Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics

Abstract: 

Recent developments in EU security and defence have surprised by their speed, especially in light of a lack of such progress in the past. Brand new EU security institutions are already in place. EU states have also made clear military troops commitments for a Rapid Deployment Force by 2003. The Nice European Council of December 2000 has confirmed these developments. What has happened and what are the wider implications? Are the EU and NATO on a possible collision course? Probably yes, as both the EU is militarising and the Atlantic Alliance is becoming more and more a political institution. The crucial role of Britain is also examined and it is concluded that it remains more pro-Atlantic and anti-European supranationalism than ever before.

Following the European Council meetings in Cologne, Helsinki and Feira (respectively, June and December 1999, and June 2000), progress on a European Union security and defence policy has been achieved at a faster rate than at any time during the previous 50 years in the history of European integration. To quote from the Director of the Western European Union-Institute for Security Studies:

‘In the space of a year, from St-Malo to Helsinki, the European Union has made more progress on common defence than during the previous forty years of European construction. The pace of these developments is as striking as their seriousness and scope’ (Gnesotto 2000: 1).

This is important because integration in security and defence policy is seen, to use Jolyon Howorth’s words (2000b), as ‘the ultimate challenge’ for the Union. The Nice European Council meeting of 7-11 December 2000 confirmed that the Union has moved closer than ever towards its goal of a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). The Nice meeting approved the (French) Presidency report on European security and defence policy. Nice summit was mainly concerned by the necessary institutional arrangements needed to prepare the Union for its next enlargements, but this paper does not cover this question. It deals with the development of a European security and defence policy.

The paper aims first to ‘take stock’ of nearly two years of fast progress on security and defence matters in the Union. It roughly covers the December 1998 to December 2000 period. In other words, from Saint-Malo to Nice. Part 1 reviews recent developments in the field of defence and security policy. This is an area notorious for its difficult ‘integration capacity’ over the years, or rather, decades. So what has changed recently? Why has it changed so rapidly? Part 2 of the paper considers the implications of these recent developments for the USA, NATO, the WEU and the neutral EU states.

The first part of the paper deals with the following topics: the desirability and feasibility of a European security and defence policy; the background to recent developments (mainly the Franco-British St-Malo Declaration of December 1998); and, finally, new developments in both practical institutional and other military arrangements.

1. feasibility and desirability

2. the Saint-Malo Declaration

3. institutional arrangements

4. the so-called ‘headline goal’ for military commitments.

European defence policy is not only desirable and necessary. It is also feasible. This might nowadays sound like a truism. It is not so. History has shown that defence integration has been the single most difficult item on the integration process agenda since the end of the Second World War.

This is not the place to give a historical account of the (failed) attempts at developing a common European defence policy in the past. Suffice it to say that the first serious (and the only one until recently) such attempt was made in 1950. This was only five years after the end of WW2 and one year after the launch of the most powerful voluntary military alliance in the history of the world in 1949: NATO. The (West) European states of France, (West) Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries tried to develop a European Defence Community with its own armed forces and institutions. The European Defence Community also included a supranational European Political Community with full federal characteristics (see Furdson 1980). The EDC saga collapsed in 1954 for a number of national, European, and international reasons: the death of Stalin and the end of the war in the Korean peninsula; the ‘unholy’ alliance of Gaullists and Communists in the French Assembly; and the supranational nature of the EDC project. This last element had attracted the fierce opposition of the UK, thus rendering the viability and credibility of the whole project highly problematical. As a result, the collapse of the EDC/Political Community projects put the question of defence integration on the back burner for the following half century. That is, if one uses 1948 and 1998 as the key dates, with the Brussels Treaty and the St Malo Declaration as respective points of reference. It also confirmed the need for British participation in any future such effort.

