Abstract

This paper assesses both the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP or Barcelona Process) and its parliamentary dimension. It discusses various problems that the EMP has encountered. However it also shows that there are a number of different limitations which are specific to its parliamentary dimension. It also confirms that the Forum suffers from the same, more fundamental, contradiction that is already visible within the EMP: on the one hand, there is the EU’s stated objective of democratising the Southern shores of the Mediterranean; on the other, there is its de facto policy of stabilising existing undemocratic regimes. The paper also concludes that the Parliamentary Forum has faced problems that have more to do with internal EU politics than the changing international situation in the Mediterranean basin. This is a specific element to the parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP or ‘Barcelona Process’) was launched in Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995. It is the latest and most sophisticated attempt at organising, in fact institutionalising, the European Union (EU)’s Mediterranean policy [2]. The EMP has created a ‘Partnership’ between, on the one hand the EU and its fifteen member states, and on the other, eleven Southern Mediterranean states plus the Palestinian Authority [3] . The  EMP contains a number of institutional arrangements (see below). All its 27 partners have agreed in a Declaration to:

‘establish a comprehensive partnership among the participants of the Euro­Mediterranean partnership through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension, these being the three aspects of the Euro­Mediterranean partnership’.

There are of course other EU instruments, like the 2000 CFSP[4] Common Strategy on the Mediterranean[5]. It is one of the contention of this paper that internal EU politics have a major impact on the EMP Parliamentary Forum.

This paper concentrates on the EMP’s parliamentary dimension which has not received much academic attention. Assessing the records of the two Parliamentary Fora to date (October 1998 and February 2001) does have implications for the Process itself, and vice versa. Therefore, this paper covers both the EMP and its Parliamentary Dimension, although it differentiates between the successes and failures of each one of them. Now that the latest ministerial meeting in Valencia in late April 2002 has agreed to set up a Parliamentary Assembly for the Euro-Mediterranean region, it is all the more important to offer an assessment of the first two parliamentary fora. I do not assess here the third, extraordinary, meeting that was convened in November 2001 in Brussels after the 11^th September terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Its specific mission was to condemn terrorism and deny the inevitability of a Huntingtonian ‘clash of civilisations’.

What follows consists of three sections [6] : the first section looks at why the Mediterranean is important for the European Union before it reviews the way the EMP works. It ends with a number of major criticisms that have been levelled at the Process. The second section considers its Parliamentary Dimension, with a particular emphasis on the Second Parliamentary Forum of February 2001. The third section sums up the main conclusions of this paper now that the Forum has been institutionalised on an annual basis, and that Valencia has announced the future setting up of a Parliamentary Assembly. 

 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership [7]

As the Parliamentary Forum (see Part 2) does not exist in a vacuum, it is important to begin with a study of the EMP nearly five and a half years after its creation. This section considers in turn (1) why the Mediterranean is important for the EU; (2) why the EMP was set up in 1995 and how it works; (3) and, finally, what are the particular problems it has faced to date.

Why is the Mediterranean important to the EU?

In brief, there are at least four reasons why the Mediterranean is important to the EU [8] : [i] geographic proximity and historical links; [ii] economic links; [iii] energy dependence (oil and gas); [iv] the importance of  Islam.

The geographic proximity and historic arguments amount basically to state the obvious, although there is disagreement over whether the Mediterranean is clearly an interdependent region because of its location and past or if it is an invented concept [9] . As for the more recent historic links they mainly result from the colonial pasts of France, Britain, Italy and Spain [10] .

The economic linkages between the two shores of the Mediterranean have been reiterated recently by the European Commissioner for External Relations:

'Mediterranean imports from Europe amount to more than 30bn, or some 47% of the total volume of imports. On the export side, the figure is even higher: more than 63bn of Mediterranean exports are to the EU, amounting to some 52% of the total' [11] .

As for energy supplies, there is a strong European dependence on oil, and more recently, also on gas, with new pipelines via Spain and Italy which will extend throughout the EU. Thus,

'in 1995 Western Europe imported 9.6 million oil barrels/day; of these 5.5 millions from countries of MENA [Middle East and North Africa]’ [12] .

