of mutual vetoes, illustrates this point: the both perform functions similar to those of a 'grand coalition', pointing to a mode of political accommodation which Taylor termed 'government by alliance' (1975: 346): a coalescent style of leadership emphasising the conditions under which nations decide to do certain things in common, whilst setting the limits of acceptable behaviour.

The present EU may thus be paralleled to a system of 'horizontal Kooperative Staaten', in that the formulation of common policies rests upon the existance or not of prior agreement between state and federal actors, while their implementation on the administrative capacity of the states. In this sense, the EU is based on a co-operative type of federalism, rather than on a federalism founded upon hierarchical authority structures. This alternative arrangement to the traditional 'center-periphery model' facilitates the institutionalisation of state participation in the common exercise of power to protect territorial interests, whilst raising the possibilities for 'a federal-type organisation to operate without a centre traditionally conceptualized...constructed by member governments without its being detached from the collectivity of constituent units' (Sbragia, 1992: 289). This polycentric pattern of interaction that takes place in an intersegmental 'positive-sum' game, we term inverse federalism: a situation where political authority tends to be diffused as much as possible to the executive branches of the constituent units, rather than to the central institutions. Yet, inverse federalism does not proclaim the demise of the European nation-state, neither does it envision the immediate creation of a transnational civic identity. Rather, it helps to consolidate further the practice of consensus elite government at the larger management level.

Confederal Consociation, as a new type of collective polity, poses no fundamental threat for the constitutional orders of states. Nor does it presuppose the creation of a new sovereign entity, along the traditional federalist lines - i.e., through the making of a European constitution. Unlike a federal state, the European polity rests on an international treaty signed by sovereign nations, where 'the condition of "the last-say"' (Dahl, 1956: 38) rests with the partners to it, rather than with an independent authoritative entity at the central level. In brief, Confederal Consociation refers to a consensually pre-arranged form of 'union', whose component parts preserve their integrity and continue to form collective national identities, without resigning their individual sovereignty to a higher central authority (Chryssochoou, 1995: 287). But where does the European polity, whose elusive 'constitution' currently remains in limbo between two major treaty revisions, fit in the above theoretical discussion?

Structure and Dynamics in Perspective

Reflecting on the TEU, the European Community (EC) remains the essential part of the EU's tripartite structure, whilst the other two 'pillars' complementing this 'temple model' - the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) - represent two pluralist arenas, revealing the limits of QMV in sensitive areas whose locus decidendi rests firmly with the Council of Ministers. As Taylor put it: 'The whole was to be consolidated into a single package of activities linked in systems of common management' (1993: 99). Given that the TEU rests on two different legal mechanisms - the 'Community method' and the 'intergovernmental method' (Demaret, 1994: 5), the extent to which there exists a 'single institutional framework' is far from self-evident. In brief, the legal architecture of the TEU has raised more questions than it sought to address, becoming 'a source of controversy' (Pryce, 1994: 3). As H. Wallace notes, 'the terms of Maastricht...can be interpreted as easily as making efforts to set a ceiling on, even a roll back of, the forces of supranationalism as they can be seen as crossing a new threshold on the route towards a European transnational polity' (1993: 294). It is conceivable that the Union be considered 'a new international organisation sui generis and thus as a subject of international law' (Ress, 1994: 156), if by 'international organisation' is meant 'a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between members...from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interests of membership' (Archer, 1992: 37). In brief, the question of whether the EU has moved closer to a federal type of polity or whether it can still be conceived as a 'union of states', remains an open-ended one. But what is also in need for further clarification, is whether this 'new stage in the process of creating an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe' has increased the democratic properties of the regional system.

