Department of Political Studies - University of Catania

Jean Monnet Chair of European Comparative Politics

Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics

Dimitris K. XENAKIS

University of Exeter

The Barcelona Process: Some Lessons From Helsinki

October 1998 - JMWP 17.98

This study consists of two interrelated thematic units and explores the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative from a historical-institutional perspective. Considering that the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the so called ‘Helsinki Process’ inaugurated in the early 1970s, has proved a successful model for the promotion of peaceful transition in Europe, this paper aims to draw conclusions from the comparative study of the Barcelona Process (BP) and the Helsinki Process (HP).

The structural resemblance between the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and the model of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act based on the incorporation of distinct, yet interrelated pillars or baskets - dealing with political and security issues, economic and financial matters, as well as with human and cultural issues - becomes a very useful tool in ascertaining possible elements of compatibility or indeed institutional and policy differentiation. Hence, if the normative implications of the BP and those of the HP are seen, inter alia, as compatible to each other, then we may conclude that the basket-based arrangements of both processes are a means of overcoming potentially significant obstacles toward substantive regional co-operation.

On the other hand, equal attention is paid to the motives underlying these processes, the major actors involved in their structures and the strategic implications stemming from the implementation of their declared principles. As the focus of this study is to compare the HP and the BP, then the functional elements that formed the backbone of the Helsinki co-operative security regime i.e. norms, institutions and procedures become a major concern in this study.

Although the experience gained by the CSCE, and now OSCE, may be a useful model for the creation of regional security and co-operation mechanisms, it is probably a blunder to believe that the HP can simply be reassigned to fit the geo-political irregularities and endogenous political, security and socio-economic related complexities of the Mediterranean region. If the aim of the HP was to achieve a relaxation of tensions between the two dominant blocks, and also to emphasise the importance of human rights to that end, the BP should aim at a peaceful, multi-level, institutionalised and mutually reinforcing environment among its 27 participating states. After analysing both processes, this paper concludes by highlighting a core set of issues and lessons drawn from the HP that are particularly relevant to the BP with regard to the limits and possibilities of creating adequate institutional mechanisms to accomplish its declared principles and objectives in the Mediterranean.

The Helsinki Process

A good point of departure for the analysis of the HP is the 1^st of August 1975, when the United States, Canada and all the European states (except Albania) signed a declaration that set standards and norms which are relevant even to this very day. With the 1975 Helsinki Final Act (HFA), the CSCE launched a process of constant review of the implementation and enhancement of its norms and standards. In fact, the HFA was not an international treaty, but a politically binding agreement that proved to be the constitution of the follow-up HP. Yet, the basic principles that were embodied in the HFA are widely considered to have significantly contributed to the easiness and eventually the ending of East-West confrontation by providing impetus for ideological democratic reform. More than anything else on the international scene, the HP has been a quantum of the hopes and disappointments underlying Europe’s transformation since 1975, initially as an open-ended conference with periodic formal meetings, but without any concrete institutional design, and up to the 1990 Paris Summit when it became more institutionalised. It has since changed and adapted to the new challenges that arisen after the end of the Cold War era.

The HP has served as a means of communication between countries whose relationships were in a period of exceeding tension (1). It has been argued in the relevant literature that the HP is a product of détente as it was initiated at the vertex of the struggle between the two superpowers, in order to overcome highly fragmented relations between the two security alignments, NATO and WTO (2). Surprisingly perhaps, in view of worsening East-West relations, the HP continued its process of deepening inter-state relations after 1975 with follow-up meetings in Belgrade (1978) and Madrid (1980). It is important to remember that the international headlines during the Cold War described the East-West political dialogue as practically non-existent, as the fast growing military potentials created a unique ‘war of nerves’ among the Eastern and Western states. Individuals were prevented from travelling and exchanging ideas, while economic exchanges had frozen for a long time, not only due to the non-compatibility of the capitalist and communist systems, but also from the political implications of such transactions (3). At that time an ‘iron curtain’ had covered the area from the Baltic to the Adriatic, making European co-operation seem impossible. To this end, the HP served as a unique multilateral forum and, in fact, it was the only setting to conduct a dialogue between the two confronting world blocs, when relations on the European continent had reached a dead end.

At a glance, the HP is a unique ensemble of inter-linked regimes, the overall aim of which is to focus on the global respect of human rights, economic co-operation, environmental concerns, free flow of people, information and goods across borders, within a multilaterally controlled and transparent military setting (4). Although its title may suggest that the CSCE is a stricto sensu military security setting, in reality, as Mastny (1992) asserted, ‘it has proved to be more about politics rather than a collective security arrangement’ (5). Distinct from the assorted arms control negotiations that were at the top of the international agenda, the HP produced relatively little during its first ten years. It addressed primarily the non-military aspects of security. It is ‘that align of goodwills that make states, governments and individuals feel secure or less so for political, economic, cultural, environmental, scientific and a number of other reasons’(6). As for the military aspects of security, the CSCE primarily concerned itself only with those liable to regulate the degree of global hopefulness because of their bearing on the interactions rather than the capabilities of potential combatants (7). Yet, in the post-Cold War era, it has re-structured and re-orientated its scope and role towards conflict-prevention and conflict-management in its wider architecture, which today includes no less than 55 countries.

The linkages between its baskets of co-operation made the HP rather unique during the explosive world politics of the 1970s and 1980s. Because of the CSCE’s comprehensive view of security and the basket-based arrangement, agreement in one basket-area depended on agreement in others. Otherwise the whole process would grind to a halt. Indeed, hardly anyone in 1975 could have foreseen that the HP would survive in the age of the bipolarity, as it was decided to continue and deepen the CSCE in the follow up meetings. The founding agreement (HFA) has since been supplemented and improved by a vast number of equally important subsequent agreed documents. To this end, review conferences were held in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna. Significant landmarks in the evolution of the HP also include the 1986 Stockholm document on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), which was expanded and improved by the 1990 and 1992 Vienna documents.