During the Second EMP Parliamentary Forum (see also below), European Commissioner Loyola del Palacio argued that the Union depends now for 50% on the Mediterranean for its energy needs and that in the future this dependence will grow to 70%. [13]

But this is only one side of the picture. The real concern is the existence of a clear gap between a rich North and a poor South. Economic and social data point to a big income gap of 1 to 10 between the north and southern rims of the Mediterranean. 1997 figures show a GDP per capita of 2,285 dollars for the Southern rim and 22,785 dollars for the EU member states [14] . However, this is only one third of a triple gap: there is also a North-South divide between the EU member states themselves, with the poorer countries being in the geographical (Spain, Greece and Portugal) or economic (Ireland) South. There is also a North-South gap within the Southern EU members with Italy's Mezzogiorno as its best illustration. All this complicates matters further as non-EU Mediterranean states tend to produce similar goods and products (agriculture) to those produced in the southern regions/parts of EU Mediterranean member states.

Islam is acting as both an external factor (refugees, migration) and an internal one in some EU states which have a substantial Muslim presence. The fear of immigration is not only linked to the very substantial existing communities of North Africans in France or Italy but also of Turks in Germany. There are also many Albanians in Italy and in Greece. There is also a link – whether real or perceived- between the presence of foreigners and the rise of racism and neo-fascism. The 'best' examples are the recent progress of the far right Freedom Party of Jord Haider in Austria and of the National Front in France in the spring of 2002. This should be considered in the wider context of the so-called ‘demographic time bomb’. An easy way of illustrating this is to say that currently twice as many people live in the Northern side of the Mediterranean coast. This ratio will be reversed in the next three decades. Just to give one, dramatically sad, illustration, recent reports claim that in the past five years,

‘some 3,123 would-be illegal immigrants have drowned in Moroccan waters (…) nearly four times the 801 estimated to have been found in Spanish waters’ [15] .

Added to the economic and social chasms that already exist today, it does not take a genius to imagine what the consequences of such a demographic shift might be for the future of the region, the states and societies concerned, and EU-Mediterranean relations.

There are of course also other reasons why the Mediterranean is important to the EU. They can only be briefly mentioned here for reasons of space: one is the proliferation of arms of mass destruction, not only chemical and biological (plus nuclear for Israel) but also conventional weapons (especially missile delivery systems). In 1992-1995, Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia absorbed just under two thirds (65.6%) of all arms deliveries to the Middle East. More than half of the top 10 countries acquiring conventional weapons on the world markets are in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf [16] .

Another important factor is tourism because there are 100 million tourists ‘going South’ each year. The impact of such a massive population movement on the environment is rather self-evident. When this is added to a region where water (or rather its scarcity) is seen as a possible cause of a future war, one gets a good idea of the many problems, ecological and others, that the Mediterranean is experiencing.

Why Barcelona?

The objective of the EMP is to create a zone of peace, stability, economic prosperity, where democracy and human rights are fully respected (Barcelona 1995). It was launched for at least three reasons. First, because of the failure of all previous efforts at bridging the economic gap between the two shores of the Mediterranean, and especially with regards to the demographic growth in the South, together with fears of mass migration and terrorism. It represents the first real EU effort at offering a global approach to the Mediterranean Basin. There was clearly a need for '[a] comprehensive strategy for development', to use the words of the Tunisian foreign minister, Ben-Yehia, in November 1995 [17] .

Second, because the Southern Mediterranean states themselves asked for more EU trade in an effort to find an alternative to the economic clout of the US and its world-wide dominance (some people use the term 'hegemony' [18] ). Thus, the European Union is seen as a credible regional alternative (Egyptian Industry minister Ibrahim Fawzy in 1995 [19] ).

Third, because of the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in late 1989, the reunification of Germany in 1990, and the collapse of the USSR in 1991, some Northern EU states, especially Germany, are perceived by several Southern EU states (especially France, Italy, and Spain) as redirecting their foreign policy towards the East at the expense of the South [20] . The existence of sophisticated EU programmes such as PHARE (for economic reconstruction and the introduction of free market economy reforms), together with the so-called Europe Agreements which are in part a pre-accession strategy for 10 CEEC (Central and Eastern European Countries states), and now the current accession negotiations [21] clearly point to a new order of priorities for the EU. Only Cyprus and Malta [22] are somehow 're-balancing' the Eastern bias. The 1999 Helsinki European Council granting of a candidate status to Turkey can also be seen as a (late) EU effort not to be too clearly pro-CEEC. The Barcelona Process is seen as an effort to redress such a bias. This has been consistently reiterated in official EU documents especially from the European Commission [23] . For instance, on the eve of the November 2000 Marseilles EMP meeting, the Commissioner for External Relations declared that:

            ‘En s’etendant a l’ Est, l’ UE n’oubliera pas le Sud’. [24]