‘High politics’ were thus removed from the integration agenda in Western Europe. NATO, the Americans and national defence policies took care of West European security and defence for the duration of the Cold War and beyond. The Europeans chose instead the functionalist, non-controversial, gradualist path to integration. They started with coal and steel (European Coal and Steel Community), adding later other economic and commercial sectors (European Economic Community), before moving on to more politically sensitive areas. By that time, the European Union (1993) had also superseded the European Community. More controversial areas included the launch of a single currency in 1999.

There were efforts at producing a common foreign policy in Western Europe as early as the early 1960s with the Fouchet Plans but they also collapsed. Initially because they were too intergovernmental, and later for not being intergovernmental enough! The first plan was opposed by the smaller states who feared a directoire. The second plan by the big states, mainly France, for being too supranational (see Bodenheimer 1967). In 1970, there was agreement for an intergovernmental foreign policy cooperation structure outside the existing EC treaties known as European Political Cooperation (EPC). It developed over the years (see Nuttall 1992). But its main characteristics were its flexibility, its intergovernmentalism (only the 1987 Single European Act institutionalised the role of the Commission in EPC), and its rule of unanimity. It produced rather few concrete results and left a vast number of international issues outside the scope of EPC (for more details see Stavridis 1991: 134-219; 1997: 103-109). With the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, the ambitiously named Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) replaced EPC. Most of EPC’s main characteristics remained but there was also, for the first time, provision for majority voting. The defence taboo had been broken as the WEU became the new ‘defence arm’ of the Union (Regelsberger, de Schoutheete, Wessels 1997). All this fell short of a real security and defence policy (i.e. in military terms). The situation was not fundamentally altered by the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty, except for the introduction of the Petersberg Tasks (WEU) in the EU (see below).

So, why is integration in defence desirable and necessary? Not only because of what has just been discussed above. That is to say as the culmination of a very long process (the missing element if you like). But also because in the last decade the world has witnessed historic changes. These words cannot overestimate the importance of the momentous events involved: 1989 and the collapse of the Berlin Wall; the end of Communism as a credible political ideology (at least in most parts of the world); the disintegration of the USSR; the democratisation of Central and Eastern Europe; the Gulf War; the wars in former Yugoslavia including the 1999 Kosovo bombing; and the return to democratic rule in Croatia and Serbia. All have created an added impetus for the creation of a CESDP. America remains, to use French foreign minister Vedrine’s words, the only ‘hyper power’ on the planet. The unwillingness of the Americans to use multilateralism, the rule of international law and the United Nations has characterised many recent US foreign policy decisions and actions. Therefore, there is a clear need for more Europe in the security and defence fields.

All of the above deals with the question of the desirability of a European defence policy. As for its feasibility, all of the events just referred to, have also altered the international situation to such an extent that smaller and more professional armed forces with high-tech equipment have replaced the need for huge traditional conventional armed forces. The latter was the rule during the Cold War (with the added protection of the American nuclear umbrella). This is no longer valid. Major conventional (or nuclear, at least theoretically) wars have been replaced with crisis situations where rapid action (and rapid action deployment forces) are more necessary than ever before. This means that ‘pooling’ national defence resources will enhance the EU’s influence in the world. None of the EU member states, including the big ones, could achieve such a capability on their own.

In addition, non-military means are also required, be they of an economic, social or political nature. In that respect, the European Union, a civilian power par excellence, is well equipped to project this new type of power. This is not the place to discuss ‘civilian power Europe’, but it suffices to say that the EU, with its huge economic, political and financial clout, does exert some influence in the international system. Whether it uses it or not in the right way (i.e. to promote international democratic principles according to the François Duchene standard definition of a civilian power) remains another matter. The main point here is that developments in European defence cooperation should not be seen in isolation from other, non-military, means (for more details on civilian power, see Smith 2000; Maull 2000; Stavridis, Hutchence 2000; Stavridis 2001).

Finally, where desirability and feasibility eventually coincided was in the national politics of one of the key member states for European defence. The change of government in Britain in May 1997 led, eventually, to the December 1998 St-Malo Declaration. This is analysed in the next section.