Until the late 1980s when the Cold War began to annihilate, the HP had served as a forum for dialogue between the two confronting blocs. This function of the HP was further reinforced along the pluralisation of the Soviet Union under the Gorbachev era. According to Mastny (1993) the collapse of Moscow’s hegemony in Eastern Europe, by ending the East-West European division, laid down any western doubts about the adequacy of the HP (8). Thus what deserves special attention here is that the slow pace of change had nourished some doubts concerning the adequacy and, indeed the desirability of the HP. As a result of the deterioration in East-West relations after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland, the follow up meetings at Belgrade and Madrid did not produce tangible results. Yet, the HP’s contribution was lying to the significant practical assistance that gave to the reform forces in the former communist states.

The end of the Cold War has proved to be neither the ‘end of history’, nor the end of Europe’s vulnerabilities. The post-Cold War world was rapidly tested by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and since then it has been exposed increasingly to a variety of regional conflicts in Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans. Most of these conflicts have been expressed by a large number of outbreaks of intra-state conflicts (9). In addition, massive violations of human rights, including minority rights, have given rise to further tension. Ethnic and nationalistic conflicts are escalating and regional wars have led to tens of thousands of dead, and millions of refugees, to say nothing of the economic devastation and the pure absence of development in the above mentioned war-torn regions. All these developments, especially those in Europe, have led to a fundamental change in the role of CSCE, thus prompting some analysts to argue that the HP was a victim of its own success and that it was no longer needed after the collapse of Communism and the evolution of a new post-bipolar European architecture. Yet, in the post Cold War era the CSCE was reorganised to fill the security and power vacuums in Eastern Europe. The 1990 Paris Summit marked the beginning of the HP’s institutionalisation, reflecting the changes in the post-1989 European arena. In this context, all CSCE countries committed themselves to the values of democracy, rule of law, human rights and market economy. As Richard Weitz observed, ‘rather than codify balance of power arrangements among competing superpowers, the HP now had to guide international change, including disintegration of authoritarian empires, and oversee disputes among antagonistic nationalities’(10). The challenge ahead was no longer the struggle for the adoption of common values among the participating states, but to meet the challenges presented by the post-Cold War period.

By 1990, the collapse of most Communist regimes in Eastern Europe had created a new role for the HP. The leaders of 34 nations (among them the newly unified Germany) signed in November of the same year the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which not only recognised the end of the cold war division of Europe, but also formed the HP first permanent organs. The 1990 Paris Charta, by establishing a new timetable of regular political consultations, and by giving the HP a modest degree of institutional underpinning, helped to transform the HP and to place it on a more permanent footing. However, the scope and nature of the CSCE’s competence has been subject both to the political integration of the EU (Second Pillar), and the transformation of NATO in the face of new developments in the wider West. Accordingly, the OSCE’s development has been characterised by its ever-increasing number of mechanisms, designed to deal mainly with human rights centred security challenges. The importance of increasing co-operation with other European organisations and trans-Atlantic organisations and institutions was emphasised at Helsinki in 1992, while, the fifth Review Conference was decided to be held in Budapest from 10 October to 2 December 1994, and concluded with a meeting of CSCE Heads of State and Government on 5-6 December. At the Budapest Review Meeting a decision was taken to change the name of the Conference on Security and Co-operation into Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This fundamental change should be conceived as an expression of its determination to give a new political impetus to the HP, thus enabling it to play a central role in the promotion of a common security space (11).

Today, the OSCE has been recognised as a major element in the multi-dimensional European security architecture. Wilhelm Höynck, the OSCE Secretary-General, rightly pointed out that the CSCE could ascertain genuine advantages for dealing with early warning and conflict prevention, among other things by its comprehensive concept of security and its determination to reach at the root of the causes responsible for the conflicts. "But comprehensive security means more than mere military security" (12). In recent years the OSCE has been paying more attention to the economic and civil dimensions of security, as these apply particularly to human rights violations, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CCEE) whose economies and polities are in transition. The ‘steady but innovative approach’ to the new challenges in post-Cold War Europe has allowed the OSCE to play an increasingly important role in the on-going integration of the CCEE countries and the former Soviet Union into (formerly) Western security structures (13). OSCE missions have certainly helped defuse tensions in the Baltic region while its interventions in Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, and Albania have demonstrated its expanding role in the fields of human rights and democracy building, regional conflict-management and other issues of European security.

Critics have argued that the OSCE has yet to find its place in an overcrowded area, and that it will be difficult to carve out its own identity and role in the new European security architecture (14). It has been extensively reported that focusing on conflict prevention sets an objective which is ambitious enough but well suited to certain ‘comparative advantages’ which the OSCE possesses today when compared with other regional and sub-regional settings in Europe. Institutionally there is already much in place, which only needs to be made to work better (15). The OSCE actually disposes of a bewildering array of mechanisms and sub-mechanisms. These include, the CSCE Council, which was made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the participating States, a Committee of Senior Officials, a CSCE Secretariat in Prague, an Office for Free Elections, (the predecessor of the present Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) in Warsaw, and a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna. Furthermore, the new challenges that arisen from the collapse of the Eastern alignment and the disintegration the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia, made it essential to establish additional institutions whilst consolidate existing ones (16).