How the EMP works

The EMP consists of a three-pronged strategy based on three so-called ‘Pillars’ or ‘Baskets’: Pillar I deals with Political and Security matters. Pillar II covers economics, whilst Pillar III considers issues with a human dimension, including culture and other aspects of civil society. In terms of institutional arrangements, there is a permanent Euro-Mediterranean Committee of Senior Officials which consists of representatives from the EU Presidency Troika, the 12 Southern Partners, and the European Commission. An important number of specialised  committees meet regularly. There are also regular Ministerial meetings (ideally but not necessarily at the foreign foreign ministerial level). After Barcelona (November 1995), there have been four such meetings: in Valletta (1997), Stuttgart (1999), Marseilles (2000), and Valencia (2002). There are also informal such meetings, like the one in Brussels in November 2001 and the one scheduled during the 2003 Greek Presidency. The next formal meeting will take place during the second half of next year (2003) under the Italian Presidency. In addition to these 'big events,' there are also numerous meetings of other ministers, experts, and official, as well as many conferences, workshops, and other formal or informal meetings on a variety of issues [25] , including ‘alternative’ civil society meetings [26] .

The Barcelona Process has also created a number of  research and policy-oriented networks which group foreign policy institutes (EuroMeSCo) and those specialising in economics (FEMISE) [27] . There are also plans for a network of defence studies institutes. A number of other networks are extremely useful and their activities are available on the web [28] . Finally, there is a network of Euro-Mediterranean chambers of commerce called Archimedes [29]

The most practical objective of the EMP is the creation of a zone of free-trade among the 15+12 by the year 2010 (700 million people) which will take place with

'the elimination of the restrictions to trade that still exist for the export of industrial products for the Mediterranean Partners to the EU market, and the gradual elimination over a period of 12 years of all the tariffs that burden the import of industrial products from the EU' [30] .

This objective is materialising with the signing of bilateral (on the one hand the EU and on the other each one of the Southern Mediterranean partners) partnership agreements which replace the existing association agreements [31] . As of April 2002, new Partnership agreements have been signed with all Partners except Syria, and the one with Lebanon was not signed due to the absence of the latter from the Valencia meeting [32] . Finally there is the special status of Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. There has been a customs union with Turkey since 1996. Customs unions were also scheduled for the two Mediterranean islands. These have now been subsumed into the current accession negotiations with the two Mediterranean islands.

Criticisms

There are a number of criticisms that are intrinsic to the EMP. The reason I discuss them here is to show that the parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process suffers from related but also independent problems (see below). There are however structural problems that also need to be addressed irrespective of this parliamentary dimension, even if they have a direct impact on the Forum.

The EMP’s objectives are a prosperous zone of peace and democracy. As for the means, it has been said in the EP Nair Report that aid money worth 1,000 million euros goes each year from the EU to the South. However, 34,000 euros is the total trade deficit of the same South towards the EU. Nair thus argues that the EU is earning 34 times more out of its Mediterranean partners [33] . The EU’s political ideology (‘an open market will lead to an open society’) is also rather naïve and it implies that it is not clear if the EU aims to stabilize or democratize the South [34] . It also wrongly takes for granted that South-South cooperation will flourish, that most Southern states do not have economies heavily depending on one commodity, or that these economies do not just survive thanks to massive state intervention and control. As for the means, they are not only rather limited in terms of funding. They also exclude the sectors where the South has a clear comparative advantage (agriculture) [35] .

Finally, a major obstacle to the EMP is the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) [36] . It was initially assumed that such an important aspect of Mediterranean politics and security would have no impact on the Barcelona Process. It did not take too long to find out how naïve such an expectation had been when the first follow-up ministerial meeting was moved from Tunis to Malta in 1997 to allow for Arab reservations at hosting Israeli officials on Arab soil. Similarly, the constant postponement of the Charter for Peace and Stability [37] confirms how unrealistic an expectation it initially was to want Arab states to agree to a formal security agreement with Israel without any real progress on the Palestinian Question. Events in the region since September 2000 (the ‘second Intifada’), and more importantly, in the first quarter of 2002 with a full-scale military re-occupation of territories under full or partial Palestinian control, have shown what impact the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can have on the Barcelona Process.

All the problems listed above mean that overall there is a clear disatisfaction with the EMP. The key issue was then how to deal with it. The EU produced in June 2000 its CFSP Common Strategy on the Mediterranean (Feira European Council). The relaunch of the Process was formalised in October 2000 with a new Commission report, prior to the November 2000 ministerial meeting in Marseilles. The former (Common Strategy) offers an important new development: the Union (via its European and Foreign Councils and its Mr CFSP) has become the main actor in the Barcelona Process. The Commission‘s wings have been clipped somehow. The importance of the Euro-Med Committee is thus reduced to that of a coordinator of what is mainly agreed first by the European states.

