Redrawing Identity Boundaries through Integration Policies: Strategies of Inclusion/Exclusion of Immigrants in Québec and South Tyrol

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Abstract

Following the research agenda introduced by Will Kymlicka, this qualitative study offers an interpretation of how the sub-national elites of Québec and South Tyrol police the integration of immigrants. For these national minority groups, which are constantly undergoing a process of redefinition of their collective identities by differentiating themselves from the Others who do not belong to the in-group, immigrants have progressively become the most significant Others as they are not part of the original system of compromises. This article questions how sub-national elites are handling this relatively new kind of ethnocultural diversity brought about by large-scale permanent immigration on two levels: first, the political narrative of the ruling sub-national parties, their electoral appeals, manifestos and speeches; second, the policy arrangements for the integration of immigrants in education, language and social policy. The initial approach of the article is pessimistic, as it assumes that sub-national elites will marginalize immigrants to please core nationalist supporters. In fact, the hypotheses to be tested are whether the national minority groups of Québec and South Tyrol engage in a process of reconstruction of their ethnic identity bounded by opposition to real or imagined Others - the newcomers; and whether they adopt practical measures that force newcomers to be assimilated into the group or to be marginalized. The comparison between Québec and South Tyrol provides a basic understanding of the impact of immigration in two sub-national polities that are very different, but still adopt similar political narratives and policy strategies with regard to the integration of newcomers.

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Key words

Minority nationalism - sub-national polities - integration policies - immigration to Québec - immigration to South Tyrol.
# Table of contents

1. **Introduction** ............................................................... 5  
   1.1 Literature ................................................................. 6  
   1.2. Why Québec and South Tyrol ......................................... 7  
   1.3. Method .................................................................. 8  
   1.4. Arguments and the Hypotheses ..................................... 9  

2. **Political Responses: Formal Discourses** ................................. 10  
   2.1 Civic Formal Positions of Sub-State Elites ..................... 11  
   2.2 The Anxiety under the Surface .................................... 12  
   2.3. Political Responses: Conclusion ............................... 16  

3. **Policy Arrangements: Formal Measures for Integration** ............ 16  
   3.1. Measures for Integration in Québec ............................ 17  
   3.2. Measures for Integration in South Tyrol ...................... 19  
   3.3. Policy Arrangements: Conclusion ............................. 21  

4. **Conclusion** ................................................................. 21  

5. **Figures** ................................................................... 24  

6. **Bibliography** .............................................................. 28  

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Lorenzo Piccoli

1. Introduction

Immigration is an enormously important issue in today’s world of mobility and cultural clashes. The early twenty-first century has been defined as the “age of migration”. International migration, from developing countries in particular, is considered an essential part of globalization because it affects many places around the world, from a “major metropolis of Canada” such as Montreal, to a “small peripheral town like Bolzano”. Today immigrant integration is a prominent issue in most Western democracies and, even more so, in all those “countries in which the historic population itself is deeply divided - particularly those with sub-state nations and multiple political identities”. In such contexts, where sub-national groups have traditionally sought to defend their identities against the challenge of globalization, permanent immigration constitutes an exceptional challenge and, at the same time, a formidable opportunity for developing original and progressive forms of collective identities.

Immigrants, in fact, alter the population balance of these places in such a fundamental way that their integration raises a dilemma for elites engaged in sub-state nation-building processes. To include newcomers in the construction of a unified sub-national identity could reduce the cultural homogeneity, but to exclude them could represent an illiberal move that might undermine the ability of the national minority to present itself as a legitimate international actor, and also reduce the demographic force of the region. Several scenarios are therefore conceivable. Although oversimplifying the position, immigrants may be forced into a one-way homogenizing assimilation process in which they are expected to do all the adapting in order to join the national minority; or they may be integrated through a more

4 Keith Banting and Stuart Soroka, “Minority Nationalism and Immigrant Integration in Canada”, 18/1 Nations and Nationalism (2012), 156-176 at 156.
pluralistic two-way process in which society accepts some duty to recognize and accommodate immigrant diversity even as the process aims to inculcate a shared overarching identity. These developments, in turn, could reduce the potential for ethnic tensions, but could also lead immigrants to be constructed as “Significant Others” as traditional groups bond together to create a stronger internal cohesion against them. Either way, accommodating immigrant diversity forces national minorities to shape integration policies while evolving the perceptions of their own collective identities.

From this perspective, the process of managing immigrant integration reflects how a polity defines its boundaries, thus representing a “vital value at stake” for the national minority, as well as a powerful instrument of political and cultural national construction. Focusing on those socio-political challenges/opportunities that are distinctive of sub-national polities, the research questions whether immigration is currently dealt with mostly as a threatening challenge or rather as a positive opportunity by sub-state elites and administrations.

Depending upon how sub-national elites handle this relatively new kind of ethnocultural diversity brought about by large-scale permanent immigration, more inclusionary or more exclusionary boundary-making strategies will emerge.

1.1 Literature

Immigration and national minorities have surged to the top of the political agenda of most European governments over the last 15 years, and today they are two fundamental topics for social research. Will Kymlicka was among the first to propose a study of the linkage between immigrants’ and national minorities’ cultural claims. The problem he offered to the political agenda of sub-national polities was whether “the claims of immigrants [are] in conflict with the aspirations of national minorities, and [whether] they [are] compatible or even mutually reinforcing”. Building on this assumption it is possible to develop a more structured understanding of how “immigration-based transformations ... affect minority nations”. The question of how this happens, however, remains largely unanswered. In spite of Kymlicka’s appeal for a new research agenda, the overwhelming literature on these two topics has not addressed their interaction.