Another lesson drawn from the HP’s evolutionary course is that the need of conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes can only be achieved by preserving some elements from its previous function as a ‘process’. This becomes evident in today’s OSCE which has retained its most traditional function - that of being an accommodating forum for dialogue and political consultation. Although certain characteristics of the Organisation’s previous existence as a process or conference have been retained, the HP successfully took additional steps in its transition from an open-ended conference to a genuine regional security institution. In Höynck’s words: "It had to embark on a transition from its role as a forum for negotiation and dialogue, to an active operational structure" (17). Thus the OSCE, became an active organization that has assumed operative political responsibilities. These include on the one hand, early-warning arrangements, conflict prevention, crisis management, peace-keeping measures, and on the other, the peaceful settlement of conflicts. Long-term conflict prevention and advisory missions of the OSCE have taken up their work in a number of participating states (18).

Central to its contribution to international stability and security is the accommodationist role played by the Permanent Council in Vienna. In addition the Chairman-in-Office, assisted by the Troika, has been a forceful instrument for promoting the OSCE’s ideals and for taking the necessary actions. Since 1992, long-term OSCE missions in conflict zones have proved effective in reducing tensions and creating the necessary climate of confidence for seeking political solutions. The High Commissioner on National Minorities is effectively involved in defusing minority problems with its discreet diplomacy, being conducted since 1993. Finally, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw is contributing to the development of civil societies in the OSCE area. In addition at the December 1996 Lisbon Summit, Heads of State and Government decided to enhance OSCE capabilities through the creation of two new high-level positions. The HP, mechanisms and instruments provide a possibility to build trust, increase transparency, clarify concerns with neighbours and other partners, while ‘it is always an expression of a co-operative endeavour’ (19). Today, the HP offers an excellent example in ‘Security Modelling’, as it has almost completed its evolution from an ad hoc process, rooted in the old confrontation between blocs, toward a structured system of political consultation with its own institutions and mechanisms (20). For the purpose of this study, the considerations of the HP aim to draw conclusions from the comparative study of the Barcelona Process, to which we now turn.

The Barcelona Process

To start with, the HFA contained a special section dedicated to ‘Questions relating to Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean’. It declared that European security is to be considered in the broader context of world security and that it is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole. Accordingly, the process of improving security should not be confined to Europe alone but also extend to other parts of the world, and in particular to the so-called ‘non-participating Mediterranean States’. Thereafter, within the CSCE framework, periodic meetings of experts in the fields of economics, science, culture and the environment took place in Valletta (1979), Venice (1984) and Palma di Mallorca (1990). OSCE also held two seminars in Cairo (1995) and Tel Aviv (1996), to discuss the applicability of the lessons learned from CSBMs experience in Europe, in building Confidence to the Mediterranean. But the lack of northern European interest for the vast security problems in the Mediterranean, and the Helsinki tradition to tackle these problems more in a formal rather than substantive manner, have helped to transform the dialogue with the non-participating Mediterranean States, within the HP, to an insubstantial one (21).

In order to change this imbalance, especially in view of a new eastwards-enlarged European security architecture, the southern European countries put forward multilateral schemes generally incapable of dealing with a complex array of security challenges in the region (22). European ambitions for a stabilised and prosperous Mediterranean not only have been mainly promoted from its southern member countries in the form of uncoordinated initiatives, but most importantly outside the European Union’s Mediterranean policy (23). These initiatives can be distinguished into two general categories: those involving a certain periphery of the Mediterranean, and those aiming at instituting a security structure in the whole of the Mediterranean region (24). For many reasons this has proved to be a very ineffective process, sometimes even causing friction among southern European states. Actually, these initiatives which, applied on parts of the Mediterranean rather than to the whole of the regional system, seem to have created more tensions among the southern EU member countries than any positive results.

Since its early days the European Community was desperate to open up its membership or markets to Mediterranean states (25). An increased anxiety for the Mediterranean has been recorded first in 1977 at the beginning of the Euro-Arab dialogue, then in the mid to late 1980s following the EU’s second Mediterranean enlargement, and again after the Gulf war, where the signs of enhanced European interest in the Mediterranean became manifest. The emerging military, demographic, socio-economic, religious, cultural and political problems, and the intensification of the level of global economic interdependence directed EU policy-makers towards the construction of a multi-dimensional Euro-Mediterranean system founded upon a security approach that recognises the linkages between political, security, economic and socio-cultural regimes.

The Brussels-based policy-makers in the late 1980s and during the first half of the 1990s reconsidered the security anxieties of Europe, most particularly at its southern periphery, as the EU had already declared its policy options - "it had to allow wider gaps in economic and social development between itself and its Mediterranean neighbours, or to minimise the danger of instability on its proximity" (26). In the eyes of the EU Member States, the region is being destabilised due to economic crisis and resulting radicalisation of social conflicts. In other words, the EU member states are worried about losing control over their energy supplies and about increased illegal migration from the region. These anxieties were reflected in demands for increased financial and political support from those member countries that were most disturbed by upheaval south of the Mediterranean (27).

It should be noted that, although the pre-1995 EU Mediterranean policies strengthened to some degree the intercourse of economic and political co-operation between the two shores of the Mediterranean, they failed to establish a comprehensive co-operative security regime. But a consensus on traditionally sensitive issues such as human rights, democracy, self-determination, religious tolerance, together with the initiation of economic and financial co-operation among the Mediterranean states, became the first step towards generating an agreement on a wider multilateral and multi-dimensional framework. As a result, the new generation of association agreements with the Mediterranean was aiming at including political dialogue, socio-cultural co-operation, free trade in industrial goods, economic and financial co-operation, and was expected to be seen both as a deliberate step towards a ‘partnership approach’ and as a distancing from the ‘aid approach’ (28).

