



The Courier

AFRICA-CARIBBEAN-PACIFIC - EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

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**POPULATION AND
DEVELOPMENT**


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THE 66 ACP STATES

ANGOLA	GAMBIA	ST. VINCENT & THE GRENADINES
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA	GHANA	SAO TOME & PRINCIPE
BAHAMAS	GRENADA	SENEGAL
BARBADOS	GUINEA	SEYCHELLES
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BURUNDI	KIRIBATI	SURINAME
CAMEROON	LESOTHO	SWAZILAND
CAPE VERDE	LIBERIA	TANZANIA
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	MADAGASCAR	TOGO
CHAD	MALAWI	TONGA
COMOROS	MALI	TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
CONGO	MAURITANIA	TUVALU
CÔTE D'IVOIRE	MAURITIUS	UGANDA
DJIBOUTI	MOZAMBIQUE	WESTERN SAMOA
DOMINICA	NIGER	VANUATU
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	NIGERIA	ZAIRE
ETHIOPIA	PAPUA NEW GUINEA	ZAMBIA
FIJI	RWANDA	ZIMBABWE
GABON	ST. CHRISTOPHER & NEVIS	
	ST. LUCIA	



FRANCE

(Territorial collectivities)

Mayotte
St Pierre and Miquelon

(Overseas territories)

New Caledonia and dependencies
French Polynesia
French Southern and Antarctic Territories
Wallis and Futuna Islands

NETHERLANDS

(Overseas countries)

Netherlands Antilles
(Bonaire, Curaçao, St Martin, Saba,
St Eustatius)
Aruba

DENMARK

(Country having special relations with Denmark)

Greenland

UNITED KINGDOM

(Overseas countries and territories)

Anguilla
British Antarctic Territory
British Indian Ocean Territory
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Falkland Islands
Southern Sandwich Islands and dependencies
Montserrat
Pitcairn Island
St Helena and dependencies
Turks and Caicos Islands

This list does not prejudice the status of these countries and territories now or in the future.

The Courier uses maps from a variety of sources. Their use does not imply recognition of any particular boundaries nor prejudice the status of any state or territory.

MEETING POINT:



André Kempinaire



Luis Yáñez Barnuevo

It has been some time since European Development ministers have expressed their views in *The Courier*. Our last "round" of interviews, begun in 1976, ended in 1980. Since then three new Member States have joined the European Community and there have been many developments in its various fields of activity. Time, therefore, to give the floor again to some of the national policy-makers, to allow them to define the position of their governments on development cooperation and on the various questions it raises. The floor is given, in this issue, to André Kempinaire, Secretary of State for Development Cooperation for Belgium, and to Luis Yáñez Barnuevo, his opposite number in Spain. **Pages 2 to 9**

COUNTRY REPORT

GABON: As an oil exporter, Gabon is suffering from the depression in the market for crude and from the significant drop in the value of the dollar. With an economy under pressure and in the midst of a "financial Ramadan", Gabon is staking all on reorienting its economy so as to reduce its vulnerability to international influences. In an interview with *The Courier*, President El Hadj Omar Bongo puts his country's plight—and his plans to conquer it—into perspective, places Gabon in its international and African setting, and comments on its relations with the Community. **Pages 17 to 37**



EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: North-South debate

Ten reports in one day, a tall order for any Parliament, especially given that the dimensions of the issues under review were global and their significance fundamental to the future of our planet. *The Courier* looks at the state of North-South cooperation through the proceedings of the recent North-South debate held in the European Parliament. **Pages 42 to 44.**

DOSSIER: Population and development

Always a delicate subject in Africa, questions of population are nevertheless not taboo. African countries have, in fact, recognised for some time that their very high rates of population growth are too heavy a burden on their development efforts and on the standard of living of their populations. **Pages 47 to 80**

THE ARTS: Cinema

The 10th Panafrican Film Festival (FESPACO) was held in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, from 21-28 February. The Festival has become Africa's most important regular cultural event with an ever richer spread of cultural happenings and exchanges. **Pages 89 to 91**



The Courier

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Have you answered the "Readers' questionnaire" in issue No. 100? If not, do so quickly! We need your answers!

ANDRÉ KEMPINAIRE

**Belgian State Secretary
for Development Cooperation**



P. Thougheis - "Het Laatste Nieuws"

"The first criterion is to fight hunger"

► *Minister, until 30 June, Belgium holds the Presidency of the EEC Council of Ministers and the working parties that depend on it. What were your development cooperation targets at the beginning of the Presidency and what do you think you will have achieved by the end of it?*

— When a country chairs the Community bodies in any sector, it goes without saying that it is the Commission that makes the proposals, because a certain amount of continuity is called for in European policy, although the country that presides can act as a stimulus. We have tried to do that and we have succeeded, partly at least. The next Council of Development Ministers is on 21 May, a meeting at which our idea is to stress certain things that will also figure in what we call the guidelines of Belgian development cooperation. That is to say we want to try and promote a little more action in the private sector, in private enterprise in development. There are two aims here. First, to try and reinforce the smaller businesses of the developing world and, second, to arouse the interest of, I was going to say, Belgian firms, but I could say small and medium-sized European firms in this problem. This is on the agenda of the meeting on 21 May.

Another thing we have tried to boost is an idea that came from us in the first place. When I arrived, I all

too often had the impression that many sections of the population, and often large ones at that, weren't all that interested in the problems of the Third World, the problems of development cooperation. Some people were interested, of course, but not enough. So I thought if we were to keep up the volume of our aid to the Third World, we had to do something to put European public opinion in the picture about the considerable effort the European Community makes. Those two items will be on the agenda. And the third one will follow — it may be early days yet, but it will have to come. We have to try and coordinate our development cooperation to see what the Community's position will be at the next UNCTAD, that's UNCTAD VII, in July. Although they talk a lot about trade at UNCTAD, there is a D for development in it too, so there is one thing, the relations between trade and development, where we could harmonise and coordinate our points of view. The documents are all being prepared at the moment. We have regular contact with the Commission, particularly with Mr Natali, and I believe that it will all be ready for 21 May. Of course other points can always be brought up at Councils of Ministers not by the Presidency but because other countries wish it, provided we know about it in advance, and these are discussed informally.

Cooperation with international organisations

► *Appropriations for multilateral organisations are an important part of Belgian cooperation, aren't they, at around 40% of the total. Is there a political or a historical reason for this?*

— Yes, indeed, Belgium does channel about 40% of its development aid into the multilateral organisations. But the breakdown of the funds from the AGCD⁽¹⁾, which is an important stimulus in development cooperation, is two thirds to bilateral cooperation to one third multilateral. So bilateral credits rate fairly high, I think. The reasons may well be historical, as the bulk of our aid goes to Africa, a continent which is fairly close to us and with which we had many economic links in the past. And, let us not forget, we have historical if not family ties with some countries there, with Zaïre, Rwanda and Burundi.

► *So it is for historical reasons, not because you are seeking, say efficiency, or synergy with multilateral cooperation?*

— Exactly. Because we understand the problems of this continent, because of our knowledge of the structures, the past and so on of its coun-

(1) General development cooperation Administration (the Belgian cooperation Ministry).

tries we are able to make a more effective job of the aid we provide. Obviously that doesn't rule out any cooperation with the big international organisations on projects that are too vast for us alone. We try to help finance this sort of thing. The international organisations are very important when it comes to the very big projects we could not cope with alone. Take the anti-hunger campaign in Saharan Africa, poverty on the Horn of Africa, in Ethiopia and Sudan and Somalia, and the problem of desertification (an area twice the size of Belgium is lost every year). Take the big reforestation projects and so on. We couldn't tackle those by ourselves. Infrastructure, road-building and dam projects we can run on a smaller scale and provide technical assistance, but if the projects are really vast, then the only way of intervening is through an international organisation.

► *How do you see Belgian cooperation in relation to Community cooperation and to Lomé in particular? I am thinking of geographical and sectoral orientation here and of the Community cooperation programming procedures.*

— Obviously there are a lot of problems here. First of all—and this is something that will be on the agenda on 21 May—we have to make a better job of harmonising and coordinating the Community's cooperation with the Third World. I think what we need is—and it's the same for all countries—to try and avoid duplication. We have to try and harmonise food aid and improve the way we coordinate our supplies of equipment. If we, say, supply a country with so many lorries and so many machines and another country gives them the same, but different makes, different spare parts and different maintenance systems, we have an undesirable situation on our hands. We have to get better harmonisation and better coordination in the Community, particularly with Lomé. That is something else we are trying to do.

Geographical focus

► *What about Belgium's geographical focus as far as the 66 ACPs are concerned? What countries do you focus your aid on?*

— Africa—and I told you why—is where we concentrate our aid and let us say more than 70% of our aid to this continent goes to Zaïre, Rwanda and Burundi. We also have 26 countries we call focal countries, that is to say, countries with which we have general or special aid agreements, and here we do in fact channel a little bit outside Africa. There are 18 focal countries in Africa and eight outside — the Philippines, China, Thailand and Indonesia in Asia and Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia in Latin America. Other countries have a similar sort of geographical preference. We welcome the entry of Spain and Portugal to the Community because these two countries are constantly drawing our attention to all that still needs to be done in Latin America. These two new members will pull European cooperation a little nearer Latin America which has, to a certain extent, been neglected. Belgium, ultimately, is only a small country. It cannot do it all. But if we list the financial aid we channel into development cooperation, it comes to more than 100 countries of the world.

► *But you have "favourites" don't you — Cameroon, Kenya, Senegal and Niger, for example, where you are very active. Why is this?*

— I've been asked that a lot and my answer, I have to say, is a rather odd one. What often happens is we get a visit from the Head of one of these States or our Head of State goes out to one of these countries and interest is created on occasions of this sort. I'm not saying that we don't have specific criteria for our focal countries. It's more a question of political or economic trends. Let me give you a couple of examples. Haiti had a revolutionary movement and chose democratisation. Why not take that opportunity of encouraging it and saying "We can and we want to help you, now that you are on the road to democracy and this is how we shall encourage you". It's exactly the same with the Philippines at the moment and there were no doubt others in the past. Now, don't go saying that we only choose countries that are of commercial or economic interest to Belgium. There are plenty of examples of us choosing focal countries without giving a thought to improving trade or

tightening economic ties. That is certainly not the case. The first criterion is always a humanitarian one, that of relieving poverty, providing food and fighting the scourges that afflict them. We also have links with countries which have nevertheless notched up some economic progress and here we make no secret of the fact that, if we give them aid, then we are looking for something in return, for economic effects. I am thinking here of the Maghreb, of Morocco and Algeria and Tunisia. And I am thinking of Thailand. Singapore and Hong Kong which are still considered to be developing countries, you know, but you can't really give aid, grants, to countries like that. So we try and work on a kind of equal footing and consider them as equal partners by giving State credits or other things, lines of credit, say, that are right for their situation. And in this case we expect some kind of economic spin-off.

► *What about sectoral orientation? The Lomé Convention stresses rural development and you, too, have mentioned the problems of desertification and the environment. Would you say that, for the humanitarian reasons you have underlined, Belgian cooperation is going to look more to social projects, to such things as health and education, or to rural development? Or to the smaller businesses you talked about just now and therefore to industry?*

— Development cooperation is not all that old. Look back, to the period of decolonisation in the '60s and after, say, and you have 25 or 30 years. I think we have reached the stage now where all the rich countries of the world which have gone in for technical assistance, as it was called at the start, have realised that a lot of mistakes have been made. Many countries thought they could continue the colonial system in a way, by, for example, trying to develop the Third World countries with rapid industrialisation, often on a large scale, by building dams and big factories and outside plantations. But ultimately we had to wake up to the fact that many of these things—and they put enormous debts on the back of the Third World, something for which we are all to a certain extent responsible today—were failures. Many of the industries failed to reach the anticipated output and some

of them don't work at all because there is no technology or maintenance or costly spare parts. So now the first criterion in all projects is always to fight poverty and hunger.

Integrated agro-industrial schemes

In the second place, why couldn't we do this with what have been called integrated projects and with small schemes that we are in a position to manage and that ultimately the beneficiaries themselves out there in the developing countries can manage and maintain? This is why we want to concentrate on agro-industrial schemes. The word "industrial" is important but so is the word "agriculture". With the whole thing, we are aiming for an overall result — we can fight hunger, we can encourage small-scale industries and trade in these countries through SMEs. Not just agricultural projects where you sow and you harvest, but where you provide fertiliser, improved seed and storage facilities and you market the produce. What we are seeing now is that some of the so-called poor countries are producing surplus food, cereals, but don't manage to sell it and can't, because they don't have the infrastructure or the storage facilities or the transport or the processing facilities, to send them to what may well be nearby regions where food is short. So what is needed are small integrated agro-industrial schemes and, second, a drive to develop South-South and not just North-South trade.

► *And what about purely social projects, such things as education and health?*

— We cannot provide education for the whole of the developing world. We have provided some countries with basic structures but I think we have reached the point where they are able to train their own students and we have reached the stage where we would do better to stress teacher training in standard subjects and in technical education.

► *In the public health sector, what is Belgium's attitude to the demographic problem that is so acute in the countries to which it is linked, Rwanda for example?*

— That, obviously, is a terrible problem, because whenever the economy develops favourably, it is overtaken by an expanding population. It is a vicious circle we never seem to be able to break out of. But these countries are sovereign countries. They are masters of their own destiny and we must not indulge in paternalism or force them to accept rules or conditions for the aid we want to give. Many of them are aware of the importance and potentially catastrophic consequences of these problems, but all we can do is help them with what has been called education and training and mother and child welfare schemes. Obviously if these countries have family planning projects, we can encourage them and help them through research and education. But not really operationally.

► *For the past five years, Belgium's share of GNP channelled into cooperation has stagnated at 0.5%. Do you still think you can reach the 0.7% previously aimed at?*

"0.7% is not a magic figure"

— For the first time, this question has been included, in those very terms, in the Belgian Government declaration⁽¹⁾. That is to say the Government has taken upon itself to try and reach the figure of 0.7% of GNP as official development assistance by the end of its term. I should like to say one or two things about this. First, we shouldn't be ashamed of our cooperation record, as we are in fifth place in the world, behind the Scandinavian countries and The Netherlands, and we have not always been at 0.5%, but even 0.55% and even almost at 0.6% once. You have to realise that half a percent can mean billions of francs to the Belgian Treasury. I have also asked the Government to set up an inter-ministerial committee to list all the official development assistance to the Third World. It has never been done before. I don't think, for example, that anyone has ever worked out what all the communes and the provinces and other institutions give. The Development Cooperation Ministry isn't the only one involved. Other ministries

are too—the Ministries of Finance and Education and Defence and Health and maybe others—and quite considerable amounts of ODA are concerned. So other departments, too, will have to make an effort to increase the volume of aid. But the most important thing is that I don't think that 0.7% is a magic figure, a goal which we can cheer when we reach and shout: "We have done our duty, it's all over". I see that many other countries, and practically all the OECD members, are unwilling to tie themselves to a precise timetable for the 0.7%. They all look upon it as a goal. But they are not putting any time limits on it and their reasoning is "Why not put greater emphasis on efficiency and the quality of aid?" The example is always the same. Suppose that one country sends, say, 10 million-worth of drugs to a developing country, realising that they are mostly poor quality, can't be distributed in time and go where they shouldn't, and that another country sends only 5 million-worth at the same time, but is careful to see they are good quality, properly distributed and reach their destination in good time? The first country, with its 10 million-worth of drugs, will soon be on the list of 0.7% givers, but, to my mind, will have been less help than the country that sent 5 million-worth. And there are plenty of examples of this sort.

► *Aren't you more interested, then, in whether a project really meets the people's needs than than any economic or financial targets?*

— Absolutely.

► *What about the dialogue that Lomé implies in Community cooperation? Haven't you had the same thing in Belgium for some time, with the "joint committees" made up of Belgium and its various beneficiary countries? Do you find it a good system or a cumbersome one?*

— It is an effort, that much is clear, because we have 26 countries in our focal group and we have cooperation agreements with them. If we have to have a joint committee meeting with each country every year—and that is more or less it—it means meetings practically every week. I think it is enormously useful because the world is on the move and everything

(1) The Government's official declaration to Parliament when it takes up its duties (Ed. note).

changes, even over very short periods. It is difficult to say, for example, we have a five-year plan with one or two guidelines we shall try and follow during that time, because things can change in five years. It is very useful, I think, to get to know people first and then to go out and see how the projects are going on the spot, take stock of them and often reorient things that are already under way. Meetings like this really have become inevitable and totally essential, I believe.

► *Do you have five-year plans for all the countries with which you cooperate?*

— No. But with most of the “focal countries” with the general agreement,

no idea of any financial benefit. These are projects we have seen out in the countries and we appreciate them greatly.

The second thing, the cofinancing of investments, is something which is very dear to me. Many of these developing countries have, I think, reached a certain stage of maturity when they can do certain things alone. They can invest, but not find the money or the technology or the know-how. This is when cofinancing, via loans and interest rebates that make for very soft loans (practically donations) and even grants, can provide the recipient country's share and we can seek SMEs—small and medium-sized enterprises—here in Belgium to provide the know-

and NGOs that will get Zaïre's economy off the ground?

— I don't know. Look at our countries here in the West. The backbone is still the 10 000 or 20 000 SMEs, not the very large industries. I am convinced that if we go on like this, we will have a snowball effect. The best example for any population in the Third World—and I have seen this myself—if you want to change traditional habits in farming and, say, bring in a new system of fertilisers, not chemicals, but natural ones that you find locally, but that people have not used over the centuries because their mothers and their fathers and their grandparents and their great-grandparents didn't either, is to show them on our own fields just what can be done with, say, cassava roots in only two years. It's not easy to change people's habits, so you have to do it little by little.

► *Where do you stand on supplying European farm products as food aid for the developing world?*

— First of all there's emergency aid in a crisis. We are always willing to supply aid when there is famine or disaster. As for food aid in other circumstances, it would be fairly considerable and somewhat of a burden on the European agricultural policy, but if there is a way of having local production and encouraging South-South trade by buying food in one country and distributing it in another, then we can and we must do it — either by encouraging bilateral South-South trade, from one country to another, or by including triangular aid.

► *In spite of the butter mountains and the milk rivers of European agriculture?*

— Yes. Because we have noticed that the countries that receive the most aid from Europe, as a pure donation, have often stayed very poor. Second, because these European products do not encourage the local farmers to make an effort to produce a surplus to market. And third, because, by bringing in our food products, we are creating a problem of a change in the eating habits of certain populations and I don't know if we have the right to do this. ○

Interview by M.-H. BIRINDELLI



“The private sector needs to be pushed forward”

we have what we call a five-year plan and it goes without saying that we have to adjust our aim and take stock of events during this time.

The good work of the NGOs

► *The relative share of investment in Belgian aid is much smaller than that of technical assistance and NGO cofinancing. Why is this?*


— We channel a very large part of our funds into the NGOs because we try to have confidence in the sound projects they run. They still often have what I would call idealists who work with no thought of personal gain and

how and the technology. We have just had a report from two experts in Zaïre who have seen the drive and inventiveness and courage and work that some people over there put into achieving things, sometimes with the most rudimentary of means. I am talking about dairies, leatherwork and tanning and fishing. A lot can be done in so many fields where the people still work with elementary means and whatever they can find locally and where a small amount of money and a little bit of technology—not necessarily high technology, either—would go a very long way.

► *But don't you think there is still a balance to strike? Is it little projects*

LUIS YAÑEZ BARNUEVO

Spain's State Secretary
for International Cooperation
and Latin America



“Spain is anxious to develop its relations with the ACPs”

► *Spain spent 0.1% of its GDP on development cooperation in 1985. Does this mean it only has low priority in your foreign policy? Are things changing?*

— I realise that the 0.1% could, at first sight, give the impression that Spain is only making a very limited effort with its official development assistance. But you have to see it within the particular situation in our country, which doesn't have a tradition of development cooperation as such. We received aid ourselves until almost 10 years ago. And now we are in the position of a country that does the helping. The post of State Secretary for Cooperation was only created in August 1985, so we are now in the first stage as donors. We have to start by creating the instruments and organising the aid bodies and getting the experience we need so that, in time, we can make an efficient job of managing a larger and more significant amount of aid.

As to the importance of development assistance as an objective of Spain's foreign policy, I think that, bearing in mind the policy of economic adjustment and stringency the Spanish Government has had to run over the past few years, this 0.1% is indicative of a reasonable priority, particularly when you look at the Government's desire to make gradual, regular improvements in the cooperation ef-

fort. You know, 1992 will be a very important date for Spain. It is the 500th anniversary of the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus and we intend celebrating, as far as development assistance is concerned, by reaching the present OECD average of 0.36% of GNP. That is our aim.

► *That will be a terrific effort for the Spanish budget when it has financial problems and even social upheaval of its own to deal with. What will Spanish public opinion think about an increase in aid?*

— It's a problem — but not because of the social upheavals. They are the result of the way the economy has developed, particularly over the past couple of years. It's a general problem of public opinion. Internationally speaking, our country was isolated for several decades, so what we have to do now is run a campaign to make our people aware of the problem, teach them about the need for development aid and make them realise it is necessary. And as for the Cortes⁽¹⁾, the MPs don't criticise the Government for the money earmarked for cooperation (40 billion Pesetas in 1987)⁽²⁾ and some of the Opposition even complain it isn't enough. We need the same cli-

mate in the street — which is why we are going to be running this awareness campaign in September or October, using the television and the radio and the press to tell people what the aims of development cooperation are and what the Government intends doing about it, especially as regards the projected increase in cooperation funds.

► *This money nearly all seems to go into bilateral cooperation and you recently claimed that “multilateralism is in a state of crisis.” So how do you stand on Community development cooperation?*

— It's not quite true to say that bilateral cooperation is our prime concern. In 1985, multilateral aid was 24% of our ODA⁽³⁾ here in Spain. At that stage we weren't in the Community, but if we had added the Spanish contribution to the ordinary cooperation budget and to the EDF, multilateral aid would have accounted for 90% of our ODA and bilateral cooperation would have been relatively low. The Spanish Government is very much in favour of the Community's development cooperation and we are making a huge effort to establish contact with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific and to encourage closer links between the Com-

(1) The Spanish Parliament — Ed.

(2) Around ECU 274 million — Ed.

(3) Official Development Assistance — Ed.

munity and Latin America without adverse effects on the Community's activities in Asia.

If I said multilateralism was in a state of crisis, what I meant was the UN family, for example, which the USA and the UK have pulled out of. And I described reality. We have to combat crises like this, I think. We have to overcome them, but if they exist today, it would be as well also to ask the most radical countries of the Third World for greater comprehension when it comes to the obligations of countries like ours, developed countries but not *very* developed ones, so as to obtain a consensus in the international organisations. If it is just the number of countries that counts, if the Third World countries alone could direct the decisions of an international organisation by having, say, two thirds of the votes, then that organisation would be short-lived. We have to obtain a consensus on respecting the majority of countries and populations of the Third World and respecting the choices and priorities of the middle countries as well and not just the great powers.

"We welcomed the Lomé Convention"

To return to the Lomé Convention — we welcomed it. We are very keen on benefitting from belonging to the Community, to develop relations with the ACP countries which we had little to do with before — and that means a good 50 of the 66 members of the Group. We had minimal relations with them, quantitatively speaking, and that is why we want to be active within the Community. That is why we want to back up the Commission in its policy of relations with the ACPs through the Lomé Convention. And at the same time, we want—perfectly legitimately—to benefit from these relations to have close ties with these countries in the future.

I personally attended an ACP-EEC meeting of Ministers in Barbados to show our desire to participate and our desire to develop these relations. I am sorry there is a certain tendency in the Community to tell the ACPs that Spain isn't interested in anything except Latin America. I think that people who say that are being dishonest. We have a national interest in foster-

ing relations with the ACPs, as, from this year on, we shall be making the 5th biggest contribution to the European Development Fund.

And it is clear that Lomé is the most advanced system of cooperation in relations between the countries of the North and the countries of the South. No other country or group of countries or international organisation has a system anything like the Lomé system. Which is why I believe that it has to be preserved at all costs and improved little by little. But we joined the Community and the Lomé Convention too recently for me to be able to assess the way specific things—like programming and implementation and evaluation—work.

► *Do you intend speeding up the discussions on the Protocol on Spanish accession to Lomé so that agreement can be reached, as planned, by 30 June this year?*

— I am optimistic. Spain is ready to speed up the discussions on the Protocol and our intention is indeed to sign before 30 June. It is not just a question of time. It is also a question of content. Spain is currently looking at improving the already very favourable conditions granted to the ACPs in the transitional measures. As you know, we negotiated transitional measures with the ACPs, in accordance with Article 284 of Lomé III, for 1986 and they were extended until 30 June so a more ambitious and, it has to be admitted, better—drafted Protocol could be signed.

These transitional measures are very generous as far as Spain is concerned, for two reasons. First, Spain gave the ACPs the same basic customs duty as it gave the ten, whereas before it joined the Community, it used the rate applied to third countries. So, with the transitional measures, it opened its markets to the ACPs whose products have become more competitive than those from Latin America — to which the Common Customs Tariff has applied since Spain joined the EEC.

In favour of speeding up the Protocol on Accession

So Spain wants to speed up the talks and get the Protocol signed... although I have to say—and this is

something I must insist on—that we have made a huge effort for the ACPs from the very day we joined the Community, through Regulation 698/86, which contains the transitional measures.

As to the ACP demands, let us not forget that Spain has a ceiling on advantages. ACP products cannot get more favourable treatment in Spain than products from any EEC member do and we cannot give more favourable treatment to ACP products than the rest of the EEC members give ours. But don't forget that, for as long as Lomé III lasts, ACP agricultural produce will go into the rest of the Community countries on better terms than the same Spanish products get.

As a general principle, I should like to point out that Spain opens its markets to ACP products as the Community opens its markets to Spanish products. At all events, we want to move as quickly as possible and, once the Protocol has been signed, with proper terms, we are willing to consider extra advantages as far as time limits are concerned.

► *Where does most of your development aid go?*

— Overall, and taking a significant number of years into account, of course, it goes mainly to Latin America. For obvious reasons. This is the region whose language and culture we share and with which we have close contact in all fields. However, I should add that the country which gets the most aid from us is in fact Equatorial Guinea, an African country, for reasons outlined just now.

We also have cooperation programmes in Africa, with the Arab countries of the Maghreb. But in sub-Saharan Africa, it is Equatorial Guinea that gets the largest amount of our cooperation credits. Since we joined the EEC, we have developed important cooperation relations with the Portuguese-speaking nations, with Angola and Mozambique and Cape Verde and São Tomé. Unlike the other countries of Europe, Spain had practically nothing to do with Black Africa. But, of course, the rest of the Community, Portugal excepted, had nothing to do with Latin America either.

That is why it is reasonable for our

bilateral relations to be geared to Latin America most of all. I shall always remember the first time I went to a Council of Development Ministers. I saw the name of the meeting. Development Council, it said. But it was all about Africa. I didn't understand. I wondered whether Africa was the only place in the world to want to go in for development cooperation. It came as a great surprise. At that stage, I didn't know exactly where cooperation between Europe and Africa had got. It's important, I think. We want to take this opportunity to participate with the rest of the Community, with the Community itself, loyally, in cooperation with Africa, but we also want to develop cooperation relations with Latin America in the Community.

Priority to the least developed

► *Do you have any particular geographical priority in Latin America itself, the Contadora Group, say, or do you share out your funds over the whole area?*

— Our criteria are, first of all, the level of development, which is to say we put priority on the least developed nations; and second, respect for human rights and democracy. This is why our global cooperation programme is geared to the Central American isthmus, to Honduras, Salvador and Nicaragua, and to the Andean countries, to Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. These six countries are the priority as far as our development aid is concerned. Relations with the rest of Latin America are different. With Mexico, for example, and Argentina and Brazil, we have out development cooperation agreements, but the most important thing is the economic and commercial relations and the problem of the debt.

► *Where do you stand on the debt?*

— It would not be wise to try and outline a solution to the Third World debt problem, where the nuances are particularly important, in a talk as short as this. But I am convinced that this problem, the biggest issue in international economic relations today, calls for a firm desire for dialogue on the part of both debtors and creditors.

I think the approach begun at the last UN General Assembly and, to a certain extent, confirmed at the ECLA⁽¹⁾ meeting in Mexico is a major step forward from the point of view of quality and gives grounds for a certain amount of hope.