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Studies have remained unidimensional, analysing the two different cultural demands in isolation from each other. To my knowledge, the only authors who have written specifically on the interaction between the cultural demands of immigrants and those of national minority groups in the last few years have been Barker, Blad and Couton, Hepburn, Winter, Zapata-Barrero and, very recently, Adam and Banting and Soroka. Starting from this background, this article advances an extended comparison of some of the recurring elements in how sub-state elites police the criteria of immigrants’ integration.

1.2. Why Québec and South Tyrol

The case studies of Québec and South Tyrol were chosen for their respective long histories of minority culture and for the complex coexistence of the minority with the national group. By comparing an under-researched European sub-state polity, such as South Tyrol, with a polity that was more carefully scrutinized over the years, such as Québec, the research offers an alternative perspective on the approach to immigration in sub-national polities. As a matter of fact, the case studies both constitute two strong instances of regional identities, being “distinct and self-governing nation[s] within a larger state, and ha[ving] mobilized along nationalist lines to demand greater regional self-government and national recognition”. These are singular cases, as their minorities are not dominated, but rather dominant. Their sub-national administrations fulfil the role of political authority, though lacking full ‘stateness’ in the traditional sovereign sense. In such contexts, national minorities are politically hegemonic, thanks to specific agreements, but feel constantly threatened by the relative isolation, embedded ideological divide and competition with the national group. Within the provinces, identity has long been a contested issue as local parties and movements have invested heavily in identity-based cultural associations; this

16 Kymlicka, “Immigrant Integration …”, 62.  
17 Pallaver, G., “South Tyrol. The ‘Package’ and its ratification” 2(1/2) Politics and Society in Germany, Austria and Switzerland (1990), 70-79 at 70.
is referred to as the existence of two “parallel societies” in South Tyrol,\textsuperscript{18} and “two solitudes” in Québec.\textsuperscript{19}

In such structurally multicultural contexts where the identity issue has been an topic of discussion, and indeed argument, for a long time and hidden every other political dimension, immigration brings about a brand new political challenge as it represents an even more complex form of diversity that sub-national elites have to accommodate while navigating among “other aspects of public policy regarding how government deals with ethnocultural diversity”.\textsuperscript{20} While national minorities have a fundamental interest at stake in handling ethnocultural diversity and immigration, they may be afraid of opening up a Pandora’s box by questioning deeper issues of “integration, respect for diversity, protection of individual and group rights, preservation of social cohesion and unity”.\textsuperscript{21} This article seeks to explore this issue by analysing how sub-national elites handle this relatively new kind of ethnocultural diversity brought about by large-scale permanent immigration.

### 1.3. Method

The study does not aim to confirm or otherwise any particular theory, but instead its purpose is to explore the main factors in the construction of identity boundaries by sub-national groups when confronted with large-scale permanent immigration. To do so the research proceeds on two distinct levels, the separation of which is reflected in the structure of this article:

1. **formal attitudes**: political recognition by sub-national elites in the form of declarations, speeches, interviews, electoral appeals, and manifestos;

2. **institutional measures**: integration policies by local administrations in the form of all those local and regional rules that affect, either directly or indirectly, the integration of immigrants in the sub-national polity.

To scrutinize these two levels, a case-oriented comparative method is applied. This approach represents an alternative to traditional comparative methods based that rely on a most-similar or most-different systems design. Instead, the case-oriented comparative method chosen in this research is based on evidencing both those factors that are universally applicable to the two cases and, at the same time, “a principle of variation in the character or


\textsuperscript{19} Charles Taylor and Guy Laforest, Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism (McGill-Queen’s Press, Montreal, 1993).

\textsuperscript{20} Micheline Labelle and François Rocher, “Immigration, Integration and Citizenship Policies in Canada and Québec. Tug of War between Competing Societal Projects”, in Ricard Zapata-Barrero (eds.) Immigration and Self-Government of Minority Societies (P.I.E. Peter Lang, Brussels, 2009), 57-83 at 57.

More generally, by comparing two polities that exhibit different features the research offers an interpretation of the risks and potential benefits, while providing strategies of inclusion for other sub-national polities that are struggling with similar issues. The focus, drawing from one of the very first pieces of research in this field, is on normative conceptions of membership and community that govern the process of integrating immigrants and that inform particular policies.

1.4. Arguments and the Hypotheses

While in every Western democracy immigration can bring about sectarianism or it can be a means to build social capital, in sub-national polities in particular this process may represent an opportunity for progressing towards more inclusive forms of minority nationalism. Nonetheless, the initial hypothesis of this study is pessimistic and draws from more traditional interpretations that depict minority nationalism as a force inherently based on a regressive, pre-modern and closed vision of society. Such an approach assumes that minority groups tend to marginalize “outsiders”, causing “racialized” or “Significant Others” to bond together. Hence, policy arrangements tend to reflect such an attitude by stressing the necessity for immigrants to do all that it takes to join the national minority group and its absorb its customs. Such an approach rejects the possibility of including immigrants through a two-way process of integration that allows the accommodation of diversity even as it aims to inculcate a shared overarching identity resulting from a negotiated compromise. This assumption is discussed in this article by testing two more specific hypotheses on two different levels. The research asks whether the leaders of the main ruling parties, the Südtiroler Volkspartei in South Tyrol and the Parti Québécois in Québec:

H1. engage in a process of reconstruction of their ethnic identity bounded by opposition to real or imagined Others - the newcomers;

H2. adopt practical measures to force newcomers either to assimilate into their group or to be marginalized.

