**COUNTRY REPORT**

**Guinea Bissau**

An 11-year struggle for independence and two subsequent decades of state control seem to have stunted Guinea Bissau's development. This is one of sub-Saharan Africa's most indebted nations with an unenviable place almost at the bottom of the life expectancy table. The government led by João Bernardo Vieira began to relax the state's grip in 1986 and the process gathered momentum following his re-election in the 1994 multiparty polls. While political debate appears to be thriving now, The Courier found the country - which is in dire need of foreign exchange - striving to implement reforms, boost productivity and raise more resources for essential services. A lot of hopes have been vested in the country's recent membership of the WAEMU – which should boost monetary stability and improve Guinea Bissau's access to the wider regional market.

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**DOSSIER**

**Children**

In an ideal world, childhood would be a time of happiness: a period when innocence evolves gradually into understanding in a secure environment. Sadly, this is just a pipe-dream for millions of young people. For many, the harsh realities of survival take precedence. Over the past decade, four million children have perished as a result – directly or indirectly – of armed conflicts. Several times this number have been displaced by wars. Many more have to cope with poverty, hunger, disease and ill-treatment. They are made to work when they should be playing or learning. Some are obliged to bear arms for causes they do not understand. These, and many others are forced to become adults before their time. For the Dossier, we invited contributions from a variety of sources including organisations directly working to help children. They leave us with a disturbing picture of lost innocence, but also a message of hope that more can and will be done to protect this most vulnerable section of humanity.

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Moussa Touré, President of the WAEMU Commission

'The Union has entered its operational phase'

A Senegalese economist specialising in development and economic integration, Moussa Touré has held a number of posts, both in his own country and in Europe. He was Senegal's Minister of Finance, Planning and Trade, and then its ambassador to Germany. Now President of the West African Economic and Monetary Union's Commission, the body responsible for directing and consolidating convergence and harmonisation of development policies in the organisation's eight Member States, Mr Touré is at the heart of the integration process in his home region. The Courier interviewed him during the Brussels Conference on the future of the Lomé Convention, where he gave us his thoughts on topics as diverse as the future of the CFA franc vis-à-vis the Euro (the proposed European single currency) and policy on WAEMU convergence and enlargement. We asked him first about the current state of regional integration in West Africa, an issue which is seen as central to economic revival.

- I believe I am in a good position to confirm that the WAEMU is in good health. I am not just talking about its past achievements – you know that the Union has been in existence for a few years now – but also of the firm political commitment that is needed to implement such a wide-ranging and ambitious project. Of course there have been attempts in the past to achieve pan-African, and notably West African, economic integration but current international developments appear more conducive to creating the long-term conditions that will ensure that the WAEMU takes off. The Union became operational two years ago and deserves to be congratulated for the positive progress it has made since then. To have achieved so much over such a short period encourages us to be optimistic, particularly when you see that, elsewhere, it has taken much longer to arrive at the position we are in today. The WAEMU will be more than able to meet the challenges, be this vis-à-vis its people, economic operators, investors or the authorities in the Member States.

  ■ Some purists say the WAEMU is working 'back to front' in that your single currency has preceded the achievement of economic union. Economic integration theory normally envisages the opposite, with a progression from customs union to single currency.

  - In our situation, the single currency gives us strength and eases the path towards economic convergence. You only have to look at the problems Europe is having in the run-up to its single currency, in spite of all the efforts. I am convinced, nevertheless, that Europe will attain its goal, and will do so according to the timetable it has set itself. As far as we are concerned, sharing a single currency frees us from certain constraints and enables us to concentrate on other important areas. It goes without saying that a single currency is a great help when setting up a Common External Tariff (CET). Sharing a single currency also enables us to avoid problems arising from exchange rates. We have been spared this destabilising influence in our integration process and this is why I think it will be easier for us to achieve the CET. I am hopeful that decisions about the establishment and application of the CET will follow the timetable which has been proposed to the Member States, which enables them to achieve the necessary convergence. In global terms, I believe that from 2000 onwards, the WAEMU Member States will be presenting a united front, with a CET in place backed up by the abolition of duties on most products traded within the Union. There will be announcements shortly to provide economic operators, investors and our various partners with a clear picture of our intentions and undertakings.

  ■ A single currency is obviously a considerable advantage. Despite this asset, West Africa has seen many integrationist organisations come and go – which haven't amounted to very much. What lessons should the WAEMU draw from this?

  - You are right to say that the single currency is a distinct advantage for the WAEMU, although I should point out that the Union has achieved a number of other things as well. Despite the record of past failures in integration, we have learned from the experience – there are both positive and negative lessons that have helped us build on the groundwork already done. We have not had to start from scratch. It is also important to take advantage of the good example set by the EU's experience, given that its objective is the same as ours. I say again, the achievement of a single currency enables
us to target all our efforts on convergence of macro-economic policy and on sectoral policies. In a way, we are approaching it from the opposite direction as compared with the EU, but, ultimately, the goal is the same: integration, economic development and the establishment, in the longer term of a homogeneous and united whole.

Not all Member States benefit from the positive effects of Union in the same way and at the same time. The landlocked countries, for instance, may lag behind. Have you managed to overcome the political problem of nationalist attitudes – for example, the desire of each country to have its own cement works or some other industry, to enable it to be self-sufficient rather than having to import from other Member States?

This is a difficult question to answer. I think everyone needs to understand that integration for an individual Member State entails 'zeros' and 'minuses', as well as 'pluses'. The important thing is that when all the elements are added together, the final result should be positive. In other words, the individual Member State should have reached a higher level of economic development than existed before. It is important to be open and honest with people when explaining this, and it is something to which we pay a great deal of attention. Indeed, from a conceptual standpoint, we have to raise integrationism to the status of a philosophy, perhaps even to that of a belief or a religion. If every Member State is determined to be a 'winner' in every decision relating to integration, there is a risk that we will end up with flexible or à la carte integration, and then everything grinds to a halt. The process requires people to waive their rights to some extent, and to be ready to adapt. In a word, it is a matter of solidarity. And, of course, our economies are now being subjected to new types of constraint, resulting from economic globalisation and trade liberalisation. Whether or not one is directly involved in this particular process, it affects us all. So our economies have to perform even better. Above all they must be competitive so that we can hold our own in the home markets, but also go out and win customers abroad. So realistically, the nationalism you refer to is simply an effort to preserve artificial economies. All the Member States have genuine potential, in a number of areas, and this potential must be developed. Needless to say, it requires a process of gradual transformation. It isn’t a question of sweeping everything away and starting again with a clean slate.

The eight WAEMU Member States are all in ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), which has 16 members. Some of the other ECOWAS countries have a significant influence in certain WAEMU states. I am thinking particularly of Nigeria whose currency, the naira, is widely accepted in neighbouring countries. How can this aspect be incorporated into the Union’s policy, given the overlap between the two organisations?

This problem exists because not all the countries in West Africa are organised in the same way and not all of them enjoy the same levels of political, social and economic stability, good governance and democracy. Our aim is that all the states in the sub-region should be well-organised, and be part of an area where responsibility is shared and where there is economic convergence. From this standpoint, Nigeria should be viewed as a potential additional force for positive progress, rather than a hindrance to integration. Also, if we accept that the WAEMU and other sub-regional or regional organisations are simply tools for our continent’s further development – in other words, recognising development objectives as being the ultimate goal – then each sub-regional or regional organisation has its rightful place as a link in the integration process. There is no question that the

The single currency gives us strength and eases the path towards economic convergence.
doubtless grow to more than 20 Member States at some future date. If you look at it more closely, you can see that EU enlargement has brought countries together which are much more disparate than is the case in the WAEMU area. Importantly, however, what all of the latter share is under-development and poverty (in addition to their single currency). I think it should be easier, on the basis of a firm political undertaking, to expand the WAEMU. This can be either through straightforward accession, or through an association relationship covering certain common policies or projects. The CFA franc is a stabilising influence and, as such, is a tried-and-tested basis for expansion. Take the example of Guinea Bissau, for instance, which has just become the eighth member of the Union. In the beginning, I am sure, the WAEMU may have been viewed with suspicion, but nowadays, there is a genuine interest, or at least curiosity about what the system entails among certain other countries in the sub-region. We should all now be looking to the future with serenity, caution and realism.

§ Europe will soon have a single currency, the Euro, while the CFA franc remains linked to the French franc, with a fixed parity guaranteed by the French Treasury. Will the CFA franc be linked to the Euro, via France, or will the WAEMU have to strike out on its own?

— This is a subject that comes up increasingly in interviews these days. The most important thing now is for our CFA franc to perform well, very well, in fact, in terms of the criteria that people use to determine the credibility of a currency. As we have been indicating, the economic performance of the various countries involved is currently satisfactory but we need to make every effort to ensure that this continues against a background of sustainable development. What we have at present is a solid, dependable currency and, on that basis, all avenues have to be explored. Of course we want to guarantee the best possible future for our currency. I might add that our French partners have assured us, at the highest political and technical levels, of their willingness to maintain the current mechanism even when the Euro has come into being. Other aspects are purely technical or procedural.

§ Given the current monetary uncertainty, there is no longer any question of inflationary financing of growth in the CFA franc zone. What is the limit set for budget deficits in the Member States?

— We do not apply a budget deficit criteria as such within the Union. Instead, we use a basic 'primary balance' ratio based on fiscal income, which has to be at least 15%. However, I would point out that the WAEMU Member States have voluntarily, mutually and as a group, accepted joint responsibility for the macro-economic policy of their countries, with a view to guaranteeing economic convergence. With this in mind, the Council of Ministers has adopted directives for 1997 and 1998 setting out a number of criteria relating to good economic and public-finance management. The Commission is responsible for monitoring and application in a wide range of areas: inflation rates, investment rates, levels of external and internal debt and so on. It has also taken on board a recommendation on minimum growth rates. All these criteria and recommendations are taken into account in the budget calculations of Member States.

§ With Lomé IV now nearing the end of its term, what is your assessment of the current level of cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries, and more specifically those in West Africa?

— Despite criticism, here and there, of certain aspects of EU-ACP cooperation, it is important that everyone, particularly our European partners, be aware that Lomé is an exemplary and unique system of cooperation. As a model, it could inspire developed countries, developing countries and international cooperation institutions in everything they do. There are now moves aimed at improving the existing system and organisation, although everyone agrees that the present geographical structure of the ACP side should be maintained. At the same time, however, the synergies and the convergence which exist within groups of countries and economic sub-groups must also be acknowledged. The ACP group could even go beyond the framework of EU-ACP cooperation to take account of interests common to its members as a whole. This could give the 71 countries involved more political weight in other areas of North-South cooperation. It is important that there should be more than a mere institutional framework. Within the ACP Member States, particularly in Africa, there are common interests which should be developed. Almost all the countries in question have set up regional or sub-regional bodies which are beginning to take shape or are just now becoming operational. These should be used as 'staging posts' and as instruments for further developing EU-ACP cooperation. This applies to WAEMU, ECOWAS, SADC and, without doubt, the future CAEMC (Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community). They are all groups whose future lies in promoting integration as a way of achieving economic development. The ultimate goal is that the projects set up by each regional or sub-regional group should be able to converge, so as to promote the development of Africa and of the ACP countries in general. In addition, all those involved should be able to find their own place in this cooperation process, particularly the regional and sub-regional organisations. We have reason to celebrate the fact that long ago, EU-ACP cooperation broke new ground. It acknowledged the fact that regional and sub-regional bodies were appropriate, and implemented a sub-regional development policy through the various regional indicative programmes. The WAEMU Commission is delighted to have been acknowledged as the coordinator of regional funds alongside ECOWAS and the ICDCS (Interstate Permanent Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel) for West Africa. It will do its utmost to expand on and develop steps already taken. Nowadays everyone recognises that the integration process is one we must get involved with. It is the only way in which our countries will develop further.
Commission proposes new partnership with ACP countries

The European Commission has adopted political guidelines to steer the EU through the negotiations that will determine the framework for future dealings with the ACP countries. The Commission wishes to preserve the EU-ACP partnership but proposes reinforcing its political dimension, more rigorous and selective management of aid instruments and an integrated approach to poverty. It also advocates greater geographical differentiation of the overall agreement with the 71 ACP countries through the conclusion – depending on the partner’s level of development – of economic cooperation or partnership agreements with regional or subregional groupings to further their gradual integration into the liberalised world economy. The political guidelines approved on 29 October will be followed by detailed proposals for the negotiations to begin with the ACP countries next autumn. The Lomé Convention, which currently governs EU-ACP relations, is due to expire at the start of 2000.

Following the adoption of his proposals by the other members of the Commission, João de Deus Pinheiro declared: ‘The post-colonial days are over. The Union and the ACP countries have common interests to develop and a strategic opportunity to grasp within a brighter, more ambitious project.’

The ‘Guidelines for the negotiation of new cooperation agreements with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries’ are the product of a wide-ranging and active debate on last November’s Commission Green Paper. Conducted in both the Union and the ACP countries, this debate confirmed the need to review EU-ACP relations in the light of radical changes on the world scene and with a view to helping the ACP countries rise to the challenges of the 21st century.

The five major political guidelines proposed by the Commission entail:
- revitalising the partnership and giving it a strong political dimension;
- refocusing cooperation through an integrated approach to poverty;
- opening up cooperation to economic partnership;
- making the management of cooperation instruments more rigorous and selective;
- developing geographical differentiation while keeping the ACP group intact.

**A strong political dimension**

The EU and the 71 ACP countries must become true political partners. Their cooperation must be based on respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law features of the current Lomé Convention plus good governance.

This will involve greater selectivity in the management of cooperation, more effective and open dialogue upstream of conditionality and a new overall contract based on a shared political vision. Preventing conflicts and pursuing political stability will be a key theme of the future relationship.

An enhanced dialogue contributing to the establishment of a political climate conducive to good governance will make development cooperation more effective. Depending on the importance and interest of the subjects at hand, this dialogue should be multilateral, regional or bilateral and be conducted at political or technical level.

The Commission is proposing an integrated approach to poverty, that balances economic and social considerations. This entails addressing both the factors for economic growth, and in particular the development of local markets, regional integration and entry into the world economy, and the social and environmental impact of growth. Particular priority will go to developing private enterprise by supporting the reforms needed to remove obstacles in both the formal and the informal (‘popular’) economy. By the same token, the social dimension of cooperation will also have to be strengthened considerably (by supporting employment policies and basic social services – education and health – and improving the situation of women).

**A new concept: economic partnership**

The Commission considers that the Lomé trade preferences, though beneficial, have failed to generate sustained growth. The ACP countries’ trade performance has generally been disappointing and Community businesses have shown relatively little interest in them.

The EU must be guided by the objective of helping the ACP countries gradually adjust to the rules of international trade and integrate into the multilateral system.
This includes both the development of their trading capacities and their ability to attract domestic and foreign investment. We must also create a new trading dynamic and strengthen Europe’s presence in the ACP countries by enabling EU businesses to tap into those countries’ comparative advantages. The ACP countries should be invited to cooperate with the EU in the framework of international economic and trade negotiations.

The future economic partnership must enable the ACP countries to rely on an economically strong and reliable partner as they reform their economies, strengthen the transparency and credibility of such reforms and ensure the consistency of their trade and economic policies while they do so. It must help generate more business interest in the ACP countries, fostering domestic and foreign investment and the transfer of know-how and technology, thereby increasing the ACP countries’ competitiveness and aiding their gradual and smooth integration into the world economy.

Enhanced economic partnership would therefore entail the conclusion of an overall EU-ACP agreement and a series of agreements with regional subgroups involving trade arrangements providing for varying degrees of reciprocity and suitable timetables. These agreements would be negotiated in several stages. Special attention would be accorded to the needs of the least-developed countries (LLDCs), for which the current arrangements should be maintained and even extended.

The ultimate objective would be to establish economic partnership agreements with each of the three ACP regions (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific). The first stage of this gradual process would be to negotiate economic cooperation agreements with regional subgroups involved in integration processes.

The economic cooperation agreements linked to the overall EU-ACP agreement would combine greater cooperation to increase the competitiveness of the ACP economies (on the protection of investors, intellectual property rights and all trade-related areas – standardisation, certification, consumer and competition policies, public tenders, etc.) together with support for the establishment of regional economic areas with preferential trade arrangements involving increasing reciprocity, albeit with a degree of asymmetry in terms of the reduction of tariffs and the length of the transition period. Such agreements would have to be compatible with the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

Besides provisions on economic cooperation, regionalised economic partnership agreements could provide for the gradual establishment of free trade areas in accordance with WTO rules and the CAP.

Over the coming period, the Commission will be examining, in the light of the criteria laid down in the report to the European Council, the opportunity and the feasibility of the final objective of free trade.

**More rigorous and selective cooperation**

Contractuality, security and predictability are principles of EU-ACP financial cooperation that the Commission would not wish to undermine. There have, however, been problems with their practical application, which has failed to stimulate genuine political commitment among ACP governments. Cooperation instruments have tended to overshadow the policies they were meant to serve. They have also become increasingly complex, making them difficult to manage.

The strong public support for greater efficiency calls for a change in cooperation practices. The Commission’s proposals include:

- a reduction in the number of instruments (a package of programmable resources, an investment fund targeted on the private sector, an emergency package);
- better programming and the focusing of resources on a limited number of fields, favouring a sectoral approach;
- the introduction of criteria of merit, based on performance and good governance, alongside those of need, based mainly on development indicators (honouring commitments and implementing aid effectively will guarantee countries greater funding).

**Differentiation without breaking up the ACP**

Future EU-ACP relations will have to keep the ACP group intact while encouraging differentiation within an overall agreement. Keeping the ACP group intact was a key point that came out of the Green Paper debate, with both ACP governments and civil society expressing a strong desire for solidarity. The EU must respect this wish. Yet differentiation is made necessary by the regional dimension of economic and trade cooperation, the growing importance of regional integration as a factor for development and the need to tailor cooperation to ACP countries’ differing circumstances.

This has led the Commission to propose a new overall agreement with the ACP countries, involving differentiated procedures and agreements.

The EU-ACP convention should remain open. The EU and ACP partners should establish together the principles and mechanisms of any new accessions to all or part of the convention. The Commission notes that some provisions of the future agreement could be extended to other countries of a comparable level of development (in particular the extension of the ‘Lomé’ trade arrangements to non-ACP LLDCs).

Similarly, the regionalisation of economic agreements and complementarity between ACP and non-ACP countries in a given geographical area could also constitute grounds for extension.

Press release issued by the European Commission
Joint Assembly in Lomé, October 27-30

A harmonious prelude

The Togolese certainly know how to put on a good show. Every seat in the Grande Salle of the Palais des Congrès in Lomé was full: delegates and observers in the centre flanked by the massed choirs of the host nation. At ten o’clock precisely, the choristers burst into song and we all rose to greet the arrival of the platform party. They made their way down the steps of the huge ranked auditorium to the martial accompaniment of ‘Marching through Georgia’. Photographers and cameramen jostled for the best view as the speakers took their places on the very stage where all four Lomé Conventions have been signed.

Regular Joint Assembly watchers are used to a bit of pomp and circumstance at the ‘Solemn Opening’ but this event put previous efforts into the shade. Between each speech, there was entertainment, including a specially composed song featuring the names of all the Convention signatories, a rendition by university students of the Hallelujah chorus and even a chant which successfully managed to include the six-syllable word ‘complementarity’. It can only be coincidence that Handel’s best known choral work, with its assurance that ‘He shall reign for ever and ever’, should have preceded President Eyadema’s speech (the President celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of his accession to power in Togo earlier this year).

‘A difficult labour’

A sign of the way things have changed at the Joint Assembly over the years came in the speeches which followed. In the past, this formal opening would have been the occasion for expressions of welcome and general statements about the importance of partnership or the challenges of development. To be sure, President Gnassingbe Eyadema and National Assembly President Pere were fulsome in their welcome, while the Assembly’s co-Presidents (Lord Plumb and Sir John Kaputin) graciously acknowledged the warmth of the reception. But the speakers also tackled more sensitive topics. Aware of the misgivings that had been expressed on the European side about holding the Joint Assembly in his country, Mr Pere, assured his audience that they were fully committed to the process of development and démocratisation. Referring specifically to democracy, he insisted that ‘despite a difficult labour, the baby has been born’.

Sir John Kaputin, the ACP co-President, said that the decision to meet in Lomé should not be regarded as approval of the situation in Togo, which he described as ‘not perfect’. He referred, in particular, to the ‘extreme political polarisation’ in the country. However, he argued that ‘enforced isolation’ was ‘a strange way of fostering human values’. He was particularly critical of economic sanctions, which he said were a ‘blunt instrument’ which very often missed their target.

Sir John also dealt with some broader issues of ACP-EU cooperation concurring with the view expressed in the Commission’s Green Paper that ‘relations cannot continue as they are at present.’ Global liberalisation, he said, was a universal process, but its effects were ‘emphatically not uniform’. Among the problems that needed to be tackled were corruption and mismanagement, the unnecessary ‘complexity’ of Lomé procedures, and the continuing prevalence of non-tariff trade barriers.

European co-President, Lord Plumb, also spoke of the need for big changes in the ACP-EU partnership, calling for ‘a new convention and not merely a marginal update of Lomé IV’. He argued, among other things,
for a complete overhaul of financial and technical co-operation procedures, with a greater stress on 'user participation'. As for trade, he had an uncomfortable message for those who pin their hopes on maintaining traditional preferences. International trends are very much against this and there would have to be some 'hard decisions', with the dismantling of protective arrangements for all but the poorest nations.

The changing world was a central theme of President Eyadema's discourse. He spoke about economic liberalisation, the growth of information highways and the dismantling of barriers across the globe. More than ever before, the people had a 'shared destiny', he said. 'We must have the courage to give tomorrow's world a form and content which places human beings at the heart of the development project.'

The President also stressed the link between democracy and development, and the importance of 'good management of public affairs'. He assured his listeners that Togo had entered an 'irreversible' process of democratisation.

The opening session ended with another round of enthusiastic singing. The Assembly then adjourned to a smaller conference chamber in a neighbouring hotel, for three and a half days of substantive discussions on a wide range of issues.

UN Conferences and ACP-EU cooperation

The main set-piece debate at the Lomé meeting was on a general report prepared by Karin Junker (PES). The title of the report was 'The Effects of the UN World Conferences 1990-96 on cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries in the context of the Lomé Convention'. Few would dispute the importance of the topic. If the various declarations emanating from the UN gatherings of the 1990s are to have any practical impact, then they must obviously be translated into concrete action.

The problem lay in the scope of the subject. While the Assembly's 'general report' is intended to be a comprehensive treatment of a broad issue, the UN conferences actually covered a whole series of broad issues (children, education, environment, population, social development, human rights, women, population and habitat). The effect was a debate in which people felt free to raise almost any issue they liked, and there was a decided lack of focus.

Ms Junker, in her introductory speech, made a brave attempt to draw the strands together when she argued for 'an integrated approach' with poverty at its heart. She also emphasised the importance of sustainability, pointing out that 'if we follow the Northern model of development, we will destroy much of the world.' She observed, for example, that in terms of energy consumption, 'one European equals twelve Africans.'

The poverty theme was taken up by Raphaël Chanterie (EPP) and the representative of Benin, with the latter also arguing that peace was a key element. 'No country at war', he insisted, 'has succeeded in development.' It was with this in mind that Monica Baldi (UFE) insisted on priority for preventive diplomacy.

The debt issue was raised by a number of speakers including Francis Wurtz (GUE/NGL), the Côte d'Ivoire representative and José Manuel Torres Couto (PES). They all called for measures to reduce the developing countries' burden of indebtedness. The speaker from Côte d'Ivoire went on to raise a specific subject close to its own heart – the EU proposals regarding the content of chocolate. These, he claimed, could have disastrous consequences for his country.

Other areas emphasised during the debate included human resource development (Dominican Republic), unfair trading (Dominica), child labour (Edgar Schiedermeier – EPP) and enhancing the role of women (Haiti and Barbara Schmidbauer – PES). Michel Rocard (PES), came up with the interesting suggestion that ACP-EU relations might be enshrined in a permanent treaty.

Speaking at the end of the debate, Commission Deputy-Director General, Athanasios Theodorakis, stressed that the Commission was endeavouring to incorporate the substance of the various UN declarations in its policies and actions. As he pointed out, 'The commitments made in these international conferences are commitments for the EU as a whole.'

Later in the session, the Assembly adopted Ms Junker's General Report and the attached resolution with a number of amendments.

South Africans still seeking the vote

The Courier has 'jumped the gun' somewhat in announcing South Africa's partial accession to Lomé IV, as we discovered when the Joint Assembly met in the Convention's own birthplace. The latest session found this country's representatives still sitting on the sidelines – able, as observers, to take part in the discussions, but not to vote on resolutions. The explanation is to be found not in Pretoria or Capetown, but in the capitals of certain EU Member States. Apparently, South Africa's entry to the Convention can only take legal effect once the treaty revisions agreed in Mauritius (in November 1995) have been ratified by two
Quotable quotes from Lomé

On development cooperation and the Lomé Convention
'Europe's interest in the South is inversely proportional to its growing interest in Central and Eastern Europe. This link must be broken'.
Lord Plumb, European co-President (EPP)

'After 25 years of the Convention, we need to recognise that the returns have been meagre'.
Michel Rocard, President of the EP Development Committee (PES)

'We are keeping to the spirit of the Lomé Convention and will continue to do so irrespective of whether we receive our entitlements'.
Sudan representative

'A few years ago, we were all worried about the very existence of the Lomé Convention. Today, we are talking about its future'.
Senegal representative

On the new global information highways
'Governments that seek to retain power by controlling information will soon find that time is running out for them'.
Commissioner Pinheiro

On the environment
'Does a family in the industrial world really need two or three cars to exist?'
Fiji representative

On Togo
'Parliamentary democracy in Togo is essentially an evolving apprenticeship'.
Mr Père, President of the Togo National Assembly

'We are not here because we think Togo is heaven on earth'.
Michael McGowan (PES)

'You won't find Mobutu's chateaux in Togo - they are in your countries'.
Togo representative

On Rwanda
'In rebuilding the country, we have had to start from scratch'.
Rwanda representative

On the Democratic Republic of Congo (ex-Zaire)
'Given the support which we gave to Mobutu, we need to be circumspect about what we say'.
Bernard Stasi (EPP)

On Nigeria
'The government has faithfully implemented the political transition programme'.
Nigeria representative

'The transition process is a complete and utter sham'.
Glenys Kinnock (PES)

'Nigeria should be given the benefit of the doubt to carry out its timetable'.
Ghana representative

'Nigeria must think we are cretins to believe what they said in their introductory speech'.
Ernesto Caccavale (UFE)

'Wole Soyinka should come and see the situation for himself'.
Nigeria representative

On the possible impact of an EU-South Africa trade agreement
'The very least we can do is to reward - not punish - the front-line states for what they did in the past'.
Allan Macartney (ARE)

On democracy
'We democrats recognise that African regimes which are dictatorial are more favourable to European interests'.
Angola representative

'European countries say they want democracy, but they continue to give support and weapons to anti-democratic regimes'.
Guinea-Bissau representative

Miscellany
'We obey God before we obey the United Nations'.
Sudan representative

'There is no longer a Tuareg problem... and there never was one'.
Mali representative

Nigeria's representative invited Wole Soyinka back 'to see the situation for himself'.

Togo's representative referred to Mobutu's chateaux in Europe.

Glenys Kinnock described Nigeria's transition as 'a sham'.

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thirds of ACPs and all EU countries. And two years on, some European states have still not completed the necessary formalities. There is now a possibility that the negotiations for the next Convention will have begun before the Mauritius agreement enters into force.

This situation drew barbed comments from some of those who spoke during the debate on Southern Africa. Tony Cunningham (PES) sought and obtained a commitment from the co-President for a letter to be sent to the Council and 'offending' Member States about the matter. A more telling point came from an ACP representative speaking outside the chamber. 'The Europeans are rightly keen on good governance' he observed to us. 'Doesn't this concept include fulfilling one's international commitments within a reasonable time!'

Looking ahead

The future of ACP-EU cooperation was a subject which, not surprisingly, kept cropping up at the Lomé session of the Joint Assembly. During the same week, the EC Commission met in Brussels to discuss Professor Pinheiro's initial guidelines for a negotiating mandate while the following week, ACP leaders were due to assemble in Libreville, Gabon to draw up their proposals (see the article which follows).

The post-Lomé IV theme featured prominently in the presentations made by the Presidents of the ACP and EC Councils of Ministers. Nathan Shamuyarira, who is Zimbabwe's Minister of Industry and Commerce, expressed the firm view that cooperation should be strengthened after the year 2000. The Minister concentrated his remarks, however, on 'the daily tragedy facing thousands of our brothers and sisters' in parts of Africa. He argued that while humanitarian support was welcome, it was important for African solutions to be found to African problems.

Luxembourg's Foreign Minister, Georges Wohlfart, also favoured continuing cooperation but stressed that this required 'a thorough redefinition to meet the challenges of the 21st century'. He pointed out that the Lomé trade system was being increasingly called into question by the international community while aid budgets were under pressure. In these circumstances, it was important to improve the efficiency of aid. Mr Wohlfart also said that the EC Council was keen to expand the political dimension of ACP-EU links, and that this should be based on democracy, the rule of law and conflict prevention.

Commissioner Pinheiro had a busy day on the Tuesday, delivering a statement in the morning, answering questions for almost two hours in the afternoon, holding a press conference in the early evening and then taking an overnight flight – in order to be in Brussels the following day to present his proposals to his fellow Commissioners. Like the EC Council representative, Professor Pinheiro was anxious to stress 'the political side in the dynamics of our relations'. In this context, he pointed out that structural stability – both internal and external – was essential for development. As regards internal stability, the

Commissioner accepted the basic principle that it was not for outsiders to interfere, but it was nonetheless evident that 'democracy and good governance are essential elements, and respect for human rights is central.' He took issue with those who resisted fundamental values on the grounds that they were not indigenous. 'The essence of human rights', he insisted, 'cuts across all cultures'. As for external stability, Professor Pinheiro expressed the view that more resources needed to be allocated to peace-building and conflict prevention.

Obviously, Mr Pinheiro was unable to reveal the details of his proposal to the Commission in advance of the Brussels meeting, but he did offer a number of pointers in a frank exchange of views with Assembly members. On trade, he anticipated that the arrangements contained in the next Convention would be a 'lot more complex' than hitherto. He expressed the hope that the WTO would come up with a system to help the least developed countries (LDCs), but suspected that the EU and ACP states would need to help the global trade body in this area. The Commissioner also believed that the proposed 'Agenda 2000' reforms would make the EU's Common Agricultural Policy less problematic for developing countries.

Trade was obviously a major preoccupation for the Assembly (with yet another lively debate on bananas during the session), and Professor Pinheiro acknowledged that it would be the most difficult area in the coming negotiations. But the central theme, he insisted, was 'human and social development'. 'I am looking 25 years ahead', he stated, 'and I want a system which is on that timescale'.

On the Thursday, the Commission representative was able to report that Professor Pinheiro's proposal had been adopted by the full Commission the previous day (for more details, see the preceding article).
Observing an election

The EU has a budget line which can be used, among other things, to help emerging democracies organise their elections. I don't know if the Joint Assembly can be described as an 'emerging democracy' but the experience of the recent session in Lomé suggests that it could do with some help in organising ballots.

The usual procedure is for members to vote on a show of hands with a simple majority required for resolutions or amendments. But if five members so request, a split vote must be taken, the ACP and EU members being balloted separately. When this happens, a majority is needed on both sides for a resolution to be adopted.

Recently, the Joint Assembly broke new ground by introducing the possibility of secret ballots. This innovation is linked to the appearance of more critical resolutions. While a lot of effort still goes into obtaining consensus on substantive development questions (resulting in worthy, and often lengthy, texts which attract little controversy), the Assembly is also increasingly tackling politically sensitive issues, notably in its debates on specific ACP countries.

One justification advanced for secret ballots is that they help prevent members feeling intimidated. Representatives of small ACP states, it is suggested, might be reluctant to vote openly in favour of a motion which criticises one of their more powerful neighbours. The principle that people should cast their ballots in secret when choosing their leaders is widely accepted, but the proposition that politicians should be guaranteed confidentiality when voting on issues is more dubious. How can electors hold their representatives to account if the former do not have the right to know how the latter voted?

Whatever the democratic shortcomings of this approach, the Assembly has accepted secret ballots and four were held at the recent Lomé gathering. Until now, for reasons which are unclear, the vote could not be both secret and split. Thus, at the last session in Brussels, Nigeria was at the receiving end of a condemnatory resolution adopted by 60 votes to 23 with seven abstentions.

This time, Lord Plumb, the co-President in the chair for the final voting session, felt obliged to recognise that this 'either/or' approach had no basis in logic. He acceded to ACP demands for votes which were both split and secret on four resolutions involving Nigeria, Sudan, Togo, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ex-Zaire). The texts on Nigeria and Sudan were strongly critical, while those on Togo and Congo-Zaire were more nuanced. In the event, the MEPs voted decisively for all four but only the Sudan resolution gained majority support on the ACP side.

It was clear that the Assembly was not really geared to running elections of this kind and improvisation was the order of the day. The Secretariat did have the foresight to provide blank ballot papers and each representative was handed four (one for each resolution). Members lined up in two queues (one ACP, one European) to cast their first vote and it soon became clear that it would be a long process. To save time, the next three votes were taken together, with representatives asked to write, on the outside, the name of the country on which they were voting. It was left to the officials counting the ballots to separate the papers.

As a neutral 'election observer', The Courier can confirm that the vote was free and fair – but the organisation could certainly be improved. Perhaps for next time, they could arrange to replace the empty cardboard containers marked 'Xerox' with more convincing looking ballot boxes! [ ]

Party group abbreviations

PES – Party of European Socialists
EPP – European People’s Party
ELDR – European Liberal, Democrat and Reformist
ERA – European Radical Alliance
Green – Greens
EUL-NGL – European United Left/Nordic Green Left
UFE – Union for Europe
EN – Europe of the Nations
I – Independent

The secret ballot results

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* The abstention figures include blank ballots cast.
ACP Summit in Libreville

For the week beginning 3 November 1997, Libreville took on a new look as it hosted the summit of ACP Heads of State and Government, and related preparatory meetings with ministers, attended by 71 delegations from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The ACP Council of Ministers held its 66th session and followed this up with an extraordinary meeting of the Joint Council of ACP Foreign Ministers and ministers responsible for the Lomé Convention.

To mark the occasion, the Gabonese capital became the ACP capital, to judge by the never-ending toing and froing of brand-new official cars, each number plate displaying the name and flag of one of the 71 ACP states. Meanwhile, the ordinary citizens of Libreville went about their daily routine, somewhat perturbed by the tight security. However, the event warranted all the preparation – Gabon was hosting the very first summit of ACP Heads of State and Government.

Back in November 1995, in Mauritius, that country’s Prime Minister, Sir Anerood Jugnauth, used the opening ceremony of the ACP Council of Ministers meeting to suggest the organisation of a ‘grand summit’ of all the ACP Heads of State and Government. This was on the eve of the signing of the mid-term review of Lomé IV and questions, even doubt, as to the future of relations between the EU and the ACP States were already at the forefront of people’s minds. The logic behind Sir Anerood’s proposal was undoubtedly a perceived need to deliver a clear message of friendship and solidarity, defining a common ACP position regarding the direction ACP/EU cooperation should take in the new millennium. A top-level conference would enable ACP leaders to air their views on the most significant aspects of cooperation with the EU.

The summit took place on 6 and 7 November in Libreville, in the chamber of the international conference centre in the heart of the ‘Seat of Democracy’, the first ever summit of ACP Heads of State and Government. In the entire history of the Lomé Conventions, the first of which was signed in 1975, there has never been such a meeting. On the ACP side, people had urged the ACP States to adapt imaginatively to all these new challenges, commenting that it was high time for a review of relations between the ACP countries themselves as developing countries and also for a review of their relations with a Europe and a world undergoing major change. Mr Mugabe also emphasised the need for the ACP Group to demonstrate its solidarity and to present a united front to the world. He described solidarity as an important factor in the tasks facing the ACP States,

An imposing opening ceremony

The delay surrounding the start of the opening ceremony had not the slightest effect on the quality of the fifteen or so speeches given from the platform by prestigious speakers.

The opening speech was given by Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe, and also President-in-Office of the OAU (Organisation of African Unity). He began by reminding his audience of the tremendous upheaval taking place worldwide on account of the globalisation and liberalisation of economies, making reference also to the changes currently facing the EU, both in terms of its construction and of its actual structures. He
particularly as part of the campaign to eradicate poverty, and mentioned the fact that 41 out of the 50 countries classified by the United Nations as the least developed in the world belong to the ACP group, and that 45% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa and 38% of the population in the Caribbean live below the poverty threshold.

President Mugabe nevertheless acknowledged the EU's positive role in allocating resources to development and in providing humanitarian aid to the ACP States as well as the advantages offered by the commercial preference system under the Lomé Convention. His views were echoed by the Secretary General of the ACP group, Peter Magande, who outlined the many problems facing several ACP States in a changed international environment. In his opinion, the very holding of such a summit confirmed the ACP States' commitment to a close examination of the way in which their group operates, with a view to giving it renewed impetus by targeting more specific and better defined objectives.

The President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, who, as chairman of the Summit, was responsible for overseeing proceedings, emphasised the renewed interest of the industrialised countries in the ACP States and expressed the wish that these noble ideas raised recently at the US/Caribbean summit, the Asia/Pacific forum, the Tokyo meeting on development in Africa and the G7 summit in Denver should be acted upon. He then called for a strengthening of intra-ACP exchanges and also for a consolidation of the identity and the political dimension of the group. In his opinion, the expansion of the ACP family over the years had not been matched by a sufficient number of appropriate institutional reforms. Mr Bongo, on the other hand, recommended that the ACP States should incorporate into their development efforts such aspects as human rights and democracy, improvement and marketing of agricultural and industrial products via a dynamic and high-performance private sector, regional integration and international cooperation and, lastly, the prevention and settlement of conflicts. He punctuated his address with proposals for a wide-ranging modernisation of the partnership with Europe, using a model based on the aspirations of peoples in the ACP States, better adaptation of intra-ACP cooperation instruments and the strengthening of relations between the ACP group and the rest of the world.

UN Secretary General, Koffi Annan, was represented by Ibrahim Fall, who gave an eagerly-awaited address to those present at the opening ceremony. The Secretary General's message was an unambiguous confirmation of the UN's support for the ACP group and its efforts at furthering economic development and partnership between nations, this meeting serving as a guide for the UN's actions in supporting development.

This Summit was regarded as an unprecedented event and the EU had a high profile, with representatives from its most important institutions. President Jacques Santer in person represented the European Commission, his speech describing the summit as a reflection of the ACP States' ambition to be recognised as a political entity in their own right, capable of formulating and implementing common objectives. Mr Santer restated the EU's commitment to the process of democratisation and to a more open civil society, adding that a renewed partnership was needed to take account of a constantly changing world. Also appearing on behalf of the Commission, Professor João de Deus Pinheiro took stock of the discussion generated by the 'Green Paper'. In his view, these consultations had given strength to those seeking greater ACP/EU cooperation, although on a new basis – the idea of 'donor/recipient' had to become a thing of the past. The Commissioner also summarised the significant aspects of Commission thinking which were to serve as a
basis for negotiations on the future of the EU/ACP cooperation due to start next September.

The European Union's rolling presidency is currently held by Luxembourg, whose Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Georges Wohlfart, together with Lord Plumb, co-President of the ACP/EU Joint Assembly, also spoke at this lengthy opening ceremony.

Unity, solidarity and identity

'Unity is strength'. This familiar (somewhat overused, some might say) adage was much in vogue throughout the Summit. Indeed, an important aspect of the Libreville meeting was the confirmation of the 71 ACP States' common will to continue to present a united front in the face of the new challenges they would have to deal with in the early years of the new millennium. There were few speakers on the ACP side who failed to mention the unity of the ACP States as being essential to future cooperation with the EU. The various representatives – from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific alike – were practically unanimous in their stated desire to speak with one voice – and not in extended order – to their European counterparts regarding next year's renegotiation of the cooperation agreement. According to the representative from Barbados, separate agreements would entail separate negotiations and would deprive each group of the strength enjoyed by a group acting as one.

Ultimately, the ACP States were in favour of preserving and consolidating the 'ACP core', but there were no feelings of outright hostility to a qualified, 'positive' differentiation which might take account of the specific characteristics and development requirements of each region. The speech given by the Prime Minister of Mauritius contained the remark that the ACP States were in favour of positive differentiation but did not want this imposed on them.

The unexpected guest at the Libreville Summit

What on earth was Yasser Arafat, wearing his customary keffieh, doing amongst the ACP Heads of State and Government? Had Palestine joined the ACP family or was it in the process of applying for membership? It was all very strange, because, geographically speaking, Palestine does not belong to Africa, the Caribbean or the Pacific. Unless ...

Those not au fait with Lomé Convention issues certainly expressed their surprise and there was much speculation as to why the President of the Palestinian Authority should be joining the group of ACP leaders. Even though some of those attending were discovering countries which they had never heard of before, Palestine clearly was not an ACP State.

So, if Yasser Arafat had come to Libreville, he must have been specially invited by Gabon's President Omar Bongo to take part in this first ACP summit.

The Palestinian President took advantage of this exceptional occasion to issue an emotional appeal to the 71 ACP countries meeting in Libreville, calling upon them to support the Middle East peace process. He urged all those present and all those wishing for a successful outcome to the peace process to take immediate and rapid action in all areas to persuade the Israeli government to submit to the will of the international community and to the UN's resolutions. The political and diplomatic weight of the ACP group, the size of its representation within other international institutions and the problems of economic development it shared with Palestine were evidently the principal reasons for the Palestinian leader's presence at the summit, where he was seeking support to promote peace.

Mr Arafat was also able to hold an informal meeting with Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission, having earlier paid tribute to the European Union's support for the peace process in the Middle East.

Before leaving, Mr Arafat invited EU and ACP representatives to take part in celebrations in 2000 to mark Christ's birth in the Holy Land, Palestine and, more specifically, in Bethlehem.
The future

The Libreville Declaration provided an illustration of the 'ACP' view of future cooperation. Priority areas have already been discussed, with emphasis being placed on the improvement and consolidation of Lomé's achievements and the stepping-up of the political dialogue with the EU. Through such dialogue, the ACP States seek to strengthen regional mechanisms for preventing, managing and settling conflicts and for guaranteeing human rights, democracy and the rule of law. A proposal aimed at resurrecting consultations at Joint Assembly level, by setting up an ACP assembly, was included in the text of the final declaration.

Regarding trade matters, the ACP group was once again unanimous in its firm denunciation of the WTO's 'inequitable' rules on trade. ACP States want the current non-reciprocal preference system and market access to be preserved and protocols and arrangements relating to basic products to be maintained, although they recognise that these advantages will not in themselves bring about a competitive environment. It is worth noting that the 'banana' issue which was the subject of long debate during the extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting, was often referred to and was even the subject of an amendment, tabled by Zimbabwe, to the final declaration. At the press conference closing the summit, Jean Ping, Gabon's Minister responsible for the Lomé Convention, recalled that the ACP States are signatories to the Marrakesh agreement establishing the WTO, but that the preferential system they benefit from should be extended to allow, in combination with efforts on their part, their gradual integration into the world economy.

Debt and the speeding-up of the regional integration process also figured prominently in the proposals made by ACP Heads of State concerning the future of cooperation.

Furthermore, the group called for an improvement in the way in which the Stabex and Sysmin instruments operate. In their desire for progressive integration into the world economy, the ACP States confirmed their resolute commitment to implementing a trade-development programme, to promoting the private sector and to creating an environment favourable to direct inward investment.

In a further comment, the ACP expressed the wish that any post-Lomé agreement should safeguard the granting of financial resources based on the States' development requirements - transparency, and a responsible and effective approach were required for managing such resources.

With a view to the forthcoming negotiations, the ACP Heads of State and Government called upon the Council of Ministers to draw up a work programme providing not only a negotiating mandate, but also a strategy to be implemented prior to any negotiations and a mechanism for following up such negotiations. Similarly, the representatives from Mauritius and Barbados expressed their wish that the Georgetown Agreement should be revised, amended and adapted before negotiations with the EU were started.