Spain has always been very flexible, in spite of the fact that some of the Latin American countries owe us a great deal. We were very understanding when the debts of countries such as Mexico and Argentina were renegotiated. These are the sort of lines we should be working along, I believe.

► *To return to cooperation programmes — what sectors are yours geared to?*

— One of the problems of Spanish cooperation before the State Secretariat for International Cooperation and Latin America was set up was the fact that our aid was spread over too many sectors. But since it was set up a year and a half ago, the Secretariat has worked on sectoral concentration. Naturally, the sectors depend on the degree of development of the country with which we are cooperating. Where the level of development is low, our cooperation is mainly geared to basics, to agriculture and health and education. And we try to ensure that our programmes and projects are properly integrated.

► *What are your criteria in choosing programmes and projects?*

— The first criterion, of course, is the priority the country itself indicates. And second, we look at all the priority projects which have been submitted and see where Spain is best placed and likely to be at a comparative advantage when it comes to implementation. If the country mentions no priorities, we say we are willing to cooperate on such things as education, health, nutrition and farming. That doesn't rule out other types of projects, of course. We help with those too, for a variety of reasons.

► *In the health sector — is Spain's position on the demographic issue influenced by her Christian tradition?*

— There are contradictions, it is true. But even though there is a tradi-

tion of this kind in Spain, I think that Spanish society today has a certain lay outlook, particularly when it comes to birth control. But we do often use religious organisations for our development cooperation and we are very satisfied with them. Cooperation officers of this type are exceptionally motivated and devoted, on almost any terms, and they manage to obtain astonishing results with very little money. Take education. In Equatorial Guinea, say, there is cooperation of this type and it is very positive. This type of organisation has its position on birth control, but it doesn't oppose it.

Cut the red tape in cooperation

► *Do you work mainly through technical assistance, the supply of equipment, turn-key projects or the training of local staff?*

— Spanish cooperation to a certain extent uses all these. So far, financial aid has mainly involved sending out capital equipment and turn-key projects and our technical assistance has mainly been experts and staff training. What we want to do in future is break down the barrier between financial and technical cooperation so that relations can gradually grow up between them.

► *Do you work with NGOs?*

— Yes of course. We are very keen on them because they are a way of cutting through the red tape of cooperation and avoiding the excesses of the administrative apparatus. It is still early days for the Spanish NGOs, of course, but the State Secretariat is planning to come up with a regulation on working with NGOs and intends developing this joint activity. Our NGO subsidies have doubled since last year. And next year, we intend quadrupling this year's Ptas 350 million⁽²⁾. The NGOs are vital to our development cooperation effort.

► *Is your ministry the only one that can deal with the developing countries or are there other Spanish organisations, banks, say, which are involved? And as a result, do you also give loans on fairly soft terms in addition to the grants?*

(1) The Economic Commission for Latin America.

(2) About ECU 2.4 million — Ed.

— As far as execution is concerned, Spain has a wide range of organisations involved in cooperating with the developing nations. The need to unify their aims and criteria and to coordinate the management and evaluation of their results was what led to the creation of the Secretariat. So, because of the provisions under which it was set up, the Secretariat has horizontal powers and is involved in coordinating all the administrative bodies working in cooperation.

As to financing, Spain gives both grants and soft loans. The main idea behind the grants is to finance technical assistance, food aid, the activities of Spanish NGOs and humanitarian relief. The soft loans are mainly aimed at implementing investment projects and they are granted by an interministerial Committee chaired by the Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs, on which the Secretariat has powers of initiative and three representatives. For example, we have just given Bolivia a tied aid of \$ 15 million and a further \$ 5 million on what almost amounts to subsidy terms. What we want is both big projects and smaller, one-off but exemplary projects.

“Creating conditions that foster respect for human rights”

► *You mentioned human rights a moment ago. Where does Spain stand on the South African sanctions? And on developing countries that do not respect human rights?*

— On South Africa, Spain is with the rest of the Community. Our policy coincides with that of the EEC. But don't forget that when the subject was discussed in the Community, Spain was in the so-called *avant-garde* group along with Denmark and the Netherlands. When it comes to adopting positive and restrictive measures, I should like to point out that Spain's domestic law already contains the provisions the Community recommends here and that we have set up a programme worth \$ 100 000 p.a. to help apartheid victims.

To sum up, I should like to say we are monitoring trends in South Africa closely. We are stepping up our contact with all the political groups in the

country and any worsening of the tension or the climate of discrimination would lead us to insist that the Community take a firmer stand.

And what about those developing countries that do not respect human rights? Our cooperation is geared to creating conditions that foster respect for human rights and greater social justice. But we also have to realise that some countries still have problems and that we cannot judge them according to strictly European rules.

We must not adopt a hard-line position that would punish the people in countries which don't respect human

15 countries of western Africa have just met in Malabo. What was the point of all this?

— There is a serious problem in Equatorial Guinea, that of the survival of the nation's biggest bank, the Guinnextebank. The Foreign Affairs Minister's trip, I think, was an opportunity to reach pre-agreement on an outcome. The Spanish Government will be supplying Ptas 700 million⁽¹⁾ which, together with money from other sources, should be enough to return the situation to an acceptable level... provided bank management is very stringent from now on.



Left, Secretary of State Luis Yáñez Barneuvo, right, Juan Antonio March Pujol, Programme Director at the Secretariat of State

rights. We have to exert intelligent pressure and keep the dialogue going. And in some countries, we can help the people directly, without going through the Government institutions, as we do in Chile, for example, where we have a fairly respectable cooperation programme.

Maybe this type of cooperation would not be so easy in Africa. You have to take trends in respect for human rights into account. They may be positive or negative. And if they are negative, then all the countries of the European Community must be coordinated.

► *The Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister has just been to Equatorial Guinea and Spanish Ambassadors to 14 or*

The Ambassadors' meeting reached operational conclusions in relation to Spanish action in these countries. They are useful to my department in particular, as they give answers to such questions as how can cooperation between Spain and these countries of Africa be viewed and what Spain can do there. The Ambassadors made their proposals after close contact with other Community Ambassadors and Commission Delegates in these countries. Over the past year or year and a half, we have learned a great deal about Africa through the European Community. ◊

Interview by M.-H. B.

(1) About ECU 9.8 million — Ed.

Lomé III gathers momentum

King St Louis of France administered justice under a tree, but are the ACP-EEC leaders going to dialogue under palaver tree? Well, they might be, if André Auclert's mission to Zambia is anything to go by—the EEC Deputy Director-General went out in late February and spent more time in the bush and visiting projects than talking in the air-conditioned offices of the capital.

But over and above this anecdote, this mission displayed the mutual desire of ACP and EEC leaders (and especially Vice-President Natali, the EEC Development Commissioner) to get the indicative programmes decided for each ACP country under way as quickly as possible. In Zambia's case, this concern is largely shared by the Head of State, President Kenneth Kaunda, who welcomed Mr Auclert and backed up his highly operational policies. "We need doers and not talkers" was how he put it ⁽¹⁾.

Getting things done in Zambia

Four sets of provisions were agreed on in a memorandum of understanding which Zambian PM Musokotwane and André Auclert signed at the end of the mission.

— First, they agreed to hold meetings. Monthly (remarkably frequent) meetings of the Zambian National Authorising Officer and the Commission Delegate in Lusaka would be held so that the implementation of decisions could be monitored closely by both sides. This should rule out the possibility of any misunderstanding and neither side should tolerate delays from the other. The two officials should report to the PM every three months.

— Next, they agreed to adopt flexible procedures. The lower limit of projects for which invitations to tender can be used is now the equivalent in local currency of roughly ECU 5 000.

(1) As quoted by our colleague on the Zambia Daily Mail on 28 February.



"Dialogue under the palaver tree"

These projects will be part of annual work programmes, for which estimates are produced, and each will have a coordinator in charge of an (audited) imprest account. The holder of this account therefore decides on any outlay of less than ECU 5 000. Invitations to tender can be launched (provisionally) before the financing decisions are taken. Both parties will do their best to speed up the recruitment of technical assistance staff, particularly when it comes to the flexible procedures provided for in Lomé III (Article 211) and the special financing facility the Commission has recently provided for it whereby they can give their agreement to the National Authorising Officer in order to take on consultants within a ceiling of ECU 40 000 per operation. All the Delegate has to do is justify these commitments to the Commission authorities in Brussels afterwards.

— They also agreed to run a specific programme in 1987 using a large sum of money (probably about three quarters of the Community funds currently available to Zambia under Lomé III plus any outstanding amounts from Lomé II). A substantial part of this amount would go to a programme to import inputs for agriculture and spare parts and inputs for national fertiliser production. There were four advantages to a programme of this sort—greater agricultural productivity (and output therefore), assis-

tance for local industry and thus to local employment and support for the balance of payments. The rest of the amount due to be committed in 1987 will go to six projects—five in rural development (smallholdings in the copperbelt, Phase Two of the Central Province maize project, rehabilitation of three silos in Lusaka, Monze and Kitwe, the Batoka ranch and a micro-project programme) and one involving an accountancy training centre.

— Lastly, they agreed to stick to the jointly produced timetable of the measures each party had to take.

And elsewhere?

Zambia will not be an exception. The practical implementation of Lomé III is now of prime importance in ACP-EEC circles. The programming carried out in Uganda itself (see Courier No. 102, News Round-up, p. VII) was already very operational in approach and any European missions to ACP countries will echo this.

It was also decided to speed up these missions to back up the work of the local Delegates. Mr Auclert, for example, suggests one every month, and after Mali (in March) and Togo (April), six visits are planned to countries in central, eastern and southern Africa. Other Commission leaders, starting with Vice-President Natali himself, will also go out to various countries. ○ M.-H.B.

An ACP-EEC Cultural Foundation Conference

“Cultural identity and integral development”

In the News Round-up of Courier No. 101 (January-February 1987), we announced that we would be reporting on a conference which the ACP-EEC Cultural Foundation and its Secretary-General, Raymond Chasle, the Mauritian Ambassador to the EEC, ran in Brussels in late November last year, with the help of the EEC Commission, the General Commissariat for International Relations of the French-speaking Community of Belgium, and Unesco. The subject of the conference, “Cultural identity and integral development”, attracted a fairly large audience, provoked people to talk on a number of topics and led to interesting and sometimes highly committed discussions.

It is clearly not possible to give an exhaustive description of the speeches and discussions here. We can only suggest that readers refer to the report of the proceedings that the Foundation is about to publish⁽¹⁾. We would remind them that the debate centred on the way cultural identity relates to socio-economic structures, religion, technology, health, women’s status, information, the environment and education; each of these topics was dealt with by one and sometimes several high-level specialists.

This article is simply a summary of what some speakers said, based on what was felt to be most directly relevant to ACP-EEC cooperation.

Before summing up some of the reports, here are one or two extracts from speeches which were made at the beginning of the conference and shed light upon it.

The first speaker, Edgard Pisani, the Chairman of the Board of the Foundation and a former EEC Development Commissioner, said he felt the aim of the Foundations’s research ought to be to achieve a “compromise between heritage and innovation... which meant... professors leaving their Chairs and talking to the peasants in the fields”.

His successor as Development Commissioner, Vice-President Lorenzo Natali, himself came out in favour of humanism and realism when he said: “there should no longer be any great doubt as to the validity of the path that had to be followed. History was there to show us the way. And experience was there to warn us that the path was strewn with obstacles when superficial, partial and ideologi-

cally all-embracing suggestions insinuated themselves in an authoritarian and artificial way into the natural dialectics of cultural promotion and economic growth”. He refused to accept the “improbable myth of totalitarian uniformity” and recognised the quality and specific nature of the socio-cultural structures of the “so-called primitive societies”. Lomé III was, Mr Natali maintained, a “first answer to the question of whether any development hypothesis... could discount the rehabilitation and revaluation of this social balance and these cultural identities”. Lastly, he “hoped the conference would lead to proposals that were pertinent and realistic and could be applied at once”.

Mr Arfwedson, the Deputy Director-General for culture and communication at Unesco, reminded participants of a study which his organisation had carried out for UDEAC on “socio-cultural constraints as factors of blockage of economic action”. Cultural indicators, he thought, should be produced to take account of possible “accidents” of cultural origin in the pursuit of development. Mr Peipul, PNG



Djenné, traditional dwelling. “There was no culture that had not had its ‘spontaneous’ architecture”

Ambassador to Brussels, insisted on the need to protect cultural values. “Money can never give us back our cultures or our languages if we allow them to be lost”, he said. And Mr Carrington, the ACP Secretary-General, stressed that “cultural identity was not synonymous with national frontiers”.

Raymond Chasle himself, who had quite deliberately given his report a title that some people found somewhat sibylline (“Ordinal and cardinal—cultural identity at the service of better-being, on which man’s total fulfilment depends”), was quick to put his point of view across. As he saw it, knowledge and consideration of cultural identity came up against a “discrepancy between stated intentions and the reality as it is in the field... not because of any hypocrisy” on the part of the decision-makers, but because the developing countries are faced with huge problems of structural reform. And to solve these problems, there is a great temptation to let

(1) Write to the ACP-EEC Cultural Foundation, 50 av. Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1050 Bruxelles, Belgium.

oneself be guided by the figures, something which leads to "quantitativism and the supremacy of figures, which become a criterion of evaluation of social existence". Obviously, Mr Chasle went on, quantity had to be taken into account, but not quantity alone, otherwise there was "a great risk of the perversion it had brought into human relations getting even greater". In this case, "every individual becomes a mirror of everyone else" and this leads to the disorder we all know about and a "culture of discontent", when what we should be doing is seeking "a culture of liberation".

Mr Chasle quoted Binet, the French philosopher, contrasting European thought, which is Cartesian and analyses all (political, cultural, social and economic) phenomena in succession, with African thought, which proceeds by synthesis. But this is the type of approach that should be used if we are to obtain the practical proposals "that we are all impatient for". For "practical proposals are meaningless unless ... they are rooted in cultural questioning" about the reasons why development often appears as "misdevelopment". The aim of the meeting thus emerged as to clarify concepts and produce a series of proposals for decision-makers. If they are to be enabled to find "solutions that are more in conformity with the specific features" of the developing countries, guidelines must be laid down as a safety net for those who, "with the best will in the world", want to find solutions to the problems to "starving populations and countries weighed down beneath the burden of debt".

Cultural pluralism and State imperatives

The first guideline was suggested by Mr Abglemagnon, the Head of the African Laboratory for Coordination, Research and Interdisciplinary studies, and Mr Sahadeo, the Guyanese Ambassador to Brussels. What had to be done, they said, was to ensure respect for cultural pluralism and agree to the development system coming not from the centre, but from the towns and villages (as happened in, say, Guyana). A detailed sociological and multidisciplinary analysis was therefore vital. However, participants were not unanimous

on this point and, in the debate that followed, African speakers stressed that some aspects of the local cultures could be behind a certain under-development because "some people systematically refused anything that smacked of modernism" and because cultural diversity and the nation-state could be in opposition. Even the best sociological studies could not stop a project having to take account of the State's imperatives. Unfortunately, the relatively short time reserved for the debates precluded a really thorough reply being given to this question.

However, it was taken up indirectly by Monsignor Tshibangu, the Chairman of the Zairean Universities Board, who recalled the three great principles of traditional African, "genuinely humanitarian" religion—"life, strength, unity". To give just one example, the first principle involves recognising the positive worth of the life and value of the child, which explains the special nature of the African stance on certain problems such as demography.

Further light was shed on this problem by Professor Poirier of the Mediterranean University Centre of Nice (France), who defined the notion of endogenous integrated development. To begin with, he said, there is "deliberate" development—i.e. development that is not imposed from the outside or uses foreign models, but is thought out by the people for whom it is intended, who should be consulted. Secondly, development has to be "interiorised", particularly in relation to the adoption of technical innovation by the masses. And lastly, development should be "self-sustaining, integrated, homogeneous and socialised"—i.e. designed in the light of the specific cultural features and value systems of the recipient group and taken over not just by individuals but by the group as such. So "pilot peasant" schemes and "model farms" had to be abandoned, Professor Poirier maintained, as they did not work and a more communal approach had to be adopted to projects.

It is dismissal of local culture, said Professor Broekhuizen (Tropical Institute of Amsterdam, Netherlands), that has led development schemes in Africa to fail. The model which the Europeans proposed did not fit in with African cultural characteristics—which

the "Afro-westerners" (those African élites trained in western ways of thinking)—who hold power in Africa—had deliberately ignored. "Naïve westerners" had believed the Afro-westerners, thinking that they really represented Africa. Thus the development policies the African Governments took with help from the funders in fact blocked development.

The dynamic force of culture

A very interesting debate followed. One speaker for example emphasised the fact that there was too great a tendency to talk about African culture as if it were something static, whereas in fact it was a dynamic force that was constantly evolving, with changes "being not undesirable excrescences, but normal developments". Another speaker, an African demographer, regretted that Africa was short on the applied research structures that would enable it to ensure the transition from basic analysis to practical action. A representative from the African Cultural Institute in Dakar hoped to see "the projects emerge at grass-roots level", and thought that training programmes should include "new educational methods which would stress the importance of taking account of cultural values and ways of life so as to keep closer to the realities of the country in question".

An example: the cinema

Mr Gaston Kaboré, the Secretary-General of FEPACI (the Pan-African Film Federation) based in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, emphasised relations between culture and economics, using the specific example of the cinema. The cinema, he said, was a part and a manifestation of culture and it was an industry which needed financial means, and if culture was to be for the masses, an economic-type organisation was called for. Why were African films needed? Gaston Kaboré's answer was simple. "Because Africans go to the cinema". They could produce as well as consume and they needed to express themselves. In the years following independence, the African cinema was along European lines, with the dreams and the fantasies of the former colonials, and it was forced on a public that had all-too-recently emerged from co-

Part of the resolution on rural development

Rural development should be thought out with a view to the short and medium-term on the one hand and the longer term on the other. In the first case, one has to take account of the existing rural structures and graft onto this substratum a series of measures likely to generate, accelerate, implant or extend development processes. In the long term, it is important to acquire an extensive knowledge of rural society with an eye to identifying future needs so that strategies may be devised to satisfy them.

I. Short and medium-term strategy

I.1. Consideration of the structural features of the rural world

It is imperative that the rural environment be perceived as a whole; deeply-integrated rural societies are entities. Any sectoral or sequential approach could lead to serious errors.

I.1.1. *Social characteristics:* ...

I.1.2. *Economic and technical characteristics:* ...

I.2. Series of measures to be promoted

As a general rule, outside the areas which fall within the catchment area of conurbations, the object should be to disenclose rural areas.

I.2.1. *Institutional spheres:*

(a) Within the rural societies themselves:

- Root measures in existing institutional networks, thought and belief patterns; in this context make use of the structures and participatory organisation models such as the village, the hill, the land, the rural community (village committees, hill committees, the rural council, the planning subcommittee), women's movements, youth movements, young pioneers, co-operative and para-cooperative organisations.

- Abide by the rationality of rural societies.

- Revivify the corpus of knowledge, skills and experience which have enabled such societies to survive by exploiting certain aspects of their environment.

- Base measures on community self-training processes and on individuals able to provide supervision from within, especially where new techniques or new tools have to be introduced.

- As regards community development, use any existing technical rural back-up structures: schools, social teams, rural education by radio, the press, the cinema..., grass-roots political organisations...

(b) As regards the integration of rural societies into their environment.

- Create intermediary institutions between villages and research centres to establish a permanent two-way exchange of information.

- Provide channels of communication between rural society and the economic and technical bodies responsible for putting scientific knowledge into effect.

- Pay attention to ecological balance of tracts of land, to sectoral equilibria, relations between villages; harmonise the priorities peculiar to the various partners.

- Use country logic as a basis for dividing up the region in accordance with local notions of boundaries.

- Interconnect local initiatives in order to create reciprocal multiplying effects; encourage complementarity of land use; include local initiatives in regional, inter-regional and national policies.

I.2.2. *Technical spheres:*

- Enhance or revive genuine African farming techniques depending on their economic reliability.

...

II. Long term strategy

II.1. Studies to be carried out

With a view to the longer term, certain contemporary features of rural societies must be analysed to enable operational development strategies to be drawn up for the future. In general, it is important to this end to discern external disintegration and the destruction factors and at the same time

the motivations and stimuli derived from the emergence of new roles, new types of status, new decision-making centres, new forms of social and geographical mobility...

In this general context particular attention should be paid to certain special structural elements and assessments made providing information to be taken into account when drawing up long-term policies.

II.1.1. *Priority factors to be incorporated into studies to be carried out:*

- Reasons for resistance to the adoption of useful innovations, to external pressures to innovate; in other words causes of attachment to the old value systems and factors making people psychologically and sociologically receptive to innovation.

- Features of the new life styles resulting from structural changes.

- Scientific roots of traditional practices and fundamental scientific knowledge present in traditional cultures.

- Links between the technical, cultural and social aspects of traditional production systems and the new systems being introduced; finding bottlenecks, areas of antagonism, factors promoting modernisation.

II.1.2. *Balance sheets and inventories to be drawn up:*

- Institutions which have shaped rural society including the dimensions of orality, visuality, writing...


II.2. Details of the strategies to be put into effect

- Focus village mentality and interest on the problems and potentialities of the village.


- Motivate village societies to agree to participate with outsiders in analysing their own situation, in seeking ways to improve their situation.

- Motivate rural dwellers to imagine new arrangements, to seek new ideas for making progress, to implement original solutions.

- Base the rationale for innovations to be introduced on scientific material showing their purpose and effect. ○



“Saho”, the house of young Bozos (Mali).



Djenné region, a village house.

“One must recognise the quality and specific nature of the so-called primitive societies”

lonialism to be able to react. But since then, it had changed into something home-grown that, to a large extent, involved native Africans examining themselves. It is a “counter-discourse with political and economic effect”. But African films come up against competition from foreign films with their own, very extensive, distribution networks.

As far as audiences are concerned, there are not enough cinemas and those that do exist are concentrated in the towns. This affects the programmes, with films often needing to be changed every day to enable cinema-goers to see as many as possible. This is detrimental to African films, making them less profitable, and backers are often unwilling to “run the risk of producing expensive films in Africa”. What countries have to understand is that the cinema is not “a peripheral sector... but a productive one which has greater need of a favourable environment than of money”. So, more generally, what is needed is proper management of the culture industry and projects that are realistic and achievable, so as not to give “reluctant authorities the excuse they are looking for”. Lomé III offers a number of possibilities here and the ACP countries have to use them.

... and architecture

Raoul Penalzoza, an architect with the Victor Horta Institute in Brussels (Belgium), took the example of architecture and illustrated his talk with

a fine set of slides on Sudano-Sahelian architecture compiled by Serge Domian, also an architect⁽¹⁾. Mr Penalzoza maintained there was no culture that had not had its “spontaneous” architecture and architects. But as this was a form never studied by future architects, through lack of time, there was a “formidable void in the basic cultural conception” in their training. Any culture had a certain degree of technical skill and, in the case of architecture, it was important to lay down the conditions of insertion in the culture and not confuse architecture and construction. At the moment, things were built “with a repertoire of materials, the production of which is controlled by a certain ideology of profitability, ... so things are linear, ... and architecture becomes codified and vulgarised in relation to culture”.

In future dossiers *The Courier* will return to other topics that are of particular interest in view of their practical nature. These will include, for example, the development of the traditional pharmacopoeia by Professor Molle of the Free University of Brussels, and the problems of teaching literacy in the national languages by Mr Doneux, an ethno-linguist.

Proposals for decision-makers

Regrettably there were relatively few decision-makers—or at least experts operationally involved in develop-

(1) The photos illustrating this article are taken from the book “*Architecture soudanaise, vitalité d’une tradition*”, by Mr Domian, to be published by Sindbad, Paris.

ment cooperation—at the conference, who could have commented on the more-daring-than-realistic proposals that some participants made along the lines of: “We need to alter all the present aid procedures and all ACP government procedures too... and stop bringing in projects from the top and only respond to initiatives taken by the population”. One participant, an anthropologist, tried to put matters in a more balanced context. He said “there were no longer any rural projects that did not take population involvement into account, the real problem now was the quality of this involvement”.

The resolutions put forward at the end of the meeting were many and varied, covering technology, health, women’s status, rural development, the environment, apartheid, genetic engineering, research and more, with an attempted synthesis. As an example the inset quotes a large part of the resolution on rural development.

Although the meeting was a long one (four days), there was nevertheless not enough time to fulfil the organisers’ second hope—of laying down practical guidelines taking into account all development constraints (including the need to go fairly fast and be as general as possible to prevent the gap with the developed countries from widening further)—although the first aim, of clarifying the concepts, was better reached.

But where cultural identity is concerned, will there ever be a time when we have thought enough? o M.-H.B.

Research and extension: an African farmer's point of view

by Robinson GAPARE

The author of this article, Robinson Gapare, runs a farm—together with Mrs Gapare—of 2.5 acres communal lands near Serima in south-eastern Zimbabwe, where he grows maize, the main staple food, vegetables, groundnuts and keeps some cattle. He is also President of the National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe which counts over 300 000 members organised in some 4000 cooperatives (see also *The Courier* no 97, pages 27 to 35). In the following article Mr Gapare puts forward his views, as a farmer, on the ways in which research and extension can and should help farmers on communal lands.

About 80% of Zimbabweans live in the countryside, many of them in regions where the climate is adverse, with a high probability of drought and uneven rainy seasons. Not only is the communal farmer exposed to the vagaries of weather, but he was also neglected in terms of research and extension for the whole of the pre-independence period. Thus, with an economy faced with declining ratios of man/land, coupled with high birth rates, there is a need to realise that a scientific approach is needed if the communal sector is to be food self-sufficient and contribute significantly to GDP. The lack of a scientific approach has left the communal sector dependent on gaining experience through trial and error. There has not been any significant scientific contribution to the production of food crops in the communal areas based on a continuous scientific data base, though recently, it is true, the trends are beginning to change.

Apart from giving greater attention to actual food production, a great many other things need to be improved, since these are also of tremendous influence. Health facilities, housing, educational infrastructure and the availability of water are among these.

The only way the scientific approach can help increase food production in the communal lands is if a thorough knowledge of the farmers' socio-technical-economic environment is well understood by those who design the technology intended to increase food production. Unfortunately such data is often lacking. Information such as on-farm input costs and mar-

keting costs is often unavailable. Production data are often nowhere to be found, nor are social data such as the farmer's attitude to innovation and his perception of risk.

How, therefore, where little is known about the socio-economic environment of the farmer, can the technology emanating from research be expected to be appropriate, capable, that is, of solving the problems of the farmer?

With this lack of knowledge in mind, some of the problems of the farmer are highlighted below, in the hope that research and extension to increase food production from the communal sector can be designed on a problem-specific basis.

The farmer's problems

The first of the farmer's problems is shortage of capital. Because he has little, he is reluctant to commit it to any risky venture. Many innovations proposed to the farmer require him to spend money, and he often has too little money to make maximum use of innovations or new techniques. The refusal by the farmer to take up new technology means that he is viewed as uninnovative and unwilling to change, while the fact is that much of the technology offered to him is simply too risky in terms of his capital endowment.

Input supply and marketing of produce

Other problems include the supply of inputs, their delivery and their cost. The planting time directly affects the



Robinson Gapare inspecting his maize

final yield. Most farmers receive their inputs very late and this affects the yields going to the market. Thus, there is a need for rigorous co-ordination between the various agencies supplying inputs, so that they arrive on time and enable the final yields to be high. Related to this is the high farm-gate input prices for the communal farmer, having to pass through a system of bureaucratic marketing arrangements which can make the final price as much as 50% higher than that paid by his commercial counterpart. Operating in such an unfair economic environment, some of the crops recommended to the communal farmer are not grown by him.

Research is also needed into ways of trying to introduce an efficient marketing system. When the farmer markets his produce a fair amount of his returns are consumed by transport costs. This is due mainly to the poor infrastructure that exists in most communal lands, which means there is little foundation for competition and results in over-charging by transporters. An area with a comparative advantage in terms of the right crop can be disadvantaged due to the transport problem. Research into marketing must, therefore, take account of questions of technical back-up and transport, too.

Labour

The case with the communal lands is a very peculiar one, with periods of

both under-employment and shortage of labour. In most instances the labour force is restricted to family members.

With such a restriction, bottlenecks are experienced, resulting in certain crops not being grown. This is the case with groundnuts, in that a labour shortage has contributed to the significant decline in the area allocated to the crop. The labour shortage factor is linked to the problem of lack of capital: often the farmer cannot afford to take on extra hands. What is needed is research into technology that helps the farmer cope with these shortages.