23 Carens, *Immigration, Political Community …*, 112.
25 Ibid.
2. Political Responses: Formal Discourses

Sub-national polities have become the primary community of allegiance and belonging for many citizens as those polities have developed distinctive opportunities for participation and policy implementation. Citizens of Québec and South Tyrol enjoy significant political representation through devolved assemblies and have the power to legislate autonomously in certain fields. In such contexts, every public choice becomes controversial, even apparently innocuous facts, such as the language spoken by the coach of the local hockey team or the nationwide festivities celebrating the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the unification of the state. While groups are encouraged to participate fully in the policy-making process to influence the outcomes, they are also forced by immigration to debate identity in an already contested terrain. Québec and South Tyrol are instances of strong regional identities brought about by the presence of a national minority that has long based its coexistence with the national majority on antagonism or, at best, suspicion. In both territories the identity debate is a long-standing issue that has never been completely overcome.

In such a context, when confronted with immigration, “Québec’s elites have negotiated diversity … asking whether … a distinctive sub-state national response exists, and to what extent a minority trope has shaped Québec’s policies on immigration and migrant integration”. 28 Similarly, for South Tyrol, the question is whether “[t]he self-concepts of both groups, Italian speakers and German speakers, might shift considerably under the pressure of the new ‘immigrants’.”29

As Québec’s and South Tyrol’s distinctiveness derives from the coexistence between the historical national minority and the national group, the presence of people that do not fit into the historical minorities can severely undermine consolidated frameworks and obstruct the creation of a “socially congruent society”.30 Accordingly, “national minorities seek to forestall such possibilities by shaping immigration and integration policies where they can”.31 Hence, it is crucial to understand what is the national minority’s perception of what rights they believe immigrants should have, and whether/how this differs from the definition of rights provided by national and international legislation. As a matter of fact, the first hypothesis is that national minorities’ leaders engage in a process of reconstruction of their ethnic identity bounded by opposition to real or imagined Others – the newcomers – in their declarations, speeches, manifestos and electoral appeals, thus evidencing a particular perception of the rights that should be

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28 Barker, “Learning to be a majority …”, 12.
31 Banting and Soroka, “Minority Nationalism …”, 156.
granted to the members of the community. This hypothesis is modelled on Kymlicka’s argument that “the idea that minority nationalism and immigrant multiculturalism are allies in the pursuit of a more pluralist or tolerant form of cultural politics seems odd”.\(^\text{32}\) In fact, it is very difficult for sub-national minorities to “navigate through the question of diversity while justifying [their] very existence as a nation in a larger socio-political setting”.\(^\text{33}\) While fears about threats to liberal values and cultures are part of a broader backlash against immigration that is widespread in many countries, sub-national polities evidence more specific concerns with regard to immigrants' potential “to dilute the culture of the national minority, affect the prospects for nationalist mobilization, and upset historic balances between the sub-state nation and the majority in the country as a whole”.\(^\text{34}\) In South Tyrol, immigrants traditionally joined Italian schools and associations, and spoke the Italian language, thus strengthening the status quo of the Italian community vis-à-vis the German group. In Québec, too, immigration has traditionally played a vital role in support of the vitality of the anglophone group, numerically strengthening its university system and neighbourhoods. In other words, when given the choice, most of the immigrants to Québec and South Tyrol had naturally opted to learn English and Italian respectively rather than, respectively, French and German.

The challenge, for sub-national elites, is being able to preserve their language and culture while attracting sufficient immigrants who are willing and able to sustain them. National minorities, historically afraid of losing their demographic hegemony in the polity and therefore their political power, have instead expressed opposition against large flows of immigration, which they perceive merely as a threat to the survival of their group. The question, thus, becomes: “To what extent should [the minority groups] aim for the establishment of a democratic, inclusive, pluriethnic, and multicultural society without jeopardizing their own identity and the fragile socioeconomic hold they have ... without, in other words, running the risk of being made culturally, socially, and politically irrelevant in the long run?”\(^\text{35}\)

### 2.1 Civic Formal Positions of Sub-State Elites

In 1988, Breton convincingly argued that immigration in sub-national polities could have the positive effect of dissociating ethnicity, and particularly religious belonging, from language.\(^\text{36}\) Such an optimistic approach to immigration arises from the assumption that newcomers can contribute to render the ethnic cleavage less entrenched, forcing sub-national elites to

\(^{32}\) Kymlicka, “Immigrant Integration ...”, 62.

\(^{33}\) Alan Gagnon and Raffaele Iacovino, Federalism, Citizenship and Québec (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2007).

\(^{34}\) Banting and Soroka, “Minority Nationalism ...”, 157.


reconsider “not only ... traditional models of the nation-state [but also their] self-conceptions and political aspirations”.

These are the conditions under which civic, or post-ethnic, forms of minority nationalism can emerge. Civic nationalism differs from ethnic nationalism “on the question of who constitutes the nation and on the basis for legitimacy of nationalist demands”. It represents a form of group defence that is not exclusionary, but rather progressively oriented at allowing individuals to voluntarily consider themselves to be part of the sub-national polity. This kind of inclusionary strategy for the incorporation of immigration is relatively common in sub-national polities such as Flanders, Catalonia and Scotland. There are two main drivers for such an open approach to immigration policies: either “the considered interest of fortifying the sub-state nation demographically” or the interest of projecting national minorities as legitimate actors on the international scene. Either way, through such open immigration policies that refuse one-way, homogenizing assimilation, immigrants become natural allies of national minorities and allow the definition of a broader concept of identity within the polity. Formally, the official positions of the governments of Québec and South Tyrol reflect such a progressive approach to immigration based on accommodation of diversity and negotiation of a shared overarching national identity.