For this reason it is also believed that the EU felt the need to upgrade its Southern Flank policy framework. Progress in the relations between the EU and its Mediterranean partner countries was made possible through the Euro-Mediterranean initiative, launched for the first time by the Greek Presidency at the Corfu Council in June 1994, later to be clarified at the Essen Council in December 1994 as a programme to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) to promote peace, stability, prosperity and co-operation in the region. But it was in 1995 that the EU started to take full advantage of its weight in international affairs, and develop its new strategic objectives in the Mediterranean basin. First, at the European Council at Cannes in July 1995 and then in Barcelona in November 1995, the EU decided to pass from the statism of its Mediterranean policy to a new strategy aiming at substituting the traditional bilateral approach strategy with a multilateral and multidimensional partnership. The strategic importance of the Mediterranean, the necessity to guarantee peace and prosperity in the region, and the need for a co-ordinated answer to the new Euro-Mediterranean economic, political and social challenges, were among the issues addressed by the Barcelona Conference. The EMP initiative was set up in order to correct the imbalance created by the European monolithic bilateral and trade-orientated relations with a more coherent and comprehensive policy approach. The aim was to systematise all the co-operation and association agreements and, ultimately, to secure the stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean.

The rationale of the Barcelona Conference was to link the region through political, economic and social ties, contributing to the improvement of conditions for peace and economic development in the 12 Mediterranean countries. Thus the 1995 Barcelona Declaration was structured on the three baskets model introduced by the HP: political and security; economic and financial; and socio-cultural. The Declaration’s political and security basket aimed at establishing a common area of peace and stability. The participant countries stressed their conviction that peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean region are common assets, which they pledge to promote and strengthen ‘by all means at their disposal (29)’. The 27 participating countries plus the European Commission agreed to respect human rights and the rule of law, and recognised ‘the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system’. In the economic and financial basket, the participating countries set three long term objectives to their partnership: to speed sustainable social and economic development; to improve living conditions by increasing employment and closing the development gap in the Euro-Mediterranean region; and to promote co-operation and regional integration. The participant countries agreed to put a plan for the establishment of a Mediterranean Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by the year 2010. Finally, the socio-cultural basket included the development of human resources and the promotion of mutual understanding among different cultures. In Barcelona the participant states agreed to increase the level of interactions among peoples, in culture, religion, education, the media, as well as between trade unions and public and private companies, along with civil society organisations. It also included migration issues and co-operation concerning organised crime, drugs trafficking and local government.

The Declaration contained an appendix - also known as the fourth basket of BP - offering a follow-up procedure, that is a series of meetings between the EU and the Mediterranean partners to implement its provisions. The inclusion of the latter constitutes the dynamic element that provides assurance for the ‘continuity’ of the EMP. This involves the review of the implementation of the Barcelona provisions in a way similar to which the HP functioned during its first phase, when it was transformed from its primary form of a periodic Conference to an Organisation. The appendix offered a follow-up procedure in various sectors (at both Ministerial and Senior Officials level) for the Mediterranean partners to implement. The Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the BP was decided to be consisting of officials from the Troika (the current, previous and next Presidencies of the EU) and from the southern Mediterranean countries. The Euro-Mediterranean Committee was decided to meet regularly and report to the Foreign Ministers. It was also decided that the Foreign Ministers from the 27 nations will meet periodically to review progress in implementing the Declaration and to agree on actions that will achieve its objectives. This was a substantial advance compared to earlier regional initiatives, ‘with ill-defined follow up provisions depending on constant ministerial action’ (30). In addition, as it has been asserted that this new set of relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries associate the economic and political aspects of Europe’s policy in the region more tightly, may also put an end to the previous uncoordinated regional initiatives (31). In fact, the EMP has the advantage of making the EU’s Mediterranean policy a common European policy, rather than one limited to its south European countries and their diversified interests.

Most Mediterranean scholars and analysts agree that Europe initiated the EMP for geographical and historical reasons. It can also be claimed that it might have been only an upgrade of the existing trade and aid settlements, especially in view of the significant decline of the trade importance of the Mediterranean non-member countries (32). But the EMP sees economic progress as the key to securing stability and prosperity in the region. Epitomising the essence of the EMP is the emphasis put on respect of democracy and human rights, political and economical dialogue, the opening up of markets to European competition (thereby exerting a formidable but constructive adjustment pressure), and financial and technical assistance on the part of the EU for the necessary reform and adjustment process of its Mediterranean partners.

The BP was the result of a successful effort by the EU to re-innovate and reinforce its Mediterranean policy. It has been described as a political gesture aiming at correcting the problems that were created from the inadequacy of its previous narrow-minded policies towards the region (33). As Tsardanides pointed out: ‘the three set of actions agreed at Barcelona involved some well-known topics of the Euro-Mediterranean diplomacy revised to elucidate the Mediterranean regional complexity, while it encompassed a group of new advanced policy components which have their roots in the notion of the Maastricht Treaty’(34). The 1995 Barcelona document infused greater political and security bias to Euro-Mediterranean relations, while also encompassed an ambitious economic plan for the creation of MEFTA by the year 2010. The latter objective is to be achieved through a process of economic restructuring and financial assistance from the EU, designed to relieve the southern Mediterranean countries of their debt burden and develop their private sector.

On the other hand, the EU has claimed that the EMP was a European attempt to redefine ‘the threat from the South’, and thus, rather than seeing an Arab military threat, it addressed the danger of social unrest and economic underdevelopment (35). However, EU diplomats made clear that the financial aid plan was intended to contribute to the slowing down of the current huge migratory flows from the southern shores of the Mediterranean to Europe. The Barcelona Declaration recognised the future challenges posed by the demographic trends in the southern Mediterranean states and declared that they must be counterbalanced by the appropriate policy measures to accelerate economic take-off. As Malcolm Rifkind addressed it, ‘one of the most important ways in which we can achieve political stability is by economic growth, and by the countries of the EU helping those in North Africa and the Middle East develop their economic potential and economic infrastructure: Political stability will flow from that" (36). Put simply, with trade flows growing in the region, jobs will be created in the Mediterranean countries and migration flows will slow down. This in essence was a response to increased fears in Europe, which hosts around 11 million legal immigrants and at least four million illegal ones.