Another quick return back to the 1993 Maastricht Treaty is needed. The WEU (Western European Union) became the defence arm of the EU but there was disagreement over the impact of such a decision on EU-USA/NATO relations. The Europeanists saw it as a Europeanisation of defence. The Atlanticists as reinforcing the European pillar within NATO. The UK, the Netherlands, Portugal and Denmark are seen as Atlanticists, whereas France, Italy, Spain and Greece are seen as Europeanists. Germany is somewhere in between, having had a ‘special relationship’ with the USA during the Cold War (for more details, see Tsakaloyannis 1991). The main actors are the pro-NATO UK and the pro-WEU France. The key reasons can be summed up as follows: their respective military power, nuclear forces, and seats on the UN Security Council. One should also add a reluctance to use military force by both Germany and Italy, and to a lesser extent Spain. The neutrals pushed for the WEU’s new role in the so-called Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and evacuation missions, peace-keeping and peace-making missions; Article 17 TEU). All this meant there was no real accord on how to move on European security and defence matters. The influence of the Gulf War (1991) was clear but most important was the violent collapse of the Yugoslav federation. However, most importantly, the slow militarising of the Union had begun. As was noted above, the taboo on security and defence had been broken in practice after it had been broken in principle in the Maastricht Treaty earlier.

More progress was achieved by the Amsterdam Treaty on foreign policy matters too. It created a CFSP planning cell and a so-called ‘Mr PESC’. Javier Solana, the former NATO Secretary General, took up this role in November 1999. He also soon afterwards became the new WEU Secretary General. In terms of treaty commitment, Amsterdam replaced Maastricht’s commitment to an ‘eventual’ common defence policy with a ‘progressive’ one (article 17 and former article J.7).

The most reluctant European of all member states, Britain, changed government in 1997 after 18 years of Conservative rule epitomised by its ideological and practical anti-Europeanism. The former was clear during Margaret Thatcher’s "reign", and the latter poisoned John Major’s premiership. Both Prime Ministers paid a heavy price for their different stances on Europe: it was one of the reasons why Sir Geoffrey Howe and Michael Heseltine respectively damaged and challenged the authority of the Prime Minister in 1990. Most importantly, the parliamentary weakness of the Major government, especially after his 1992 elections victory (reduced parliamentary majority), meant that he had to deal with anti-European revolts and feelings in his party throughout the remainder of his term-in-office. Once Labour came to power there was little hint at a major shift on Europe as the Amsterdam European Council meeting in June 1997 (and its ensuing Treaty) showed. However, the Petersberg Tasks were included in the new Treaty (as noted above).

At a time when Britain was looking for a role in the EU, its ‘natural’ leadership was clearly in defence. It could but would not join the euro (single currency). For the first time in a very long time, the UK had a Prime Minister who was willing to take the lead. Tony Blair has indeed been described as ‘the most unambiguously pro-European Prime Minister since the UK joined the then EEC in 1973’ (Whitman 1999: 11).

The UK position took some time to develop (for details see Whitman 1999; Howorth 2000a; 2000b; Remacle 2000). This is not the place to discuss fully the reasons behind it. Nor is it to explain who was behind this decision in Downing Street, or whether the French’s had shifted their position on NATO first. What is important is that the relative speed in which developments took place confirms both the urgency and the need for a European defence capability.

I would agree with those who believe that St-Malo does not represent a British ‘conversion’ to the European cause (here meaning federalism). It also means that the way integration in Europe has evolved over the decades is somewhat different from the original fathers founders views, but this is another topic (for a theoretical analysis see Chryssochoou, Tsinisizelis, Stavridis, Ifantis 1999: 1-82). In my view, those who see the British efforts as mainly motivated by their wish to keep the Americans in Europe seem to be more accurate in their assessment. But, at the end of the day, this new coincidence of interests between London and Paris has meant that a new deal could be struck.