2.2 The Anxiety under the Surface

Contradicting the formal positions of the provincial government, when questioned by researchers, the national minority of Québec exhibited a feeling of “anxiety over identity” as a reaction against the ever stronger role played by immigrants and their multicultural rights. The political dynamics of how immigration became a crucial issue for voters in the two case studies is, in fact, very similar. Negative feelings towards immigrants were initially exacerbated, in particular by radical secessionists, and then those feelings progressively entered into the common perception as political elites tightened their positions on this issue. Eventually, immigration inevitably fell into the zero-sum identity politics.

More specifically, only in 2003, after the hard-line campaigns by right-wing and harshly anti-immigrant ethnoregionalist parties such as Die Freiheitlichen and the Union Fur Südtirol, did the national minority of South Tyrol recognize that immigration is a permanent phenomenon that needs to be policed. These parties suggested that immigration would eventually lead to the ruin of the

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37 Kymlicka, “Immigrant Integration ...”, 63.
42 Adam, Sub-state nationalism ...”, 6.
German-speaking minority by eroding its customs as well as diluting the German language through the territory. The steady electoral growth of these parties and the attraction of voters to anti-immigrant campaigns led the Südtiroler Volkspartei to follow some of these positions in the subsequent electoral campaigns. In fact, immigration was a central topic in the 2008 elections, and the Südtiroler Volkspartei suggested that the national minority had to be protected from foreign infiltration by assimilating immigrants - preferably from Europe, as it would be much easier to integrate them - into the nation through a homogenizing process aimed at protecting the national minority’s core values and traditions.44

In Québec, anti-immigrant feelings rose in the 1990s as part of a broader backlash against forms of ‘groupism’, that is referred to multicultural group rights for immigrants.45 The reaction against such a two-way multicultural dialogue supports a more homogenizing one-way assimilation in which immigrants are expected to do all the adapting in order to join the national minority. Dimitrios Karmis pointed out that this attitude emerged as a consequence of the Jacobin-influenced nationalism that led the national minority to depict Québec as a “normal state [that] should assimilate immigrants to the language and culture of the francophone majority”.46 Such an approach is often reflected in the public positions of politicians from all the main Québec provincial parties; former member of the National Assembly of Québec Pierre Lagault, for instance, declared that the assimilation of immigrants into the francophone community of Québec was “a key factor that will determine the future of the French language in Québec”.47 Liberal leader and Québec Premier Jean Charest, as well as then Parti Québécois leader André Boisclair, made statements favouring the assimilation of immigrants into some of Québec’s core values, such as the language and, more broadly, the distinct culture. These appeals show that political elites generally want immigrants to come, on condition that they are “committed to staying in Québec, learning French, and helping to build the distinct society”.48 In Québec this is explicitly part of an intercultural policy that includes a ‘moral contract’ with newcomers, a statement that since early 2009 has had to be signed by new immigrants arriving in Québec and that includes recognition of French as the common language of public, commercial and social life. More recently, in 2010, Québec’s immigration minister Yolande James declared: “There is no ambiguity about this question. If you want to attend our classes, if you want to integrate into Québec society, here are our values”.49

Such prescriptions and impositions are justified, but they remain extremely controversial as they reflect a constant nationalist concern related to the

44 Südtiroler Volkspartei, Stranieri in Alto Adige, party manifesto, 2008.
45 Winter, Us, Them, Others ...., 26.
47 Cited in “François Legault’s shameless pandering on immigration”, in MacLeans.ca, 30 August 2011.
48 Carens, Immigration, Political Community ..., 26-27.
preservation of a distinctive culture and identity that outweighs individual rights. Such a problem emerges very clearly in the defining political moments. In Québec’s 1995 referendum for independence, for instance, while the Parti Québécois initially appealed to a broad cultural identity that included immigrants, in the weeks before the referendum it shifted to a much narrower ethnic conception of collective identity.\(^{50}\) In that context, the party “increasingly made emotional appeals to ‘old-stock’ Québécois, whilst placing immigrant groups onto the ‘them’ side of the ‘us versus them’ (or French versus English) fence”\(^{51}\). Not surprisingly therefore, after the defeat, the leader of the Parti Québécois and premier of the province Jacques Parizeau famously complained: “It is true that we were beaten, but in the end by what? By money and ethnic votes.”\(^{51}\) Similarly, Silvius Magnago, one of the historical leaders of the Südtiroler Volkspartei, is generally credited for with saying: “It is useless to continue speaking German if we acquire Italian ways and mentalities ... An ethnic minority must never lose its fear of disappearing. Once it does, it will disappear.”\(^{52}\) In this sense, while fears about threats to liberal values, challenges to historic cultures, and Islam are part of a broader backlash against immigration that is widespread in many countries, minority groups may be particularly frightened to lose their blood and their memory, therefore seeking “smaller worlds within borders that will seal them off from modernity”\(^{53}\).

Such an ontological “anxiety over identity”\(^{54}\) can, in turn, be easily used as a mobilizing tool and a way of bonding people together. Marginalization, the ostracizing of the Other, in this respect becomes “a fundamental function of the state meant in large part to specify membership in, and the contents and limits of, the political community”\(^{55}\). As a result, “minority nationalisms have often become ‘ethnic’ nationalisms which emphasize bonds of blood and descent, are deeply xenophobic and often racist, and, obviously, tend to exclude immigrants”\(^{56}\). The recent electoral campaigns in South Tyrol (2008, 2009) and Québec (2007, 2008) evidenced once more the centrality of the topic of immigration with a constantly growing number of increasingly important xenophobic parties.