The Libreville Declaration was adopted by acclamation by the 71 ACP leaders who also expressed their satisfaction as to the results obtained from this first Summit. As their meeting drew to a close, many delegations were already hoping that President Omar Bongo's suggestion of institutionalising the ACP Summit would indeed be acted upon - the next one could take place in 2000, before negotiations with the EU are finalised.

K.K.
ACP-EU trade: past, present and future

by Peter Gakunu*

The author, who is a senior trade expert at the ACP Secretariat in Brussels, comes to terms with the shortcomings of the Lomé trade preferences and suggests a strategy for improving the situation after the year 2000.

The Lomé Conventions originate from past associations between the ACP countries and the EU. The relationship between Europe and its former colonies (spread across Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific) stemmed, on the one hand, from the demand for cheap raw materials by European industries, and on the other, from the need for markets for their processed and manufactured products. In effect, the seeds of ACP-EU cooperation are to be found in the needs of Europe, not the objectives and basic requirements of the ACPs. The establishment of the EEC in March 1957 meant that this relationship had to be continued on a Community-wide basis. When most of the ACPs gained independence in the 1960s, the former metropolitan powers decided that it would be useful to continue the relationship, first through the Yaoundé agreements and later, under the Arusha and Lagos accords. In 1973, when the UK joined the EEC, the preference scheme that applied to Commonwealth members was incorporated into the Lomé Convention in the form of commodity protocols.

The Yaoundé Convention set out ‘to promote cooperation between the contracting parties so as to further the economic and social development of the Associated (African) states by increasing their trade and implementing measures of financial intervention and technical cooperation.’ Through the new arrangement, the signatories aimed to ‘expand the economic structure and independence of the Associated States, promote their industrialisation, encourage African regional cooperation and contribute to the advancement of international trade.’ The same underlying objectives were more or less continued in the subsequent Lomé Conventions, although the overall content of ACP-EU cooperation has been progressively extended since Lomé I was signed in 1975. The trade objectives, however, have not changed radically, the aim still being to promote and diversify commerce between the ACPs and the Community, and to expand intra-ACP transactions.

Disappointing trade performance – despite the preferences

An overall assessment of the Lomé trade preferences reveals that they have not had the desired impact, either in improving the performance of ACP exporters, or in diversifying successfully into higher value-added export goods. Some ACPs have recorded high rates of production and export growth, but most have experienced declining growth rates, with merchandise trade generating a diminishing share of GDP. In 1975, ACP countries accounted for 7.6% of total EU imports. In 1994, the figure had dropped to 2.8% although it rose again to 3.8% in 1996. The recent gradual recovery is relatively insignificant and is largely due to oil exports. It is, nonetheless, positive evidence of the reforms implemented by most ACP countries in recent years. At the same time, however, other developing countries, particularly in Asia, have more than doubled their share of the EU market. This suggests that, despite the preferences, the ACP countries were not able substantially to improve their position in trade with the EU, either by increasing the volume of traditional exports or by diversifying into higher value products. Other countries, without the same levels of preferential access, performed better.

A number of ACP countries are not highly export-dependent but on average, exports account for around 30% of output and in some states, the proportion is significantly higher. Rapidly growing economies are characterised by even more rapid export growth, so the share of exports in national production rises as the level of economic development increases. As a result, exports become an increasingly important source of growth.

New trade context

The conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of the World Trade Organisation are new developments – and there is growing concern about the potential impact on the ACPs of the commitments which these entail. Trade and capital market liberalisation, technological innovations, and the internalisation of production by multinational companies are all hastening the pace of world economic integration. Globalisation and the resulting gains from trade mean that the economic performance of countries will increasingly be determined by their degree of integration into the world economy.

The commitments within the WTO to accelerated liberalisation should not be irreversible, particularly in cases where such commitments may undermine developing country economies. Specific measures are needed to enable them to meet the challenges and exploit the opportunities. Developing nations should either be given a chance to adjust to the rapid changes, or the international community should propose different principles for their gradual integration into the world economy. Export-led growth cannot be the only development strategy. What is needed is a total development package encompassing both export growth and the promotion and development of the internal market – through diversification of local production and encouraging possibili-

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* This is an abridged version of Mr Gakunu’s text. The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of the ACP group or of the ACP General Secretariat.
Future ACP-EU trade arrangements should:

- be in conformity with the relevant WTO rules, to provide security and stability for the Convention’s market access provisions;
- promote fuller and more active participation of the ACPs in the world economy, and in the WTO;
- preserve and enhance the current level of access to EU markets, by improving access conditions, including the relaxation of constraining rules and procedures, and by safeguarding the benefits that have accrued through the Lomé preferences and commodity protocols;
- counteract the shift in EU trade and investment to other regions, which has detrimentally affected flows to ACP countries;
- provide a credible and stable enabling international environment in support of the trading and regulatory system being put in place by most ACPs;
- encourage the competitiveness of ACP economies and contribute to better resource allocation to improve the supply response to world market price incentives and new market opportunities;
- provide the necessary conditions to facilitate the promotion and success of regional integration among ACP countries;
- assist ACP countries in coping with increased national and international regulations, which give rise to new obstacles and requirements on market access;
- allow ACP regions and sub-regions to join other trading arrangements to reduce marginalisation and compensate for any negative impact which could arise from such trading blocs;
- take account of the differentiation among ACP states in respect of their level of integration into the global economy, their level of development and their perceived needs;
- give priority to trade development as part of a comprehensive policy focusing on competitiveness and the private sector;
- target the private sector with priority for the creation of international partnership networks, joint investment promotion, and the development of support service industries and institutions;
- give greater emphasis to enhancing European-ACP private sector networks;
- support ACP states in gaining access to information technology.

Ties for processing indigenous inputs.

The disappointing performance of most ACP countries can be explained by a host of internal and external factors. These include the small share of manufactured items as a proportion of total exports; the fact that ACP merchandise exports have grown more slowly than those of other developing nations, and the ACPs' high dependence on the EU market – which has grown more slowly than other export markets.

Improved output in most ACP countries will depend on substantial diversification of exported products, with a greater share of exports directed to other markets.

One of the basic conditions for the ACPs' economic development and growth is to ensure that they earn sufficient foreign exchange from their commodity exports. The establishment of predictable and stable conditions for ACP participation in international trade will be necessary within the new global economic system. This should include: the improvement of the preferential treatment given to ACP states; adoption of more liberal rules of origin to encourage processing and diversification; increased participation of ACPs in the distribution, marketing and transportation of their commodities; and appropriate measures for attracting and channeling investments in their direction.

ACP-EU trade arrangements after the year 2000 should be assessed on their ability to meet the challenges, constraints and problems confronting most ACP countries (see box). Failure to devise an appropriate framework may result in the break-up of the ACP group, the drifting away of some ACP regions and countries from the present link with the EU, and further marginalisation of the poorest members.

The expiry of Lomé IV in the year 2000 will take place at a time of very considerable changes in the structure and nature of European cooperation with the ACP countries, and at a time of significant global changes. It is conceivable that the very notion of an ACP grouping, created in the framework of the colonial past, may cease to be relevant to Europe. The new ACP-EU accord must address the needs of ACP countries, which are heavily dependent on the European market. Trade liberalisation by other countries will open new market opportunities and the agreement should provide the technical and financial resources necessary to exploit these opportunities.

ACP countries have some of the weakest economies on the planet and are hence among the most vulnerable. They are most likely to be adversely affected by globalisation. The next Convention should focus on measures that enable these countries to adjust, both by improving their agricultural sectors and by increasing their export revenues. The ability of the ACPs to take advantage of the new trading opportunities will depend on their capacity to export competitively – and it is on this that future ACP-EU cooperation should concentrate.
Future ACP-EU trade relations

by Claude Maerten*

Future ACP-EU trade relations must be directed towards strengthening the economic partnership to support the economic, social and political reforms implemented in ACP countries, consolidate regional integration processes, develop trade in goods and services in a stable legal environment and promote supply capability, increased domestic and foreign investment and improved competitiveness.

Rather than a quantitative approach – which, in trade, has long been measured in terms of the margin of preference vis-à-vis the Community’s other partners – new arrangements need to enable a qualitative leap to be made, allowing the promotion of sustainable development, the eradication of poverty, and integration into the world economy by way of greater complementarity of aid and trade.

The Green Paper sets out the various options in the trade sector: the status quo, integration into the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), uniform reciprocity, differentiated reciprocity or differentiation in a single framework involving a combination of the other options. They are presented and analysed as support for macro-economic and sectoral policies, intended to increase the confidence of economic operators in the effective implementation, credibility and permanence of the reforms, while respecting regional integration processes and the rules of the multilateral trade system.

The status quo

The status quo too often refers only to the conditions for access to the Community market. In the framework of the Green Paper, it is set out as a broad option which would maintain the level of access to the Community market (also retained by certain other options). In addition, it would cover other trade-related fields so as to reduce non-tariff barriers, thus allowing a genuine synergistic effect with the other instruments of cooperation.

Given that this option is based on non-reciprocal trade preferences, it requires an exemption under Article XXV.5 of the GATT, something which would doubtless be difficult to obtain in the light of the recent conclusions of the WTO appeal body on the Community banana system. Also, since it has to be renewed annually, it would completely destroy the security that is needed in the trading system for promoting investment.

The Lomé Convention currently contains few trade-related provisions. It would therefore be important to include new chapters expanding coverage in this area – matters such as access to public contracts, trade in services, protection of intellectual property, competition rules and investment protection. However, drawing up such provisions common to the entire EU-ACP relationship would make it impossible to take due account of specific national or regional features within the ACP states. The danger would be a minimalist outcome – an apparatus with no real power to boost the confidence of economic operators. Even so, new provisions could be drawn up in certain areas, such as the right of establishment, provision of services, movement of capital or the standardisation of technical rules.

The status quo option makes it impossible to boost Community aid for regional integration processes. Indeed, it could have adverse effects on the negotiations that the ACP states – or certain ACP subregions – are planning with developed countries. At issue here is the reten-

tion of Article 174 of the Convention, which requires the ACP countries to guarantee the Community access to their markets on terms as favourable as those granted to other developed countries.

The advantages of this option, thus are essentially: the level of access to the Community market (including the sugar, banana and beef/veal protocols); uniformity of treatment for all ACP states; and the absence of adjustment costs for the latter. The disadvantages of the status quo are that it fails to create a climate of confidence for developing economic activity, and does not integrate the regional dimension or introduce elements of differentiation to take account of development levels. It is, in effect, an outmoded model which comes up against the rules of international trade. Though it could be adopted as a transitional measure on the way to a new trade system.

Integration into the GSP

The Community’s GSP is covered by the enabling clause of the GATT and involves granting non-reciprocal preferences on an autonomous basis. For the landlocked and least developed countries (LLDCs) it is envisaged that the preferences, which already come close to those provided by Lomé, will be extended to provide, from January 1998, a system of equivalent access to all the LLDCs. Thus, for the 38 ACP states defined as LLDCs by the United Nations, this decision should maintain their level of access to the Community market. For the others, the GSP establishes a staggered system of preference levels, depending on the sensitivity of the products for the Community market. Such a preference system would depart considerably from that established by the Lomé Convention.

This option offers no critical advantages for promoting integration into the world economy, since it is based solely on market access. Although it conforms to the GATT rules, an exemption would still be needed to retain the product protocols. ACP-EU relations would be considerably weakened as a result, since the GSP is not negotiated with the
beneficiary countries. Trade aspects would have to be handled in a single framework, with the same limitations as were mentioned in connection with the status quo. Nor does this second option take account of the economic integration that is developing in various ACP regions, and in some cases it could even obstruct this process. It would effectively introduce inequality of treatment in regions where LLDCs and non-LLDC states are organised into a customs union (of the seven WAEMU states, for example, five are LLDCs).

**Uniform reciprocity**

The essential advantage of the third option, uniform reciprocity, is that it retains and strengthens the principle of ACP-EU partnership. However, its implementation would require a free trade area (FTA) among the ACP states. At present, there is no political consensus on this. So as things stand, it would involve the creation of a large number of FTAs centred on Europe.

The adjustment costs would be heavy for some ACPs, whose revenue is heavily dependent on customs receipts. They would, of course, benefit in the medium and long term by the dynamic effect such an agreement would have on growth — because of the confidence-boost provided to economic operators. The non-reciprocal preferences for the LLDCs would still be guaranteed (as a result of a decision taken by the General Affairs Council in June 1997), but these countries might still oppose such an option, in the absence of additional flanking measures.

Access to the Community market could be preserved with the product protocols being revised, where appropriate, to comply with the WTO rules. However, there is a problem over the feasibility of implementing uniform reciprocity, first because of the difficulty the ACPs would have in agreeing on a single liberalisation plan, compatible with the sensitivity of their various economic sectors, and second, because of the difficulty involved in establishing something which complies with GATT Article XXIV (obligatory ten-year time-frame for liberalisation, possibly extended to twelve years for some products). However, given that we are talking here of a North-South agreement and bearing in mind the development aspects of the scheme, the article might be interpreted flexibly.

**Differentiated reciprocity**

Most of the comments about uniform reciprocity apply also to differentiated reciprocity. The latter's essential advantage is that it takes account of the current processes of regional integration. However, these processes would have to be sufficiently advanced — ideally with the subregions having established a common trade policy — to enable the rapid negotiation of the various free trade areas. Given that some countries are not involved in current regional integration efforts, this option would, therefore, lead to a proliferation of negotiations — which would be almost impossible to justify given the modest economic scale of the ACP country economies.

**Differentiation within a single framework**

This proposal combines the various options covered above, but within a single framework. It allows differentiation between ACP states, to be introduced in accordance with their wishes. Thus, the LLDCs could retain a non-reciprocal trade relationship, possibly with a broader level of access to take account of the current situation. Some non-LLDCs of sufficient economic stature and some subregions (which might include LLDCs) could opt for reciprocity. These free trade agreements would be brought into force by stages during the liberalisation period, with a high degree of asymmetry: on the Community side, consolidation of Lomé access from the time of entry into force; on the ACP side, a gradual opening of their markets. At the end of the transitional period, countries/regions with which it had proved impossible to conclude such agreements would have to be integrated into the GSP. The implementation of these FTAs could take place after the year 2000, thus enabling the countries/regions to make the necessary adjustments. During the transition period, which would have to be limited (if only to send a positive signal to the private sector), the current system could be retained. This would need an exemption under GATT Article XXV.5.

This option would generate benefits additional to those provided by the liberalisation of the trade in goods alone, through trade-related measures in areas such as investment protection, access to public contracts, competition law, protection of intellectual and commercial property, standardisation and certification, capital movements, the banking sector and trade in services. These measures would allow an increase in domestic and foreign investment, technology transfer and the evolution of research and development projects — all essential factors for increased competitiveness and economic diversification.

Furthermore, differentiation within a single framework would make it possible to achieve the objective of harmonious, gradual integration into the world economy, its flexibility making it easier for the ACP states to adapt to a global environment, taking due account of internal constraints. It would also encourage the retention of market access and respect for and promotion of regional integration, and would enable the supply capacity to be developed while giving a signal of strong commitment to the economic world, and would enable trade-related areas to be appropriately integrated. Finally, a telling argument in favour of this approach, by comparison with the other options, is the added dimension of support for development.

It is understandable that people should be suspicious and critical of an approach which appears to fragment the global EU-ACP partnership. But as a way to proceed, it may be acceptable if the medium or long-term objective is to achieve a similar level of (enhanced) development among the ACP states, thus leading on to the option of uniform reciprocity. Looking even further ahead, a move towards uniformity would boost the political will for regional integration which already exists in much of sub-Saharan Africa, and in the Caribbean, and which may well develop among the Pacific countries.

C.M.
The 21st annual meeting of the ACP-EU social partners, held in Brussels in October, examined the conditions for achieving greater integration of the ACP countries into international trade in a period of globalisation and in the light of the WTO’s rules governing trade. Although representatives noted that ACP exports were increasing at between 8% and 10% per annum in absolute terms, they were concerned at the falling share of ACP trade as a proportion of global transactions. They called on the EU to support private initiatives in ACP countries and to strengthen the effectiveness of public administration, with a view to guaranteeing a fairer distribution of wealth.

Looking at the 30 main categories of export goods, the ACP countries’ share of world markets dropped from 20.8% in 1975 to 9.7% in 1995. The ACPs clearly face problems in the new global trading order. The social partners recognised this when they stated in their opinion that preferential access to EU markets did not offer the solution, the problems being essentially of a structural nature. They also observed that in the sphere of agriculture, the WTO provisions actually ‘conflict with the Lomé Convention’.

The meeting participants, who included trade unionists, employers and consumer representatives, formulated a number of recommendations, including an action programme, which referred to the importance of regional or sub-regional ACP organisations. These could assist in the establishment of wider integrated markets and thereby facilitate integration into the world trading system. Speakers from both the ACP and EU sides, therefore, advocated a system of differentiated reciprocity within a single framework as the basis for a new ACP-EU partnership. Weaknesses identified in the Lomé system included a lack of resources for democratisation efforts and social projects, the fact that economic actors were not involved in the discussions, and implementation problems. Given the consequences of economic globalisation and the uncertainty over what the relationship might contain following the expiry of the present arrangement in the year 2000, the social partners recommended fairer trade targeted on sustainable social and economic development.

In order to coordinate the various positions adopted by the Lomé signatory countries, it was suggested that a joint ACP-EU office should be established in Geneva (headquarters of the WTO). The aim would be to resist pressure on the Lomé system coming from other countries. A large number of ACP states feel that they have emerged as victims rather than beneficiaries of the changes in the global trading order which began in the mid-1980s and have accelerated since the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round talks.

The rapporteur for the Social Partners’ trade debate was Mr Alleyne of the Caribbean Congress of Labour. He argued that the limited involvement of ACP countries in world trade could be attributed to a failure to adapt the trade provisions of the Lomé Convention. In the face of globalisation, he said, these were now outdated. Improved integration of ACP countries into international trade must have as its object an enhanced contribution to their sustainable economic and social development. The possible detrimental effects of globalisation on the development of the ACP countries should therefore be monitored, particularly from the point of view of social cohesion. The existing dysfunctional situation, he argued, could also be put down to a lack of knowledge about the procedures for exploiting preferences and the complexity of the said procedures – which are used little (if at all) by ACP companies. This problem, he believed, ought to be rectified.

The response from the European Commissioner, João de Deus Pinheiro, who attended the initial session, was that ‘additional preferences should be established in the near future for those countries where legislation exists to protect the rights of workers and the environment.’ He indicated, moreover, that ‘further improvements could be brought in at the time of the 1999 review of the generalised system of preferences (GSP).’ Following the EC Council’s decision to implement undertakings made in favour of the least developed countries at the WTO ministerial conference in Singapore, this option would, for the LDCs, be equivalent to the present Lomé set-up. Professor Pinheiro also said that it would be necessary to update the Lomé instruments and the Stabex and Sysmin programmes, and spoke of the CDI becoming an Enterprise Development Centre.

Henri Malosse, who drafted the ESC’s opinion on the future of ACP-EU cooperation, gave a ‘grassroots’ view of the Convention’s objectives and operation, based on analyses and evidence provided by the economic and social partners. He referred to the list of recommendations that needed to be followed up, leading to a fundamental reform of the relationship. Among other things, it would be necessary to renew the Convention, taking more account of geographical differences and levels of development. The system would, in that way, become an instrument of cooperation with the EU which was open to new accessions and was differentiated in terms of geographical regions with specific interests in common with the Union. For greater synergy, he advocated that EDF budgeting should take place in a Community context, favouring horizontal actions, aid targeted at regional cooperation and operational programmes focused on the most deprived countries. Support for the private sector and for the spirit of enterprise, he insisted, would remain decisive in the task of wealth creation.
Guinea Bissau: on the reform path

Statistics on Guinea Bissau make frustrating reading. Repeatedly, interviewees during our recent visit stressed the potential of the country's land and sea resources, and of its 'tolerant', mainly rural population. Yet the figures suggest otherwise. Illiteracy is high (62%), health and education indicators are poor and life expectancy is low. The country is also crippled by debt. Finance Minister, Issuf Sanha, acknowledged himself that Guinea Bissau is one of the most indebted countries on the planet. And as one opposition figure asserted: 'There is a total absence of production.' It seems that the long struggle against colonial rule, followed by 20 years of state socialism, left little scope for genuine economic development. The picture may appear gloomy but the prospects for a more economically sound future are now looking brighter. The country has enjoyed three years of political stability following the first ever multi-party elections, and there is a commitment to reform and restructuring.

Poor street lighting in Bissau, the capital, is one sign of the lack of public amenities. It makes driving difficult and accidents are frequent (especially, we were told, in May and June when the palm oil and cashew wine flows!). Another pointer is the piles of litter which have not been collected, and which are left to the scavenging vultures and pigs. It is no surprise to learn that it is proving difficult to eradicate cholera. There have been 22,500 cases and more than 800 deaths from this disease since October 1996. And in rural areas, according to Amine Saad (leader of the UM opposition party) 'the state is almost completely absent.' He drew particular attention to the fact that there are no telephones in Gabu, one of the biggest towns in the north east.

The broad range of assistance given by the EU and other donors, ranging from fisheries to the fight against AIDS, and the number of expatriate technical assistants employed in the ministries, are indications of the country's dependence on external aid. But with the backing of donors, including the Bretton Woods institutions, a hefty reform agenda is being set in motion by the very able finance minister. And there is lively political debate in the National Assembly. The President, João Bernardo Vieira, expressed pride that the country had enjoyed political stability since the 1994 elections, and said that they were now ready to push ahead with reforms to raise the resources for health, education and social housing.

Rather unexpectedly for one of the poorest countries in the world, there is quite a lot of environmental awareness here. People are keen on preserving natural resources and the culture of the rural areas. They discuss the effects of felling trees for charcoal, and express their desire to improve the urban environment. The EU's regional programme (PACIPE) for protecting the environment is a practical reflection of these concerns.

The fresh coat of paint that was being applied to the walls of the Finance Ministry in Bissau during our visit seemed to symbolise the new start. The minister told us about some of his targets over the next two years, notably to develop the productive sectors of agriculture and fisheries, and to reform the civil service. The programme, he said, would include 'privatising essential services such as shops, cleaning and security', with the aim of reducing the number of civil servants from 15 per 1000 of the population to the WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) average of between seven and eight. A wage increase for public employees is also in the pipeline. Their average salary is currently just CFA 13,000 (ECU 20) a month. A hotel waiter can expect to earn twice that figure! The poor conditions in the civil service led to strikes in August 1997. Tax and customs reforms are also foreseen to bring the country more in line with other WAEMU countries. Much of the economy is 'informal', there are a large number of barter transactions and 80% of the currency circulates outside the banking system.

Barter economy

Agriculture is the basis of the economy, representing 50% of GDP, 82% of employment and 93% of exports. The importance of barter is well illustrated by the amount of cashew cultivation that takes place. Cashew trees can be found at every turn in Guinea Bissau (there is even one in the grounds of the EC delegation). A barter trade has been going on since 1984, whereby a kilo of cashews can be exchanged for a kilo of rice. Many landholders have taken advantage of this and of the fact that the trees can be grown on poor land, requiring little at-
tention. One just has to wait for the crop to ripen and fall. There is very little value added however, and most of the nuts are sent to India for processing before finding their way on to the cocktail tables of Europe, where they are served as appetisers. And while the country exported rice in the 1960s and 1970s, nowadays, imports account for 40% of domestic rice consumption. This comes mainly from Thailand.

The cashews for rice barter system has benefited a small number of businesspeople who have done their sums. Rice can be bought on the international market for $275 a tonne. With customs levies added, the cost of importing it is about $360. Meanwhile, the market price for cashews is between $520 and $570. So someone who buys in rice, swaps it for cashews and then exports the nuts can make a profit of perhaps 25%.

The cashew sector is one that has been looked at by the Agriculture Ministry. With the help of outside technical expertise, it has drawn up a strategy for the farm sector covering the next five years. The accent is heavily on sustainable exploitation of agricultural resources while improving the lives of rural dwellers. Specific aims include boosting food self-sufficiency, more privatisation in areas such as processing, marketing and storage, and greater availability of credit to facilitate the transformation. The Ministry wants to see cashew growing continue, but it warns of the potential competition from Mozambique and South Africa. The strategy emphasises the need for more rice production. The problem here is whether to go for highly intensive mangrove rice – which has been grown for 400 years and is unique to the country – or to concentrate on shallow rice growing. There are also doubts, it was suggested to us, about the strength of the political commitment to expanded rice production. Cashews, after all, are ‘a nice little earner’.

The Ministry’s strategy document also identifies other areas with export potential. One of the most promising products is the mango – Guinea Bissau has 450,000 mango trees. Indeed, exports to Europe have already increased sharply (from 3.5 tonnes four years ago to 87 tonnes in 1995). Other possibilities are citrus, bananas, cola nuts, guava, pineapples, papaya, cotton, livestock, maize and forestry products.

If the maximum benefit is to be reaped from agriculture, however, the nettle of land reform will need to be grasped. Put simply, decisions are needed about which plots belong to whom. The issue has been on the agenda for some years but it has still not been sorted out. Guinea Bissau has some 90,000 small villages known as Tabancas which account for 90% of farm production. The Poteiros (average size, 136 hectares) are the larger farms, operated under state concessions. There are currently about 1,200 of these. The trouble is that some Tabancas and Poteiros overlap and it will be extremely difficult to achieve a delimitation, and in particular a definition of communal land, which is satisfactory to both sides. This is not to mention the tenure problems in the ‘sacred forests’.

Privatisation

Guinea Bissau has a target growth rate of 4% per annum up to the turn of the century, and to achieve this, privatisation is envisaged in non-agricultural sectors as well. Key state companies recently sold off include Dicol and Guiné-gas the petroleum and gas supply companies. Petrogal and Shell each purchased 45% of the former while 10% was retained by Guinea Bissau. Petrogal also acquired a 75% stake in Guiné-gas, the remaining quarter of the shares being held by local private investors. Koumba Yaia who leads the PRS, an opposition party with centre-left leanings, cautioned against ‘overdoing’ privatisation. ‘We can accept privatisation of a boat for example, though even here, the state should get a financial return for it. But you can’t privatise things like electricity or the roads. These should remain under state control.’

Chamber of Commerce President, Canjura Injai, welcomed the recent creation of the guichet unique, an office or ‘one-stop-shop’ which has the task of coordinating all government initiatives to encourage and attract private investment. He regretted, however, the lack of seed money available from Europe to get investment started, and the lack of information about schemes that did exist.

Regional targets

Many politicians in Bissau are optimistic that their country’s membership of the WAEMU, with access to a market of 62 million consumers, will help them to hit their growth targets and achieve greater monetary stability. The country joined the monetary system in January 1997 and just over a month later, acceded to the full regional organisation. The currency changeover (from peso to CFA franc) began on May 2 and the peso ceased to be legal tender at the end of July. Many residents have amusing tales of their outings to cafés weighed down with bagfuls of pesos (the currency was badly hit by inflation).


**A buoyant future for fishing?**

You don’t have to spend long in Guinea Bissau before you discover the importance of fishing, both for the people and the government. This sector accounts for about 50% of budget revenues (including a major contribution from the fishing agreement with the EU) and provides a livelihood for some 10% of the working population (40,000 people). On the production side, however, it is a very different story, with little value being added locally. And you won’t see many large vessels in harbour, for Guinea Bissau has no trawling fleet to speak of. In the port of Bissau, the focal point is where the bideiras gather to haggle loudly over the price of fish landed by the artisanal boats.

Industrial fishing activities are undertaken by foreign vessels. These operate in the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under a range of fishing agreements. Foreign countries pay for the right to fish, then take the catch back home to process and sell.

The EU first entered into an agreement with Guinea Bissau in February 1980. The basis of this was that the EU vessels would be allowed to fish in local waters in return for aid. This arrangement has been renewed and updated on seven occasions, with the most recent four-year accord due to expire in June 2001. Over the period, Guinea Bissau will receive a basic ECU 34m in compensation as well as having access to funds specifically for fisheries research (ECU 300,000), institutional support (ECU 200,000), supporting artisanal fishing (ECU 150,000), maritime surveillance (ECU 800,000) and other fisheries-related activities (ECU 400,000).

Under the agreements, boat owners must pay for licences allowing them to catch fish up to a specified quota. The EU vessels in question come from Spain, France, Italy and Portugal.

A new feature of the most recent accord is permission for the EU trawlers to sell some of their catch in Bissau to meet a deficit on the local market. During The Courier’s visit, negotiations were under way as to how much could be sold, and whether the vessels should enter the harbour, or transfer the fish offshore to artisanal boats. The talks were due to be concluded by the end of the year.

Some NGOs criticise these traditional fishing agreements on the grounds that they are ‘exploitative’ and advocate more joint ventures with local boats to boost local receipts. But, according to Fisheries Minister Artur Silva, ‘to be able to export fish, you need to have the technical means.’ And the resources, he said, simply aren’t there at the moment ‘for us to set sail on our own.’ He suggested that the country might be in a position in five years time to exploit its resources, and efforts were being made to move towards this.

He cited a range of things that were currently lacking – boats, foreign exchange, private operators to develop the sector, portside processing facilities and electricity supplies. He also stressed the need to comply with strict phyto-sanitary norms, if they wanted to export fish to the EU.

The starting point, the Minister said, was to build up their knowledge of their fish resources. ‘We have to know what we have and how to go about exploiting it in a sustainable manner, otherwise development will not be viable.’

This should be helped by the fisheries research institute that is being built, with Taiwanese assistance, at a cost of $3m.

Another element in the first stage is to ‘strengthen and rationalise’ the country’s growing artisanal sector. In 1989, there were 1,200 artisanal boats (20% motorised) which caught 10,000 tonnes. The Fisheries Ministry estimated that by 1996, there were almost 2,500 vessels (25% motorised) catching 52,000 tonnes.

Looking more to the longer term, donor assistance is helping to develop the port of Bissau. A slipway has already been built for smaller boats and next year should see the completion of a larger slipway and a new market.

Surveillance of the EEZ is traditionally a problem for developing countries, which may not have the resources to protect their stocks against ‘pirate’ trawlers. In this part of the world, regional surveillance has had some success. Some vessels, both European and African, have been arrested and prosecuted for illegal fishing. The Minister suggested that just as there is regional surveillance, the idea of regional fisheries cooperation agreements might be considered for future ACP-EU talks. As he pointed out, the countries of West Africa were all members of the same regional market – yet their fisheries accord with the EU remained bilateral. To back up his suggestion, he made the valid point that ‘there are no frontiers for fish’.

Going home with purchases from the fish market.

The Minister hopes that the country may be able to exploit its fish resources commercially within five years.
In joining the region’s monetary and economic organisations, the authorities aim to stabilise exchange rates, curtail speculation, monetarise an economy still heavily dependent on barter, attract overseas investment and ‘formalise’ economic exchanges more generally. These reforms, it is hoped, might lead to a rescheduling of the country’s crippling debt. Donors have provided concrete backing for Guinea Bissau’s adhesion to regional institutions. The EU, for example, came up with ECU 5m to help with the ‘entrance fee’, and also provided macro-economic technical support and assistance in collating statistics.

But the opposition has gained some mileage out of the alleged ill-effects of membership. They claim it has caused consumer prices to rise by about 30% since May. Once the exchange rate was established (at 65 pesos to one CFA), some traders reputedly rounded up prices. Finance Minister Sanha accepted that people had initially profited from the confusion by raising prices, blaming this on a lack of information. ‘But when we stepped up our information campaign and discussions with suppliers’, he said, ‘prices settled down to more acceptable levels.’

For Amine Saad, the decision to join was ‘bad timing’. He suggested that the country should have left it for another three years, by which time the region’s single market would already be established.

Concerns about the possible economic impact of accession to West Africa’s monetary and economic institutions are not restricted to the opposition. One of the leading lights of the ruling PAIGC, National Assembly President, Malam Sanha, also had a word of warning. ‘Guinea Bissau,’ he commented, ‘currently has no production to speak of. It could find itself importing much more from the region than it can export, causing an imbalance that could increase the cost of living’.

**Good governance**

The fact that such criticisms are freely made, even within the ruling party, is a sign of the frank and open democratic atmosphere. In fact, the problems facing the emerging democratic system appear to be material rather than philosophical. National Assembly members, for example, have complained about a serious lack of funds which prevents them from operating their offices, organising meetings or getting around the country. This is sure to be an issue as the nation gears up for next year’s municipal and legislative elections.

In addition to evidence that good governance is taking hold, there are signs of improvement in the human rights field. This, at least, is the view of Fernando Gomes, who chairs the high profile Human Rights League. Not that his praise is wholehearted. He is critical of the problems facing ordinary people in gaining access to the courts, and highlights poor conditions in the country’s prisons.

A political mini-crisis, which has since blown over, reveals that the ruling PAIGC has not been without its difficulties. The problem began in May 1997 when the PAIGC Secretary General and Prime Minister, Manuel Saturnino Da Costa, was dismissed by President Vieira. This set in train a minor constitutional crisis, the newly-appointed premier Carlos Correia being removed from office in August following a Supreme Court ruling that the President had failed to consult fully with the National Assembly. The matter was resolved in mid-October when Mr Correia’s was reinstated, following proper consultation.

While the crisis revealed strains in the PAIGC, the President of the National Assembly also argues that it was a good illustration of a properly functioning democracy: ‘The President acknowledged his mistake,’ he stressed. ‘He returned and proposed something else’. The Sixth Congress of the PAIGC has been postponed three times this year but Mr Sanha insisted that this was not evidence of divisions within the party. It was, he said, a question of different ‘sensitivities’.

**United opposition**

There is some talk of forming a united opposition. This is an option mooted mainly by Domingos Gomes, the leader of Bâ-fatâ which is the largest opposition party in the Assembly (see interview later in this Report). Amine Saad, whose UGen already embraces six parties, appeared less enthusiastic, seeing no purpose in uniting just to dispose of the PAIGC. ‘During the crisis, we thought that a solution might be to dissolve the National Assembly and have a coalition government appointed but, in retrospect, this would not have been helpful’.

The popular Koumba Yala, who came a close second to ‘Nino’ Vieira in the presidential poll, stressed to us that his country was still at the beginning of a democratisation process and said that the key thing was to ‘safeguard democracy’ by consolidating it gradually. ‘We think that only a government supported by a consensus of all parties... will guarantee long term stability.’ He too discounted the idea of joining forces with Bâ-fatâ. ‘I respect Bâ-fatâ but they are totally different ideologically. Their leaders are veterans of the Portuguese army,’ he claimed. ‘They sided with Portugal in the struggle for independence and most of their families reside in Portugal.’

In talking of political formations, there have been suggestions that a powerful Islamic party might emerge to challenge the existing political groupings. Malam Sanha dismissed this suggestion, pointing out that while about half the population is Muslim, their support is distributed across the political spectrum. Arab countries provide some very visible assistance to Guinea Bissau, and recently, Libya has given aid worth $2 million.

In conclusion, Guinea Bissau remains firmly on the path to reform, but clearly the destination is still some way off. Perhaps the most pragmatic summary of the situation came from Mr Sanha. ‘We didn’t start out on a very promising basis and our economic breakthrough hasn’t yet happened’, said the National Assembly President, ‘but are going in the right direction.’

D.P.
After military training in the People’s Republic of China, João Bernardo Vieira took part in the long struggle for the independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, joining the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) in 1960. The party was founded by Amílcar Cabral in 1956. Vieira held a number of posts in the Cabral government, becoming Prime Minister in 1978 and President two years later in the wake of the coup d’etat which ousted Luiz Cabral (the latter had acceded to the Presidency in 1973 after the death of Amílcar who was his half-brother). The second round of the first multiparty elections, held in 1994, narrowly confirmed his position. 'Nino' Vieira received 52% of the vote in the presidential poll, compared with 48% for Koumba Yala of the PRS (Social Renewal Party). With 62 seats, the PAIGC remains the dominant force in the National Assembly.

While we were in Guinea Bissau, a minor government crisis arose over the appointment of Carlos Correia as Prime Minister, as part of a cabinet reshuffle which took place at the end of May. On 3 October, the Constitutional Court declared Correia’s appointment unconstitutional because the opposition parties had not been consulted. However, once this oversight was rectified, Mr Correia was confirmed in his post. For the opposition, this controversy is evidence of a weakness in the PAIGC administration. It means that the reform timetable has suffered a setback, albeit temporary. The situation regarding economic liberalisation, and land, public service and wage reforms, still leaves much to be desired.

In political terms, have you completed all the reforms that have been envisaged, to establish a democratic system?

- The answer to your question, I believe, is yes. Our constitution establishes the separation of powers, political parties can operate without restriction, we have a free press, a completely independent human rights monitoring organisation and no one is imprisoned on account of their opinions. In short, I would say that we are making strenuous efforts to safeguard individual freedoms.

Presidential and legislative elections were held in 1994 and were regarded by the international community as having been conducted completely freely and fairly. Admittedly, we are a little behind schedule as regards the organisation of local elections, but I guarantee that these will take place early next year.

The structural conditions, therefore, are progressively being put in place to enable us to consolidate democracy despite the fact that the country faces a number of economic, social and cultural constraints. We are convinced that the success of our efforts depends on our ability to create a democratic culture and to deal with these constraints. Take, for example, the tension created because people want an improved standard of living and the administration is not able to meet such demands in full. The root of the problem is the crisis which is weakening our economy and undermining the material basis of the state.

I cannot therefore overemphasise the fact that democratisation goes hand in hand with increased productivity. But to achieve this, we need a strong, credible government, a responsible opposition, and a civil society which is not only fully aware of the complexities involved in governing the country, but also has a higher profile in economic, social and cultural areas.

What are the main economic problems facing the country?

- In the early years after independence, Guinea Bissau’s growth strategy was inward looking and based on central planning. Hardly any attention was paid to increasing agricultural production. The result was that, despite having been a rice-exporting country in the past, we grew to be largely dependent on food aid from abroad. Public companies were also set up, and these absorbed virtually all the state’s resources, given that their raw materials were imported.

Such policies also caused serious fiscal deficits and these were increasingly financed by Central Bank loans. This fuelled inflation, which had already reached alarming levels, so between 1987 and 1989, Guinea Bissau began a programme of reforms. This concentrated on the liberalisation of...
prices and trade, and reform of the banking sector. These structural reforms played a part in promoting economic growth, but financial policies still left a great deal to be desired. It was this, in combination with a number of external factors, which caused our position vis-à-vis the outside world to deteriorate and inflation to increase.

Given this background, the country’s main concern today is to re-establish macro-economic balances. This includes controlling inflation and increasing production and productivity, particularly in agriculture. We are well aware that the main driving force behind all this is a dynamic private sector, which means we have to set up SMEs and SMEs. A strong, dynamic and competitive business sector, capable of facing up to the challenges presented by our membership of the WAMU and WAEMU, is therefore one of our urgent strategic objectives.

Are you actually in a good position to liberalise the economy further? How can you be sure that all the efforts you have made to increase productivity will yield results?

- You may recall that our economic liberalisation strategy is part of the structural adjustment programme set up together with the World Bank and the IMF in 1987. Despite the fact that certain problems remain to be solved, I genuinely believe that the goal we have set ourselves is achievable, in global terms. We will therefore continue to implement the policy, albeit with caution.

As regards the second part of your question, our efforts will yield results. The liberalisation policy is enabling the state to adopt a lower profile in the productive sector. The aim is for private enterprise to play a more active role in developing production, as it becomes more dynamic itself and takes on a more leading role. Liberalisation will also make it possible to set up the legislative framework we need to encourage foreign private investment and for the state to be able to concentrate its efforts on establishing the credit institutions the private sector needs. In this way, the state apparatus will become less bureaucratic and more efficient. It is for all these reasons that we are placing our trust in liberalisation policy, although we are doing so with a degree of caution and are, from time to time, taking stock of past performance.

Guinea Bissau recently joined the franc zone. Is that currency now in full circulation? Also, what are the principal benefits of membership of the WAEMU? Has the population had to meet the cost in terms of higher food prices?

- The team managing the changeover from the peso to the CFA franc has reported that 96% of pesos in circulation have now been withdrawn. A team has also been set up to monitor the situation and its most recent reports show that the CFA franc is now in full circulation throughout the country.

There are many benefits of being a member of the WAEMU, for example currency and price stability, reduced inflation, harmonised sectoral policies, expansion of the Union’s market, increased real GDP growth, reduced poverty levels, and so on.

Admittedly, at first, membership led to price destabilisation, particularly regarding basic necessities. This was not just because the people were unfamiliar with the currency, but because they were not used to coins – which had disappeared from the market more than 20 years earlier. Naturally, increased prices fuelled inflation, but after several awareness campaigns targeting the wider population, and economic operators in particular, the prices of certain essential goods are now on a downward trend.

We were well aware that there would be some problems at the outset which would have to be overcome in the longer term, but this is not a phenomenon peculiar to Guinea Bissau. The same situation arose in other countries when they joined the Union. The solution undoubtedly lies in increasing and diversifying production, to promote food self-sufficiency and increase exports.

To what extent does Guinea Bissau’s debt affect the country’s economic and social development?

- Our debt is certainly very high. In late 1995, the external public debt stock was approximately $945 million, that is to say 372% of the GDP in relative terms. 41% of this was owed to multilateral financial institutions.

The updated figures for foreign debt, expressed as a percentage of exports of goods and services, was 1928% at the end of 1995! In 1996, after debt reduction, our servicing obligations represented 11% of our export income (from goods and services) and 72% of government revenues. Obviously, this situation cannot be
allowed to continue if we are genuinely going to establish a viable economy.

The IMF, World Bank and Guinea Bissau's government have set up a joint technical team which is currently preparing an updated version of the report on debt viability. They are also looking at loans on an individual basis, using updating rates specific to each currency. Once the results have been approved by our government and the two institutions, the intention is to submit them to their Executive Authority before the end of the year. In the light of prevailing circumstances, the competent bodies intend to continue with the debt-management policy, although they will do so extremely prudently. For example, the government and public bodies are unable to arrange or guarantee new loans without the 'grant' component being at least 35%, with the exception of short-term import credits and loans for refinancing the existing debt, including its rescheduling.

■ How do you see the development of cooperation with Africa's other Portuguese-speaking countries and with your immediate neighbours?

- Even during the independence struggle, you know, we established coordination and cooperation instruments and afterwards we also set up the relevant mechanisms for cooperation not only in politics and diplomacy but also in the economic field. One example is the PALOP (African countries with Portuguese as official language). Within that organisation there are a number of sub-committees dealing with various areas of interest – politics and diplomacy, transport, trade, agriculture, health and education. It is a forum for us to consult each other on current African and international issues. Two years ago, another cooperation organisation was created – the CPLP (Community of Countries with Portuguese as a common language). All the Portuguese-speaking countries in the world belong to that body.

As regards those states with whom we share a border, we pursue a 'good-neighbour' policy, combining non-aggression and respect for territorial and economic integrity. Given that regional and sub-regional integration is one of our priorities, we belong to several integrationist groupings, particularly the ECOVAS (Economic Community of West African States), the ICDCS ( Interstate Permanent Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel), the OMVG (Gambia River Improvement Office), and now the WAMU and WAEMU. In a world where the current trend is towards globalisation, we see integration as a way of meeting and overcoming the challenges we face as part of the development process and which arise essentially from our status as poor countries.

■ Do the problems currently facing Sierra Leone and the province of Casamance pose a threat to Guinea Bissau's stability?

- As I stated earlier, Guinea Bissau has excellent, friendly relations with all its neighbours. We have on several occasions in recent years made a modest contribution to taking the heat out of various conflicts in this part of Africa. We remain true to our chosen role as 'peace-maker', not only out of a duty of solidarity towards our neighbours, but also because we feel that our own stability depends on a climate of peace in the sub-region.

Needless to say, events in Liberia and currently in Sierra Leone and Casamance do have negative repercussions on Guinea Bissau. In the past few years, we have taken in hundreds of refugees from Casamance and large numbers of citizens from other states in the sub-region seeking the security they were unable to find in their own countries. This causes economic and social tension, but so far we have managed to control this, although the effects of it can be seen among the population.