As Bin has observed, the EMP addressed the Mediterranean reality as an overlapping and interaction of different regions integrating different dimensions of regional co-operation including the socio-cultural one, something that was missing from previous Mediterranean initiatives (37). In addition, the BP proved to be a very innovative mechanism compared to other Mediterranean co-operation schemes, because it was also a flexible arrangement. Although the Euro-Mediterranean space encompasses significant differences in political regimes and economic systems, the Barcelona Conference brought together for the first time the Foreign Ministers of all fifteen EU states and twelve of their Mediterranean homologues, including representatives from the Palestinian Authority. It should be considered here a major achievement on part of the European Commission that Arab countries like Syria, finally accepted to sit at the same table with Israel; something which it has occurred very few times in the diplomatic history of the Mediterranean.

On the other hand, the MEFTA that the EMP has inspired to create by the year 2010 hinds security risks, since accelerated market liberalisation in the southern Mediterranean could produce greater instability to the already sensitive balance in the region (38). The financial assistance to the 12 Mediterranean countries has considerably increased. One should not forget that the substantial differentiation of the ratio with the CCEE countries from 1:5 became 3.5:5, which was the major reason for attracting the interest for the south Mediterranean countries (39). In practice, after the 1995 Barcelona Declaration the BP moved forward to a large extent by the series of new Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement which updated and enhanced the previous individual agreement between the EU and the southern Mediterranean countries (40). Still, the idea to use the BP as a springboard for strengthening the co-operation between the 12 Mediterranean states has not been profitable, and thus the trade among the southern Mediterranean partners is still on a very limited level. This has been directly associated with the 1995 worsening of the Arab-Israeli relations and the consequent upheaval it created especially among the Mashreq countries. But the significant question here is that, although the Barcelona Declaration proposes the creation of MEFTA by the year 2010, the BP has not yet involved any ingenious mechanisms to sustain regional socio-economic co-operation between the two sides of the region, and this in turn resulted to the exaggeration of the already wide North-South gap in the Mediterranean.

In addition, the results of the second ministerial meeting held at the island of Malta in 1997 provided a reality check of what were the main issues at stake in the first two years of the BP (41). Certain alterations need to be made if the EMP has to prove a real partnership that will accommodate solutions to the vast security related political problems. The EMP’s detachment from the - US dominated - Middle East Peace Process was primarily considered as a successful manipulation by the Europeans to avoid the obstacles complex relations of the Eastern Mediterranean. The exclusion at the same time of the US from the EMP - something that gave the EU a predominant role in the BP - brought about a reluctance on the part of the US to share its Mediterranean initiatives. Indeed, as Attina has asserted, ‘to keep the US out of the BP is of great importance to the Euro-African Mediterranean region, especially if seen in connection to the previous experience of the West European countries of containing US presence in Europe and the surrounding areas’ (42). This should be regarded as a major problem obstructing the realisation of the EMP, especially when considering the negative results noted in the 2^nd Euro-Mediterranean Conference of the Malta in 15-16 April 1997, which was ‘hijacked’ by the breakdown of peace in the Middle East region and underlined the existence of a causal relationship between progress in the Middle East peace process and progress in the BP (43).

The BP should be conceived in Gillespie’s words, as ‘emblematic of a process’ being constituted from dynamic set of international exchanges, but still has a lot to achieve before it becomes a meaningful and comprehensive partnership between the two Mediterranean shores (44). The EMP represents a balance of EU and non-EU interests rather than necessarily common Euro-Mediterranean interests. Thus, the economic partnership, particularly the financial-aid part of it, is much more in the interest of the non-EU partner states. In return to the increased financial aid that the Union offers to its 12 Mediterranean partners, it wants to see progress towards free trade, as well as a commitment to the political principles agreed in Barcelona. As Klaus Hansch, President of the European Parliament stated just before the Barcelona Conference, there was no dilemma in the EU’s priorities: "Either we export stability, or we import instability" (45). The new elements that the BP involves, especially when compared with other pre-1995 EU Mediterranean policies, may animate some confident expectations for its future, but realistically, the development of the relationship between Europe and the Mediterranean will much depend upon both the willingness of the EU to extend co-operation, and the willingness and readiness of the countries of the Mediterranean south to respond to such initiative.

A Comparative Perspective

The Barcelona Declaration has a structural resemblance to the normative foundation introduced by the 1975 HFA, based on the incorporation of distinct, yet interrelated, baskets. As in the HP, progress in any of the three baskets of the Barcelona Declaration is depended on progress to the others. Both the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and the 1975 HFA are not international treaties, but politically binding agreements that provide the constitutions of the BP and the HP, as these were presented previously in this paper. Unarguably, the BP and the HP (up to 1990) have a resemblance in their first stages, as they both functioned as conferences with periodic meetings, but without any concrete institutional design. It can also be claimed that, as the OSCE has been giving more attention in recent years to the economic and human rights aspects of security. It is noteworthy that this rationale dominated EU officials when they designed the EMP - to help the southern Mediterranean countries develop their economic infrastructure, as that would produce political stability. The latter, can easily draw parallel considerations for the Mediterranean, especially when considering that both processes share the same objectives to provide guidance in countries with economies and polities in transition.