In 2008, the governing Südtiroler Volkspartei issued 16 guidelines for the integration of so-called Foreigners in South Tyrol.\(^{57}\) The guidelines demand


\(^{51}\) Hepburn, “Citizens of the Region ...”, 520.


\(^{57}\) Südtiroler Volkspartei, “Mit euch fü r Südtirol” (Südtiroler Volkspartei, Bozen/Bolzano, 2008), 1-16.
control over immigration numbers, better involvement of local labour forces thus avoiding the need for foreign labour, prevention of immigration only for social benefits, and separate waiting lists for natives and for immigrants in relation to social housing allocation. The language used in the provincial guidelines does not show any willingness to integrate. Terms such as “possible inevitable foreigners” are not expressions of tolerance and respect, even if the package highlights human dignity, international law, cultural diversity and “avoiding discrimination and segregation”. The proposed provincial guidelines did not initially mention any specific rights of immigrants or for their cultural, religious or linguistic diversity to be respected. This approach was partly overturned only in 2011 through the provincial law on integration, which will be discussed below.

Similarly, two of Québec’s municipalities published highly controversial codes of conduct for immigrants, which reflected overtly anti-immigrant attitudes. In 2007, the municipal council in the town of Hérouxville published a guide to explain what was considered normal in Québec’s society, as well as listing a series of practices, such as stoning women or burning them alive, that were instead prohibited “by Western standards”\(^{58}\). The guide contained several references to a variety of immigrant groups; for instance, it explained why carrying a weapon to school (the Sikh ceremonial kirpan) or covering one’s face (the Muslim veil) was not permitted. It also stated that “[o]ur people eat to nourish the body, not the soul”\(^{59}\) (referring to the Muslim dietary laws, which have an opposite aim). Public concerns over cultural differences increased considerably as a consequence of this guide. The Parti Québécois, however, decried the Hérouxville code as an isolated case. In fact, it was not. At the end of 2011, Gatineau, one of Québec’s most populous cities, published a 16-point guide to local values for immigrants, which ranged from refraining from bribing officials, killing people for honour, to cooking smelly foods. This statement of values, which received funding from the Québec government, was harshly criticized as, according to the critics, it treated immigrants “like they came out of a cave”.\(^{60}\)

These developments reflect various strands of disquiet, but at a general level they expose how “the difference of non-Western ‘immigrants’ gave [nationalist parties] license to push these ‘minorities’ and their apparently sexist and anti-democratic way of life to the margins”.\(^{61}\) Obviously, not all the sub-national elites supported such developments, but at the same time, the relevance that these positions have assumed in the political debate shows that regressive forms of minority nationalism do not easily disappear in contexts where communities have long histories of being defensive about their identity.

\(^{58}\) Normes de vie de la municipalité d’Hérouxville, Municipalité d’Hérouxville (2007).
\(^{59}\) Ibid.
\(^{60}\) Cited in ‘Gatineau’s values guide for immigrants stirs controversy’, Globe and Mail, 4 December 2011.
2.3. Political Responses: Conclusion

While it would be easy to conclude that national minorities simply reject immigration, the reality is more complex. Officially, sub-national governments appear to value immigrant diversity and encourage a two-way multicultural process of inclusion. Under the surface, however, constant nationalist concerns related to the preservation of a distinctive culture and identity continue to override all the other considerations. This attitude is less evident in Québec than in South Tyrol, where the perception of collective identities remains relatively static and often quite regressive. It is also evident in Québec, which sometimes is considered more open to multicultural or intercultural integration, but where moments of crisis and political tension exposed the anxiety of the national minority and its difficulties in openly accommodating immigrants, as was articulated by Will Kymlicka.62 A crucial point here is that such feelings are not always apparent and often remain under the surface. Furthermore, whether and how these feelings help to determine practical institutional arrangements for immigrant admission and adaptation policies remains to be seen. This is the issue that will be discussed in the rest of this article.


When dealing with immigration, sub-national elites have only a limited range of instruments to protect themselves. In fact, it is important to distinguish between two distinct sets of policies. First, the immigration policy per se, which deals with the transit of persons across the polity’s borders by regulating the quality and the volume; and second, all those policies that deal with immigrants’ incorporation and allow groups to set their own terms of integration.63

The most obvious area to interrogate groups’ initiatives in tackling immigration would obviously be the former (that is, immigration policy); but, in fact, immigration policy is not controlled by South Tyrol’s administration and even Québec, which acquired a set of powers in this field that are unique to sub-national polities (there is not any other sub-national polity having such powers) with the explicit aim to serve the interests of the francophone community to create not only linguistic but also “cultural dominance and authority”,64 is not fully in control of it. The Canadian federal state ultimately maintains overall control of immigration, while the sub-national polity can affect the flows and the citizenship of immigrants only to a limited extent. In fact, the capacity of Québec’s Ministry of Immigration to shape the province’s immigrant population should not be overstated: immigrants coming to Canada remain free to move to Québec, as well as the other way round,

63 Ibid. See also, Barker, “Learning to be…”, 11-36.
that is immigrants to Québec are free to move to other Canadian provinces or territories.

Furthermore, dealing with immigration in these contexts “implies more than simply taking account of the number of newcomers the government is prepared to welcome or receive them right away”. Therefore, to understand national minorities’ true intentions towards immigrants it is more effective to analyse all those local and regional policies - such as language, culture, social programmes and education - that show how sub-national groups in practice affect the way immigrants are integrated in the polity. This is a more interesting field to explore as it shows groups’ power to acquire control, not just over immigration but most importantly over “the terms of integration (e.g., via policy powers in education and language)”. Policies that allow the groups to set the terms of immigrants’ integration are, in fact, controlled by Québec’s and South Tyrol’s administrations as national laws leave integration as a competence of the provinces.