It is also clear that the states wish to protect their own cultural, political and constitutional identities. As Art. F (1) states: 'The Union shall respect the national identities of the Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy'. This provision is indicative of the need to sustain a pluralistic form of society at the larger level, but also that any challenge to constituent identities will be unacceptable. This search for regional unity through a compromised structure of federal principles and confederal structures points to a series of interstate concessions, without the states relinquishing their own autonomy. For the TEU offers a unique blend of consensual mechanisms for accommodating varying degrees of diversity within a nascent, yet fragile, political unity. Joining together diverse entities in a larger unit that respects their individual integrity, the constitutional structure of the EU challenges the organic theory of the polity, without relying on the properties of 'segmented differentiation'. From this stems its greatest merit as a new framework of mutual governance: to provide equality of status to its members, whilst allowing for a less rigid understanding of statehood. This has been achieved so far by applying a mixed system of consensus and majority rule, somewhat close to what Forsyth describes as 'unanimity at the base, majority voting in the superstructure' (1994: 66).

But against an ever more cynical electorate, any residual touch of optimism since the mid-1980s - a period hailed as a neo-functionalist 'comeback' (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991) - seemed to have evaporated by the early 1990s. Although the TEU was eventually ratified, a new 'democratic disjunction' became manifest between the wishes of national leaders and popular political sentiments (Stavridis, 1993: 130). As in past efforts to reach consensus on a final text, the TEU reflected the ongoing tussle between those defending the states' rights and those projecting an independent legitimacy for the new polity. As Neunreither put it: 'It is a text for insiders, not only in being difficult to read and to digest, but even more because of its paternalistic approach - everything is done for the people, not very much by the people' (1994: 96). The lesson to be drawn is that unless there is sufficient consensus among the elites to ease the tensions arising from a classical interpretation of self-determination, and a more advanced conception of co-determination, no viable outcome can exist. This accords with what most sceptical students of integration have implicitly assumed: over the last years, the interplay between the scope and level of integration has exploited to the highest possible degree a crucial property of consensusal politics: the institutional capacity to reconcile the concurrent demands for 'unity in diversity'.

A similar conclusion is drawn by looking at the moderate reforms embedded in the Treaty of Amsterdam (AMT), signed on 2 October 1997. As The Economist colourfully put it, the new Treaty 'produced more of a mouse than a mountain' (June 21, 1997: 37). Whether a 'reasonable step' or one that is 'lacking ambition', the AMT preserves the three-pillar structure of the EU and with it the existence of two separate legal mechanisms. Some areas previously falling in the sphere of JHA will be gradually transferred to the EC (partial communitarisation), while the Schengen Agreement is fully incorporated into the EU (with Britain and Ireland having secured an opt out). A new employment chapter is also part of the AMT (as a job-creating measure), and so is Maastricht's 'social chapter'. In the CFSP, the AMT provides for a limited extension of QMV for detailed policy implementation; the appointment of a 'high representative'; the creation of a 'planning unit'; and the use of 'constructive abstention' in joint actions. At the institutional level, it is agreed that at the first enlargement the big countries will lose their second Commissioner provided that they are compensated through a reweighting of votes in the Council. But a decision has been deferred until a new IGC is convened at least one year before EU membership exceeds 20. QMV has been extended in the fields of research, customs co-operation and fraud, and so has the (now simplified) 'co-decision procedure' in the areas of employment (incentive measures), social policy (equal opportunities and treatment), public health, transparency (general principles), statistics, and data protection (independent advisory authority). Moreover, the common legislative procedures involving the EP are reduced to three: co-decision, consultation and assent; whilst a Chapter on Fundamental Rights and Non-discrimination is inserted in the AMT to strengthen the EU's 'human face', and safeguard the protection of human rights.

A new protocol is also enshrined in the AMT in an attempt to define more precisely the criteria for applying the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. It states: 'In exercising the powers conferred on it, each institution shall ensure that the principle of subsidiarity is complied with', and 'any action of the Community shall not go beyond any action necessary for the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty'. It is also noted that these principles shall respect the acquis communautaire and the institutional balance, whilst taking into account that 'the Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies'. Still, however, it is the EC that has to justify compliance of proposed legislation to these principles. Ceteris paribus, directives should be preferred to regulations and so should framework directives to detailed measures, thus leaving as much scope for national decisions as possible. The Commission should seek maximum consultation prior to initiating legislation; minimise administrative or financial burdens; and submit an annual report to the other EU institutions on the application of these principles.