What has happened since the Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defence (Saint Malo, 4 December 1998) which called for an autonomous defence capacity for the EU whilst respecting the NATO commitments and obligations? It called for an

‘appropriate structure and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning’.

It also stressed the need to revamp and reorganise existing armed forces and the need for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry and technology.

Following Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999), and Feira (June 2000), a number of decisions were taken to provide the EU with the necessary institutional decision-making tools. The most important developments were the creation of a number of new EU institutions based in Brussels in March 2000 (initially in an interim form). To quote from the Helsinki Conclusions:

‘The following new permanent political and military bodies will be established within the Council:

a) - A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Brussels will be composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level. The PSC will deal with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP, in accordance with the provisions of the EU Treaty and without prejudice to Community competence. In the case of a military crisis management operation, the PSC will exercise, under the authority of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the operation. For that purpose, appropriate procedures will be adopted in order to allow effective and urgent decision taking. The PSC will also forward guidelines to the Military Committee.

b) - The Military Committee (MC) will be composed of the Chiefs of Defence, represented by their military delegates. The MC will meet at the level of the Chiefs of Defence as and when necessary. This committee will give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC, as well as provide military direction to the Military Staff. The Chairman of the MC will attend meetings of the Council when decisions with defence implications are to be taken.

c) - The Military Staff (MS) within the Council structures will provide military expertise and support to the CESDP, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations. The Military Staff will perform early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks including identification of European national and multinational forces’.

After the Nice European Council meeting, these structures have now been confirmed as permanent ones. In addition, a capability catalogue was prepared to show who would contribute what for what was going to be called the Rapid Deployment Force. The latter is analysed in the next section.

The so-called ‘headline goal’ of the respective national armed forces of the EU member states was first mentioned at Helsinki. It called for the creation by 2003 of a 50-60,000 troops (up to a corps level in military terms) rapid deployment force, able to be deployed within 60 days and be sustained for one year. With its necessary back up including a transportation and intelligence system, this means in practice about 100,000 troops, 400 airplanes and 100 warships.

At Feira, it was announced that a general assessment (a survey of means and resources available if you like) would be carried out. The result of this exercise produced the various troops commitments which were formally announced on 20 November 2000 at the Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels. They are as follows (Le Monde and International Herald Tribune, 22 November 2000):

Just for comparison purposes, currently, France has over 400,000 troops, Germany over 350,000, the UK 250,000, and Spain over 200,000. Only the British armed forces have been fully professionalised since 1967. All other countries are now introducing or about to introduce professional armed forces. France, Italy and Spain have already done so whereas the topic is more controversial in Germany.

But it was immediately recognised that a big effort was still required as was publicly acknowledged by both Tony Blair and Javier Solana (Le Monde, 22 November 2000). This is not only due to weaknesses in ‘lift’ and intelligence (especially satellites) capabilities (see COREPER 2000: 18), but also because it means current reliance on NATO, and therefore less autonomous capacity to act. This capacity must be created and it will cost more money.

The EU’s 15 total defence budget in 1998 was 145.9 billion dollars, whereas that of the USA was 271.1 billion. Russia spent 79 billion, Japan 42.1 and China 6.7. There are however problems with all these statistics because some countries include, for example, pensions in their calculations and others do not (see Heisbourg 2000 for more details). More importantly, research and development expenditure is sometimes included in these figures. The key point however is that in 1989-1998, ‘military expenditure in France, Great Britain and Germany respectively has fallen by 12%, 24% and 28%’ (The figure of the day’, EU French Presidency website, 21 September 2000).

The budgetary implications of all these developments remain at the heart of the future of the European commitment to develop an autonomous defence capability. François Heisbourg (2000) has convincingly shown that the limits of ambiguity have now been reached. The EU needs to deliver in concrete terms. The downwards trend of all EU military budgets over the last decade (the so-called ‘peace dividend’) will probably continue in the near future. Ironically the so-called Maastricht criteria put limits on expanding public expenditure. Also it is difficult not to agree with Lord Robertson’s claim that the Europeans have ‘to end the culture of taking a peace dividend when there is no peace’ (quoted in Nicoll 2000). This is not the place to discuss this important question further. But it is important because it brings in money and budget: that is to say, domestic national politics. The path to a credible and effective CESDP will be a long and tortuous one.