Technical factors

Various technical factors also play a major role, of which the harsh agronomic environment within which the majority of farmers operate, the lack of data on soil types, and the agronomic practices best suited to such soils are the most important.

Education is also an important factor, though. Most farmers in the communal lands are unable to understand the technology that is brought to them, which is often put in a language that they cannot understand, meaning that adoption is minimal. The farmers are also not fully conversant, often, with the management aspects required by the 'packages' brought to them.

Social factors

The tenural system under which the farmer operates does not allow him freehold to the land, a factor which influence his attitude towards the way he manages his holding and the amount of capital he is willing to reinvest in the holding. These aspects need to be looked at before any technology is introduced.

Role of research and extension on the farmers' problems

Communal farmers grow crops at their own risk, with some of the extension advice not appropriate to that particular locality. It can happen, therefore, that the communal farmer is not using the appropriate seed fertiliser. Research in communal lands should focus on the best crop for the

particular area in terms of both agro-ecological and agro-economic appropriateness. Many soils in the rural areas lose organic matter and nutrients quickly if cultivated intensively, yet if rural food production is to increase, ways must be found to make a transition both to a more commercial system of production and to viable methods in terms of both environmental and social appropriateness.

It is critical that the research be on-farm rather than on-station, that it should understand local farming systems. This understanding should embrace problems of land use emerging from changing man/land ratios, as well as the farm management objectives of the farmer. This is not only important in designing a technology that is compatible with the farmers' values, level of education and social environment, but also trains the research worker to correctly interpret and report the farmers' problems.

It is important also to consider the farm as a whole. Most results from past research efforts are irrelevant to the communal farmer in that they have been on individual crops in which all but one or two variables were controlled. Under farm conditions ideal management of each crop is rarely possible. Other enterprises may make equal or greater demands on a farmers' resources of land, labour and capital.

Extension

With or without new mechanical technology, raising the productivity of the rural sector in Zimbabwean agriculture will depend heavily on improving agronomic practices by whatever means available. Factors such as time of planting, spacing of plants and so forth are important management factors necessary to achieve a high quality crop.

The fact that most rural people have never had any formal education means that they need to be trained in new agricultural methods. The biggest problem in all developing countries is that developers sometimes use approaches that produce negative results, making the farmer suspicious of other programmes which the developer might like to implement. Here are

some suggestions that can be followed before an extension programme is applied to local people:

Conduct an identification of people or groups at village level and then:

- 1) shape out what people need and shape out your policy from there;
- 2) learn from these people, plan with them and work with them;
- 3) start with what they know and build on that;
- 4) get their full support;
- 5) apply programmes at village level where people know each other very well.

The organisation of agricultural research and extension

It would be wrong to assume that suitable innovations will become available readily when an extension service is formed. Rather it is the other way round. The extension message must be devised and tested locally before an organisation is set up to take it to the farmers. Yet one often encounters extension organisations without an effective means of raising output. Very often the answer lies in strengthening the links between research and extension and allocating the necessary finance and manpower for the development of appropriate farm technology. Involving the farmer in agricultural research and extension services will produce fruitful results, that is to say results which solve or lessen the farmer's problems. These problems can only be known if the farmer is involved in the research and extension decision-making processes. But research and extension are only two of the six functional components of agricultural systems. The other four are production, supply and credit, marketing and regulation.

Weakness in any one function or linkage can hold back development of the whole system. In the communal lands some of these linkages are, in some cases, weak—or even missing—whereas they need to be present if the intended results of research are to be fully realised. The improvement of agronomic practices implies major commitment of financial resources on the part of the Government, however. Researchers must make sure these scarce resources are utilised in the way which will best benefit Zimbabwe. ○

R.G.

GABON



Elf-Gabon

Economic downturn and financial Ramadan

Makaya, Gabon's man-in-the-street, bumps into a friend coming out of the M'Bolo, one of Africa's biggest hypermarkets. He asks him how he is. "Well... OK... OK", he says, meaning that it's not OK at all. "I've been caught by the economy". Well, Makaya knows what that means, for the one thing on everyone's lips in Gabon at the moment is the economic downturn. It covers all the economic and financial problems currently facing Gabon, which has a grave crisis to cope with in its public finances, and one which is revealing just how vulnerable its economy is to international events.

Gabon exports oil and oil is rather like the building industry (which isn't doing so well either) — when it works, so does everything else. But oil, as far as the producer is concerned, is not working and on top of that the dollar has slumped, hitting the nation's revenue from its "black gold" and its "green gold"—timber—and from its manganese and uranium as well. So Gabon will have to tighten its belt in the coming years, probably until 1989.

But its resources are considerable. It is Africa's fourth largest oil exporter, almost 80% of its territory is dense forest, it is the world's second producer of manganese, it is a major exporter of uranium and it has plenty more mineral wealth. There is vast marine potential too. And since 1960, when it became independent, the country has travelled the long path of economic progress and has done so with remarkable

political stability. Its per capita GDP has long been the envy of other countries in the developing world, but the speed at which it is dropping is a clear indication of its weakness as a gauge of economic development.

It is perhaps premature to talk about the post-oil era in Gabon, as the major reserves discovered in 1986 and the potential deposits still to be located seem to underline. But there is profound awareness of the need to avoid oil dictating to the economy as a whole and of the increasing importance of striking a fresh balance to the benefit of other sectors of production—farming, forestry and fishing, which need fresh impetus, in the main—and creating a native industrial network by setting up small local businesses. Mining will continue to depend very much on trends in the world economy.

Clearly, what we are seeing in Gabon is a move from a situation in which King Oil brought in major revenues to one in which the income generated is considerably less substantial. It will be an economy placing great hope on the future of its big national unity and economic integration project, the TransGabonese. This railway, a real achievement, has, thanks to the will and tireless drive of President El Hadj Omar Bongo, opened up much of the hitherto virtually inaccessible interior and its vast resources since the end of 1986.



Prunet

Libreville, the capital, on the Como Delta in northern Gabon

Blessed by nature

Gabon is on the Equator. It covers an area of 267 667 km² (slightly more than the 248 700 km² of Federal Germany) and has an 800 km coastline on the Gulf of Guinea. The coastal region is a fertile sedimentary plain, studded with swamps, often as much as 200 km wide. About three quarters of the territory are the basin of the River Ogooué, which crosses the country from east to west to flow into the Atlantic Ocean at Port-Gentil. This city, with its population of around 60 000, is the country's main port and petroleum centre and often called the economic capital, in contrast to the political and administrative capital, Libreville (240 000 inhabitants approx.) on the mouth of the Como Delta in the north. Franceville, in the south-east, with a present population of about 20 000, could well become a third major focus for economic development, as it is now linked to Owendo-Libreville by a 650 km lifeline, the Trans-Gabonese.

The interior is mainly upland with one or two mountain areas which, although fairly low, are still uneven enough to make internal communications a difficult problem. This handicap is made even greater by the climate, a humid equatorial one with rainy seasons that make the roads practically unusable. More than 200 000 km² of the country is tropical

forest, dense and rich in precious species, particularly okoumé, of which Gabon has what amounts to a world monopoly.

The 1980 census put the national population at 1 232 000 and the Government suggests it is between 1.3 and 1.4 million by now. Agreeing on the figure is a problem, however, as the



Prunet

The interior is very hilly, covered with dense forest and crossed by countless rivers

international organisations have different ideas. The UN, for example, put the national population at 1 060 000 in 1980 and 1 150 000 in 1985, while the World Bank suggested only 812 000 in 1984. The statistical methods are often based on an extrapolation of figures several years old and they have given rise to a certain amount of indignation among Gabon's political leaders. Pascal Nzé, the Minister for Planning and Economic Affairs (and former President of the Council of ACP Ministers), told us: "One may well wonder why these organisations feel entitled to doubt our census. We carried it out according to the rules and in the light of our own administrative infrastructure and we have no reason to doubt the exactness of the results".

But from many points of view and for a number of historical, natural and human reasons, Gabon, with a density of only 4.6 to the km² is underpopulated. It is easy to see why it is one of the rare ACPs where contraception is illegal. There are 40-odd tribes. The main ones are the Fang (about 40% of the population), the Bapounous (about 20%), the Batekes, the Myenes and the Okandes. Although the range of languages, customs and traditions is wide, there are two common characteristics — semi-nomadism and a form of social organisation with segmentary societies based on villages and religious brotherhoods and on notions of tribe and clan.

And, obviously, Gabon is at the heart of the Bantu lands. Libreville is the headquarters of CICIBA⁽¹⁾, the International Bantu Civilisations Centre, with all the development based on the values of this already ancient civilisation that this implies. "Of course, the people of Gabon today don't have the same culture as they did 20 or 30 years ago, as, in view of the level of development already achieved and the undeniable effect of the oil boom on our cultural development, there is a *de facto* symbiosis between the fecund elements of other cultures and Gabon's own cultural roots in the Bantu region — which differ from country to country and even within each country", François Owono-Nguema, State Minister for Culture, Education and the Arts, told us.


(1) See courier no 92 (July 1985) and 100 (November 1986).

Gabon's greatest concern at the moment is indeed the economic crisis as emerges clearly from a survey which our colleagues on "L'Union", the Gabonese daily, published in mid-1986.

New deal in 1986

Gustave Bongo, the High Commissioner for Planning, Development and Economic Affairs, who is also responsible for the investment budget, says there are two essential dates behind the reversal of the Gabonese economy. "First of all, there was 22 September 1985 when the Ministers of Finance of the five industrialised nations⁽¹⁾ met in New York and decided to orchestrate a drop in the American dollar. And then there was 9 December 1985 when OPEC dropped its defence of the official oil price". These two decisions brought an abrupt end to what was a particularly good period as far as Gabon was concerned. Until then, it had lived primarily from its oil revenue and, having experienced economic growth of an average 12% over the 1980-84 period, the consequences were serious. In just over a year, the dollar dropped by almost 25%, from CFAF 450 to around CFAF 350, and,

(1) The Federal Republic of Germany, the USA, France, the UK and Japan.



ACP-EEC Courier

Georges Rawiri, first Deputy PM with responsibility for Transport, Water, Forests and Social Communications:

"We have to get over the crisis, however difficult it may be"

in late 1985, the export price of a barrel of oil slumped too, losing almost 50% of its value. Whereas the 1985 price had been relatively stable at about US \$28 per barrel, the subsequent price war brought it down to \$15 in 1986.

For relatively small oil producers such as Gabon (with 8.6 million t in 1985 and 7.9 million t last year), the



ACP-EEC Courier

François Owono-Nguema, State Minister for Culture, Education and the Arts:

"There has been an undeniable effect of the oil boom on our cultural development"

price war was a disaster. Traditionally, two thirds of the Gabonese State's own resources came from the oil sector. The State's role in the economic life of the nation was almost excessive because it covered almost 60% of total investment and 40% of total consumption in 1985 and the private sector is not taking over on the productive investment front. So it is easy to see that a loss in oil revenue of around 30% of the 1985 figures (-CFAF 113.4 billion, totalling only CFAF 283.6 billion in 1986) is a hard pill to swallow.

Finances had, of course, already started to slide before that, in 1985, when the investment budget went CFAF 78 billion over the amount in the Finance Law for that year to reach CFAF 403 billion - CFAF 69 billion more than in 1984. And this in turn led to external debt and an increase in official debt servicing of 10% over the 1984 figures. The balance of payments went from the CFAF 17.4 billion surplus of 1984 to a deficit of CFAF 22 billion the following year and net external assets declined by 51%.

This was the background for the economic change of 1986 - a huge cut in the national income with a 30% drop in GDP (CFAF 1 156 billion in 1986) and tumbling sectoral GDPs (65% in oil, 28% in mining, 22% in



ACP-EEC Courier

Pascal Nzé, Minister for Planning and Economic Affairs:

"We should still have a positive effect on the future of the country and its economic re-equilibrium"



ACP-EEC Courier

Gustave Bongo, High Commissioner for Planning, Development and Economic Affairs, who is also responsible for the investment budget:

"We are having it hard today to have it easier tomorrow"

building and public works etc). The four export products, oil, manganese, uranium and timber, which accounted for 98% of the export trade in 1985, all dropped in volume and/or value and the trade balance fell by 90.5% from the CFAF 455 billion surplus of 1985 to only CFAF 43 billion in 1986 — when the balance of payments was also in deficit, to the tune of an estimated CFAF 105 billion. Borrowing soared and the servicing of the official debt rose to 45.2% of export earnings, whereas it had only been 11.9% the year before, and to 34% of budget revenue as against 22.5%.

Financial Ramadan

“We realised the oil slump was coming and towards the end of 1985 we started being careful. But not careful enough. For no-one could predict how bad the crisis was going to be”, Pascal Nzé, the Minister for Planning and Economic Affairs told us. For more than a year now, President El Hadj Omar Bongo has been stating the facts in no uncertain terms, taking it upon himself to tell the people of Gabon about the full extent of the crisis. He it is who introduced idea of a financial Ramadan — and one which could well last far longer than the month the Moslem religion lays down, as it may go on until 1989-90. On 12 March, at the festivities to mark the 19th anniversary of the PDG (the Gabonese Democratic Party), the Head of State again made clear that Gabon “is going through one of the worst economic crises in its history”. Pascal Nzé says that “we must still grasp the President’s idea and remember that, for a Moslem, Ramadan is not necessarily a bad thing. Quite the contrary — it is more the manifestation of divine will and a programmed period in which one forgoes certain pleasures. Our crisis and our period of financial fasting were not programmed, but if we are careful and try and head off any negative effects, they should still have a positive effect on the future of the country and its economic re-equilibrium”. First Deputy PM and Transport, Water, Forest and Social Communications Minister Georges Rawiri makes it clear that “we have to get over this, however difficult it may be. We know this is only a crisis. What counts is our ability to cope with it

and the Gabonese people have agreed to restrictions until things get better”. As Gustave Bongo puts it: “Having a hard time today to have it easier tomorrow”.

The Government is handling the crisis with an economic adjustment programme backed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. There are two aims — to strike a proper balance so genuine growth can be achieved and to expand the non-oil economy so the economy as a whole is less susceptible to external shocks.

In mid-October 1986, Gabon had to tell its creditors it could not honour its external debt commitments over the last quarter. The Club of Paris rescheduled (the official debt) on 21 January 1987 and similar negotiations were scheduled for private debts with the Club of London in March. The IMF and the IBRD were also expected in March⁽¹⁾ to negotiate the finishing touches of their help with the adjustment programme with the Gabonese authorities.

A series of budgetary measures have been decided on for revenue and expenditure and are already being implemented. The by-word of the Finance Law for 1987 is austerity. Gustave Bongo summed it up as follows: “We have slightly increased both direct and indirect taxation to bring in extra income and we have taken a series of measures to cut the operating budget by about 15% and the investment budget by a very drastic two thirds of last year’s figure”. The man in the street is well aware of all this and there is a new set of crisis slang in which terms like “caught by the economy” figure large. Civil servants, for example, have seen a lot of their advantages, allowances and bonuses cut, leaving them with earnings 21% down on what they used to be. One knotty problem still to be unravelled was the 12% by which the IMF insisted wages be cut on the grounds that the basic wage, CFAF 64 000, was a burden on the firms’ production costs and made their exports less competitive. This measure, which is tied up with the IMF agreement and the rescheduling of the debt and ought to bring in around CFAF 13 billion, is not a very

(1) The Courier visit took place in mid-February.

popular one, obviously. Comments vary from the “politico-politician” approach of the “Although it’s also our business, the IMF doesn’t have much consideration for the developing countries’ internal politics” type to the more technocratic “The crisis calls for sacrifices”. And the choices may be difficult. As may the priorities of the investment budget, now down at a mere CFAF 100 billion, making the person in charge of it, Gustave Bongo, say, not without irony, that it has become a kind of target, it is easy to understand why. Absolute priority has gone to the productive sector, which has almost three times the percentage it had last year.

Improving farming and fishing

Agriculture is particularly important in the drive to expand production outside the oil industry. Although in terms of actual cash, it gets less than before, its share of the investment budget this year is more than 23%, as opposed to the 7%+ it got in 1986. This led Agriculture, Livestock and the Rural Economy Minister Michel Anhouey to say that it was “an ill wind that blows no-one any good”. As he saw it, they had not waited for the crisis “to redirect the nation’s development”, but had put greater emphasis on the rural sector, one which is in fact only relatively under-developed in Gabon. Farming, herding and fishing account for less than 5% of GDP and barely 0.5% of the national territory is under crop, in spite of the fact that more than half the working population works on the land.

Gabon also depends very much on imported food, which cost more than CFAF 23 billion in 1985. The fifth (1984-88) plan already had two major aims for this sector — greater agricultural output to reduce dependence on food imports and boost the earnings from export crops, and promotion of the rural world by reducing the gap between town and country to put a brake on the rural exodus (the urban population is an estimated 55% of the total). Pascal Nzé said that the Gabonese “tend not to be very good at farming, but we have to go on changing their outlook. Some people must be able to have a good standard of living in the country and not dream of get-

ting a job in the town". Michel Anchouey said that the "general economic downturn has begun to send people back to the country and... the rural world is losing less of its life-blood". And both Ministers agreed that the priority negotiated with the EEC for the Lomé III funds (80% goes to rural development) reflects the nation's priorities and is very much in line with the present measures.

Georges Rawiri, First Deputy PM and recently-appointed Head of the fisheries sector, is determined to give the nation's fishing industry fresh impetus so as to "get more for the people from Gabonese waters, which all the experts say are rich in fish, but have been little exploited so far". There is an obvious problem of patrolling and controlling industrial fishing in the ocean and the EEC has been asked for help with this as part of the regional fisheries project in the Gulf of Guinea. On the artisanal fishing front, there are a lot of foreigners (from Benin, Nigeria and so on) and so the Gabonese themselves have to be told more about improved fishing techniques. This is another field where the EEC is to intervene as part of a major regional project.

New lease of life for the forests

"The forests are our oldest asset



ACP-EEC Courier

Michel Anchouey, Minister for Agriculture, Livestock and the Rural Economy:

"We didn't wait for the crisis to redirect the nation's development, it merely added to the emphasis we had put on the development of the rural sector"

and, in a period of this sort, we can place great hope in them", said Georges Rawiri, who was recently appointed head of this sector too. And

Gabon indeed does have dense forest and a wide range of species—421 compared to the 80 or 90 of a European forest—covering more than 80% of the national territory. And this is the kingdom of okoumé, a valuable species, which is easy to work and suitable for peeling and veneer. Gabon has what amounts to a monopoly on this wood and in an average year produces around 1 million m³, plus around 300 000 m³ of 30-odd other species, particularly ozigo. Forestry accounts for slightly less than 1.5% of GDP, although last year's export revenue was past the CFAF 51 billion mark.


But the sector is in difficulty, to the point where Georges Rawiri convened a kind of council of war of the leaders of the forestry sector — forestry proper and marketing and processing too. There are both internal (structural, management and organisational) and external problems, with world demand depressed and increased competition from the international timber markets of South-East Asia, especially Malaysia.

The first thing to note is that, technically speaking, okoumé is complicated and expensive to exploit and replant. The national territory has been divided into exploitation zones and the first has now been under constant exploitation for more than a century, so conservation measures are called for



FAO

Barely 0.5% of the national territory is farmed, although almost half the working population works on the land



EEC-Durazzo

Gabonese waters are rich in fish but have been little exploited so far



Prunet

Gabon has a virtual world monopoly on okoumé, a very valuable species. "The forests are our oldest asset", says Georges Rawiri

Okoumé peeling for plywood at CFG




to redevelop it. Evaluation and inventory could well be followed by a period of closure to allow natural production to improve. More generally, artificial reforestation needs to be continued, species need further diversification, maintenance of the existing plots needs to be encouraged and farming needs associated with forestry to achieve integrated agro-forestry systems.

Timber used to be floated down the Ogooué to Port-Gentil but now the TransGabonese is there, transport to Owendo is easier and a start has been made on reorganising the timber port facilities. As far as marketing is concerned, times are hard, particularly for the SNBG (the National Timber Company). This company, which is 51% State and 49% forester owned, has a monopoly on okoumé and ozigo, but the economic recession in Europe (where France is one of the main outlets) has cut demand and there is an increasing tendency to use European species, particularly poplar and pine, for the inside of plywood, leaving only a fine okoumé veneer on the outside. And the decline of the dollar has made timber from South-East Asia highly competitive on the international market.

Gabon has made a big effort to encourage timber processing for both local consumption and export. Several sawmills, one or two veneer factories and two plywood plants reflect this and the New Timber Company was opened to turn out something like 2 million sleepers for the TransGabonese. The industrial wood market is clearly dominated by the CFG (the Forestry Timber Company). Its capital of CFAF 4.6 billion⁽¹⁾ is divided between the State (51%) and various European partners and it has a turnover of CFAF 13.2 billion and 2 400 people on the payroll. It is vertically integrated in the sector because it deals not just with exploitation of the forests (284 000 m³ in 1986, including 45 000 m³ of "various woods"), but with manufacturing okoumé plywood, taking 55% of the timber produced and turning out 80 000 m³ plywood in 1986, and marketing (foreign sales worth more than CFAF 3 billion in 1986). CFG is run by Martin Rekan-

(1) Scheduled to be raised to CFAF 6 785 billion in March.

galt, who is well known in ACP circles as he used to be Gabon's Ambassador to Brussels and is a former Chairman of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors. His main aim was to tell us about the quality of CFG goods. "Our plywood is all okoumé. This is the case of only 4% of the world output and it is true that this is the Rolls Royce of plywoods because it puts up the best technical performance", he told us. Here again the world market is depressed and the company is engaged on a huge efficiency and productivity drive — as the present modernisation




ACP-EEC Courier

Martin Rekan-galt, Head of Gabon's Forestry Company:

"Okoumé plywood is the Rolls Royce of plywoods because it has the best technical performance"

of the factory shows. "Prices virtually stagnated over the last few years and we are sparing no effort to be more competitive in the difficult economic situation we are faced with today", he explained. As well as insisting on the rational exploitation of okoumé ("which grows back best in its natural surroundings"), he also mentioned that they were doing even more to market the other species of timber, stressing that "action taken with the EEC in this sector has been very positive".



COMILOG (manganese) (left) and COMUF (uranium) (right) have dwindling world demand to cope with

Mining — hit by the slump

It has to be admitted, yet again, that the slump has also hit the mining sector. Gabon has some small-scale gold production, but its main minerals are manganese and uranium, both of which have to face dwindling world demand and a declining dollar. But it is making a big effort to investigate its mineral wealth and is producing a Systematic Inventory of Mineral Resources at the moment.

With about a quarter of known manganese reserves and the COMILOG (Ogooué Mining Company) working of the Moanda deposits near Franceville, Gabon is currently the world's second biggest manganese exporter, with 2.3 million t in 1986. Manganese is vital to modern industry, as it gives steel its flexibility, its resistance and its hardness. The ore has so far been shifted by overhead line, the longest and fastest in the world, from the open-cast mine to Mbinda on the Congolese frontier and thence by rail to the port of Pointe Noire. The opening of the TransGabonese line to Franceville is now a further possibility — if, of course, the mineral port of Owendo is developed. This alternative could well bring down the cost of transport. The countries concerned, Gabon and Congo, have already signed an agreement to share the manganese transport capacity. If world demand looks up, output at Moanda can easily be increased.

The world uranium market is not much more promising either. Supply exceeds demand and nuclear power

stations are not being developed at the speed they were before, no doubt because of pressure from the ecologists and the Greens. Gabon's uranium is produced by COMUF (the Franceville Uranium Mine Company), a Gabonese organisation with a capital of CFAF 5.05 billion shared by the State (25%) and a group of mining firms. COMUF was formed in 1958 to work the uranium deposits uncovered by the French Atomic Energy Commission near Mounana, but over the past few years, it has only turned out about 900 t uranium (850 t metal sold in 1986), so the processing plant is only

working to two-thirds capacity. The technologically highly sophisticated facilities produce yellow cake, a concentrate containing about 76% uranium metal, from the ore. This concentrate is then packed into tanks and taken to Owendo and exported, mainly to Europe and Japan (under long-term contracts), for conversion into fuel for the cores of nuclear power stations. As COMUF Director-General Henri Basset says, "prospects are far from brilliant. Without being pessimistic, you mustn't forget we have to fight on all fronts at the moment. We have to make a huge effort just to survive. The crisis is a constant obligation to do better, to boost our technical abilities by ever-more advanced training for our staff, to augment our productivity and to improve our general organisation in production, processing, management and marketing". With a turnover of CFAF 25.3 billion last year, COMUF is a cornerstone in the economy of the Mounana area (with about 12 000 inhabitants) where it distributes around CFAF 4.5 billion in wages (to around 1 100 employees) and has provided a lot of basic infrastructure in the form of roads, houses, schools, health facilities and so on. It has also embarked upon diversification, being involved in two mineral prospecting syndicates (gold in the Eteke region and more uranium south-east of Franceville) and producing fruit and vegetables and mineral water. Mr Basset also has a firm staff Gabonisation policy at all levels. "My personal conviction is that we must do as much as we can with local staff, so



Henri Basset, Head of COMUF (uranium)

"The crisis is a continual obligation to do better..."

they have to be trained in the best way possible. This makes economic sense, as local staff are much cheaper than expatriates". So, by and large, the future is fairly bleak. The experts do not expect the world uranium market to balance again, or production to improve therefore, until 1995...

It is impossible to discuss mining in Gabon without mentioning the Bélinga iron deposits, a billion-tonne reserve with 345 million t 64% iron ore but relatively high-phosphorous and, over a wider area, hundreds of millions of tonnes of lower-grade ore, too. These reserves were inventoried with outside help, particularly from the Community. A mining company, SOMIFER (the Mekambo Iron Mining Company), has already been set up, with the Government holding 49% of the capital. Notwithstanding the obvious need for the international iron and steel market to take off again, there are still one or two problems for Gabon itself to handle before it can start exploitation, particularly when it comes to shifting the ore. In the present economic situation, financing for a third stretch of the TransGabonese Railway, between Booué (halfway between Owendo and Franceville) and Bélinga, 229 km further on, would be a burden for the country, as would the idea of developing a vast mineral port at Owendo. Some sources suggest that China might be interested in financing these two essential pieces of infrastruc-



ACP-EEC Courier

Emmanuel Nzé-Bekalé, Minister for SMEs:

"The production apparatus has to be diversified and the Gabonese people have to be emancipated... as businessmen"

ture if it were later repaid in iron ore.


Banking on the smaller firms

In these difficult times, Gabon is setting a lot of store by its small and

medium-sized enterprises and industries (SME/SMIs). The idea is to create a network of national industries, as there is a lot of foreign stake in the other major sectors of the economy. The Ministry responsible for all this only set up in 1983, is headed by Emmanuel Nzé-Bekalé, who described the two main ideas behind the policy. "We wanted to diversify the basis of our production in a country that is more or less dwarfed by the oil giant and we wanted to encourage the Gabonese people to be emancipated, not as wage-earners but as businessmen... The most important thing to do was create a spirit of enterprise, for in this relatively underpopulated country of ours, where the revenue is fairly high, people tended to look for comfortable jobs as wage-earners. But now things have suddenly changed, we have to offer other possibilities of employment and personal fulfilment".

The strategy was a threefold one. First they had to find out the lie of the land, so a census (10 545 SMEs⁽¹⁾) at end 1985, 82% of them in the non-structured and 18% in the structured sector) was run and a diagnosis made. Then "promotion schemes proper had to be run". That is to say that the people had to be made aware of what was going on, meetings had to be organised, contact established with the world of business and a project bank set up. And lastly, extension services and assistance had to be provided via a reduction in taxation and customs duties, technical assistance with evaluation, management and training and financial assistance — i.e. soft loans and guarantees and interest rebates. On this last point, the Minister made clear that "the EDF aid we received through its first line of credit in 1985 and its second more recently and the technical help it will be providing is very precious".

Mr Nzé-Bekalé said that there were and still are many obstacles to overcome. "We lack a spirit of enterprise, as already mentioned, and we are short on technical training and management ability. We have no national savings and our local banking sector was until very recently unwilling to get involved in the SMEs. Training is not geared to employment, so we need to



MTG

The SMEs (above, Métallurgie et Tréfilerie Gabonaise) know they have to corner the home market before they launch themselves into exports

(1) Firms with a turnover of less than CFAF 500 million.

turn out more of the sort of people the economy needs. One of the groups we are particularly aiming at is young people who are still in training and whose future employment is still uncertain. We have to find bold solutions for them", the Minister said.