The national political preferences of the EU member states governments become the real issue at stake. The main consequence is that a process that had initially started as an attempt to develop a new policy in the Mediterranean has now been subsituted by a coordination mechanism for the EU. This is best illustrated by Fulvio Attina who argues that:

‘[c]ontrary to the institutional structure designed in the Barcelona and other official documents of the EMP in which […] the Commission had the role of the strategic player, the Strategy puts also the Council/High Representative for the CFSP in the position of the strategic player of the EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean region’. [38]

I now turn to problems which are specific to the Parliamentary Forum in the next part.

The EMP Parliamentary Forum [39]

There are a number of reasons why one needs to study the EMP Parliamentary Forum. There has been a growing parliamentary presence, if not role, in international affairs. There is increasing evidence that parliaments, be they national or transnational in nature, are displaying what has been dubbed ‘parliamentary diplomacy’. The best-studied example is the US Congress due to both the particularities of the American system and the USA’s global role [40] . But this is not limited to the American example. The European Parliament (EP) has also increased its international presence over the years [41]. Be they in Europe, Latin or Central America, Asia, or the Mediterranean, there is also a proliferation of transnational parliaments. In the Mediterranean, in addition to the EP’s involvement in EU-Mediterranean relations and the existence of the EMP Parliamentary Forum, there are also the activities of the respective national parliamentary institutions of the 27 EMP partners. To those national and transnational actors, one should add the parliamentary assemblies of the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe), the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), and, finally, the International Parliamentary Union (IPU). They all possess a Mediterranean dimension. There is a parliamentary input at various levels of world politics and policy-making. Therefore, this section of the paper assesses a particular aspect of  Mediterranean parliamentary diplomacy. However, it does not intend to develop a theoretical framework. Nor does it cover all aspects of the parliamentary aspects of Euro-Mediterranean relations, be they of a national or transnational nature. [42]

The long road to the First Forum

The initial reference to a parliamentary forum for the EMP was made in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration in the section ‘Follow up to the Conference’ which states that:

‘Contacts between parliamentarians, regional authorities, local authorities and the social partners will be encouraged.’

Furthermore, in its Work Programme, under ‘Institutional Contacts’, the Barcelona Declaration calls for a ‘Euro­Mediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue’ in the following words:

‘An Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean was held in Valletta from 1 to 4 November 1995. The European Parliament is invited to take the initiative with other parliaments concerning the future Euro­Mediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue, which could enable the elected representatives of the partners to exchange ideas on a wide range of issues’.

Therefore, the Parliamentary Dimension is given no special attention and is only one among a number of other initiatives that could be taken within the overall Barcelona framework. Its role is designed as purely informative: a forum for the exchange of ideas.

It is also interesting to note that other organisations than the EP had taken the lead on parliamentary links. However, the EP is identified as one of the main actors for what was then still only a planned parliamentary dimension for the Barcelona Process. Other possible actors are not specifically identified. This will turn out to be important for the subsequent development of the Parliamentary Forum. This will generate, as we will see below, both a problem with regards to which parliamentary institution should take charge of  the EMP’s Parliamentary Dimension, and, perhaps more importantly for the purpose of this study, who should represent the Europeans: the EP or its member states, or both,  and in that case in what proportions?

One of the EP Secretariat participants in the earlier stages of the Forum setting up process, Dr. Thomas Grunert, presented a first assessment of what the Forum could achieve during the first summer school on the EMP of the University of Catania in July 1998 [43] . He emphasised among other things that the EP initially wanted Libya, Mauritania and the former Yugoslav states to be part of the EMP. However, the MEPs realised that the Commission’s definition of the Mediterranean would prevail as it had already been accepted by the EU member states.

Dr Grunert also made it clear that the EP was quite conscious from the start of the fact that the MEDA funds could be used as a major tool for EP influence in the process. There is thus a different view as to the role of the Forum. From the initially envisaged one of just a ‘talking shop’, the EP is willing from the outset to use the EMP as an additional means of control over EU funds. This is a right that the EP already possesses and has been rather good at utilising to its best advantage. It is best illustrated by the EP decision to increase the funds available for democracy consolidation/export under the MEDA Democracy programme [44] .

The First Forum

As for the actual setting up of the First Forum, despite a fresh call for a parliamentary meeting during the Malta foreign ministerial meeting of 1997 (Barcelona II), such a forum only took place in October 1998 in Brussels. The delay in organising the first meeting was mainly due to an ‘EP versus national parliaments’ debate. This institutional ‘turf war’ also occurred in a number of meetings between either national EU parliaments and Mediterranean parliaments, or between the EP and Mediterranean parliaments, but not the two (EP and EU parliaments) together. Another reason for the delay was related to the MEPP’s slow collapse (Netenyahu years). But after some renewed optimism following the October 1998 Wye Agreement [45] , the Forum actually occured.