Flexibility was finally included in the AMT, albeit precluding the creation of a Europe à la carte by introducing strict conditions for its application. Such a principle should further the objectives and protect the interests of the EU; respect the principles of the Treaties and the single institutional framework; be used only as a last resort; concern at least a majority of EU members; respect the acquis communautaire; not affect the competences, rights, obligations and interests of those members that do not wish to participate therein; remain open to all members states; and be authorised by the Council. It is also stated that the new 'flexible' arrangements will be governed by the same decision-making rules as in the TEU, adjusted accordingly for membership, and that the EP will be regularly informed by the Commission and the Council. But the AMT precludes the member states from initiating flexible arrangements in areas that fall within the exclusive competences of the EC; affect EC policies, actions, or programmes; concern EU citizenship or discriminate between member state nationals; fall outside the limits of the powers conferred upon the EC by the AMT; and constitute discrimination or restrict trade and/or distort competition between member states. Authorisation for such 'flexible' schemes 'shall be granted by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal by the Commission and after consulting the EP'. Any objection by a state on grounds of 'important and stated reasons' results in the whole matter being referred to the European Council for a unanimous decision.

Turning to the political dynamics of regional constitutional change, one could argue that the new Treaty forms part of a wider evolution towards a more federally discernible European polity: a multilevel, pluralist structure based on a constitutional system of delegated, reserved and/or shared powers between relatively autonomous, yet interrelated, levels of government. From this view, the AMT brings the shared undertaking into another transition stage termed nascent Gemeinschaft. As Hallstein's 'First Europe' (1958-66) (institutional centralisation) was succeeded by Dahrendorf's 'Second Europe' (1969-74) (creative intergovernmentalism) and then by Taylor's 'Third Europe' (1974-97) (symbiosis), so the latter is giving way to a Fourth Europe based on the practice of co-determination and the joint exercise of sovereignty. Whether or not this phase will result to a genuine European 'constitutive polity' is too early to assess. All too often, deterministic approaches to the outcome of treaty revisions have been widely misleading. Suffice it to stress that a Gemeinschaft-type of polity would be comprised of citizens simultaneously conscious of their separate existence as distinct political entities (or demoi) and of their collective existence as a composite demos (Chryssochoou, 1997). As always, the nature of the relationship between the collectivity and the segments will depend upon the preferred lines of interpretation of the AMT. For the moment, however, the European polity continues to be defined along the lines of a Confederal Consociation. Whatever the winds of EU constitutional reform hold for the future, one thing is certain: European integration in the 1990s is not about the subordination of states to a higher central authority, but rather about the preservation of those state qualities that make the segments survive as separate collectivities, while engaging themselves in a process that transforms their traditional patterns of interaction. On balance, the 'burden of proof' lies more on federalism, rather than on intergovernmentalism, albeit of an essetially modified nature, as a method of furthering both the scope as well as the level of integration.

The "Democratic Deficit" Revisited

The argument put forward in this section is that the transformation of the EU from democracies to democracy, and from a 'policy-oriented enterprise' to a 'constitutive polity' is based on the existence of a European demos through which QMV will not only be operationally meaningful but also socially legitimised, and the 'Gemeinschaft factor' in that the positive feelings of the sub-units must be stronger than any divisive issues that may arise as the scope of joint decision-making is being extended. For it is in the Gemeinschaft-type of polity that one may perceive the embryo of a community constituting the civic identity of its members. As Cohen put it: 'there can be no larger part unless the larger part and the smaller parts are indeed parts of one whole' (1971: 46). Thus, the more the EU relies on democratic procedures, the more it depends on whether elements of Gemeinschaft are embodied in the member demoi. The difficulty is to identify the means toward the transformation of a fragmented European demos into 'a mode of coexistence reaching...a very strong sense of "we"' (Sartori, 1987: 36).