Another important objective, as he sees it, is "the possibility of creating SMEs at both ends of the rural production chain to stem the rural exodus and ensure that the country develops harmoniously by bringing life to centres other than Libreville and Port-Gentil and creating centres of attraction throughout the country".

As well as the basic options resulting from the nation's general economic planning, whereby emphasis is on the sub-sectors of farming, forestry, fishing and services, Mr Nzé-Bekalé says that it is clear "that we have to corner our own domestic market before launching into export-oriented SMEs, for two reasons. First there is the high cost of input, which makes it difficult to compete outside, and second, exports mean sophisticated logistical support when we are still at the stage of training sound managers of efficient SMEs". Partnership with in-


vestors is of course desirable, which is why the Minister is anxious for "close contact with the forms of assistance which such organisations as UNIDO and the CDI can provide".

An oil future?

Given the complexity and seriousness of the present crisis the economic situation has thrust upon Gabon, the important thing is to find out whether, structurally speaking, the development of non-oil activities will provide something to take over from oil, which has ensured almost all the economic growth so far. We have already mentioned how "black gold" dominates the Gabonese economy and the Gabonese leaders' now-dominant desire gradually to strike a fresh balance, but it is still important to see how the oil sector will stand, overall, in the future.

"In the past, Gabon got a lot from the two oil shocks. Prices were high between 1974 and 1981 and the drop after 1981-82 was offset by a rising dollar and considerable income. A combination of a falling dollar and falling oil prices since early 1986 has confirmed the trend away from a strategic oil market dominated by supply to a market dominated by demand and a much more ordinary product". So said Michel Romieu, Deputy Director-General of Elf-Gabon, the longest-established oil company in Gabon. Elf-Gabon is 54% Elf-Aquitaine (the 11th biggest oil company in the world in terms of turnover), and its veritable war-horse, and 25% Gabonese State. It is the cornerstone of the country's petroleum industry with 4.7 million t of the total output of 8.6 million t in 1985 and 6.2 million t of the operators' production (the others being mainly Shell-Gabon and Amoco-Gabon). Its turnover was CFAF 437 billion the same year.

Gabon's oil is comparable to the light Arab product, with a low sulphur content. However, output is scattered (30-35 fields and about 200 wells) so the logistical costs are high. Most of the oil produced (about 95%) is still from offshore sources and probably reaching its peak, while onshore sources are difficult to get at, prospect and work. The sector works on two main systems — the more conventional one using an exploitation permit




Elf-Gabon

The crisis has forced the oil companies to use high technology to boost their productivity gains. Above, seismic detection by helicopter

(sharing the profit margin via tax) and production sharing. Conditions vary considerably, technical feats are often called for and the consumer markets are relatively far away.

The slump has not passed the oil companies by, either. Elf-Gabon expects its turnover for 1986 to have dropped by 50%. "But the crisis did not catch us napping. Our strategic response was essentially to seek productivity gains at all levels so as to safeguard our profit margins with the threefold aim of meeting our tax commitments to the Government, getting a good return on capital and pursuing investment. We expect to meet our productivity targets in two years, although the idea was it should take five, through highly selective investments and extremely rigorous management", Mr Romieu said.

And what are oil's chances in the future? Mr Romieu did not hide his optimism. "Assuming the market is fragile and cyclical over the decade to come and there are no more very violent oil shocks, we are convinced that there is still plenty to do in our sector in Gabon. There are two things that inspire us here. First the high technology of oil geophysics opens the way for new research topics—deep offshore deposits, for example—which, com




ACP-EEC Courier

Michel Romieu, Deputy Director-General of Elf-Gabon:

"High technology of oil geophysics opens the way for new research topics"

GABON



Area: 267 667 km² of which $\frac{3}{4}$ covered by dense forest either side of the Equator; 80 km of Atlantic coastline (Gulf of Guinea)

Population: 1 230 000 (off. est.), of which approx. 55% live in main towns.

Main towns: Libreville (capital) ($\pm 240\ 000$); Port-Gentil ($\pm 60\ 000$); Franceville ($\pm 20\ 000$)...

Languages: French (official language), Fang, Miéné, Batéké...

Independence: 17 August 1960.

Head of State: President El Hadj Omar Bongo (since 28 November 1967).

Ruling party: Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG - created 12 March 1978).

Employment: Salaried workers $\pm 140\ 000$ (of whom 20% civil servants); basic monthly salary CFAF 64 000

Currency: CFAF (1 CFAF = 0.02 FF); 1 ECU = CFAF 343.5 (Feb. 87).

GDP: CFAF 1156 billion (1986 - current prices, 29.8% down on 1985); GDP/inhabitant (1986): US \$2850 (1985 US \$3920); 1987 estimate: US \$2200.

Principal resources: oil (1986 production: 7.9 m tonnes - 8.6 m tonnes in 1985); manganese (± 2.3 m tonnes in 1986); uranium (900 tonnes); timber (± 1.3 m cubic metres of logs); cocoa (1775 tonnes exported in 1985-86).

Balance of payments: recent trends in the overall balance (in CFAF billions) - 1984: 17.4; 1985: -22.1; 1986: -105.3.

External debt: (31/12/86) total outstanding debt: CFAF 461 billion; debt servicing: CFAF 171.8 billion.

Map taken from an information memorandum on the Republic of Gabon published in December 1986 by Kuhn Loeb Lehman Brothers International Inc., Maison Lazard et Cie., S.G. Warburg & Co. Ltd.

combined with our more than 50 years' experience here in Gabon, makes things very hopeful. Second, onshore prospecting is far from being complete and is highly promising".

Spectacular success has already been achieved with the Kounga-Rabi deposit, the biggest ever discovered in Gabon. If this joint Shell-Elf Gabon source is to be worked (with Shell as operator), considerable investment is called for because a whole new oil zone has in fact to be opened up. But things are very promising all in all. The reserves are still being evaluated and Elf-Gabon has suggested something like 30-35 million t (which puts the nation's total oil reserves at around 100 million t). The field could produce 4 million t p.a. with high productivity per well and this, combined with the as-yet-undiscovered potential deposits and the advantageous tax arrangements for oil companies (a profits tax of only 73% instead of the 95% in, say, the North Sea), has not been without attracting a large number of other oil companies ("following like sheep..."), to the point where some people are talking about an oil rush.

The country has won its biggest wager on the TransGabonese, "the backbone of new Gabon", as Georges Rawiri calls it, and it will overcome the crisis, as it did once before when its economy overheated at the end of the '70s. The present downturn is serious, of course, but it is only relatively so, bearing in mind the prospect of further oil production of as much as 10-12 million t in the 90s. The authorities are determined to diversify the economy and strike a fresh balance to make it more self-sustaining, less dependent on oil and therefore less vulnerable, but they expect no improvements before the end of the decade.

They are convinced, meanwhile, that people have to stop thinking that Gabon is the Emirate of Africa and start adopting a more realistic approach, as the present financial Ramadan suggests. Although King Oil is inevitably being removed from his throne today and the country is moving away from an economy in which he brings in all the revenue, it is difficult to imagine that oil will not have a preponderant part to play in Gabon after the crisis. o

Roger DE BACKER

“We have to base the activities that drive our economy on renewable resources” says President El Hadj Omar Bongo

December 1986 was a big month in the career of the Gabonese Head of State. Not only was he re-elected to the Presidency for a further seven years, but his great dream, the TransGabonese Railway, came true and, on the 30th of the month, his birthday no less, he opened the second (Booué to Franceville) stretch of the line that has gone down in the history of railway construction and is the cornerstone of the nation's strategy for the post-oil era.

Omar Bongo has led the Gabonese nation since 28 November 1967, when he took over after the death of Léon M'Ba, to whom he had been very close, and founded the Gabonese Democratic Party (PDG) on 12 March the following year. As leader of this party of “concerted, democratic progress”, the President is a man of dialogue.



El Hadj Omar Bongo
President of Gabon

“The post-oil era won't be tomorrow”

His most recent contributions to regional cooperation in Africa include the inspired role his country played in getting CICIBA, ECCAS (the Economic Community of Central African States) and APPA (the African Petroleum Producers Association) off the ground. As Chairman of the OAU's *ad hoc* Committee, set up to try to solve the Chad-Libya border issue, he has worked tirelessly to handle the problem and try to “reconcile all Chadians”.

President Bongo was on an official visit to China when *The Courier* was in Gabon, so he answered our questions in writing, putting the country's present crisis and the strategy for overcoming it into perspective, setting Gabon against the international scene, in Africa in particular, and commenting on its relations with the Community.

► *Mr President, after your re-election to the Presidency and the recent ministerial reshuffle, Gabon seems to have both political stability and an economic and financial crisis. Is this crisis structural or cyclical, do you think?*

— I have already had plenty of opportunity to explain the origins and the nature of the problems facing our country today to my compatriots and to international public opinion. Like all the other countries whose economic health is based mainly on trading their raw materials, Gabon is hit by the full force of market trends over which we have no control. At the end of 1985, the petroleum market, which had been in a state of upheaval since 1982, got worse and, as we all know, crude prices slumped to a low no-one

had anticipated. And the drop in the price of a barrel of oil was accompanied by a bad slide of the US dollar against the CFAF. This had never happened before and the unhappy combination of these two factors hit our State finances hard. In 1985, oil revenue brought CFAF 400 billion into a budget where overall revenue was CFAF 630 billion. But the following year, it was down to CFAF 285 billion and overall revenue to CFAF 521 billion and, in 1987, we are expecting scarcely more than CFAF 60 billion from oil. As far as immediate effects—the reduction in the State's financial capacity—are concerned, the crisis seems closely tied up with external constraints that we believe to be largely cyclical in nature. But you still have to bear in mind that the size of

the imbalance attendant on external factors means the structure of the Gabonese economy is also in a situation of great vulnerability. The deterioration in the terms of trade affects all our other raw materials — manganese, timber and uranium.

► *Will financial austerity be enough to get the Gabonese economy off the ground again?*

— The sudden drop in our budget resources has meant a medium-term financial adjustment programme. It has the support of the International Monetary Fund and it is aimed at re-establishing the balance of public finance, payments and currency. Quite naturally, the accent is on the vital need to match State spending to our

considerably reduced financial resources. And it also involves boosting production, in particular by encouraging public firms to make a profit. But the recovery of the Gabonese economy with circumstances as they are does mean reprogramming the whole of the productive sector and this is the job the Government—which has to come up with a structural adjustment plan, with the help of the World Bank, over the next few months—currently has in hand.

► *Is the crisis leading Gabon to make firm plans for the post-oil era or is this just a pause pending the conditions for recovery of the oil economy?*

— We have to bring about a substantial reduction in the grip that a non-renewable commodity, that is so sensitive to the ups and downs of the oil market, has on our economy. The drive to develop and build for the post-oil era has been going for a few years now. The five-year (1984-88) economic and social development plan already aimed at promoting the diversification of the national productive apparatus and starting to change its direction. What in fact has to be done is base the activities that drive our economy on renewable resources. The drive to set up new structures to bring about this change in the best conditions will be given fresh impetus. But the post-oil era won't be tomorrow. Recent discoveries prove as much. The Rabi-Kounga deposit—with 75-80 million t before extraction is over—is just one example that is food for thought.

► *Gabon has joined the Association of African Petroleum Producers, hasn't it? Why has it done this and what does the country expect to get out of it?*

— Yes, indeed, we have joined this organisation, which, as you know, saw the light of day in Lagos in January this year after experts met in Libreville in October 1986 and came up with the relevant texts. This is by no means an innovation in the field that concerns us. Alongside OPEC—and you really can say that if that organisation hadn't existed, we would have had to create it anyway—more regional organisations have been set up in other parts of the world. And we all know that some of them have done some terrific things in petrochemicals,

within an appropriate economic area. That emphasises the point of this kind of cooperation and of the organisations that preceded us in this field. At least, that's how I see it. So the African Association is not the result of a desire to create a kind of counter-power and its interests are those of eight, geographically close nations, quite naturally. As you know, most of our deposits, unlike those on the Gulf, are small and costly to work as a result, and we have to keep our prospection going all the time to maintain the level of our reserves. When it comes to actual exploitation, of course, the companies are more or less the same in all our countries and these are the sort of developments, those of the past few years, that is to say, that have created the need for new oil taxation — which is good reason for close collaboration between our respective Governments. We also think that the responsibility that non-OPEC members now have in regulating the oil market means that all the oil producers just have to collaborate. I am convinced that structures like our African Association, which combines OPEC and non-OPEC members, can make an effective contribution to developing the collaboration we are seeking.

► *How do you see Gabon's role as a driving force in Central Africa continuing, particularly in UDEAC and EC-CAS, of which you are the founding father?*

— First of all, I should like to say that Gabon makes no claim to being a driving force in this part of Africa. We are an active member of these two inter-state organisations, obviously, but don't forget that the decisions are taken by all the partners. Another thing we are very concerned about is getting the Lagos Plan applied, with the aim of boosting the economic potential and increasing economic growth and achieving better economic integration on the continent. At the moment, we are putting particular emphasis on developing our small and medium-sized businesses and agriculture, because we firmly believe that the economic future of our countries depends on them greatly and that they are even a priority as far as that is concerned. ECCAS is a young organisation, so there is still a long way to go, but our ambition, the ambition of all the member coun-

tries is to make it a dynamic organisation that can improve trade within the Community, as other similar organisations do.

► *You have been at the heart of many initiatives on the African diplomatic scene, especially in helping to find a peaceful solution to the Chad issue. What will your line of conduct be on this one in the future?*

— I recently told people who asked me this question that what I was concerned with was trying to reconcile all Chadians, so that the peace they so ardently desire returns to their country. What that means is that, following the agreements between the Chadian Government and the CAC-CDR, the FDT and the CODOS⁽¹⁾ and the rallying of other opponents, including Colonel Kamougué, I am willing to help anyone interested in working for peace. I am ready, as I have always been, to make Gabon's contribution to solving this problem, as part of the work of the President-in-office of the OAU. And as I also said just recently, I believe that the time is now ripe for the *ad hoc* Committee on the frontier dispute between Chad and Libya to be convened. Since Gabon is chairing this Committee, all I need to do is to suggest a date for the first meeting—and we think it should be in Libreville—before June this year — to the two parties, in the light of the way things are going.

► *You recently mentioned a new Gabonese foreign policy. Can you outline this for us?*

— In an environment of conflict in the OAU and international political and economic crisis, I asked my departments, back in 1984, to take a good look at the idea of redefining our foreign policy. It was something that had to be done bearing in mind the not always positive view some of our partners had of Gabon. The last congress of the PDG, the National Democratic Party, discussed this in detail and adopted a number of resolutions on how we should change our diplomatic approach. Essentially, this meant resolute pursuit of a rational policy of opening onto the outside

(1) CAC-CDR: *Comité d'Action et de Coordination du Conseil démocratique révolutionnaire*; FDT: *Front démocratique tchadien*; CODOS: *Commandos*.



J.-M. Chourgnoz

The TransGabonese Railway, backbone of national development and cornerstone of the strategy for the post-oil era

world, which has made a considerable contribution to our economic and social progress in the past, continuing involvement in international, regional and sub-regional cooperation bodies with a view to the good of our nation, and firm condemnation of any system that represented a threat to international peace, in particular racism and apartheid, and defence of human rights. As you can see, this foreign policy is founded on respect for the great principles clearly laid down by the organisations and movements to which Gabon belongs as well as reflecting the slogan of the PDG — Dialogue, Tolerance and Peace. And it was with this in mind that we embarked upon various diplomatic moves that we are very pleased about today. Chad is one example.

► *Diversification seems to be the key to Gabon's economy in the post-oil era. What does this actually involve? Will there be any more big projects after the TransGabonese?*

— Gabon has some trump cards outside the oil sector. It has uranium and manganese and mineral prospec-

tion, which has only covered 10% of the country so far, and has shown large quantities of resources such as talc and iron. We plan to put all the money we can earn from these resources into our reorienting activities — which will have to be based on forestry, fishing, herding and farming... on the tourist trade, which has real, but as yet unexploited, potential. This strategy for the post-oil era, which will be aimed at intensive exploitation of the country, of course calls for a proper transport network. The railway we inaugurated on 30 December 1986 is the cornerstone, but it has to be completed. So the Government has combined with private investors to complete the mineral port of Owendo through which some of Gabon's manganese ore will transit. The link between the Belinga iron deposit and the TransGabonese Railway is another major project which the Government has to see through. And lastly, we must continue the drive to provide roads so the forests that have hitherto been inaccessible and can now benefit from the railway facilities can be exploited too.

► *Does Gabon have the sort of regional development policy that is in line with the size and abilities of its population?*

— The great economic centres of Gabon, the coastal regions and the eastern part of the country that is, have expanded a lot in recent years and this is why they are extremely attractive as far as people from the interior are concerned. Of course, cities such as Libreville and Port Gentil and Franceville are far from being so overcrowded or having the uncontrolled migration that does such damage to certain other metropolises. But the rural exodus still bothers the Government, for some areas are losing their lifeblood, and so we are going in for a policy of national restructuring with a view to spreading people and activity properly over the whole territory.

We shall manage this by creating viable activities that are attractive and can provide a living for our rural populations and keep the young people on the land. As you have had the opportunity to see, Gabon is a relatively large country and there is no real pos-

sibility of achieving significant development of the whole of the national territory with scattered investments. The idea is to have integrated zonal operations with each of the provinces focusing investments on one or two clearly defined priority areas where the potential can easily be mobilised. The rest of the territory will benefit from diffuse activity, smaller investments of a sort that can gradually be integrated into the development process either by expansion of the original priority areas or by a dynamic movement of their own.

Within this policy, we must seek a kind of synergy of productive investments, infrastructure and services whereby the conditions of production and marketing can be improved and greater attention given to providing equipment and facilities for the community. Where this drive has been undertaken methodically and with perseverance, populations are already getting younger and young people are coming back to work in rural areas.

► *As far as cooperation with the European Community is concerned, Gabon's Lomé III indicative programme was signed more than a year ago, I think. Does it reflect the aims of the nation's planning, do you feel, and does it anticipate the present economic situation?*

— The Lomé III national indicative programme is based on a grant of ECU 23 million, I believe. It is always possible to criticise, of course, because it is still less than the ECU 25 million we got under the 3rd EDF more than 10 years ago. What I think is essential to underline here is the comprehension that everyone has shown in shaping the new framework for financial and technical cooperation between Gabon and the EEC over the Lomé III period.

As I think I said earlier, agriculture is our top priority. It was already clear under the Third five-year Economic and Social Development Plan and it has been underlined in this Fifth Plan which has generated a movement that should lead the country to self-sufficiency in food. The indicative programme, where there is close cooperation between the EEC programming mission and the Gabonese Government, has earmarked 80% of 6th EDF resources for this. This focus is the

result of a shared concern with making our cooperation more effective. I should also like to see this as auguring well for greater consideration of Gabon's needs in the future.

► *Moving on to a more general topic, could we have your opinion on cooperation between the EEC and Gabon over what is now more than a quarter century and on relations between Europe and the ACP?*

— The first relations between the EEC and Gabon date back to 1959,



"I am willing to help anyone interested in working for peace (in Chad)..."

the year the first EDF was set up. As we all know, this 1st EDF was set up under the 1957 Convention associating the new European Economic Community, on a unilateral basis, to the various overseas countries and territories. But it was really not until after independence that proper cooperation got going, because it was only then that the consultation machinery, which we feel is the right framework for relations between the Community and the African countries that had become sovereign and independent, was set up.

First of all we had the two Yaoundé Conventions. They covered two periods of five years — 1963-68 and 1969-75. And then the three Lomé Conventions, the ACP-EEC agreements, took over. As far as Gabon is

concerned, the Community's commitment through its various instruments — the EDF and other things such as the EIB, Stabex and the regional cooperation activities—has tended to be in line with what the nation needed over all those three periods. The 2nd and 3rd EDFs made decisive contributions to the country's communications infrastructure — with the commercial port of Owendo and the TransGabonese Railway worthy of particular attention. The Community's withdrawal over the 4th EDF could, of course, have suggested that cooperation was cooling off, but the increase in aid that started under Lomé II and has been confirmed under Lomé III seems to indicate good will on all sides when it comes to getting over any misunderstanding. As to the ACP Group as a whole, the important thing to agree on is the example which the Lomé Conventions set. They are exemplary, first and foremost in decision-making. In most global agreements involving developing countries, the decisions are unilateral or maybe involve the developing countries to just a small extent. But Lomé decision-making is a system that should be a model for other people.

The Lomé Conventions are also exemplary in the diversity of instruments they provide. They reflect a genuine desire to give the right answers to the needs of the different ACP economic structures and of their economies and levels of development. It is an effort which should be pursued.

I should like to take this opportunity of saying that I am worried about cooperation in the mining sector. People are always saying that Europe and the ACPs, especially the hard core, the Africans, have a mutual interest in developing a joint policy for exploiting our mineral resources. But it has to be admitted, alas, that very few of the good intentions have been put into practice in the everyday life of the European iron and steel industry — which is still geared to the output of countries outside the ACP group. Believe me, the Community is well able to overcome this and help the European iron and steel industry diversify its sources of supply so that Africa, particularly its iron ore suppliers, has a bigger part to play. ◊

Interview by R.D.B.

Gabon and the Community — more than 25 years' cooperation —

by Dominique DAVID (*)

There is nothing surprising about calling the Gabon of 1960 by the generic term "developing country", just like most of the other countries which obtained independence at that time.

On the eve of the '80s, after a brief period of severe crisis, now overcome, El Hadj Omar Bongo, the President, illustrated the change with the expression "country under construction".

Now, 25 years after the State was formed, without being and without wishing to be classified as a rich country, Gabon cannot really be put in the Third World any longer, as it has affirmed an individuality based on political stability and economic expansion—albeit one recently threatened by an economic and financial crisis, partly cyclical in nature and due primarily to the external constraints of oil prices and the American dollar.

The EEC has used this quarter century to define its objectives, refine its development aid criteria and decide on the best way of responding to its partners' joint and several situations. This has taken practical shape in the six European Development Funds and the various other Community instruments—the European Investment Bank, the regional cooperation programmes and the non-governmental organisations.

The 25 years of Community presence in Gabon reflect this double trend in a constant drive to adapt and a constant desire to work together with the national authorities and other economic partners in this country.

Initially (1960-68), the EEC helped shape the response to the nation's development needs. Then, in 1968-75, it offered support for the country's construction drive in the shape of projects of various kinds. And, in 1975-80, it helped at different levels with the financial crisis Gabon had been unable to avoid.

From 1980 onwards, the Community had to adjust the specific nature of its aid to suit the personality of the nation which emerged from the crisis.

What the EEC has to do under the 6th EDF is to help forecast and manage the future on a basis of crisis and structural readjustment by backing up the best development strategies that are most suited to the needs of the Gabonese people, with their Bantu values, in their national and regional environment.



Dominique David, Commission Delegate with Georges Rawiri, First Deputy Prime Minister. "Europe and Gabon are practically linked by blood ties" as the former President Léon M'Ba, said back in the 1960s

Commercial affairs

Trade

The European Community is by far Gabon's biggest trading partner, buying half of all the country's exports and supplying 70% of its imports.

Trade cooperation

With Lomé, the EEC is seeking to encourage the trade of Gabon and all the ACP partners in a number of ways—very favourable customs arrangements, for example, trade promotion measures and an export earnings stabilisation system (Stabex).

Customs arrangements

The Lomé trade arrangements mean that Gabonese products enter the Community free of customs duties, although the Gabonese customs are entitled to tax European imports. This is the principle of non-reciprocity of commercial advantages mentioned in the Convention and it is not a negligible one as far as Gabon is concerned, because it applies to half its trade.

Trade promotion

As free access to Community markets would not be enough to ensure that ACP sales expanded, the EEC finances additional trade promotion schemes every year, particularly national participation in trade fairs and specialised events. So, since 1976, Gabon has had stands at four or five such fairs, in Africa and in Europe, every year. However, the rigid structure of Gabon's external trade unfortunately precludes the sort of promotional activity that will bring rapid results.

It is too early to get a proper idea of the results of the first Central African Industrial Forum (run, with Community help, by the Gabonese Foreign Trade Centre) which brought businessmen from 20 countries to Libreville in December 1985.

Stabex

ACPs can get cash transfers from the Stabex fund (about 10% of all the financial resources available under Lomé) to compensate for loss of earnings due to poor harvests or a drop in

(*) Commission Delegate in Gabon.

prices of their main export products (timber, cocoa etc.).

This insurance for bad years has so far helped Gabon once, under Lomé I, when a transfer of CFAF 1 955 million was made for timber, following a large drop in both prices and the tonnages exported in 1975.

Development aid

The extent of EEC-Gabon trade has meant there have always been commercial ties between them and these ties have been tightened by the substantial aid that the Community countries have given to the development of this nation since 1960.

Gabon's biggest source of aid is the European Community. More than 90% of all the assistance it gets comes from the EEC and its Member States.

Since 1960, Community aid (EEC plus EIB) alone has been almost ECU 187 million, i.e. about CFAF 64.2 billion at present rates of exchange (ECU 1 = CFAF 343.493 on 1 January 1987), and 60% of it, mostly (85%) in the form of grants, has been for the successive national indicative programmes.

EIB loans have made up 25% of the Community aid. The remaining 15% is accounted for by regional projects run in Gabon, Stabex and NGO projects.

Between 1960 and 1980, the Gabonese Government used the funds the Community provided to put priority on economic infrastructure: 76.5% went on sea, rail and land transport and communications. Since 1980 (Lomé II), the bulk (90%) of Community support has been concentrated on assisting production in the rural sector and in mining. The idea under Lomé III (i.e. 1985 onwards) is to continue the drive to improve renewable resources (agriculture and forests), which will be getting 80% of the funds.

1960-80 - Responding to a developing country's needs

- 1960-63 - 1st EDF
- 1963-68 - 2nd EDF

Like any developing country in the '60s, Gabon had to advance on all fronts at the same time. It had to find a social policy to make up for the shortcomings in public health, educa-

The Bokoué pilot reforestation project, 5th and 6th EDFs



Forestry products represent 75% of the renewable resources of Gabon, the home of okoumé. But forestry, as currently practised here, is becoming less and less of a paying proposition.

In 1960-72, EDF resources helped with okoumé planting in Haut-Como. After a study in 1982, Gabon asked the EEC to finance a pilot reforestation project at Ekouk, 150 km south east of Libreville.

The project began in 1984 with the aim of laying down final guidelines for large-scale reforestation techniques and methods in Gabon over the next 10 years.

An initial 600 ha pilot phase is now under way and has already made it possible to outline how to boost the productivity of the replanted land and encourage the diversification of species (150 ha okoumé and 200 ha of limba and bilinga).

The system of cutting now being used allows species suitable for cabinet-making to be taken for the carpentry element of the project (which includes a training programme for carpenters) and any offcuts from the carpenters and the sawmill are used for experimental charcoal stoves.

Phase II financing, a grant of ECU 6 million, has been decided. This project is part of a sectoral rural development project and stresses environmental protection and the rational exploitation of forestry resources.

The idea is to define reforestation methods and techniques and produce a village agroforestry model, while continuing and extending the essentially experimental pilot scheme.

The experimental choice of small-scale agroforestry concerns will make it possible to replace extensive production methods and generate beneficial effects when it comes to putting a brake on the rural exodus.

Practically speaking, the project concerns the 600 ha of reforested land at Bokoué, the agroforestry operation at La Mbiné (150 ha), plus monitoring of all the trees already planted.

The provisional internal financial rate of return on the 10-year, 4000-ha reforestation scheme is somewhere between 6.5% and 4.4%. The economic rate of return is somewhere between 6.5% and 4.1%.

The project is essentially an experimental one which will give the Gabonese authorities technical know-how and a method of replanting and agroforestry that can be extended to all Gabon's six reforestation areas. ○

tion and the standard of living in general and it had to start on an economic policy in a country which, at that stage, was unaware of most of its natural potential other than timber and had acute communication problems because of the rim forest, which aggravated both obstacles and distances.

1st EDF

The amount provided here was ECU 17 501 000 (or around CFAF 6 billion at present rates of exchange) and the 16 projects were divided, essentially, into social investment, infrastructure and training schemes, properly reflecting the emergency nature of the situation.