Take, for example, the problem posed by the thousands of Senegalese displaced from Casamance who have taken refuge in the north of Guinea Bissau. We are experiencing major problems in feeding them all and their numbers are also placing pressure on our society, causing unemployment and a further influx of people into the towns and cities. We make every effort to take in our brothers, but we need more assistance from the international community to do everything that needs to be done.

Furthermore, not all of these people are refugees. Some came originally from other countries which have been or still are theatres of conflict, and this is a real threat to us. Such people bring in weapons and, on occasion, they have had no hesitation in using them in holdups or other such crimes. Guinea Bissau is also seeing the emergence of new forms of criminality which did not exist before. However, I am pleased to say that, despite the higher crime rate, our country is still one of the safest and most secure in the sub-region.

■ Is European Community aid important to you?

- Certainly. Under the Lomé IV second financial protocol, a further cooperation programme has been set up between EU and Guinea Bissau. The objective is twofold: first to contribute to sustainable development in Guinea Bissau through support for productive sectors and, second, to achieve a successful political and economic transition, transforming a centralised system into a market economy supported and monitored by a democratic political system. In specific terms, this means promoting poverty alleviation, supporting the democratic process and helping us integrate into the world economy. In terms of actual figures, ECU 47 million has been allocated over the period of the protocol.

■ Are there specific problems regarding the fisheries agreement with the EU?

- Fisheries cooperation between the EU and Guinea Bissau began in 1980 when the first protocol on the subject was signed. Further protocols have, of course, been concluded since then, reflecting the interests of both parties. Fishing, and the rational use of marine and related resources, has
always been a priority sector, both in terms of allocating quotas and in the Commission’s support for areas of national interest. The latter include surveillance patrols, training, non-industrial fishing, scientific research and institutional support for the Fisheries Ministry. All this is in addition to the financial compensation which goes into Guinea Bissau’s overall budget.

Generally speaking, agreements signed with the European Commission have been beneficial to both parties in that they have helped to deal with the country’s financial difficulties. They have also enabled us to contribute to maintaining levels of animal-origin protein in the European diet. All the agreements signed with the EC have been properly implemented, so neither party has ever had reason to complain — which has meant that the agreements have been renewed over and over again.

Under the two most recent protocols signed with the Commission (1995-1997 and 1997-2001), special attention was given to the sensitive area of patrols at sea, which were increased in our Exclusive Economic Zone. The results of this have been very satisfactory. Illegal fishing within the EEZ has dropped, although we still have to maintain a presence, thanks to the finance allocated to the FSEMAR project for surveillance patrols.

These additional resources have helped alleviate policing problems. The protocols signed since 1980 have thus produced positive results. Each time, we have tried to make the best of the advantages on offer to both parties. But Guinea Bissau now feels that future efforts should be directed towards establishing a stronger partnership on the basis of joint-ventures between entrepreneurs here and shipowners in Community countries. The main objective is to develop our fish stocks.

With the new millennium just around the corner, cooperation between ACP countries and the EU is being restructured. What improvements would you like to see?

- It is essential to take stock of what has been achieved over the 25 years that cooperation agreements have existed between the ACP and the EU. The Dutch Presidency of the European Council took the initiative by convening a meeting of development ministers from the ACP countries and the EU in Maastricht on 18 and 19 April this year. This meeting defined the political bases of cooperation in the era after Lomé IV. The ministers dealt with four main issues: the general context of EU-ACP cooperation; technical and financial cooperation; trade and economic cooperation; and, lastly, the institutional dimension and cooperation policy.

We fully support the conclusions and recommendations arising out of this meeting, particularly the fact that the principles underlying the Convention, its achievements and the contractual form of cooperation will be upheld, with multi-sectoral objectives. We also agree that cooperation should do more to promote regional integration; alleviate poverty; promote good governance, democratisation, solidarity, sustainable development and private-sector investment, and the development of skills within ACP countries. As regards economic and commercial cooperation, the emphasis must be on adapting Lomé to the undertakings made in the context of the WTO — in other words, the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination. In the financial and technical areas, we suggest that the Convention should be greatly simplified, containing fewer instruments and more transparent procedures. Our experience is that the decision-making process is subject to a great deal of delay. Finally, we would call for ongoing political dialogue, establishing regular EU-ACP consultation prior to certain international meetings, such as those of the United Nations, and particularly in areas such as conflict prevention, peace, stability, the debt problem and technology transfer.

Interview by D.P.
Profile

General information
Area: 36,125 sq km
Population density: 29 inhabitants per km²
Capital: Bissau (pop. approx. 200,000). Second largest town, Bafatá (15,000)
Main languages: Portuguese, ‘Crioulo’ (widely spoken), Balante
Ethnic composition: There are 20 ethnic groups. The Balante are the most numerous making up 30% of the population.

Politics
Presidential elections are held every five years, parliamentary (multiparty), every four.
President: João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Vieira (in power since November 1980; re-elected in August 1994).
Prime Minister: Carlos Correia (since 1997)

Current composition of National Assembly:
Partido Africano da Independência de Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) 62
Partido da Renovação Social (PRS) 19
União para a Mudança (UM) 12
Frente da Libertação para a Independência Nacional da Guiné (FLING) 6
The last legislative elections were held in July 1994.

Economy
Currency: The CFA franc was brought into circulation on May 2 1997. The old currency, the peso, was then phased out, ceasing to be legal tender on July 31 1997. 1 ECU = 659 CFAF
External debt: $910 million (1996) – almost four times the GDP
Annual growth rate: 1996 – 6% (estimated). The target is to achieve an average of 4.5% growth per annum for the period 1997-99.
Inflation: 50% (1996). The target for 1997 is 12%

Main exports: cashews, timber, fish products.
Main imports: foodstuffs, transport equipment, petroleum products, machinery.
Main destination of exports: Spain, India, Thailand, Italy.
Main origins of imports: Thailand, Portugal, Côte d’Ivoire, Japan.
Visible trade balance: Exports $33.2m, Imports $52.4m, deficit $19.2m dollars (1994).

Social indicators
Life expectancy: 43.2 years (1994)
Adult literacy: 55% (UNDP estimate for 1995)
Population with access to clean water: 59% (1990-1996)
Population growth rate: 2.2% (annual average 1990-1995)
Enrolment in education (all levels): males 38%, females 21% (1994)
Infant mortality: 138/1000 births (1994)
Human Development Index rating: 0.291 (163rd out of 175)

Small beginnings but big ambitions

The title encapsulates the upbeat attitude of a variety of 'movers and shakers' whom The Courier met in Guinea Bissau. Despite a dire lack of resources for private and public investment, there is, at the micro-level, a desire to fill the gaps and push the pace of change. We were shown a number of projects that are laying the foundations of the market economy and offering the promise of a brighter future in the West African regional market. But as film producer, Flora Gomes, poignantly remarked: 'We are having to start from zero.'

Into the computer age

In a building with a worn façade, on a road full of potholes in Bissau, a room crammed with new computers comes as a surprise. Assistência técnica fornecimento de equipamento electrónico (SITEC) belongs to Amidu and Abdulai Sila. We met Amidu (his novelist brother was at a bookfair in Germany), who started out repairing machines in 1987 with less than $100 in his pocket, following aircraft navigation studies in Brazil. There are no development banks in Guinea Bissau but he managed to obtain an external loan of $60,000 – although its value shrank to $30,000 on devaluation of the peso.

The business took off, and he now has 90% of the country's computer market with his sights set on neighbouring Cape Verde and Guinea. He has an agreement to purchase Brandt and STX computers in the USA. A big drawback, however, says Mr Sila, is that so much has to be paid in advance. For example, of the 16% import duty on computer equipment, 3% (ie 3/16) has to be put up front before the import goes ahead. And he says that he pays 45% tax on his earnings. Despite the constraints, the firm employs 21 technicians and has an annual turnover of $800,000.

Rather than holding him back, each hurdle he encounters simply fires his ambition further. There is a cybercafé on his premises – open from eight in the morning to 10 at night. The 'surfers' are largely expatriate development workers, since many Bissau-Guineans cannot afford the tariffs. But Mr Sila now wants to give his compatriots the opportunity he never had – to do high level computer studies in their own country.

Mr Sila showed us round a striking building with mirrored windows which will house a new purpose-built training centre. With donor backing, he intends to offer 150 students a three-year training course. Each will need a scholarship of $5500. He acknowledged that he had faced some difficulty rallying support for the project. This, he said, was due to a perception that it served private interests – despite the fact that it aims to plug a gap caused by the severe lack of such training in the public sector. To date, USAID has pledged 20 scholarships (20% of which must go to women) and the Dutch development agency has offered 10, with the condition that most of the grantholders must be female. Mr Sila explains that, to be eligible, students must have had nine years of schooling in addition to some professional experience or, alternatively, 11 years of schooling. At the time of The Courier's visit, SITEC staff were busy correcting the exam papers of 800 hopefuls.

The course will offer basic word processing, technical aspects of computing, maths and languages (Portuguese, the national language, English, the technical language and French, given the mounting importance of the West African regional market). There will also be an input from visiting overseas professors. From some of Mr Sila's remarks, we gained the impression that he was not happy about all aspects of government policy – in particular, as regards telecommunications. This has long been a high cost state monopoly – which translates into high charges for businesses. But undaunt-

Women in business

The same drive to get things moving, despite the difficulties, is demonstrated by the women who belong to the 'Associação das Mulheres de Actividade Económica' (AMAE), an association of 35 women's business groups with diverse activities. It was launched in 1992 with backing from the Ministry of Women and the UNDP. Again, the grouping reflects the changing mood after 20 years of a state-planned economy. It cuts across the political divide: its President, Francisca Vaz Turpin, is a parliamentarian for the Bâ-Fatá opposition, while Treasurer, Lucinda Spain, is a PAIGC supporter. The association backs a diverse range of projects. For example, with the support of the Trading Investment Programme Support (TIPS) and USAID, pumps have been provided to raise water for horticulture. These can reach depths of six metres and pump between 5,000 and 6,000 litres every hour, meaning that women do not have to trek in search of water. A cashew nut processing project has also started up in Quinhãmel, and there are plans to improve drying and bottling techniques for conservation of tomatoes and green beans to sell on local markets. Mrs Vaz also explained that she has been working with the Fisheries Ministry to maintain the rights of the Bideiras to trade in Bissau port. She then gave us details of the latest project: a country-wide statistical...
bank which, at the touch of a button, will give all details of associations, capacities and possibilities of backing for projects. 'The last thing I want to do before the end of my term is to create a credit system on the lines of the Bangladesh Grameen Bank', commented Mrs Vaz. The Grameen makes funding available to poor women who would not be normally meet the eligibility criteria set by commercial banks. The AMAE President stresses that, under her project, men would also be eligible for credit.

**NGO working in the community**

Carlos Schwarz, a former minister of agriculture, is also trying to change aspects of peoples' lives, starting at the grassroots. His NGO, which is supported by the EU and other donors, runs activities across the country. Some of these are social in nature and others have an economic or environmental goal. The big challenge, he says, is to 'create structures and boost the capacity to transform products.' He is keen to strengthen the dynamics of organisations and groups' which, after long years on state provision, are somewhat dormant. Mr Schwarz is particularly concerned about improving the lives of rural women who do the bulk of the farm work in this predominantly agricultural nation. The ecology features strongly in Mr Schwarz's work. Thus for example, the NGO is sponsoring a local fish-smoking project using surrounds made of locally manufactured bricks instead of the traditional wire con-structions. This results in a 25% reduction in the use of firewood. The escalada (smoked fish) fetch a high price on the Senegalese market. His organisation is also sponsoring several eco-tourism activities.

One particularly interesting project sponsored by the NGO is Radio Quelele. Independent radio broadcasts used to be prohibited but since the ban was lifted, the organisation headed by Carlos Schwarz has set up three stations, including one serving the Quelele district of Bissau. A full set of equipment costs around $5000. Mr Schwarz described how Quelele had recorded few cases of cholera during the recent upsurge of the disease in Guinea Bissau. The radio had played an important part in this achievement, transmitting advice from doctors and others on how to prevent cholera with proper sanitation. Information on animal husbandry is also transmitted using compact discs provided by the Technical Centre for Agriculture and Rural Cooperation (CTA). On top of this, the channel broadcasts a lot of music and even has an 'agony aunt', Rosa de Amor, who gives advice on emotional problems. One of the presenters, Idrissa Queita, proudly showed us around the community centre in Quelele where young people read magazines, take language courses or listen to music. Mr Schwarz has also installed a simple but imaginative paper-recycling operation and a small workshop on the site where women sew using local textiles. When we visited, they were working on an order from the Trade Minister making fabric attaché cases for an exhibition in Macao.

**The church makes a contribution**

Father Battisti, an Italian priest who has lived in the country for over 20 years, displays the same drive. Long queues were waiting for him when we visited him at his church. 'It's always like this at this time of year when school fees have to be paid', he said, sadly reflecting on the lack of free education. Father Battisti has provided a facility to help meet this need, teaching young people how to carve sculptures from local wood. Funds raised from the sale of the artefacts go towards study fees. The project meets a demand from visitors who cannot find original Guinea Bissau crafts on the local markets. This dynamic cleric has also set up a pharmacy in his premises to fill another gap in the market – the lack of affordable western medicines. Father Battisti will soon be returning to his native Italy. But what had kept him in the country for so long? His admiration of the tolerance of the Bissau-Guineans, he told us, together with his belief in their potential.

**Expat entrepreneurs create jobs**

A similar passion for the country is shared by the van Maanens, a Dutch couple (Will van Maanen is the Honorary British Consul). Everyone in Bissau has heard of Ma-grevo and it was something of a surprise to discover that it is a supermarket owned by this husband and wife team. A huge satellite dish is perched above the shelves — that stock everything from televisions to tinned soups and yoghurt (a particular favourite with local people). Mrs van Maanen explained that the dish emits BBC radio programmes on short wave. Her husband spent four and half years in the country as a Dutch development volunteer. He went back to the Netherlands at the end of his stint, but then returned to Guinea Bissau to set up the supermarket, which is one of only two or three in the country. The operation now employs 100 Bissau Guineans (full or part time). Mr van Maanen has moved into selling Nissan cars and has ambitions to develop a shopping complex. 'But it's an everyday battle to do business', says his wife, not least because of the high import taxes and shipping costs.

The projects we have described all seemed to be flourishing in a difficult environment thanks to the imagination and commitment of those involved. The attitude was perhaps best summarised by our interviewee Flora Gomes whom we cited at the beginning of this article. Despite his exportable cinematic talents, the film producer has chosen to work and live in Guinea Bissau — and one the key reasons, he told us, was 'to give the country a vision'.

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*Idrissa Queita (right) with colleagues on Radio Quelele.*

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*Photo: Guine"
Interview with Domingos Gomes, President of Bâ-Fatá

'We need to manage our resources more efficiently and sell them more aggressively'

In Mandinga, a local language, Bâ-Fatá means 'the river is high and it must be crossed'. It is also the name of the main opposition party and of the second largest town in the country (although in the latter case it is written Baiata). This symbolism was brought to our attention by Domingos Gomes, president of Bâ-Fatá and a man with a highly developed political conscience. This was first aroused in 1961 when, at the age of eleven, his father was killed in the former capital, Bolama, during nationalist attacks against the Portuguese. He was studying in Lisbon when Guinea-Bissau won its independence and only returned in 1980, after the coup d'état which brought President 'Nino' Vieira to power. This event ushered in a new political openness. Gomes, who is a doctor, pursued his medical career back home and it was not until six years later that he founded a political party, initially known as the RGB (Resistência da Guiné-Bissau Movimento). Renamed Bâ-Fatá, it is now the main opposition party. Its supporters argue that the country could be in a much better position if it were run more efficiently.

How and why was Bâ-Fatá founded?

- Our party's raison d'être is human rights. It was set up in 1986 as a movement to defend human rights and promote freedom and democracy in Guinea-Bissau. Our country had just gone through an extremely troubled period. Many leaders of the ruling PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde) as well as some civilians, accused of having instigated a coup, were killed. It was then that we realised things had to change and that this was only possible through democracy and freedom for the individual. At the time, I was working in the main hospital in Bissau. One of my best friends – the Director of Public Prosecutions – was killed. We had been students together in Portugal. The pitiful state of our country shook us into action, and we decided to offer the nation an alternative. This is Bâ-Fatá. The movement was born on 27 July 1986 and its aims were unequivocal: democracy, respect for human rights and, most importantly, the achievement of these objectives by peaceful means.

Have the aims of your party changed at all since the parliamentary elections in 1994?

- Of course, many things have changed in Guinea-Bissau since our movement was set up. The first multiparty elections were held in 1994 and, despite the fact that Bâ-Fatá only came second, we still see this as a victory. Remarkable progress has now been made in the field of human rights. In 1986, for example, there were many political prisoners in the country and repression was widespread – you found it in almost every village. People were being killed for very trivial reasons. Of course, we still have the occasional problem. Last year, for example, a Spanish expatriate was killed. But these are now isolated incidents and the general picture has changed. As for freedom of speech, anyone can, and does, speak out. Parliament discusses problems openly and with complete freedom. There may be some local authorities that still try to oppress people, but things are made very difficult for them. Any repression that does still exist comes from individuals, not institutions.

Do you think the current administration is giving economic and social development a high enough profile?

- Obviously, many people consider their country's development to be a priority issue and the party in power does talk about it, but what exactly is it saying? The sort of development plans they are proposing are 25 years old! True, they fought for our country's independence, and we must not forget that. I also believe they genuinely want to see Guinea-Bissau grow and prosper. But that is simply not enough. The problem is how to achieve this growth and prosperity. What we really need now is a new driving force, a fresh outlook and new ideas. We want to see Guinea-Bissau grow and prosper. But that is simply not enough. The problem is how to achieve this growth and prosperity. What we really need now is a new driving force, a fresh outlook and new ideas. We should take up the challenge and allow a new generation of politicians to take the reins of government – because the present government is not prepared for the challenges. It doesn't even share the vision.

That brings us on to current problems, and in particular the poor economic and social indicators. Are these the result of policy blunders or are external causes, such as falling raw material prices, to blame?
Blaming 'external forces' all the time is no answer to the problem. Of course the government's policies can be criticised. We are well aware that the IMF is not exactly a charitable organisation. It doesn't exist merely to serve the needs of Africa. And debt servicing remains an enormous problem for us.

But I reserve my greatest criticism for the way this country is run. This brings me back to what I was saying earlier about drive, competence and initiative — qualities which the present ruling class lack. The same can be said of the local authorities, which are totally incapable of stimulating the sort of development at grass-roots level that could provide the impetus for developing the nation as a whole. Politically speaking, the interior of the country is dead; there is no administrative structure. This is what stands in the way of our development.

What is more, we have a paradoxical existence. We are poor, but we like to live the lives of rich people, with beautiful houses, nice cars, and so forth. In other words, state funds are not targeted at providing solutions to public problems. The private sector gobbles up all the foreign aid, leaving the public sector in a catastrophic state, so much so that hospitals do not even have aspirin to give their patients. Admittedly, Guinea-Bissau cannot be compared to Angola, and our natural resources are very limited. Having said that, we are by no means the poorest country in Africa. Take agriculture for example. We have enormous potential there.

That's another paradox isn't it? Guinea-Bissau has great agricultural potential, yet it cannot claim to be self-sufficient. Rice production is a case in point.

— We import everything, even rice. Look at the fishing sector. Huge numbers of people here are involved in fishing, yet you rarely see any fish for sale in our markets! The government makes a lot of money granting fishing licences, but what does it do with the funds? We are not a wealthy country, I know, but there is still a lot that could be done, especially in the agriculture and fishing sectors. In agriculture, for example, it is absolutely vital that funds be made available to support not just the small and medium-sized farms but the farming cooperatives as well, so that mechanisation can be handled more effectively and new technologies can be introduced into the sub-region. At present, however, agricultural grants are non-existent in Guinea-Bissau. It is essential, therefore, that we encourage farm production by providing support and assistance for rural communities.

Within the framework of our cooperation agreements, Taiwan runs three rice-growing centres here and they have managed to perform miracles — without a lot of sophisticated technical equipment. If our government is genuinely interested, it could do the same kind of thing with minimal resources. But we always come back to the same problem: the total lack of any national initiative. We need to make the best of the resources that are available to us and say to ourselves 'I am going to buy myself a tractor to work the land, rather than a luxury car'.

It is just as important to exploit the markets within the sub-region, because they do exist, you know. When I was in Cape Verde in February, the Prime Minister assured me that his country was prepared to import our entire maize crop. There again, it is a question of where there's a political will...

'Ve are poor, but we like to live the life of rich men'

Health is also an area of crucial concern. We have travelled the length and breadth of the country and conditions everywhere are grim. There are hospitals, true, but today hardly any of them are functioning due to a lack of technically and professionally trained staff. In fact, the only hospital which can be said to be reasonably functional is the one built by the People's Republic of China at Cantchungo in the north of the country.

Both health and education are top priorities for us. We believe that what our country needs most urgently at present are skilled, technically trained staff.

— Any country that seeks to develop itself must find the money from the resources available to it. In other words, they must put the funds they do have to the best possible use. There are a number of potentially profitable sectors in Guinea-Bissau which, as yet, have not been exploited. This is true of tourism, for example, which could be made to work for us in the same way it has benefited the people of Senegal. The basic problem is the one we have always had — to succeed we need to manage our resources more efficiently and sell them more aggressively.

Do you share the government's enthusiasm for the benefits that membership of the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union might bring in the future? Have there been any suggestions that this may have been a bad move?

— At the time the issue of membership came up, we explained our concerns to anyone who was willing to listen. We believed that the whole question of membership revolved around three criteria. First, we were adamant that there had to be thorough preparation before integration took place. We felt that we needed to wait a few years and work towards integration rather than rushing in blindly.

Second, we were concerned about the lack of information that was available about integration. Until last January, nobody knew what the CFA franc really meant. A mere month before it was introduced, hardly any information about it had been disseminated either it simply did not exist, or it was seen as being strictly a problem for the government. The upshot has been that the people still have great difficulty relating to the whole issue. The city of Bissau is something of an exception but even here there is no shortage of criticism. Prices have gone up more or less everywhere and, what is worse, the increased purchasing power that had been expected has still not materialised. As far as ordinary people are concerned, it is becoming progressively harder to 'hang on' until the end of the month. Even managing from one day to the next is difficult. A few months ago, the government did attempt to introduce standard prices for the most commonly used items. The result, however, was a 30% increase.

The result, however, was a 30% increase.
The third issue about which we expressed doubt concerns the historical differences between Guinea-Bissau and the other WAEMU countries. In short, the differences between French and Portuguese colonialism and the differences in religion. There is also the fact that our population is just one million. Our neighbours are much bigger. In terms of competitiveness within the sub-region, this is a significant aspect.

All this implies that there are serious problems to be faced in the very near future. Although membership will undoubtedly bring our country certain advantages, our clearly-expressed view was that the preparations should not be rushed. The government, on the other hand, was keen to get involved straightaway. So our position is still: 'Yes to integration, no to immediate membership'.

- Is democracy working well in Guinea-Bissau? Is it easy to engage in political dialogue with the government?

There is a great deal of mistrust between those that fought for independence and our generation. The older generation did not really understand democracy and were fearful of our ideas. At first, they were convinced that the opposition wanted to take away their power, their cars, their houses, and so on. However, the situation in Parliament is much improved today. This is thanks mainly to a willingness to cooperate on the part of the President – I believe in giving credit where credit is due – and on the part of a number of Ministers who work together with us. At the moment, the biggest problem we have with the government is over whether they have made a definite decision about the local elections. The PAIGC is dangerously divided and the prospect of these polls, which are scheduled for 1998, is terrifying the various factions – who will doubtless try to disrupt them. This obviously does not bode at all well for the country's political development. There are also personality clashes, between the former Prime Minister, Manuel Saturnino, and the President for instance. A further faction, with Islamic leanings, has also grown up around the president of the National Assembly, Malam Sanha.

- Have you encountered any obstacles to your new democracy or does it extend to the whole country? I am thinking here in particular of rural communities, where the village elders still have a powerful influence?

Needless to say, things are not at all easy. Parliament is finding the issue of resources an extremely tricky one – which brings us back to the same old problem of efficient management. Lack of funds is also proving difficult for our MPs, whose salaries are inadequate. Committees have nowhere to meet and no cars to take them into the country's interior. But just because things are difficult, this does not mean that democracy itself is impossible. The fact that MPs are able to discuss the problems at all is already a plus point. Our people understand what the expansion of democracy means. In the countryside people thank us for having given them their freedom. I have heard people say: 'You may not have brought us money, but you have given us liberty and that is more important'. Older folk, especially, tell us this because know what it is like to live under a repressive regime. Yes, we have to look at exactly how democracy fits in with village life and the traditions of our people, but democracy is found in rural areas in any case. Problems are discussed thoroughly in these communities and there is a keen awareness of shared rights and civic responsibility. It is the day-to-day problems we are left with: the times when someone wants a bit of money. This was one of the reasons for the PAIGC's victory in the 1994 elections. People were sick and tired of the corruption and repression. This underlines why it is important to give people as much information as possible.

- Are you seeking to join forces with other political parties so as to form a stronger opposition to the government?

- From an electoral standpoint, this has not proved to be very easy. The truth of the matter is that all opposition parties in Africa try to infiltrate the corridors of power and Guinea-Bissau is no exception. There have been numerous 'satellite' parties and many groups struck deals with President Nino Vieira. At the outset, therefore, any form of united opposition was extremely difficult.

Today, however, I think that the political climate is ideally suited to forming such a union. In Parliament, in particular, our party and most of the other groups represented, have talked matters through and have come to the same conclusions. I believe we are well on the way to achieving such a union. We are already working together with two or three parties that have seats in Parliament, and with others that are not currently represented in the chamber. Interview by D.P.
On the tourist trail

The eighteen inhabited islands which fan from Guinea Bissau into the Atlantic seem somehow to have become parted from the continent, as if propelled by some mysterious force into the ocean. Access is difficult. The nearest, Bolama, is three and a half hours away by boat. It is this difficult access which has partly kept intact the codes by which the main ethnic group on the islands, the Bijagós, live. As 'animists', they worship the life forces emanating from God, including plant and animal life, with rituals and sacrifices.

Declared a 'biosphere reserve' by UNESCO in 1996, the islands reveal an untouched natural beauty - and some have long stretches of sandy beach. It is these attributes which politicians in Bissau have spotted as offering tourism potential - and scope for a much-needed boost to the country's income. Some private entrepreneurs already have plans to get things moving under their own steam. But the visitor quickly becomes aware of the dilemma.

Would tourism development on a bigger scale simply erase the islands' main attractions - their natural beauty, the adventure of travelling to barely-explored islands and the mysterious Bijagós culture which has been preserved?

Gateway to Bijagós

Bolama, which was Guinea Bissau's capital until 1941, is the gateway to the islands. If you are travelling there by boat, be prepared to settle for a space between the cool boxes that belong to the 'Bideiras' (literally: 'women making a living'). They make the journey from the mainland to Bolama to buy fish which they then take back to Bissau where they can get twice the price on the local market. In the dry season (November - April), the crossing can be done in style on the Africa Queen which cruises around the islands. Its clients, we are told, are mainly French people on fishing holidays.

The now derelict Hotel de Tourismo.

The still hot air hangs heavy as we approach the flat green island, but there is a sense of anticipation over what is to come as the boat crosses the mouth of the muddy Canal do Gêba (the mud reputedly has therapeutic properties). Fishermen and children rush excitedly to greet the boat, just as they might in Bissau, and there is a lot of bustle and activity. But beyond the port the picture is very different. You have the impression of arriving at the location of some long past natural disaster or, perhaps, a disused film set depicting Portugal's colonial era. Unlike Bissau, with its sterile statues marking the country's socialist era, the hinterland of Bolama appears to have been caught in a time warp. The straight roads have grassed over, and pigs and goats seek shade on the terraces of striking old colonial buildings, now in a state of disrepair. This small island actually has between a thousand and two thousand inhabitants, but most of these live on the outskirts of the town in the traditional tabancas, making their living from growing cashews or fishing.

High grasses invade the once manicured parks and the Hotel de Tourismo is no more. There is the odd reminder of the long struggle for liberation from Portugal, and on a street corner, you come across a monument to the father of the nation, Amílcar...
Cabral. Bats can be seen hanging from an old church ceiling.

One of the few things to break the slumber is the hammering of workers involved in an African Development Bank project, who are busy building a national institute of navigation. Bizarrely it seems, they are renovating a swimming pool right beside the sea, but we soon learn that this is part of the project. International maritime rules require that future sailors should know how to swim!

Nature islands

Beyond the historical attractions, the sleepiness of the place rubs off on the visitor and the interest that has been expressed in developing eco-tourism can be understood. The lush vegetation combines with the hot sun to arouse the senses. Philip Beaver, a British Royal Navy lieutenant who led an expedition to the islands in 1792 in search of coffee, tobacco and sugar cane, noted in his diaries that Bolama had 'been conceived in one of nature's happiest moments'. But he abandoned the idea of settling there when malaria struck.

Bolama does not have the best beaches in the archipelago, but a sandy stretch can be found – with the assistance of a four wheel drive. If you decide to dip your toes in the water, watch out for the stingrays that lurk beneath the sand. One of the biggest drawbacks of the island is that there are so few places to stay. Perhaps the best option is to do what we did and knock on the door of the fishing project run by Les Iles de Paix, a Belgian NGO. They have a few rooms to let in the Gouveia compound, the headquarters of their fishing project. The project itself, which has completed its third phase (1993-1996) and has received funding from the EDF, has successfully provided fishing and boat-building skills throughout the Bijagós. Some local fishermen are now in a position to purchase their own boats on credit.

Right on the sea front, the old building which houses the boat construction yard and a furniture-making workshop, has one of the best views of the island. When the tide is in, children splash around in the water and when it's out, the fishermen land their catches. The French manager of the project, Louis le Dauguet, does not discount developing tourism as an offshoot of the fishing project. But like other properties in Bolama, there is some doubt over who owns the Gouveia site (a Portuguese private owner or the government?) This uncertainty could affect any future plans.

The more ambitious traveller can sail on to Ilha de Bubaque – which does have more organised accommodation or perhaps hitch a ride with one of the 'Iles de Paix' vessels to one of the other islands, such as Canhabaque – which boasts a fishing training centre. Bubaque can also be reached by air directly from Bissau. Whereas Bolama has a mix of ethnic groups (including Manjaks, Bramés and Papeis), Canhabaque is true Bijagós country. There you will find people conducting the rituals and sacrifices that mark their profound respect for nature. The passage of males to adulthood involves donning masks of animals such as sharks and bulls, and a vigorous dance routine which is designed to manifest the potency of the young adult male. These people find it difficult to understand the activities of the Senegalese fishermen who have built-up a $10 million a year trade catching sharks from the waters around the Bijagós. The shark fins are exported to Asia... and the rest of the carcass is discarded!

Obstacles

The World Bank has already been looking at the potential for tourism on the islands. Eric Féron works for the Union Mondiale de la Nature which is involved in several environmental conservation projects. His study entitled Le Tourisme et la Réserve de la...
**Biosphère de l'Archipel Bolama**
(Tourism and the Bijagós Reserve) – published in January 1997 to coincide with a World Bank mission – warns of some very obvious obstacles to development in this sector.

First, he says, Guinea Bissau is not an easy country in which to operate: there is said to be no protection of private property, the infrastructure is poor, cholera has become endemic and malaria is widespread. In 1996, the country attracted just 1,500 tourists whereas 1,500 a week visited neighbouring Senegal. And Guinea Bissau may not be a cheap destination given the competition. The visitor from Europe can enjoy two weeks of tropical sunshine, flight and accommodation included, in say, the Maldives, for as little as 6000 French francs. Poorly served by direct services, a return trip alone between Bissau and Europe can set you back FF4000. Eric Féron believes, nonetheless, that the country has some potential – perhaps as part of a circuit also taking in Senegal or the Gambia. He told *The Courier*: 'We do not discount that tourism can have positive effects, but it must not upset nature. We want tourism to serve the environment, and conservation to serve tourism'. In Guinea Bissau it appears to be a very tricky balance to strike.

If you want to stick exclusively to Guinea Bissau, a visit to the Bijagós could be combined with a foray into other parts of the country where the attractions are less obvious but potentially rewarding. You might start in the capital Bissau with its attractive but crumbling colonial architecture, busy markets and good places to eat fresh fish. At Varela in the North, towards the border with Senegal, you will find accommodation and a sandy beach. And in the South, there is the rice-growing area of Tombali. The EU is working with the government in the South to try to establish the boundaries for a National Park at the ‘Lagoas de Cufada’. Georges Grépin, who is a consultant on the project (*Ecosystèmes Fragiles*) explained how the emphasis was on developing the natural resources to make as many local people as possible aware that a living can be earned from environmental conservation, including eco-tourism possibilities. Carlos Schwarz, whose NGO is involved in a variety of EU-backed activities in the country, has mounted a project to train local guides in Tombali in tracking the wealth of the sacred forests.

Just North of Bissau, by the side of the *Río Mansã* is Quinhãmei, another tourist spot. Here, oysters prised off the rocks are served in the local café. And just outside the country’s second town, Bafata, which is in the North East, accommodation is available in hunting lodges. The *Cluba de Caça* near Capé has a mainly expatriate clientele who go to hunt birds. The route there is lined with the strange forms of termite hills. By day, they are a ruddy brown, but at night their tall, jagged peaks cast menacing shadows. Apparently, these mounds were used as defence works during the war with Portugal. Their solid construction provided shelter from the enemy’s bullets!

It is difficult to judge how far tourism can be developed in Guinea Bissau without causing environmental damage. The country is naturally keen to attract tourists (and their foreign exchange). At present, the best approach would probably be to seek out the discerning visitor with an interest in the culture and ecology of Guinea Bissau. In other words, the kind of thing on offer at the Gouveia compound – simple overnight accommodation using local services and produce. Those who are attracted to this formula will be rewarded with some of the freshest barracuda you can ever hope to taste!
The 8th EDF: varied but precisely targeted

by Riccardo Gambini*

Just like the ones that came before it, the programme financed under the 8th EDF covers many areas, but the main emphases are production, infrastructure and institutional support.

Over the years, the European Commission’s delegation in Guinea Bissau has had five Heads, and in early 1998, it will be celebrating its 23rd anniversary. At the end of 1998, the country will have been independent for a quarter of a century and it has been a member of the group of ACP States since the signing of the second Yaoundé Convention. Thus, the cooperative relationship between Guinea Bissau and the EC is long-standing and uninterrupted.

The new National Indicative Programme under the 8th EDF (ECU 47 million), signed in Bissau on 2 December 1996 by Commissioner Pinheiro, is the sixth consecutive agreement of this kind between Guinea Bissau and the Commission. The period covered by the latest EDF runs from 1998 to 2003 and aims to maintain the country’s productive sectors, particularly through the construction of roads (see box), by boosting agricultural production (rice-growing, crop diversification and long-term management of natural resources) and through institutional support for key ministries (Finance, Agriculture, Public Works) and other sensitive sectors (Education, Health).

In those sectors which are not being specifically targeted, particular attention will be paid not only to basic and local initiatives (micro-projects and micro-developments) but also to cultural actions (books, films, the press, music and arts festivals) and to administrative decentralisation (municipal abattoirs, clean-up projects in towns and zones around the capital, opening-up of rural areas). Support will also be given to the National Assembly and to arrangements for the forthcoming legislative, municipal and presidential elections, with a view to monitoring political dialogue and consolidating Guinea Bissau’s young democracy.

Three other aid instruments are available to Guinea Bissau. First, there is the structural adjustment programme agreed in close collaboration with the World Bank and the IMF. The funding available for this programme under the 8th EDF has yet to be determined, but given the country’s entry into the franc zone in July 1997, it looks likely to take the form of budget support for social sectors. The second instrument is the STABEX fund which offsets the reduction in export income from shrimps, palm nuts and oil, and timber, as well as going towards projects aimed at diversifying agriculture (mangoes, cashew nuts) and building up the non-industrial fisheries sector. The third instrument involves cofinancing in conjunction with the NGOs and ECHO services – which have an important function in a variety of fields (fisheries, agriculture, promotion of grassroots actions, aid for refugees and the anti-cholera campaign).

The European Investment Bank also still has a presence in Guinea Bissau, providing a grant of ECU 5 million to promote private investment in the processing industry (agricultural produce and fish) and for financing small and medium-sized export companies.

Lastly, a new four-year fishing agreement (the seventh of its type) was signed in June 1997. The fishing zone off Guinea Bissau’s continental shelf has abundant stocks, and fleets of Community vessels – particularly from Spain, Italy and Portugal – fish here for shrimp, cephalopods and high-quality species. French-flag vessels are mainly interested in

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tuna-fishing. This trade agreement, which has been continuously improved over the years, also has development-promoting components for training, ichthyological research, non-industrial fishing, maritime surveillance and institutional support.

The Commission's contribution, income from the grant of fishing licences and the results of maritime surveillance account for approximately 50% of the state's total income.

Besides these NIP-linked actions, Guinea Bissau, like Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique and São Tomé & Principe, receives aid reserved for the PALOP states (African countries with Portuguese as official language). The second such programme has been allocated ECU 30 million, distributed over the following priority sectors: institutions and administration (31%), employment and training (34%), culture (15%), statistics (5%), education (7%), and tourism and the environment (8%).

Still at a regional level, like the other members of the ECOWAS, Guinea Bissau shares in the ECU 228 million allocated under the 8th EDF West Africa Regional Indicative Programme, a fund aimed at stepping-up inter-regional exchanges and boosting the region's economies. This programme especially targets the abolition of trade barriers, development of regional trade and support for the private sector, strengthening of integration mechanisms, promotion of trade within certain production sectors and development of regional transport, communications and power systems.

Commission assistance to Guinea Bissau is therefore, significant and varied but nonetheless precisely targeted, with a number of aid instruments employed to support a range of sectors. It is also compatible with the cooperation arrangements operated bilaterally by the European Union's Member States, of which France, Portugal and Sweden are diplomatically represented in Bissau.

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**Maintenance deficit**

There is a road in Bissau where the children rule. To pass through the thin rope which acts as a barrier, you have to pay them a few CFA francs. The money goes to purchase the sand and stones needed to fill the holes in the asphalt. Although the children themselves appear cheerful enough, vehicle owners and 'donors' alike are less happy. They complain that the authorities are not paying enough attention to the poor state of roads in Bissau and elsewhere in the country. It is true that a lot of routes, built with EDF funds, are currently in a poor state of repair, and their refurbishment, together with the construction of bridges, is part of the programme set up with the EU under the 8th EDF. The aim is to stimulate regional trade, but the success of the scheme depends on whether the undertakings entered into by the government are complied with. Satisfactory upkeep of Guinea Bissau's major road network could have a very significant economic impact, says civil engineer, Dr Antonio Torres, who is the EU delegation's technical adviser in that country. He estimates that it could boost income by ECU 6.24m (equivalent to 2.6% of GDP and 17.5% of state revenue).

Guinea Bissau has 636 kilometres of designated roads, one of the densest networks in West Africa, but it is frequently overloaded with traffic, with all the well-known consequences this brings: damage to vehicles, damage to roads and higher numbers of accidents.

Owing to a lack of maintenance, 60% of the network is classified as 'passable to bad', although there have been positive developments since 1988. Regular maintenance of the major-road network remains one of the principal objectives set by the government in its definition of transport-sector pol-
Children

The child who has everything or the ill-treated child, the child who is the focus of family attention or the child who is fought over during a divorce, tomorrow’s adults are currently the subject of much concern. Economic and social situations in certain countries are such that several million children worldwide live in absolute penury, struggling against malnutrition, disease, prostitution and delinquency. Often homeless, and without guidance from their family or school, these children exist, either alone or in small groups, on the absolute fringes of society, in a world where violence and repression reign.

Society in the majority of countries defines the child as a separate entity from the adult. Determining the age, with its ‘initiation rites’, at which a child acquires adult status is a major ongoing problem, particularly so since it is perceived differently from one country to another. In an attempt to even out any discrepancies, given that childhood, depending on the country concerned, may be seen to end anywhere between 12 and 25 years of age, Article 1 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as any human being under 18.

Progress report

Thirty years on from this United Nations Convention, with its 54 articles on the rights of the child, the situation of children the world over continues to give increasing cause for concern in many respects.

According to the latest estimates from the International Labour Office, a quarter of a billion children aged between 5 and 14 throughout the world work – and half of them work full time. Although this phenomenon can be seen in a number of ‘industrialised’ countries and in countries in eastern Europe, child workers are found primarily in Asia (over 54 million), Africa (31 million) and Latin America (8 million). This does not take into account the large number of young girls who work as domestic servants, responsible for all manner of household tasks.

The drift of populations to the towns and cities (agriculture can no longer provide enough food for all the peasant farmers and their families) has given rise to a break-up of family structures and led many thousands of young people to move to urban areas in search of work. A town is often regarded as an ‘Eldorado’, where it is possible to get rich quickly. Unfortunately, cities in the southern hemisphere (and increasingly in the North) do not have the infrastructure to enable such a large number of people to live in decent conditions. Their dreams usually turn to nightmares. To help their families, the children have to work long hours as shoeshine boys, porters, cigarette sellers or scrap merchants, left to their own devices in the street. If current trends continue, almost 60% of children in developing countries will be living in towns and cities by 2025, and over half of these will be poor. In addition, children in urban areas are now increasingly feeling the effects of youth unemployment – the tasks they are given to carry out endanger their health, they are the victims of violence and sexual exploitation, and drug addiction is now widespread.

Take sexual exploitation, for example: in August 1996,
Stockholm hosted the first world congress dealing with the sexual exploitation of children for commercial purposes, which focused attention as never before on practices prevalent the world over, which violate their rights. Such practices jeopardise the survival and retard the development of approximately one million children every year. Often taken far away from their homes, either by deceit or by force, they become the 'property' of traffickers and suffer physical and psychological trauma from which they never recover.

Disease and malnutrition are further scourges which are part of the daily life of millions of children. About 200 million suffer from protein and energy deficiencies, and although such dietary deficiencies are sometimes caused by feeding customs and taboos, which deprive pregnant women of a healthy (and usually fully available) diet, the result is that babies are born already suffering from the inevitable after-effects of the mother's deprivation. Malnutrition is becoming more common and is now reaching a level not seen since the 1930s, but it is not a problem specific to the Third World. According to the UN World Summit on children, which took place in 1995, the gulf separating rich and poor is just as marked in developed countries. The number of children, therefore, born into conditions of poverty is growing, with all the consequent risks of premature death, stunted growth, mental retardation and chronic illness.

Nowadays, children make up almost half the numbers of victims of conflicts: since the end of the Second World War, over 21 million people, most of them children, have died because of armed struggles, 4 million children during the last decade alone. The evils that war and its privations generate may be direct (death, injury, psychological trauma) or indirect (displacement of populations, under-nourishment, insanitary conditions). In twenty years of civil war in Angola 500,000 children were killed, 8,000 of these less than five years of age. Seventy thousand others had limbs amputated, their injuries caused by the terrible anti-personnel landmines against which there has been an international outcry, but which are still manufactured. Their designers make them in every conceivable shape and form, some specially attracting children. There are the butterfly mines which, when triggered, spring up to around hip- or head-height before exploding.

How many more are forced to leave their villages, either with or without their parents, to take refuge in safer areas? The lucky ones are taken in by foster families or by refugee centres, but what becomes of the others, particularly when every day is a struggle for survival? Optimum welfare requirements are difficult to satisfy, as are their food, health and education needs. These are pillars of the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, but massive shortfalls in provision arise due to lack of resources and a paucity of aid compared with need.