Part Two deals with the implications of recent developments in European security and defence matters for the USA, other NATO members (mainly Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Canada), the so-called neutral EU states, and the WEU.

1. the USA/NATO

2. other NATO members

3. neutral states

4. the WEU

At the end of the Cold War, the initial ESDI (European Security and Defence Identity) concept was seen as a necessary re-adjustment to new world realities (the so-called ‘new international order’ to use U.S. President George Bush words in 1991). Europe had to do more to help the USA. This debate had been ongoing since the creation of the Alliance under the more technical term of ‘burden sharing’. During the East-West confrontation, there was no major problem with the unilateral political leadership of the USA. However since the end of the Cold War, it has contained a key contradiction: will the European Pillar that is therefore going to be created in the Alliance be under the control of the Americans, or is it going to be turned eventually into an autonomous CESDP (for more details, see Howorth 2000b)?

This debate emerged in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. It led for a short period of time to a rapprochement between the French and NATO. It even implied a de facto return to an integrated NATO military command, which the French had left in 1966. Similar arrangements during the Bosnian operations led many to believe that the Europeanisation of NATO would confirm the superiority of the Americans. However all this collapsed over a number of theological issues, best exemplified by the saga over the Southern Command in Naples (see Bozo 1995; Gnesotto 1998). The issue of what type of NATO will emerge continues to be fudged. The biggest such fudge was the 23-24 April 1999 NATO New Strategic Concept, in the midst of the Kosovo bombing, when the Alliance welcomed its first new members since 1982: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The New Concept reiterates NATO’s primacy whilst confirming the importance of ESDI (NATO Press Release NAC-S(99)65 - 24 April 1999).

There is now, at long last, a realisation among many observers and practitioners that, whatever the British or anybody else for that matter may think or say, any development on the European defence front will have serious implications for the future of NATO and American engagement in Europe. The then US Defence Secretary William Cohen put it in the most striking way recently when he argued that unless the Europeans improved their NATO commitments, ‘NATO could become a relic of the past’ (International Herald Tribune, 6 December 2000). Cohen fears competition between the EU and NATO and said that the Atlantic Alliance was facing a choice ‘between vitality and decadence’. The NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, a former (New) Labour Defence Secretary, has also warned about the risks of duplication of resources and rivalry between the two organisations. Another way of asking the same question is, to use William Pfaff’s own words, to ask ‘When Europe gets its own army, what will NATO be for?’ (International Herald Tribune, 5 December 2000).

In that respect, the November 2000 announcement of the headline goal details led to a clear divergence of views between Lord Robertson and France’s Defence minister, Alain Richard: to the former, the RDF is going to ‘complement’ NATO and not duplicate, weaken or replace it. On the contrary, the latter openly criticised Robertson’s comments as an attempt to create a hierarchy between NATO and the EU, arguing that he was being ‘plus royaliste que le roi’, in this particular instance the USA (Le Monde, 22 November 2000). Britain’s current Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, had also previously disagreed with the French by arguing that ‘It is simply not sensible, practical or affordable to duplicate Nato structures, assets or capabilities in some form of European "mini-Nato" (in Nicoll 2000).

The EU COREPER Report of 4 December 2000 could not be more explicit: the CESDP is open to all EU applicant states and other European NATO members but ‘Cette ouverture doit naturellement respecter le principe d’autonomie de decision de l’Union europeenne (2000: 7)’.

The French Quai d’Orsay provided further ammunition to the debate:

Cette Europe de la defense doit etre naturellement coordonnée avec l’Alliance mais, pour ce qui concerne son elaboration et sa mise en oeuvre, elle doit etre independante par rapport au Shape [le quartier general des forces de l’OTAN]: coordonnée mais independante.