2nd EDF

There were again 16 projects here, but more than 60% of the funds (totalling ECU 21 033 000, roughly CFAF 7.2 billion at present rates of exchange) went on building the port of Owendo.

The EIB financed three projects over the same period. They were the SMAG (milling and poultry raising), the SOTEGA (fabric printing in Libreville) and the laying of 70 km of road between Oyem and Lastourville.

The rural sector, which is central to development, remained the poor relation until the 5th EDF.

1969-75 – Backing up the construction drive

1969-75 – Yaoundé II – 3rd EDF

The substantial increase in the funds provided under the 3rd EDF (ECU 25 196 000 or around CFAF 8.6 billion at present rates), compared to the number of projects (five) over which they were spread, reflects the desire to focus aid on particular sectors. Some were schemes with medium- or long-term effects and others aimed at opening up the interior of Gabon and making the whole country more open to the outside world. The emphasis shifted from the social sector (investments in education and health were almost exclusive to the 1st EDF) to transport and communications.

The new projects included the hertzian link between Moanda and Francheville and further work on the port of Owendo, but the big major theme

during this period was EEC support for the TransGabonese Railway.

1975-80 – Helping with the financial crisis

1975-80 – Lomé I – 4th EDF

There was a relative decline in Community support over this period. The considerable reduction in the 4th EDF contribution was put down to Gabon's per capita GNP, but it was in fact due to the EEC's problems in backing up the policy of uncontrolled investment which followed the high oil production of 1975 and generated a serious financial crisis in 1978.

So the 4th EDF indicative programme came down to ECU 9.5 million (around CFAF 3.25 billion), a drop of more than 60% in comparison with the 3rd EDF, and the EIB failed to agree to any of the projects put forward over this period.

However, there is more to it than that and failing to point this out would seriously misrepresent what Community aid actually did for Gabon during these years.

Although, quantitatively speaking, the indicative programme was smaller, it is worth emphasising the fact that the EEC used other Lomé instruments

to make up for the destabilising effect of the oil boom and a Stabex transfer of ECU 6 703 311 (around CFAF 2.3 billion) was made for a loss of timber export earnings.

The Gabonese authorities were quick to learn the lesson of the crisis and the effort put into overcoming it. The EEC also realised the need to prepare for the post-oil era and it used new means (regional cooperation) and looked at new sectors of application with which the Gabonese strategies were involved.

It was under the 4th EDF that the Community homed in on the productive sectors and the exploitation of renewable resources.

So EEC-Gabon cooperation in fact far from cooled over this period, which was one of redefinition. Although oil still largely dominated the economy, it was generally agreed that agriculture had become the new priority.

1980-85 – Adjusting Community aid to the personality of the nation

1980-85 – Lomé II – 5th EDF

The preparation of Lomé II made 1980 the year for taking stock of coo-

Line of credit for SMEs, 6th EDF

The line of credit for the SMEs (ECU 1.5 million) and support for external staff (ECU 600 000) are intended to help support the SME promotion policy at a time when a slump in oil earnings is forcing the economy to change its direction.

This line of credit will be managed by the Aid and Guarantee Fund at the Ministry for SMEs, which will be able to grant direct aid in the form of preferential loans to 30 SMEs in the agricultural sector (in the broadest sense of the term). These firms are situated in the interior of Gabon and they meet local demand and capitalise on the country's natural resources. The promotion drive will primarily be of benefit to young people, rural dwellers and women.

It will be up to the Fund's Credit Committee, of which the Commission Delegate and a representative of the EDF National Authorising Officer will be members, to select the priority projects.

This line of credit will enable 200 jobs to be created, with an annual turnover of CFAF 1.5 billion and net annual earnings of around CFAF 200 million.

The promotional and financial management of the line of credit will involve external support staff in the short term. Government support has been obtained and the Aid and Guarantee Fund financing body has the budget it needs for both operation and investment.

This line of credit follows on from the one the Fund was already granted under the 5th EDF. ○



Fernan-Vaz integrated rural development project, 4th EDF

The Fernan-Vaz lagoon is by the coast of Gabon some 220 km south of Libreville and 100 or so km south east of Port Gentil. An integrated rural development project financed by the 4th EDF in 1982 is situated on the southern shores.

The main idea of this scheme was to develop viable farming activities that would be a livelihood for the local populations and ensure they stayed in the rural environment.

The work has been done as part of a programme combining agriculture (production of plantains and other food crops), trade (transport and sale of harvests by means of

three barges, three refrigerated containers and two trailers), social facilities (schools, dispensaries and medical support) and roads (road and track maintenance).

Over a four-year period:

- people have returned to the centres of activity;
- the number of cars and canoes has increased, as has the area under crop;
- the demand for plantains on the market in Port-Gentil, the economic capital of Gabon, has been satisfied.

Gabon's Lomé III indicative programme includes extensions of an integrated rural development project in the Fernan-Vaz zone. ○

peration between the European Community and Gabon, which have been associated since the very beginning. Although the record was largely positive, readjustment of development strategies was not ruled out.

The Gabonese authorities and the EEC reached agreement on figures, means and sectors, as follows.

In spite of the authorities' disappointment at the size of the 5th EDF indicative programme (ECU 16 million or around CFAF 5.5 billion), Community assistance clearly increased over this period. Commitments under Lomé II in fact amounted to two thirds of the funds provided in 1960-80, since this first figure must be added to ECU 12 040 000 (around CFAF 4.1 billion) worth of regional cooperation of direct interest to Gabon and the ECU 41 700 000 (CFAF 14 billion) which the EEC invested with EIB own resources and EDF interest rebates.

This diversification of means was exactly what the authorities wanted and clearly reflected the situation in Gabon. Regional cooperation enables this country to play its rightful part in central Africa and palliate the difficulties attendant on its geography.

The return of the EIB meant that productive investments could once

more be made in a country that is now in category one of the bankable nations—not to mention the decisive part it could play as a catalyst in other financing operations.

Lomé II confirmed and clarified the priority sectors that had come to light during the previous period. Aid for production now got 90% of the funds and there was a drive for increasing promotion of farming, fishing and forests, sectors which had only had 3.2% of EDF investments before. Training also got significant support.

1985-1990 - Helping with the development strategy for an economy whose prosperity has to last

1985-90 - Lomé III - 6th EDF

Faced with a crisis, the Gabonese plan stressed the development of replaceable resources as part of a drive for balanced territorial development for the benefit of the greatest number and the withdrawal of the State as both investor and operator in the economy.

The 6th EDF Indicative Programme signed in Libreville on 16 December 1985, took this political stance into account and has provided Gabon with ECU 23 million (CFAF 8 billion),

ECU 15 million (CFAF 5.5 billion) of it in the form of grants and ECU 8 million (CFAF 2.5 billion) in special loans. The EIB will also be providing ECU 25 million (CFAF 8.5 billion).

It was decided that the best sector to focus on was rural development, with a view to improving the standard of living of the people by boosting agricultural output and improving marketing, as well as protecting the environment and rationally exploiting replaceable resources, especially forests (80% of the whole programme).

Financing for a first tree-planting/agroforestry project has already been approved (Libreville, 9 March 1987). This is a grant of ECU 6 million (or around CFAF 2 billion).

A village rubber project and a rural food development programme are also in the indicative programme.

The idea is to make rural activities in Gabon profitable and attractive, so that they bring in more than a basic wage.

Outside the focal sector of rural development, the Government's plans are to put priority on schemes to help small and medium-sized businesses and industries. A financing agreement on a line of credit of ECU 2.1 million (around CFAF 720 million) for SMEs was also signed in Libreville on 9 March.

Regional cooperation

Gabon plays an important part in the regional organisations of central Africa, UDEAC and the ECCAS, which has its seat in Libreville. The capital is also the home of CICI-BA, the International Centre for Bantu Civilisations, and various other specialised regional and inter-regional bodies.

Membership of these organisations means that Gabon got the benefit of Lomé I and II regional monies, in particular with respect to regional training centres.

Other regional (industrial and rural) activities, including a study of and support for the regional Gulf of Guinea Fisheries Committee, have also been financed in Gabon.

In the mining sector, Gabon has had regional monies from the 5th EDF to study Haut-Indivo (Gabon-Congo) iron deposits and, on the industrial cooperation front, a Central African Industrial Forum was financed and put on in Libreville in December 1985 to get together many businessmen from the EEC, Gabon and the sub-region who were interested in cooperation.

The 4th and 5th EDF regional resources of direct benefit to Gabon total something like CFAF 5.8 billion.

The 6th EDF regional programme for central Africa is still on the drawing board. Gabon added a declaration on regional cooperation to its indicative programme, covering such things as the preservation of the natural environment and traditional fauna, cultural and social cooperation in the Bantu world, regional agricultural research, air security, support for UDEAC and ECCAS, as well as the regional fisheries sector and telecommunications. ○ D.D.

EEC-Gabon cooperation (1960-1987)

1. National Indicative Programmes

First	1 EDF	ECU 17 501 000
Second	2 EDF	ECU 21 033 000
Third	3 EDF	ECU 25 196 000
Fourth	4 EDF	ECU 9 500 000
Fifth	5 EDF	ECU 16 000 000
Sixth	6 EDF	ECU 23 000 000
		ECU 112 230 000

2. Stabex

Timber	Fourth EDF	ECU 6 703 311
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3. EIB

Yaoundé I	ECU 3 241 000
Yaoundé II	ECU 1 195 000
Lomé II	ECU 34 500 000

4. Interest on EDF grants

Fourth EDF	ECU 630 138,38
Fifth EDF	ECU 9 391 515,45

5. Regional cooperation

Fourth EDF	ECU 4 000 000
Fifth EDF	ECU 14 285 000

6. NGOs

ECU 455 263

Total financial assistance EEC-Gabon 1960-1987:
ECU 186 631 227,83 (approx. CFAF ±64 billion)

Community intervention in Gabon, 1960-1987

Rural development

Agriculture

Fernan-Vaz integrated rural development.
Food and fruit production in Franceville.
Creation of market gardens in Médouneu.
Rubber growing in Mitzié.

Forestry

Haut-Como okoumé planting brigade.
Bokoué pilot reafforestation scheme.

Herding

Rural cattle rearing testing and development in Moanda.

Fishing

Artisanal fishing group centre in Owendo.
Fresh and salt water resource development studies.

Communications

Roads

Kougouleu-Médouneu, Ebel-Ndjolé, Libreville-Kougouleu, the Libreville-Owendo link, Basse Ogiga-Wagny, study of the Mikongo-Lastourville road and a study of the Port Gentil-Bifoun road.

Bridges

The Ayem and the Ebel bridges.

Railways

Study of the TransGabonese railway (Owendo-Booué).
Construction of the TransGabonese railway.

Ports

Studies for and construction of the port of Owendo.
Container park, Owendo.

Telecommunications

Transhorizon hertzian links, Gabon-Congo.
Hertzian links, Moanda-Franceville.

Industry

Energy

Studies of micro-HEP stations and electric lines between Port Gentil and Libreville.
Doubling Poubara HE development.

Mining

Aerial geophysical mineral research (national mining inventory).
COMUF (Mouana) uranium mine and factory extensions.

SME-SMI

Lines of credit for the Aid and Guarantee Fund.

Hotels

Construction of the Dialogue Hotel.

Social projects

Health

Port Gentil maternity unit.
Building and fitting out of 30 health units in Port Gentil.
School of nursing and midwifery, Libreville.
M'batavea basin drainage, Libreville.
Libreville water supplies (Ntoum V).

Education

Technical high school, Libreville (Estuaire).
Apprenticeship centres in Oyem, Ndendé and Moanda.
Vocational training centres in Libreville and Port-Gentil.
Boarding facilities for modern colleges in Koulamoutou, Tchibanga and Franceville.

Training

Study courses and grants and specific training schemes.

Regional projects

School of posts and telecommunications (boarding facilities and help with training), Libreville.
OAB (technical assistance).
IAI (equipment, construction and technical assistance).
ISTA (studies and pilot industrial operations).
CIADFOR (equipment, technical assistance and training).
Gulf of Guinea Fisheries Committee (studies, technical assistance, research and production schemes).
Haut-Ivindo iron ore deposits (evaluation).
Central African Industrial Forum (technical and financial assistance).

Trade

Trade promotion. Stabex transfer (timber).

Various

NGO cofinancing. Scientific and technical cooperation.

Total financial contribution by March 1987:

Approximately ECU 187 million or CFAF 64 billion.

Gabon-EEC Member States relations

We are giving readers an idea of bilateral relations between an ACP State and the individual Member States of the Community, on a purely exceptional basis, with this "bird's eye view" of Gabon. The details were assembled by Dominique David, the Commission Delegate, mainly with help from the Ambassadors of the six Member States represented in Libreville. It is not of course possible to draw any general conclusions about the relations each ACP State has with the Community countries from this, but it does show that there is every reason, in most cases, for speaking of genuine partners on the path to economic development.

Belgium

Belgium-Gabon cooperation relations have expanded since two cooperation agreements were signed in 1982.

As well as contributing to the building of the TransGabonese Railway, Belgium has sent out 18 cooperation officers, paid directly by Brussels, to help with the running of the lines.

A further 17 cooperation officers are working in agriculture, the SMEs, vocational training and public works and there are 76 teachers as well.

Belgium has transferred CFAF 2 billion-worth of funds to the Gabonese State since 1981 (95% of it for the TransGabonese Railway).

It has also helped in the tourist sector (completion of the Sheraton Hotel), with airways (Sabena, an air agreement in 1984), the maritime sector (a 1981 agreement), banking (the Banque Bruxelles Lambert), oil (FINA) and agriculture (Agro-Gabon).

BLEU* exports to Gabon have increased constantly since 1982, reaching BFrs 1.6 billion (around CFAF 13 billion) in 1986. The trade figures more or less balance, thanks to the nation's oil exports.

About 500 Belgians live in Gabon.

Denmark

Gabon's imports (1985) were worth CFAF 468 million and consisted mainly of beef and veal and mechanical equipment.

Timber exports to Denmark are worth CFAF 153 million.

Germany

Germany has concluded contracts with the Gabonese Development Bank and the Development Bank of the Central African States, as well as in the public works and textiles sectors.

Technical cooperation has involved rehabilitation of the Oyem rural radio in May 1986, with two experts. Another expert is also engaged in managing the TransGabonese Railway.

There are 27 Gabonese grant-holders training in Germany at the moment, five of them on German Government grants.

In 1985, imports from Gabon were worth DM 117.5 million (around CFAF 18.5 billion) and exports to Gabon DM 142 million (around CFAF 24 billion).

Greece

Imports from Greece to Gabon were worth CFAF 121 million in 1985 and exports from Gabon to Greece (manganese and timber) CFAF 7.2 billion.

Spain

Spain has been present in Gabon since 1964, when diplomatic relations were established and the Embassy opened in Libreville.

There are four cooperation agreements forming the legal framework for relations between the two countries—an economic and commercial agreement (1976), an air transport agreement (1976), a cultural agreement (1977) and a mercantile marine agreement (1981). These involve Spain offering a certain number of study grants for higher and technical studies every year. Two teachers are provided for the Omar Bongo University and various programmes have been financed over the past few years (resource assessment campaigns in Gabonese waters, advanced seminars for Spanish teachers, a study of tourist possibilities etc.).

There are no Spanish financial institutions in Gabon. However, trade is fairly considerable, particularly in oil, a sector in which investments are also made.

For several years now, Spain has been one of Gabon's biggest customers for crude, having imported more than 1 million t in 1984 and 1985. Its imports from this country totalled Ps 44.6 billion (around CFAF 115 billion) in 1985, but, in spite of a constant but slight increase since 1982, exports have stayed at a very low level, being worth less than Ps 2.6 billion (CFAF 6.7 billion) in 1985.

Hispanoil, the Spanish company, is very active in Gabon. It is associated to ELF and, since 1986, its investments have reached Ps 8.3 billion (CFAF 20 billion).

The forestry sector (timber exploitation and export) is in second place, but it is still a long way behind the petroleum sector as far as trade and investments are concerned.

In 1981, the Spanish Government offered the Gabonese Government financing facilities (FAD and export credits) worth Ps 6 billion (CFAF 15 billion) for various equipment projects. Half of this has been used so far.

France

The importance of France-Gabon cooperation is an historic matter, with the close political and economic relations between Paris and Libreville and with France's large contribution to development in Gabon.

I. Economic and commercial relations

France is Gabon's principal customer and supplier.

In 1985, it took 40% (CFAF 295 billion-worth) of Gabonese exports, primarily crude oil (70%), timber (10%), uranium (8%), manganese (6.5%) and wood panels and plywood (3%). It is also Gabon's biggest supplier (with 50.2% of Gabon's imports in 1985), selling it agro-food products (12%), intermediate products (24%), finished industrial products (46%) and consumer goods (17%).

The level of bilateral trade is largely tied up with the long-standing location of major French firms in Gabon and the extent of private French investment in the country.

Major French firms are also represented through subsidiaries in almost every field—oil (ELF-Gabon), mining (Mokta and Coframine, Cogéma and BRGM), building and public works (Campenon Bernard, Bouygues, Satom, Dumez, Dragages Colas, Chantiers Modernes, Razel etc.), electrical and computer equipment (Thomson, CGE, Bull, IBM-France), agro-industry (Somidia, Grands Moulins de Paris), everyday consumer goods and distribution (the SCOA, CFAO and OPTORG groups), transport (UTA, Delmas Vieljeux) and banking (UAP, Gras and Savoye). A large number of SMEs with French capital complete this picture and contribute to the development of the Gabonese economy.

II. Financial aid

Official French assistance goes out through two organisations:

1. *The Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique*. This has been present in Gabon for 40 years now and is the country's biggest funder in the long term (all bilateral and multilateral aid combined).

Total loans from 1968 to 31 December 1986 were CFAF 116 billion. These monies

(*) Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union.

have mainly been channelled into rural development and agro-industry (30.5%), water and electricity (40.5%) and industry and the hotel trade (9.2%), while infrastructure and telecommunications have received 18.5% and housing 1.5%.

A new long-term procedure for financing the private sector via the local banks has recently been devised with a view to encouraging private investments.

Lastly, the CCCE will be offering Gabon substantial aid in 1987 to help it over the difficulties of the ongoing economic situation.

And there is another side to the CCCE's activity, namely capital holdings in various national companies and, through a subsidiary Proparco (the economic cooperation promotion and participation company), in a number of local SMEs too.

2. *The Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération.* This awards grants for investment only. It finances mainly feasibility studies, pump-priming starting investments, pilot schemes, major project accompaniment operations and training schemes. Over and above the bilateral funds decided on each year, there is a general FAC that supports general programmes (usually run by official French bodies) and an inter-State FAC which subsidises projects in which a number of countries are involved—e.g. Ciciba or the African Informatics Institute.

The FAC is geared to rural development and mining, but it has still considerably broadened its range. Flexible formulae enable it to help launch SMEs and provide funds for small development operations and small amounts of credit for various fields (including culture).

One of the main schemes financed from the bilateral FAC (CFAF 1 billion) in 1986 was support for Africa No. 1 and the mineral inventory along the TransGabonese (CFAF 300 million each). FAC's means in Gabon are due to be boosted now the French Cooperation Minister has decided on a 50% increase in credits.

III. Technical cooperation

This is very diversified. Large numbers are involved, in spite of a certain amount of deflation attendant on budgetary constraints.

On 31 December last year, there were 727 French civilian cooperation officers in Gabon, 400 of them in teaching and 222 in technical branches. There were a further 105 officers, 50 odd of them in cooperation posts with OCTRA, the Gabonese railway company, and 30 with ASEUNA, helping with civil aviation.

Lastly, an NGO (the Association Française des Volontaires du Progrès), in liaison

with the Cooperation Ministry, has 20 or so staff in primary health care and rural development.

This support is completed by about 100 study grants and courses, financing for French expert missions and backing for inter-university agreements.

Cultural activities are along various lines. Aid is offered for the cultural heritage (restoration of Schweizer's hut), the running of a vast public literacy project, assistance with Gabon's archives and audiovisual facilities.

France also backs local artistic endeavour and, as a corollary, is doing its best to spread Gabonese culture in France. The special effort made with Ciciba over and above the FAC subsidy is worth noting here.

Technical assistance and cultural support are worth an average of CFAF 12-16 billion each year.

French military technical cooperation involves more than 100 experts working throughout the Gabonese security forces. They were sent out to help train Gabonese military cadres and to offer advice with the organisation of the local army.

The various French military schools also have about 250 Gabonese students at the present time. And lastly, Gabon gets direct aid in the form of materials and equipment every year.

IV. The French Community

There is a relatively large French population in Gabon at the present time, in spite of a certain withdrawal due primarily to the economic crisis but to other factors as well, and quite naturally, it has an active part to play in developing bilateral economic relations. There are still 18 000 people living there, more than 12 000 of them in Libreville and more than 3 000 in Port-Gentil.

Italy

Italy's presence in Gabon is primarily in the form of commercial relations and the Italian firms based there.

There are one or two significant examples in the trade sector:

- teaching material supplies (US\$ 8 million – CFAF 2.4 billion); the TEMA company;
- SOMIVAB manufactures sleepers for the TransGabonese Railway and markets Italian household electrical equipment.

The Italian firms in Gabon mainly deal in the fisheries sector (Efim and Ingeco) and infrastructure (Salini Costruttori). Wabco-Westinghouse has contracted to provide the coaxial cables along the TransGabonese.

Lastly, Italy has backed up EEC action on a bilateral basis by responding to a request for financing for an artisanal fishing project now on the drawing board in the Gulf of Guinea Fisheries Committee.

Netherlands

Gabon imported CFAF 9 billion-worth of goods (primarily mechanical equipment and machinery, beer, vehicles, milk, cloth, iron and steel products, plastics and beef and veal) in 1985.

It exported CFAF 30 billion-worth of goods, primarily oil, to the Netherlands.

A number of Netherlands firms have branches in Gabon—Damen Marine Service and Hollando-Gabon (general trading). Air Gabon, a national firm, also uses Fokker 27s.

Portugal

Gabon imported CFAF 425 million-worth of goods from Portugal in 1985, as against exports, essentially of timber and manganese, of CFAF 1.2 billion.

United Kingdom

I. The financial assistance the UK offers to Gabon is entirely geared to multilateral agencies such as the EEC (EDF). As far as technical cooperation is concerned, the British effort is concentrated on training future Gabonese teachers of English in the UK. Study grants for post-school education are also offered.

II. The main British investment in the private sector has been that of Shell. This company plans a considerable amount for further investment in connection with the working of the main oil-field at Rabi/Echira over the coming two years. Other British oil companies, including BP and LASMO, are associated with international oil companies.

III. The UK's role in the second part of the TransGabonese Railway Scheme has been a major one. Two British construction firms, Wimpey International and Taylor Woodrow International represented 22% of the Eurotrag consortium. Financing for this project came partly from banks in the United Kingdom, with the Midland as the biggest contributor. British companies such as British Rail Engineering also supplied equipment and training for OCTRA.

IV. British organisations are also involved in the tertiary sector. Barclays Bank has offices in Libreville, as do British Caledonian Airways. The Hotel Intercontinental is run by a British company, Grand Metropolitan Hotels Ltd. Other British companies, Guinness and Dunhill, for example, are also represented. ○ D.D.



The Indian Ocean Commission

— an up-and-coming body —

by Benoît AUBENAS (*)

The Indian Ocean Commission, one of the most recent of the regional organisations, held its ministerial session in Moroni, the capital of Comoros, on 7-10 February earlier this year. It has already shown its strength with a sound project record (around ECU 10 million in three years) and with its diplomatic activity, which is as discreet as it is intense and in the tradition of its elder sisters in the discussion of the serious problems of the presidency, the seat and the secretariat. It takes the veteran officials of the European Communities back to the heroic days of the creation of the ECSC and the early 60s!

The Port-Louis meeting


Both the history and the people of the region—which saw, very early on, daring mariners sailing the Indian Ocean seeking to reach the Indies round the Cape—are extremely rich and complex.

Comoros is peopled by the descendants of Arabs who came, usually from Oman, along the African coast. Malaysians and Indonesians began arriving in Madagascar, via India and the Maldives, back in the 10th century. And of course the other islands, Seychelles and Mauritius and Reunion, are melting pots of civilisations too. This wealth of different traditions, the history and religion and all this heterogeneous influence has created a unit which has had to forge its own national equilibrium.

Trade was between north and south, or south and north, but rarely south and south. So, because of their singularity and their history, the Indian Ocean countries have ultimately had little contact or trade with each other and only recently awakened to the fact that they belong to a unit in which cooperation could be organised.

The idea first came to light in 1977, at the initiative of Mauritius, at the

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University of Aix-Marseille. It developed until 1982 when sympathy between certain Governments of the Indian Ocean, actively supported by the Community and the French Government, enabled the Port-Louis Conference to be held and the Act of Establishment to be signed, thus putting an end to "our three islands missing their appointments" (1).

The Mauritian Government invited the Governments of Seychelles and Madagascar to a conference in Port-Louis on 18-21 December 1982 "discuss and set up regional cooperation structures in the south west region of the Indian Ocean" (2).

The joint communiqué of this Conference outlined what the countries intended to do. Priority should go to economic, commercial and technical cooperation, they said, as well as to fruitful cooperation in cultural, legal, scientific and social affairs. Lastly, the Conference did not wish to be a closed group, because it set up a permanent Indian Ocean Commission to look into requests for accession from any State or entity in the south eastern part of the Indian Ocean.

A number of remarks are called for here. From the word go, the States

(1) Opening speech by the Mauritian Minister de l'Estrac on 20 December 1982.

(2) These are references to the Conference's joint communiqué.

confining their cooperation to the geographical region covering the south west of the Indian Ocean and to economic cooperation rather than integration (a more restricted and more pragmatic approach than that of the Preferential Trade Area set up by the Treaty of Lusaka in 1981) and they opened their doors to other countries or entities in the area i.e. to Comoros and Reunion (a French overseas department). The Commission organises its work and its meetings, including a small secretariat, very fully.

In conclusion, it proposed that the founder States ratify a general cooperation agreement between the Member States of the Indian Ocean Commission—the so-called Port-Louis Agreement of 21 December 1982.

So in only three days, the countries of the Indian Ocean laid lasting foundations for very active cooperation in terms that were both practical and dynamic. This was possible for two main reasons. Intense preparation had been made and, most important, the three delegations concluded that there was already a convergence of views between their three countries.

Four years of the Indian Ocean Commission

Three major problems have dominated the life of the Commission since

1982. They are enlargement, project financing and internal organisation.

Enlargement

The Commission was originally set up by three countries, but it wanted to bring in neighbouring islands—Comoros and Reunion. Comoros were rather isolated in the region because of long-standing cultural antagonism and fairly different political leanings. But the essential improvement in flight communications meant that contact with Comoros started again, official visits were exchanged and Comoros became first an observer and then a full member of the Commission in January 1985.

The “other entities” of the region mentioned in the general agreement obviously meant Reunion. But there were problems here because of the Island’s special status as a French Overseas Department, i.e. an integral part of the French Republic. This meant that France would be including part of its territory in an international organisation of which it was not itself a full member. After close discussions with legal and political experts giving their views in both the capital cities and the Commission sessions, common sense and pragmatism prevailed. France became a member of the IOC, but the protocol of accession said that the idea was to encourage the integration of the department of Reunion into the Indian Ocean unit and that France would be represented on the Commission by representatives (Prefect, General Adviser) from Reunion. So this is



an original structure, with four countries from the ACP Group joining with part of the Community to promote their joint expansion through trade and a better understanding of their complementarity and potential.

With this delicate decision, the IOC was thus complete, with five full members and one privileged observer, the EEC, in view of its active contribution and support in the creation and activity of the organisation.

Project financing

The creation of the IOC should give fresh impetus to regional cooperation under the Lomé Convention.