**An ongoing task**

Sixty per cent of the population of the ACP States is under 25 years of age, presenting enormous potential in terms of human resources and economic development. These people cannot be ignored when the future is being discussed at the negotiating table. However, according to some observers, they are not genuinely taken into account in the texts of the Lomé Convention. Admittedly, Title XI refers to them as a ‘key group’ in terms of social and cultural cooperation. The Convention calls for the involvement of young people in economic, cultural and social development and for this to be taken into account in the appraisal of all projects and programmes. It also encourages measures to improve the situation of young people and acknowledge their aspirations and role in society. Yet what is needed is more than just words and declarations of intent. The Lomé Convention offers youth organisations several possible ways of becoming involved, which could be further utilised.

How should we respond to the innocent, hopeful smile of the girl in the picture? How can we help her to look to the future with joy and happiness? What can be done to improve her circumstances? How can we ensure that she does not become cannon fodder or is not forced to become a prostitute? We have attempted to address these and other issues in this series of articles provided by specialists on childhood.

Although the current living conditions of children offer a disturbing image of lost innocence, they also give us a message of hope: a number of projects can and must be implemented to protect the most vulnerable of mankind. This message can sometimes be summed up in just a few words: access to education and healthcare, and the preservation of human dignity. In short, the safeguarding of children's rights. The work that needs to be done to put an end to such evil is an ongoing task.
ILO-IPEC: striving to end child labour

In issue 165 of the Courier (p.61), we published an article by Marcel Boulard of the International Labour Organisation on efforts to tackle the problem of child labour. In this abridged text, the ILO gives us an update on the progress of the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC).

The IPEC was launched in 1991 following a substantial financial contribution from the German Government. Belgium joined the programme in 1992. Three years later, Germany pledged a large additional sum, a major contribution was received from Spain, while four other industrialised countries began contributing. IPEC became operational in late 1992 when six developing countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the ILO. Five more signed up in 1994-95. IPEC expanded rapidly in 1996-97. 29 participating countries have now signed MOUs on child labour with the ILO and 16 donor nations have committed resources. However, while the number of donors has risen, contributions are uneven and IPEC still relies heavily on the generous support of the two largest donors, Germany and Spain.

The problem

Child labour, which persists, is one of the most serious violations of children's rights in the world today. These rights are clearly set out in the ILO Conventions specifically dealing with the issue, and in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. According to a recent ILO estimate, the number of working children worldwide aged between five and 14 years is around 250 million. At least 120 million of these are working full time and are involved in work that is hazardous and exploitative.

With about 40% of the children in this age group in work, Africa has the highest incidence of child labour. The figures for both Asia and Latin America are about 20%. In absolute terms, Asia has the most child workers (more than 60% of the global total). Child labour also still exists in industrialised countries. In Southern Europe, many children are in paid employment, involved especially in seasonal activities, street trading, small workshops or working at home. The problem has also resurfaced in Central and Eastern Europe because of the difficulties that have arisen in the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy.

Many children are made to work at a very early age. This is particularly so in rural areas, where it is not unusual for children to start at age five or six. While most economically active children are in the 10-14 band, the proportion under ten is far from negligible.

Especially serious is the fact that many millions of children work in dangerous occupations, and industries or sectors exposed to serious health and safety hazards. Because they are physically immature, children are more vulnerable to the effects of arduous labour, and to exposure to dangerous chemicals. They are not physically suited to long hours of strenuous and monotonous work, and they suffer the effects of fatigue more than adults. It is known that their labour can have an effect on their intellectual development. Although many working children combine work and school, most do not have educational opportunities.

The most vulnerable child labourers are those exploited in slavery conditions and forced labour systems. The most common of these is 'debt bondage', whereby children work to pay off a debt or other obligations incurred by the family. There are also less formal types of child slavery and forced labour in which rural children are lured to the city with false promises of work. Here, they may be led into domestic service or sweatshops. Worse still, they may become victims of commercial sexual exploitation or cross-border trafficking. Children are also being used in the narcotics trade in the major cities of Asia and Latin America, and are victims of drug trafficking organised by criminal networks.

The response

The ILO's International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, which was launched in 1992, is now operational in more than 30 countries. Its aim is to work towards the progressive elimination of child labour by strengthening national capacities to address the problem, and by creating a worldwide movement to combat it. The priority target groups are bonded child labourers, children caught in hazardous working conditions and occupations, children who are particularly vulnerable (below 12 years of age) and working girls.

The starting point for IPEC action is the political will and commitment of individual governments to address child labour issues – in cooperation with employers' and workers' organisations, NGOs and other relevant 'actors' in society such as universities and the media. The concept of sustainability is built-in from the beginning with an emphasis on in-country 'ownership'. Support is given to partner organisations to develop and implement measures aimed at preventing child labour, withdrawing children from hazardous work and providing them with alternatives. A phased and multi-sectoral strategy is applied consisting of the following steps:

- motivating a broad alliance of partners to acknowledge the problem and act against child labour;
- carrying out an analysis of the situation;
- assisting with the development and implementation of national policies;
- strengthening existing organisations and setting up institutional mechanisms;
- raising awareness nationwide, in communities and workplaces;
promoting the development and application of protective legislation;
- supporting direct action;
- replicating and expanding successful projects; and,
- putting child labour issues into the mainstream of socio-economic policies, programmes and budgets.

What has been achieved

At the international level, ILO-IPEC has helped put child labour high on the world development agenda. In just five years, the ILO has become the key UN agency to which member states turn for advice and assistance on this subject. There is renewed interest in the promotion of international labour standards (ratification of ILO Convention No. 138) and support for the proposed new standards on the most intolerable forms of child labour. A succession of international conferences is focusing worldwide attention on the problem. ILO-IPEC provided technical support to the Amsterdam Child Labour Conference (Amsterdam, February 1997): the Preparatory Regional Consultations in Brasilia, Lahore and Pretoria, and the International Conference on Child Labour (Oslo, October 1997). Other international organisations have begun paying attention and devoting resources to the issue.

In most countries participating in IPEC, a combination of political commitment and the fact that a broad social alliance has been mobilised, has resulted in enhanced interest and action. Many countries have defined their national priorities and are implementing national action programmes. Some have begun allocating financial and human resources to address the root causes of child labour, and to implement direct action and advocacy programmes. These resources are far more than those provided by IPEC. New participating countries are moving from awareness-raising and 'sensitising' to comprehensive programmes designed to change the lives of working children. Tailor-made and innovative approaches have been developed to deal with the problem in each country.

Given that child labour is an issue common to many countries, national action needs to be reinforced by programmes at sub-regional or regional level. A number of such projects initiated in 1995 have been successfully completed. These include a programme of action for commercial agriculture in English-speaking Africa and a study on child labour in the manufacturing industries of South-East Asia. The Inter-regional project on the mobilisation of teachers, educators and their organisations will lead to the production of a 'resource kit' and a report on child labour and education, which are due to be completed by the end of 1997. A number of new sub-regional and regional actions have also been launched during 1996-97. Examples include a programme on child trafficking in Asian countries, and a regional information system on child labour in Latin America.

IPEC has provided substantive technical input for the development of policies and programmes by regional bodies. These include the Arusha recommendations on child labour adopted by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in April 1997; the Cartagena de Indias Declaration, adopted by 20 Latin American countries in May 1997; the child labour resolutions of the Council of Europe agreed in June 1997; and the Declaration adopted by the Joint Parliamentary Committee of MERCOSUR in September 1997. Several regional consultations were also organised with IPEC support by workers' and employers' organisations, and NGOs, in Africa, Asia and Latin America. These have resulted in the adoption of common policies and frameworks for action against child labour at the country, sub-regional and regional levels. Two major regional meetings for ASEAN and African countries respectively are scheduled for 1998.

Dependable data is necessary for the formulation of national child labour policies and action programmes. The ILO has taken the lead in developing methodological approaches for conducting child labour surveys at the national level. These have been tested in several countries over the last five years. In response to requests by many more states, data collection and analysis will be carried out on a wider scale in the future by IPEC and the ILO Bureau of Statistics through the Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labour (SIMPOC). This is a mechanism set up to monitor the child labour situation and the implementation of the relevant policies and programmes. Currently, analysis of existing information is being carried out at sub-regional level in South East Asia and at regional level in Latin America.

Research and evaluation provide the analytical basis for maintaining or adjusting methods and strategies to meet changing needs. Research on education and child labour has been conducted in 13 countries. Its outcome provides guidance for educational interventions aimed at preventing child labour and withdrawing children from hazardous and exploitative work. A country programme evaluation has been undertaken in India while a seven-country analysis on national efforts to combat child labour will be completed in 1998. The results will be used for further in-country policy and programme development. In addition, they will provide a basis for the development of a 'best practice' guide for policy makers on child labour - in short, an attempt to share country experience worldwide.
IPEC-supported action programmes in the participating countries are focusing increasingly on the most intolerable forms of child labour. In 1996-97, about two-thirds of such programmes involved children working in hazardous conditions. Some 20% related to situations of forced labour, while the remainder concerned other forms of child labour.

37% of programmes were directed towards children under 12 and 38% to those in the 12-14 age group. The remaining 25% involved children above the age of 14. Boys and girls were equally covered, with a slight bias towards urban areas and the informal sector. Expenditure was shared roughly equally between programmes in the services, manufacturing and agricultural sectors.

Looking at the types of intervention, one sees a significant shift since the early 1990s away from direct action with children – which used to predominate – towards a broader balance. 32% of interventions in 1996-97 involved direct action, 30% were in the field of awareness-raising, institutional and policy development accounted for 21%, while 17% entailed programme development, research and evaluation.

These initiatives indicate how IPEC is expanding. It is responsible for pionerous work in research, policy and programme development, advocacy, revision of legislation, statistical data gathering and monitoring, non-formal education and pre-vocational training.

Strategies: International instruments and direct action

ILO-IPEC draws strength from its close linkages with the ILO normative framework on child labour and its orientation to country priorities for the elimination of child labour. The ILO Minimum Age Convention of 1973 and Minimum Age Recommendation of the same year, were milestones in defining internationally accepted policy guidelines for application by member states. The establishment of IPEC gave the ILO an operational arm to assist in formulating national policies in line with ILO standards and to build national capacities to combat child labour. IPEC also draws inspiration from the work of the United Nations. It promotes the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and in drawing up its activities, takes account of the Programme of Action for the Elimination of the Exploitation of Child Labour adopted by the Commission on Human Rights.

IPEC’s core approach is to concentrate on the vital strategic elements that have a long-term sustainable impact in eliminating child labour in participating countries. These include:
- a focus on in-country ‘ownership’;
- sustainable action;
- placing child labour concerns in the mainstream of national socio-economic development policy;
- priority for the prevention and abolition of the most intolerable forms of child labour (including the provision of viable alternatives for the social and economic integration of the most vulnerable children and their families); and,
- involving a broad alliance of partners, making use of multi-sectoral integrated interventions.

ILO-IPEC action is based on a unity of purpose, and contains common elements, but it also allows for a variety of approaches, taking account of countries’ specific needs and priorities and identifying ‘customised’ solutions. It is now widely accepted that child labour cannot be solved in isolation and must be tackled in a comprehensive manner.

IPEC now faces a crucial challenge. Its success has led to a much greater demand for its services and increased pressure on limited resources. In the coming years, it will continue to focus on the most intolerable forms of child labour, consolidating existing experience to put child labour concerns into the mainstream in national development policies and programmes. IPEC will analyse the impact of its action and assist countries to develop capacity in monitoring the problem, collecting and analysing data and measuring progress made towards the elimination of child labour. It will support the worldwide campaign against child labour in close partnership with other key actors.

Focus on ‘intolerable forms’ of child labour

In 1996, the ILO took the lead in calling for priority action on intolerable forms of child labour with the publication of its landmark report Child Labour: Targeting the Intolerable. The response has been broadly positive. New international labour standards on this subject – in the shape of a proposed Convention and Recommendation – are scheduled for the initial discussion at next year’s session of the International Labour Conference and the hope is that they can be adopted in 1999. The objective of the proposed new standards is the immediate world-wide elimination of the following intolerable labour practices:
- Activities contrary to fundamental human rights: bonded child labour, working in slave-like conditions, prostitution; the use of children in drug trafficking or the production of pornography;
- Activities that expose children to particularly grave health and safety hazards such as work with chemicals, dangerous tools and machines, or involving heavy loads and complex tasks;
- Activities performed in hazardous working conditions and environments;
- A total prohibition on work by very young children, and special protection for girls.

The ILO hopes that these new standards will promote a dynamic advance in the global child labour campaign. The international community expects that their application will bring a new lease of liberty to millions of children in situations of extreme risk. The new standards will complement and reinforce the existing ILO Conventions. The most important of these are Convention no. 138, which sets the minimum age for employment in all sectors of economic activity; and the ILO Forced Labour Convention of 1930 (no. 29), which applies to certain brutal forms of child labour such as bondage, prostitution, slavery and practices of a similar nature.

ILO-IPEC is giving increasing attention to this challenge by
launching a Programme of Action against the most intolerable forms of child labour (AMIC). The latter are often kept from the view of the wider public. At national and regional level, efforts to deal with the more extreme forms of child labour are accelerating. Target groups that have received extra attention include children involved in prostitution, victims of trafficking, domestic workers and children engaged in agriculture, fishing operations, mining and hazardous manufacturing industries. A common problem in all countries is that there are very few public programmes or specialised NGOs working in this area. Efforts to develop methodologies and institutional capacity to address invisible forms of child labour will continue to be an important aspect of IPEC work.

**National action programmes**

The child labour problem will be solved only if its root causes are systematically addressed through socio-economic development policies and national action programmes. Placing child labour issues in the mainstream is therefore one of IPEC’s key concerns. Efforts will be made to ensure that the subject remains high on the national and international agenda and that policies, programmes and institutional processes are progressively implemented until child labour is effectively eliminated. At the very least, the aim is to make significant inroads in eliminating the practice.

It is important that IPEC-supported initiatives fit into overall national development and child labour policies and that effective coordination mechanisms exist. At present, with most national and action programmes still under way, only preliminary observations about the success or failure of ‘mainstreaming’ are possible. Monitoring and evaluation will therefore be intensified.

**Programme development, monitoring and evaluation**

The effective elimination of child labour in any given country requires a programmatic approach, involving a wide variety of parties working together towards policy reforms and social changes. This is a lengthy process and requires expertise in many technical fields. Several countries are moving towards a strategic, coherent approach while new programmes have just begun in a number of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Thanks to the Office’s work, there is now considerable interest in having a strategic approach, with a timetable for the elimination of the most intolerable forms of child labour. For the technical assistance provided by IPEC, this entails a renewed focus on a well-defined and coherent programme which sharpens national policies and programmes, targets the intolerable, reinforces capacity-building in partner organisations and implements selected direct action programmes for demonstration purposes. Over the next two years, further country programme and thematic evaluations will be systematically carried out to identify successful approaches and avoid common bottlenecks. The lessons learned will be widely disseminated at national, regional and international level.

**Broadening collaboration**

Recognising the complementary roles played by actors in the public sector and in civil society, IPEC has extended its collaboration to a wide range of organisations, including key government bodies, workers’ and employers’ associations, international and national NGOs, the media and universities.

Global efforts to solve the child labour problem and the expansion and deepening of ILO-IPEC activities in various areas has led to a much greater interaction with UN agencies and other international bodies. The long-standing collaboration with UNICEF has been strengthened by the signing of a ‘Letter of Intent’ on 8 October 1996, which set the broad parameters for ILO/UNICEF cooperation on key issues such as policy development, research and field opera-

**Conclusion**

Five years of field experience have yielded many positive results. ILO-IPEC is recognised as the foremost operational instrument in a campaign which has put child labour high on the international community’s agenda. The policies and strategies pioneered by IPEC have been widely accepted and its operational methodologies applied. The Programme is a significant factor in the growing support for a new focus on intolerable forms of child labour.

This is a good beginning, but the task remains immense. The campaign to eliminate child labour is a long-term undertaking. ILO-IPEC is committed to staying the course and to delivering the long-term quality service required by its member states.
Malnutrition: an unrecognised danger

by Philippe Henon

According to the recent Unicef report entitled, 'The State of the World's Children 1998', more than seven million children die in the developing countries each year either directly or indirectly as a result of malnutrition. Malnutrition is therefore responsible for over half of the world's child mortality, says the UN agency.

Quiet starvation

The media keep us regularly informed about world hunger problems. Such reports generally concern starvation on a large-scale, which is exacerbated by drought or war. But starvation of this type is not the only form of hunger to threaten life and health. Malnutrition resulting from a shortage of certain nutrients, such as proteins and 'building-blocks' like iron, iodine and vitamin A, is at least as important. There is, however, less public awareness of the fact that millions of people, and children in particular, fall victim to this. Unicef refers to the phenomenon as 'quiet' starvation.

A healthy balanced diet is the key to good health. It is not just the quantity but also the quality of food that is important. It is certainly essential for young children to receive appropriate food, at regular intervals. A malnourished child experiences growth problems. Even if such a child has more to eat when he or she is older, the ground that has been lost is never fully made up.

Although solid progress has been achieved in certain parts of the world, globally, the number of malnourished children has increased in absolute terms. Half the children living in Southern Asia are malnourished. The body weights of one in three African children are too low, and even in a number of industrial countries, you will find poorly-nourished children.

A heavy toll

Malnutrition, in all its forms, takes a heavy toll. In addition to causing the deaths of more than seven million children a year, malnutrition also seriously impairs the development of millions of other young people throughout the world.

If young children do not receive sufficient iron, their psychomotor development is impaired and their IQs are reduced by nine points on average. Serious insufficiencies of iodine are associated with infantile myxoedema. A shortage of vitamin A does not just cause blindness, but also impairs the immune system, making children less resistant to illnesses such as diarrhoea and measles.

It is estimated that 167 million of the world's children have body weights that are too low for their heights, and the weights of about 183 million children are too low for their age. Research has shown that children with body weights that are too low are eight times more likely to die within a year than their contemporaries having normal body weights.

These figures do not just reflect personal tragedies. The development potential of entire nations is affected. Malnutrition is frequently considered to be a direct consequence of poverty, but malnutrition itself is actually also a cause of poverty. Shortages of vitamins and minerals cost certain countries over 5% of their potential Gross National Products. India and Bangladesh, for example, are estimated to have lost about $18 billion because of this in 1995.

The UNICEF report

Unicef's report entitled 'The State of the World's Children 1998' is available in English, French and Spanish, and costs BF 350. A Dutch summary is also available. The report can be ordered from:

Belgisch Comité voor Unicef, Documentatiendienst,
Kunstlaan 20, 1000 Brussels
Tel: 02/230.59.70
Fax: 02/230.34.62
Email: pec@unicef.be
Website: http://www.unicef.be

The importance of proper nourishment

High-quality food is vitally important. History shows that improvements in the diets of women and children were frequently associated with social and economic progress. Research reveals, for example, that more than half the economic growth experienced by most West European countries between 1790 and 1980 was due to improvements in nutrition, healthcare and sanitation.

Investing in healthcare and social facilities, however, is not just an essential precondition for governments wishing to improve their people's nutritional levels and thus increase their countries' development potential. Proper nutrition is, first and foremost, a right. Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which has been ratified by 191 countries, expressly states that the state parties must take appropriate measures to reduce infant and child mortality and to combat disease and malnutrition – through the application of readily available technologies, and the provision of nutritious food and clean drinking water.

There is, unfortunately, no panacea capable of solving the world's food problems. Malnutrition can take very different forms, which sometimes occur at the same time and are mutually rein-
forcing, such as shortages of proteins, iron, iodine and vitamin A. In many cases, the deficiencies are in substances that cannot be manufactured by the body itself, for example, vitamin A and iodine. These deficiencies can have a harmful effect on a wide range of physiological functions. Each form of malnutrition is the result of the interplay between a whole range of mutually reinforcing factors: family income, mother’s health, access to healthcare and sanitation. Many of these elements are, therefore, not directly connected to the physical condition of an individual but are also the result of political, cultural, social and economic factors.

For example, sex discrimination and violence against women are significant causes of malnutrition. After all, women play a crucial part in feeding young children. Access to education and information is also very important if malnutrition is to be combated effectively.

In short, malnutrition is not a simple matter. If nutrition in the developing countries is to be improved – leading to social and economic development – it is necessary to take simultaneous action in a number of different areas.

**A successful approach**

In *The State of the World’s Children 1998*, Unicef analyses a number of recent success stories. These have been used by the organisation to determine the general conditions that need to be met for the successful solution of the problem of hunger.

Most countries where nutritional levels have improved over the past two decades have experienced relatively substantial economic growth – that has been sustained over a long period. Increased growth is reflected in higher average family incomes. In Indonesia, for example, the expansion of the economy between 1976 and 1986 was associated with a doubling of income for the poorest 40% or so of the country’s citizens. It also resulted in an improvement in the population’s average nutrition levels.

One important factor is sex discrimination affecting women and girls. The high level of malnutrition in Southern Asia is, for example, to a great extent due to the fact that women have limited access to education and employment. In Thailand, where nutrition has improved considerably over the past 20 years, women appear to be better educated, have more access to employment and are more involved in decision-making in the home.

Government investment in healthcare, education and improving access to such facilities for women and girls are the most important policies likely to result in overcoming malnutrition successfully.

In addition to these general measures, there are also a number of more direct actions that Unicef considers will lead to a direct improvement in children’s level of nutrition.

One measure is to record a child’s growth. Child malnutrition is frequently not obvious, even to mothers. Asking mothers to measure the length and weight of their children, and to compare the results with the average for children of the same age, will enable them to detect whether their
Burundi tragedy

In the Burundi camps, the spectre of malnutrition is always close. Wrapped in a small green-and-yellow blanket, 16-month-old Richard Nsabimana thrusts two tiny open palms into the air, searching for his mother's arms. His hair is thin and white, and his skin broken, wrinkled and spotted with scabies. On his legs, open sores invite a cluster of flies, and on his foot, the squeeze of a thumb leaves a prolonged imprint. He is weak, has little appetite and, like many children in Burundi, is severely malnourished.

Malnutrition is common in Burundi. The spectre has long been present in the hills and homes of this tiny Central African nation's verdant but impoverished countryside. In an area where access to food, health, sanitation and proper care are limited, children fall easy prey.

600,000 internally displaced people

But since the outbreak of civil war in 1993, levels of malnutrition have increased - climbing ever higher as the overall health situation deteriorates. Conditions are the worst by far in makeshift camps for the displaced. Around 600,000 people - as many as 25% of whom are children - have been displaced inside Burundi for the past five years. In some of the worst-hit areas, particularly regroupment camps in Karuzi, rates of malnutrition for children have reached 18.7% and rates of severe malnutrition 4.9%.

'I don't know why he's sick,' says Richard's mother, 24-year-old Madelene, cradling him in her arms. The child has kwashiorkor, due to a combination of factors: part diet, part health, part education, part access to food, part care - and all amplified by the civil war.

Access to fields blocked

Their diet consists primarily of beans, porridge and supplementary food from an NGO. But, she says, 'it is not enough.' Like many families in Karuzi, they have been unable to cultivate their fields, partly due to sickness, partly to restrictions placed on their movement by the authorities. When Madelene is able to go back to her fields two kilometres away, she gathers whatever food she can for her family. But, she says, 'whatever is there is there by the grace of God.'

The atmosphere in this camp is like that in many others. The effect has been to undermine the nutritional status of children across Burundi. Little Richard Nsabimana is just one of many victims.
Children and mines

by Bill Howell*

Children are among the most frequent victims of anti-personnel landmines, and are almost certainly the most vulnerable in physical, social, and economic terms. There is much in the popular press about the targeting of children with anti-personnel mines. These stories are the more believable because, unfortunately, the world is such a place that it is actually conceivable that someone would purposefully target a child with violence. However, in terms of anti-personnel mine use, the specific targeting of children, except in indirect ways (including random terrorist utilisation of mines), is probably exaggerated.

The most frequent story is of the toy-shaped mine, conceived expressly for the purpose of attracting children. Mines, on the whole, are mass produced and there is no record of any mine being manufactured in the shape of a child’s toy. What does happen is that items which may be attractive to a child, even if not toys, can be and often are booby-trapped. But these items: perhaps a watch, a tin of food, a small radio, or indeed any unusual object; are equally attractive to the adults for whom such traps are actually laid.

One should also not discount the attractiveness of mines and other explosive objects for a child in a relatively impoverished environment. The freedom of childhood ends very early in many of the countries where landmine pollution is the worst, but the curiosity of childhood may not be so easily left behind. Toys and structured entertainment are rare and it is up to the child to entertain himself with what is at hand. In such an environment, unfamiliar objects can be attractive and interesting as diversions. In other words, they may be seen as 'toys' whatever their original purpose. In Afghanistan, the widespread use of 'butterfly' type mines, a scatterable mine made of plastic of varying colours, has led to a large number of handling accidents. These mines do not resemble a toy except in that they have an unusual shape and are made of plastic, but their attractiveness to a young shepherd boy with little to do is easy to imagine. In Laos, the problem is 'bombies', small air-dropped sub-munitions which were designed to explode on impact with the ground. Far too many did not. For reasons known best to those who manufactured and used them, the 'bombies' were often painted in various colours. Coloured metal spheres the size of a tennis ball, they have taken a toll on a number of children who mistook them for something benign.

Physical vulnerability

The physical vulnerability of children is related to their smaller size and lower body mass in relation to adults. The weight necessary to set off an APM is well within the range of the force generated by the steps of a child while

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* Director of Handicap International.
the ratio of explosive force generated to body mass is much less. The results of an explosion are far more devastating to their smaller bodies. For children, anti-personnel landmines, often conceived only to wound adults, are murderous weapons.

Blast mine effects, the worst of which might perhaps be limited to the lower body of an adult, can seriously affect the body, arms and head of children. As for fragmentation mines, penetration of fragments is relatively deeper with vulnerable organs closer to the surface of the body. Bounding mines bounce to a height corresponding to the body of an adult, but to the level of the head of a child, with greater danger of deadly cranial injury, blinding and facial scarring, where distance from the mine is great enough to avoid instant death.

Secondary vulnerability

The vulnerability of children to mines is not limited to the direct effects, however. The destructive effects of a landmine injury work against children in secondary ways as well. Mines which are, in tactical military terms, often referred to as 'force multipliers' quickly become 'vulnerability multipliers' for children and their families. In an often already difficult subsistence environment, landmines attack the fabric of a child's social protection: the family and the community.

Each day, as a landmine strikes an adult victim, an entire family is hurled across the line from subsistence to deprivation. Even subsistence living becomes problematic when the breadwinner of the family becomes a mine victim, and children are perhaps the most vulnerable to the deprivation that results. In many cultures – where the centre of life is the family, the familial structure breaks up as the result of a landmine accident. Psychological loss is added to the physical hardship brought about by the accident.

The mines also add to the often catastrophic condition of local infrastructures which should serve as safety nets for children. Landmine wounds require more of the scarce resources of the local hospital or health clinic than nearly any other condition. Inevitably, this reduces the ability of the health system to concentrate on treatments, and prevention activities such as vaccination, for childhood related diseases.

The psychological results of traumatic amputation are well known, and include a poor self-image, a paranoia of the environment, and depression linked to a less open future. In some cases, the fact of the wound is enough to marginalise the child even within the context of his own family, since his value as a contributor to
the family income is drastically reduced – and may even be the cause of increased family indebtedness.

**Children and mine risk education**

The challenge of mine risk education (MRE) is to succeed in bringing about changes in behaviour which reduce the risk of mine accidents. At the same time, behavioural change and education are long term processes and the child in question may not have the luxury of time to take this on before being confronted with the dangers. MRE messages can be transmitted by parents or other adults and siblings, or by community and cultural authorities, but each vector presents its own challenges.

Passing messages for children through adults, whether parents or community authorities, must be carefully based on the actual level of supervision and discipline that each culture adopts for its children, and the extent to which fatalism, economic necessity, and a number of other factors may play a role in family organisation and direction. While children take on responsibilities which contribute to family survival early in life, they remain children, with all that this entails – lack of experience, curiosity, immaturity of judgment and a simple lack of information. Observations from the refugee camps in Ethiopia indicate that many accidents involving refugee and local children are provoked by children purposefully activating explosive devices as though they were fireworks. Left to themselves, children’s early independence also means early release from supervision. In some cultures or situations, even within sight of adults, children are not necessarily disciplined in the respect of the dangerous objects around them. This can mean that before being able to protect the children by training their parents, the behaviour of the parents toward their children may have to be changed. This adds to the complexity of the problem and implies a delay in reaching children that must be overcome by direct contact with the children themselves.

Children are thus a primary target for mine risk education (MRE) programmes, but at the same time present MRE with its greatest challenges. At different times and in different ways, children learn by direct absorption, by experience, and by example, and each effort to present MRE for children should take this into account.

The challenge of reaching children with mine risk education is complex because between the ages of three or four to the age of at least 15, they appear to pass through at least three distinct ‘ages’ which bear on the way information and messages must be presented. This requires that MRE for children be constantly adapted to the age group of those addressed as well as to the extent of liberty, discipline and responsibility given to a child of a given age in a given culture.

At the earliest ages, from three to six years, when many children of the developing world begin to move around in their environment with only sibling supervision, information on the dangers of mines must be made available which can satisfy a natural curiosity without creating either attraction or trauma. Parents and care givers (who may be just slightly older siblings) are the prime vectors for such information. From seven to 11/12 years, children remain curious, but are also living their first ‘years of reason’. This is the time when children, with some conviction, will be most likely to pass on well-presented messages to their siblings and elders. As they are frequently the care-givers for their younger brothers and sisters, messages must be developed that are targeted at their level directly, or that can be easily passed through them to others (for example, through child-to-child methodologies). Later, in the adolescent years, MRE must be careful not to have its messages of danger interpreted as a ‘challenge’ or a ‘dare’. Nor should information given be such as to leave the impression that any level of ‘expertise’ or familiarity with the weapons themselves has been reached. Purposeful risk-taking is a phenomenon already well known among adolescents and risk-taking with landmines has been observed among adolescents in a number of environments.

Children are especially vulnerable in any case, and landmines act as a multiplier of this vulnerability, both directly and indirectly. Preventing them from becoming victims presents special challenges to all those who work in mine action programmes. The field of MRE is only beginning to recognise the challenges and develop specific methods and tools to meet them.

![Warning notice by an Angolan roadside.](image-url)
Soldiers of human folly

Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states that parties in conflict must take all possible steps to prevent children under the age of 15 from participating directly in hostilities and, in particular, they must not recruit them into their armed forces. That is what the Convention recommends, at least. Nevertheless, some 200,000 children, aged between 12 and 15 years, are to be found fighting on the battlefield, according to a recent United Nations report. Some of these young boys – and also girls – are not even ten years old. Such is reality!

For us in the Northern hemisphere, the phrase ‘child soldier’ usually calls to mind rank upon rank of young faces standing awkwardly in close order, their eyes fixed on the target, kalashnikov slung over skinny arms and green bandannas bearing the words ‘I am ready to die for Allah’. Two hundred thousand is difficult to imagine and might appear to be purely anecdotal to members of a media-hardened society, but most of us have been touched by sad photographs and some of us may even have inveighed bitterly against what appears to be fanaticism, against all those who are so cowardly and so stupid as to recruit tiny children into the ranks.

Yet it would be unfair to attribute such practices only to the Iraq/Iran conflict, although there are few governments that would admit that they do the same. From Beirut to Kabul, from El Salvador to Mozambique, from the Tamil Tigers to the Khmers Rouges, the recruitment of children to fight in wars is unfortunately an established fact the world over. Nor is this a new phenomenon – we have only to look to the Spartans and, closer to our own times, the infamous Hitler Youth. Furthermore, articles in the press appear to confirm that the practice is currently on the increase in countries such as Sierra Leone (between 1992 and 1996, years of the most bitter conflict between government forces and the United Revolutionary Front, it is estimated that, in all, 4,500 children were forced into combat), Uganda (the Lord’s Resistance Army) and Kampuchea (Kampuchea People’s Party).

Such children, generally from a poor background and often orphans, are mostly used for support functions, at least at first. The boys work as porters, messengers and spies and the girls as cooks or ‘nurses’, although, all too often, they are called upon to provide sexual services. However, for the majority of these children, this does not last. Before long, girls and boys alike are obliged to take part in the fighting and, intentionally on the part of their commanders, to act as cannon fodder. Why is this? The reason is simple, cold and pragmatic: ‘a child will obey orders more easily, does not complain and has no difficulty in infiltrating enemy lines...’.

What leads a child to take up arms? Is it the Molotov cocktails or the stones, rocket launchers or...
AK-47 sub-machine guns? Is a child forced or does he volunteer? Is it likely that a nine- or ten-year-old youngster will, on his own initiative, agree – even if he says it was his idea – to go to the front? Such questions are undeniably difficult to answer but one aspect comes to light in a number of studies: patriotism is in no way one of a child’s innate characteristics. Regardless of his motivation, there is always adult influence at whatever level one cares to mention.

**Child victim or child torturer?**

These same studies and reports on child soldiers all record the phenomenon of forced enlistment. Throughout the Mozambique conflict, for example, and particularly during the second half of the 1980s, combatants lured young children away from their homes before putting them through military training. Such practices are not isolated. Many children have been literally kidnapped as they came out of school, travelled on a bus or were simply standing in the street. Countless others have been called up against their wishes to join not only the armed forces (Myanmar, Ethiopia, Peru, etc.), but also guerrilla and other opposition forces (Angola, Sudan, Nicaragua, etc.). In other cases, it is not the child himself who is physically threatened, but his family, which will become the victim of violence if it refuses to hand over a son, brother or cousin to ‘help the cause’.

Preventing a child from deserting is therefore a ‘question of method’. For ‘method’ read humiliation, punishment, special initiation rites, etc. According to the authors of *Child Soldiers*, a study conducted for the Henry Dunant Institute, there are those who, after having kidnapped a child, take him back to his home village and force him to kill one of his relations, thereby preventing him from ever returning home. At the same time, the child becomes dependent on his ‘ jailers ‘ and some even identify with their cause.

However, the same study reveals that ‘the vast majority of child soldiers are not forced to take part in conflicts, but are subject to a number of extremely subtle manipulative pressures and incentives which are even more difficult to eradicate than forced recruitment’. These incentives take many forms and range from the promise of reward to out-and-out, unadulterated indoctrination, with the last sacrament replaced by a set text. These dreadful practices are effective, however, so easy is it to influence young children. In *Gosses de guerres*, reporter Alain Louyot describes these very young soldiers as usually belonging to the poorest classes of society, agreeing to go to the front and a certain death, usually without the slightest financial incentive. Proof, evidently, that indoctrination and disinformation works. Unfortunately, there is no shortage of examples. The Iranian revolution – the eminently religious nature of the society and the sense of sacrifice and martyrdom peculiar to Shiite Islam – once again speaks volumes. Yet such practices were also prevalent in the 1970s in Kampuchea, where systematic indoctrination of children was a skill of the Khmers Rouges. The phenomenon crops up again if one looks at the conflict in Angola. A further significant example would be the national socialist propaganda fed to Germany’s youth 50 years ago.

Yet, there are indeed children who take up arms of their own volition. Fleeing poverty, a life on the street, begging, fear and threats, their mind’s eye sees a uniform as a mark of prestige, and they desire above all else to be like other children in their position or simply to find some sort of ‘home’. All these aspirations can be exploited by adults, all the more so when a reward or wage is involved. And then there are other factors, too, all undoubtedly more pernicious, rooted deep in the child’s individual and/or collective consciousness. The incentives on offer invite the child to draw on his own experience, on the way in which he perceives the reality which surrounds him: in brief, the political, social, cultural, religious and economic context in which he is growing up. For some, this may be an extremely militarised daily existence, for others an intimate knowledge of violence, either as a victim or as a witness. The list goes on. A typical example is the Intifada’s stone-throwers (even if this is more urban violence than armed struggle). As Sylvie Mansoure rightly puts it: ‘the Palestinian child is condemned to take part in events not only because of his “family history”, but also purely and simply because he is Palestinian and because what is called “the Palestinian problem” persists. Similar thoughts must go through the heads of children in countless other conflicts, the variant perhaps being the moment when the child actually consciously “takes up arms”, this progressive transition from playing at being a soldier to actually being a soldier. There comes a point when everything is possibly in the balance: when the child’s game becomes his protest and he takes his turn at throwing down a challenge in reality’s arena. This is when his action becomes political violence’.

**The return of the warrior ... but a return to where?**

What happens afterwards? What will become of these child soldiers, once the war has ended? Could their return from the front and their laying-down of arms possibly take place smoothly? Alain Louyot writes: ‘Most child soldiers are no more than little urban delinquents whose emotional vulnerability and psychological fragility is poorly concealed by their submachine gun or rocket launcher. The insane world of warfare deprives them of any concept of good and evil – they are prematurely aged and become insensitive adults’.

For many children, the end of a conflict unfortunately does not always signify a happy ending. There are those who stagnate in jail, the reason for their imprisonment long forgotten, just as they are “forgotten” by their recruiters. Others are captured by the enemy, suspected of being terrorists or accused of desertion. They are only ‘kids’, but are physically tortured or summarily executed. Given the usually catastrophic economic and social situation that characterises periods of conflict, for others the long months or even years they
ties are formed during childhood. For most of them, demobilisation bears the psychological nature, given that it is bound to have harmful effects. It is undoubtedly of a psychological nature, given that it is bound to have harmful effects. The effect on any immunisation campaigns.

The most significant after-effects are undoubtedly of a psychological nature, given that it is bound to have harmful effects. The end of a conflict is usually akin to a return to nowhere, accompanied by fear, anxiety and memories of atrocities - a far cry from a hero's return. The Graça Machel report, named after the widow of Mozambique’s first president, mentions that many such children have been physically and sexually maltreated by their comrades-in-arms, most of them also having been forced to take part in murder, rape and other atrocities. It goes on to say that they are ill-equipped for life in peace time and are accustomed to taking what they need by violent means. What is more, many of the children who take part in armed conflict have never been to school. In 1994, the United Nations appointed Mrs Machel as the organisation's expert responsible for drawing up a major report on the effects of armed conflict on children. The report was presented to the UN's General Assembly at its 1996 ordinary session. The effect of war on the psyche of child soldiers will be all the more serious if the happy reunion between the child and its family, village and community does not turn out as expected. Indeed, many have no family left to go back to after they are demobilised, and others are rejected. The authors of _Child Soldiers_ describe instances of Liberian children being banished by their families either because of what they might have done in the past or through fear of violent reprisal for such acts. Violence is often the only point of reference remaining to these children. Violence and its infernal vicious circle.

For many, the road to the recovery of even a minimum of mental well-being and their reintegration into a life without conflict will be a long one, but various reintegration programmes have been set up by local or other NGOs, international bodies (UNICEF) or regional initiatives in order to help them through this long transition. Education is obviously the preferred means of rehabilitation and, in addition to a school building, there is a great need for trained teachers capable of meeting the special needs of these children.

**Prevention, the stock answer**

Reintegration programmes are important, but in the final analysis, the key to solving the problem of child soldiers lies in prevention (as in so many other spheres). Although the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed at the UN in November 1989, establishes childhood as the period up to 18 years of age, it nevertheless acknowledges 15 as the minimum age for voluntary or compulsory recruitment into the armed forces. Pressure is now mounting for a non-binding protocol to the Convention to be signed, raising this minimum age to 18. The Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by 167 nations, but try telling that to the 200,000 child soldiers. As the old refrain goes, all that glitters is not gold. There are other means at people's disposal, however, to solve the problem of squaring the (vicious) circle: protest movements. Targeting governments or any armed forces, such movements, if relentless enough, can sometimes achieve results, as revealed by the Machel Report: 'In Peru, forced recruitment campaigns now appear to be much less common in those areas where they have been reported by the Church. In Myanmar, protests on the part of aid organisations have brought about the release of boys recruited forcibly at a refugee camp. In Sudan, humanitarian organisations have negotiated agreements with opposition groups to prevent the recruitment of children'.

Ultimately, prevention does not depend only on the armed forces. The same report also confirms that the recruitment of children is made much easier when there is no shortage of assault rifles, which are readily available in the international weapons trade.

"War games" in Bosnia. There comes a point when everything is in the balance: when the child's game becomes his protest.
Acting against the sexual abuse of children

by Anita Gradin, European Commissioner

It is now more than a year since 122 representatives of the world’s governments came together in Stockholm with intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies, members of the world’s media and, not least, a delegation of young people, and unanimously adopted the Stockholm Declaration and Agenda for Action to combat the commercial sexual exploitation of children. The declaration sets out objectives and measures for preventing and eradicating this fundamental violation of the rights of the child. It is now being implemented by governments, NGOs and international organisations including the European Union.

The commercial sexual exploitation of children is an industry built on the abuse of power; power that treats children as commodities that can be bought and sold. Its scope is transnational. In almost every country of the world, children are traded as sexual objects. This trade connects small villages with large urban centres; developing countries to each other and to the industrialised countries. It is a trade that crosses borders. Sometimes it is ‘small fry’ as children are exchanged in loosely organised paedophile networks, often as symbols of trust and friendship rather than in exchange for money. In industrialised countries, particularly, children are found ‘selling themselves’ on street corners – forced by circumstance, coerced by third parties or driven by pressures that involve drugs, family break-up and global consumerism. But whether or not money changes hands, the status of the child is the same: this human being, with rights embodied in universal treaties and national laws, is deprived of dignity, identity and humanity.

Although we are still learning about the trade in child sex, we do know that some exploited children and some of the clients who exploit them have been sexually abused in the family. This is why increasingly, since the first World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Stockholm last year, we have also turned our attention to the sexual abuse of children by family members. Irrespective of whether children are used for sex in return for payment, for the profit of an intermediary or simply to be sexually dominated by someone they know or do not know, the result is the same. The child is traumatised by fear and mistrust of adults, often damaged physically, exposed to severe health risks, and robbed of childhood and, indeed, often of a future.

The vast majority of commercially exploited children are girls but victims include a growing number of boys. They are mostly children from poor families from both urban and rural areas. The bulk of them are between the ages of 14 and 18, although there is evidence that the fear of AIDS in some countries has caused a greater demand for ever younger girls. These children are deceived, kidnapped and sold. They are also runaways or children who turn to prostitution to survive, to improve their standard of living, or to increase their access to consumer goods.

Those responsible for sexually exploiting children represent a wide variety of behaviours, origins, and motives. They include customers, intermediaries, recruiters and others who profit from the commercial exploitation of children for sex or who seek illicit pleasure by abusing a child of the family. The vast majority of paying customers are locals, for whom sex with a child may often be a question of availability as much as preference. During the last decade, international tourism for sexual purposes – so-called ‘sex tourism’ – has grown.

The complex web of illegal transactions that constitute sale and trafficking frequently include bribery and abduction, false identification and documentation, sham marriages and adoptions, illegal immigration, violence and bonded labour. Many trafficked children are from poor, rural and remote areas where they and their families are least likely to understand the true nature of the risks and consequences involved and are more easily deceived. Taken to an unfamiliar area, such children are completely dependent on the trafficker and, thus, are easier to control. Isolated by language and without identity papers, they are vulnerable to exposure and arrest as illegal immigrants if they try to escape.

Inadequately protected due to loopholes in legislation or lax implementation of laws, such children are often treated as criminals and left with little recourse other than to re-enter the vicious cycle of abuse and exploitation at a constantly increasing level of risk to their life. Because this sexual trade in children is always illegal, it is not easy to collect information on its extent. Nevertheless, data from agencies working in child rights for many years provide a range of figures which clearly indicate that the problem is growing.

In the run-up to the Stockholm Congress, during the Congress itself, and in the months since, we have gradually built up our knowledge of the causes, nature of and responses to both commercial sexual
exploitation and domestic sexual abuse of children. And we have made enormous strides in the active fight against these violations of children's rights.

Police cooperation has led to the arrest and conviction of highly organised suppliers and distributors of the lucrative commodity that is child pornography. Clients of these traders in child flesh have also been targeted, bringing to our attention the fact that many of the people who collaborate in perpetuating child pornography are indistinguishable from the so-called 'man in the street'.

Extensive work has been undertaken to understand how the abuse of new technologies such as the Internet, which exploit children across frontiers, can be prevented. Above all, the use of children for sexual purposes, whether commercially or for personal sexual gratification, has been recognised as a fundamental violation of their rights as human beings and specifically as children. There is also agreement that the full weight of the law should be brought to bear against it.