The 1^st Forum consisted of about 150 participants: 112 parliamentarians from lower or single chambers or other parliamentary delegates (senates, higher councils) attended the event. There were also 25 officials and 7 observers. In terms of representation, there were 43 MEPs, but only 13 national MPs from the EU states (when up to 2 MPs from each EU state, i.e. a potential presence of 30 MPs, had been allowed) were present. Only 9 out of the 15 EU states had sent parliamentarians: Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. There were 54 MPs from the South (when up to 6 from each Southern Partner had been allowed, i..e, a potential presenceof 68 parliamentarians), plus nearly another 40 participants, mainly from Southern Mediterranean embassies in Brussels.

Two Committees were set up (instead of the three as originally discussed to reflect the EMP’s three baskets): one for the rules of procedures and one for the final declaration [46] . The decision making rule was consensus (and not the 2/3^rd majority as originally envisaged). Still a British MP claimed that this could not bind any of the national parliaments represented in the Forum [47] .

The Forum issued a Declaration which is rather general and avoids any subject which could have caused controversy, except a call to include Libya and Mauritania in the Process. There is a lot of optimism about the MEPP. The only ‘sour’ note is an addendum by the Cypriot delegation complaining that the Forum Final Declaration does not refer to the Cyprus Problem because of  ‘the objection of the Turkish delegation (…) despite repeated calls by several members’ [48]

The same procedural problems continued after the First Forum: how many representatives from the EP and how many from the national parliaments of the EU member states? There were a number of  parliamentarians, especially from the largest EU member states, who were unhappy about the representation allocation that had been agreed during the First Forum. As the latter’s rules of procedures had only been agreed for that particular meeting [49] , the debate about how many MEPs and how many national MPs form EU states should participate in the Forum continued. In particular, the German, French and Italian parliaments were unhappy about the existing levels of representation. Their objections can be illustrated in the fact that under the existing rules, there would be 6 Maltese parliamentarians but only 2 German MPs. These objections were made clear in a number of private letters from the Presidents of the three national parliaments previously mentioned to the EP President [50] .

A number of meetings took place but only at the level of the presidents of  Mediterranean parliaments: in November 1996 in Palermo (at the initiative of the Italian Parliament); in April 1997 a meeting which led to the formalisation of the first conference of Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Presidents in Palma de Majorca in March 1999, in Alexandria in June 2000, and in Athens in March 2002. Such a dimension falls beyond the strict remit of this study but it is mentioned as evidence of some frustration about this institutional turf war between the EP and the national parliaments.

The 2^nd  Parliamentary Forum (Brussels 8-9 February 2001)

During 1999, the holding of a second Parliamentary Forum meeting was discussed but it did not materialise. Then, the event was scheduled for October 2000 (in Strasbourg) but it was postponed once more. The fastly deteriorating situation in the Middle East after the beginning of a second Intifada in September 2000 had also complicated matters further. The Forum eventually materialised in February 2001. Just to note that by delaying the October 2000 Strasbourg meeting, the EMP parliamentarians missed the opportunity to respond to the June 2000 CFSP Common Strategy, and the Commission paper on the relaunch of the EMP which followed in October 2000. However, after the Marseilles ministerial meeting in November 2000 (Barcelona IV), two EP reports (respectively by Nair and by Muscardini) on the EMP and the Common Strategy were produced in late January 200, just in time for the Second Parliamentary Forum.

The first issue that needs to be tackled is once more why did it take so long for the Second Forum to take place? One of the reasons often mentioned is that there were elections in key EU Mediterranean countries [51] . This is not convincing. Indeed, it is ironic to use democratic elections to justify problems with the organising of parliamentary events. Afterall, parliamentarians are normally elected by their respective electorates. Another reason mentioned (again during the proceedings of the 2^nd  Forum) was the MEPP. Once more this explanation is not satisfactory as it fails to explain why other EMP meetings did take place during the same period. It is more correct to argue that the foreign ministerial meetings possess even more political symbolism than the parliamentary forums. In fact, the real reason for the delay –that it to say the institutional turf war between European parliamentarians- was not openly discussed during the proceedings of the Second Forum. 