The elements of compatibility and indeed of institutional and policy differentiation in these two processes are becoming more clear when one considers the quiet cataclysm of world politics in the early 1990s. This clear resemblance between the two processes differs only in the priorities that were set in both cases. Today, in the Mediterranean region there is no major military threat as was the case in Europe during the Cold War. However, the region is destabilised by inter-state and intra-state conflicts and socio-economic related security risks. Thus, if the aim of the HP was to achieve a relaxation of tensions between the two dominant blocks, and also to emphasise the importance of human rights to that end, the BP aimed to bring political and socio-cultural change to the southern shores of the Mediterranean through economic reformation. As Edwards observed, "unlike HP however, the BP depended on economic change being carried out swiftly" (46). Hence, the fact that the normative implications of the basket-based arrangements in the case of the HP served as a means of overcoming the bipolar Cold War confrontation, in the BP they have to serve as a comprehensive framework of overcoming the potentially significant obstacles toward substantive regional co-operation, as the increasing political, demographic and socio-economic related discrepancies between the two shores of the Mediterranean have gradually fragmented North-South relations and subsequently minimised the prospects for co-operation.

But the historical experience of the HP can only provide an imperfect guide to the future of the BP. Yet there lessons to be drawn from the HP that can provide answers to the complex Mediterranean problems limiting progress in the BP. Necessary to remember here is that in the 1970s and 1980s any fluctuation of the East-West relations had its impact on the progress of the HP. In particular its slow pace in the first two meetings in Belgrade and Madrid had nourished doubts about the adequacy and indeed the desirability of the whole process. In the order given, the Middle East Peace Process breakdown has created similar impact in the progress of the BP, especially when one considers the poor results the Malta and Palermo Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conferences. However, the lesson that needs to be learned here, is that any ‘process’ is not a linear development, but has its ‘stop and go’ phases. In the HP the defragmentation of relations resulted after long and arduous negotiations which lasted more than fifteen years and ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall - when East met West without ideological barriers. Yet in the Mediterranean, and under the current configuration of the BP, it is rather naive to expect an immediate relaxation of the tensions stemming from the vast security problems of the region, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Cyprus question, Libya and the south-eastern Balkans, to mention but a few. What is legitimate to expect are results in bridging the alarming North-South gap.

Another useful lesson to be drawn from the HP is the importance of preserving its ‘process characteristics’ so or to maintain dynamism and continuity. This continuity has been supplemented and become more sophisticated by the provisions adopted in the CSCE meetings in Copenhagen, Moscow, Bonn and summarised in the 1990 Paris Charta. Of course, the OSCE structures cannot simply be reassigned to fit the geo-political irregularities and endogenous political, security and socio-economic complexities of the Mediterranean region. Yet the HP proved as much a result of changing realities as an instrument of further changes. As previously mentioned, the HP successfully took additional steps in its transition from a ‘Conference’ to a genuine regional security Organisation. Although the HP offers a clear-cut structure for decision-making, in the BP it is very early to speak as such institutionalisation, considering the limited progress made since 1995. It is rather more relevant to examine the possibility of creating adequate mechanisms and institutions that will fill the existing politico-economic vacuum in the Euro-Mediterranean space. However, the BP has not yet involved any ingenious mechanisms to sustain regional socio-economic co-operation, and this in turn results to the exaggeration of the already wide North-South gap in the Mediterranean.

Conclusions

Today, international institutions have been transformed and adopted to the new requirements posed by the New World Order, having realised the opportunities for co-operative problem-solving and conflict management, by incorporating new policy areas, competencies, instruments and decision-making procedures for achieving their objectives effectively (47). The question here is ‘are there any models for the future development of the EMP’? With this prospect in mind, there is a need for innovative thinking, which would not only take into account the experience within the HP framework, but also keep in mind the specificity of the Mediterranean. Whether the BP will be capacitated to play a dynamic role in the political, economic and security perplexities of the Mediterranean, depends not only on the success of a Mediterranean regional integration process, but also on the process of adjusting its own institutional structure to fit the Mediterranean irregularities.

The logical path to be followed - stemming from the HP normative stage - implies that, if the BP is to become a more effective Euro-Mediterranean approach, the creation of institutions and mechanisms for political and security co-operation should be considered as a ‘safe way’ to put itself on a more permanent footing, so as to survive in the complex patterns of Mediterranean diplomacy. In this case, the creation of adequate mechanisms - similar to those used in the HP - should be regarded as a prototype for the utilisation of the EMP. The adoption of such mechanisms and procedures will formalise the whole process and will guide much more effectively the necessary changes in the Mediterranean as inspired by and clarified in Barcelona.

Furthermore, as it has recently been asserted, the creation of a minimum of Euro-Mediterranean institutions will transform the EU’s policy into a real partnership or an international regime (48). Claiming too much for international institutions would indeed be a ‘false promise’ (49). However, ‘… in a world politics constrained by state power and divergent interests, and unlikely to experience effective hierarchical governance, international institutions operating on the basis of reciprocity will be components of any lasting peace’ (50). It is also useful to remember that regional security regimes would continue to play an important role in Europe’s security architecture, but what has really changed with the end of the Cold War is not their relevance to security but ‘the nature of the functions that must be performed by the types of regimes that have been implemented to secure stability’ (51). What is relevant here is that, if the BP seen as an international/regional regime in the making (similar to the HP), then considering the new functions that the post-Cold War era has imposed on the role of international organisations and institutions, it is questionable how far can the BP realise its objectives under its currently poor institutional machinery.

The inclusion of the follow up procedure - aiming to review the implementation of the provisions agreed - placed the BP in a position to be considered as a mechanism for political, economic and socio-cultural co-operation between the EU and the 12 Mediterranean countries. Though political co-operation may be related to all the components of the EMP, security and political issues are crucial to the Barcelona follow-up. But despite the fact that the EMP was proposed to hold periodic meetings of high-ranking diplomats, it is debatable how the existing co-operation schemes are going to function, as similar groups working on the actual Mediterranean security issues have halted (52). All the more so, if one considers the negative combination of potential sources of tension in the Mediterranean, a region of cultural, religious and sometimes of even clashing diversity, often founded upon longstanding nationalistic and ethnic tensions. It is also important to note the difficulty on part of the EU to deal with security issues in the Mediterranean region in contrast with other regions, most notably, the Central and Eastern Europe (53). The HP may prove a successful model of regime-formation for the promotion of stability in Europe, including innovative mechanisms such as the CSBMs. But if the building of such measures is to be effective in the context of the BP, then they should aim at a peaceful transition favourable to all partners, and will need to be accompanied by some degree of formalisation of the BP’s procedures.