The above suggest that EU democracy is linked with both its sociological and communitarian base: 'the construction of a "we" in a context of diversity' (Mouffe, 1993: 69) that reflects the core values of the uniting parts. This notion of European polity-formation requires neither assimilative, nor oppressive techniques of 'enforced homogeneity'. Rather, it needs mechanisms to accommodate divergent claims without threatening the maintenance of democratic bonds among the sub-units. In this context, the formation of a transnational civic identity patterned on a substantive corpus of shared democratic values is imperative. Indeed, it is somewhat irrelevant to speak of EU democracy as 'rule by the people', unless the member publics are characterised by feelings of 'belonging to' an 'inclusive' demos based on the common democratic properties of its 'component' demoi. Here, the concept of European demos overrides any territorial conceptions of polity-formation such as those associated with artificial collective identifications. Instead, it refers to a self-constituting process that respects cultural pluriformity and multiple identity-holding. But for such a pluralistic demos to exist, its members should be based on a 'core curriculum': a body of shared values which keep its members together as an identifiable entity (Etzioni, 1993: 147-51). Only then it is possible to build a self-directed and self-determining European polity.

What also needs to be said is that 'transnational demos-formation' requires active participation in the affairs of the polity, as well as citizen identification with its central institutions. These democratic elements will determine the effectiveness and responsiveness of EU democracy: the ability of the composite demos to influence EU decisions; and the degree to which those empowered to commit the polity as a whole remain responsive to public needs and demands. But they will also determine what Cohen terms 'the sovereign range of democracy': the extent to which ultimate power lies in the affected public or in those deciding on its behalf (1971: 22-3). Thus, the making of a European demos should not be confused either with 'the art of nation-building', or with the creation of a superstate sustained by new forms of nationalism, or even with 'a purely political European nationalism' (Smith, 1991: 152). The EU is not yet 'that "stable middle ground between the cooperation of existing nations and the breaking of a new one"...' (Scharpf, 1988: 242; Hoffmann, 1966: 910).

Thus sketched, the formation of a European demos does not require a formal constitutional merging of pre-existing polities in a larger amalgamated unit (Deutsch, 1957: 6): it implies neither the creation of a 'state', nor a disruptive effect of 'the European pattern of national identity' (Smith, 1991: 153). A group consciousness is needed, but one based on adherence to democratic shared rule, not on a consciousness of 'sameness' and feelings of belonging to a new regional state. Unlike 'formal' political amalgamation, then, whereby different peoples form the core population of a larger territory, transnational demos-formation aims to make the European peoples feel, look and act more as a demos than as several, fragmented and alienated to each other citizen bodies. Its logical outcome is not a 'homogeneous polity' but a new framework of unity that preserves the integrity of the member publics. This dynamic within the relationship between the national demoi as individual units, and as an identifiable transnational demos, is crucial for the democratisation of the larger polity.

In summary, the democratic transformation of the EU rests on the following premises: democratic self-consciousness of the collective citizen body; emphasising of shared 'belief-systems'; public awareness of integration processes; determination to direct democratic claims to the central institutions; and a 'sense of community' to support concerted civic activities. Above all, however, for a European demos to exist, its members should recognise their collective existence as such. Thus, it is neither the creature of a body of law granting rights to a community of peoples composed of different nationalities, nor does it aim to create a sense of 'national identity' or pride (Birch, 1989: 37). Rather, it is a process of self-transformation, in so far as the pursuit of 'large-scale democracy' (Dahl, 1989) presupposes adherence to novel democratic practices, and of self-transcendence, in so far as the states get in the way of doing so. The current antipathy between intergovernmentalists and federalists generates two competing views on the sources of EU legitimacy: national governments (indirect legitimation) and the European public (direct legitimation). According to H. Wallace, their inability to reach a 'substantive consensus' has left the EU 'uncertain about the application of liberal democracy within its own processes', delaying 'the shift from policy to polity' (1993: 100-101). This is crucial for the member publics to meet the requirements of 'a fully democratic process in relation to a demos' (Dahl, 1989: 114). In conclusion, looking at the relationship between Gemeinschaft and European polity-formation is a means of gaining experience about the prospects for a more democratic process of union. It also suggests that the preservation of a 'democratic deficit' in the EU springs from a conscious effort by the segment elites to maintain overall systemic stability by avoiding inter-elite confrontation. Something which in a congruent polity would simply be unacceptable. The following diagram highlights our previous points:

Stages in European Polity-Formation

Structure of European Demos

Fragmented Cohesive

Confrontational

Patterns of

Exchange Gesellschaft

(Self-determination)

Nascent Gemeinschaft

(Democratic Dynamic)

Elite Behaviour

Co-operative

Managed Gesellschaft

(Concordance System)

Complete Gemeinschaft

(Political Community)

As this diagram illustrates, each stage corresponds to a certain type of political organisation, ranging from a system of self-determination to a 'complete' political community: where the structure of the EU demos is cohesive rather than fragmented, the democratic viability of the larger polity depends upon the degree to which its citizens can be actively engaged in the setting of the integrative agenda and be governed by democratic institutions. This currently missing property of the European polity we term transnational civic competence: the institutional capacity of the larger demos to exercise control over joint decision-making, and influence the shaping of EU legislation. But let us now turn to the metatheoretical implications of our findings.

A Metatheoretical Agenda?

Is the existing laboratory of concepts and ideas drawn from the study of the EU firmly enough established for its students to turn to metatheoretical approaches? That is, to investigate the fundamental principles of the integration process and formulate a set of presuppositions about the internal conditions of European polity-formation. A first answer might be that the core-theories of European integration - functionalism, neo-functionalism and federalism - are unlikely to be offering any concrete sense of direction in assessing the emerging patterns of interaction between the states and the regional system, or for that matter the relationship between a cluster of democratic polities and the building of an 'inclusive' and self-encompassing transnational one.

The question is whether a metatheorical approach to the study of the EU will help the analyst to investigate issues that, however central to the methodology of raising the appropriate set of questions (or research agendas), are somewhat subsumed by the need to provide a descriptive and/or narrative account of regional governance, its evolutionary course, and how its internal dynamics relate to, or influence the development of, national political institutions and processes. Whereas the older functionalism developed by Mitrany has focused on the role of international functional agencies as a means of establishing a 'working peace system' based on the notion of 'technical self-determination' within an 'a-territorial', rather than a priori 'a-political', policy environment; Haas's neo-functionalism has centred on the dynamics of a pluralistic arena of organised interests, functional and political spill-overs, and patterns of elite socialisation; and the postwar continental (mainly Italian) federalist school has stressed the importance of institution-building and large-scale constitution-making, they were all concerned in the end with the exercise of fundamental powers.

The point to make here is that the above core-theoretical approaches aimed at providing answers about the relationship between national and regional/international dynamics; joint decision-making procedures, questions of who holds power in the management of transnational affairs, who controls or influences the setting of the integrative agenda, how different policies pursued at the regional/international level suit the interests of the collectivity or those of the segments, who is ultimately responsible for which particular set of policies and decisions, what the impact of integration processes is on the domestic orders of the component political systems, whether the common system is indeed capable of dealing with internal crises and through which institutional mechanisms, and so on. In a word, these theories have been primarily concerned with the following questions: 'Who Governs?' and 'How?'. A metatheoretical approach on the other hand, redirects our analytical focus to issues relating to the kind of questions we ask and the type of answers we offer: it navigates and at the same time challenges our basic assumptions about what it is that we try to establish when examining the internal political arena of the larger association. The fundamental question, therefore, is 'Who is Governed?'. Or, what the essential nature of the nascent European demos is in relation to EU integration processes. As Wendt has pointed out in the context of international relations, metatheory may be seen as 'second order theory', focusing on 'the ontological and epistemological issues of what constitute important or legitimate questions and answers for IR scholarship, rather than on the structure and dynamics of the international system per se' (1991: 383).