The Forum eventually met on 8 and 9 February 2001 in the EP building in Brussels under the co-chair(wo)manship of the EP President (Madame Nicole Fontaine, EPP, France) and the President of the Moroccan House of Representatives (Mr Abdelwahad Radi). There were two absentees (Syria and Lebanon), as it had been the case in the November 2000 Marseilles foreign ministerial meeting. This is important because it does away with the oft-repeated but unconvincing claim that the EMP has at least offered a forum of discussion for all MEPP participants even at times when the latter experiences huge difficulties.

The Forum lasted one and a half day. The declared objective was to come up with a common final declaration at the end of the proceedings. The other objective was of course for the forum to be a place where parliamentarians from the two sides of the Mediterranean  could exchange ideas, opinions, and views. Four particular aspects of the Forum will be considered here: [i] the participation; [ii] the plenary debates; [iii] the final declaration; and [iv] the decision to institutionalise the Forum from next year (2002).

The question of the participation is important in light of the long saga over how many parliamentarians, and from which European parliaments, would represent the European parliaments. But it is also an important signal with regards to how important (or otherwise) each European Union state considers the Barcelona Process to be. The higher the representation, the more interest there is.  One can but notice the rather weak representation of several EU states. All EU national parliaments were represented, except one: the Netherlands. But quite a few other national MPs did not attend. Several delegations were present but only through parliamentary officials and not through parliamentarians. The UK, Denmark and Finland sent their permanent Brussels parliamentary office representatives.  Thus, only 10 out of the EU 15 were represented by parliamentarians. The Northern geographical location of these countries is quite clear and there is some evidence of a North-South divide in the EU over the Mediterranean. This particular point was raised by Martinez Casan (a Spanish MP) during the Forum proceedings [52] .

However, to have national EU parliaments permanent representatives in Brussels is a recent, and interesting, initiative that several parliaments EU have taken to date. The British, Danish, Finnish parliaments now have staff permanently based in Brussels (in the EP building itself) who act as liaison officers between the EP and their own respective parliaments. Such a development shows how important the EP has become in EU policy/decision-making. This is an important aspect for the future institutional debate of an enlarged Europe. But it falls beyond the specific scope of this paper. It is only mentioned here as an example of the impact that internal EU politics have on the way the EU is acting abroad. [53]

Having said that, it is clear that such a low level of participation is not a good signal for the South Mediterranean parliamentarians who attend the Forum. Of course, MEPs could be seen as also representing their own countries, but this would be contrary to the idea of the EP as a representative of the wider EU interest. The key point remains however that by not sending national parliamentarians, this might have the effect of implying less interest in the Mediterranean from the countries involved. The 12 Southern partners could be affected in a negative way. One needs to stress that their respective populations harbour rather hostile views towards the West, especially after the 1991 Gulf War and over Israel. After all perceptions are all important in international affairs.

With regards to the total number of participants, there were about 210 participants. In addition to the 2 co-chairs, there were 45 MEPs and 47 national MPs from the EU (including officials). There were 46 Southern MPs, plus another 44  southerners (mainly officials from Brussels-based embassies), another 14 observers, plus 7 officials and ECOSOC and European Commission representatives (including one of its Vice-President, Spain’s Loyola del Palacio). This made up the grand total  of  210+. The meeting was open to the public so the actual number of participants was even higher but impossible to calculate in an accurate manner.

The key difference between the two Fora is the clear increase in the number of national MPs of EU member states. There is perhaps some evidence of a ‘national “hostile” takeover bid’, which was half-jokingly discussed by a number of observers. The increasing role played by the Italians in particular did not pass unnoticed, especially as the next EMP Parliamentary Forum will be held in Italy next year. The question then becomes whether the EMP is turning into a intra-EU politics ‘toy’. The debate over increasing links between national parliaments and the EP has tended to reinforce ‘a return of the national’ [54] in European integration. Such a development was evident in the Amsterdam Treaty, and painfully visible during the Nice European Council meeting in December 2001 [55] , which epitomised well how European institutional arrangements are still used to defend national interests [56] . If one refers to a number of economic problems, especially with regards to entranched agricultural interests in southern Europe, one can but be pessimistic about the real utility of the EMP in general and of its Parliamentary Forum in particular.

Yet, the EP remains crucial to the future of the Parliamentary Forum ‘because we have the money and the Southern partners do not’ [57] . The EP signalled its interest in the Mediterranean by (co-)chairing the event with its own President rather than one of its Vice-President as had been the case in the first Forum. But this might not be a positive development afterall. Another, more critical, way of looking at it would be to point to the fact that such a development also dilutes any personal interest in the region [58] . This was mentioned with regards to the fact that Mr Guiterrez Diaz, then EP Vice-President and co-chair of the First Forum, had a personal interest in the Mediterranean, whereas the then EP President, despite her many other qualities, is not reputed to possess such an interest.