Control over these policies “has a degree of urgency” particularly for the group that is a national minority: “If the minority nation has neither resources nor competencies in order to outline reasonable demands towards immigrants, inevitably the natural tendency is for immigrants to become integrated into the dominant society. Immigrants need incentives to become integrated into the minority cultural society.” By orienting these policies, the elites control the transmission of values to newcomers. For instance, as the educational systems of South Tyrol and Québec are based on a rigid separation between the two languages and the two national groups, the choice of the schooling system becomes a fundamentally controversial field. Policy choices in this area are:

“relevant not just to the effective delivery of a public education but also to the future patterns of language use by the generations of children whose linguistic repertoires are shaped by the school system. Most of the controversies concern what the main language medium or media of public education should be, but increasingly there are also disputes about what additional languages should be taught as subjects in the public school curriculum. How these issues are resolved can profoundly shape not only the individual student’s language skills but also the ability of linguistic groups to reproduce themselves over time.”

3.1. Measures for Integration in Québec

From the late 1960s the francophones of Québec exhibited a particular concern about the forms of immigrant integration as the vast majority of

65 Labelle and Rocher, “Immigration, Integration …”, 57.
66 Barker, “Learning to be …”, 15.
immigrant pupils enrolled in anglophone schools. Precisely to counter such a trend the Parti Québécois government passed a law that made it mandatory for immigrants to send their children to French schools: Bill 101 or the 1977 Charter of the French Language (La charte de la langue française) and related laws are, in fact, the cornerstones of Québec’s language policy.

Bill 101, in particular, is a broad language charter aimed at improving the status of French within the province. As such, it also includes some significant points dedicated to immigrants, such as the obligation to send all children under 16 to French schools to receive their primary and secondary education, unless one of the child’s parents received most of their education in English, in Canada, or the child themselves has already received a substantial part of their education in English, in Canada. Even more strictly, the original 1977 Charter provided for the English instruction not on the basis of a parent having received his instruction in English in Canada, but in Québec only; this was subsequently amended. Les enfants de la loi 101 is the name given to that generation of children whose parents immigrated to Québec after the adoption of the 1977 Charter of the French Language. Between 1977 and 2012, successive Québec governments promulgated a number of laws designed to address the general issue of the language spoken by immigrants in order to integrate newcomers in the linguistic milieu of the francophone community.69

These developments eroded the traditional elite status of the English minority in the province and caused a huge anglophone migration from the province, a migration that lasted until 1995. The number of people in Québec whose main language was English dropped by 12 per cent between 1971 and 1981, while the proportion of immigrant children going to French schools increased from 39 per cent in 1980 to 75 per cent in 1990.70 Since 1971, the use of English in Québec dropped progressively and, since 1996, the change has been dramatic: the number of allophones (people whose first language is neither English nor French) who declared using English as the language of the home dropped from 61 per cent in 1996 to 49 per cent in 2006; conversely, allophones who declared using French as their home language increased from 39 per cent in 1996 to 51 per cent in 2006.71 Finally, the number of immigrants enrolling in the English school system dropped from 85 per cent in 1972 to only 20 per cent in 1998, while their enrolment in the French primary

69 Although Québec’s language provision for adult immigrants was never made mandatory, the government itself is strongly committed to this intercultural policy and funds language courses either on arrival or via the Alliance Française network. The government’s policies recognize immigrants’ obligation to speak a common language, although the 1990 ‘Let’s Build Québec Together: Vision: Policy Statement on Immigration and Integration’, a fundamental document in the evolution of Québec’s immigration policy, recognized that plurality and language rights are among its basic principles. These proactive measures create the structural conditions to learn the national minority language.

70 Richard Y. Bourhis, “The English-Speaking Communities of Québec: Vitality, Multiple Identities and Linguicism”, in Richard Y. Bourhis (ed.), The Vitality of the English-Speaking Communities of Québec: From Community Decline to Revival (Université de Montréal, Montreal, 2008), 127-164.

71 Data from the Census of Canada 1971, 1996 and 2006.
and secondary school system increased from only 15 per cent in 1972 to 80 per cent in 1998.72

Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the francophone community may be tempted to enlarge the scope of these measures, extending their application to post-secondary education, which is the only field where citizens are free to choose - and where, in fact, many still opt for English schools and universities. In 2010, the Parti Québécois called for the extension of the language laws to the Collège d’enseignement général et professionnel, the public post-secondary education collegiate institutions. This measure was widely opposed by the anglophone community, showing the persistence of the identity cleavage and the continued reasons for tension.

This trend, however, shows that French is now the exclusive language of public life, and a language that one has to learn to be incorporated into Québec’s polity. Consequently, Québec’s education system had to be based on French and today “[it] continues to be shaped by public policies geared toward promoting French”.73 By making French the official language of the schooling system, the francophone group is undertaking increased public responsibilities, perceiving its role as that of an “integrative hub”.74 Members of this group contend that this approach is intercultural in its scope as the only obligation it imposes on immigrants is learning the French language. Obviously, people are not forced to speak French at home, or in ethnic associations or clubs, or in churches or mosques, or in vibrant ethnic media. As in every Western society, there is a very large area of private life and civil society where people are free to speak whatever language they like. The mandating of language is therefore really only relevant to the domain of public institutions. The Parti Québécois, in particular, maintains that language is central to Québec identity and seeks to fully integrate immigrants into a French-speaking Québec as “immigration should be set at the ability to Frenchify new arrivals”.75 Through such measures, French is no longer the language of one ethnic group, but one for all the groups of the polity. Therefore, “immigrants are routinely becoming francophones”76 as the knowledge of the French language is considered essential for integrating into and contributing to Québec society.