The limited relations between the countries of the region are behind the limited regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean. Under Lomé I, ECU 8.3 million were spent, ECU 7.9 million of it on telecommunications, an operation in which other countries of Africa

were also involved. Under Lomé II, only a small amount was spent before establishment of the IOC, primarily on projects that included countries outside the zone as well (telecommunications, and air security for ECU 4.35 million). Only one project, the National School of Maritime Studies in Madagascar, worth ECU 2.1 million, symbolised the desire for cooperation. Lomé II programming was for ECU 20 million and the IOC’s main activity here was with specialised groups (tourism, trade, craft and fishing) with experts and then ministers, listing projects and assessing them and then putting them forward for Community financing, in line with the demands of the Convention. These projects were:

- new and replaceable energy: ECU 1.7 million
- tuna fishing: ECU 6.4 million
- regional aircraft repair centre: ECU 3.2 million
- training and research: ECU 1 million
- craft, tourist etc. studies: ECU 1.25 million

All these projects were identified and submitted to the EEC Commission, which agreed to finance them within two years. The total financing involved was ECU 13.55 million. This shows both the coordination supplied by the IOC, a job which had clearly become necessary, and the weight of the Community, which provided massive financing for IOC-proposed projects and thus gave practical shape to the cooperation. It is worth noting that the projects financed in this way were mostly fully-fledged projects (88.75%) and only a small percentage (11.25%) were studies.

The IOC and the EEC continued the dialogue under Lomé III. When their national indicative programmes were drawn up, the four ACP countries said they wanted their regional cooperation to expand within the IOC framework. They also said in which fields they wanted to cooperate. These are, perfectly logically, maritime activities (resource management, meteorology and sea rescue) and cooperation between the islands (better movement of individuals, services, goods and culture). Some countries and Madagascar in particular, emphasised the fact that they wanted to go beyond the Indian Ocean framework in certain cases.



Reinforcing inter-island cooperation is one of the aims of the regional cooperation aspects of Lomé III in the Indian Ocean

What was being referred to here was opening up to the countries of Africa on the coast of the Indian Ocean, which is something that is on the drawing board and will be developed once certain national problems have been overcome.

ECU 26 million has been earmarked for Indian Ocean regional cooperation under Lomé III. An agreement along these lines should be signed by the IOC and the Community in the near future.

The special situation of Reunion, which takes part in projects without benefiting from them because it is part of a Member State of the EEC, posed certain problems. The Island, in fact, takes part in projects in which it is involved via either cofinancing or contributing capital or staff or by providing installations. An appropriate formula has to be found for each project.


Internal organisation

The countries of the Indian Ocean pragmatically decided at the start that they themselves would deal with the projects as they arose rather than have a permanent secretariat, an expense which it would have been difficult to meet. With the basic idea that the country which was president and hosted the working meetings should cover the costs of the IOC, the organisation got through the early years without too many problems. However, from the word go, each country appointed a permanent liaison officer to keep in contact on IOC affairs with his colleagues in the other countries. The Commission Delegation on Mauritius has also provided dynamic, effective support for the emergent organisation. But the initial minimal administrative structure can only be a temporary solution.

The future

The ministerial meeting of 7-10 February was the opportunity for the Indian Ocean Commission to look at what it had done since 1982 and think about the future.

Its record can be summed up in two words—existence and activity. The IOC is now a reality. It is now fully operational, with regular meetings of its specialised committees several times



Fishermen of Mauritius... among the poorest of the island's citizens. Too often, the profits of the Indian Ocean go to industrialised fishing nations like Japan and Taiwan and not to members of the IOC

a year and its twice-yearly experts' meeting which prepare for the ministers', held once a year in the capital of the country which ensures the presidency on a 12-monthly basis. Seychelles began, followed by Madagascar, Mauritius and then Comores. France, for Reunion, will be next. It is currently managing a number of practical projects and is getting ready for involvement—ECU 26 million—in other projects under Lomé III.

But the ability to manage a programme of activities backed up by projects depends on the solution used to solve certain problems conditioning its future.

The rotation of the presidency has now been settled. There are of course still some problems of sensitivity to be sorted out between the Governments, but the principle is there.

A more permanent problem is the secretariat. So far, the liaison officers in the various Governments have ensured secretarial continuity. But this is no solution in the medium term. Technical assistance from France will help in the short term and Mauritius has offered to house the Secretariat. With the Commission operating normally, a balance must be struck, so the organisation has a Secretariat that is efficient and operational yet light enough to avoid costly red tape. On this also depends the permanency and

efficiency of the Indian Ocean Commission.

The IOC has made its presence felt in the Indian Ocean and in the outside world too, in the Community in its dialogue on Lomé III regional cooperation and through the financing of projects. It has also taken practical shape in the contact it has as an entity with other international organisations, with UNIDO, the ACCT and the WMO (and in other relations, bilateral ones especially) likely to finance any of its projects.

There are two characteristics here—international recognition and an aptitude for designing and running projects in which expertise is actually called for. The coming years will be decisive.

* * *

The history of regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean through the IOC is now in the process of being written. So, happily, there is no conclusion—other than to hope for fair winds for this five-masted ship. Lomé III, with its special provisions on regional cooperation, means—and this is its originality—that these States can boost their joint development and even make a direct contribution to it via the national indicative programme. ○

B.A.

UDEAC

The economic union that is gaining ground

Regional cooperation is one of the keystones of development in Africa. This conviction was forced upon the African leaders in the early years of independence and it led to the creation of regional and sub-regional groupings in western and central Africa whose main aim was to set up a common economic zone of the new States. These technical organisations sometimes also emerged as a vital complement to the strengthening of the more or less institutionalised political groupings that were speedily set up by the newly independent nations, most of which had no economic, political or human contact with the others.

In 1964, an economic and customs union of four States of French Equatorial Africa (Congo, Gabon, CAR and Chad) plus Cameroon was set up and the new organisation, UDEAC, actually started up in 1966. It held its 22nd Summit last December in Equatorial Guinea. Like other organisations of the same sort, it was soon to have its ups and downs. In 1968, Chad and CAR withdrew, CAR returning shortly after Union, although Chad did not return as a member until 1985.

Equatorial Guinea joined in 1984, bringing the member countries up to six. The arrival of the new member and the return of the two others, even for a short time, shows the great interest the African nations find in any economic grouping.

UDEAC's aim was to promote an economic unit that would seek ways and means of bringing about a gradual reduction in the commercial and industrial barriers in the Union and create a genuinely common economic zone as quickly as possible. For more than 20 years now, and in spite of the difficulties involved in achieving the stated aims, UDEAC has nonetheless made considerable progress.

It began by introducing a single tax on all its products. The rate varies according to the type of product and the

percentage of value added in the Union. A solidarity Fund created and fed by levies on products from third countries is a way of compensating land-locked members for the increasing expense of imports and exports due to transport and port fees. So communications were one of the Union's priorities from the start.

The development of means of communications was also one of the forerunners of the tourist policy which the member countries encouraged.

In addition to the common internal tax, Union customs policy involved bringing in a common external tax and setting up a customs regulation for all the States to apply. One of the most important features of this is the product code, i.e. a UDEAC goods identification system.

A drive was made to harmonise the way both business and individuals were taxed. This was intended to



The headquarters of UDEAC in Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic

speed up economic integration and thus achieve genuine free movement of people and goods within the Union.

But UDEAC has done more than regulate the movements of goods, services and people in the community. It has also created a number of common technical bodies which help get the member countries to work together on sectors and programmes for the future. Schools and institutes of applied technology, statistics, veterinary medicine and so on are on the drawing board or have already been opened in the various member countries. There is also a common financial and monetary policy by which all the countries belong to the same central bank (BCEAC—the Central Bank of Central African States), which is based in Yaoundé, and a joint development bank (BDEAC), based in Brazzaville. These complete the Union's instruments of economic, financial and monetary cooperation.

The head of UDEAC is the Secretary-General, a post currently held by Ambroise Foaem (Cameroon), who is responsible for implementing the policies decided on by the steering Committee, the group of Ministers of Economic Affairs which meets twice a year. An annual conference of ministers has been introduced in the very important field of agriculture. This involves yearly meetings of Agriculture and Economic Affairs Ministers, who draw up action programmes for the Union which are put before the Heads of State who also meet once a year for approval.

The Secretariat-General produces the annual budget, which currently stands at CFAF 2.6 billion. It is spread among the different members on an equality-preserving basis and recovered at various rates reflecting the individual members' ability to reimburse. There are plans for a new fund, essentially to cover studies.

As Ambroise Foaem, the Secretary-General, says (and he is quoted here by Timothée Malendoma, the head of Production and Research), "the Union must be built in such a way as to ensure that the member countries make harmonious economic progress, in particular through the sort of industrialisation that is best adapted to the conditions and assets of each". ◊ L.P.

Two hands to untie a knot

The European Parliament's debate on North-South cooperation

"It takes two hands to untie a knot" an old Touareg saying goes, and it will take two hands, one of the North, one of the South, to untie the knot that is underdevelopment and all it entails. North and South need each other, depend on each other not only for their markets or their raw materials or manufactures, but also to defend the principles of democracy, to avoid the proliferation of refugees and to maintain world peace. This interdependence between the hemispheres was the leitmotiv of the day given over by the European Parliament on February 17 to a wide-ranging debate on North-South cooperation in which no fewer than ten reports were submitted on major issues affecting North and South, including indebtedness, disarmament, coordination of aid, NGOs and the fight against hunger. Fortunately, given the vastness of the subjects to be covered, the debate was mercifully short on rhetoric, concentrating resolutely on practical ways in which North-South relations could be strengthened and enhanced.

As the Commissioner for Development, Lorenzo Natali, himself observed in a keynote speech to the Assembly on the objectives of development, to comment in a short space on reports of such richness and diversity was not an easy task. Many of the reports (e.g. those on debt, trade, disarmament and refugees) highlighted the frequently harmful effect on the South of policies undertaken by the North. The indebtedness which had built up in the South, for example, in Africa and Latin America particularly, was to be attributed in great part to the monetary policies of the North—to high commercial interest rates and to unpredictable exchange rates (especially, of course, of the US dollar). The "lack of adequate control of capital lending" (elsewhere more bluntly described as "the irresponsible attitudes on the part of the banks") had also played a role, as had "the high incidence of protectionism in OECD countries", Willem Vergeer (PPE, The Netherlands) (*), the Rapporteur on indebtedness contended.

This latter was also a theme of the report on the Community's relations with developing countries with regard to trade and raw materials in which the Rapporteur, Robert Cohen (S, The Netherlands) called for improvements for developing countries in the GATT system, including the inclusion of more agricultural products in the GSP and the revision of the rules of origin. Greater differentiation of preferences to allow LLDCs better access to the Community's market was also seen as an important step to be taken. The Multifibre Arrangement, in particular, came under heavy fire, Mr Cohen calling for its abolition by 1990. More important still, though, he believed, was the negative impact of non-tariff barriers on international trade which, in so far as they applied to LLDCs, should, he contended, be dismantled in the forthcoming round of GATT negotiations.

The EEC: a special responsibility to shoulder

The European Community was seen as having a special responsibility to shoulder in North-South trade relations. It had a duty, for example, to ensure that its agricultural policy not only made sense internally, but that it avoided undermining the interests of developing countries—interests which, after all, the Community also strove to serve through its development policy.

Certain other North-South problems under discussion were frequently,


in reality, East-West problems transposed. Such was the case to a large extent with the world refugee problem, where ideological conflicts were often at the source of the misery of the world's estimated 10 million refugees. The responsibilities of East and West were also called to mind in the debate on disarmament which followed the submission of Mr Trivelli's (COM, Italy) report. While indebtedness, Mr Vergeer was convinced, was the principal obstacle to development in the 1980s, and constituted in the eyes of the President-in-Office of the EEC Council, the Belgian Minister Kempinaire, "a threat to the stability of the world system", there was also widespread consensus that militarism acted as powerful brake on economic growth. Putting the issue in perspective with a series of telling statistics, Mrs Schmit (S, Luxembourg) reminded MEPs that every 44th citizen of our planet was a soldier. "If each of the world's leaders... Gorbachev, Reagan, Craxi, Kohl... could be persuaded to write a cheque for the cost of a single modern tank", she calculated, "that cheque would enable 6 000 classrooms to be built, for 180 000 pupils...".

"We are interdependent, also, in our crises..."

But none of the problems, it was acknowledged, would be solved if the political will to tackle them seriously was lacking. What was needed was a more widespread understanding, by government and people alike, that—as the Commissioner responsible for North-South relations, Claude Cheysson, said, "we are interdependent also in our crises". It was not just true that what was bad for the North was bad for the South—the reverse was also true. Mr Vergeer had put forward as a palliative to debtor countries the proposal of a European Trust Fund for Development, to be fed by the purchase of "golden Ecus", but even he admitted that a purely technical approach was inadequate and that a political solution was the only real answer. More than five million jobs in the EEC were directly dependent on ACP/EEC trade, he said, and Europe had nothing to gain by the bankruptcy of its markets and the source of raw materials for its industry.

(*) Political groups in the EP

S = Socialist
 EPP = European People's Party
 ED = European Democratic Group
 COM = Communists
 LDR = Liberal and Democratic Reformist Group
 RDE = Group of the European Renewal and Democratic Alliance
 ARC = Rainbow Group
 DR = European Right
 NI = Non-attached



Development education: a long way to go

This message seemed nevertheless *not* to be getting through to the powers that be, or not with the sense of urgency required. The Community Mr Medeiros Ferreira (RDE, Portugal) said, "had no parallel in the world in its action in development" (and other speakers made flattering comparisons with the poorer records of Japan or the Eastern bloc countries). Nevertheless, it had taken "stubbornness" on the part of the much-praised Katharina Focke (S, FRG), the outgoing Chairman of the EP's Committee on Development and Cooperation, to galvanise her own assembly into action (and, even then, the Strasbourg hemicycle was less than half full...) "Will you give over the next European Council to a debate on North-South cooperation?" she challenged Minister Kempinaire. "And you, Mr Cheysson, will the Commission spend a full session debating it?" Mr Cheysson had no opportunity to pick up the gauntlet thrown before him: Mr Kempinaire was happy to confirm that the issue would be item number one on the Council's agenda—a reply that left Mrs Focke clearly less than fully satisfied, however.

And even within the hemicycle itself were heard a few of the kinds of comments that surely faithfully reflect a section of the public opinion of the North as a whole. Did the interdependence between North and South stretch to that in diseases, too, wondered Mr Beyer de Ryke (Lib, Belgium). And how, he wanted to know, (addressing Bishop Kamphaus, invited to take part in a packed round table

debate, following the thinly-attended Parliament debate) did the Catholic church reconcile its preaching on birth control with the population explosion in the South? Certainly, Mr d'Ormeson (DR, F) conceded, people in the South were suffering, but mostly from corruption, war and violence... Others, in less strident tones, admitted the difficulties experienced by Northern leaders in persuading their own populations to cooperate in the South's development. Half of the "men in the street", Mrs Daly (ED, UK) thought, would want aid levels reduced rather than increased. Those people had, she said, to be persuaded to *want* to do more.

There were, however, hopeful aspects. Youth and the media were "on our side" affirmed Bishop Kamphaus, and Jef Ulburghs (NI, Belgium) in his report on NGOs confirmed that this was, indeed, the case for the former. Consciousness among youth of the sufferings of those in the Third World was high, and thousands of young people were willing to leave to work in the developing countries of the world on a voluntary basis. Some 10 000 volunteers were at present doing just that. The media, too, had been sympathetic and had played a crucial part firstly in informing the North of the famine in Africa, in Ethiopia particularly, and secondly in stirring its populations into action.

For other issues—such as desertification or longer-term measures against hunger—it was less easy, through the media or otherwise, to persuade the peoples of the hemispheres of the need for urgent action. Governments were certainly at fault, Roger Chinaud (LDR, France), the Rapporteur on de-

sertification believed, in not having the "guts" to tell their peoples what the cost of anti-desertification campaigns would be. Yet the area involved was, after all, enormous, the Sahara representing an area over three times as large as that of the whole of the Community, with an amount of land representing twice the size of Belgium lost each year to the desert.

Coordination: little cost, great savings

Here, as elsewhere, the money available, both from the North the South and from the countries affected was felt to be wholly inadequate. Quality, many speakers believed, was as important an aspect of development aid as quantity, however, and Christopher Jackson (ED, UK) in his report on the coordination of development aid suggested that the usefulness of such resources that were available could be greatly increased if there was greater cohesion between donors. A plethora of agencies and systems operating on the same territory was certainly not in the interests of the beneficiary government. Even Europe, the Rapporteur believed, with 13 different government agencies at work—the 12 of the Member States and that of the Community itself—was probably wasting something like one million dollars a day of its aid through its duplication of work and multiplicity of systems. Emergency aid operations, at least, should be shared, so that, for example, only one kind of truck would be used to ferry supplies, requiring only one make of spare parts, instead of many... Not that Mr Jackson did not have praise for what the Commission and the Council had already achieved

on measures for coordinating disaster relief—he did. But even greater coordination, he stressed, would cost little and had the power of making great savings.

Coordination in other fields (such as the fight against desertification) was touched upon in Mr Natali's address to the Assembly, as were the Commission's positions on the reports on refugees and on fishing agreements with developing countries. The latter, drawn up by Guy Guermuer (RDE, France), who as an MEP based in Finistère represents important fishing interests, reviewed the eight fishing agreements signed by the Community since 1976 with ACP coastal states, agreements that are both commercial and developmental in scope. While warning against the dangers of over-exploitation of fishery resources, Mr Guermuer called on European boat-owners to "face up to the new situation facing them" (restrictions in Community waters and loss of traditional northern fishing grounds) and to accept the challenge to fish in new waters. "Only then", he said in his report, "can the fishing agreements with Third World regions or states become real development instruments, contributing to those countries' nutritional, economic, technological and social development".

The final report, and one of the most depressing, was that drafted by Herman Verbeek (ARC, The Netherlands) on refugees and displaced persons in developing countries. The picture painted was grim indeed, with an estimated 10 million refugees and 5 million displaced persons in the world today, and the numbers increasing steadily. Parts of Africa were among the areas worst affected. Sudan and Somalia—among the poorest countries of the continent—were each believed to have some 700 000 refugees within their boundaries, and famine, together with war and civil unrest had led to a doubling of the number of refugees in the Sahel as a whole over the past two years. The solution proposed? Nothing, of course, that the European Community could single-handedly achieve, the Rapporteur considering that only "a fair international economic order, peace and stability" could prevent the occurrence of new population displacements. What the Community could

Extracts from reports considered by the European Parliament in its debate on North-South Cooperation

1) *"Indebtedness has become the principal obstacle to development in the nineteen eighties..."* (Mr Vergeer's report)

2) *"Globally, there is mutual interest in trade between the industrialised world and the developing countries..."* (Mr Cohen's report)

3) *"The arms race accentuates the vulnerability of Third World countries who are victims of economic insecurity, and often resort to military growth as a cure for their ills..."* (Mr Trivelli's report)

4) *"Priority in development cooperation to-day more than in the past must be the fight against hunger and to satisfy the basic nutritional needs of the world's population..."* (Mr Medeiros Ferreira's report)

5) *"Fisheries agreements between the Community and the developing countries, although essentially commercial in nature, play an important role in development..."* (Mr Guermuer's report)

6) *"The scale of the desertification problem can be seen in the statistics. 7.5 m sq km of land in Africa alone are under threat..."* (Mr Chinaud's report)

7) *"Joint financing of programmes with non-governmental agencies such as the International Red Cross is an effective way of managing development aid, especially where small projects are concerned. The NGOs play an important role in the distribution of food aid and emergency aid..."* (Mr Ulburghs' report)

8) *"There exist at the present time more than 10 million refugees throughout the world..."* (Mr Verbeek's report)

9) *"Better coordination—often impeded by the business and political interests of the donor countries—would substantially improve the value of development aid..."* (Mr Jackson's report)

10) *"As the Community was established to make a positive contribution to world peace and that as a regional Community it is particularly well qualified to strengthen inter-regional cooperation, and thus reduce tension, it is in the interests of both the Community and the developing countries to improve North-South cooperation..."* (Mrs Focke's report)

Copies of these reports may be obtained from the secretariat of the European Parliament, 97-113 rue Belliard, 1040 Brussels, Belgium.

do, though, in addition to exerting political pressure, was to increase its expenditure on—and staff dealing with—refugee problems and to seek through development actions to eliminate their causes.

If the Parliament's debate was worthy (and the term is in no sense used pejoratively) it was up to the Round Table discussion that followed it to be impassioned. Here, for the first time in the day, were heard the voices of the representatives of the South itself—Olusegun Obasanjo, a former Nigerian Head of State, Ambassador Araneo, Uruguay's representative to the United Nations, and Mr Bandrinath, India's Minister Plenipotentiary, as well as others on the floor of a hall filled to capacity. And voices of desperation they were, too, with General Obasanjo calling for a halt to the protectionism in trade between industrialised countries that had conspired to make Africa's export performance "poor" in 1985 and "woeful" in 1986. Desperation, too, on the part of the South with the industrialised world's inability—or unwillingness—to "induce a just settlement" in South Africa. For Ambassador Araneo the debt issue, seriously affecting the economies of much of the South American continent, was the root cause of the suffering of many of his countrymen, denied the road to higher living standards by the burden of massive interest repayments.

It was Bishop Kamphaus, however, who earned the loudest applause of the day in evoking the parable of the good Samaritan. The North, he claimed, not only had a duty to "bind the wounds" of the ailing South, it also had an obligation to make known the perpetrators of the robbery—"structural robbery" as he put it—and to put an end to their evil. At the same time, he said, the South must not be demeaned by being seen as an object of aid, but as a partner in joint development. And it was the spirit of partnership rather than recrimination that carried the day in Strasbourg—a recognition, albeit on a totally inadequate scale as yet, that the futures of the two hemispheres, North and South, are as one... and that if they fail to have one future they will have no future at all. ○

Myfanwy VAN DE VELDE

A simple cost-of-living survey in Niamey

by Badjo Ali GAMATIE and Daniel BYK (*)


Niger's Ministry of Planning (National Directorate for Statistics and Informatics (DNSI), with financial support from Luxembourg and technical support from Eurostat, has conducted a survey on the consumption of essential goods in the city of Niamey. The objective of the survey was to provide Niger with rapidly available results which would be useful in determining its food policies. The survey comprised two phases, yielding provisional results available ten days after the fieldwork finished.

end of the first phase became the frame of reference for the improved household survey conducted by the Association of Niger Women and for a survey carried out by the Family Health Centre.


The results of the second phase will help towards a better understanding of the nature of the food shortage by showing the relevant pattern of consumption. They will also be used to update the consumer price index base for the city of Niamey, which dates back to 1963.

The results presented here in sum-

Households according to socio-professional category



Households according to type of householder



The first phase was to draw up the sampling base needed for the rest of the operation. Population figures and socio-economic characteristics were gathered from a 10% sample. This phase produced structural data (sex, age, etc.) on the population of Niamey, and some analyses were possible. For example, it emerged that civil servant heads of households comprised only 17% of the population whereas private sector employees accounted for 28.7%. Thirty per cent of households owned their own homes, 5.3% were tenants and 17% had free housing. Thirty-two per cent of heads of households proved to be literate. Oth-

(*) Mr Gamatie is Head of the National Directorate for Statistics and Informatics in Niger; Mr Byk is Principal Administrator at Eurostat ("Analysis and Development" Division).

er data on socio-professional category, type of building materials used, type of household, water and electricity supplies etc. are also available.

The second phase was to collect data on actual household consumption on the basis of a sample of 576 households. Provisional results show that 45% of households have a monthly budget of between 40 000 and 100 000 CFA Francs. Thirty-seven per cent of households spend between 10 000 and 45 000 CFA Francs a month on food. In 57% of households between 5 000 and 30 000 CFA Francs per month were spent on housing.

The provisional results of the two phases are being used for decision-making as well as for other operations. The sampling base drawn up at the


many form are particularly interesting in both form and content.

To begin with the form. This survey was carried out with a budget of some ECU 30 000, within very tight deadlines (the decision to launch the survey was taken in September 1986 and the detailed results are now available, i.e. in March 1987).


The methods used are entirely in line with the rules and principles of sample surveys. Savings in time and costs—a relatively small sample and short survey period—were possible because the objectives were precisely defined and the structure of the survey precisely targeted. That is the principle of a "simple survey".

In content, this operation presented

Households according to type of building material used for dwelling




Households with water and electricity supplies




A → no water or electricity C → electricity only
 B → water only D → water and electricity

Households according to expenditure on food



A → less than 1 000 CFA francs
 B → between 1 000 and 5 000 CFA francs
 C → between 5 000 and 10 000 CFA francs
 D → between 10 000 and 15 000 CFA francs
 E → between 15 000 and 30 000 CFA francs
 F → between 30 000 and 45 000 CFA francs
 G → more than 45 000 CFA francs

Households according to monthly expenditure on accommodation



A → less than 1 000 CFA francs C → between 5 000 and 30 000 CFA francs
 B → between 1 000 and 5 000 CFA francs D → more than 30 000 CFA francs

a very simple challenge: the data—a more accurate assessment of the food shortage and more precise knowledge of the characteristics of the population of Niamey—were needed extremely urgently (with a sample that remained very structured and a short observation period). The challenge was successfully met: this survey's results—all of them—are being used, including at government level.


The lesson of this experience is a simple one: prompt action is possible if objectives are very precisely defined. But care is needed. Such an operation cannot take the place of a household budget survey. In Niger, it is the forerunner of such a survey, fulfilling the most urgent requirements and preparing the DNSI for the complex exercise. In other cases, a similar data collection could be used to update data re-

sulting from a complex survey which "ages" rapidly.

Finally, this simple survey is a good example of EEC-ACP cooperation. It was carried out by the Niger DNSI with finance from the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and technical support from the Commission, more precisely from Eurostat and the INSEE (France). ○

B.A.G. and D.B.

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT



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Demography in Africa and the world

We have all seen or heard apocalyptic statements of the "X number of people are born every second" kind, without being able to check on the figures. For, if there is one field where exact data are almost out of the question, it is demography, as many countries have no recent or reliable statistics of any kind. The UN has of course tried to do something about it by financing population censuses where none were available, but some of the figures obtained have to be taken with a pinch of salt or are now out of date. This is why world population figures are always different, particularly since some organisations like the World Bank and Worldwatch have their own projections. And many demographers use figures from the UN Population Division—which however does point out that they are only estimates involving considerable margin for error.

Nonetheless, in 1985, there were an estimated 4.8 billion people on the planet. And the world population went up by something like 80 million in that year alone. The list of the 10 most populous countries in the world contains one African ACP—Nigeria, with 95 million people. The other nine on the list are China (1063 million), India (750 million), the USSR (278 million), the USA (239 million), Indonesia (163 million), Brazil (135 million), Japan 120 million), Bangladesh (98 million) and Pakistan (96 million).

The demographers think that it took millions of years for the world to notch up its first billion inhabitants, in about 1800. But then things speeded up. It took only 130 years to reach 2 billion (in 1930), 30 more to reach 3 billion (1960) and another 25 to reach 4 billion. It is generally thought that the 6 billion level will be reached before the year 2000.

However, in the early '70s, the demographic growth rate slowed down noticeably and in most industrialised countries it went on dropping after the baby boom that followed World War II.

In Latin America, it went up to 2.9% p.a. in the early '60s, but it is only 2.4% now and the same has hap-

pened in Asia, where it has gone from 2.5% at the end of the '60s to 2.1% today. Africa is the only continent that has not followed suit.

Over the past decade, the rate of increase of the sub-Saharan African population has gone up from 2.8% to 3% p.a., with peaks of as much as 4% in Kenya, which holds the world demographic growth record. It is not the overall figure for the African population that is the problem today—nowhere in Africa other than Rwanda and Burundi are there Asian-type densities—but rather the rate at which it is increasing. In the long run, it puts very heavy constraints on the standard of living, the health and the education of the Africans. The World Bank thinks, in fact, that the sub-Saharan African population, which was 460 million in 1985, could soar to beyond 730 million by the year 2000 and be 950 million by 2010. These are average projections of course (and LTPA,

the Community-financed prospective study, gives others in this dossier), based on a considerable reduction in both fertility and mortality in Africa and on a modest amount of economic and social progress. But other scenarios with even more apocalyptic figures are perfectly possible.

An FAO study suggests that Africa could theoretically feed a population several times larger than it has at present. But this would not only mean people from the highly populated countries moving into the less populated ones, but investments being made in irrigation, new technology introduced and large-scale assistance given to smallholders—none of which is imminent.

So what is behind this population explosion? A recent survey of fertility in 10 countries of Africa (Benin, Cameroon, Côte-d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan) gives us some interesting information here. Some of the facts have been known for some time—children, for example, are often looked upon both as useful labour in the fields and social assistance in old age,



The average African family: father, mother and seven children

while high death rates encourage large families as being the only way of ensuring survivors. But an analysis of relations in traditional African society suggests strong reproductive tendencies. Women marry young, first of all, and their status depends on their fertility. The study also shows that children cost the mother more than the father and it concludes that, as long as men maintain their position of dominance in society, reproductive rates are highly likely to stay up. Other factors also help push up the birth rate.