On the opposite side (of the argument), Lord Roberston continued to claim that any coordination outside NATO would only concern military operations ‘à tres petite échelle’ (Le Monde, 17-18 December 2000).

Even more evidence of this cleavage can be found in the proceedings of a July 2000 Conference on European defence: the US, through the intervention of Lisa Bronson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs at the Pentagon, argued for complementarity and for enhanced interoperability between NATO resources and the Headline Goal (Lindley-French 2000: 6). The French through the intervention made by the Quai d’Orsay’s Political Director, Gérard Errera, argued that ‘it is essential that the EU enjoys full autonomy in its decision-making because the EU is not a sub-set in a wider Euro-Atlantic world’, to use the Conference rapporteur’s own words (Lindley-French 2000: 2). Errera’s own contribution – in French - is worth referring too: he insisted that there was no hierarchy between NATO and the EU, and that the worst case scenario would be for the latter not to acquire a defence capacity (in Lindley-French 2000: 18-19).

This debate is not surprising and confirms the view that the British are mainly interested in finding a way to keep the USA involved in European defence. After all, the UK had made it clear from the start of the CESDP at St-Malo that any European effort to develop a military capacity ‘should be military credible, politically intergovernmental and NATO compatible’ (Howorth 2000b: 25 see also 29 and 47-48). This bridging role between the two sides of the Atlantic has been consistently and constantly reiterated by senior British politicians. Thus, Peter Mandelson, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, argued in speeches to Chatham House in London and to the Chicago Council for Foreign Relations that

‘We [the British] can be the bridge between Europe and the United States, but only if we fully commit ourselves to constructive engagement in Europe’ (Mandelson 2000: 15).

His World Today article which is based on those two speeches was revealingly entitled ‘Pro-American, Pro-European’. European Commissioner Chris Patten scolded both anti-Americanists and those who do not promote more Europe in defence because they ‘fear that this would sever the all-important transatlantic link’ (Patten 2000: 18).

It is too early to assess what policy the new Bush (Junior) administration is going to take on that matter. It is also unclear how much of the campaign ‘sound bites’ will be carried through in actual foreign policy (see Vernet 2000). But it is clear that a number of alarm bells have been already heard, most importantly on a claim that he would pull all US troops out of the Balkans’. For instance, Condoleeza Rice, now the new National Security Advisor of the incoming Bush Junior Administration, is reported to have said during the presidential campaign that the Americans ‘do not need to have the 82^nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten’. She also added that, were the Gore camp to win the 2000 election, ‘America’s military will continue to be overdeployed, harming morale and re-enlistment rates, weakening our military’s core mission’ (quoted in Gordon, Erlanger 2001).

The same is true of the national defence missile shield (or NMD: National Missile Defense). The whole new US defence team has been a strong supporter of the defence shield. In particular, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld has been described as the key actor in turning round the Clinton administration after a less favourable report had been produced earlier (see Meyers 2000-2001). Most Europeans opposed the new plan. For instance, the French President has recently argued that he is worried by it: ‘Our concern is that (…) NMD cannot fail to relaunch the arms race in the world’ (quoted in International Herald Tribune, 30 January 2001; for a similar analysis, see Carlin 2001). In addition, one should note that transatlantic rifts had begun during Clinton’s final year as President (see Drozdiak 2000; Fitchett 2000; see also de Beer, Zecchini 2001).

Of all the other states in NATO, two deserve particular attention: Canada and Turkey. Norway and Iceland are not a problem and Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are expected to join the EU in or soon after 2003.

The case of Canada is very interesting because over the years the Europeans and the Canadians have often shared common positions on international affairs. For instance, one could list their common refusal to endorse US foreign policy over Cuba (ongoing and especially during the 1990s), Central America (1980s), extra-territorial jurisdiction of US law (1982 Siberian pipeline), or their current opposition to a nuclear defence shield.