3.2. Measures for Integration in South Tyrol

Similar measures, although less far reaching, exist in South Tyrol. Here, where the topic of immigration entered into the public debate only recently,

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72 Ibid.
75 Éric Gamache cited in ‘Will immigrants save the French language in Québec, or hasten its demise?’, MacLean’s.ca, 2011.
the German-speaking group still seems hesitant to promote comprehensive legislation on the issue. In this province, immigrants have traditionally chosen Italian schools and language, and the patterns of incorporation are therefore clearly oriented towards the Italian group. Such a trend could only be countered through measures aimed “at encouraging immigrants to stay and regard[ing] them as co-citizens from the very beginning, thus reinforcing their commitment to the minority language”.77 That the German-speaking group is taking measures in this regard is signalled by the non-compulsory requirement for immigrants to take a German test before being granted the permesso di soggiorno in the polity, a development in the most recent immigration law. This requirement shows that immigrants are finally encouraged to realize that the knowledge of German becomes a fundamental precondition for communication and thus for integration into the local society. In this sense, a fundamental difference between South Tyrol and Québec is that the Italian province does not have a comprehensive and symbolic piece of law that addresses the incorporation of immigrants into the national minority language, such as Québec’s Bill 101.

There are, however, three significant aspects that foster the use of the German language among immigrants. First, European immigrants have the de iure obligation of bilingualism in order to be allowed to hold a public office in the province; and since employment in the public sphere is regulated by census results and is allocated according to the ethnic identification of census respondents, for European immigrants who have the possibility of freely choosing among the two languages, it becomes more convenient to adhere to the German-speaking group as more public posts are allocated to this group. Non-European citizens can not even apply for public employment. Second, there is an obvious de facto advantage of bilingualism on the job market: while knowing two languages is obviously an advantage for everyone, this condition becomes even more important for immigrants who come to the province as strangers. Knowing German, in this sense, is not really a choice for immigrants. Finally, the Südtiroler Volkspartei members of the government have traditionally looked at countries such as Germany, Slovakia and the Czech Republic (countries whose language is either German or one that is close to German) to provide subsidies for seasonal workers. In fact, these workers are known as “the German Gastarbeiter”,78 that is, a typical example of immigrants who hoped to stay temporarily but end up being part of the polity. This development shows the national minority’s desire to incorporate as many potential allies as possible, while discouraging the presence of all those who are not likely to assimilate into the national minority group.

In this manner, even in South Tyrol, “[s]ub-state political elites [had to] engage in strategic nation-building to maximize certain interests with respect to the competitive context vis-à-vis the nation-state. In the context of

77 Voltmer, “Insights into the ...”, 218.
78 Ibid., 217.
immigration, for example, political elites [had to] implement policies they believe[d] offer the greatest likelihood of improving the sub-state nation’s relative political or demographic weight”.

3.3. Policy Arrangements: Conclusion

There appears to be a significant difference between Québec and South Tyrol in the institutional measures adopted for the integration of immigrants. In fact, the elites of Québec have dealt with the problem since the 1970s and today they are relatively in control of immigrants’ incorporation. In particular, the elites of Québec have developed a set of measures to protect French that has become the exclusive language of public life and a central element of Québec identity. Conversely, the elites of South Tyrol do not seem as concerned as those of Québec about the issue - arguably, because they do not feel under siege by an entire anglophone continent, nor do they perceive an immediate demographic threat, nor do they fear their language might lose its relevance, as its significance is linked to the most powerful economy in Europe.

4. Conclusion

At first sight, developments in Québec and South Tyrol seem to be consistent with moves in other sub-national nations, such as Catalonia and Scotland. Nevertheless, in contradicting teleological approaches suggesting that sub-national polities such as Québec and South Tyrol will either exclude migrants or progressively become more open, this analysis shows that policies dealing with immigrant adaptation are extremely controversial. Unsurprisingly, immigration proved to be a very delicate topic in the sub-national polities that were analysed, but at the same time neither of the two initial hypotheses proved to be entirely accurate. Sub-national elites and administrations do engage in a process of redefinition of collective identities, but not necessarily to reaffirm their identity against that of newcomers. The general effect of immigration in these polities is that of making “the cultural, political or linguistic contours of membership more explicit”. Strategies for the integration of immigrants, however, are neither entirely one-way assimilatory nor two-way multicultural.

More specifically, there are four conclusions that can be drawn from this brief comparison between the two case studies. First, the incapacity to “come to understand what is at stake for minorities” clearly represents a significant burden for the development of more far-reaching strategies of inclusion - political appeals in Québec and in South Tyrol have proved to be only relatively consistent with institutional arrangements. The link between the two levels is not straightforward. Still, there is a coherence in that both

79 Barker, “Learning to be ...”, 16.
80 Ibid., 34
political appeals and policy arrangements present a welcoming ethos open to the accommodation of immigrant diversity, but in practice they suggest that immigrants are required to do all that it takes in order to join the national minority group and, more precisely (and very importantly), to learn its language. This is true of many of the declarations and party manifestos cited in the first part of this article and also of many of the measures discussed, such as the language test for immigrants in South Tyrol and the obligation for immigrants to speak French in most of Québec’s public institutions.