As for the plenary debate proceedings, the Middle East dominated the proceedings but this should not come as a surprise as the Forum took place the day after the election of Ariel Sharon in Israel. During the proceedings, a number of (mainly Palestinian but also other) Arab delegates repeatedly described him, in a rather blunt and undiplomaticatic way, as the ‘butcher of Lebanon/Sabra and Chatila’ [59] . Other key themes were migration, human rights, the role of women, and the bilateral  Partnership agreements. There was a clear feeling of disenchantment with the results of the EMP after five years in existence. The lack of progress in the MEPP was mainly blamed for such a sorry situation.

The only other ‘hot’ moment was an outburst against human rights abuses in Tunisia by a French MEP of North African origin. As a result, Morocco’s  House of Representatives President, who was then chairing this particular session of the meeting, made sure that every other speaker who spoke after the French MEP was a parliamentarian from North Africa and defended Tunisia’s reputation. Their main arguments were to label her ‘attack’ an ‘unacceptable interference in the internal affairs of an independent and sovereign state’ or to call it a ‘worrying sign of European neo-colonialism’ [60] . This is quite important as the EP’s concern over human rights abuses in Tunisia had already been described by the Tunisian Parliament as mistakenly based on ‘des allegations que leur fournissent trois ou quatres traitres a la patrie’ [61] . An important report on human rights violations in the region by the FIDH (Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme) in conjunction with the OMCT (Organisation Mondiale contre la torture) is now available on the EMP Parliamentary Forum’s internet, but it was not made available at the time of the meeting. One may also wonder why such reports and others (for instance by Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch) were not provided to all Forum participants.In brief, the really difficult issues of human rights violations were repeatedly ignored or countered by the (Moroccan) Chair (see above). Other topics like Algeria [62] or the Western Sahara were not even mentioned. Little real debate and perhaps some ‘agenda control’ might be seen an unfair description of what happened. The real issue is of course whether, and in what manner, sensitive issues should be discussed. But it is difficult to see what use such a forum would have if it amounts to yet another talking shop.

Similarly, the Final Declaration is a rather interesting example of how one can end up having a rather cynical view of the whole exercise. A draft declaration was circulated at the beginning of the meeting, for all to see, including the media present. Then the membership of a drafting committee was suggested and more or less accepted [63] . A final declaration was then circulated the following day (day 2 of 2) after ‘a long working night’ according to the EP President [64].

The Final Declaration is slightly more anti-Israeli than its initial draft version. Again this is not a surprise considering the wider political climate which followed Sharon’s election (see above).  The Final Declaration also regrets a number of unilateral EU/Council decisions such as the Common Strategy’s adoption without any prior consultation with the EP (a criticism that is also made in the two EP reports that were issued prior to the February 2001 Forum). However, despite the rethoric during the plenary debates about the need to open up EU agriculture to the South from both European and other delegates, the key word of ‘agriculture’ has been dropped from the sectoral areas that the Forum would like to see opening up as quickly as possible in the Mediterranean. Otherwise there is little discrepancy with what the Commission wanted in its October 2000 Report.

The Declaration also expressed its regrets to the lack of progress towards the adoption of the Charter on Peace and Stability. There are also the usual calls for better relations, more money and more efforts, which are all laudable aims. On the international front, there is a call for Iraqi sanctions to be lifted. Libya and Mauritania (both are currently enjoying an observer’s status) are invited to join the EMP.

Whereas it did not appear in the draft declaration, the Cyprus Problem was mentioned in the final version. As mentioned previously, it had not been included in the First Forum Declaration where only a reservation by the Cypriot delegation had been appended to the text. This is not only important because it might mean that some issues become more relevant when the wider EU context has changed (enlargement negotiations). It could also mean that the Forum might have a potential conflict-resolution role in the Mediterranean. This also relates to the wider question of how the EU can help resolve conflicts in general, and the Cyprus problem in particular. [65]

            Last but by no means least, what was agreed in the Final Declaration includes an institutionalisation of the process. A permanent body has been agreed  ‘to enable work to continue between sessions’. Perhaps more importantly, a Working party has also been set up to work on the final rules of procedures. In the light of the institutional turf war between the EP and the parliaments of EU member states, especially those of the big ones, such a development is to be welcomed. The Forum will now meet annually. In addition, a parliamentary dimension to a Mediterranean observatory on migration is foreseen (this was also demanded in the two January 2001 EP reports). The latter is a clear example of how the Forum could be useful in a practical manner.