Interestingly, the EU, as a polycentric arrangement among democratic polities reflects a striking paradox: it represents a collective entity in which traditional notions of democracy are losing their normative characteristics, whilst exhibiting a notable potential for democratic self-development. Whereas, on the one hand, it appears as a living manifestation of a 'part-formed' body politic whose nascent demos still lacks the vantage point from which to see the larger system as a coherent political whole, on the other, it displays a psychological need to cultivate its civic consciousness and create a new democratic environment by transcending the boundaries of the political. It is our contention that the struggle for a more democratic process of union will be won when the emerging European demos consolidates its collective civic identity and sees the purpose of its activities in the larger political configuration. This said, the remedy to the 'democratic deficit' is as simple to state, as it is difficult to achieve: public support for, democratic control over, and citizen identification with the decisions produced by the central institutions. Yet, as long as the public acts only as a passive receiver of EU initiatives, it will be this distinctive pattern of consensus elite government which will continue unchallenged to steer the Union, control the fate of its citizens and command the major hierarchies of power in its political architecture.

Evidently, the current form of transnational managerial elitism is but a poor substitute for democratic rule, leaving little if any space at all for citizens to share in a complex system of joint decision-making whose 'outcomes' directly affect their daily lives. The aim is to find appropriate ways to stop the European polity from falling short of accountability and responsiveness by means of reforming its institutional base as well as creating a 'politically constituted public sphere' (Tassin, 1989: 171). For democratic reform is not the cause but the consequence of popular determination to be governed democratically: it follows rather than precedes public pleas for greater and better democracy. Put simply, EU reform is not an end in itself: democratisation presupposes a self-conscious unit within which institutional reform actually takes place: a collective civic consciousness that has to emerge from the European public, itself. Otherwise, democracy will remain ineffective and, hence, largely unfulfilled.

And since no single democratic doctrine can claim to have the last word on what democracy is and how it actually works, it may be a good idea to understand first what popular democratic assumptions are all about, and then establish a distinction between democratic and non-democratic approaches to EU integration. To borrow from Schattschneider: 'Democratic government makes very little sense until we know why people should in any case at all have anything to say about how they are governed...Unless we know, why it is supremely important that people participate in their own government, the great effort required to make democratic government work will not seem worth the pains' (Schattschneider, 1969: 43). This way at least, one should not be disappointed in discovering how much transnational political practice deviates from academic definitions of democracy and 'good government'.

Providing the answers to these questions falls beyond the scope of this study. Yet, the point is clearly made that a metatheoretical debate, questioning the fundamental assumptions or 'first principles' underlying the existing research agendas, and involving a foundational discourse on European polity-formation, should not be ruled out, not least due to the fact that metatheory may itself 'open up (or close down) avenues for substantive theory and thereby exercise an important regulatory influence on the latter' (Wendt, 1991: 383). Especially in the case of those integration studies concerned with the building of a democratically viable European polity whose unity is constituted not by a set of interstate contractual arrangements, but by a profound popular basis - a transnational demos - this requires the transcendance of purely institutional considerations and the making of a new methodological commitment to addressing a priori substantive questions about grassroots political developments, the growing chasm between democratic theory and practice in EU structures and, in brief, the socio-psychological conditions of European polity-formation. In short, metatheory helps us to articulate an explicit alternative to structural approaches to the democratic pathology of the EU, by formulating a demos-oriented conceptual apparatus which, to borrow again from Schattschneider, perceives democracy first as 'a state of mind'.