The crucial point to be made is that within the integration process, a strong ethnic character is ascribed to language. The broader goal of most of the policies discussed in this article is that of encouraging immigrants to learn the language the national minority and have their children educated in it. Such a process becomes important not because speaking the same language is more convenient, but rather because it increases its relative status in the polity. In other words, this research showed that Québec and South Tyrol are not interested in the protection of the language as a means of communication, but rather as a marker of identity.\(^{82}\)

In this regard, however, sub-national elites showed different degrees of preoccupation. Much more far-reaching pieces of legislation have been promoted in Québec, where over time, the francophone group of Québec has proved able to establish a comprehensive set of policies aimed at making French the language spoken by immigrants in public places, rather than the language of the national group. In South Tyrol, conversely, as shown by the fragmented and incomplete debate on the immigration law that was passed in 2011, groups seem afraid of opening up a Pandora’s box that might further strengthen ethnic tensions among the groups. This difference between the capacity of the two elites to push forward legislation to tackle the problem is understandable if we take into account that there are some factors that do not apply to South Tyrol and that make the issue much more urgent for Québec’s national minority: francophones’ much longer history of dealing with immigration; their feeling of being under siege by an entire English-speaking continent; and their demographic crisis. The political risk, for both the polities, is that an increasingly protective attitude can lead xenophobic parties, such as the Action démocratique du Québec, the Freiheitliche Partei Südtirol, the Südtirol Freiheit and the Union für Südtirol, to eventually hold the balance of power and influence the political agenda of the main regional parties, such as the Parti Québécois and the Südtiroler Volkspartei. This development can give rise to “an ugly war of words over the ‘special’ privileges accorded to ‘immigrants’ and the limits that should be placed on them”.\(^{83}\) In such a situation, regressive and illiberal assimilatory policies

\(^{82}\) In such a context, language becomes a tool to exclude and differentiate groups. The collateral damage may be that even strictly linguistic policies assume an ethnic connotation, causing an even greater crisis of identity. Further, previous policies, initially thought to address other issues, may also be contested and used instrumentally by the groups.

aimed at homogenizing immigrants in the national minority group may in turn become the case. At present, however, this is not the situation.

At the same time, the task of integrating immigrants through a two-way multicultural integration resulting from accommodation of diversity through negotiation and compromises still remains just too hard for sub-national polities that have long histories of being defensive about their identities. In these polities, as has emerged through this article, “ethnic allegiance overrides all other considerations”.84 Therefore, it is unlikely that the “ethnicization”85 of the two minority nationalisms will eventually leave room for more civic forms of integration. As ongoing contestation and negotiation of identity will probably continue to be central features of Québec’s and South Tyrol’s political debates, understanding these driving forces and elaborating them into a comprehensive and coherent strategy for the handling of ethnic diversity in the long term remains a fundamentally urgent requirement for sub-national polities and, more specifically, for their national minority elites.

84 Fait, “A Gemütlich segregation …”, 221.
5. Figures

5.1. Extended List of Similarities and Differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Political Characteristics</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>South Tyrol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>state</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type</td>
<td>federal province</td>
<td>autonomous province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strong national consciousness</td>
<td>since the 1960s</td>
<td>since the 1920s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic and secessionist tension</td>
<td>since the 1970s</td>
<td>since the 1920s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>permanent international immigration</td>
<td>since the 1970s</td>
<td>since the 2000s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Territory and Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>small percentage of territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>borderland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mountainous landscape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sea cost territory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>separate ethnic communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>own language as a minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>linguistic plurality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic religious tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>numerical relation between groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kin-state for the minority claims</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>higher income than the average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economy based on the third sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5. Politics and Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>national minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationalism as a political movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>central ethnic parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provincial ethnic parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationalist Christian-Democrat ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support from the Catholic Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ethnic influence in electoral behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant electoral sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>majority support for nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>separatist nationalism</td>
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### 6. Legal Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>South Tyrol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some elements of asymmetry</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High level of self-government</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional guarantees of the autonomy</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International guarantees of autonomy</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two co-official languages</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence/powers in international relations</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good provision of financial autonomy</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.2. Demographic Composition of Québec and South Tyrol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>South Tyrol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td>7,435,905</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority-language speakers</td>
<td>5,916,840</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National-language mother tongue</td>
<td>607,165</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allophone</td>
<td>866,000</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (member of the Ladin minority)</td>
<td>18,736</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on data from the Census of Canada (2006) and Astat (2009)

### 5.3. Demographic Composition of Québec in 1971 and South Tyrol in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>South Tyrol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>total</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td>6,039,655</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority-language speakers</td>
<td>4,860,410</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National-language mother tongue</td>
<td>788,830</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allophone</td>
<td>390,415</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (member of the Ladin minority)</td>
<td>18,736</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on data from the Census of Canada (1971) and Astat (2009)
5.4. Migratory Trend in Québec: 1945-2011

Compiled from data from: Census of Canada (1960-2010); Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities (2011)

5.5. Migratory Trend in South Tyrol: 1960-2010

Compiled from data from: Astat (2011)
5.6. Immigrants’ Education Choices in South Tyrol: Absolute Numbers (School Year 2009/2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>German school</th>
<th>Italian school</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>immigrant pupils (absolute numbers)</td>
<td>1,949</td>
<td>2,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigrant pupils (relative numbers)</td>
<td>4.19%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
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</table>

Source: Astat (2010)

5.7. Immigrants’ Education Choices in Québec: Absolute Numbers (School Year 2003/2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>French school</th>
<th>Anglophone school</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>immigrant pupils (absolute numbers)</td>
<td>62,390</td>
<td>6,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigrant pupils (relative numbers)</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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