However, over EU defence capabilities, the Canadians support it only in so far as it strengthens NATO, and as a mechanism for crisis management and not as an alternative institution to the Atlantic Alliance. See for instance the recent comments by the Canadian ambassador to NATO, David Wright, which are clearly taking a US position on who is in charge of defence matters in Europe:

‘Canada fully supports the ESDI as a means of strengthening the European pillar of NATO (…). Our direct concern (…) is the unity of the Alliance (in Lindley-French 2000: 25-26).

Of the non-EU European members of NATO Turkey presents an important problem (For a recent discussion of a similar debate, but related then to the WEU, see Cebeci 1999). What is particularly relevant to this paper however is Turkey’s rejection of what they see as a French attempt to create a European mini-NATO, thus challenging the very role of NATO (Turkish Daily News, 15 December 2000). As a full member of NATO, Turkey is not happy about being left out of the EU decision making process which will be using NATO troops. Following the Feira June 2000 meeting, the Turks made their feeling quite clear and received support from the United States. Turkish intransigence hardened after the headline goal was announced (see Turkish Daily News, especially 14 December 2000). This is a topic directly linked to the future shape of the Union. Solana has recently complained that this intransigence over the EU use of NATO assets is a tactic by Turkey to become an EU member through the back door (as reported by Drozdiak 2000). On 16 December 2000 it was announced that Turkey had scuttled the NATO-EU Plan (International Herald Tribune; see also Fitchett 2001). The Turkish media praised the ‘firm stance’ adopted by Ankara on that issue (Turkish Daily News, 16 December 2000). Interestingly, its editorialist, Ilnur Cevik, described the EU stance as ‘a gross mistake which may backfire in the not too distant future’. He also argued that the EU’s Rapid Deployment Force might be used in the future against Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean. This point was further stressed by Professor Huseyin Bagci:

‘After Southern Cyprus becomes a full member, then Greece and Southern Cyprus will start to cry, as it is to be expected, that Turkey occupies EU land and borders. It is not a joke that the first crisis for the EU army to manage, if there will be one, will be with Turkey’ (Turkish Daily News, 18 December 2000).

I will not expand here on a rather strange reading of history where NATO and the Americans have tended to favour the Turks, including in 1974. Nor will I refer to the change in the WEU’s application of Article 5 in 1995 when Greece joined the organisation (see Chryssochoou, Stavridis, Moschonas 2000: 197-201). Nor will I point out that the continued occupation of part of Cyprus is condemned by the UN and the international community, and that only Turkey recognises the ‘TRNC’. But it is interesting to see what the nature of the arguments used in Turkey over the reasons why it is blocking the development of an institutionalised EU-NATO arrangement.

The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty was initiated at the request of a Joint Finnish-Swedish Memorandum on 25 April 1996. (See Howorth 2000b: 71-91). What is relevant to this paper is the fact that the militarising of the Union is proceeding apace despite the presence of at least five neutral or non-aligned states (Sweden, Finland and Austria plus Ireland and Denmark). It is not the place to expand on this matter here, but just to mention that these neutral states will have to find a way to ‘sell’ to their respective public opinions why what was taboo for centuries or decades is no longer so.

In an interesting recent report, the Swedish Social-Democratic Party (in power almost without interruption for the last seventy years) is making the case for the unlikeness of Sweden remaining neutral if there is a conflict near its borders (Russia, the Baltic states). The Swedish are now arguing that there is political solidarity among EU member states even if there is no Article 5 guarantee yet (see Jacob 2001).

Similarly, the Finnish Defence minister has argued recently that NATO membership would benefit the economy of his country. As public opinion in Finland continues to be opposed to such a development right now, it is only fair to assume that his comments should be seen as a first attempt at shifting popular opinion in the longer term (see New Europe, 28 January-3 February 2001: 16).