In conclusion, the OSCE offers an excellent case for stydy with the BP, as it has almost completed its evolution from a process structured system now to that of political consultation with its own institutions and mechanisms. The instruments and organs for co-operative conflict resolution that have been successfully used in the HP may indeed help to the realisation of the BP’s objectives in the Mediterranean region. The institutional structure of the OSCE, equipped with instruments for carrying out specific political and functional tasks, offers a political operationally meaningful capability in Europe. Thus, its relevant mechanisms and institutional arrangements should be considered as particularly relevant tools to be applied in the framework of the BP. The Permanent Council in Vienna, the Chairman-in-Office assisted by the Troika, the mechanism of High Commissioner on National Minorities and finally the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw are useful paradigms for the creation of adequate mechanisms and institutions in the Mediterranean. It is in this sense that the experience gained from the institutional evolution of the HP reveals some clear and practical lessons for the future development of the BP, and the subsequent advancement of Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Footnotes

(1) Ghebali, Victor-Yves (1991): "The CSCE in the Post Cold-War Europe", NATO Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, April, p. 8.

(2) O S C E, "1975 - 1995: 20th Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act", OSCE Newsletter, Special Web edition, Vol. 2. No. 8 August 1995, Internet Adopted Document.

(3) Laulan, Yves (1973): "East-West Economic Relations", NATO Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 15-16.

(4) See inter alia, Maresca, John (1985): To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1973-1975. Duke University press; Lehne, S. (1991): The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: A Turning Point in East-West Relations. Oxford; Freeman, John (1991): Security and the CSCE Process: The Stockholm Conference and Beyond. London; Mastny, V. (1992): Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Process and the Reintegration of Europe, 1986-1991. Duke University press, Durham NC; Bloed, A. (1993): The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents. Martinus Nijhof, Kluwer Law International, Netherlands; and; Bloed, A. (1997): The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Basic Documents, 1993-1995. Martinus Nijhof, Kluwer Law International, Netherlands.

(5) Mastny, V. (1992), op. cit., p. 1.

(6) Höynck, Wilhelm (1993): "Ensuring Stability in Europe: The CSCE Contribution", Address to the 39th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Athens, 1 October, Internet Adopted Document.

(7) See analysis provided on this point in Bandini, M. Th. (1990): "The CSBM negotiations in Vienna: a commitment to build a new European Security system", NATO Review, No. 3, Oct.

(8) Mastny, V. (1993): "The Helsinki process and a new framework of European Security", in Story, J. (ed.) The New Europe: Politics, Government and Economy since 1945. Oxford, Blacwell Publishers, p. 421.

(9) Rotfield, Adam D. (1997): "Conflict is within states, not between them", in The Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy Research, How can Europe Prevent Conflicts. Discussion Paper, No 14, November, pp. 56-68.

(10) Weitz, R. (1993): "Pursuing Military Security in Eastern Europe", in Keohane, R. O., Nye, J. S. & Hoffman, St. (eds.), After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991. Harvard University press, p. 346.

(11) Höynck, Wilhelm (1995i):"The OSCE’s Contribution to new Stability"Speech at the Seminar on "Post-Cold-War Europe-Organizations in Search of new Roles", Helsinki, 10 May, Internet Adopted Document.

(12) Höynck, Wilhelm (1995): "From the CSCE to the OSCE: The Challenges of Building New Stability", Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 3.

(13) US Congress, Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. The President's 35th OSCE Report to the US Congress, 1 April 1996 - 31 March 1997, Internet Adopted Document.

(14) See further analysis of this argument in Alexander, Michael (1991): "European Security and the CSCE", NATO Review, Vol. 39, No. 4, April, p. 11.

(15) See Zaagman, Rob (1994): "Focus on the Future: A Contribution to Discussions on a new OSCE", Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 3.

(16) De Vito, Ugo (1996): Vade Mecum: An Introduction to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, ETH Zurich, Internet Adopted Document.

(17) Höynck, Wilhelm (1994): "CSCE works to develop its conflict prevention potential", NATO Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, April, p. 16.

(18) The OSCE's potential for settling disputes by peaceful means was not sufficiently used in the past. At the end of 1992, therefore, the CSCE Council, meeting in Stockholm, adopted further procedural improvements (the procedure for settlement by order of the OSCE and the agreement on settlement and arbitration procedures within the OSCE).

(19) Höynck, Wilhelm (1994): "The new CSCE and its contribution to Stability-Building: Possibilities and Limitations", Speech delivered at the Seminar on General CSCE Issues, Tashkent, 28 September, Internet Adopted Document.

(20) See Niemtzow, Elisa (1996): "The OSCE's Security Model: Conceptual confusion and competing visions", Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 7, No. 3.

(21) See on this point Ghebali, Victor-Yves (1993): "Toward a Mediterranean Helsinki-Type Process", Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1, Winter, p. 92.

(22) For a more extended analysis on the Mediterranean Initiatives, see inter alia Tsardanides, Charalambos (1996), "The Southern EU Member States' Policy towards the Mediterranean: Regional or Global Co-operation", in Gabriela, Lazaridis (ed.), Southern Europe in Transition. Special Issue of Journal of Area Studies, No. 9, Autumn, pp. 53-69; and Bin, Alberto (1997), "Mediterranean Diplomacy: Evolution and Prospects", Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, 5/97, Jan.