Unlikely and Possible Conclusions

This essay has tried to project a macroscopic view of the European polity, by asking, first, which body of theory can best explain its evolutionary course and, second, what are the prospects for democratising its internal political structures. Whether or not such an approach may contribute towards a 'conceptual consensus' is difficult to foresee. Yet, the point is clearly made that familiarity with theory is a two-way process: it helps to test our analytical tools and appreciate their relevance to the study of European polity-formation. Our theoretical approach reveals that the member states, although parts of a larger polity, have lost nothing of their anxiety to preserve the integrity of their respective polities against the tides of institutional centralisation. In other words, integrative schemes related to a substantive re-ordering of national political structures - i.e., their structural adjustment to a new regional centre - through centrally-controlled federalising attempts have failed to produce a sense of linear progression toward a supranational polity, or for that matter toward a post-national regime in which sovereignty becomes part of the EU's systemic properties. Modernity, and thus the relationship between the 'scope' and 'level' of integration, are still relevant when aiming to explain the evolving reality of the emerging European polity: a consociational partnership of nations based on largely confederal structures. The EU system has thus failed to meet the requirements of responsible government, not least due to its weakness to develop mutually reinforcing legitimation structures based on the principles of ruler accountability, decisional openness and transparency.

As a result, throughout the 1990s, and especially after the ratification of the TEU, an increased tension became manifest between democracy (as indirect demos control) and integration (as polity-formation): the incorporation of the former into the latter was often taken to imply a straightforward loss of national autonomy to an ever federalising scheme which would be detrimental to the constitutional orders of states. This tension has marked its impact over the future evolution of the European polity, demonstrating that the process of uniting distinct politically organised states and demoi is neither automatic, nor easy to achieve. Rather, it is an open-ended one, still a product of a predominantly utilitarian calculus among the governing elites, operating within a common management system where national sovereignty matters. Any 'post-modern' interpretation, would thus seem an unlikely conclusion to the present author. For a polity whose emerging properties and dynamics are continuously under the conceptual and analytical scrutiny of international scholarship (Hix; 1998), but where no substantive agreement has yet been recorded on its political nature, the search for a clear model is no easy task. If anything, the diversity of definitional accounts reported in the acquis académique such as 'union of states', 'proto-federation', 'confederance', 'concordance system', 'mixed commonwealth', 'quasi-state', 'Staatenverbund', 'condominio', 'regulatory state', 'regional regime', 'international state', and so on, suggests that the questions of what exactly the European polity is, and towards what it develops, have yet to be sorted out. Given thus the difficulties involved in reaching an authoritative statement on the nature of the EU, we suggest that instead of placing undue emphasis on the peculiarities of the regional system, it is more profitable to examine those aspects of its internal organisation which can be paralleled with already familiar models of governance. Thus, a new theoretical thesis will not only have to take into account existing classifications, but also to use them constructively so as to substantiate its findings both theoretically and empirically.

In many respects, the current situation has produced exactly the opposite of what neo-functionalists had hoped to achieve: instead of politicisation - i.e., the process of linking the management of integration with the daily lives of European citizens - becoming an additional weapon in the hands of pro-integrationist forces, it is increasingly used by the more sceptical actors, thus making it difficult to mobilise the constituent publics in favour of further integration, and towards a 'complete equilibrium' between different levels of government (Schmitter, 1994). Such a development contests the idea that the implied benefits of joint action, or for that matter commonly performed functions, even when requiring resort to majority rule, would somehow overcome any potentially divisive issues which may arise as European polity-formation proceeds. But this may in turn lead to 'multiple flexible equilibria', a 'condominio...based on variation of both territorial as well as functional constituencies' (Schmitter, 1996: 31), where the form that the European polity is allowed or indeed prohibited from taking will determine the outcome of specific functions. Whatever mode of political interaction eventually prevails, Schmitter's view of the Union as 'the most complex polity that human agency...has ever devised', is likely to remain unchallenged, at least in the foreseeable future.

 


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ã Copyright 1998. Jean Monnet Chair of European Comparative Politics.

Dimitris N. CHRYSSOCHOOU, University of Exeter, Lecturer in Pan-European Politics.

 

D.N.Chryssochoou@exeter.ac.uk