Some may argue that this, nonetheless, only begins to scratch the surface of the phenomenon of sexual exploitation of children. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, whose 'birth' in 1989 was a milestone in the fight to recognise that children have rights that deserve and demand protection, has achieved near-universal ratification. And seven years ago, at the World Summit for Children, governments underscored their commitment to those rights. But despite this, the sexual abuse and exploitation of children has grown and spread.

Awareness and understanding of the phenomenon have undoubtedly increased. However there are still daily reports of children being sexually used by adults – more often, in more countries and in more ways. It is a sad truth that the opening of borders, the increasingly global nature of consumerism, the spread of mass media and the breaking-down of cultural values, structures and family protection mechanisms have made thousands of children more vulnerable to abuse by those who look on them as no more than chattels to be sold for commercial gain, or used for personal pleasure. Such factors add to the vulnerability already caused by poverty, the status of the girl child and the breakdown of the family in the wake of unemployment, uprooting, drug and alcohol abuse and other elements of social malaise.

The fight against this horrendous violation of children's rights is high on the European Community's agenda. Follow-up to the commitments European participants made at the World Congress in Stockholm last year has encompassed concrete, collaborative steps towards fulfilling the Agenda for Action in a number of fields.

As early as the end of September 1996, I presented an aide memoire identifying a number of areas where action was needed or had already begun. On 16 October 1996, the Commission issued a Communication on illegal and harmful content on the Internet, and a Green Book on protection of children and human dignity in the field of audiovisual services. Abuse of the Internet and other audiovisual media cannot be prevented by national borders. The two initiatives are being followed up by further action such as promoting self regulation of the sectors.

In October 1996, the Commission set out a strategy specifically targeting child sex tourism. This is now being implemented. It aims at reducing demand, in particular, through awareness-raising campaigns. It is also addressing the source of supply in the countries of destination. Cooperation with NGOs is important here.

As regards child sex tourism, the extraterritorial effect of legislation is particularly important. This provides for offenders to be tried in their own countries for sexual crimes against children committed overseas.

It has been shown to be a significant deterrent to paedophiles and simple 'pleasure-seekers' who think that by travelling to an exotic or unfamiliar culture they are somehow 'liberated' from the norms of acceptable social behaviour.

In November last year, a significant step forward was taken in this area. The EU Member States agreed on joint action whereby the sexual exploitation of children – in all forms – will be regarded as a criminal offence. They also agreed that, under certain conditions, legislation would have extraterritorial effect. These measures will provide an efficient tool in the fight against sex tourism.

A number of horizontal instruments have been adopted in the field of justice and home affairs, facilitating police and judicial cooperation in combating international trafficking in children for sexual exploitation and aimed at breaking up international networks which exploit children for sexual purposes. The extension of the mandate of EUROPOL's Drugs Unit to include trafficking in human beings is one example. The creation of a centre of excellence in the form of a directory of national experts in the field, available to assist in other Member States, is another.

An important prerequisite for more intensive cooperation is the development of networks between people active in the fight against the trade in human beings and the sexual exploitation of children. This is the aim of the STOP programme adopted in November 1996. It covers projects involving mainly public bodies and public officials.

In the spirit of the Declaration and Agenda for Action, moreover, the Community has gone beyond governmental action and has actively sought partnerships with agencies such as UNICEF and NGOs who are at the forefront of the fight for children's rights. The DAPHNE initiative launched in 1997 plays an important role in this respect, providing finance for projects run by NGOs and voluntary organisations.

Disconcertingly, however, while the Community has been to some extent in the forefront of tangible action against sexual exploitation of children, reports indicate that Europe is increasingly becoming a centre of such exploitation.
Some countries in Eastern Europe offer all the necessary conditions for the sexual exploitation of children to prosper. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of Communist social infrastructures have, in some countries, left a gap into which vulnerable children have fallen headlong. Parents who were themselves raised under the all-encompassing socialist system have not developed the child protection and nurturing skills needed to fill the gap.

As a result, many children are left vulnerable. Excluded from the formal education system by the inability to pay newly introduced fees, or because no one checks on truancy rates, they join the growing numbers of children who spend their time on the streets. At the same time, increasing drug and alcohol abuse, in the context of loose parental controls, inadequate social monitoring and economic hardship, means that many of the children of Eastern Europe’s poorer countries are ‘ripe for the picking’ when paedophiles or criminal intermediaries move in.

This is an alarming development. Already assistance is given in programmes such as PHARE and TACIS for efforts to prevent sexual exploitation and to rehabilitate child victims. These efforts should be further strengthened.

For the future, we need to continue in our efforts to implement the agenda for action that came out of the Stockholm World Congress. We should do it bearing in mind that for too long the issue of the sexual exploitation of children has been hushed up. We can no longer ignore the fact that children’s rights are an integral part of human rights. We must therefore do our utmost to ensure that children are given a safe and secure upbringing, free from sexual exploitation or abuse.

For this to happen, national or local measures are not enough. Coordinated measures at the European level have an important role to play. We must make use of all the means at our disposal. This is precisely what I intend to do in addressing these matters.

A.G.

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**Lesotho's herdboys**

*Freelance journalist in Lesotho. Former editor-in-chief of the Mirror newspaper. Article from Gemini News Service, 9 White Lion Street, London N1 9PD.*

Educated and professional women outnumber their male counterparts in Lesotho because so many boys have to look after livestock and miss out on school. But with high unemployment posing a growing problem, reports Gemini News Service, an attempt is being made to take classes up into the pastures.

A nationwide drive is trying to tackle Lesotho’s unusual literacy problem — more boys than girls cannot read or write. The situation has arisen because most boys between the ages of 7 and 15 herd livestock and miss out on formal education. Their work is hard and they face dangers from severe weather, thieves and wild animals. Most of the boys are from poor backgrounds and are compelled to work to assist their families. They are often employed by wealthier people with large herds to graze. When they grow older and finish herding, they face difficulty finding work because they have few other skills to fall back on in a country of high unemployment.

The herdboys take on a heavy responsibility. Cows — ‘the god with a wet nose’, as they are called in an old proverb — are vital to many people’s survival in the small, mountainous Southern African kingdom. Cows are used for transportation and to cultivate fields. They provide nourishing milk and their flesh is essential at feasts and weddings. The hide is used for clothing, rope, sандals and drums. Cows are an essential component of the lobola, or bride price, and in the settlement of disputes. A death is normally marked by the slaughter of a cow.

**Long spells away from home**

Boys as young as seven herd the precious animals across the rugged plateaux in search of fresh pastures. Carrying the basic necessities of life wrapped in small bundles, the young herdsmen — sometimes in groups of two or three — leave home for weeks or months on end. They sleep in the fields when the weather is good and seek shelter in caves when it is bad. They live on mealie-meal flour provided by the livestock’s owners, and supplement their diets by hunting for rabbits, birds and rodents. They also eat wild fruit and, if they are lucky, honey. Loneliness is a big problem as they work in isolation up in the hills.

‘It takes me two days to travel from my master’s cattle-post at Mothiane,’ says 14-year-old Lehlohonolo. Sengoara Nthonyana thinks it is bad for herdboys to be alone, as he is. ‘If there are two or more herd­boys they can at least take turns to check the animals at night,’ he says. Sengoara has to wake up every couple of hours to see that his boss’s cows, sheep and goats are safe. ‘If a boy slackens in his watch he may wake up to find that two or more of his animals have been killed in the night,’ says Sengoara. This means deductions from salary, ‘or even worse — deduction and dismissal’. Sengoara single-handedly looks after 700 sheep and 72 cattle, earning only 700 maloti (ECU 135) or one cow a year — ‘that is if I stay on duty until the end of the last month of the year’, he points out. ‘If the boss decides to fire me before that, then it’s hard luck.’

**Dangers**

Loneliness and poor wages are not the only problems: there are real dangers in the mountains. In 1996, when strong winds and heavy snowfall battered the highlands, seven herdboys perished in the Maluti range after being stranded with their animals. They died of cold and hunger, isolated from their families and friends. More than 75 others suffered seriously from exposure.

Herdboys have little chance of attracting help if they fall victim...
to illness or attacks by wild animals or humans. 'The boys have to check constantly through the night that their animals are safe from thieves and predators,' says one boy, Moholi. 'They use stones to scare off the jackals.' Yet most herdboys do not complain about their lives. They have been taught that their lifestyle is part of becoming a man.

**Aim to boost literacy**

Because of the work, the illiteracy rate for males over 15 is as high as 60% in some areas, compared with 11% for females. A few boys with younger brothers are able to hand over the task of herding while they are still of school-going age. To improve the situation, a literacy network is being developed. With support and funding from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Lesotho Distance Teaching Centre coordinates the activities, with the aim of increasing the literacy rate by 20% by the end of the decade. As well as organising village classes, the centre runs an 'Each One, Teach One' scheme, which encourages boys with a little education to take basic teaching materials into the hills to share with their friends. The centre has 'learning-post administrators' in almost all villages, staffed by primary school teachers or literate volunteers.

About 700 herdboys graduated from the programme last year, a remarkable achievement considering that most can study at home only during the planting season. Girls, on the other hand, tend to go to school and stay there. So there are more educated and professional women than men in Lesotho – a rare state of affairs for any country.

**Fewer jobs in South African mines**

The gap is gradually being bridged as more families move to towns and more boys go to school. Change is essential, as former herdboys can no longer rely on jobs in neighbouring South Africa. Illiteracy was not seen as a problem when a boy could count on a job in a South African gold mine upon reaching adulthood. While almost 125,000 men still work in the mines, South Africa is now cutting back on foreign labour and the consequences for the Lesotho economy, and for ordinary households, could be very serious. Boys will need to be able to read and write, and to acquire marketable skills, if they are to survive in the new Lesotho.
Schooling for girls lags behind

by Flore Murard*

More than two thirds of the 140 million children not receiving primary education in developing countries are girls. Despite the fact that the number of children attending school over the last 30 years is broadly on the increase, it is boys who have benefited most. To a considerable extent, girls are still excluded from the education system, the instruction they receive being haphazard and subject to a wide range of constraints. Many leave school without being able to read or write the official or national language of their country, and such illiteracy has a permanent effect on their personal and social development, making them 'second-class' citizens.

'All sex discrimination in education must be abolished', according to the World Declaration on Education which was ratified in Jomtien (Thailand) in March 1990. That objective still remains to be achieved. Disparity between the sexes in primary education persists in many countries. In the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, for example, 20% to 25 % fewer girls than boys attend school, the differences being particularly marked in Yemen, Togo and Nigeria. In Senegal, almost half the girls of school age do not receive an education, and the figures are even higher in rural areas. Southern Asia is where girls seem to get the best chance, with Pakistan, India and Nepal recording the highest rates of female participation in education.

The numerical discrepancy is only one aspect of the inequality which exists between the sexes.

Girls also attend school, on average, for less time than boys. Often, they receive just a couple of years of formal education, leaving before they have mastered the basics of the 'three Rs'.

A catalogue of impediments to girls' academic prospects

The reasons for this situation are complex and vary from culture to culture, but there are a number of points in common. The first is poverty. If a family's income is low, the son is normally chosen to attend school rather than the daughter. The latter is more likely to have family responsibilities, fulfilling often essential tasks. As such, she is an 'asset' which her parents are reluctant to give up. The non-financial cost of sending her to school may be crippling.

Furthermore, girls can create more demands where education is concerned. Apart from books and other equipment, they have to have suitable clothing, a uniform often still being compulsory in many schools. They are also seen as more vulnerable and less able to protect themselves (for example, more exposed to danger travelling to school). Distance between home and school, and the scarcity of schools in rural areas, are thus important factors when it comes to deciding whether female children receive any kind of education at all.

While financial or physical difficulties are significant, they are not the only reasons for school under-attendance by girls. Education is also an area which is influenced by powerful cultural constraints. The question posed by many parents in developing countries is: 'Why should we provide an education for our daughters? In their eyes, the exercise may be pointless given the perceived female role in society. Despite historical trends and socio-economic developments, the age-old distribution of tasks between the sexes has by no means disappeared in certain countries. This is what is subtly implied when reference is made in conversation to 'traditions' or 'customs' (i.e. arrangements which tend to perpetuate sexual inequalities). The image, place and future of a female child are still subject to restrictive structures, and primarily to a patriarchal system. There is a Nigerian lullaby whose refrain is 'Oh, no, my birth will afford me no happiness or reward': What prospects are there when attitudes are so ingrained?

Education for girls, therefore, is often given grudgingly, and in some places, it is provided mainly by the family or social group. This lack of an academic culture, which is so pronounced in rural areas, is one of the biggest obstacles to girls' academic success.

The image of the school as an alien institution - in conflict with family values - also has an effect on a girl's own perception of her education. She may see learning as being valueless, incompatible with parental models and sometimes, therefore, not worth the effort. Surveys have demonstrated that many young girls' lack of motivation is due to low self-image - they do not regard themselves as competent. Such internalisation of problems only adds to the many other difficulties facing a girl who attends school.

Dropping out

If a girl has the opportunity to go to school, she is often torn between her academic and domestic duties. In Nepal, for example, the housework carried out by a girl of between six and 12 years of age may account for up to one third of her daily routine, leaving little time for study. The specific restrictions on girls are such that their life outside the learning environment often takes priority, and they drop out of school. This is a common feature of education sys-

* Geographer.
tems in developing countries, and it affects girls more than boys because the former are more restricted by the norms of society, to which they have to conform.

For many reasons, attendance at school may come late in childhood and academic years have to be repeated. It is not unusual, accordingly, for adolescent girls to be found still in primary school. They then face the consequences of puberty — including pregnancy and marriage — and the conditions leading to the abandonment of their academic career are then in place. Marriage at an early age takes girls away from school at a time when their capacity for learning is at its height: In countries such as Nigeria and Bangladesh, 70% of girls aged between 9 and 15 drop out of the system.

Thus, the key problem of education for girls is not so much their failure to attend school during the early years, but rather the process of progressive exclusion from the education system thereafter. As a result, women are less likely to have the habit of learning — the system is ill-adapted both to the rhythms governing their lives and to their requirements.

One possible way of tackling this problem is to devise a more flexible system which fits in better with the rhythms of a girl's life and does not conflict with the demands placed on female children outside school. An approach which includes a flexible timetable, employing female teachers and gaining the agreement of families, has already produced results in rural communities in Bangladesh and Nepal (the Chéli-Bhéti Programme). These innovative experiments in non-formal education are particularly effective when the community as a whole actively supports them and takes part in them — as has been seen in Benin. This type of education enables those on the fringes — girls in isolated rural areas, street children and those restricted to the home environment — to be incorporated into the system.

For girls to attend school, a total social process must be in place, involving the entire community and with the latter's full support. The key to making education more widely available to girls lies at local level.

An essential investment

The role of education in development and, more particularly, the place of women in development, attracts a lot of international attention. In most developing countries, women have a crucial role in the production system — particularly in the areas of craft, trade and agriculture. In Africa, women account for more than half of those working in farming and they have made a huge contribution to improving subsistence agriculture at the level of the family unit. A woman's level of education is also decisive in terms of her children's nutrition, healthcare and general chances of survival. If a woman has had an education, infant mortality is halved. Likewise, late marriages and the use of contraceptives are more common when academic levels are higher. To educate women is, therefore, to provide a number of solutions to major issues such as halting population growth.

More fundamentally, however, an education gives them back their right to take on projects for themselves and to build the life they themselves choose. In short, education teaches women how to live as women.
Haiti’s invisible workers

With the recent international conference in Oslo, the issue of child labour has been attracting unprecedented interest. But media attention has concentrated mainly on the more extreme forms of exploitation, ignoring the less conspicuous practice of employing children in domestic service (often involving very 'hard labour'). This practice is widespread in certain countries.

For a long time this was the least known form of child exploitation, taking place as it does within the home and on a purely private basis. It is, however, one of the most common types of exploitation throughout the world. Although the phenomenon can be seen on every continent, it is particularly prevalent in Southern and south-east Asia (Bangladesh, Nepal, the Philippines and Indonesia), in East and West Africa (Kenya, Togo, Senegal), and in Central America and the Caribbean. Recent local surveys have revealed the extent of the problem and the way in which it has become more widespread over the last decade.

In Haiti, approximately 250,000 children, 20% of whom are aged between 7 and 10 years¹, are in domestic service. This represents between 11% and 14% of the child population (with a higher proportion of girls). The figures are estimates, of course, because, by the very nature of the activity, it is difficult to determine the full extent of the exploitation that is taking place. It is, in effect, a 'hidden' activity that is not reported. It is also difficult to categorise because it depends on one's definition of 'domestic'. A child placed in the home of a stranger may be easily labelled as a 'domestic servant'. But what of one living (and labouring) in the home of a relative, or in the home of a stranger? But what of one living with his or her natural parents but obliged to do full-time work in the household?

Domestic work is a social phenomenon which is widespread in Haitian society – and this makes it difficult to outlaw it.

The underlying factors

Originally a rural phenomenon, domestic service in this Caribbean country arose out of the crisis in traditional rural society, fuelled by population growth. A further contributory factor was the forced emigration of young people to the towns and cities. Lack of money and low academic levels, in a population where 50% is under 15 years of age, force children out into the world early, as they attempt to boost their family incomes.

There are, therefore, several underlying factors – economic crisis, uncontrolled urban growth and crisis in the educational system. The inability of academic structures to accept everyone of school-age population and the lack of adequate, free instruction for children, leads poor families to try their luck in this informal urban sector.

Under the traditional system, families anxious to reduce the number of mouths they have to feed, 'place' one or more of their children elsewhere, where they often have a better chance of survival. The trade-off is that they receive board, lodging and clothing in return for domestic services. For the youngsters, this amounts to a form of 'sponsorship'. It is not unlike the African custom of the 'loan' whereby one or two daughters were 'entrusted' to other members of the family who were able to provide for them in a way that was beyond their own parents. This intra-family household assistance is now becoming less common in Haiti – and is being replaced by a poorly supervised system in which the work is extremely tiring and often lasts longer than the statutory working day.

The 'foster parents' can put the children to work as they wish, in exchange, more often than not, for remuneration in kind rather than in cash. The children are responsible for various tasks: preparing the fire, cleaning the kitchen, fetching water, and other general household chores. In short, they take care of everything. Nutrition and access to basic healthcare are provided at the family's discretion. Such children rank lower than any member of the family and must provide any service required, including sadly in some cases, sexual 'services'.

The category of children that are most poorly treated are the 'restavek' (which means 'who lives with' in Creole). These are the youngsters whose families have no blood ties or other close links with the foster family. Such children are most open to abuse. Where there is a family relationship, the domestic servant in question is known as a 'Pitik kay' ('child of the house'). This status provides greater protection.

In all cases, the absence of a written contract and the informal way in which the children are hired (through intermediaries) condemns them to servitude, however. There are a number of local organisations, such as the Maurice-Sixto Centre in Port-au-Prince (or the Enda Tiens-Monde team in Dakar) which work with these young household workers and which are attempting to educate them about their rights and interests. Legislation needs to be improved, however, to help them gain the protection of the authorities – who have up to now, tended not to intervene.

Attendance at school is the core of the problem. The obligation to provide for education was one of the traditional terms of the old customary contract, but this promise rapidly became little more than a decoy. Either the child received no education (as is the case of 50% of domestic servants from the countryside), or schooling took place under deplorable conditions. Incompatible timetables, the constraints of homework, and fatigue meant that the schooling was random to say the least. The results were thus mediocre and failure was practically guaranteed. Some programmes have set up a system to provide education outside the school environment (special evening classes), but the results of these are still not very encouraging. The children suffer from illness and psychological disorders (according to one employee at the Maurice-Sixto Centre in Port-au-Prince, 80% of children are ill).

As a result, these young people in domestic service have few opportunities or prospects. Sadly, their employment perpetuates their lack of education, and the result is that underdevelopment persists.

ChildHope

Working for street children

by Nicolas Fenton*

My work on behalf of street children is based on two separate but interlinking sets of experiences. Before ChildHope was established in 1989-90, my previous post, which I held for eleven years, was as Director of 'Centrepoint', an NGO which works in London with and for young homeless people. It provides a range of services for marginalised youth, including a night shelter in the heart of the city, a safe house for under-age runaways, and follow up accommodation with independent living apartments. The project works closely with other NGOs operating in London, especially those offering day centre and outreach services. More recently it has established a key partnership with central and local government - undertaking work as part of an integrated approach to resolving the issue of youth homelessness.

The experience gained working on the front line with youth homelessness in a western European capital city provides me with an unusual but excellent scenario for the work that ChildHope now does with street children in countries outside the UK. I shall return to this later in the article.

The term 'street child' is used to describe children and young people who live and/or work on the streets and in other urban spaces - which include empty buildings and wasteland. In the developing world, and in Central and Eastern Europe, street children come from families that live in extreme poverty, although in industrialised countries, this may not always be the case.

Broadly speaking, there are two categories of street children - those who work on the street but sleep in a home environment and maintain strong and significant contact with their families, and those who live on the street and have limited or no family contacts. There are also children who are at risk, those held in prisons or other institutions, and those whose living conditions contravene the Convention on the Rights of the Child. As for the numbers of street children, no accurate or provable figures exist on a global basis. The general view is that we are talking about several million, and if one adds to this children who are working and 'owned' by their employers, the numbers swell alarmingly. One should, of course, also include those employed in illegal or marginal activities such as begging, theft or survival sex.

ChildHope is working in partnership with a growing number of NGOs to improve the lives and defend the rights of street children worldwide. Relationships have been formed with local groups, and one of our main objectives is to help increase their capacity to respond directly to the needs of the street children in their communities.

We are also linked to other independent ChildHope offices in Brazil, Guatemala, the Philippines and the USA. ChildHope has adopted a number of principles since its establishment, and is continually reviewing these as it develops its activities and learns from experiences (both successes and failures).

One of the guiding principles is that ChildHope cannot and should not work alone in trying to assist children. There are a number of reasons for this. First, it is, by design, a small NGO. The office in London is staffed by a team of paid staff and volunteers, and there is a Board of Trustees who serve on a voluntary basis. As a British-based NGO, ChildHope depends on the commitment, skills and local understanding of its partners to establish and develop good working practices in a way that takes account of the culture, language and local specificities of the country in question. Thus, all of the projects are staffed by local people. This is important since we believe it goes some way towards reducing dependency on outside bodies. ChildHope is currently working in Brazil, the Philippines, Kenya, South Africa, and an increasing number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Many of its projects are supported by funding arrangements with the European Commission.

ChildHope assistance in helping set up projects is offered in a structured way, which we hope, allows for a 'bottom-up' approach. From the beginning, we try to establish a modus operandi with our partners, and to set out the different roles and responsibilities of each.

Although there is a strong commitment to do something positive to help street children, it is often the case that local groups...
have no hands-on experience of what is difficult and sometimes highly stressful work. ChildHope is able to suggest proven ways of working which could be adopted at local level. These ideas are usually drawn from experience gained working in other countries in the region but, in some cases, even experience of working in London may have a direct relevance. The difference between running a shelter in the middle of London for a teenager desperately in need of comfort, food and perhaps personal support, and running a similar project for his 'younger brother' in somewhere like Manila, may be quite small. The same working methods could well apply. ChildHope is in a unique position to guide the proposed project in a way that prevents mistakes from being repeated. Of course, projects in Western Europe do have the distinct advantage of having access to a wide range of other resources. With all its deficiencies, a western European country will nonetheless have a tried and tested education service, health, housing and social benefit systems.

We strongly suggest that before a project is started, the people responsible look at what is already being done by other groups, and identify where there are still gaps in provision. Competition between NGOs can have disastrous effects on the welfare of their potential beneficiaries. ChildHope also tries to point out that if a project for street children is to succeed, it must have a number of key attributes. These are well-known but are worth repeating.

Wherever possible, they should take account of the expressed needs of the children themselves. Street children are no different from other young people in their immediate physical and emotional needs. It is their circumstances which are different. Their saga has been well-documented by the world’s media, and by activists who work regularly with them. They may be disconnected from or abused by their families, not attending school because they are the sole providers of the family income, taking care of younger children, addicted to solvents, suffering from eating bad food, lacking access to medical help when they get sick, in trouble with the police at an early age, and prone to sexual exploitation.

Opening a project for street children has major personal implications – for the children and the carers alike. ChildHope offers help in the careful planning of projects that do not inadvertently harm the children, providing them with what they need, and what they have a right to expect.

This technical assistance is provided by specialist advisors who work in the field of childcare management. In addition, we stress the importance of ensuring that projects should not inflate children’s expectations beyond objectives which are realistic and manageable.

There is little point in opening a massive building to accommodate 300 children. The very size of such an institution will prevent the personal, ‘one to one’ approach that the children need. In fact, the operating costs of this type of project are such that, nowadays, they are unlikely to attract donors.

It is a large and complex problem and NGOs are, of course, only one factor in the equation. If they are to have any lasting impact, they need to persuade local and central governments to stop the persecution of children and put sufficient funds into supporting families so that their children are not forced on to the streets to survive. Equally important are sustainable partnerships. These need to be created and maintained between local groups, communities and the authorities. In this way, the number of ‘stakeholders’ is increased and the problem is not just left to ‘someone else’.

In the first instance, the NGOs’ role has been to respond to the needs of street children (largely in the absence of an official response), to indicate that there are workable alternatives, and to show that given clear objectives, the children’s lives can be changed for the better. Once the first hurdles have been overcome, we believe that effective liaison can be created between the NGOs and the authorities. The most successful arrangements have been where the central government, through the appropriate ministry, has recognised the rights of children.
decided to include resources for them within main government programmes, and financially supported the NGO projects.

This is what has happened in the UK, although the process did take fifteen years, and youth homelessness had already reached a crisis point. It seems that preventive approaches are rare. In countries such as Brazil and the Philippines, the problem reached almost epidemic proportions before there was any significant official response, and it is clear that the world’s media have an important part to play in alerting the public to the situation.

It is not possible here to go into detail about the methods that have worked in tackling the problem of street children. This is partly because each region and country has adopted its own particular approach. The chart, however, indicates broadly how NGOs usually approach the issue. It also shows an important additional element, namely that there should be a clear process, involving a series of stages — allowing a child to move away from the street into a safer environment, then to more secure accommodation, and then possibly back home or on to independent living.

An increasing problem for children is that when they reach a certain age (say 18), they may then be considered adult and able to fend for themselves. This may not be a correct assessment, especially where there is psychological damage that needs a long time to heal. Then there is the question of acquiring the life skills needed to achieve independence. Providing young people with the requisite education and work skills is now a major feature in a number of projects that ChildHope supports.

The question of financing is a major issue that ChildHope and its partners have to face right from the beginning. While it is easy to show that a well-run project for street children is much better than classic ‘institutionalisation’, or the repressive penal approach still adopted by some states, it is a hard battle to find the money to pay the capital and operating costs. The schemes that ChildHope has helped set up need funding over a number of years, and each year brings increasing competition for finite funds. The approach of most major donors, which is to fund a project for a year or two and hope that someone else will foot the bill after that, appears rather short-sighted. In most developing countries and even in those in transition, governments have so many other priorities, that the needs of street children often drop to the bottom of the pile.

Sustainability is, of course, a key aim for most NGOs, but the reality is that the bulk of projects do not have significant money-raising capacity, or the opportunity to create funding relationships with corporations or foundations. ChildHope is concerned about this, especially as many of our partner NGOs have shown that the work they do for children provides unique added value in a neglected field.

Another challenge facing ChildHope and its partners is how we can best share the methodology of the various approaches adopted in different projects. In an ideal world, the NGOs should have the resources and time to meet together, observe each other’s operations and exchange experiences. To date, ChildHope has not been able to fund this kind of arrangement adequately, although it has done so on a limited basis.

We have recently helped set up the European Network for Street Children which is based in Brussels. One of its aims is to make this kind of mutual contact possible. Thus, for example, street educators in Cape Town might undertake exchange visits for two or three weeks with their colleagues from Manila or Sofia. They would surely have much to tell each other, and much to take home and share with their own teams.

Ultimately, street children themselves could take advantage of such arrangements, sharing their experiences of being cared for in different projects, and perhaps in their own time and way, becoming involved in the next generation of carers. In the final analysis, an organisation like ChildHope, with EC support, can only do so much. With luck, and a lot of hard work, it can show the way but we need the total commitment of many more actors in the system if we are to have a lasting impact on the terrible and unacceptable situation that faces the ‘child of the street.’

N.F.
Young people are the driving force of development - with or without Lomé

by Marisa Atienza and Bénédicte Walter

How do young people fare under the Lomé Convention? We present a critical point of view from the 'Youth Forum' (an umbrella body of youth-oriented NGOs). The Convention, the writers claim, contains good intentions but is deficient when it comes to practical application. They go on to highlight some positive efforts to involve young people as actors in development.

Although in absolute terms, southern Asia tops the 'famine' table, sub-Saharan Africa has the unhappy distinction of coming first in levels of malnutrition, and these are on the increase. If nothing is done between now and 2010, it is estimated that by then, 300 million people in the region will be under-nourished (the figure for the period 1990-1992 was 200 million) – and that the majority of these will be young children. Most societies affected by famine define the child as a separate entity from the adult, and establish the age (with its 'initiation rites') which marks the passage to adulthood. This creates a problem, because childhood is perceived very differently from one country to another. It may be regarded as coming to an end at any age between 12 and 25 depending on the society in question. In an attempt to even out the discrepancy, Article 1 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as any human being under 18. 60% of the population in the ACP states is under 25 and, although the Lomé Convention does make reference to young people, but these have never been fully applied. Article 143, for example, says that the involvement of young people in economic, cultural and social development should be taken into account in the appraisal of all projects and programmes. Article 144 encourages measures to improve the situation of young people, and Article 148 urges that contacts and meetings between groups of young people from ACP states and EU countries should be promoted. However, these articles have not been developed beyond the stage of a declaration of intent.

Furthermore, in their attempts to use the tools available to them under Lomé, to increase their involvement in development programmes, youth organisations come up against a lack of information, expertise and political will.

In theory, the Convention gives youth organisations scope for involvement in micro-projects or decentralised cooperation. More specifically, micro-projects (Articles 252 and 253 of the Convention),

What is the Youth Forum?
The Youth Forum is an international organisation founded in 1996 by the National Youth Councils and the International Non-Governmental Youth Organisations. It currently has more than 100 members throughout Europe.

The Forum works through various bodies and organisations to promote issues affecting young people in Europe vis-à-vis the European Union, the Council of Europe, the United Nations and other political decision-makers. The Youth Forum also aims to support and coordinate the work of its member-organisations.

The Youth Forum aims to:
- be consulted by international institutions regarding all matters of interest to young people and youth organisations;
- promote the integration of youth policy into overall policy;
- influence the policy decisions of international institutions regarding issues affecting the younger generation;
- increase the involvement of young people and youth organisations in decision-making processes;
- promote the development of mutual understanding and the campaign for equal rights;
- support and coordinate the work of its member-organisations.

What does the Youth Forum do?
The Forum works to promote the rights of young people in Europe with a view to setting up a political dialogue with European institutions and other political decision-makers at European level. Its role extends to other regions of the world and also to other organisations such as the UN and its specialised agencies. The European Youth Forum also provides services to its member-organisations. Lastly, it organises public-awareness campaigns on certain issues, conducts research and provides information on problems affecting young people.
which have an economic and social impact on the life of local people and in which the community participates, offer youth organisations the opportunity to secure funding for projects such as the promotion of independent work or the setting-up of young farmers’ cooperatives.

In practice, however, most ACP youth organisations were not involved in a dialogue with their governments when the national indicative programmes were drawn up in 1995. As a result, it has not been possible to take the concerns of the young into account in national priorities.

As far as decentralised cooperation is concerned (Articles 251a, b, c, d and e), the Convention provides that ACP youth organisations should be able to contact the EU delegation in their country to discuss cofinancing opportunities. But those organisations that are likely to be eligible for funding are either unaware of what is on offer or have no information as to where to apply for it. Moreover, in purely practical terms, provincial organisations may have difficulty contacting the EU delegations located in ACP national capitals. What has happened to the lofty ideals of decentralised cooperation?

Finally, the four resolutions adopted at the ACP-EU Joint Assembly in Dakar in February 1995, which called for the Lomé provisions to be adapted to issues concerning the young, to enable them to take a more active role in decentralised cooperation between the ACPs and the EC, have not been applied. The same is true of a resolution adopted by the Windhoek Joint Assembly in March 1996. This calls for the integration of young ACP and EU graduates into their chosen profession, for meetings between young people and for school-twinning in the context of decentralised cooperation.

In theory, the Lomé Convention is a framework for cooperation between young people in the ACP states and the EU, but, in practice, they encounter huge obstacles when they attempt to expand their activities or find a platform for self-expression. The possibilities offered to youth organisations under the Convention are thus largely under-exploited.

European Commissioner Professor Pinheiro stated at the Dakar Joint Assembly that although there was no specific chapter devoted to young people in Lomé, there was nothing to prevent the setting up of programmes that applied specifically to them.

In reality, such programmes only exist on the drawing-board. Young people, however, have not let a lack of political will stand in their way, and a number of youth organisations have taken the initiative, becoming involved in development and cooperation projects. These include, in particular, pilot projects under Action D of the Youth for Europe programme.

Twenty-seven leaders representing European youth organisations made a 12-day study visit to Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa. The visit was organised by the national youth councils of Denmark (DUF), Portugal (CNJ), Sweden (LSU) and Norway (LNU) in collaboration with their counterparts in Namibia and Mozambique and in the culture South Africa. It led to a strengthening of relations between African youth structures (South/South) and between European and African youth organisations (North/South). The intention of the European youth representatives was to lend their support to the establishment of youth-based structures to represent all of Africa’s young people. After the visit, those who took part organised meetings between European and African youth leaders, and the South Africans decided to resurrect the existing network of youth organisations in their country.

International Christian Youth Exchanges (ICYE) enabled 25 European and African youth leaders to take part in a training programme in connection with European/African voluntary-service exchanges, in October 1996 in Nairobi. This course took stock of exchanges of volunteers between Europe and Africa and prepared the young volunteers for the ‘culture shock’ awaiting them in their host country. The main aim, however, of the youth leaders was to make recommendations to the European Commission regarding the stepping-up of European/Africa cooperation in the youth sector, particularly in the context of EU/ACP relations and the European Voluntary Service.

Scout movements in countries in the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo) have set up training modules to address a number of issues which include psychological trauma, conflict management and the promotion of peace and tolerance. These are aimed at training personnel and representatives from their organisations. With support from Scout movements in Belgium, Germany and France, they have continued the work started on the outbreak of civil war in camps for refugees and displaced persons, working closely with people returning to their own countries. They have also set up a campaign to help street children, by reopening reception and training centres, with support from Unicef and the UNHCR.

Young people do indeed have a role to play in cooperation and development. This should be acknowledged by full implementation of existing provisions and resolutions, and in a specific article dealing with the young in any future Convention. Young people are not simply recipients of aid. They are a vital driving force in development.

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1 ‘Pilot’ projects because, in principle, Action D does not provide funding for youth exchanges between ACP States and Member States of the European Community.

2 For further information, please contact the Danish National Youth Council: DUF, Søren Fuglsangsgade 5, DK2100, Kobenhavn Ø, Denmark. Tel: 45-39 298 888; fax: 45-39 298 382; e-mail: duf@dok.net"
How structural adjustment can benefit education

by Bartolomé Amat*

Structural adjustment refers to a process of major reorganisation needed to overcome economic crisis and imbalances caused by internal or external shocks, and past mismanagement of the economy. The immediate objective of structural adjustment policies is to restore the macro-economic balance, both internal and external. Over the longer term, the aim is to improve resource allocation and economic incentives (prices, wages and salaries), and to increase competition by reducing or eliminating protectionism and other factors leading to market distortions. The ultimate goal is to increase growth, improve public services, and reduce poverty.

Whilst the specific mix of policies will vary from one setting to another, this economic reorganisation is likely to include currency devaluation, reducing budget deficits (for example, by cutting public spending and increasing tax and non-tax revenues, including fees and charges) and reducing subsidies – especially to consumers – in order to modify production incentives in favour of exports. It may also entail reducing or eliminating price controls to bring domestic prices closer to those on the world market, revising trade policies to reduce protection against imports, and refocusing the role of the state on providing essential public services. Finally, institutional reforms are likely to be needed to boost the efficiency and effectiveness of public services.

Government reform policies are frequently presented in the form of a Policy Framework Paper which has been agreed with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Financial support for structural adjustment, often in the form of balance of payments support, usually generates counterpart funds for the government which mitigate the harshness of fiscal measures and help sustain or improve essential services.

Impact on education

Clearly, if one aim of an SAP is to reduce overall public expenditure, this will have an impact on how budgets are allocated both within and between sectors. Funds earmarked specifically for education are often 'ring-fenced' when such an exercise is taking place, but this does not necessarily mean that the sector escapes unscathed. Since teachers are usually covered by civil service conditions, any retrenchment, rationalisation or salary adjustment applicable to public officials will have an effect on the human resource budget for education. Likewise, a decision to introduce or increase user costs at higher levels of education, and a commensurate reduction in state subsidies, will alter the way education funds are distributed.

SAPs obviously have a financial impact on parents, students and the wider community. New and in-

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mentioned are user-charges and civil service reforms (including retrenchment).

– Some principles of economic reform can be applied to advantage in the education sector. Privatisation is one example – mentioned earlier in the context of school supplies – but also creating scope for the establishment of new (supervised) private teaching institutions. Other elements of SAPs which could improve the lot of education include the introduction of human resource development policies, and poverty-alleviation strategies.

– It might be worthwhile to encourage the inclusion of additional sectoral policies within the PFPs, for example the establishment of an effective programme of in-service training for staff (teachers, principals and administrators), or a system of local management of schools.

### Structural adjustment support programmes

Structural adjustment support programmes provide funds to support implementation of economic reforms in a socially-acceptable manner. To be eligible for support, the country must have entered into an agreement with the IMF on the conduct of their macroeconomic policies. Countries should also be planning reforms designed to yield some or all of the benefits set out in Article 243 of the Fourth Lomé Convention (for example, creating an economic environment that favours employment, improving the social and economic well-being of the population as a whole, or improving public sector management.)

Under the Eighth European Development Fund, disbursements may take the form of either budgetary support, or general or sectoral 'import programmes'. The latter provide fast-disbursing foreign exchange to help close the foreign financing gap, generating counterpart funds (from importers' payments) which support the national budget. The way in which budget support or counterpart funds are used is normally governed by agreements relating to targeting, or subject to other 'conditionalties'.

Since 1991, the preferred approach has been to absorb counterpart funds generated by EU SAP support into the national budget, while securing specific budget commitments for particular sectors. Alternatively, the funds may be deployed to reduce public arrears and debt.

In 1994, the EC Council agreed a resolution on Education and Training which states that 'action under structural adjustment facilities must be better integrated into the long-term priorities of the developing countries' education systems'. This implies that SAPs which target education spending should be designed on the basis of the country's specific needs and with reference to its emerging education policy. In addition, they should be in line with the priorities set out in the resolution, and be coordinated with the actions of other donors, particularly EU Member States.

The Council text also urges support for 'strengthening the institutional capacity of local administrations, helping them both to establish a comprehensive planning framework and to increase the efficiency of resources allocated to education systems'. SAPs can assist a country's emerging education policy, in a number of ways. They can target funds to the sector, and perhaps within that, to areas highlighted in the resolution, such as basic education. They can include conditions (or 'conditionalties' in development jargon) aimed at ensuring effectiveness and sustainability – requiring, for example, an adequate overall recurrent budget for education, the correction of critical distortions in the sector, or reforms of a budgetary or broader educational nature. And the programme can provide for monitoring and training designed to improve interactions between ministries and the budgetary process itself (in particular, improving the correlation between budget allocations on paper and actual expenditure).

### Targeting

The EU has concluded SAPs in the five African countries identified as pilots for the Horizon 2000 Education Coordination exercise – Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania. In general, counterpart funds generated under the programmes have been directed towards recurrent, non-salary expenditure, and other than in Côte d'Ivoire, education has been a major beneficiary. In Burkina Faso, there has been a specific focus on primary schooling. Resources have also gone into technical assistance for sectoral ministries and improving revenue collection (see table for details).

The conditions under which counterpart funds have been released vary markedly. In three of the countries, Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Tanzania, there is a requirement to increase the education budget. Tanzania is also expected to achieve an annual increase of 5% in recurrent, non-salary spending in the education (and health) sectors. All the countries, except Tanzania, need to make progress in implementing sectoral strategies and/or budgetary reforms.

As for the practical disbursement of counterpart funds, in all five countries, technical assistance is used to monitor the process. In Burkina Faso and Tanzania, this includes support for training and advice on budgetary reform. In Tanzania, the SAP contains a work-plan with a set of targets. Improvements sought in the field of education, relate, among other things, to budgeting systems and financial planning, staffing policies and norms, teacher-training, secondary school management, and policies relating to the charging and collection of fees.

### Structural adjustment and education sector reform

The impact of SAPs on budgetary reform can have a significant and positive knock-on effect on the functioning of the education sector. There is still a tendency for draft budgets to be put together centrally in education ministries, without adequate information available – and for them subsequently to be cut, somewhat arbitrarily, by finance ministries. This 'incremental' approach is likely to lead to distortion and waste. Budgetary reform needs to involve long-term, activity-related budgeting, closely related to policy priorities and predicated on the achievement of specific objectives. It should result in better communication and coordination between finance and education ministries (and other relevant government departments with an input into the education sector). It could also involve decentralised budget planning at the district level or within individual institutions. The correlation between estimates, allocations and eventual expenditure needs to be improved, with an effort to ensure that the spending occurs at the right time. Following budget reform, the aim should be to allocate sufficient funds to fulfill reasonable objectives in key areas of expenditure (for example, number of teachers employed by category, number of books per
Having said this, it should be recognised that here are limits to the use that can be made of SASPs. In the first place, they are relatively short-term – certainly when compared with the lengthier processes involved in budgetary and sectoral reform. This means that, at best, structural adjustment support can only initiate or strengthen the reform process. Care also needs to be taken to avoid inconsistency with other aid-financed incentives operating on a longer time frame. Another point is that SASP conditionalities may specify where the money should go, and in what amounts, but this does not necessarily guarantee the quality and impact of the resultant spending. In practice, conditionality must be sufficiently flexible to allow for a poorer than expected performance or other unforeseen circumstances. Blanket conditions may sometimes be dangerous. For example, it may not be appropriate to insist that all non-salary spending is maintained at present levels (a requirement designed to prevent spending on key educational resources and materials being squeezed out by rising salary costs). It could be that some of these resources are being misallocated and could be put to better use. A further point is that where donors have a current interest in a few specific areas, and set out detailed conditions covering these, the effect could be serious under-expenditure in other less ‘fashionable’, but nonetheless important areas. Finally, there needs to be a close sector policy dialogue leading to a shared understanding of objectives and means. Without this, conditionality will not be effective. It is simply not possible to induce a govern-

ment to implement a given economic policy in a sustainable way if it does not believe in it. Paradoxically, perhaps, where there is genuine agreement and commitment, conditions become unnecessary.

**Coordination with other donors**

At present, the demand generated by donor projects for recurrent financing from the government are seldom coordinated. Donor project cycles do not coincide, and each donor tends to neglect the recurrent cost implications of the projects it supports, in terms of the national budget. They see it as a matter for the government. But financial demands created by one project may cause a general distortion in the estimates, and temporarily distort spending patterns.

Much closer coordination is required when dealing with the recurrent expenditure implications of donor projects. Structural adjustment and PERS provide an opportunity to incorporate all donor support to education within the budget. This allows one to link national budget planning, and associated public sector reforms, with wider planning of recurrent and investment spending (both government and donor-funded) within the sector.

Public expenditure reviews already involve a high degree of coordination across donor, bilateral and agencies, there needs to be closer coordination between those involved in PERS and in the design of SASPs on the one hand, and those responsible for designing and appraising education projects on the other.

The task of ensuring coordination, consistency with policy objectives, and rationality in budgetary decisions, begun in the context of PERS, has to be extended and anchored in current practice at the sectoral level. To assist this process, the Sector Development Programme concept has been formulated.