(23)Yet, the answer to the question of why these initiatives launched in region after 1989 outside the EC/EU's Mediterranean policies, a satisfactory answer can be found to the inability of the European Political Co-operation to co-ordinate the diversified national perspectives of the southern European member countries.

(24) Tsardanides, Charalambos (1992), The Renovated Mediterranean Policy of the European Community and Greece. (in Greek), EKEM, Papazisis, Athens, pp. 91-92.

(25) Ginsberg, Roy, H. (1989), Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale. Adamantine press, London, p. 120.

(26) European Community, European Community and the Mediterranean, Official Documents of the European Communities, Luxembourg 1991, p. 6.

(27) Reassuring to this South European concentration of interest was the substantial increase of the financial assistance for Middle East/North Africa region (including Iran) from France, Spain and, Italy. See on this point Marks, Jon (1996), "High Hopes and Low Motives: the New Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative", Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, Summer, p. 11.

(28) Vanhaeverbeke, G., "Survey of Europe’s Mediterranean Policy. Where it comes from – Where it stands Today-Where it is Likely to Go", Outline of an Introduction to the Euro-Med Training and Information Programme for Diplomats, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, 15-17 March 1997.

(29) Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference (Final Version), Commission of the European Communities, Barcelona 28-11-1995, p. 2

(30) Waites, Neville (1996), "Dynamics of EU Mediterranean Policy". Paper presented at the 1996:2 ELIAMEP Halki International Seminar, Greece, p. 6.

(31) See on this point, Pace, Roderick (1996), "Peace, Stability, Security and Prosperity in the Mediterranean Region", paper presented in Conference organised by MEDAC, 'Prospects after Barcelona', Malta, March 1996.

(32) Eurostat Key Figures (1996), "European Union trade with the Mediterranean countries", supplement in Frontier-free Europe, No.4.

(33) Edwards, Geoffrey & Philipart, Eric (1997), "The EU Mediterranean Policy: Virtue Unrewarded or...?", Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 1, Summer/Fall, p. 185.

(34) Interview with Dr. Charalambos, Tsardanides, Director of the Institute for International Economic Relations, Athens, 22 December 1997.

(35) Schneider, Heike & Zomer, Hans (1997), "The European Union and the Mediterranean (MEDA)", APRODEV Information Documents, Internet Adopted Document.

(36) British Foreign Office, Malcolm Rifkind, Barcelona, 28 November 1995, in British Foreign Secretary brief of the ‘British Initiative in Investment Barriers’, Internet Adopted Document.

(37) Bin, Alberto (1997), op. cit., p. 10.

(38) Marks, Jon (1996), op. cit., p. 22.

(39) Barbe, Esther (1996), "The Barcelona Conference: Launching Pad of a Process", Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1, Summer, p. 32.

(40) The new agreements focused mainly to trade liberalisation and the encouragement of foreign direct investment and economic co-operation, as well as furthering political, social and cultural ties. It was decided in 1994 that the EMP would be building on a new series of Euro-Mediterranean association agreements. The first agreement signed with Tunisia (17 July 1995) and a similar one with Morocco (26 February 1996) in November the same year. On the same approach was also based the agreement with Israel (20 November 1995), establishing a permanent political dialogue, giving further reciprocal concessions on agricultural trade, and extending the scope of economic co-operation.

(41) Calleya, Stephen C. (1997), "The Euro-Mediterranean Process After Malta: What Prospects?", Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, Autumn.

(42) Attina', Fulvio (1996), "Regional Cooperation in Global Perspective. The case of the "mediterranean" regions", Department of Political Studies, University of Catania, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, 4/96, Dec, p. 11.

(43) Tanner, Fred (1997), "The Malta Meeting revisited: The Middle East is catching up with the Barcelona Process", MEDAC, Msida, 18 April.

(44) Gillespie, R. (ed.) (1997), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Political and Economic Perspectives. Special Issue of Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1 Frank Cass, London, pp. 4-5.

(45) Quoted in Usher, Rod (1995), "A Bigger, Better Club Med : Europe and its Southern Neighbours Plot Stability", Time Magazine, 146:24, 11 Dec.

(46) Edwards, Geoffrey & Philipart, Eric (1997), op. cit., p. 186.

(47) See Peters, Ingo (ed.) (1996), New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of International Institutions. Lit Verlag, St. Martin's Press, New York.

(48) Pace, Roderick: "Enlargement and the Mediterranean Dimension of the European Union: The Role of Cyprus", Paper presented at the conference A symposium on Cyprus and the European Union, Research and Development Centre, Intercollege, Nicosia, 7-9 May, 1998, p. 6.

(49) See on this point, Mearsheimer, John J. (1994), "The False Promise of Institutionalisation", International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter.

(50) Keohane, Robert O. & Martin, Lisa L. (1995), ""The Promise of Institutionalist Theory", International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer, p. 50.

(51) Duffield, John S. (1994), "Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: the contributions of regional security regimes", Review of International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4, October, p. 388.

(52) See Jacomet, Arnault (1995), "Regional and State Security Challenges in the Mediterranean: the WEU's Response", Discussion Papers, No. 57, The University of Reading.

(53) "Europe has to anticipate possible hostility in the Mediterranean without provoking it (something similar to dealing with Russia), while on the other hand, most of the CCEE are profoundly grateful to the West". See Mortimer, Edward, "Europe and the Mediterranean: The Security Dimension", in Ludlow Peter (ed.) (1994), Europe and the Mediterranean. Published for Center for European Policy Studies, Brassey's , London, p. 106.

ã Copyright 1998. Jean Monnet Chair of European Comparative Politics.

Dimitris K. XENAKIS, University of Exeter

d.xenakis@exeter.ac.uk