One of these is polygamy, a practice whereby each wife is primarily responsible for her children, and another is the system of large families, in which the cost of children can be shared. And then, as in many other places in the world, there is religious influence and the attendant rejection of any kind of contraception that is against the will of God. All this combines to ensure that, in most African countries, couples want and indeed have large families. Women have an average of more than six children in almost all

the countries of sub-Saharan Africa today and in many places more than seven.

But things change rapidly, particularly under the influence of women's education. The study of fertility shows that, in the 10 target countries of Africa, women who have spent at least seven years at school want an average of five children, as compared to eight in the group of those with no education. This is an encouraging trend, for it has been proved that the risk of sickness and death in African mothers

Population, rate of increase, birth and death rates, surface area and density for the world, macro-regions and regions: selected years (*)

Unless otherwise specified all figures are estimates of the order of magnitude and are subject to a substantial margin of error; all data except for surface area are therefore set in italics

Macro-regions and regions	Estimated mid-year population (millions)								Annual rate of population increase (%)	Birth rate (‰)	Death rate (‰)	Surface area (km ²) (000's)	Density (1)
	1950	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1983	1984	1980-85	1980-85	1980-85	1984	1984
World total	2 504	3 014	3 324	3 683	4 076	4 453	4 685	4 763	1.7	27	11	135 837	35
Africa	222	278	314	357	410	476	521	537	3.0	46	17	30 330	18
Western Africa	64	81	92	106	123	144	158	163	3.1	49	19	6 142	27
Eastern Africa	60	76	87	101	117	137	150	155	3.2	49	17	6 349	24
Northern Africa	52	65	73	83	94	108	118	121	2.9	42	13	8 525	14
Central Africa	29	35	38	42	48	55	59	61	2.7	45	18	6 613	9
Southern Africa	17	21	23	26	29	33	35	36	2.5	40	14	2 701	13
America (2)	331	415	463	510	560	614	647	658	1.7	25	9	42 082	16
Northern America (2)	166	199	214	227	239	252	259	261	0.9	16	9	21 515	12
Latin America	165	217	249	284	322	362	388	397	2.3	32	8	20 566	19
South America	111	147	168	191	214	240	257	263	2.2	31	9	17 832	15
Central America	37	50	58	68	80	92	100	103	2.7	35	7	2 496	41
Caribbean	17	20	23	25	28	30	31	31	1.5	27	8	238	130
Asia (3, 4)	1 366	1 666	1 853	2 095	2 357	2 591	2 731	2 777	1.7	27	10	27 576	101
East Asia (3)	671	801	873	984	1 102	1 183	1 225	1 239	1.1	18	7	11 756	105
China	554	667	729	829	933	1 003	1 040	1 052	1.2	19	7	9 597	110
Japan	84	94	99	104	112	117	119	119	0.6	12	7	372	320
Other East Asia	33	40	46	51	57	63	66	67	1.8	24	7	1 786	38
South Asia (4)	695	864	980	1 111	1 255	1 408	1 506	1 539	2.2	35	13	15 820	97
Southern Asia	472	584	662	750	846	949	1 014	1 036	2.2	36	14	6 785	153
South Eastern Asia	181	225	254	288	324	362	385	393	2.1	32	11	4 493	87
Western Asia	42	56	64	74	85	98	107	110	2.9	38	10	4 542	24
Europe (3, 4)	392	425	445	459	474	484	489	490	0.3	14	11	4 937	99
Western Europe	122	135	143	148	152	154	154	154	0.1	12	11	995	155
Southern Europe	109	118	123	128	134	139	141	142	0.6	15	10	1 315	108
Eastern Europe	89	97	100	103	106	110	112	112	0.6	16	11	990	113
Northern Europe	72	76	79	80	82	82	82	82	0.1	13	12	1 636	50
Oceania (2)	12.6	15.8	17.5	19.3	21.2	23.0	24.1	24.5	1.5	21	8	8 510	3
Australia and New Zealand	10.1	12.7	14.0	15.4	16.7	17.9	18.6	18.8	1.2	16	8	7 956	2
Other Oceania	2.5	3.1	3.5	3.9	4.5	5.1	5.5	5.7	2.5	38	11	554	10
USSR	180	214	231	242	253	265	273	276	1.0	19	9	22 402	12

(*) Source: United Nations.

(1) Population per square kilometre of surface area. Figures are merely the quotients of population divided by surface area and are not to be considered as either reflecting density in the urban sense or as indicating the supporting power of a territory's land and resources.

(2) Hawaii, a state of the United States of America, is included in Northern America rather than Oceania.

(3) Excluding the USSR, shown separately.

(4) The European portion of Turkey is included with South Asia rather than Europe.

Estimates of population and its percentage distribution, by age, sex and sex ratio for all ages for the world, macro-regions and regions: 1985

All figures are estimates of the order of magnitude and are subject to a substantial margin of error; all data are therefore set in italics.

Macro-regions and regions	Population (in millions)												Per cent												Sex ratio (Males per 100 females of all ages)
	Both sexes				Male				Female				Both sexes				Male				Female				
	All ages	-15	15-64	65 plus	All ages	-15	15-64	65 plus	All ages	-15	15-64	65 plus	All ages	-15	15-64	65 plus	All ages	-15	15-64	65 plus	All ages	-15	15-64	65 plus	
World total	<i>4 842</i>	<i>1 632</i>	<i>2 933</i>	<i>277</i>	<i>2 432</i>	<i>832</i>	<i>1 481</i>	<i>118</i>	<i>2 410</i>	<i>800</i>	<i>1 452</i>	<i>159</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>101</i>
Africa	<i>553</i>	<i>251</i>	<i>285</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>275</i>	<i>126</i>	<i>141</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>279</i>	<i>125</i>	<i>144</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>52</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>46</i>	<i>51</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>52</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>99</i>
Western Africa	<i>168</i>	<i>79</i>	<i>85</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>83</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>85</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>46</i>	<i>51</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>98</i>
Eastern Africa	<i>161</i>	<i>76</i>	<i>80</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>79</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>81</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>98</i>
Northern Africa	<i>125</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>62</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>44</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>102</i>
Central Africa	<i>63</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>44</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>52</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>97</i>
Southern Africa	<i>37</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>98</i>
America (1)	<i>670</i>	<i>212</i>	<i>410</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>332</i>	<i>108</i>	<i>204</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>338</i>	<i>105</i>	<i>206</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>98</i>
Northern America (1)	<i>263</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>176</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>129</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>87</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>135</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>89</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>68</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>66</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>95</i>
Latin America	<i>406</i>	<i>154</i>	<i>233</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>203</i>	<i>78</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>203</i>	<i>76</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>57</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>100</i>
South America	<i>269</i>	<i>99</i>	<i>158</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>135</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>79</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>135</i>	<i>49</i>	<i>79</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>59</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>59</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>100</i>
Central America	<i>206</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>57</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>101</i>
Caribbean	<i>32</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>100</i>
Asia (2, 3)	<i>2 824</i>	<i>989</i>	<i>1 711</i>	<i>124</i>	<i>1 441</i>	<i>507</i>	<i>876</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>1 383</i>	<i>483</i>	<i>835</i>	<i>66</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>104</i>
East Asia (2)	<i>1 252</i>	<i>374</i>	<i>808</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>636</i>	<i>190</i>	<i>414</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>616</i>	<i>184</i>	<i>393</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>65</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>103</i>
China	<i>1 063</i>	<i>326</i>	<i>682</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>542</i>	<i>166</i>	<i>351</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>521</i>	<i>160</i>	<i>330</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>65</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>104</i>
Japan	<i>120</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>82</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>59</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>69</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>69</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>68</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>97</i>
Other East Asia	<i>69</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>44</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>101</i>
South Asia (3)	<i>1 572</i>	<i>615</i>	<i>903</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>805</i>	<i>316</i>	<i>462</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>767</i>	<i>299</i>	<i>441</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>57</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>57</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>105</i>
Southern Asia	<i>1 058</i>	<i>414</i>	<i>608</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>547</i>	<i>214</i>	<i>314</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>511</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>294</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>57</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>107</i>
South Eastern Asia	<i>401</i>	<i>155</i>	<i>232</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>200</i>	<i>78</i>	<i>115</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>201</i>	<i>76</i>	<i>117</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>99</i>
Western Asia	<i>113</i>	<i>46</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>56</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>106</i>
Europe (2, 3)	<i>492</i>	<i>103</i>	<i>328</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>240</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>164</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>252</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>164</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>68</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>65</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>96</i>
Western Europe	<i>154</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>106</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>75</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>79</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>69</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>71</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>95</i>
Southern Europe	<i>143</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>94</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>73</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>66</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>65</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>96</i>
Eastern Europe	<i>113</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>74</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>66</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>65</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>95</i>
Northern Europe	<i>82</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>66</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>96</i>
Oceania (1)	<i>24.8</i>	<i>7.1</i>	<i>15.7</i>	<i>2.0</i>	<i>12.5</i>	<i>3.6</i>	<i>8.0</i>	<i>0.9</i>	<i>12.3</i>	<i>3.4</i>	<i>7.7</i>	<i>1.1</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>102</i>
Australia and New Zealand	<i>19.0</i>	<i>4.6</i>	<i>12.5</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>9.5</i>	<i>2.4</i>	<i>6.4</i>	<i>0.8</i>	<i>9.5</i>	<i>2.3</i>	<i>6.2</i>	<i>1.0</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>66</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>65</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>100</i>
Other Oceania	<i>5.8</i>	<i>2.5</i>	<i>3.2</i>	<i>0.2</i>	<i>3.0</i>	<i>1.2</i>	<i>1.6</i>	<i>0.1</i>	<i>2.8</i>	<i>1.1</i>	<i>1.5</i>	<i>0.1</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>107</i>
USSR	<i>278</i>	<i>69</i>	<i>184</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>131</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>89</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>147</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>95</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>66</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>64</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>90</i>

- (1) Hawaii, a state of the United States of America, is included in Northern America rather than Oceania.
 (2) Excluding the USSR, shown separately.
 (3) The European portion of Turkey is included with South Asia rather than Europe.

during pregnancy and parturition are very high after the fifth child. The figures are cause for concern. The Danfa (Ghana) rural health project has shown that 400 mothers died for every 100 000 births. In Swaziland, the number of deaths is slightly smaller (370), while it tends to be around 200-600 elsewhere in Africa. Compare this with the 190 deaths recorded in Egypt (per 100 000 births), 80 in Sri Lanka and less than 10 in Sweden. So one of the main commitments the African Governments have made in the Kili-manjaro Population Action Programme is to boost national programmes aimed at cutting the present sickness and death rates among children, young people and mothers and in particular mothers and children in rural areas.

The adoption of this plan (January 1984) was the official start of the continent's drive to tackle its population problems. In this document, the countries noted, with great anxiety, the rapid population growth over the past few years, the pressure and constraints it put upon the African Governments' development drive and the meagre resources at their disposal.

There is no doubt that people are increasingly aware of the need for family planning policies. Already some countries, such as Zimbabwe, have achieved a spectacular increase in the use of contraceptives over the past five years. Today more than 25% of married women of child-bearing age use some modern form of contraception, as against 10% only five years ago. This is a relatively isolated case as far as Africa is concerned. Nonetheless, in the towns especially, there is a potential demand for contraception—as the very common practice of illegal abortion would seem to suggest.

So there is room for progress, but it will take considerable infrastructure and means for family planning to be available to all African women. Here again we come up against the basic problem of development. Some people have no hesitation in saying that development will mean the demographic growth rate will decline of its own accord. This is what happened in the industrialised countries. The problem is that, with rates of increase like this, any development seems out of the question. ○

A.T.

Population – Estimates of mid-year population (millions)

Country or area	1970	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Angola (*)	5.59	7.00	7.25	7.49	7.72	7.94	8.14	8.34	8.54	8.75
Antigua and Barbuda	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	(*)0.08
Bahamas	0.17	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.23
Barbados	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Belize	0.12	(*)0.14	(*)0.14	(*)0.14	(*)0.15	(*)0.15	(*)0.15	0.16	(*)0.16	0.17
Benin	2.72	3.29	3.38	(2)3.34	3.42	3.62	3.72	3.83	3.93	
Botswana	0.58	0.74	0.76	0.79	0.82	(2)0.94	0.98	1.01	1.05	1.08
Burkina Faso	5.38	5.84	5.94	6.04	6.15	6.20	6.31	6.41	6.53	6.64
Burundi	3.54	3.90	3.98	4.02	4.12	4.22	4.31	4.42	4.54	4.72
Cameroon	(*)6.75	7.91	(*)8.18	(*)8.40	8.50	8.72	8.94	9.16	9.54	10.11
Cape Verde (*)	0.27	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.33
Central African Rep.	1.82	2.17	2.22	2.28	2.31	(*)2.35	(*)2.41	(*)2.46	(*)2.52	2.61
Chad	3.64	4.21	4.31	(*)4.38	(*)4.48	(*)4.58	(*)4.68	(*)4.79	(*)4.90	(*)5.02
Comoros	(*)0.27	(*)0.35	(*)0.36	(*)0.37	(*)0.38	(*)0.39	(*)0.41	0.42	(*)0.43	(*)0.44
Congo	(*)1.20	1.44	(*)1.45	(*)1.49	(*)1.53	(*)1.57	(*)1.61	(*)1.65	(*)1.70	(*)1.74
Côte-d'Ivoire	(*)5.55	(*)7.30	7.61	7.92	(*)8.17	(*)8.48	(*)8.80	9.30	(*)9.46	(*)9.81
Djibouti	(*)0.16	(*)0.25	(*)0.27	(*)0.29	(*)0.31	(*)0.32	(2)0.37	0.38	0.41	0.43
Dominica	(*)0.07	0.08	0.08	(*)0.07	(*)0.07	(*)0.07	(*)0.07	(*)0.08	(*)0.08	(*)0.08
Equatorial Guinea (*)	0.29	0.33	0.34	0.35	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.38	0.38	0.39
Ethiopia	(*)30.62	(*)35.92	(*)36.76	(*)37.63	(*)38.52	(*)39.44	(*)40.40	(*)41.39	(*)42.44	43.35
Fiji	0.52	0.60	0.61	0.62	0.63	0.65	0.66	0.68	0.69	0.70
Gabon (*)	0.95	1.00	1.02	1.04	1.06	1.08	1.10	1.11	1.13	1.15
Gambia	0.46	0.55	0.57	0.58	0.60	0.62	0.64	(2)0.62	(*)0.63	(*)0.64
Ghana	(*)8.61	(2)10.45	(*)10.81	(*)11.18	11.54	(*)11.94	12.24	12.70	(*)13.15	(*)13.59
Grenada	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10	(*)0.11	(*)0.11	(*)0.11	(*)0.11	(*)0.11	(*)0.11
Guinea (*)	4.39	5.06	5.17	5.29	5.41	5.53	5.66	6.79	5.93	6.07
Guinea-Bissau (*)	0.53	0.70	0.74	0.78	0.81	0.83	0.85	0.86	0.88	0.89
Guyana	0.71	0.81	0.82	(*)0.85	(*)0.87	(*)0.88	(*)0.90	(*)0.92	(*)0.94	(2)0.79
Jamaica	1.87	2.10	2.09	2.11	2.13	2.16	2.20	(*)2.27	(*)2.30	(*)2.34
Kenya	11.25	14.35	14.88	15.33	16.67	17.34	18.04	18.77	19.54	20.33
Kiribati	(*)0.05	(*)0.06	(*)0.06	(*)0.06	(*)0.06	(*)0.06	(*)0.06	(*)0.06	0.06	(*)0.06
Lesotho	(*)1.06	(*)1.24	(*)1.28	(*)1.31	1.34	(*)1.37	(*)1.41	(*)1.44	1.47	1.53
Liberia	1.32	1.67	1.72	1.78	1.85	1.91	1.98	2.04	2.11	2.19
Madagascar	(*)6.72	(*)8.02	(*)8.24	(*)8.47	(*)8.70	8.96	(*)9.20	9.40	(*)9.73	9.98
Malawi	4.61	5.54	5.68	5.86	6.05	6.23	6.41	6.62	6.84	7.06
Mali	(*)5.69	6.51	6.70	6.90	7.10	7.29	7.51	7.74	7.97	8.21
Mauritania (*)	7.25	1.50	1.54	1.59	1.63	1.68	1.73	1.78	1.83	1.89
Mauritius (3)	0.81	0.88	0.90	0.91	0.93	0.94	0.95	0.96	0.98	0.99
Mozambique (*)	8.14	10.66	11.17	11.16	12.12	12.54	12.91	13.26	13.60	13.96
Niger	4.02	4.86	4.99	(*)5.17	(*)5.31	(*)5.46	(*)5.61	(*)5.77	(*)5.94	(*)6.11
Nigeria (*)	57.22	72.58	75.18	77.84	80.56	83.31	86.13	89.02	92.04	95.20
Papua New Guinea	2.42	2.81	2.87	2.93	3.00	3.01	3.09	3.19	(*)3.43	(2)3.33
Rwanda	3.69	4.36	4.80	4.98	5.16	5.35	5.55	5.76	(*)5.87	(*)6.07
St.-Christopher-Nevis	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	(*)0.05	(*)0.05	(*)0.05
Saint Lucia	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	(*)0.13
St. Vincent-Grenadines	0.09	(*)0.10	(*)0.10	(*)0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	(*)0.10
Sao Tome and Principe	0.07	(*)0.08	(*)0.08	(*)0.08	(*)0.09	(*)0.09	(*)0.09	(*)0.09	(*)0.09	0.11
Senegal	4.39	5.25	5.40	5.55	5.70	5.87	(*)5.99	6.32	6.40	(*)6.44
Seychelles	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07
Sierra Leone (*)	2.84	3.14	3.19	3.24	3.30	3.35	3.41	3.47	3.54	3.60
Solomon Islands	0.16	0.21	0.21	(*)0.22	(*)0.23	(*)0.23	(*)0.24	(*)0.25	(*)0.26	(*)0.27
Somalia	2.79	(*)3.56	(*)3.72	(*)3.87	(*)4.02	(*)4.16	(*)4.29	(*)4.42	(*)4.54	(*)4.65
Sudan	(*)13.86	16.95	(*)17.61	(*)18.14	(*)18.68	(*)19.24	(*)19.80	(*)20.36	(*)20.95	(*)21.55
Suriname	0.37	0.36	0.37	0.36	0.35	0.36	(*)0.37	(*)0.37	(*)0.37	
Swaziland	0.42	0.50	0.51	0.53	0.55	0.57	0.59	0.61	0.63	0.65
Tanzania	(2)16.92	17.44	17.98	18.58	19.17	19.78	20.41	21.06	21.73	
Togo	1.96	2.35	2.41	2.47	(*)2.55	(*)2.63	2.75	(*)2.79	(*)2.87	(*)2.96
Tonga	0.09	0.09	0.09	(*)0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10
Trinidad and Tobago	0.96	1.04	1.05	1.06	1.08	1.13	1.13	1.15	(*)1.17	(*)1.18
Uganda	9.81	12.25	12.78	13.22	(2)13.11	(*)13.54	(*)14.00	(*)14.47	(*)14.96	(*)15.48
Vanuatu	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.13	(*)0.14
Western Samoa	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16	(*)0.16	(*)0.16	0.16	(*)0.16
Zaire	21.64	24.02	24.78	25.56	26.38	(2)26.61	(*)27.40	28.16	29.67	30.36
Zambia	4.25	5.30	5.47	5.65	5.83	(*)5.83	(*)6.03	6.24	(*)6.45	(*)6.67
Zimbabwe	5.31	6.52	6.72	6.89	7.10	7.36	7.48	7.74	7.98	8.38

General note

Figures shown in italics indicate estimates of questionable reliability. Estimates marked by (*) have been computed by the Population Division of the United Nations and are used whenever possible to fill gaps caused by the absence of an official estimate.

(1) Prior to 1979, excluding nomads.

(2) Marked break in series.

(3) Excluding Rodrigues and other small islands.

Demography and development

by André VANHAEVERBEKE (*)

Demographic growth in the developing countries today is an extraordinary phenomenon. It took thousands of years for the world population to reach the two billion of 1900, but only one more century for it to reach six! If our birth control policies work, there will be 10 billion people on earth by the year 2050, settling, according to the World Bank, at 11 billion in 2150. Most of them (9-10 billion) will be living in the Third World.

This is not in itself a disaster, as, if the world's agricultural resources were used properly in the existing technical framework (i.e. without dreaming of outlandish technology), we could easily feed 10 billion people. The problem—or the challenge—arises more from the suddenness of the population explosion preventing countries which are underdeveloped, under-equipped and short on know-how from adapting in the time available. Hence the risk of widespread unemployment, famine and desertification. Hence, too, overpopulation in relation to resources, something that is defined in terms of the quality of the natural conditions (which are poorer in the Sahel than on well-watered volcanic ground) and in the light of the countries' ability to change their production systems through technical progress, agricultural intensification, industrialisation and so on.

Average population density figures are often misleading, as they fail to reflect the quality of natural resources. The best-known example of this is Egypt, which has an average density of 44 inhabitants to the km², rising to over 1 000 if the denominator is related to exploitable resources. With roughly similar agricultural techniques for example, the Sahel zones can feed 20 people per km², whereas the figure in Rwanda and Burundi can be 200.

Origin, extent and trends in the population explosion

Origin

Medical progress in the developing countries has brought down the aver-

age death rates substantially and rapidly, particularly in Asia and Latin America, where there is no longer much disparity with the rich countries, and in Africa as well.

Table 1
Death rates (‰)

	1950	1980
North Africa	24	13
Black Africa	29	18
Latin America	17	11
South East Asia	27	11
Industrialised countries	11	9

This rapid change was not accompanied by a parallel trend in the birth rate. There are a number of reasons for this and they have to do with persistent socio-economic behaviour—early marriage for women, a child-producing outlook and economic factors, too (low productivity in agriculture,

for example, which has always put emphasis on manual labour).


The maintenance of a very high birth rate is thus the result of behaviour dictated by a long tradition, estimable spiritual values and, lastly, the economic logic of traditional systems of agriculture.

Although in some countries, China especially, the birth rate has dropped significantly, it has declined more slowly than the death rate. Even today, the death rate in Africa is five times what it is in Europe.

Table 2
Birth rates (‰)

	1950	1980
North Africa	49	40
Black Africa	50	49
Latin America	43	33
China	44	18
Industrialised countries	10	9

The demographic explosion is thus due to the birth rate and the death rate failing to keep in line.



Nations-Unies

High population growth rates represent a heavy burden for the health budgets of many African countries

(*) Head of Specialised Service at the Commission.

Table 3
Natural growth rates
(‰)

	1950	1965	1980
North Africa	25	28	27
Black Africa	21	27	31
Latin America	26	28	25
South East Asia (other than China)	15	26	23
China	17	27	11
Industrialised countries	11	9	5

Natural growth rates on the decline everywhere except Africa

Table 3 shows that many developing countries, and the major countries of Asia (India and above all China) especially, have already taken up this challenge and managed to reduce their rate of natural expansion in relation to the 1965 figures. However, in all countries but China, the increase, at 2.5% p.a., is still high.

The major Caribbean countries are some of the most successful when it comes to containing the population explosion.

The situation gives greater cause for concern in Black Africa, where the rate of expansion is still increasing, with no hope of any immediate improvements, given the feeble birth-control policies and the favourable prospects of death rate reduction. The death rate is indeed still high, but this is because of endemics and epidemics which could be controlled fairly cheaply.

In many countries of Africa, the explosion is doubling populations in the space of only 20 years. What miracle can be expected to enable them to adapt their structures and revolutionise their techniques in a context of under-development in the time available?

Birth-control policies urgently required in Africa

In spite of the force of the African population explosion, many people still think there is nothing to worry about yet because population density is relatively low.

The ratio of men to land is of course still favourable, but it would be wrong to forget that:

(i) there is still a huge disparity in the

Kilimanjaro programme of action

All specialists agree that the second African population conference held in Arusha, Tanzania from 9 to 13 January 1984, was a major turning point in the awakening of African countries to the consequences of a high demographic growth rate on their development policies. That conference adopted a 93-point document called "Kilimanjaro programme of action on population". Here are some extracts.

In its assessment of the demographic situation of the African region and future trends, the Conference observed that the African population of about 500 million was likely to double by 2010. Although the continent's population remained a small percentage of world population, the current high levels of fertility and mortality give rise to great concern about the region's ability to maintain even living standards already attained since independence.

The Conference noted the great variation in population and distribution patterns both within each country and between countries, and expressed concern about the rapid rate of urbanisation which contributes to rising urban problems in the region.

Population and development strategy and policy

1. Population should be seen as a central component in formulating and implementing policies and programmes for accelerated socio-economic development plans.
2. National efforts to enhance the use of demographic data in development planning should recognise the interrelated nature of population and development.

3. Greater efforts should be made to create increased awareness of the importance of population in the development process and highlight the need for more education and information on the social and economic consequences of demographic changes on national development, strategies in health, education, housing, employment and nutrition.

Fertility and family planning

17. Governments should take appropriate measures to protect and support the family which is the basic unit of society.
18. Countries should recognise that a substantial decline in infant and childhood mortality is a prerequisite for fertility decline.
19. Countries should recognise the usefulness of family planning and child spacing on the stability and wellbeing of the family.
20. Countries are urged to incorporate family planning services into the maternal and child health services.
23. Governments should ensure the availability and accessibility of family planning services to all couples or individuals seeking such services freely or at subsidised prices. ○

way populations are spread and many regions (the Sahel, northern Nigeria, Rwanda, Burundi, the Kikuyu country in Kenya, Malawi, eastern Zimbabwe and so on) are already overpopulated with present levels of technology, which cannot be improved fast enough. In some cases, a better geographical spread of people and resources might be attempted, but any migration operation is a long and difficult exercise;

(ii) agricultural resources are fragile in the tropics and lose their value quickly after a few years' exploitation. Once

the natural capital has deteriorated, it is extremely difficult to recuperate and desertification is often an irreversible process;

(iii) birth-control policies take a long time to organise and bear fruit, as there are so many socio-cultural barriers. We must act now if there is to be a change next century;

(iv) population development is subject to phenomena of inertia (called the momentum effect). Even if we managed by some miracle to limit fertility today to replacement level, the population would still go on growing under

its own impetus for a bit—i.e. an increasing number of girls born during the population explosion will be reaching child-bearing age. In Brazil, for example, total annual births went from 2.9 to 3.9 million p.a. over the 1950-80 period, in spite of a 30% drop in the fertility rate.

So demographic trends must be controlled rather like a supertanker—the time it takes to react to a change of direction is such that there must be considerable time and room for manoeuvre.

In spite of the apparent availability of natural resources that are not being

fully used, Africa must react now. And fast.

Consequences of the population explosion

The first is the extreme youth of the population, with a pyramid structure, with 45-50% in the under-15 group, as a result.

In addition to the momentum effect referred to above (which will lead to prolonged expansion of the population even with a drastic reduction in fertility), it is easy to see that there is a burden on social costs (education and

health) as well as problems of job creation.

We shall investigate three of the major consequences of the population explosion here.

It prevents or holds back development

We can hope for a natural transition, i.e. that a lower rate of infant mortality, education and economic progress will bring about a spontaneous drop in fertility. Without these factors the causes of the high birth rate will not of course disappear, but the

Food production trends in ACP countries

In collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), CTA has just published (in French and English) a report entitled "Food Production Trends in ACP Countries".

The information presented deals with both population and land use, particularly food crops, as well as trends in production, consumption and commercialisation of basic food products over the last two decades. The statistics used come primarily from the FAO. ACP countries have been grouped into six geographic zones: West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

The following are examples of the kind of information found in this report. In 1980, the net food deficit of ACP countries was equal to about 10% of their total consumption of basic foodstuffs. Total production was 73 million tonnes and the deficit was 8.4 million tonnes. For ACP countries as a whole, the average food deficit worked out to be about 22 kg per capita.

For non-cereal crops there was a net surplus of about half a million tonnes and a net deficit for cereals of nearly 9 million tonnes. Commercial data indicated that nearly 95% of the cereal deficit for 1980 was filled by imports, primarily wheat (45%) and rice (25%).