**Sectoral Development Programmes**

An SDP is an operational programme that combines official ‘policy’ (reflected in realistic objectives for improving or reforming education and training) with the means necessary to implement the policy (financial resources, human and physical capacity, legislative framework and management structure). An SDP’s key elements are its sector-wide approach, government ownership of the programme, a set of clear policy objectives and priorities, institutional reforms and capacity development, and an emphasis on coordination and sectoral monitoring. This type of programme also requires a satisfactory macroeconomic framework, a sound budget and appropriate civil service management policies.

Possible advantages of SDPs (when compared with SASPs) include reduced preparation time and fewer disbursement problems. The process can be initiated with a better understanding of the issues, objectives, and constraints on development of the sector, and start with smaller interventions. A further plus point is that the support will be for a longer duration and, unlike structural adjustment, should not be vulnerable to temporary hiccoughs in macroeconomic management. Through SDPs, donors can support the introduction of necessary but often difficult institutional changes, while serious progress can be made on cost-effectiveness issues. The SDP approach is a complex one, which may be difficult to implement in its entirety, but it can lead to a genuine and sustained partnership between donors and sector authorities at all levels.  

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**Targeting of SASP counterpart funds (EDF)**

- **Burkina Faso (1994-95)**
  - ECU millions
  - Financing budgeted recurrent expenditure, Ministry of Health: 4.2
  - Financing budgeted recurrent expenditure, Ministry of Basic Education (primary schooling): 3.45
  - Debt payment: 2.7
  - TA to support budgetary programming in health and education: 0.3

- **Côte d’Ivoire (1995-97)**
  - Financing non-salary budgetary expenditures in the priority sectors of health and decentralisation: 20.5
  - TA: 0.5

- **Ethiopia**
  - Financing budgeted recurrent expenditure in health and education: 86.0
  - TA (short-term): 1.4

- **Mozambique**
  - Financing non-salary expenditure in health: 10.0
  - Financing non-salary expenditure in education: 5.0

- **Tanzania**
  - Financing non-salary recurrent expenditure in health and education: 23.6
  - Management Information System for revenue collection and introducing Value Added Tax (to increase long-term support for health and education): 0.9
  - TA for budgetary reform: 0.5

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A 'Toolkit' to help tackle HIV/AIDS

by Professor A. Whiteside* and Dr. L. Fransen**

In the last issue of the Courier, we published a contribution by Marijke van Hemeldonck charting the EU's contribution to the fight against HIV/AIDS over the past decade. The virus causes misery for individuals, but also threatens to undermine broader social and economic indicators in the countries most seriously hit. Development agencies need to come up with an effective response. In this article, the authors report on how, in practice, the European Commission is putting HIV/AIDS into the development process.

In recent years, it has become clear that the developing world is going to bear most of the burden of the HIV and associated AIDS epidemic. It is ironic that this should happen where there are the fewest resources to deal with the problem. In 1996, of the estimated 23.32 million people living with HIV/AIDS, some 21.97m (94%), were in the developing world.

Obviously, a major emphasis should be on prevention, as even in the areas with the worst incidence of the virus, there are more people uninfected than infected. In addition, there are new cohorts becoming sexually active all the time. But we also have to recognise that the existing HIV epidemic will, sooner or later, become an AIDS epidemic, with increased rates of illness and mortality. The social and economic consequences of AIDS will be far-reaching and both developing and developed countries need to plan for this.

The European Commission was one of the first major donors to recognise the seriousness of the AIDS threat for the developing world – and to argue for an approach which looked at the epidemic's effects on social and economic development. It recognised that it was vital to tackle the consequences of AIDS, but was not clear about how to go about this. In 1994, it commissioned the Economic Research Unit at the University of Natal to undertake a Study of the Impact of the HIV Epidemic on the Social and Economic Development of the Developing Countries. The emphasis was on developing methodologies and practical tools for use in the EU and developing countries.

The general aim was to minimise the impact of HIV on the social and economic development of the developing countries. More specific objectives included:

- providing information and a checklist to ensure that developing countries and EC decision-makers could consider HIV/AIDS in preparing development actions and formulating national development plans;
- investigating the way the epidemic affects the viability of development projects;
- investigating how development projects can influence the spread of HIV; and,
- developing a checklist with simple mechanisms and strategies, to incorporate the HIV/AIDS factor into the EC's development activities.

It quickly became apparent that while most of the staff, in both Brussels and the delegations, were sympathetic to the idea of considering the HIV/AIDS issue, they faced a number of constraints. Time is probably the major one. EC staff are very busy people and this involves adding another element to already stretched schedules. Setting priorities is also problematic. HIV is one of a number of issues requiring special consideration. In the past, environmental and gender issues have also featured prominently and there are manuals designed to incorporate these aspects into the conception, implementation and evaluation of projects. A further point is that the relevance of HIV and AIDS to development is not always apparent, especially to staff not working in the health or social sectors. Finally, there is the question of practicality. How can and should HIV/AIDS be considered?

The only way to design practical tools was to ask people what was workable, and then develop the methods with their input. To this end, fieldwork was carried out at the Brussels HQ and in a number of delegations, and the conclusions were presented at a workshop. At this meeting, papers were presented by Commission staff and outsiders, which were later published. But it was clear from the workshop that a collection of papers, no matter how brief or readable, would not ensure the inclusion of HIV/AIDS considerations in development assistance.

Something more was required and it needed to be short, user-friendly and practical. With this in mind, the decision was taken to produce a 'Toolkit'. This is a folder containing five main documents and three subsets, each of which can be extracted from the folder and used by themselves (see box).

The transport sector document provides an example of how the

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* Associate professor in the Economic Research Unit of the University of Natal, Durban, South Africa.  
** Principal administrator in the Health, Family Planning and AIDS unit of DG VIII, European Commission.  

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# A response for the Transport Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Possible problem</th>
<th>Potential remedy</th>
<th>Wider action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Building/maintenance</strong></td>
<td>Mobility of workers</td>
<td>Increased use of local labour. Contract documents require:</td>
<td>Liaise with Ministry of AIDS control programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase in sexual partners due to separation from family and relative wealth of labour force</td>
<td>- contractor to provide health education measures;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- distribution of condoms;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- the treatment of sexually-transmitted illnesses (STIs);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- inclusion of HIV/AIDS component in tender documents.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased illness and death among workers</td>
<td>Plan human resources and benefits to take account of this.</td>
<td>Company and government liaison on human resource requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transport services</strong></td>
<td>Mobility of service operators</td>
<td>Targeted health education, AIDS prevention and condom distribution. Reduce time spent away from home. Provide controlled rest areas. Reduce time at border posts.</td>
<td>AIDs control programme, NGOs and operators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highly mobile group with likely increased exposure to STIs and HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Operators</td>
<td>Operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management</strong></td>
<td>Planning and running transport</td>
<td>Professional and skilled cadres also experience HIV-related morbidity and mortality. These are hard to replace. Government benefits allow long periods of sick leave.</td>
<td>Government Operators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People who travel away from families and home are more likely to have sexual partners</td>
<td>Identify key personnel. Human resource plans to take account of increased morbidity and mortality.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Passengers</strong></td>
<td>Increased mobility of the population for trade, employment and leisure.</td>
<td>Transport sector should monitor traffic flows (and types of movement) and inform others who will provide appropriate education.</td>
<td>Government AIDS control programme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AIDS control programme works1. Transport is one of the main areas of EC support, and HIV/AIDS is a new problem that needs to be addressed. Better infrastructure and service provision increase people's mobility and there is strong evidence that this is linked, in turn, to the spread of HIV. So the transport sector as to find ways to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS, when constructing, maintaining and operating passenger and freight services.

There are four main areas of concern: the people who build and look after the infrastructure, those who work in rail, road, air and shipping services, professionals engaged in the management of the sector, and, of course, the passengers. Each group must be appropriately targeted if the spread of HIV and the impact of AIDS is to be reduced. The brief looks at each of these issues in turn and then provides a table that acts as a checklist (see table).

The research for this project shows that HIV and AIDS need to be considered in the development process. To ensure that this happens, staff, whose first priority is not HIV/AIDS, must be convinced of the importance of the issues. The next step is to provide ways of considering and incorporating these into their work. The Toolkit represents a start in this process. It will be refined with use and no doubt, more sectors will be added.

Copies are available from:

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Tel. (27 31) 260 25 90
Fax (27 31) 260 25 87
Internet: http://www.worldbank.org/aid-econ

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1 Extensive input for this paper was provided by Bruce Thompson of the Sustainable Development and Natural Resources Unit, DG VIII, European Commission.
Who is to blame for the South East Asian smog?

by Roy Ellen and Bill Watson*

Fire is part of the normal (and human) ecology of the world's tropical rain forests — and has probably been so for many thousands of years. For example, residues of charcoal found in cores sunk in parts of Sumatra have been interpreted as the result of both spontaneous and deliberate burning. Spontaneous ignition of forest provides opportunities for the light to penetrate to the forest floor and allows new trees to grow. It increases the scope for new species to establish themselves and maintains the distinctive patchiness of forest structure. This 'patchiness' is now widely acknowledged as contributing to the effective reproduction of forest and to maintaining its characteristic high biodiversity by providing a wide range of different habitats at different stages of regrowth. At the same time, we know that for millennia, fire has been used by traditional shifting cultivators as a way of clearing agricultural plots. This is part of a strategy for successfully farming forests on a sustainable basis and has, in turn, contributed further to maintaining the distinctive form of the South East Asian rain forest. The genetically rich lowland forests of large parts of Sumatra, Borneo and Irian Jaya, which environmentalists and governments seek to protect as 'natural' habitat, are, in large part, the result of human interference which involves conscious strategies of burning.

For much of the colonial period, traditional shifting cultivators were reviled as destroyers rather than managers and makers of the forest. It is an image which has persisted among post-colonial policy makers, aided and abetted, it must be said, by many 'expert' forestry and conservation advisors. We now know that it is a false image. The fires that have swept through parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan are not, in the main, attributable to the ignorance of traditional farmers whose fires have 'got out of control' (a common explanation put forward by the Indonesian authorities). They are, rather, the cumulative result of policies that have encouraged widespread and intensive transformation of forest areas designed to make them more productive. The effect has been to simplify their ecological organisation and reduce their diversity, thereby increasing the risk of widespread fire damage, without the controls being in place to prevent accidents.

The fires appear mainly to be a consequence of extensive land clearing (part of government plans for transmigration), indiscriminate and unregulated logging, and modification of the forest for plantation trees. For many decades, following a pattern established by the Dutch, the Indonesian authorities have used transmigration as a way of alleviating demographic pressures in the Indonesian heartland and opening up areas for economic development. It is also used as a political tool — to integrate an ethnically diverse population. Many transmigrants in pioneer zones find it impossible to cope on the land they are provided with. They quickly move out of the resettlement areas and cut down forests — legally or illegally — to establish dry land agriculture. Not having the knowledge that the local people possess, they use slash and burn techniques but fail to take the necessary precautions.

The lumber business in Indonesia has grown rapidly since independence. It is a combination of small-scale local logging concessions, larger companies and multinational joint ventures. Modern logging techniques, even when not involving clear-felling, leave an enormous amount of trash behind. When dry, this can easily catch fire, whether spontaneously or accidentally. Areas cleared through logging, 'pioneer' slash and burn, or specifically for clearance purposes, are planted with plantation crops. These vary from place to place, but increasingly include timber trees for wood pulp, rubber and — in the places where the fires have been raging most fiercely — oil palm. Here again, it is the unsecured dry waste left by the firms involved which seems to pose the greatest risk.

A lot of attention in recent press reports has been focused on the so-called global El Niño periodic oscillations. Put simply, these result in longer dry seasons and spells of below average annual rainfall in parts of the tropical belt. There is undoubtedly an increased likelihood that El Niño aberrations will exacerbate the risk of widespread fires. But such oscillations have occurred for centuries without triggering the kind of regional calamity — with its pathogenic smoke and smog effects — that we have seen this year. There have always been fires that have raged out of control, but these have become much more frequent in recent times, even without the El Niño effect. Since the late 1970s, for example, fires in Kalimantan have regularly obscured the sun, creating hazards for people in places such as Brunei and east Malaysia. In some locations, surface coal seams and peat have ignited, continuing to burn for years. The rains, however, usually come in time to solve the immediate problem — which the government appears incapable of handling in any other way.

Many traditional farmers in the tropics are aware of the so-called El Niño effects, and have managed them satisfactorily in the past, in some cases even making contingency plans. Institutions appear more ignorant, and less well-placed to respond. It is crucial to understand the reason for this if the problem is to be addressed, let alone solved. It does not appear to be due to a lack of information. The Indonesian Department of the Environ-

*University of Kent at Canterbury

This is the abridged text of a press release issued by the APFT Bureau de Sensibilisation. APFT is a multi-disciplinary project sponsored by the European Commission (DG VIII) which aims to investigate and document the future of the peoples of the rainforest in three principal areas: the Caribbean, Central Africa and the Southwestern Pacific. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission.
ent, for example, is able to match satellite imagery to databases which indicate precisely the ownership of plantations where the worst fires have started. These have been on estates belonging to some 146 companies. Some of these enterprises are owned by members of the Indonesian political elite, some have Malaysian and Singaporean backing, and some involve Western capital.

Reaction among the peoples and governments of the region has been mixed. The governments of the ASEAN grouping feel a strong sense of solidarity and are extremely reluctant to criticise each other. Because of this, Indonesia has had a relatively easy ride despite the very severe consequences of the pollution in Malaysia and Singapore. President Suharto has apologised to his ASEAN neighbours on two separate occasions and this seems to have satisfied them, at least for the time being. At the popular level, however, criticism has been relatively unaffected, including the capital, Jakarta, have been kept woefully uninformed about the extent of the problem. When people learn what has been happening, for example following a visit to Malaysia, some remark that they 'are ashamed to be Indonesian'. In parts of the country that have been severely affected, such as the province of Jambi, the response is more critical, though mixed. It is generally recognised that the rains have been late this year. On the other hand, it has been understood locally for some time that one should not depend solely on the rain to control the fires. Small farmers have been told for years that forest conservation measures require building fire-breaks and ensuring fires do not get out of control.

In the traditional farming areas, the responsibility is being laid squarely at the door of those who clear the land for new plantations, (particularly oil palm which is being heavily promoted in Indonesia in competition with Malaysia). There is a widespread perception that business tycoons from Jakarta have been given too much scope to devastate the forest land, without enough attention being paid to the proper procedures. Others seen to share in the blame include a 'get-rich quick' itinerant work-force, and certain local law enforcement officers who are apparently willing to accept bribes. The latter frequently turn a blind eye to forest destruction and, at times, even participate in illegal felling themselves.

The result of all this is that new divisions are emerging. Within the indigenous community itself, the farmers who want to keep to their centuries-old clearing techniques are pitted against those who have abandoned traditional cultivation and see an opportunity for making quick money working for contractors engaged in illegal felling. There is also a divide between locals, who feel they have a genuine claim to the forest land based on traditional usage, and newcomers. And there are rivalries between local government agencies which tend to compete with one another rather than working cooperatively.

Two things are striking about the present catastrophe – other than its devastating scale and the complexity of the technical factors involved. First, the pollution is not just a local problem but has spilled over into a regional (and indeed, global) crisis affecting millions of people. The second point concerns the perceptions and responses of the various actors involved. The situation is widely portrayed as a 'natural' disaster – especially in official press statements – but in fact, it has its roots in the activities of human beings, and the long term policies of governments and companies. It is not unusual for people to advance a 'natural' explanation for circumstances which are, to a great extent, actually socially or culturally-caused – or at least influenced, by people. We all do this, quite innocently, from time to time. As we mentioned earlier, the rain forest itself is only 'natural' in this sense. But it is wholly wrong to attribute the fires, and the resultant polluting smog, to a freak natural catastrophe in the face of which governments and business are impotent. Equally, it would a gross calumny to blame local farmers who routinely use fire as a tool for modifying the forest.

The result of all this is that new divisions are emerging. Within the indigenous community itself, the farmers who want to keep to their centuries-old clearing techniques are pitted against those who have abandoned traditional cultivation and see an opportunity for making quick money working for contractors engaged in illegal felling. There is also a divide between locals, who feel they have a genuine claim to the forest land based on traditional usage, and newcomers. And there are rivalries between local government agencies which tend to compete with one another rather than working cooperatively.
Do the developing countries need scientific research?

by Dr Olivier Retout*

The 5th 'generation' of the Lomé Convention coincides with the 5th generation of European scientific policy. This could be seen as an ideal opportunity to review the role of research in sustainable development.

As part of the comprehensive, Green Paper-inspired effort to examine EU-ACP relations, the Commission looked at the role of science and technology in development. A thorough review of all areas involving cooperation revealed that progress of any kind has to be based on a strategic accumulation of knowledge, know-how, scientific and technical expertise, and innovation. This is precisely the approach adopted by the industrialised countries, which devote between 2% and 3% of their GDP to financing specialised institutes, university laboratories, technical centres and major equipment items. The result is the opening up of new areas of knowledge (basic research), the trying out of new techniques (applied research) and the focusing of expertise (strategic research). It is the level of financing and the diverse nature of the disciplines covered that have enabled Europe to achieve critical mass in terms of researchers and engineers.

Europe has, thus, developed the necessary experience. A link may be traced between pure knowledge (for example, botanical knowledge), applied knowledge (plant physiology), techniques (irrigation) and innovation (computerised management of irrigation) which encompasses the cultural and social dimension. However, if such research and technological development (R&T&D) activities are to have an impact on socio-economic development, there must also be long-term investment (to guarantee that research is maintained). In other words, genuine scientific policies have to be defined and implemented.

**What about the developing countries?**

The evidence reveals that developing countries lag far behind the EU in this field. On average, they invest about 0.35% of their GDP in research, and national R&T&D systems (essentially public-sector-based). While Europe celebrates the Nobel prizes its scientists are awarded every autumn, the position of researchers in ACP countries, particularly in Africa, is unenviable. Timidity in science policy is one reason for this. But societies are also distrustful of and unconvincing about science – an understandable attitude when one takes into account the fact that the scientific approach is very much a cultural component of the industrialised nations.

The Lomé Convention has always looked upon R&T&D as being a specific cooperation sector (in fact, as part of cultural cooperation!), and it refers on more than one occasion to scientific research, particularly in agriculture and health.

Yet, when it comes to taking stock of results, there are glaring shortfalls (see table below). On the one hand, projects are usually limited to the transfer of knowledge via scientific and technical assistance, with only low-level involvement on the part of the beneficiaries. On the other hand, few disciplines are covered (agricultural engineering, water supplies, health, etc.). What really stands out is the lack of research in the social sciences. This explains, for example, the difficulty in understanding – and thus in managing – new phenomena such as urban expansion. The same applies to engineering sciences, to the extent that imported technologies which have proven technically and/or socially unsuitable – for lack of local input at the design or application stage – are no longer relied upon. In addition, many ACP countries still do not have adequate numbers of universities where far-reaching socio-technical changes, imposed by the globalisation of trade, can be perceived, understood and anticipated.

**Scientific cooperation**

For its part, European scientific policy, which came into being in 1983 with the first R&T&D framework programme, has paid increasing attention to areas of research that concentrate specifically on solving the problems of developing countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Regional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock-rearing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forests</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resources</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous (mining, industry, health)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 166</strong></td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The portion actually earmarked for scientific research is estimated at ECU 120 million, i.e. less than 0.8% of the total provided under the 6th and 7th EDFs.

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* Science journalist.
From the outset, the challenge was two-fold. Not only did the European scientific and technical community have to be mobilised to examine the problems facing such countries, but the latter's human potential in terms of scientific expertise also had to be consolidated. The solution was to finance joint research projects on subjects of interest common to all developing countries. Successive programmes targeting science and technology for development (STD) (see table below) had neither discipline-based nor geographical constraints and were initially limited to agriculture and health. They were later expanded, adopting a global, multi-disciplinary approach which actively encouraged the exploitation of overlap between research areas. When it came to appraisal, all were deemed to be positive – so much so that, in the fourth framework programme, scientific cooperation with the developing countries, known as the 'INCO-DC Programme' (International Cooperation with Developing Countries), became closely allied with development cooperation policy, supporting research targeted at the same major priorities. The results of the STD/INCO programmes (the new name) and their 'natural' spread throughout the scientific community have often been used when formulating development programmes or projects in developing countries.

Nevertheless, despite 15 years of evolution towards a more useful appraisal of end-user requirements (not an easy task in the case of research projects which are necessarily remote from everyday realities), the STD/INCO programmes have not reversed the trend.

Research and technological development in the developing countries, and in the ACPs in particular, are not in a position to offer the level of scientific excellence which is necessary to respond to underdevelopment issues. Hundreds of researchers have certainly participated in R&TD projects and have, therefore, been instrumental in the establishment of a genuine local skills base in some places. Examples include the CERAAS (Regional Study Centre for Improving Adaptation to Drought Conditions) in Senegal and the CRBP (Regional Banana and Plantain Growers’ Centre) in Cameroon. These have led the way in cooperative projects between the EDF and the STD/INCO programme. The EU also supports a global malaria-research network which involves several teams from ACP countries. The discovery of a gene providing resistance to bilharzia in rural populations, and the creation of varieties of sorghum with a high essential amino acid content (which are compatible with local food tastes and customs) are just two of the many examples which testify to the valuable work carried out by the STD/INCO. Despite its multi-disciplinary approach, and its involvement in sustainable development – which includes a strong ‘exchange and training’ component – STD/INCO has only had limited resources to tackle the challenges facing it worldwide. In the final analysis, however, it would appear that the main deficiency over the last decade and a half has been not so much money as the lack of a global vision of R&TD in development.

A strategic variable in development

Nowadays, the Commission is proposing a global approach, making research a strategic variable in development, thereby finally clearing the way for genuine ‘complementarity’ and greater consistency between the two policies. While development cooperation views institutional and regulatory consolidation (research policy, patent policy, etc.) and financing of research capabilities (infrastructures, in particular) as preconditions for any action, scientific policy takes care of the actual cooperation between the researchers.

The Dutch Presidency of the EU and the Commission, which jointly organised a major conference on this subject in Leiden, Netherlands, in March 1997, have confirmed this new direction. Ministers, decision-makers and researchers the world over have clearly indicated that the aim is to open a political dialogue between partner countries so as to target cooperation towards the areas specified by the beneficiaries. The conference’s conclusions suggested that countries in the Southern hemisphere view North/South scientific cooperation, which is entirely designed and managed by countries in the Northern hemisphere, as lacking effectiveness. At issue was an ill-conceived idea of local socio-economic and cultural realities. It was also suggested that the EDF be used directly to finance research in the ACP countries and not just for funding of infrastructure and equipment.

The Leiden Conference gave a clear indication that the process of preparation for the fifth research and development framework programme was an opportunity to be seized, not only to keep the INCO/DC programme going, but more importantly, to give a clear signal to developing countries’ partners: European cooperation will henceforth have the means to identify ‘best practice’, by stimulating scientific research both within, and together with, the developing countries.

### The three STD programmes

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>Ecu 42m</td>
<td>Ecu 85m</td>
<td>Ecu 125m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of the R&amp;TD framework programme</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdown</td>
<td>Agriculture 75%</td>
<td>Health 25%</td>
<td>Agriculture 70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposals</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2527</td>
<td>2030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracts</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The ACP countries will have the opportunity to formulate their specific research requirements during discussions on the future of the Lomé Convention.

While supporting the Commission's proposals which were approved by the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament has accepted, in a report prepared by one of its members, Allan Macartney, the idea of using EDF resources set aside for coordinating and evaluating development policies. In other words, the idea of conducting research (on a long-term basis with the right tools to respond to challenges) could become a strategic area in the development and evolution of ACP countries within the framework of the post-Lomé IV national and regional indicative programmes.

At a Forum meeting held with the ACP countries, Michel Rocard, President of the European Parliament's Development Committee, expanded the idea even further. He suggested the creation of a European foundation to aid research in the developing countries, to support and sustain inter-national-level research teams over the long term by providing them with sustainable aid. This idea, incorporated into Mr Macartney's report, emphasises support for research teams, and not just for programmes.

**Knowledge must be made available to the people**

It is widely recognised that in both ACP countries and Europe, scientific results need to be utilised as speedily as possible and that to succeed, one needs to tackle the 'cultural' dimension. ACP political leaders relying on a specific technological research and development structure need, from the outset, to examine ways of passing the new, theoretical knowledge on to their populations. They could draw inspiration from Europe where, last year, a wide-ranging debate was initiated on why the continent is less innovative than the US despite being at a similar level in scientific terms. One conclusion from this debate was that promoting a culture of innovation was more decisive than providing funds for new technologies.

The same conclusions will apply to developing countries. No technology will have a long-term impact in socio-economic terms if attention is not paid to the level of its social acceptance. Scientific excellence must reach the general population if it is to be of service. It must (again) become a jointly-owned asset.

On the one hand, scientific language has to become less obscure and dialogue between civil society, decision-makers and researchers must be stepped up. Meanwhile, knowledge should be made widely available, taking supply (available results) and demand (questions from the recipients) into account. It is wrong to say that scientific knowledge is too complex for large-scale dissemination. Esoteric equations, sometimes so obscure that only a few brilliant minds understand their true meaning, do not matter to the person in the street. But learning how to improve one's situation in concrete terms is a very real requirement of developing societies and this entails adapting tools that originated in a scientific context. To close the 'technoscience' gap between rich and poor countries and, within the latter, between people of different educational levels, the best approach would be to combine the mechanisms for consulting beneficiaries and for the strategic circulation of results as early as possible. For researchers in the developing world, therefore, the challenge is not the accumulation of a long list of papers published in prestigious scientific journals, but actually demonstrating that developing countries have a need for specific and autonomous technological research and development.
The land tenure system – a key factor

by David Prodger*

This article has two objectives – first to highlight the importance of the issues surrounding land administration generally and security of land tenure in particular and second to indicate how donors, such as the EU, may focus on land tenure to achieve their stated aims of sustainable development and poverty alleviation.

A common theme in the development of any country is the unique role attributed to land. It is the platform for almost all human activities, linking people’s need for economic, social, emotional and even spiritual well-being. As a result, land and land use provide the basis (either directly or indirectly) for all economic activity and hence are a primary focus for development.

Over the last three decades, nations in transition have struggled to balance the need for sustainable development against the ever-increasing pressures on the land imposed by the conflicting needs of agriculture, a growing population, urbanisation and conservation. Institutions responsible for managing the land have failed to keep pace with these demands in a political environment which is constantly changing. In many cases, this has reached the point where land tenure problems, by promoting activity in the informal land market, are proving a major constraint to economic development. This has the effect of increasing the vulnerability of those without formal rights to the land.

There is, therefore, a need to manage the land more effectively. This may be achieved through the definition of a land policy, and the creation and updating of land information to support its implementation and improve decision-making. An effective policy will provide for the registration and regulation of access to the land and hence control of it. The need for such a policy may be considered at three levels: the community, the government and the donor agency.

The community

At the community level and for the individual, access to land, security of tenure, and a formal method of registration, offer a series of opportunities. Whether rights to land are expressed through the direct ownership of a freeholder or the formal ‘right to use’ of a leaseholder, access to land allows:
- the provision of ‘shelter as a basic human need’;
- the individual to attain a level of financial security and the means of production to generate an independent income;
- long term investment – increasing motivation to protect soil and water resources hence curbing pollution and erosion caused by short-term exploitation.

As more countries move towards a market-based economy, greater emphasis is placed on the need to develop a free market in land. This will only be possible with information about rights to the land. When these are formally established, they become a tradeable asset enabling the owner to buy, sell or raise capital against the land.

The knowledge that rights to land are not simply written on a piece of paper or held by the village headman, but entered and formally recognised on a central register, allows the individual (or family unit) to react to external events. This is particularly the case when considering disasters. The family could be displaced without the fear of having to relinquish their land rights – which would have been lost under many systems of customary tenure.

The government

The primary reason for formalising land tenure is to alleviate poverty through an equitable distribution of rights to land. Security of tenure and information about land rights provide a number of benefits for government:
- They stimulate the land economy. The formalisation of 150,000 titles in Peru resulted in a 900% increase in property investment;
- They stimulate the broader economy. It is estimated that 75% of all private businesses in the USA have raised funds through mortgages against private property;
- They realise national wealth. It is estimated that in developing nations, as much as 75% of national wealth may be held in property. Communal land has no realisable value;
- They generate income. Tax may be levied on the land, or on its use;
- They facilitate planning. This relates to both urban planning for service provision by regulating the informal land market; and rural planning to establish balanced land use patterns serving the conflicting needs of food production, resource exploitation and conservation.

The donor agency

Security of tenure and access to land underpins many of the stated aims of donor agencies – primarily aiding in poverty alleviation, widening opportunities for personal development and enhancing productive capacity. Achievement of these aims will help enable the donors to shift emphasis from short-term relief to long-term development. The promotion of secure land tenure policies will also allow greater access to land information, which in turn will have a series of wider benefits in seeking to maximise the impact of aid. Good information about rights to land will promote integrated regional planning – aiding good governmental practices. Donor agencies themselves will benefit through:
- a better understanding of disaster impact, prevention, and disaster alleviation planning;
- a better understanding of post-war scenarios and management of displaced populations – especially...
Is there a need for change?

Traditionally, rights to land are granted from within the local social environment by the elders of the tribe or the village chief. These ‘customary’ rights typically depend on the individual demonstrating that they are actively using the land. From this develops a perceived need to protect one’s rights. This leads to various defensive strategies including:

- a reluctance to lend or share land for fear that those who cultivate it will eventually possess it;
- a restriction on the type of crops that a tenant may grow;
- a hastening in recultivation of the land.

Within the rural environment, this leads to obvious inefficiencies in land use, a loss of fertility, and consequently, lower agricultural output. This in turn may create unemployment, social and environmental degradation and ultimately, increased migration to urban areas.

In an urban or peri-urban setting, the growing pressures of rapid urban expansion result in an unregulated growth of the informal sector. Capital-based tax regimes can result in a further increase in informal development, exacerbating problems of poor service provision, and accentuating the vicious circle of urban poverty.

A typical solution to overcome some of these problems has been to introduce a system of land rights based in legislation. The aim is to formalise the rights of the individual (or community) to the land, and in so doing, to limit the practices mentioned above that neither make best use of the land nor provide equality of access to it.

Some key implementation issues

A number of problems can arise in implementing an efficient, sustainable land tenure policy. Broadly speaking these occur at the political, cultural and financial levels. There are also a number of technical issues that would need to be tackled.

Looking first at political issues, implementing changes in land policy is extremely sensitive. Difficulties may be compounded by the perceived danger of official corruption and manipulation in the granting of land rights by a socio-political elite. In this environment there is unlikely to be trust in any process imposed by government. Accordingly, formal land rights should be established by a combination of ‘top-down’ government legislation and ‘bottom-up’ community participation. This will allow much of the bureaucracy to be circumvented, while enabling the community to become active stakeholders in the land economy. A difficulty that might arise could be in persuading government to decentralise control of land administration to make implementation effective. It is in this area that governments can call on donor agencies for support in formulating equitable land policies and providing an impartial long-term commitment to change.

As mentioned previously, land policy and land information have a direct bearing on many aspects of government decision-making. If land reform is to be sustainable there must be support at the highest level to allow institutional strengthening and capacity-building to occur within all relevant government departments. This will include new development of the departments directly responsible for land administration. But it also requires an understanding of their relationship with other bodies whose activities would be aided by information about the land – such as agriculture, town and regional planning, and environment agencies.

As for the cultural environment, policies that promote access to land should be evaluated in their social context. What are the rights of those on the land (informal settlers) or those who require access to it (tenant farmers) vis-à-vis those who own it? For example, most farmers in Africa are women, but in many countries they are socially and legally disadvantaged in terms of land access.

If the introduction of a formal system of land tenure is to succeed, then significant cultural change will be needed at the community level. This will involve caste and gender issues among other things, but it should be recognised that widespread acceptance is unlikely if new policies are simply superimposed on customary arrangements. Where new rights of private ownership clash with existing informal rights, there is a serious risk of conflict. Therefore, solutions must be adopted from within the community ensuring that local consultation and approval occurs throughout the implementation process.

Clearly all development aid is limited by financial constraints. Governments are coming under increasing pressure to recover costs, so greater emphasis is being placed on the cost-effectiveness and long term impact of donor-assisted projects. An efficient land registration process offers significant opportunities for cost recovery. While formalising and registering land rights can be expensive and time-consuming, and often
difficult to justify on a short-term financial basis, an efficient system, as mentioned earlier, will result in huge social benefits. It will also provide great potential for generating revenue through the production of statistical data and the distribution of land information to other institutions. As stated, land tenure information provides a basis for collecting land-related taxes. One should be wary of using this as the sole justification for reform, however, as it may prove counter-productive. Liability to land taxes may discourage people from holding land and simply increase activity in the informal sector.

If a successful land tenure system is to be introduced, it is vital that the initial investment is not wasted through the adoption of inappropriate technology which cannot be maintained without external funding. An efficient system of tenure is one which can be maintained at a low cost, with the possibility of becoming self-financing in the longer term.

**Technical issues**

If registration of land rights is to be successfully implemented, a number of technical considerations also need to be addressed. These may include:

- Evaluation of the existing system. How appropriate are current land registration systems? Should one move away from traditional or existing tenure systems, or are there already procedures in place that can be adapted? What would be most appropriate for the community as a whole?

- How to reconcile existing and new registration systems. If there is to be a new system, it will usually operate in conjunction with existing ones over an extended transition period. As a result, people may experience confusion as to the situation governing ‘their’ land. To alleviate this, and minimise delays in the transfer of rights and investment in the land, a simple and transparent method for granting rights should be introduced.

- Dispute resolution. When rights to land are formalised, disputes will normally arise, and their resolution is an integral part of the registration process. Land disputes will generally relate to either ownership or boundary definition. These need to be settled in a clear, unambiguous and public manner. The process of resolving disputes and allocating compensation is a key part of the legislation for land registration. Again, the situation will be greatly facilitated by community involvement – perhaps through the use of community members as arbitrators fulfilling the role of ‘community advisors’ rather than as agents of government policy. A detailed understanding of the existing informal sector is essential to the introduction and acceptance of new tenure systems.

- Registration of title and data maintenance. Perhaps one of the most difficult barriers to effective registration of tenure arises with the recording and maintenance of rights relating to the land as they change over time. Poorly designed, complex registration procedures in the past, coupled with a scarcity of skilled personnel and a reliance on paper-based systems, have resulted in backlogs of titles to be registered, with a lack of resources to process these claims. The introduction of low-cost, easily understood methods for recording, storing and maintaining titles, and making this information available to other institutions, is vital. The data gathered may then provide the basis for integrated cross-departmental planning.

**How can donor agencies help?**

Security of land and tenure rights are essential in achieving the long-term development objectives of many developing countries. The process of safeguarding rights enables long-term investments in land improvement, promotes efficiency and increases productivity. Donor agencies are in a unique position to support the formalisation of land tenure as a key element in the drive for sustainable development. This may be achieved in a number of ways:

- direct funding of land reform projects – particularly to formalise existing structures, provide equitable access to land to those who require it, and develop efficient legislation to liberate the land market;

- integration of land tenure with other externally-funded projects – ensuring that agricultural improvement, urban planning, environmental protection and disaster alleviation projects take account of both formal and informal land tenure patterns. An understanding of these rights to the land is fundamental to maximise the long-term impact of relief and development aid;

- training & institutional strengthening – in order to enable long-term independence from external funding by ensuring that local institutions have a suitable structure, workforce and development plan to implement and sustain an effective land policy;

- long-term support through institutional linking – providing long-term training and support throughout the process of institutional development, and allowing a regular transfer of skills and technology;

- adopting sustainable solutions – through the active involvement and participation of the local community. The training of community members in conveyancing, surveying and arbitration to a basic level will alleviate the shortage of highly qualified staff required for the registration of land rights.

A high-tech approach will not necessarily result in effective land registration. If solutions are not supported by staff development, institutional strengthening, and integration within the broader development framework, there is a danger that any benefits gained will be short term and unsustainable.

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Security of land tenure and access to the land are a fundamental driving force for sustainable development. Information on these rights can form the basis of integrated planning for the long-term management of both the land and its resources. However, the successful implementation of a land policy is dependent on long-term support rather than short term relief.

D.P.
Saving the Nile crocodile

by Juan Ovejero*

For 20 years, from the 1940s to the early 1960s, the Nile crocodile (Crocodylus niloticus), was ruthlessly hunted, being regarded at that time as a dangerous species. Today, the surviving populations of these reptiles are seriously endangered. It was no surprise, therefore, when the Nile crocodile was placed in Annex 1 of the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES).

Fortunately, from the early 1970s onwards, African countries have regarded the Nile crocodile as a valuable part of their natural animal heritage, both because of its important ecological role and as a source of sustainable income when the species is carefully managed. Many African states have therefore adopted national legislation to protect the crocodile and have instituted sustainable management programmes. Since the 1970s, this policy has borne fruit, and there are signs that the number of Nile crocodiles has stabilised, or is even increasing, in most of the countries where the species is to be found.

Conservation and sustainable use

Programmes for the conservation and sustainable use of the Nile crocodile are based on our knowledge of the inexorable growth of the human population and the resulting loss of these animals' natural habitat. This poses a long-term threat and the sustainable use idea links economic value with the preservation of wild crocodile habitats, thus encouraging local people to protect the latter. One notable success, which has become a model for other African states, has been a programme undertaken in Zimbabwe based on the 'ranching' technique: the eggs are collected in the wild and then farmed. A small number of the farmed animals are then released into their natural environment, while the rest of the stock is used in the manufacture of products intended for international trade. By collecting the eggs in the wild, the breeding stations have thus made the crocodiles economically valuable, which has greatly contributed to their protection. The fact is that Africa's rural population commonly detest crocodiles, which they see quite simply as a threat to their own and their livestock's lives. The economic exploitation of products obtained from the crocodile - hides and meat - with the involvement of the local communities, also involves a wide distribution of income. This is well illustrated by the Kariba project in Zimbabwe, where, in the early 1990s, the economic value of the Nile crocodile population exceeded four million dollars. The Kariba breeding stations have also made great efforts to educate the local people to tolerate the species, and have made substantial investments in crocodile research and management.

Since 1983 - when the species was declassified by the Washington Convention - the CITES has responded to requests by countries with healthy and well-managed Nile crocodile populations to be allowed to exploit them, transferring these populations to Annex II of the Convention, with a special quota system for export and permission for ranching. Today, 11 states of Southern, Central and Eastern Africa are making their contribution to the conservation of the crocodiles by marketing products derived from them as part of their sustainable use programmes within the CITES framework. The adoption, in 1992, of the universal marking system for crocodiles has reduced the risk of illegal trade to a minimum.

Ranching and breeding in captivity

The CITES originally discouraged the taking of crocodiles from the wild, preferring captive breeding - often ex situ, in other words in countries that were not included in the species' distribution area. This was intended to reduce captures while providing an alternative source of crocodile products. The approach was of little value in conserving the Nile crocodile. Experts now acknowledge that collection in the wild, when properly managed, often provides an economic incentive to preserve the wild populations and their habitats. While breeding in captivity can prove useful for conservation, it can also act to the detriment of conservation schemes in situ, in other words in countries with wild crocodile populations.

Despite this, captive breeding is still being proposed as a way of conserving other species. In some cases, this takes the form of transferring genetic resources from Southern countries to ex situ facilities in other developing countries.

The best guarantee of conservation is a mixed management system combining collection in the wild with 'ranching'.

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states. A mixed management system – combining collecting in the wild with 'ranching' – seems, however, to be the best guarantee of species conservation, and captive breeding in countries with no wild population should be discouraged.

**Participative management**

The *Campfire* rural development and conservation programme in Zimbabwe provides economic and ecological research and helps to train villagers. It is a good example of how local people assist conservation through the management and utilisation of the species. With the development of the Nile crocodile ranching industry, the eggs have become a valuable resource, and breeders pay a reward for their collection by local communities – who have become eager to protect the laying grounds, formerly regarded as a threat. At Chisango, in the Guruve district of Zimbabwe, the villagers have even gone so far as to 'arrest' people collecting eggs, believing that their presence in the area was illegal. It transpired that the intruders held the necessary permits, but this does show how *Campfire* has created a new attitude among rural communities.

**A message from Africa**

The message we are receiving from the African countries, led by Zimbabwe, regarding the conservation and sustainable management of the Nile crocodile is that there are three essential factors: management plans based on the best available scientific data, the participation of rural communities who routinely share their land and rivers with the crocodiles, and the economic valorisation of the species and its ecosystem, calling for the existence of international markets that are strictly regulated but open and characterised by stable demand.

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**Cultural transition in Africa**

*by Pamphile Sebahara* *

Economic globalisation has become a commonplace phrase. But a closer examination shows that the changes in society, in both hemispheres, go beyond the economic field. They have an impact on all the fundamental principles on which social organisation used to be based. Indeed, most problems are increasingly regarded as being insoluble except on a regional or global scale. Hence, globalisation is not just economic but also political (the spread of free market democracy, for example) and cultural (the diffusion of knowledge or consumption habits). To talk of globalisation is to talk of world-scale expansion of the Western cultural model, but also the emergence of resistance to that model. A case of the global village versus self-absorption.

What will be the impact of cultural globalisation on sub-Saharan Africa? Will it mean the disappearance of local cultures? Can those cultures withstand the spread of dominant values and standards? What will be the result of the coexistence of two different cultural models? What can the African states do to manage the cultural transition? This article suggests various approaches to answering these topical questions.

**Historical background**

The colonisation of Africa dates from the end of the 19th century. Previously, social organisation was based on oral communication. The dominant political system was monarchy, and trade took the form of barter. Colonisation brought a new era to Africa. It introduced the capitalist economy, cash-based trade, school education founded on the written word and a Western-inspired system of law. The constitutions of the various newly independent states bear witness to this. Africa, then, adopted the Western model of political organisation. Furthermore, many Africans inherited from colonisation, amongst other things, a monotheistic and would-be universal religion, Christianity. Although religious practices already existed in Africa, what was new in the early 20th century was the coexistence of two different world views. The peoples of Africa continued to practise their traditional religions while also adopting forms of Christianity. In some cases, the same individuals shuttled between the two practices.

These various factors played their part in the evolution of social relationships. The economic, social, spatial and symbolic practices that can be seen in African rural and, especially, urban environments today are the product of a dynamic clash of traditions: on the one hand the internal determinants inherited from the past, and on the other the external economic and social determinants such as the internationalisation of production relationships, underdevelopment and urban growth. Increasingly, it is the latter that im-
Globalisation is not homogenisation

Some observers see cultural globalisation as leading to the world-scale homogenisation of societies. Others, myself included, see it as producing hybrid logics. Globalisation implies the use of a variety of homogenising tools (ranging from armaments and advertising techniques to styles of dress and external linguistic hegemonies) which are absorbed into local political and cultural economies. The local actors then produce new inventions on the basis of the factors deriving from the dominant cultures. They take over those factors as a function of their own prior cultural experiences. Homogenisation is simply an outward appearance, linked to the standardisation of techniques and consumption models. In any event, developments in ethnic, regional or religious fundamentalism suggest that fears about the possible disappearance of local cultures are overstated.

The question of the effects of cultural globalisation in Africa seems to be the most important and urgent one facing us today. True, globalisation gives rise to social fragmentation almost everywhere in the world. But Africa has special features linked, among other things, to economic, political and social handicaps. These are accentuating the elimination of the normative reference points.

A cultural crisis

The cultural crisis of African society is linked to the coexistence of two different world views: the traditional view, based on oral tradition, and the modern view based on the written word. Globalisation broadens the impact of this phenomenon. It creates a polarisation of the social strata: on the one hand, the literate who can become integrated into the process, and on the other, the illiterate who are increasingly marginalised.