Conclusions: lessons and recommendations

I will not discuss the EMP as such in any detail as there are plenty of other studies on that matter. What is clear is that the Process has not been relaunched as expected. There seems to be consensus that the EMP appears more and more like a post-MEPP forum. The signs are, at least for the moment, that unless and until there is a real Peace Process in the Middle East, Barcelona would not be able to offer much. This might be a harsh conclusion. But one cannot see any other realistic option at this stage.

In spite of the above there is still overall agreement that Forum is necessary. There is a need to have a forum for exchanging views, ideas and entertaining a dialogue. This was repeated in my interviews with a number of leading Spanish MEPs in March 2001. But, in that respect, I do not share the rather optimistic assessment made by the EP President and Co-Chair of the 2^nd EMP Parliamentary Forum who described the Final Declaration as ‘un texte tres fort’. Nor do I have the same view as her Co-Chair who described the meeting as ‘un travail enorme, un succes’. [66]

What could be done to improve the current situtation? Additional linkages with other institutions such as the Women Parliamentarians Forum (which held a meeting in Malta in March 2001), or other existing transnational Mediterranean forums in NATO, OSCE and the IPU might be considered. But there is also a need to rationalise these institutions in a way that reflect no longer the Cold War logic under which these were created (NATO, OSCE or IPU; also the Arab Interparliamentary Union or the Consultative Council of the Arab Maghreb [67] ). What is the right representative structure  for European parliamentarians in the EMP Forum? The solution adopted in Valencia in April 2002 has been to set up in the near future a Parliamentary Assembly for the Euro-Mediterranean basin. Time will tell if this will be enough for addressing some of the problems identified in this paper.

In particular, there exists a wider problem which seems to be much more fundamental than a full institutionalization of the parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process. Are Southern parliaments real parliaments? That is to say à-la Western Liberal model. There is no real democracy in the South except in Malta and Cyprus. Israel is a problematic case as it is reminiscent of Western Europe during the colonial years [68] . In other works, is the current formula the best approach? How can this work if the partners are not democrats. Currently, the Parliamentary Forum looks very much like the UN General Assembly! Otherwise, the plenary debates will be full of platitudes from all sides, including a rather larger number of calls to avoid such platitudes! There is also the related problem of a number of parliamentarians, especially from North Africa and Turkey, who acted as official ‘mouthpieces’ of national positions during the 2^nd Forum plenary debates. 

This question is vital for the future of the parliamentary dimension of the EMP. It should not be dismissed as unfair, patronizing or unrealistic. I would simply note that the initial reference to the Forum in the Barcelona Declaration mentions ‘elected representatives’. In other words, there is an expectation of some democratic life for such a forum to exist. For instance, I would contrast the presence of non-democratically elected representatives in the EMP Forum to the way things can be organised elsewhere, e.g. in Latin America. Only the Presidents of the Democratic Iberoamericanos Parliaments have met, now for over ten meetings, although there exists a Parlatino which groups all parliaments including those of non-democratic states.

It might be true that in some Southern cases, the regimes can be perhaps undermined by the EMP and its Forum. Even limited democratic systems have some opposition parties. The latter could use the Forum as a way of expressing different views from those of the government/regime. Eventually this might perhaps help the development of a civil society. The latter (basket 3 of the EMP) is by far the most ambitious and promising element of the Barcelona Process [69] , especially after local authorities and cities decided to develop their cooperation (Marseilles 2000). But there is no guarantee for such a development.

In conclusion, to date, the Forum looks more like just another ‘talking shop’ rather than an innovative instrument for the promotion of democracy in the South Mediterranean. It is hoped that this will change in the future. But whether it will be possible or not, there remain the following following three unescapable elements that need to be addressed:

  ·        the perrenial question about the utility of dialogue, which is a phenomenon that affects the EMP as much as it does impact on its parliamentary dimension. For how long does one keep talking? Is it not better sometimes to make public clear and deep divergences of opinion? See for instance the ‘no meeting of minds’ in the final declaration of the NATO and Southern Mediterranean meeting at Genova on 1 December 2000 [70] .

  ·         the vexed topic of whether the EU is interested in stability or democracy in the Mediterranean. To use the words of a Belgian MP during the Second Forum (Moriau), one is entitled to argue that ‘on ne batit pas la democratie avec le deni de democratie’.

  ·        is the EMP more about the need for EU consistency in external affairs than on the EU’s impact on an international region? If it is only the former, then one should not be surprised by the lack of any substantial progress on the latter.   Those three factors cannot be ignored for ever without a cost. It is hoped that this study has shed some light on a number of problems and prospects that the Parliamentary Dimension of the Barcelona Process has been encountering and will, no doubt, encounter in the future.