There is also a clear discrepancy between the way the Europeanists members of the EU defence plan led by France basically argue for an independent and autonomous capacity. They see the Rapid Deployment Force as the beginning of something much bigger to come later. On the contrary, the so-called neutrals consider Petersberg-style operations as a maximum for integration in defence. This still rather unnoticed clash of interests will undoubtedly influence the future debate over defence in Europe.

It appears at first that the WEU is easily dealt with, as it came officially to an end on 13 November 2000 at its Marseilles meeting of foreign and defence ministers (Le Monde, 15 November 2000). However, and this confirms the ‘beauty’ of the contradictions in Europe’s security and defence matters, a number of residual elements will continue to exist: a shadow secretariat in Brussels, the Paris-based Institute for Security Studies, the WEU Parliamentary Assembly (also in Paris), and, most importantly, Article 5 which is more automatic than its NATO equivalent (because of US constitutional restrictions). It is ironic that a defunct institution continues to provide an automatic guarantee clause against a possible attack on the territory of one of its member state. This is something that the EU has declined to do so far, despite the inclusion of a political solidarity clause in Amsterdam. The Treaty’s Article 11 also states that the objectives of the CFSP include ‘to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union’.

But what this continuation of a defunct institution shows is that the EU has now replaced the WEU in the old ‘NATO versus WEU’ debate about what kind of European defence. This is the crucial element about the CESDP. The fact that the EU is militarising, and that NATO is at the same time becoming more and more a political, even possibly an economic, institution, means that there is a clash that will have to be resolved one way or another. NATO also now uses ‘democratic discourse’ (also in its actions, see 1999 Kosovo). This is a massive shift in NATO rhetoric and action, mainly due to a new international context, but still quite afar from its initial intentions (Salazar in Portugal, the military junta in Athens 1967-1974, and the military control of Turkish politics for a long period including today) all the same. To quote from William Pfaff:

‘The reason the case [depleted uranium in Kosovo] has so exarcebated tensions in the alliance is that since the Cold War NATO has been converted from a mutual defense organization with a limited aim into a vehicle for Western political and politico-military action and influence in areas beyond NATO. As NATO is American-led, this has ordinarily come down to promoting U.S. policy, with the allies in a subordinate role’ (Pfaff 2001).

All of the above will have major implications for the future of defence in Europe. Perhaps it was hoped that the end of the WEU would make things easier because it means de facto that the CESDP comes under the CFSP (second pillar of the Union) and that a fourth pillar is thus not added to an already rather cumbersome EU structure. This fails to consider the intricacies of European integration (for more, see Stavridis 2000). But it points to a key element in the CESDP debate: what kind of European defence will follow from St Malo will define what kind of EU there will be in the future.

This section reiterates the main point of the paper. The progress made in the past couple of years towards CESDP has been breathtaking to say the least. Whether the momentum will continue remains an open question, mainly due to three factors: [i] budgets; [ii] the UK position; [iii] the US reaction. There is little doubt in my mind that NATO-EU relations are on a collision course. Not of a military or any other ‘nasty’ kind. But it seems to me that we have reached the limits of claiming that to be pro-European can only mean to be pro-American. The indivisibility of Transatlantic defence interests is simply no longer credible. And I do believe strongly that they were so during the Cold War. Such an approach was widely accepted, except from a leftist perspective. Democratic peace theory (two democracies do not fight each other) will make Transatlantic relations smoother rather than harsher, but this will not prevent trade wars or using the World Trade Organization to settle disputes over planes, food, technology, etc.

Finally, whether or not the CESPD is a success (and I include autonomy as one of the criteria for assessing it), then the world will be either under the continued influence of hyper-power USA or under a more balanced international order. What is important is whether the EU will emerge as a counterweight to US power and that will make the world quite different from what it is today. In other words, the shape and success or otherwise of the CESDP will be as important for the Union as it will be for the rest of the world.

[1] Dr Stavridis is currently a Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence. He also holds a Jean Monnet Chair in European Political Studies in the Department of Politics, The University of Reading, UK.

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