An analysis of the African cultural landscape reveals two phenomena worthy of consideration by anyone concerned with the development of the continent. The first is the scale of illiteracy in many countries. Precolonial Africa had its own oral-based approach to education. The European system was added on to this. Illiteracy and inadequate schooling have been the consequence of this uncomfortable coexistence. More broadly, inadequate educational achievement is a brake on economic and social development, and a handicap to democracy. We have to recognise that education is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratisation to succeed – and it is undoubtedly fundamental, even if other criteria also have to be met. It is almost impossible to imagine active democracy in a society where more than half the electorate is unable to read or write. Yet this is often the reality in the Southern hemisphere, and especially in Africa.

In general terms, the coexistence of two different systems of education creates a division within African societies. It is a source of tension, as is more and more apparent from outbreaks of violence of all kinds. Do states have the means of solving this problem?

The second phenomenon concerns the 'disruptive' effects of modern educational systems. These are numerous, but I shall confine myself to a few aspects. First, the curricula are not always suited to the needs of the countries in question or the globalised employment market. From this standpoint, Africa's schools are actually helping to pull the 'social actors' away from their culture and roots. They are not succeeding in marrying tradition to modernity and so creating stable reference points for individuals. Second, the development of teaching is often accompanied by inequalities between regions of a single country or between the sexes. Although it is undesirable to generalise, this is one of the reasons for growing 'regional' demands by those who feel marginalised. Third, advances in schooling, both quantitative and qualitative, are creating a gap between the generation which achieved independence and occupies the political and administrative positions, and the new generation – that is better educated than its predecessors. Tensions have multiplied, especially at the onset of democratisation in 1989-90. In one way or another, they have influenced the success or failure of multi-party politics. How can this cultural crisis be explained?

Observers agree that such varied factors as the economic crisis and the transition to democracy have helped eliminate the normative reference points in Africa. More specifically, the cultural crisis
A challenge for the future

If Africa is to escape from its cul-de-sac, action will be needed on two complementary lines: identifying the continent's problems and handicaps and doing what is required to provide adequate responses. Analysts, governments and external actors such as the international organisations are certainly confronting a challenge.

Analysts have long played an important part in the planning of development policies. The anthropologists of the colonial period were the first to describe the native populations and propose ways of facilitating the work of 'civilising' them. For them, development was a linear process, the transition from a traditional society to a modern one. The practices of the Western model were thus diffused into every field. The results varied, depending on the type of colonisation (Belgian, British, French or Portuguese). But in all cases, the effect was the deculturisation of the African peoples and the denial of their history.

The postcolonial period has not changed the course of events. Governments have launched development projects backed by industrialised countries. During the mid-1980s, some observers and political actors became aware of the limitations – one might even say the failures – of development policies that had been implemented over almost three decades. Despite international aid, agricultural, commercial, economic, ecological, sanitary and urban conditions in Africa have consistently deteriorated.

Today, most observers explain the failure of development programmes in terms of the fact that colonialism imposed on the people of Africa lifestyles that they could not accept or understand. As a remedy, they propose the recognition of local traditions (customary law, traditional medicine, etc.) and priority for the wishes of the population. These are culturalistic explanations, at the opposite extreme to the argument mentioned above. I believe – as do others – that the issue is not a choice between tradition and modernity. They are not incompatible. The essential thing, rather, is to be able to reconcile them. This is the challenge that Africa's societies must meet.

Globalisation is an irreversible, though not a uniform process. A return to ancestral traditions can only increase the marginalisation of Africa and I believe the most urgent thing is to handle the cultural transition. What needs to be done is to rehabilitate the history of the peoples of Africa, while giving them the means to adapt to the process of globalisation. Not only are the specific and the universal not incompatible – they are, in fact, complementary. In looking at possible avenues for future progress, analysts need to take this into account.

Once the avenues have been identified, it will be necessary to stick to them. This is the second essential stage. Governments and providers of capital need to invest in the education and training of adults. And the teaching must emphasise not just practical knowledge but also universal values such as tolerance, respect for differences and the value of a dialogue between cultures and religions.

Investment in appropriate education and training – the best way of meeting the challenges of the 21st century.
Seychelles – a treasure trove in the Indian Ocean

The airborne visitor to Seychelles* will arrive in Mahé, the biggest and most populated of the islands. Landing on a runway of reclaimed land, on the edge of an island of soaring peaks covered with lush green vegetation, one is struck by the smallness and intimacy of the airport. There is an air of calmness, none of the clamour usually associated with holiday destinations. Ours is the only plane to land, airport formalities are over quickly and easily. Despite its exotic location in the Indian Ocean, and its spectacular beauty, Seychelles has not apparently become another victim of mass tourism.

The Seychelles archipelago consists of about 115 islands (the number is indefinite because of the difficulty of deciding when a rock becomes an island!), spread out in the Indian Ocean from Madagascar to the equator. The inner islands have the distinction of being the only mid-ocean group in the world which are granitic (all others being coral). The best known of this cluster of isles are Mahé, where 90% of the country’s 75,000 population live, Praslin, the second largest (population 2000), and La Digue which has 500 inhabitants. The outer ring of islands is coraline, and mostly uninhabited.

The population is a melting pot, drawn from European, African, Malagasy, Indian and Chinese backgrounds. Most Seychellois are trilingual, speaking Creole, the national language, French and English. Creole is a sort of phonetic French, most of which will be understood by francophones, although it also seems to incorporate a fair number of English words. While variants of this tongue are found in other places such as Mauritius and the Caribbean, it has been taken a step further in Seychelles. A Creole institute (Lenstiti Kreol) was set up to promote the language and there is a television station which broadcasts in it. A week-long Creole festival is held each year, beginning with a conference on a particular aspect of the local culture – in 1997 it was ‘Language and identity’. The festival also features other forms of cultural expression such as dance, poetry, literature, art and cooking. Used in law, business and politics, and the medium for all debates in the National Assembly, Creole is thus firmly rooted in Seychelles.

A dream location

It is not surprising that Seychelles has a reputation as an exclusive holiday destination; these are islands of extraordinary beauty, with endless stretches of sandy, palm-fringed beaches, seemingly empty of tourists. Many of these strands have been the backdrops for fashion shoots for glossy magazines. Beau Vallon beach in Mahé is where most visitors are concentrated, yet it is far from crowded and there is not a high-rise block in sight – in fact there is not a building in sight. The only giveaway sign is the lights twinkling among the palm trees when darkness falls. The policy is to build hotels just off the beach, with the rule that their height should not surpass the surrounding palm trees. The isolation of Seychelles – it is a nine-hour flight from Europe – and the resulting cost, probably also help to keep the holiday hordes at bay.

Here, visitors can pick the island of their choice. They can walk in green mountainous jungle, dive in crystal clear waters, sail into secluded...
ed coves (called anse), or hunt for pirate treasure. For a sample of traditional living, where transport is by oxcart, the place to go is La Digue. There are few cars here and no airport. Transport to the island is provided by an elegant schooner and a visit is recommended to the evocatively-named Anse Source d’argent beach, with its spectacular granite boulders (see photo on the inside back cover of this issue). Another attraction for the tourist is the island of Praslin, a suggested location for the biblical Garden of Eden. This, at least, was the theory of British general Charles Gordon, who came ashore here in the 19th century. The coco-de-mer palms found on the island are said to represent Adam and Eve, and they have entered the folklore of the Seychelles (see box). Praslin is nowadays a favourite holiday island for many Seychellois.

Those who choose not to venture from the main island of Mahé will be richly rewarded by the beauty and variety of the many beaches and coves. For a contrast, there is the cheerful, bustling capital, Victoria, with its dramatic mountain backdrop, elegant colonial buildings and tin-roofed dwellings half-hidden by vegetation.

Apart from the ‘sun, sea and sand’ guaranteed to satiate the most demanding of tourists, there is another side to Seychelles. The country has an extraordinary natural environment with an unrivalled diversity of flora, fauna and marine life. Such are the natural treasures that almost 60% of Seychelles’ territory is protected.

There are two World Heritage sites. The Vallée de Mai, on Praslin, is the habitat of Seychelles indigenous plants and trees, including the aforementioned coco-de-mer palm. The trees tower up to 30m high in a sombre valley, their broad fronds blocking out the sun and crashing against each other like giant waves when there is the slightest breeze. Vallee de Mai is also home to the rare black parrot, Seychelles national bird, and a variety of unusual reptiles. Aldabra, the other World Heritage site, is sanctuary to a unique collection of flora, fauna and marine life, drawing research scientists from around the world to its shores. It is said to be the largest coral atoll in the world, and is home to the planet’s biggest population of land tortoises (superlatives are unavoidable in Seychelles!). Galapagos is the only other place where these creatures are found living wild. Aldabra was saved from near destruction in the 1960s, when a plan to build a British-US military base there was averted following outcry from conservationists around the world over. Aldabra has yet another claim to fame – it is home to the only species of flightless bird in the Indian Ocean, the white-throated rail.

Tourism is a big earner

Not surprisingly, tourism is the major source of income in Seychelles, generating 70% of foreign exchange earnings, and 17% of GDP. Close to a fifth of the working population is directly employed in the sector, and a similar proportion have jobs in related businesses (ranging from taxi drivers to craft workers). Tuna processing has made big strides recently but ‘tourism remains the number one industry,’ says tourism and transport minister, Simone De Comarmond, ‘and I imagine this will be the case for many more years’. Despite this, the government is keen to keep the sector within bounds, to protect the unique environment and culture of Seychelles. ‘We have a policy not to have mass tourism; to go for quality rather than quantity’, explains Ms De Comarmond. ‘To do that, we have a limit on the number of beds – which, at the moment, is 5000’. The government has had its own stake in the tourist business, owning and running hotels. Now they are trying to sell off state-owned accommodation and attract potential investors. The authorities are keen to bring in some big, internationally-renowned hotel operators, to maintain the luxury tag. ‘They have the marketing power’, says the minister. ‘Working with them, we can better promote the destination’.

‘Bed tax’

In the 1997 budget, the government introduced a new levy on hotels, known, somewhat derisively, as the ‘bed tax’. It is, in fact, a property licence whose cost is based on the number of rooms in a hotel – regardless of whether they are occupied. The government points out that there has always been a hotel licence but hitherto, the amount charged has been minimal. The new arrangement involves an increase of about 200%. Ms De Comarmond justifies this move by saying, ‘bed tax’ is by oxcart, the place to go is La Digue.
Coco de Mer

Legends abound about this palm tree, the 'sea coconut', which is indigenous to Seychelles. It is a dioecious plant, which means that there is a male and a female tree, usually growing alongside each other. The female bears a huge nut, which can weigh up to 18 kg (the heaviest nut in the world). The nut has a strikingly feminine form, and the catkin growing on the male tree has a decidedly male shape! It is not surprising, therefore, that aphrodisiac qualities have been attributed to it. According to local lore, the trees approach each other at night-time – and anybody witnessing their union will not live to tell the tale! Sailors finding the husks of these nuts floating in the Indian Ocean, thought that the coco de mer tree grew under the sea – hence the name. The theory has also been advanced that it is the original Tree of Knowledge.

Seychelles is undoubtedly an expensive destination. It costs a lot to fly there and most hotels are in the middle to upper price range. It is now recognised that, to justify such relatively high prices, the quality of service has to be improved. There is a hotel and tourism training school, run by the Ministry of Tourism but working very closely with the private sector. Organisations involved in tourism are encouraged to have their own in-house training, with back-up from the school. 'We know that to have a good service we have to train', explained the minister. This applies not just to the hotel industry but across the board – to customs and immigration authorities, banks, shops and so on. A campaign called U-First has been launched to create public awareness of the importance of tourism and the need to give good service. As a destination which is off the beaten track, and facing tough competition, according to the Ms De Comarmond, 'we have to make every effort to get visitors.' She informed us that the rate of repeat visitor was running at between 18% and 20% – a good indication that efforts to improve the service are being repaid.

About 85% of visitors come from Europe, mainly from Britain, France, Germany and Italy. The government is trying to expand into other markets, such as South-East Asia and the Pacific, and has recently opened a tourist office in Singapore.

Air Seychelles, the national carrier, has recently stopped its direct flights to Tel Aviv and Madrid, and have withdrawn one of the two direct flights to Singapore, because they were not viable for the airline. It remains to be seen if this will have an effect on tourist figures.
Biosafety capacity-building in developing countries

by Ivar Virgin*

Modern biotechnology will provide important tools for developing countries in their quest to benefit from their genetic resources in a sustainable way. However, there have been concerns about the safety of these technologies. Hence, a key component of national biotechnology development strategies is the establishment of a biosafety regulatory oversight infrastructure.

Apart from the formulation of biosafety regulations, countries must also acquire the capacity to implement these regulations through scientifically-based, environmental impact assessments. This article describes some of the current biosafety capacity building activities relevant to the ACP countries.

The diversity of techniques that constitute modern biotechnology offers much to serve the pressing needs for sustainable development in agricultural, environmental and industrial programmes. However, the over-optimism that characterised the early advances of biotechnology has now given way to a more balanced assessment regarding which techniques will or will not prove useful in developing country settings. Nevertheless, science-based biotechnologies may gradually come to benefit both small-scale farmers and food processing industries in ACP countries who will increasingly look to science for solutions to pressing food production problems

During the last five years, integration of modern biotechnology into developing countries' research and development programmes has accelerated, especially in the field of agricultural research. Several ACP countries are now developing skills in advanced biotechnologies, including recombinant DNA technologies. While biotechnology may hold great promise for the future, concerns have also emerged over its potential environmental and health impacts. Although considerable knowledge of the properties of recombinant systems and a vast volume of data gathered from different applications of biotechnology are now available, these concerns are still evident.

As with any new technology, the rate of transfer and the level of success are dependent not only upon the access to capital, labour and supporting infrastructure, but also on an accepting environment in which to introduce and use it. Thus, an increasingly important part of an environment suitable for technology transfer and development is the establishment of a biosafety regulatory structure (the concept of biosafety is here defined as the policies and procedures adopted to ensure the environmentally safe applications of biotechnology). It is often argued that the biosafety regulatory structure facilitates biotechnology transfer. This is based on the notion that lack of such structure may lead to reluctance on the part of northern companies or agencies to use the new techniques in collaboration with partners in developing countries. In addition, scientists within the countries are reluctant to develop transgenic organisms without government sanction or regulatory reviews.

While biosafety issues have been discussed for over twenty years in the developed world, only in the last five years have the issues been extensively explored in the global arena. This has mainly occurred in connection with the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and Agenda 21 programme extensions. In 1995, the Conference of the Parties (COP II) to the CBD started a negotiation process to develop an International Protocol on Biosafety in the field of safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms. The decision reflected in part, developing countries' concerns regarding the un regulates transport and use of biotechnology products from industrialised countries.

The Protocol is not meant to substitute national regulations, but rather to act as an umbrella instrument to stimulate development of national legislation. Indeed, many ACP countries have now started to build a biosafety regulatory structure. For many of these countries there seems to be a general sequence of events in building such a structure. Raising the awareness among policy makers and scientists on biotechnology and biosafety issues usually triggers the process. Subsequently, a drafting committee is often charged with the task of formulating policies and drafting of biosafety regulations (accommodating, at best, views from all sectors of society). This is often followed by the formalisation of regulations and coordination of responsibilities. A key step in the process is the formation of a national biosafety advisory commit-

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* J. Bunders, B. Haverkort and W. Hiemstra (eds.) 'Biotechnology, Building on Farmers' Knowledge', 1996. Published by the ETC Foundation, Macmillan Education LTD, London, UK.
the harmonisation of guidelines and procedures in order to facilitate the adaptation and uniform interpretation of regulatory instruments regionally, but also worldwide.

However, neither an international biosafety protocol, nor national regulations, will facilitate the safe development of biotechnology in and of themselves. There must also be a national capacity to implement the regulations based on sound scientific principles with consistency and expedience. One could therefore argue that the capacity to regulate biotechnology through risk assessment and management is as important as regulations themselves. Looking at the international biosafety scene today, it is obvious that the dominant problem facing most developing countries is the lack of functional organisational structures and above all, the human capacity to ensure adequate biotechnology and biosafety policy implementation. Recognising this, a Regional Biosafety Focal Point (RBFP) has been established in Harare, Zimbabwe. Its present members are Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The principal objective of the Focal Point is to coordinate biosafety capacity building and the implementation of regional safety measures in the conduct of biotechnology within the region. The RBFP-standing committee consists of one member from each of the participating countries. The Secretariat is located in Harare.

Before discussing biosafety capacity building it is useful to try to define what constitutes achieving the capacity to successfully incorporate biosafety programmes into regulatory structures. The UNEP definition of biosafety capacity building is: 'the strengthening and/or development of human resources and institutional capacities. It involves the transfer of know-how, the development of appropriate facilities, training in sciences related to safety in biotechnology and in the use of risk-assessment and risk-management'.

Even though much of the incentive to deal with capacity building has to come from the developing countries themselves, there is a clear need for continuing assistance from international organisations. With a majority of the world's countries still without regulatory mechanisms and implementing experience, there will be a continuing need for these activities in the foreseeable future. To support capacity building in biosafety one can distinguish two areas of activities, both of which should be developed, but not necessarily simultaneously:

- Sustainable strengthening of infrastructure and expertise in biotechnology;
- Short-term training in risk assessment and risk management.

The former line of work is derived from the fact that it is virtually impossible to regulate and assess the risk of a particular genetically modified organism (GMO) when competence in relevant fields of biotechnology is weak or lacking. Without competence in the basic techniques, the development of a regulatory biosafety structure would occur in a vacuum. Hence, long-term assistance programmes in biosafety development must subsequently integrate capacity building in biosafety.

In recent years, capacity building in biosafety implementation has been addressed by international training programmes and regional workshops. The workshops have aimed at building institutional and individual capacity by sharing industrialised country experiences in biosafety regulations, risk assessment and management of GMOs with scientists, policy makers, and special interest group representatives. The overall goal has been to give the participants enough knowledge and confidence for them to take regulatory decisions. A good example of this is the recent 'Southern and East African Biosafety Workshop' held in Harare, Zimbabwe on 5-10 April 1997. The workshop was organised by the RBFP secretariat in collaboration with FSP-BIOGUM, SAGENE, etc.
pletely local expertise capable of drafting regulations and recommending sound assessments for decision-makers. However, they reach a limited number of people and are relatively expensive. Therefore, one also needs to look at rapid, country-driven and cost-effective mechanisms for capacity building. As a result of the many international and regional workshops, a significant number of ACP country scientists have been exposed to advanced training in practical risk assessment/risk management. However, there is still a long way to go to achieve a sufficient critical mass in each country. Looking just at Southern and Eastern Africa, for example, one would need to train about an extra 15 people per country to achieve a significant critical mass and understanding of the issues in each country. This will take time and ACP states urgently need basic capacity-building given the rapid technology development where GMOs are becoming a part of global commerce.

The time may therefore be ripe to develop programmes where already trained developing country scientists gather putative and present biosafety committee members and act as workshop resource persons themselves. They would thus organise their own national biosafety workshops, which could also be supplemented with outside resource persons. These workshops would be geared towards giving the countries enough capacity to address the right questions and fill the most pertinent information gaps. One of the main objectives would be to give regulatory scientists a sufficient background for meaningful information interpretation and updating.

A central issue at the Harare workshop was financial support for these training efforts. National government support – which for some might be indicated as a line item in the national budget – is important. But the reality is that, without outside financial assistance to help capacity-building efforts, many ACP countries will be unable to build sufficient capacity. The implementation of biosafety regulations must also be financially feasible. In industrialised countries, regulatory formulation and implementation is being accomplished by national and institutional committees and expert panels with broad scientific backgrounds. However, Tzotzos notes that 'the replication of this model in the developing world would require institutions, human and financial resources that are far beyond the means of the great majority of countries'. In addition, due to the rapid development and increased familiarity with recombinant DNA techniques, the international biosafety regulatory landscape is constantly evolving. Both the USA and Europe are looking at simplified and more flexible procedures. Therefore, policy-makers in ACP countries have seriously to consider regulatory structures that are protective, but appropriate to the potential risk and financially feasible.

As a final note, more and more countries are forming regulatory frameworks, usually adapting a practice already implemented elsewhere. Internationally, guidelines and the potential protocol under the CBD may help to assist the process while providing an overall umbrella to national biosafety regulations. These measures will be of limited use unless the implementation process can be made to conform to state of the art risk assessment/risk management practice. At a time when discretionary resources are diminishing and programmes have to be adjusted to reflect economic downturns, it is also time to consider how to be more effective in biosafety capacity-building efforts. Intergovernmental bodies, non-governmental organisations, and ACP countries may work independently, but they probably compromise their effectiveness if they work in isolation. Redundancies, missed opportunities for collaboration, and the potential stagnation of ideas and concepts may go hand in hand with a reluctance to interact.

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Industrial Partnership Meeting

The fruit and vegetable processing industry in Eastern and Southern Africa

Well known for their exports of fresh fruit and vegetables, Eastern and Southern Africa also have a significant production capacity for finished and semi-finished products in this sector. The industrial partnership meeting organised recently by the CDI in Zimbabwe brought together African producers, European importers and international experts on the matter. We take stock of this well targeted meeting.

In the wake of the meeting organised in Abidjan in June 1995 (Industrial Partnership Meeting - Tropical fruits of Western Africa) and the Agro-Industrial Forum held in Dakar in November of the same year, the CDI organised an industrial partnership meeting on the fruit and vegetable processing industry in Eastern and Southern Africa. It took place in Nyenga (Zimbabwe) from 22 to 26 September 1997.

39 companies had been carefully selected by the Centre to attend the event: 18 European firms interested in Africa’s potential for diversifying their sources of supply of intermediate and finished products, and 21 African agri-food enterprises based in Zimbabwe, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique and Swaziland. These 21 companies, those with the most experience in exporting processed fruit and vegetables were mainly Kenyan.

Export requirements

While, in the processing sector, all the ACP companies represented in Nyenga market their produce at national and regional level, only a small proportion have experience of large scale export – an area involving a level of expertise and equipment necessary to meet the quality criteria for the European market. For their supplies, European importers have a wide range of choice and only work with companies likely to be able to provide regular and fast delivery of the quantities required.

Specific opportunities

The markets which offer African producers of processed fruit and vegetables the most opportunities are the very specific, niche markets. A study, commissio-

Endorsement for CDI at the first Summit of ACP Heads of State and Government

The historic Summit of ACP Heads of State and Government in Libreville, Gabon, from 6-7 November 1997 was the first ever Summit at this level of ACP Governments, marking both the importance attached to ACP-EU cooperation by the ACP States as well as conveying the strongest message so far to the European Union of the ACP’s desire to maintain the benefits and advantages of the partnership, and to strengthen it further rather than allow it to weaken or deteriorate.

In the context of the role and importance of the private sector in its contribution to ACP development, a supportive position was taken by the ACP leaders on the need to ‘foster a culture of private enterprise’ as well as to ‘provide the development of a socially responsible private sector and encourage its participation in the development process.’

Significant recognition for the CDI came in the wake of lobbying by some to exclude any direct reference to it in the Summit Declaration. This advice was disregarded and a specific reference was included by the Heads of State and Government in the Libreville Declaration, as follows:

‘Declaration 30. We therefore call on the EU to:
(viii) strengthen and enhance the role of CDI so as to provide the ACP private sector with the necessary support in the promotion of industrial development activities.’

The CDI has, over the last two and a half years, made a dramatic turnaround having increased its output threefold, reduced its own costs and enhanced substantially the efficiency of its intervention mobilisation. This was achieved through a deliberate policy of the CDI Directorate to ‘debureaucratise’ its internal procedures, introduce production targets with close monitoring of results, and generally through an intense focus on optimum delivery of assistance to ACP private enterprise. ACP Governments are regularly briefed and appraised of the work carried out in their countries by the CDI. This appreciation of the CDI’s contribution to their industrial development effort by ACP Governments contributed in no small measure to the endorsement of the Centre in the Libreville Declaration.

1 Zimbabwe (9 companies); Kenya (6); Uganda (2); Tanzania (2); Swaziland (1) and Mozambique (2).
he partnership meeting, identified different specialities of interest to the European market. Certain vegetables – the processing of which requires a large workforce, such as beans or asparagus – may be sold tinned or quick-frozen and so can be exported at competitive prices. Drying (leeks, onions, etc.) is also a promising method. Tropical fruits marketed as frozen pieces – using the Individually Quick Frozen (IQF) method – are of interest to industrial importers and large distributors, while pulps, purées and concentrates from crops such as passion fruit, guava, papaya, mango and lichee can be used in the manufacture of certain industrial products (yoghurts, desserts) or be distributed to specialised markets.

Fresca Holdings – An ultra-modern company, with an annual production capacity of 1,800 tonnes of dried products geared mainly towards large-scale export (see box on following page).

To gain a foothold in large scale export, ACP producers must meet three requirements: a continuous supply of raw materials, controlled quality management and product packaging that meets the criteria of importers. These three factors were examined at the meeting and specific guidelines were drawn up to ensure that they are addressed in their entirety.

A steady supply of raw materials, controlled quality management and product packaging adapted to match the criteria of importers. Three essential keys to success in international partnerships.

Reliable supply

Processing companies in Eastern and Southern Africa are supplied by local medium-sized producers – not by large industrialised farms. The participants in the meeting stressed the key role which the CDI could play in assisting the planning and management of relations between producers and processing companies. One of the main keys to the success of Kenyan agri-food companies is the quality and regularity of their supplies – achieved through contracts establishing formal cooperation with local producers. The contracts specify, for example, the type of seed and fertilisers used, the timetable for sowing and harvesting, and quantities of guaranteed purchase.

Quality and packaging

The African companies represented at Nyenga are aware of the importance of quality and are prepared to adapt the organisation of their production in order to optimise the level of production while complying with HACCP standards and aiming for ISO 9000 approval. CDI support for a quality audit in the different companies represented, and recommendations for upgrading their produc-
Sharing additional skills and resources can quickly yield excellent results. The rapid growth of exports by the Fresca group, producing dried fruit and vegetables from Zimbabwean raw materials since June 1997, is a perfect example. Fresca Holdings is the result of a project, for which the feasibility study and financial package were drawn up with CDI support, and of an agreement concluded in 1995 between Foodtech Industries, a Dutch agri-food consortium, and the Interfresh group, Zimbabwe’s main distributor of fresh fruit and vegetables. With an annual production capacity of 1,800 tonnes of dried products (from 30,000 tonnes of raw material), the ultra-modern plant in Harare was built with co-funding from Proparco, a French development company, and other international and regional sponsors. A wide variety of dried fruits and vegetables (peaches, nectarines, apples, kiwis, green beans, peppers, leeks, onions, carrots, cabbages, tomatoes, etc.) can be produced in conditions subject to the most strict quality checks. The products are mainly exported to European, North American and South African markets where they are used to make soups, sauces, baby food and condiments.

Fifty local farmers concluded fresh fruit and vegetable supply contracts with Fresca Holdings, which made a commitment, in line with a growth in its activities, to provide its suppliers with technical training and to co-fund a programme to extend their holdings. When the plant runs at full capacity, turnover should reach $8 million, with 300 direct jobs and the creation of a further 2,500 indirect jobs.

To match the requirements for large-scale export, preparation and packaging must use materials and technologies to preserve product quality, and presentation should be thoroughly researched. However, in these regions of Africa, it is difficult to obtain certain types of materials – such as plastic film, manufactured only in South Africa, or high-quality cardboard boxes. Economic partnerships between African producers and European importers or industrialists may provide a solution to this type of specific problem.

For most of the European companies, the meeting was the first point of contact with Eastern and Southern Africa. Many of them have expressed readiness to provide general assistance to African companies wishing to meet the requirements and expectations of the European market. Such help, feasible in the short term, will guarantee the establishment of lasting commercial relations, even genuine joint ventures, between European and ACP partners.
Kiribati and its 33 islands

On 27 October 1997, the CDI was honoured with a state visit by Mr Teburoro Tito, President of the Republic of Kiribati. The visit provided an opportunity to take stock of the Centre’s activities in Kiribati, in the heart of the Pacific Ocean.

Stretching over a band of some 6,000 kilometres straddling the equator, the 33 islands which make up Kiribati cover 811 km². The large majority of its 80,000-strong population is concentrated on the Tarawa Islands and the Gilbert Islands, to the west of the country, which host the administrative centre of Kiribati. Up to independence in 1979, phosphate mining on the island of Banaba provided the backbone of the regional economy, accounting for 85% of export receipts and 45% of tax revenue. Since then, the drying up of resources has forced the authorities to seek other means of guaranteeing economic development in the country.

Copra and coconut are the main viable agricultural resources of the Kiribati islands. The 10,000 tonnes of copra produced on average every year account for 70% of the income of the rural population and a significant proportion of export receipts (77% in 1992). However, the shortage of arable land – the tail ground of Kiribati is mainly coral, sand and rock – and the high population density (almost 100 inhabitants per km²) restrict the development of the agricultural sector.

Significant fishing possibilities

Fish resources, however, hold significant possibilities for development. Currently, although the Republic of Kiribati has one of the largest fishing zones in the world – extending over almost 3 million km² –, the sector accounts for less than 20% of GNP. As President Teburoro Tito stressed, the economic future of the country will depend especially on its ability to develop its fishing and seafood processing companies. He also stressed that CDI activity in the sector responded to the specific concerns of the Kiribati authorities.

The tuna sector

The person responsible for the Kiribati area in the CDI, Vana Catsica, introduced the various CDI measures which relate particularly to the development of the tuna sector. In July 1997, the CDI supported a feasibility study for the establishment of a joint venture involving Te Mautari Ltd, a publicly owned company specialising in this type of fishing. Two experts from the Greek firm Nireus also had the task of assessing the potential for developing fish farming on the islands of Tarawa and Kiritimati as well as the soundness of Teikabuti, the only private fishmonger in Kiribati, which also packs processed products. The conclusions of this study prompted the CDI to provide the company with direct assistance for the management and training of fishing staff. The CDI coordinator for the Pacific region, Peter Alling, highlighted the possible opportunities for these companies at the industrial partnership meeting which the CDI has decided to organise for the tuna sector in 1998 in Portugal.

Following his visit to the CDI, President Teburoro Tito good-humouredly declared that he was pleasantly surprised by the level of expertise demonstrated by the Centre in terms of the situation in his country. He stressed that, despite its geographical isolation, the Republic of Kiribati was nonetheless firmly on the path to economic development.
Project profile

Industrial mineral ores in the Dominican Republic

As they are well suited to the local construction industry, lime and gypsum offer promising development prospects in the Caribbean. We turn the spotlight on Procalca and Caribbean Gypsum, two Dominican Republic companies which receive CDI assistance to enhance the competitiveness and quality of their products.

With a turnover of more than 10 million dollars in 1994, Procalca is the largest producer of quicklime and slaked lime – the first is manufactured without water while the second is hydrated – in the countries of the Caribbean regional economic organisation (Caricom). Since 1994, the company has been receiving on-going assistance from the CDI. The Centre’s first intervention, in the form of an overall diagnostic of the company’s activities, came at a time when the firm was facing technical problems and was seeking to increase its production capacity. The study concluded that there was a need to reduce energy consumption and to exercise better control over certain aspects of production, particularly the use of ovens.

Produce better by consuming less

To meet this objective, a technical assistance programme supported by the CDI was established in 1995 and 1996. A CDI consultant went on several missions to Santo Domingo to coordinate the necessary improvements. More appropriate selection of the limestone rocks used, coupled with certain changes in the method of loading the kilns and the configuration of the burners, meant that the company rapidly improved its results and, in particular, enhanced the quality of the lime itself. The production capacity grew by 9% while energy consumption fell dramatically.

1997-1998: further technical assistance

In response to these encouraging results and at the request of Procalca, the CDI renewed the technical assistance contract for 1997-1998. There is still room for improvement in the production apparatus, both in terms of the yield and the quality of products. The Dominican Republic company should also receive advice from a CDI consultant on developing its...
production of ultra-pure limestone. The consultant's visits will also be used to improve the training of the technical staff and to coordinate Procalca's commercial strategy for penetrating new markets.

Plaster: a key regional market

Caribbean Gypsum Ltd produces very high-quality plaster from local gypsum. This Dominican Republic company, supported by the CDI, is also growing rapidly. The dynamism of the construction industry is such that the demand for plaster is well above the level of domestic production – shared among three companies.

Caribbean Gypsum requested CDI assistance to help it to boost its production capacity and reduce its energy consumption. An initial diagnostic, prepared by a CDI associate consultant, concluded that while production capacity could easily be doubled, significant technological changes would be necessary to reduce energy consumption.

New technologies

The company decided to replace its kettle-type kiln – with a low energy yield – by a fluid-bed kiln which is much more economical. Under an assistance programme supported by the CDI, and following a call for proposals, a South African supplier of technology and equipment was chosen to renew the thermal infrastructures of Caribbean Gypsum.

CDI assistance will in particular enable the introduction of experimental tests, equipment tests in operational conditions in South Africa prior to delivery, installation checks in the plant in the Dominican Republic, training for technicians and the first on-site tests. The equipment is currently being assembled and should be exported to the Dominican Republic before the end of 1997. The tests carried out in South Africa simulating the working conditions of the equipment, and in the presence of Caribbean Gypsum technicians, should mean that the manufacturer can make any necessary adjustments and that the Dominican Republic operator can become familiar with the new technology being used. The time needed for installation in the plant in the Dominican Republic and for operational start-up will therefore probably be reduced as far as possible, which means that the new equipment should be used for production within a few months of delivery.
ducers lies in the development of two types of product: skins and semi-processed leathers (wet blue stage) on the one hand, and semi-finished products (crust) and finished products on the other.

Semi-processed skins have traditionally been the mainstay of African exports. In 1996, deliveries of African wet blue to Italy, Europe's main importer, totalled ECU 1.1 billion. Although this figure was a 15% increase on the previous year, available resources are nonetheless under-used. Improving the recovery rate for skins (between 60% and 70% on average) and initial processing of the raw material to obtain semi-processed skins that could compete with the fierce competition from abroad (in particular Brazil), are considerable challenges that must be met by African leather exporters.

The need to master the processing stages is even more crucial in the production of crust and finished products. Access to the international market for African producers is heavily influenced by international quality standards, certification procedures, the increasing number of eco-labels and fierce competition from Pakistan and India. 'The main obstacle to access to the European finished products market is quality' stressed the representative of an Eritrean tannery. 'If we are to comply with standards in these markets, we need a skilled workforce and suitable modern technology.'

Such problems are not insurmountable. Some of the African tanneries exhibiting in Bologna are currently involved in programmes to modernise their production apparatus and have sought technical assistance from the CDI. This is the case for Keith Bahri, an Eritrean tannery – which processes 500 skins daily and exports 25% of its production as wet blue to the European Union – and Kembe, a Zambian tannery, which processes 400 skins daily, of which 55% are exported to EU countries.

The discussions organised during the Bologna trade fair also demonstrated the need to strengthen cooperation between the various African representatives of the leather industry (breeders and tanneries in the different countries, suppliers of the equipment and products necessary to process leather, sales and promotion bodies, etc.) and European importers.

African Leather, held in Johannesburg from 3 to 5 December 1997, was organised specifically to meet this concern. A cooperation forum was held on the fringes of the trade fair to promote and develop industrial agreements and synergies between the various participants. The organisers also hope to establish regional supply and marketing networks. These are vital to the growth of domestic markets in finished products, which are to act as a driving force behind the development of the African leather industry as a whole.
IN BRIEF

Concrete components – West Africa

A sectoral study, entitled Concrete components in CEDEAO countries, was commissioned by the CDI in preparation for the Partnership Meeting which the Centre organised in Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) from 11 to 14 November. This sector is growing significantly in the region. The study, directed at professionals in the building industry, introduces the building market in the West African Economic Community (CEDEAO), and in particular, the cement, aggregates and concrete reinforcement markets.

There is a structured examination of the following areas for each of the countries in the region: macro-economic situation; presentation of demand for concrete components in both the public and private sector; practical and regulatory information for companies wishing to penetrate domestic markets; presentation of existing supply, in particular with details of the quality of inputs (cement, sand and gravel) offered by local producers; investment opportunities in the concrete components sector. The profiles of European and African companies which attended the meeting are included in the appendix.

CDI contact: Sid Boubekeur

Textile sector: Portugal and Cape Verde

From 19 to 26 November, Portuguese industrialists specialising in textiles went on a business trip to Santiago and São Vicente, in Portuguese companies involved are set on investing in Cape Verde. In total, eight intervention letters or agreement protocols were signed between Portuguese businessmen and PROMEX during the mission.

CDI contact: Sebastião Ditutala

Mines ‘98

The European Union-Western and Central Africa Mining Forum, a point of contact for business designed to develop investment in the mining sector, will be held in Accra (Ghana) from 30 March to 2 April 1998. The meeting is organised by the European Community and the West African Economic Community (CEDEAO), in close cooperation with the CDI and the Central African Customs and Economic Union (UDEAC). The conference, designed above all to be a business meeting, will bring together European mining companies and finance companies specialising in the mining sector seeking to develop medium or long term cooperation with African partners. To this end, the CDI and the European Commission have set up a technical assistance fund (FACT) to facilitate the completion of projects launched during the Forum.

The mining potential of Western and Central Africa is particularly rich and diversified – ranging from gold to uranium, including shale, tin, diamonds, phosphate, iron ore, bauxite and even ornamental stone. These resources currently provide new opportunities, particularly as a result of the development of infrastructures and the reform of legislation on investment in several countries in the region.

CDI contact: Sid Boubekeur

Spanish companies as ACP partners

The eighth meeting of the CDI Steering and Follow-up Group with Spanish partners took place in Bilbao, at the invitation of the SPRI (Sociedad para la Promoción y Reconversion Industrial of the Basque Country), on 8 October. The Centre was represented by Fernando Matos Rosa, deputy director, and Paolo Baldan, responsible for the European Network. When providing details of key statistics of CDI activity in 1996, Mr Matos Rosa stressed the percentage of support for new projects (32%), expansion (29%) and rehabilitation (39%) in ACP countries and confirmed the steady growth of Spain’s involvement in partnerships between European and ACP companies. In 1997, the CDI supported four projects with Spanish interests (manufacture of soft drinks in Cape Verde, fishery product processing plant in Namibia, extraction and processing of natural stone in Ghana, and marble in the Dominican Republic). Five other dossiers are currently near completion – manufacture of detergents in Cape Verde, paper in Senegal, wood processing in Côte d’Ivoire, fish processing in Gambia and tanneries in Burkina Faso.

Paolo Baldan gave a brief outline of the various trade meetings organised by the CDI in 1997 and noted plans for Spanish professionals in the ornamental stone sector to visit the Dominican Republic.

Fernando Aceña, representative of the ICEX (Instituto Español de Comercio Exterior), presented the outcome of the Spanish investors’ mission to Cape Verde (April 1997), which is mainly being implemented through commercial partnerships in the food sector, and the results of the industrial twinning programme with the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago.

CDI contact: Paolo Baldan
Nature conservation in Madagascar

On account of the diversity of its native species, Madagascar is a very special island: many of its flora and fauna are unique. The island also has huge natural resources which should, of course, be exploited to help the island and its people prosper. Unfortunately, nature is under constant attack. In the south, peasants who have nothing other than herds of zebu, burn off vegetation from the small plots of land they tend from time to time. In order to fertilise that land, they regenerate the plot after they have burnt off the vegetation. Their actions are, in fact, futile, because such fertility as the land has will last only about three years. The soil is left so degraded that it resembles a lunar landscape and although some international organisations do attempt, in a fashion, to remedy the situation by planting pines and shrubs, this is, I feel, a disorganised and artificial procedure. Is it not preferable to attack the root of the problem rather than its symptoms? This could be done by making people more aware of the situation, explaining to them the detrimental consequences their actions have on the environment. Use could be made, for example, of audiovisual means, via TV news broadcasts, and the campaign could be extended to schools. Above all, educate the children — the future of the Malagasy nation — to manage their environment better and to adapt solutions to their specific problems. Furthermore, alternative resources ought to be provided for the peasant farmers: small-scale stock-rearing could be developed further (poultry, geese, etc.); basic foodstuffs, such as maize, could be produced; there could be further expansion into other crops (such as beets). It would be more advantageous to release funds for smallholdings rather than to attempt to replant forest and woodland, as this does not always yield the hoped for results. It takes many years before trees reach maturity, and as the vegetation does not grow in its original environment, it cannot have a symbiotic relationship with the rest of nature.

In the world in which we live, there are many who have become aware of the need to step up environmental protection. This priority has too often been neglected, environmental issues taking second place to economic ones. Surely, however, this approach yields only short-term profits? Why not identify what Madagascar’s local development needs are and help it to meet them? In this way, we could help create a more stable market economy which is more accessible to the wider population. Sectors such as crafts and small trade associations are just as valuable as heavy industry, and they require less investment. This is where micro-projects come into their own, with decentralised cooperation, judiciously applied, making it possible to avoid repeating past errors. In future, let us take account of differences in human behaviour and adapt cultural wealth to suit everyone’s needs.

Anne de Greef, Brussels, Belgium (just returned from Madagascar)

Call for international response to the tragedy in Congo-Brazzaville

Well-informed observers were ringing the alarm bells about the situation in Congo-Brazzaville for some time before the latest upheavals. The elements of tragedy were undoubtedly coming together, despite the determination of those in power to maintain the decaying institutional system which underpinned their position of privilege. Yet nothing was done to prevent the disaster. Hypocrisy can be seen in the attitude adopted by various politicians and their followers. The intellectuals, academics and other men of rank (principally from the army) show few signs of being democrats. They do not appear to be people who accept ‘contradiction and its spirit’ as a fundamental principle. Yet democracy cannot be established by decree.

The exercise of power requires, first and foremost, a struggle between political forces. But if one force succeeds in neutralising another, this generally leads to the establishment of a single-party system. The form and the content of the prevailing ‘ideology’ hardly matter. When this happens, there is little that any one country can do in the context of international law or international relations. Given this, salvation can only come to the Congolese through a concerted approach from the world’s political leaders determined to implement existing international mechanisms. The Organisation of African Unity has a useful role to play but alone, it has neither the power nor the capacity to solve conflicts in Africa.

Edouard Kouvinga, Rheims, France.
La dynamisation des initiatives locales: une force synergie de développement
(Dynamising local initiatives: a synergetic force for development)
Sub-Saharan Africa, which has received more donor assistance over the last three decades than any other region, has still not achieved broad-based, sustainable development. Today, half of its people continue to live in poverty.

Given this situation, the author of this book (a former Portuguese diplomat who now works at DG VIII of the European Commission) recognises that donor efforts have not lived up to expectations. Without claiming to offer any panaceas, he argues for a 'concerted mobilisation' involving integrated programmes, and initiatives by local people and economic actors. The key word he uses in this context is 'synergies'. In practical terms, he argues that this entails the application of methods which are closer to local populations and more capable of responding to their needs and aspirations.

Publications received

Revue noir
No. 26 Sept 1997 Madagascar: Art Contemporain Africain
No. 27 Dec 1997 Fashion special
(Revue Noire, 8 rue Cels, 75014 Paris, France).
The two most recent editions of Revue Noire, which is a bilingual quarterly magazine (French and English), offer their readers an opportunity to sample the best of African artistic endeavour – which is insufficiently explored and underexploited.
Number 26 is devoted to Madagascar's rich and living culture. Areas featured include applied art, music, dance, theatre, fashion, photography and literature. The texts are accompanied by some beautiful photographic illustrations. No. 27 portrays the magnificence of black fashion, featuring the work of numerous designers of African origin from different corners of the globe (Africa, Europe and the United States). The talents of those involved are revealed to best effect in creations which use a range of materials, sumptuous colours, striking designs and attractive models. The pictures are complemented by poetic commentaries which underline the depth of 'black' creativity.
The publication of Revue Noire is supported by the EU and French cooperation.

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Working Papers on EU Development Policy

The Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Godesberger Allee 149, 53175 Bonn, Germany) has issued five working papers on various aspects of the ACP-EU relationship. These are as follows.
1. The Pacific ACP States and the end of the Lomé Convention by Roman Grynberg. 34 pp. ISBN 3-86077-593-6

Fa'a-Samoa – the Samoan way... between conch shell and disco
Based on fieldwork trips carried out in the 1980s, this work offers a brief description of Samoan culture, and a more detailed treatment of how music and dance has evolved in this Polynesian island nation. It is intended to offer a snapshot of a society in transition – still deeply attached to the traditions of family and village life, but increasingly affected by external influences. The book is illustrated with good quality (black and white) photographs featuring various dance forms.
Brussels plays host to African artists

Two major events in the calendar of African artists took place in Brussels in October and November 1997.

The first of these was the African Festival – Fest'Afric – which ran from 17 to 26 October. Organised on the initiative of and coordinated by the NGO Coopération par l'éducation et la culture (CEC), it brought together artists from a number of countries, including South Africa, Angola, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire), Guinea, Madagascar, Mali and Senegal. The attraction of Fest'Afric lies in the variety of areas it covers: music, theatre, contemporary dance, exhibitions, films, events and meetings, with artists combining traditional and modern forms through voice, sound and image.

According to the organisers, the aim of the Festival was emphatically to reject the widespread, pessimistic view of and attitude towards Africa which appears prevalent these days, proudly displaying its colours and cultural wealth but without repudiating its pain and sorrows.

Fest'Afric ably demonstrated the wealth and diversity of Africa's cultural heritage. It provided a space where artists and the general public alike could take part in a process of mutual discovery and, by sharing art, find the key to a common humanity. The best way to combat racism is to help people discover one another. This is fully in keeping with current European concerns – 1997 has been Anti-Racism Year.

The second event was the 4th African Book Fair which ran from 14 to 17 November. Since it was first held in October 1991 (it is staged every two years), the number of visitors has steadily increased (350 in 1991, 1200 in 1995). It is organised by the Eischenhof Flemish Centre and the CEC.

For visitors, the Book Fair is an opportunity to make exceptional discoveries: a huge number of titles are available, not only recent publications but also old books. The organisers invite African authors to take part in events during the Fair, which is also an opportunity to find out about African publishers.

Information on these two events may be obtained from the CEC, 18, rue Joseph II, 1000 Brussels. Tel. (32-2) 217 90 71, Fax (32-2) 217 84 02. Pammie Sebahara

The Reality of Aid

For the fifth year in succession, Eurostep, an association of European NGOs, has published its report on development cooperation entitled The Reality of Aid (available only in English).

The report analyses the official development assistance (ODA) provided by each of the OECD's Member States. The latest figures show that the amount provided overall has fallen to its lowest level since 1950, at just 0.25% of total GDP. This year the report also offers a topical assessment of relations between the European Community's development programme and that of the Member States from a post-Lomé perspective, concentrating on financial and budgetary aspects. Among other things, the authors explain how, despite the fact that the funds allocated under EC programmes have actually increased substantially since 1990, the same does not apply to the sums actually paid out. Commitments are thought to be ECU 3 billion higher per year than the amounts disbursed. At issue is the fact that both EDF payments (disbursed, on average, over a 15-year period though the treaty covering any one EDF is ostensibly for five years) and those made under EC budget lines, take place very slowly, owing, it is said, to a shortage of staff and other resources. The authors claim that if this trend continues, unspent commitments may well amount to ECU 25 billion by 1999.

The report also contains a chapter entitled The EU and Africa, in which the authors offer their own viewpoint on the budget aid proposals contained in the Green Paper. Among other things, they stress the importance of a clearly defined partnership between the EU and the ACP States and the fact that the primary purpose of such aid is to eradicate poverty.

The Reality of Aid, an independent review of development cooperation. Eurostep, 115, rue Stévin, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. Tel. (32-2) 231 16 59, Fax. (32-2) 230 37 80 T.G.

British aid to focus more on poverty

The UK's recently-elected Labour government has issued a policy document (White Paper) promising a new approach to its overseas development cooperation. Aspects of British aid have been criticised in the past, with suggestions that the fundamental goals of development policy have been neglected in favour of schemes which benefit UK companies. The Overseas Development Minister, Clare Short, is keen to change this perception and has announced a drive for greater coherence, encompassing agriculture and environment policy as well as issues such as debt and trade. Ms Short attracted praise when, shortly after taking office, she abolished a subsidy scheme for British firms bidding for big development contracts in the Third World. The White Paper does not, however, propose the complete ending of 'tied aid'.

The Minister said that the government aimed to reverse the decline in British ODA and make progress towards the UN's 0.7% GDP target, although no specific timetable has been set out. For the national budget as a whole, the government in London is committed to remaining...
Future cooperation in agriculture and rural development

More than 30 Southern African NGO representatives from the agriculture and rural development sector met in Harare, Zimbabwe on 7-8 October to discuss future cooperation between the EU and Southern Africa following the expiry of the Lomé Convention.

The first objective of the meeting was to initiate a process aim at facilitating the involvement of participants and their organisations and partners in the debate on the post Lomé-IV arrangements. Second, the meeting sought to identify an initial list of key issues and concerns that should be addressed in any new cooperation framework between the EU and ACPs, with particular reference to the agriculture and rural development sector.

The workshop was also attended by 'resource persons' from EU and Southern African regional institutions, and government representatives.

During the discussions, food security was identified as a strategic issue for the SADC countries. The objective should be self-reliance through economic integration and a combination of (i) availability, determined by storage, trade and production (ii) access, determined by food prices and income safety nets, and (iii) nutrition, determined by food quality and safety.

In order to have an impact on poverty, the meeting stressed the importance of investing in infrastructure, skills and renewable resources, particularly for small scale farmers. There was also felt to be a need for policy research, analysis, information and monitoring. Improving income stability (safety nets, minimum wages) was seen as critical, bearing in mind the seasonal fluctuations that affect agriculture and the impact that these have on the poorest members of society.

Other key issues discussed at the conference included:
- NGO participation in policy-making at the level of national agriculture policy;
- Putting gender issues into the mainstream and improving understanding of how gender dynamics affect development;
- Agrarian land reform with a focus on smallholders;
- Ensuring stakeholders such as small-scale farmers have access to market and other relevant information;
- Capacity-building at the local level including empowerment of NGOs and community based organisations;
- Supporting rural infrastructures and guaranteeing the availability of finance for agricultural inputs.

It was recognised that national development priorities are well reflected in EU aid programmes. However, priority setting, it was felt, did not sufficiently involve non-state actors and stakeholders. Concern was expressed over declining levels of funding for agriculture and rural development in contrast to structural adjustment support (including funding of imports), which had increased.

The participants concluded that a lack of information about EU instruments hampered greater participation of non-state actors in projects and programmes. It was also recognised that NGOs tended to shy away from EU aid because of bureaucracy and complicated procedures. Finally, the point was made that NGOs needed help to organise themselves better and enhance their capacity to mount sustainable projects — so that the resources channelled through them could be put to the best possible use.

For more information contact: 'Mwengo', Nancy Kwachinge, Tel: (263) 472 14 69.
Anthony Acheampong (Research analyst specialising in ACP-EU cooperation)

ACP NGOs meet in Entebbe

NGO representatives from ACP countries met in Entebbe, Uganda from 28-31 October. The objectives of the meeting were to hold consultations, strengthen interaction among civil society groups in the three regions and enhance the NGOs' scope for direct access and input into the post Lomé IV framework.

The meeting, which was the first of its kind, issued a declaration, the main points of which were as follows:

Political dialogue: Institutions of political dialogue should be created and the approach should be guided by the principles of democracy and good governance, macro-economic policy management and conflict resolution.

Trade, trade cooperation and investment in an era of globalisation. The key areas to include in dealing with this subject are the social and environmental impact, finding ways of protecting vulnerable economies and fair trade.

Financial and technical support. The central issues identified here were debt, poverty and the environment, domestic investment capacity, and enhancing aid effectiveness.

In concluding, the NGOs represented at the meeting affirmed that they would strive together with civil society groups throughout the ACP countries to articulate and promote the needs, interests and aspirations of all peoples for a better society in the new millennium.

Zimbabwe International Book Fair

Access to information is one of Africa's greatest needs — and the annual Zimbabwe International Book Fair is one of the continent's main showcases in this area. The next ZIBF will be held from 1-8 August 1998. It will feature a wide range of books, magazines, jour-
Ethiopian minister addresses MEPs

On 24 November, the Development Committee of the European Parliament was addressed by Seyoum Mesfin, Ethiopia's Foreign Minister. He gave his listeners an overview of the situation in his country and spoke about the role it hoped to play in future within the sub-region.

The Minister began by urging the parliamentarians to do everything possible to ensure equitable ACP-EU relations. Acknowledging the fragility of democratic structures in Ethiopia, he stressed that democratisation (of society and politics) was the main objective of the Addis Ababa government and that the latter was committed to respecting constitutional principles.

Looking at the regional situation, Mr. Seyoum detailed the efforts undertaken by his government to reconcile the various Somali factions. In a similar vein, he said that a resolution of the crisis in Sudan would not be achieved until a dialogue was established between rival groups, although there were also other formidable obstacles to overcome. With the determination and collaborative efforts of other states in the region (Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda) it should, however, be possible to find a way out of the impasse. The minister went on to speak about his country's serious concerns over the violence committed by extremist groups in Algeria and Egypt.

MEPs expressed their approval of the speech, and congratulated the minister on his 'objectivity'. They put questions on a number of topics – including human rights, education, helath, food security and institutional reforms – to which Mr Seyoum replied.

It was during this session that the minister explained how Ethiopia was working to reduce defence spending and put more emphasis on the social sectors. He also thanked the European Commission for the help provided in the education and health fields. Agriculture was another priority area, he indicated, when talking about of improving food security. Finally, in the political sphere, the authorities were continuing to pursue reforms, begun in 1991, designed to establish a federal system for the country. The basic elements were already in place, with two national chambers and nine autonomous local parliaments.

Development ministers dwell on Lomé successor

EU development ministers furthered the Union's own discussions on the content of a successor to Lomé IV at their bi-annual meeting in Brussels on November 28. A simplification of the funding aspects of the Lomé Convention was advocated by a majority of ministers. This, explained Luxembourg's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Georges Wohlfart, who presided over the meeting, should entail a distinction between venture capital, investment capital and crisis funds. As for the existing Stabex and Sysmin funds, France's development minister, Charles Josselin, said that some delegations wanted these scrapped, although this was not the French view.

Mr Wohlfart indicated that many delegations supported the introduction of a tighter 'merit system', with review of aids at regular intervals leading to adjustments favouring 'good spenders' at the expense of those who deployed the funds less effectively. On the question of the geographical scope of future arrangements, notably in the sphere of trade, Minister Josselin said that there was broad support for greater regional differentiation. Many EU ministers felt that the ACPs should adapt to WTO rules over a ten-year span, with safeguards for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). But it now seems unlikely that there will any new LDC members in the next Convention. Mr Wohlfart explained that the European Parliament had already rejected the idea of expansion to a further nine LDCs during discussion of the Wilfried Martens report. Such a move would be unlikely to find favour among existing ACP states if the result for them was a reduced 'share of the cake'.

Mr Josselin found some sympathy among fellow ministers for innovations he had suggested; an agency to speed up and evaluate fund disbursement; and making funds available to ACP emigrants to EU nations who wished to return home, in close consultation with the ACPs concerned. He also recommended strengthened dialogue with ACPs on 'good governance', not with a view to greater conditionality, but rather to 'richer and fuller debate' on the issue.

Resolutions were passed on; equality between the sexes in development, including developing nations in the 'information society'; chocolate ('to conserve its original content') and, making better use of microfinancing. Humanitarian Affairs Commissioner, Emma Bonino, highlighted the worsening situation in Somalia where 1,300 people had already perished in the flooding. The Council also took stock of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. On Nigeria, a resolution was agreed which reiterated the line already taken by the EU's Foreign Ministers: 'If elections fail to produce a return to democracy and the rule of law in Nigeria before October 1 1998, the EU will adopt further measures in addition to those adopted on December 4 1995'. This means that there will be no sporting sanctions in the meantime – allowing Nigeria to take part in the 1998 Football World Cup in France.

P.S.
Analytical index 1997

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Nos 161: January-February 1997
162: March-April 1997
163: May-June 1997
164: July-August 1997
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Operational summary
n° 100 - January 1998
(position as at 17 December 1997)

European Development Fund schemes
The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of schemes funded by the European Community under the EDF (Lomé Convention).

Geographical breakdown
The summary is divided into three groups
• Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) country projects.
• Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) projects.
• Regional projects
The information within each of these groups is given by recipient country (in alphabetical order).

Main abbreviations
Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority
Int. Tender: International invitation to tender
Acc. Tender: Invitation to tender (accelerated procedure)
Restr. Tender: Restricted invitation to tender
T.A.: Technical Assistance
EDF: European Development Fund
(e.g. EDF 7 = 7th European Development Fund)
mECU: million European currency units

Information given
The following details will usually be given for each development scheme:
• The title of the project.
• The administrative body responsible for it.
• The estimated sum involved (prior to financing decision) or the amount actually provided (post-financing decision)
• A brief description of projects envisaged (construction work, equipment supplies, technical assistance etc.)
• Any methods of implementation for example, international invitations to tender).
• The stage the project has reached (identification, appraisal, submission for financing, financing decision, ready for implementation)

Note: Participation in EDF schemes is strictly confined to ACP or EU firms.

Blue Pages on the INTERNET
Enter the DG VIII Home Page
http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg08/dgviii.htm
Choose the option 'On going tenders' or 'On going projects'

Correspondence about this operational summary can be sent directly to:

Mr Franco Cupini,
Directorate-General for Development
European Commission
G12 4-14, 200, rue de la Loi
B-1049 Brussels

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<td>Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc.</td>
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ANGOLA
Rehabilitation of the Tchivinguiro Institute. 8.24 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF ANG 7014 - AFb
Reconstruction support programme. 55 mECU. Relaunch of economic and social activities. Improvement of basic social services and living conditions, poverty alleviation, increase of production and of basic communication possibilities, amelioration of basic infrastructures, participation in mine-clearing operations, support for demobilisation. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF ANG 6036/001 - AGz, AFz
Rehabilitation in rural areas of Huamo province. 3 mECU. To repair health and education infrastructure and help to get farming and other productive activities up and running again. Projects managed by Save the Children Fund (UK), Oikos (P), Concern (Ireland) and Haltrust (UK) for mine clearance operations. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF ANG 7255/012 - ACz
Support for training of lawyers and academics in the Law Faculty of Agostinho Neto University (FDUAN). 0.800 mECU. Training, supply of equipment. Project in execution.
EDF ANG 7018/000 - AFb

BELIZE
EDF BEL 6001/002 - ABd
Specific assistance for the banana industry. Two tenders for equipment (nos. 4270 and 4271 to be launched at end of October). Opening of bids for no. 4270 (supply of ten lots of packaging equipment) and for no. 4271 (supply of two lots of equipment for handling and road transport) 23.1.98 at 10.30 local time.
Financed from budget CE B7-5023/95.

BURKINA FASO
Support project for the reform of the pharmaceutical sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé - Direction des Services Pharmaceutiques (DSPh) and CAMEG 1.6 mECU. Line of credit, works, equipment and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF BK 7017 - AGc
EDF SYSMIN BK 9999 - ADa
Ouagadougou dam classified forest development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement et de l'Eau. Estimated total cost 1.200 mECU. EDF part 0.300 mECU. Cofinancing with CFD (F). The Netherlands (possible). Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF BK 7023 - AHf
EDF BK 7024 - AAb
EDF BK 7200/004 - AAc

BOTSWANA
Syssim - support to base metal industry (Copper-Nickel-Cobalt). Resp. Auth.: BCL Ltd., 33.7mECU. To deepen the shaft of the Selebi-North mine, to reach a new ore-body, equipping it and carrying out new prospective drilling to identify new ore-bodies. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF SYSMIN BT 9999/001 - ADa
Botswana Tourism Development Programme (Foundation phase). Resp. Auth.: Department of Tourism (DoT) of Commerce and Industry. 1.91 mECU. Short- and long-term T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF BT 5019/001 - AEc
Trade Development Programme (Phase I). Resp. Auth.: Department of Trade and Investment Promotion. Estimated cost 1.700 mECU. To support trade diversification and export promotion. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF BT 7008 - AEa
EDF BT 7004/001 - AFD

CAMEROON
Regional economic integration programme in Central Africa - regional infrastructures. 98 mECU. Building of the Berlioux-Geroua Bulai road. Works and management of the works. Will be launched in 3 international tenders. For the management of the works, a preselection will be launched. Project in execution. EDF 6.7 and 8.
EDF CM 7002/001 - ABd
EDF CM 5004/002 - ACh
EDF CM 6031/002 - ABd

CAPE VERDE
Malo island rural electrification. Estimated total cost 1.945 mECU. Improvement of living conditions. Supply of electricity, Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF CV 7009/000 - ABa
Santo Antao water supply and sanitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Coordination. 1.4 mECU. Works, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF CV 7011 - AAb

CHAD
Relaunch of the fishing sector. Estimated cost 2.500 mECU. Sectoral study; shortlist done. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF CD 7011 - ACa
River Chari embankment protection. Estimated total cost 5 mECU. To improve living conditions in N'Djamena. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF CD 5027 - AHf,g

Support for the electoral process. Resp. Auth.: UNDP(PNUD). Estimated total cost 0.500 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.

EDF CD 7015 - AAC


EDF CD 7012 - Abd

Restoration of bridges that fall within the framework of the Second Transport Sectoral Programme. Resp. Auth.: MINTP Chad. Estimated total cost of 4 mECU. Urgent work to be carried out to restore 15 bridges under the Transport Sectoral Programme. Works, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF CD 6001 - Abd

Support for structural adjustment. 10.2 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF CD 7200/001 - AcA

Support for Health Programme in Mayo Kebbi 1.980 mECU. T.A. Training of doctors, medical supplies. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF COM 6008/7003 - Abd

CONGO (REPUBLIC)

Support programme for the visual arts. 1 mECU. Global development in the visual arts sector. Project suspended. EDF 7.

EDF COB 7010 - AeZ

CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC)

Rehabilitation Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Coordination and Management Unit. Estimated total cost 84 mECU. and an indicative amount of 64 mECU from the Commission's budget under heading B7-5076. 'Rehabilitation and reconstruction measures for developing countries'. Regions selected: Kinshasa's economic hinterland, the Greater Kivu and the two provinces of Kasaï. Rehabilitation and maintenance of roads and farm access roads. Support for production and marketing, support for basic social infrastructure, T.A. and evaluation. Project suspended. EDF 6 and 7.

EDF ZR 6033 - AcA

Support programme for the resinsertion of displaced persons in Kasaï province (PARK). 2 mECU. The programme will be implemented by Caritas (NI), Oxfam (UK), Nuova Frontiera (I), Gret (F), and Raoul Follereau (F). Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF ZR 7255/001 - AcA

Frontier - Strengthening of the provisional health support programme. 45 mECU. Rehabilitation of health service structures in Kinshasa, Kasai and Kivu. Support for the health service at the basic and intermediate levels. Reinforcement of basic juridical services. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution.


EDF ZR 6034/00 - ACa

COTE D'IVOIRE


EDF IVC 7200/004 - AcA

Electrification of banana production sites. International tender no. 4249 already launched for the supply, in one lot, of electrical equipment. Opening of bids on 30.12.97 at 09.00 local time. Financed from budget CE B7-5023.

EDF DI 7200/001 - AcA

DOMINICA

Eco-Tourism Site Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Trade Industry and Tourism (MITT). Estimated total cost 0.558 mECU. Works, equipment and training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF DOM 6002/001 - ACa


EDF DOM 7002 - ACa

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC


EDF DO 7016 - AGz

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Conservation and rational utilisation of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 5,070 mECU. Land classification and use master plan, national system of conservation units, forest training and research centres, T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.

EDF EG 6001 - AcA, AcE, AcI

ERITREA

Sector study on national water and irrigation potential. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Water resources. 4.5 mECU. Assess the various demands for those resources, determine the potential for their sustainable development, present strategies for their development, and lay the foundations for their management. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF ERY 7002 - Abb

Upgrading of the Nefasit-Dekemhare-Dimmi road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction. Estimated total cost 20 mECU. Road works. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF ERY 7004 - AbD


EDF ERY 7001 - AbA, i

Livestock Promotion, support for the improvement of the Sanitary Environment of the National Herd. Estimated cost 1.2 mECU. Equipment, infrastructure, vaccines, training of veterinary services personnel. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF ERY 7005/000 - AGz, AFd

Short-term assistance programme for reconstruction and rehabilitation. International tender no 4265 to be published in the Supplement to the Official Journal in the first half of November 97. Supply, in a single lot, of ten photovoltaic systems for producing electricity. Opening of bids on 4.2.98 at 10.00 local time.

ETHIOPIA


EDF ET 7005/002 - Abd

Support programme for the transport sector (TSSP). Resp. Auth.: Ethiopian Road Authority. 2 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF ET 7005/001 - Abd

EDF ET 5006/002 - AAb
Support at the national level for economic training and research capacity. Resp. Auth.: Department of Economics, Addis Ababa University. 1.05 mECU. T.A. short and long term, purchase of equipment and material, evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF ET 610/001 - AfB
Lake fishing development project. International tender no. 4269 already launched for the supply, in three lots, of pick-up trucks, motorcycles and 15hp outboard motors. Opening of bids on 9.12.97 at 10.30 local time.
EDF ET 7016/001 - Afz, AfB

GRENADA
Microprojects programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry Labour, Social Service Community Development. 0.220 mECU. Water supply, road improvements repairs and extension of schools, medical and community centre and sports grounds. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF GRD 7102 - Abz
EDF GRD 7002/001 - 1Abd

GUINEA
EDF GUI 7008 - AHeb
EDF GUI 6005/000 - Agz
Construction of a bridge over the Fatale. Notification of preselection no. 4273 already published. Opening of bids on 5.11.97 at 11.00 local time.
Improvement of living conditions in the interior of the country. International tender no. 4273 already launched for the supply, in one lot, of 26 photovoltaic pump systems. Opening of bids on 7.1.98 at 11.30 local time.

GUINEA BISSAU
EDF GUB 7014/000 - Abd
Support for road maintenance. Estimated cost 8 mECU. Construction, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF GUB 6013/001 - ABo
EDF GUB 6003/002 - Abd
GUYANA
Rehabilitation of sea defences and shore zone management. Estimated cost 20 mECU. Construction, T.A. studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF GUA 6003/004 - AbB
Private sector development support programme. Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. T.A., feasibility study, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF GUA 7002/000 - AEd

HAITI
Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme II. 10.800 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF HA 7200/001 - AAc
EDF HA 7007/000 - AAz

JAMAICA
Credit scheme for micro and small enterprises. Resp. Auth.: Planning Institute of Jamaica. Implementation by Apex Institution and Coordination and Monitoring Unit 7 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and evaluation. Project on execution. EDF 5, 6 and 7.
EDF JM 5020 - Adz, AeZ
EDF JM 7005 - AHa, b, c.
EDF JM 7004 - AAc
Return and reintegration of qualified nationals II. Estimated cost 0.647 mECU. Supply of technical equipment, training, information and support system. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF JM 7002/001 - AfAe
EDF JM 9999/000 - AbD
Regional project - University of the West Indies. International tender no. 4268 already launched for supply, in four lots, of electronic equipment for administration.
Opening of bids on 2.12.97 at 14.30 local time.

Institutional strengthening and road rehabilitation. International tender no. 4279 already launched for supply, in ten lots, of various equipment. Opening of bids on 16.1.98 at 11.05 local time.

KENYA

Farming in tsetse infested areas. Estimated total cost 14.600 mECU. Refine the techniques to trap the tsetse fly and develop better technologies to prevent infections. Monitor the environmental impact of the techniques. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF KE 7011 - ACA

Family Health Programme. Estimated total cost 28.710 mECU. Reproduction time. Lots, of various equipment.

EDF KE 7015 - AGb

Technical Education. 5 mECU. Raising the level of performance of existing teaching institutions. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF KE 6005/001 - AFb


EDF KE 7016/00 - AAg

Sultan Hamud-Mitto Road rehabilitation. Estimated total cost 10 mECU. Development of micro-enterprises and informal sector organisations. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF KE 7008 - AEz

Small scale and informal sector enterprises. Estimated total cost 30 mECU. To rehabilitate priority roads and establish sustainable maintenance organisation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF KE 7011/002 - Abd

Mal-Mahlu/Naluasha Road rehabilitation. Estimated total cost 25 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF KE 7010/003 - Abb


EDF KE 7018 - ABg


EDF KE 7016/00 - AAa


EDF KE 7014 - AEc

Agriculture/livestock research programme. 8.3 mECU. Project in execution.

EDF KE 6003/001 - ACA

KIRIBATI


EDF KE 7008 - AHf

LESOTHO


EDF LSO 7002 - Abb, AHa


EDF LSO 6016/001 - ABd


EDF MAG 7029/000 - Acb

Decentralised training programme for regional private tourism operators. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Tourisme. 1.910 mECU. T.A. training, evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 1, 2, 3 and 4.

EDF MAG 6039 - AAc


EDF MAG 7003 - ACA


EDF MAG 7028 - AFd

Support for the Structural Adjustment programme 1997-98. 27 mECU. General Import Programme. Project in execution. EDF MAG 7200 - AAa


EDF MAG/7024/001 - Acd, Ahd


EDF MAG 6041/000 - AGa


EDF MAG 6041/001 - AGa

MALAWI

Soil conservation and rural production. Resp. Auth.: MOALD. 23 mECU. EDF 15.500 mECU, local 1.3 mECU, counterpart funds 5.7 mECU. Water supply, sanitation, supply of fertilizers, T.A. and training. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI 5001/002 - ACA
Information, education and communication population programme. Resp. Auth.: NAO - Ministry for Women and Children’s Affairs, Community and Social Services - Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. Increase awareness and promote behaviour change as regards reproductive health, including disease prevention. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF MAI 6009/003 - Agb, Agc

Support to the Forestry Department. Works, supplies, T.A. Ministry of Natural Resources. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7

EDF MAI 5001/003 - AAc

Health Programme. Strengthening Health Ministry capacities in the framework of planning, decentralisation and equipment maintenance. Training, infrastructures, equipments and T.A. Estimated total cost 20 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI 6009/002 - AGe

2nd Lomé IV Micro-project Programme. Improvement of infrastructures in the farmer framework with the EC participation. Building, school’s rehabilitation, health centres, water points. Estimated total cost 5 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI 7012/003 - Agz, Abh

Customary Land Utilisation Study. 1 mECU. Studies. T.A. survey. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI 6029 - AAg


EDF MAI 6022 - Abd


EDF MAI 7018/000 - AGe

Rehabilitation of Chipoka Port - Lake Malawi. Estimated cost 3 mECU. Construction, supplies of equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF 6022/001 - Abd


EDF MAI 6022/002 - Abd

Programme for the prevention of HIV/AIDS among high risk groups. 0.780 mECU. T.A., equipment, training. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI 7001/000 - AGz


EDF MAI 6009/003 - Agb, Agc

MALI


EDF MLI 7019 - AAc


EDF MLI 9999 - ADa

Support for the central unit of the National Authorising Officer. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères. Total estimated cost 1.88 mECU. Improving the services of the National Authorising Officer in the programming, management and follow-up of the projects financed by the EDF, T.A., training, supply. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF MLI 6007/002 - AAc


EDF MLI 7009/001 - AAz

MOZAMBIQUE

Kaédi and Mederda water supply. Estimated total cost 2.8 mECU. Improvement of the living conditions. Works and T.A. Rehabilitation, strengthening and improvement of water systems. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF MAU 7012/000 - AAb


EDF MAU 7200/002 - AAc

MAURITANIA

Kàedi and Mederda water supply. Estimated total cost 2.8 mECU. Improvement of the living conditions. Works and T.A. Rehabilitation, strengthening and improvement of water systems. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF MAU 7012/000 - AAb

Support for the judicial system. Estimated total cost 2.8 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF MOZ 7022 - Az


EDF MOZ 7024 - AAz


EDF MOZ 7003/000 - Aga

Namibia

NAMIBIA

Expansion of NBC transmitter network and production facilities for educational broadcasting. Resp. Auth.: Namibian Broadcasting Corporation. Estimated total cost 5.7 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 0.700 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, technical training and technical consultancies. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NAM 7007 - AGz


EDF NAM 7011 - ACa


EDF NAM 7015 - AHz


EDF NAM 7010 - AEc

Support for the regional control programme against the Tsetse fly and trypanosomiasis (RTTCP), phase II. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of Veterinary Services, Min. of Agriculture, Water and Rural Devl. 3.750 mECU. Construction of buildings and infrastructures, provision of equipment, vehicles, tractors. All by acc. tender or restr. tender. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF NAM 7020 - ACa

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Human resources development programme, phase II (HRDP II). Estimated cost 20mECU. Construction of and improvements to educational buildings. Scholarships, training and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF PNG 7002/002 - AFb

Rwanda

Return and social reintegration of students currently still in the central and east European states. Estimated cost 0.996 mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7

EDF RW 7012/002 - AAc

SAMOA

Rural water supply programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. Estimated cost 16.7 mECU. Preparatory study, works, supplies, project management. Project on appraisal. EDF 7 and 8.

EDF WSO 7002/000 - ABb

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. 0.900 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7

EDF STP 7200/001 - AAc

SENEGAL


EDF SE 6002/7002 - ACa

SEYCHELLES

Victoria market rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 1 mECU. EDF 0.770 mECU, local 0.230 mECU. Works and improvements. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDY SEY 7011 - ACb


EDF SEY - AZh

Le Niol water treatment plant extension. Estimated cost 3.5 mECU. Rehabilitation and extension of water treatment works. Works. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF SEY - AFh

SIERRA LEONE

(All projects suspended)

Improvement of Freetown - Conakry road link. Estimated cost 30 mECU. Reconstruction of about 120 kms of road from Masiaka in Sierra Leone to Farmoreah in Guinea. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF SL 7004 - ABd

Sierra Leone roads authority (SLRA) support programme. Resp. Auth.: SLRA. 22.500 mECU. To strengthen SLRA's management capacity, to support maintenance operations, rehabilitate 160 km of road, provide training and equipment to enable local private contractors to increase their role in road...
works. Rehabilitation works, equipment, T.A. to SLRA. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF SL 7002 - Abd

EDF SL 7003 - AHi

SOLOMON ISLANDS
EDF SOL 7001 - Abd

SOMALIA
2nd rehabilitation programme. 47 mECU. Inter-sectoral approach. The project will be implemented by NGOs and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.
EDF SO 6029 - AAc

SURINAME
Timber Institute. Control of logging and reafforestation activities. Estimated total cost 3.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7
EDF SUR 7005 - Acd

EDF SUR 5602/001 - Abd

Strengthening STD (including HIV) health services among Maroon and indigenous populations in the hinterland. Resp. Auth.: NAO. Estimated cost 680,000 ECU. Supplies, works, services, medical training and education. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF SUR 7010/000 - Agc

SWAZILAND
EDF REG 7012/024 - AAz

Development of smallholder irrigation in the Lower Usuthu River. Estimated cost 84 mECU. Construction, supplies, studies, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF SW 7007/001 - Aca

TANZANIA
Mwanza-Nyanguge Road and Mwanza urban roads rehabilitation, and Nyanguge-Musoma overlay. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communications. Estimated cost 55 mECU. Rehabilitation of 67 km of trunk roads (Njovu-Mwanza and Mwanza airport) and rehabilitation of Mwanza sewerage system (main works). Design study on-going. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF TA 6021 - Abd

EDF TA 5005(7) - Abb

EDF TA 7009 - Abz

EDF TA 7012 - Abd

Rehabilitation of the Dodoma to Singida Road. Estimated cost 90 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. EDF TA 7024/000 - Abd

EDF TA 7023/000 - AfD

Special programme for refugee-affected areas. Resp. Auth.: Prime Minister's office. Estimated cost 22 mECU. Rehabilitation of the Mwanza Airport runway, contribution to the Kagera road maintenance programme, improvement of the Kigoma-Nyakangas gravel road (335 km). Shortlists established. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF TA 7024/000 - Abd

Institutional strengthening for improved water supply and sewerage services in four towns. Estimated total cost 1.985 mECU. T.A., training, works and supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7 EDF TA 7014/000 - Abb

EDF TA 7200/003 - AAz, AAb

TOGO
Aid for the voluntary reintegration of refugees from Togo. Resp. Auth.: Mn. Du Plan. Estimated cost 0.430 mECU. Project under the direction of CARE Togo. Socio-economic contribution for the reintegration of 17,000 Togo refugees in their place of origin. EDF 7.
EDF TO 7006 - Ahn

Support for a group of producers in the Savanes region. Estimated cost 1.8 mECU. Construction, supplies, T.A. training. Project on appraisal. EDF 5. EDF TO 6003/002 - Aca

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Training project for young farmers (AYTRAP). Assistance for the young farmer to create rural enterprises. Estimated cost 7.3 mECU. EDF 5 mECU. Local 2.300 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and monitoring. Project in execution. EDF 6 and 7.
EDF TR 7008/000 - Aoe

EDF TR 5013/000 - Adc

UGANDA
EDF UG 7010 - Abb

Road maintenance programme in the South-West. International tender no. 4247 already launched for the supply, in 13 lots, of workshops and maintenance equipment. Opening of bids on 3.12.97 at 11.00 local time.

Health programme. International tender no. 4282 published in October 97 for the supply, in two lots, of various two-wheeled and four wheeled motor vehicles. Opening of bids on 14.1.98 at 10.30 local time.

VANUATU
Education development programme. Estimated total cost 7.5 mECU. To increase enrolment in junior secondary school and to improve the quality of education delivered. T.A., supplies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF VA 7005/001 - Afa

ZAMBIA
Forestry management for sustainable woodfuel production in Zambia (along the railway line). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environment. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Training supply of equipment, studies and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF ZA 7009 - AcA

Rehabilitation of the Kabwe-Kapiri-Mposhi and Chisamba Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Supply. Estimated total cost 15.360 mECU.
formal training programme for the Strengthening of the banking
Zambia.

EDF ZA 7020/000 - AEh
Technical assistance to the Roads
Department. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of
Roads. Estimated cost 1.8 mECU.
Provision of long-term T.A. to the Roads
Department and implementation of a
formal training programme for the
department's professional and technical
staff. T.A., studies, training. Project on
appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA 702/000 - Abd
Educational capacity-building
programme. To plan and deliver
effective and relevant education and training.
Estimated cost 10 mECU. Feasibility study, T.A.,
construction, budgetary aid and training. Project on
appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA 7003/003 - Afz, Afh, Afi
Development and rehabilitation of
urban markets in Lusaka, Kitwe and
Ndola. Estimated cost 7 mECU.
Construction, T.A. including studies.
Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA 7011/000 - Acf
Private sector development
programme. Trade and enterprise
support facility/micro-credit project.
Estimated cost 8 mECU. T.A., studies
and training. EDF 8.

EDF ZA 7010/001 - Aec, Aee
Export Development Programme
Phase II. To increase exports of non-
traditional goods. Estimated cost 5
mECU. T.A. and training. Project on
appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA 5017/002 - Aed
Assistance to the wildlife sector,
phase II. Improvement in management of
wildlife resources. Estimated cost 10
mECU. Feasibility study. Project on
appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA 7002/001 - Ace
Agricultural private sector
development (SME) - microprojects.
Estimated cost 10 mECU. T.A., study,
credit facility. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA 7023/000 AcA
Economic management support
programme, phase II. Resp. Auth.: 
Ministry of Finance and Economic
Development. Estimated cost 6 mECU.
T.A., feasibility study, financial aid,
training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA 7018/001 - AAc
Rehabilitation of the Monze-Zimba
road. Estimated cost 34 mECU.
Construction, T.A. Project on appraisal.
EDF 8.

EDF REG 7323/001 - Abd
Improvement of the Zambian Safe
Blood Transfusion Programme. Resp.
Auth.: Ministry of Health. Estimated cost
3,735 mECU. T.A., equipment, training.
Project in execution. EDF 8.

EDF NEA 7012/000
NEW CALEDONIA
New aquarium. To increase the capacity
and improve the infrastructure of the
aquarium. Estimated cost 4 mECU.
Construction, T. A. and supplies. Project
in execution. EDF 7.

EDF GC 6009/001 - Aec
ST. HELENA
Wharf Improvement project. Resp.
Auth.: Public Works and Service
Department. Estimated total cost 1.743
mECU. To increase the safety and
efficiency of Jamestown Port by
upgrading wharf facilities for passenger
and cargo handling. Works, supplies.
Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF SH 7001 - Abd
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS
Water and sewerage in Providenciales.
Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works, 3,700
mECU. Water supply works and pipes.
T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF TC 7001 - Ahc,c
WALLIS AND FUTUNA
Creation of improved structures for
pig-rearing. Resp. Auth. Ministry of
Health. Estimated cost 9 mECU.
To establish viable production structures adapted to market
conditions. T.A., training, follow-up.
Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF WF 7009/000 - AcA
REGIONAL
PROJECTS
AFRISTAT
Support for AFRISTAT (economic and
statistical control). 0,900 mECU.
Improvement in the quality of statistical
information. T.A., supplies and
equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7106/004 - AAc, Afd
10 MEMBER COUNTRIES OF ACG -
BURKINA FASO, CAMERON, COTE
D'IVOIRE, GHANA, MALI, NIGER,
NIGERIA, SENEGAL, CHAD, TOGO
Promotion of a regional grain market
in West and Central Africa. Resp. Auth.: 
NAO-Mali. Estimated cost 12 mECU.
To establish viable production structures adapted to market
conditions. T.A., training, follow-up.
Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG 6175 - Acf
INTRA-ACP
Strengthening of fisheries and
biodiversity management in ACP
countries. Resp. Auth.: ICLARM, Manila
(Philippines). 5mECU. T.A.,
management, supply of equipment, data
base creation. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7001/001 - AAc
COLEACP, Interim Project. Commercial development in exports and in the field of horticulture. Estimated cost 1.860 mECU. Training, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 6600/002 - AEd
Business Assistance Scheme for Exports (B.A.S.E.) Total estimated cost 30 mECU. To expand receipts from exports and tourism by improving enterprises’ export competitiveness and trade facilitation skills. T.A. training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF REG 7000/1020 - AEd
Support to regional cooperation for HIV/AIDS control. Estimated cost 20 mECU. T.A., studies, supplies, equipment, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF REG 8000/004 - AGz, AGc, AGe
Interuniversity support programme - Level 3 - in French-speaking sub-Saharan countries. Estimated cost 1.976 mECU. Training and educational material. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7004/014 - AFb
CARIBBEAN REGION
University level programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 21 mECU. To train a critical mass of Caribbean ACP nationals at masters degree level in development economics, business administration, public administration, agricultural diversification, natural resources, management and architecture, works, educational equipment, T.A., scholarships. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7604 - AFb
EDF REG 7605 - ABC
EDF REG 7605/001 - ABC
Education policy and dialogue. Resp. Auth.: Cariforum S.G. 0.450 mECU. T.A. for regional common policies in three education areas: basic education, technical and vocational training, language teaching. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7607 - AAd
Tertiary level programme. Estimated total cost 5.948 mECU. Upgrading tertiary level education and teacher training. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG 6628/001 - AFl
EDF REG 7613 - AFl
CARIFORUM Programming Unit. Resp. Auth.: CARIFORUM. Total estimated cost 5 mECU. T.A. to the Secretary General of CARIFORUM to help in the allocation, preparation and implementation of regional funds under Lomé IV. T.A., supply. Project on appraisal. EDF 7 and 8.
EDF REG 7615/001 - AAb
Caribbean News Agency Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Regional Authorising Officer. Total estimated cost 4.179 mECU. Establishing a CARIFORUM Information Network by setting up a coordinating centre and mechanisms and archives and increasing radio, TV and Cable wire services. T.A., supply. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7605/003 ABC
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE CBI
EDF REG 7321 ABe
Regional Integration in Eastern and Southern Africa. Assistance to COMESA Secretariat. 1.950 mECU. Training, supply of equipment, evaluation and services. T.A. short-term. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG/7316 - AAc
CENTRAL AFRICA
CIESPAC, Public Health Education Centre in Central Africa. 1.980 mECU. Student accommodation, equipment, scholarships. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7205 - AFl
EDF REG 6203/001 - AAC
EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES
EDF REG 5311 (7) - AFl
EDF REG 736 - AAc, ACe
KENYA, UGANDA, TANZANIA
Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project (Phase II). Project headquarters in Jinja, Uganda at FIFI-Fisheries Research Institute. EDF part 8.4 mECU. T.A., supplies, training, monitoring and evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG 5316/001 - ACd
Tanzania rehabilitation programme for refugee affected areas and related infrastructure. Estimated cost 20 mECU. Rehabilitation of roads and conserving the environment in refugee areas. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7322/001 - Abd
EDF REG 6304/001 - Abd
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF ECOWAS
Guarantee Fund for Private Investment Financing in Western Africa. FGIPAO, Lomé. Creation of a Guarantee Fund to cover partially credit risks given by Banks to the private sector. Total estimated cost 22.5 mECU. EDF 3.8 mECU. Others: France, Germany, EIB, Commercial Banks (E.U.). Development Agencies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7115 - AEn
Regional programme to combat drugs. Estimated total cost 5.1 mECU. Elaboration of training programmes and national plans. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7135 - AGz
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF IGAD
IGAD Household Energy Programme. Resp. Auth.: IGAD Executive Secretary. Estimated total cost 1.900 mECU. T.A. to initiate pilot projects in the area of household energy, define the role and organize the setting up of a regional unit to coordinate activities, and develop working relationships with national and sub-region institutions in IGADD's member countries. Project in execution EDF 7.
EDF REG - ABa
Development of the artisanal fisheries sector. The promotion of artisanal fisheries and fisheries trade. Improvement of the level of services available in the post-harvest field of artisanal fisheries in IGADD member states. Estimated total cost 7.8 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG/7314/000 - Acd, AEd
Grain marketing training programme. Resp. Auth. IGAD Executive Secretary. 1.990 mECU. T.A., equipment, evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 5359 - AAc
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION (IOC) -
COMORES, MADAGASCAR, MAURITIUS, SEYCHELLES
EDF REG 7501 - AFb
Indian Ocean University. Resp. Auth.: IOC. Estimated cost 1,925 mECU. Training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7506/000 - AFd

PACIFIC ACP STATES
Pacific regional civil aviation. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. Fiji. 4.9 mECU. Supply of security, air traffic control, navigation and meteorology, and training equipment. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 6 and 7.
EDF REG 7704 - ABCd
Pacific Regional Waste Awareness and Education Programme. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. 0.600 mECU. T.A. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7714 - AHf
EDF REG 7704/001 - ABC

SADC
EDF REG 6450 - ABb

ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, NAMIBIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND TANZANIA
SADC monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) of fishing activities. Resp. Auth.: SADC - Sector Coordinator for Marine Fisheries. Estimated cost 13.3 mECU. To improve national and regional capacity to manage marine fishery resources. Feasibility study, T.A., supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF REG 6406/000 - ACd

SAHEL COUNTRIES
Support to strengthen vaccine independence in Sahel-Africa. 9.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7012 - ACa

BURKINA FASO, CAPE VERDE, GAMBIA, MALI, MAURITANIA, NIGER, SENEgal, CHAD
Regional environmental training and information programme. Resp. Auth.: Institut de Sahel in Bamako. 16 mECU. T.A. training, supply of equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG 6147/001 - AFz, AHf

BENIN, BURKINA FASO, COTE D'IVOIRE, MALI, NIGER, SENEgal, TOGO
EDF REG 7106/02 - AAf
Support for the ENAREF. 0.900 mECU. T.A., training, equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7106/003 - AAc, AAF, AFd

BENIN, CAMEROON, COTE D'IVOIRE, GHANA, GUINEA, TOGO
Regional Programme to relaunch pineapple production in West and Central Africa. Resp. Auth.: Execution unit composed of one senior expert, T.A. and one junior expert. 1,995 mECU. T.A. studies, evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7138 - ACa

SAHEL COUNTRIES
Support to strengthen vaccine independence in Sahel-Africa. 9.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7012 - ACa

MISCELLANEOUS
CAMEROON, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Bertua-Garoua Boulai Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Address</th>
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<th>Telex</th>
<th>Fax Numbers</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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*Not all provisions of the Lomé Convention apply to South Africa.
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Guinea Bissau