With a total population of about 350 million, ACP countries use about 125 million hectares of arable land for agriculture production. Each

hectare of cultivated land supports about 2.8 people compared to a world average of 3.3 and 4.6 in developing countries. The pressure put on land for food production in ACP countries is thus much less than in developing countries as a whole.

Between 1960 and 1980, the population of ACP countries grew by almost 147 million as a result of an average growth rate of 2.8% per year. This is higher than the rate of population growth of developing countries in general (2.4%).

Data for the 1978-1982 period indicate that the total production of major crops in ACP countries was about 55% cereals and 45% other products. Millet and sorghum represent about a quarter of total production, which is slightly more than the combined total of maize and rice. The major proportion of non-cereal production clearly shows the importance of these products in the food habits of ACP citizens. Root and tuber crops accounted for nearly 30% of the main food harvests in these countries, compared to only 20% for developing countries in general. In countries in Central Africa and the Pacific, root and tuber crops accounted for 60% of total food production.

As far as trends are concerned, the data indicated that the increase in cultivated land represents about 80% of the increase in food production of these countries over the last two decades. Improvements in yield account for the remaining 20%. While

current food imports in ACP countries appear to be within controllable limits, certain factors indicate that their food problems could easily worsen in the decades to come. In fact, long-term trends show an increase in food production of only 2% per year compared to a population increase of about 3%. Food shortages can only be expected to worsen if these trends continue. Furthermore, food imports have been growing by more than 8% per year which, if continued, will mean a doubling of imports in only 10 years.

Foreign aid accounts for a substantial proportion of food imports in Africa. The cereal donations of almost 2 million tonnes represented nearly 25% of total cereal imports in 1981. If these past trends in food production and consumption continue, it is likely that foreign aid will no longer compensate for such a rapidly increasing food deficit, thus leading to a further deterioration of consumption levels in the poor countries of this continent.

Given the fact that increased food production in Africa has generally been brought about by increased areas of food cultivation, rather than increased yields per unit of area of land, it is suggested that technological research should emphasise ways of improving the productivity of farmers. The significance of non-cereal crops, notably roots and tubers, indicates the potential role that these products could play in helping to minimise future food deficits. ○

drama of the population explosion in the developing countries precedes and therefore acts as a brake on development. Here is an example to illustrate this. Demographic growth tends to call for investments to meet the needs of the new inhabitants and provide them with the wherewithal for work. These "demographic" investments needed to maintain the standard of living of a population expanding at the rate of 1% p.a. are an estimated 4% of the national income. So when the population is expanding at 3% p.a., 12% of the national income needs to be invested just to keep things as they are!

This is considerable investment, particularly in economies with a low per capita income. So, because of their poverty, these poor countries will have enormous difficulty mobilising the savings they need just to maintain the standard of living. In many cases, there will even be a prolonged drop in the real income per capita—which is what is happening in Africa.

There is another way of looking at it. In poor countries, where 40% of the population is under 15, it is easy to see how difficult it is for a relatively small working population (50% of the total) that is not very productive to create jobs and provide social services for the up-and-coming generation. Africa has the highest ratio for non-productive population (the under-15s and over-65s) to productive population (15-64s)—1, whereas it is somewhere between 0.5 and 0.8 in Asia and Latin America.

To take a practical example—the countries of Black Africa will see their school populations double by the end of the century. In Benin and Côte-d'Ivoire, for example, 40% of everyday budget spending already goes on education, in spite of the fact that coverage rates are less than 75% in the primary schools and less than 25% in the secondary. If 100% primary school attendance is to be achieved and basic health care offered to the population as a whole, then these countries' budget appropriations would need to be doubled over the next 15 years! This suggests that even countries which are not as yet overpopulated will be unable to cater for the basic needs of their people if the rates of expansion stays so high.

It contributes to galloping urban expansion in the developing countries

It does this in two ways—by speeding up the rural exodus of landless peasants and, above all, through the urban population's own growth. The population of the towns in the developing countries is expanding twice as fast as the population of the rural areas (3.4% as against 1.7%). Between 1950 and 1980, for example, it went up by 600 million, trebling the 1950 figure.

of more than 1 million inhabitants), usually cut off from their rural environment and lacking money and the management ability to generate enough jobs in industry and services. The risks of pauperisation are obvious, with all that this implies in terms of political and social instability.

It will probably prove impossible to halt the urbanisation movement, particularly since it is now moving under its own impetus (at 3% p.a.), but we



Information campaigns on family planning should be aimed at young Africans such as these, the mothers of tomorrow

Latin America is the most urbanised area, with two thirds of the population living in towns, the figure the rich countries reached only in 1950. Although Africa is still predominantly rural (with only 25% of the population living in urban areas), its towns are expanding very fast (by 7% p.a. in the poor countries), doubling their size every 10 years. The spatial imbalance thus created is all the more serious for the bulk of the people being concentrated in the big cities (by the end of the century, Africa will have 60 cities

must still try and change its direction by backing up the development of secondary towns whose functions would be much more of a complement to rural activity⁽¹⁾.

It is a major cause of the deterioration of the natural capital, the most extreme form of which is desertification

(1) Secondary towns in Africa—role and function in national and regional development through EEC-financed cooperation and development, 1984.

There is no population which can speed up the productivity of its natural resources fast enough to meet rapidly expanding needs. Over-exploitation is common and the soil no longer has the time to recover its natural fertility. Yields decline, deforestation occurs, erosion develops and climates change. And more. This is one of the big challenges facing Africa today, particularly in the most fragile areas on the edge of the desert, in densely populated mountain zones etc. It is a challenge because it means not only systematic reforestation and anti-erosion campaigns, but a change in the production methods of millions of farmers and herdsmen who now have to intensify their systems and preserve the natural fertility of the land.

Coping with the problem

What we have to do is break out of the vicious circle in which development, which is necessary to generate the spontaneous limitation of the population, is inhibited by the explosion of that population.

Our strategy should be along two lines.

— The drive to implement effective development policies should be stepped up. Some of the priorities for this are:

(a) Social development schemes should be run with a view to indirect generation of an awareness of the problem and the technical ability to tackle it. General education for young people is particularly important here, as is quicker reduction in the infantile death rate, the high level of which is still a prime cause of the reproductive reflex. There is a development paradox here, as, if population growth is to be reduced in the long term, it has to be increased first in the short.

(b) Where still possible, the population should be better adjusted to the land available via the promotion of properly organised migration. However, we must be careful about global visions that lose sight of the fact that the colonisable areas are not necessarily in the same country and that there are often major psychological, social and technical barriers to their actual colonisation. So the people of the Burundi highlands are unenthusiastic about moving a few kilometres to the fertile

Ruzizi plain because "people die a lot there". In fact they don't die there any more than they do in the highlands. They just die of different things.

The ideal is to back up and provide extension services for spontaneous migration—such as those observed, for example, from western to eastern Senegal from the overpopulated groundnut areas where technical progress is a problem. However, these migrations will have no long-term impact unless the colonisers of the host areas are helped to transform their agricultural and herding methods in such a way as to respect the natural capital. This is a fine opportunity, because they are starting from scratch and both farmers and herdsmen prove much more willing to change outside their original environment. But changes of this sort are obviously incompatible with systems of forced or organised migration, unless the actual administrative potential of the authorities is taken into account. In cases of this kind, precipitousness makes things worse and leads to precious resources being wasted, not to mention the costs in terms of human suffering.

(c) However, it is clear that these migrations are not a substitute for the general production intensification schemes that need to be run in the rural world—starting in the already densely populated initial areas. Although in some already overpopulated areas where the natural resources have been run down, we have to start by reducing the number of inhabitants and thus gaining the time we need for the intensification policies to take effect or by preventing exhausted land from being used.

Intensification schemes in overpopulated areas and migration will not therefore always be alternatives, but complements.

— But this will not suffice unless vigorous birth control policies are run alongside. The race between population and development will never be won unless a direct attack is made on the reproduction rate.

But first of all, is there enough political motivation for policies of this kind? That depends on the country. Sometimes it is clear that there is. China, for example, has proved able to take drastic and efficient measures—although the coercive aspect of them

has sometimes to be regretted. Africa has long lagged behind, but things change fast. Not only have the leaders come down clearly on the side of active birth control policies⁽¹⁾—in spite of the fact that it is some time before words are followed by deeds—but, above all, the urban population has awakened to the problem. But demands have yet to be properly met because the technical ability to master contraceptive methods is not there and the financial resources (foreign exchange) with which to acquire them at both national and individual level are wanting. So technical information and training and the provision of methods of control are absolute priorities if a genuine demand is to be met.

Things are different in the country areas where attitudes change more slowly and the need for birth control has not yet been perceived. Campaigns designed specifically to make people aware of the problem and the provision of birth control systems are therefore called for. Once there is a demand, it must be able to be satisfied. Obviously these campaigns will have to be adapted to the particular situation in each area—social leaders must be found, as must target groups able to spread the message, and speeches must be made to break down the specific religious and other objections of each entity.

These campaigns will be all the more effective if they are accompanied by general economic and other measures to discourage large families, early marriage etc. Such measures are politically and socially delicate, but in many cases there is no other choice. What we have to do is not define an ideal, but go for the least bad solution.

Any plea for vigorous and efficient birth control policies must bear in mind that such such policies are not panaceas or substitutes for even more vigorous development policies. But they have to be an essential complement as, without them, there is no hope of success, particularly in the countries where the ratio of people to resources is already excessive. ○ A.V.

(1) See: the Kilimanjaro action programme (Arusha, 1988); the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly's resolution (tabled by Rose Waruhiu) on Women, Population and Development (February 1987). See *Courier* No. 102, March-April 1987, News Round-up, pp. 1-11.

Population and environment: the gathering crisis

by S. MILAS^(*)

The Third World's slums are bursting at their seams and its shantytowns are mushrooming. Its people are getting poorer, its soils are eroding and its deserts advancing. All these problems are interrelated and they are often made worse by the fastest and biggest population increases the world has ever known.

There is no simple correlation between population and environment. Population, environment and development factors interact in many complex ways. However, in many developing countries, pressures created by rapid growth of population, its uneven distribution, and inadequate socio-economic development, are contributing to widespread environmental degradation.

The world population has doubled over the past four decades to reach five billion. According to recent United Nations projections it will rise by a quarter to over six billion by the year 2000, reach eight billion by 2025 and level off at ten billion in the second half of the next century.

Most of the increase will take in developing countries, many of which are already hard-pressed to feed their existing populations. This rapid growth has far-reaching implications for human life, economy, and the environment, particularly in Africa, where populations are growing fastest. Africa's 500 million people will become 850 million by the year 2000, a 70% increase in only 13 years.

The Third World in general, and Africa in particular, is caught in a worsening spiral of expanding population size, diminishing resources, intensifying underdevelopment, and continuing environmental degradation. The problem is readily visible in the forms of soil erosion, deforestation and desertification in the rural areas, and a massive influx of the rural poor to urban slums and shantytowns.

Dr Mostafa K. Tolba, the Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) describes the African crisis as "... the outward manifestation of environmental bankruptcy", the degradation of natural resources linked to an imbalance between the supply of food and energy and the need for them. Degradation of natural resources diminishes their ability to provide for the needs of the people, and so leads to widespread poverty and even famine.

Desertification and soil erosion

In the drylands of the developing countries this has often led to desertification, the degrading of the land's productive potential. In the Sahel, Ethiopia, South Asia, large areas of Central and South America, and elsewhere, the land is being rendered barren by excessive pressures and poor management. It is a spreading problem, threatening some 850 million people living in the drylands that make up 35% of the Earth's surface.

Their land yields less as the soil gets poorer, and each year there are more people for it to feed.

The figures are startling. UNEP's global assessment of desertification shows that every year some 21 million hectares of land are reduced to near or total uselessness, and hundreds of millions of hectares become less productive. Three-quarters of the 45 million square kilometres that make up the drylands, an area the size of North and South America combined, are already affected by desertification and more than a quarter of this land is severely affected, meaning that it has lost 25% or more of its potential, and the situation is getting worse.

Desertification is the result of over-cropping, over-grazing, deforestation and poor irrigation practices. Its roots lie in economic and social factors such as under-development, technological backwardness, inequitable distribution of land, and rapid population growth. These are linked to bad management, inappropriate land use and rural neglect.

The UNEP assessment shows that desertification is a man-made problem caused by excessive pressures on fragile eco-systems. But because of their poverty, its victims often have little choice. They are not able to conserve their land for tomorrow because to survive they must abuse it today.

The greatest population expansion is taking place among people who, due to poverty and underdevelopment, lack the means to make the best use of their resources. The resulting intensified pressure on land, forests and other natural resources, degrades those resources, further retards peoples' development efforts, increases their poverty, and leads to destruction of the very resources upon which any sustainable development must be based.

Studies carried out by UNEP and other organisations find that the pressures, and the destruction, are often most evident in the area of subsistence farming, the livelihood of most of the rural population of the poor developing countries. Rapidly increasing population densities have upset the former balance upon which sustainable subsistence farming depended. Traditional shifting cultivation used to al-

^(*) Seifulaziz Milas, technical officer at the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) in Nairobi.



The degradation of natural resources has often led to desertification in the drylands of the developing countries

DOSSIER

low long fallow periods which permitted the soil to regain its fertility. But with today's population pressures this is often no longer possible.

Land is being over-cropped year after year, subsistence farming is expanding onto marginal lands that are of poor productivity, quickly exhausted and highly prone to soil erosion and desertification. While population expansion drives subsistence farmers into the rangelands, pastoral populations are also growing and livestock numbers increasing, leading to severe over-grazing, range degradation and desertification.

The forest resources of the Third World are among the prime victims of rapid population growth. Most people in the developing countries depend on wood as their main source of domestic fuel—up to 90% in some cases. More people means more demand for wood-fuel and clearing of forests for cultivation. This often leads to accelerating soil erosion and diminishing land productivity.

Economic and social strains

Population growth affects all areas

of the economy and of society. It means more pressure on natural resources and on the finances needed for the rational and sustainable development of those resources. It implies more strain on education, health and other services, themselves essential components of development, simply to extend them to the additional population, without necessarily being able to improve the quality or level of services.

Over the past two decades many developing countries have achieved significant growth in their economies, only to see their hard-won economic gains consumed by the increased requirements of their additional population. The results are familiar—increasing poverty, economic decline, lack of resources to improve land productivity, intensified pressures on forests, water and land—and increasingly, the flight to urban slums of the impoverished rural population.

The flight to the city

Urban authorities in many countries, but especially in the developing nations, face unprecedented problems

as cities grow at record rates to sizes never known before in human history. Coping with the mega-city, with its four million or more inhabitants, is often too much for their meagre resources.

The urban explosion continues. In 1900 less than 14% of the world population lived in urban areas, but by 1985 the proportion was over 40%. More than 100 million urban people are homeless, living on the street or in ramshackle shelters. Hundreds of millions of others live in places which can at best be called slums.


Experts say that rapid urban growth in the developing countries will continue well into the next century, fuelled by rural population pressures, poverty, underdevelopment and high urban birth rates. Many cities may double their population in the next 20 years or less as the rural poor flood into urban slums and shantytowns in search of a livelihood.

The mega-city is new to the Third World. In 1950, only seven cities on Earth had more than five million inhabitants. But they had evolved over generations, even centuries, along with

The rise of the cities

By the year 2000 half the world will live in cities, according to the 1986 'State of World Population' Report from the UN Fund for Population Activities.

This map shows what are predicted to be the top 12 urban areas by the year 2000.



Bleak future for young Africans (*)

The young generation of Africa face a bleak future of barren unemployment. Unless the hundreds of millions of African youth entering the labour force in the decades ahead are educated and trained in suitable skills to meet the changing needs of the labour market and strive to seek self-employment opportunities, the continent will be plunged into an even bigger crisis than the recent crisis of drought and famine, says Mr George Kanawaty, Director of the Training Department at the International Labour Office.

If the present growth trends continue, the population of Africa will almost double to over 1 billion over the next 20 years.

According to Mr Kanawaty: "If the African continent is to keep up the same level of unemployment in the year 2000 as it has at present, 40 000 new jobs must be created every day between now and then".

Employment promotion depends essentially on sustained economic growth and not on artificial short-term measures. Monetary and fiscal policies are no doubt important, but equally important is a system of incentives for employers to invest and expand their activities side by side

(*) Extract from an article by V. M. Nair of ILO.

with public enterprises where these exist.

One promising programme for employment generation, according to Mr Kanawaty, is the promotion of small enterprises.

In Africa, the small enterprise programme is still in its infancy. Although a number of governments have begun to direct some development efforts to this sector, a significant number have yet to evolve clear and explicit policies favouring the growth of small enterprises, through a variety of incentives ranging from preferential taxation to establishment of industrial estates and lines of credit.

But the main thrust of any programme to tackle the problem of youth unemployment will have to be in rural Africa where the vast majority of the population now live. The tide of rural migration to the urban centres has steadily swollen in recent years, with the unemployed or under-employed seeking work in the urban areas. An all-out programme to promote employment opportunities in the rural sector can help to stem this tide. At the same time, the rural migrants in the urban areas, mostly in the shantytowns, need help to become economically self-reliant through training and access to credit to finance some form of income-generating activity. ◊

their infrastructures. By 1980 the picture had changed dramatically. There were 51 cities of over four million inhabitants of which 34 exceeded five million and most were in developing countries.

The large cities of the Third World are products of a surge in urban growth since 1970 which almost doubled the number of city dwellers in developing countries from 666 million to over 1.1 billion, far outstripping growth in housing, economic, and social facilities.

The results are familiar: the sprawling slums and shantytowns that ring the major cities of the Third World, lack of clean water and sanitary facilities, widespread unemployment and under-employment, threadbare educa-

tional, recreational and health services, and inflated living costs. For millions of the urban poor, misery is the norm of their daily existence.

The mega-cities of the Third World, are not only poor and crowded but also massively polluted by solid and liquid wastes and by vehicles and factories. Pollution and environmental controls, common elsewhere, are rare in these harsh new cities.

New Delhi, with more than seven million people is just one example of an urban crisis. The Indian Ministry of Public Works and Housing says Delhi needs 496 million gallons of water daily—only 303 million gallons are available. There are 397 million gallons of sewage against a disposal capacity only one third that. By the

year 2000 Delhi's population will probably double, bringing intolerable conditions unless solutions are found.

Cairo's sewerage system built around the turn of the last century for one million inhabitants, has been overwhelmed by the needs of a population of over nine million. But now a huge new sewerage system is being built for a population which could reach 13 million by the year 2000.

Nigeria's capital, Lagos, with some five million people and still growing fast, has no city-wide sewerage system. It is only one of the problems faced by many fast-growing African cities. Housing, sanitation, water supply, employment, a long list of basic human needs, are failing to keep pace with the growth of urban populations. A great deal needs to be done, and done urgently. At present Africa's urban population is just over 160 million, but it is expected to more than double by the end of this century.

In most Third World countries, the rapid urban explosion is in a few bloated metropolitan areas which contain a significant proportion of the national population and national economy. These mega-cities are still mushrooming while many smaller cities stagnate. As the mega-cities seem to offer economic opportunity, they are magnets for the rural poor.


In only a dozen years from now nearly two billion people will exist in the cities of developing countries. Six cities will then have more than 15 million inhabitants each and four will be in the Third World. Two, Mexico City and Sao Paulo, are expected to each have populations of more than 24 million!

According to UN estimates, by the year 2025 the Third World's urban population will be nearly four billion, with one quarter of them in cities of four million or more. The UN estimates there will be 93 cities of more than five million and 80 of these will be in the poorer nations.

The mega-cities can only be limited or reduced and their quality of life improved, by national planning which gives urgent attention to rural development. If people can find work and hope in their rural villages, fewer will stream to the slums. The slums and shantytowns can also be improved if bureaucracy gives the urban poor se-

CONTINENTAL CONURBATIONS


Latin America has some of the largest cities of the developing world – but Africa is now urbanising at a rapid rate. The chart shows the percentage of the population living in urban areas.



Source: United Nations

BUILDING FROM BELOW

The major architects of today's Third World cities are poor families building their own homes. The diagram below shows the percentage of squatters and slum dwellers in four major cities.



Graphics: Clive Offley

Source: Assignment Children 57/58

cure title to plots of land and allows them to build what shelter they can now and improve it later.

One way to slow the distorted growth of the mega-city and its mega-problems is regional "growth centres", strategically-located towns specially developed to provide an alternative in jobs and shelter. Several Asian countries including China, Sri Lanka, South Korea and Thailand, have had some success in this way.

The regional growth centre is not a panacea. The menace of the mega-city requires many policies to balance population and economic activity, to speed rural development, and to promote non-farm rural employment. The experiences of China, Sri Lanka and Thailand show that these, plus

growth centres, can help control the urban explosion.

The need for a balance

Population growth is a key dynamic factor in the population-resources-development-environment equation, affecting both rural and urban environments. It must be taken into account in planning for development, desertification control and all aspects of environmental conservation.

Desertification, land degradation, rural impoverishment and migration, and the mushrooming problems of the urban explosion, are all closely interrelated, and need to be tackled in the context of overall national development. Third World nations need to give urgent attention to the problems of population growth and distribution, and to rural as well as urban development.

Halting desertification and soil erosion is a good place to start. Human action can halt it through development, good resource management, and use of appropriate technological advances. Improved land use and better farming methods can raise the carrying capacity of land—the number of people and livestock that it can support on a sustained basis—thus relieving the excessive population pressures that fuel the urban migration, and often lead to desertification.

Realistic efforts to halt desertification and to conserve and enhance the rural and urban environments must

address the problems of development, provision of basic human needs, and resource conservation and must do so in an integrated way. But, in the long term, easing demographic pressures is essential. There is a crucial need for each nation to relate its population perspectives to its resources and to its development plans. Population increase cannot continue indefinitely in isolation from the realities of resources, development and the environment.

Recognition of this—and concern—is growing in the developing countries. Sixty per cent of these countries, containing 80% of the Third World's population have adopted policies aimed at slowing their population growth.

This concern is reflected in the Second African Population Conference's (Arusha, Tanzania, January 1984) call for "achievement of population growth rates that are compatible with the desired economic growth and social development goals", and in the rapidly growing tendency of African and other developing countries to support national family planning programmes.

These are important steps forward, reflecting a growing awareness of the need for action to restore the balance between people, resources, development and the environment. This balance must be restored if desertification is to be controlled, and deterioration of rural and urban environments curbed. ○

S.M.



UN/Maggie Murray

Hundreds of millions live in places which can at best be called slums

Spatial distribution of population in Africa

by A. ADEPOJU (*)

Governments in Africa have identified the high primacy of capital cities, the rapid growth rate of urban areas and the extreme dispersion of population distribution in general and in rural areas in particular as their major distribution problems. In fact, great concern has been expressed by virtually all countries about population distribution and the role of migration in the process.

Africa is a continent of contrasts in political history, culture, population size and land area, resource endowment and style of development. Africa

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is in reality a very poor continent and embraces nearly three quarters of the poorest countries of the world. Food shortages, inflation, political instability, rising unemployment compound the obvious indicators of underdevelopment: mass illiteracy, low incomes, low life expectancy and impending famine.

The spatial demography of Africa depicts a highly skewed population distribution. The combined population of Egypt and Nigeria, the two largest, between them account for a quarter of the continent's total population. At the other extreme, eight states, islands included, have populations of barely a quarter of a million each. Countries with small land area

(Rwanda, Swaziland, Equatorial Guinea) and population size (Gabon, all islands) are juxtaposed with those having large populations. Some countries are very sparsely populated (Gabon, Chad, Libya, Somalia, Botswana) while a few are densely populated (Burundi, Mauritius, Rwanda). With 555 million people in 1985, Africa contains 11% of the world's inhabitants on 22% of its land area. The annual growth rates of the total population (3%) and urban population (about 7%) are among the world's highest. Overall, Africa is a feebly urbanised continent. In 1985, only 30% of the population lived in urban areas. However, the level of urbanisation varies between and within the sub-regions: it is highest in Southern and Northern Africa and lowest in Eastern Africa.

Population distribution in Africa varies considerably between and within the sub-regions largely because of historical, ecological, demographic, political and economic factors. The

Push and pull

From the countryside ...

LAND SHORTAGE

As land is concentrated into fewer hands and farming is mechanised it is difficult for the smaller farmers to support their families all year round. So they move to the city for all or part of the year for extra income.

FEW OPPORTUNITIES

Rural areas have been starved of investment in many countries. The *urban bias* means that many young people will be attracted to the city where they see better opportunities for education and advancement.

DISASTERS

Droughts, floods, wars and disasters of all kinds send refugees to camps which are often on the outskirts of major towns and cities. Many families will stay in the city if they see this increases future chances of survival.

Much of the growth in the expanding cities of the Third World is a result of migration from the countryside. The poorest people are both pushed from the rural areas and pulled towards the city by a whole host of factors.

To the city ...

HIGHER INCOMES


Urban wages can be many times higher than those in the countryside. The cost of living may be greater in the city and it is becoming increasingly difficult to find work, but the *chances* of earning more seem to be greater.

BETTER CONDITIONS

City families generally live closer to clinics and hospitals – and are more likely to have good water supplies and electricity. So overall health level in cities tend to be better – though in some cases the poorest migrants may live in less healthy conditions than before.

GETTING AHEAD

It is often the more adventurous who migrate. They see the city as a more exciting place where they can get ahead – and many do well. Young women will often take city factory jobs to escape the confines of their families.



Graphics: Clive Offley

Better controlling migrations (*)

It is estimated that migrants represent on average nearly 7% of the population in nine countries in West Africa. In Côte-d'Ivoire nearly one resident in four (23%) is foreign. In Gabon the foreign workforce occupies 50 to 60% of the jobs in the private sector and 7 to 10% in the public sector, with 105 nationalities represented, according to the Department of Labour and Employment.

The figures are equally striking from the point of view of labour-exporting countries. For example, more than 1 million Burkina Faso nationals—one out of five—live elsewhere with 75% in Côte-d'Ivoire. In total, some 35 million people of all ages—nearly 10% of the continent's population—at any given moment live in a country other than their own.

Survival

The economic element is dominant in migratory movements—the attraction of countries possessing natural resources such as Nigeria or Gabon or in full development such as Côte-d'Ivoire. But there are also other reasons: migration for survival provoked by drought and conflict; nomadic traditions; more or less artificial frontiers, a legacy from the colonial period; and insufficient administrative and police controls. Attention must also be given to the growing number of refugees: Chadians in Cameroon and Ugandans in Zaïre and Kenya, for instance.

The general trend is that there are more migrants, they tend to move farther and to stay longer. It is the young, and more often the best educated and the vital forces of the countries concerned, who form the largest contingent of expatriates. If

(*) Extract from an article by Michel Fromont of ILO.

one considers the economic balance sheet of intra-African migration, it is largely favourable to the country of employment. Thus, it is estimated that Côte-d'Ivoire gains some \$250 million per year thanks to migrant workers. At the same time, Burkina Faso receives little more than \$100 million from the remittances of its emigrating citizens, which is poor compensation for the cost borne by the country to train them.

Nevertheless, the receiving countries may want, for different reasons, to eject the migrants working on their territory, especially if they are illegal. Economic difficulties motivated the measures taken by Nigeria in 1983 and again in 1985. The fight against growing unemployment generated the increasingly strict measures of control which the government of Gabon is now taking.

The receiving countries, just as the countries of origin, are increasingly aware of the need to regulate the flow of migrants.

Bilateral agreements

The former would then be able to understand and control their demographic development better, to moderate migration according to the needs of their economy, to avoid social and political crises, and to ensure public security.

The latter countries, whose primary objective is to protect their citizens, would be able to obtain the guarantee of decent salaries and the security of transfer of earnings and thus make migration a factor of development.

A round table on international migration in the countries of West Africa, convened at the ILO in the autumn of 1986, stressed the necessity of preparing and concluding bilateral labour agreements, taking existing ILO conventions into account.

The interested countries could pattern themselves on Zaïre, Burundi and Rwanda, which signed a convention in December 1985 aimed at a system of free movement of labour on their respective territories. ○



Lagos, Nigeria: the few and grossly inadequate services in the major cities have been stretched to the limit because of the rapidly increasing population

main features of population distribution in Africa include the high rate of growth of urban, rural and total population and the remarkable degree of population concentration in the cities. There are massive contrasts, at the macro level, between the high densi-

ties in the Nile Delta and the virtual absence of population in the neighbouring desert. At the micro level, centres of mining and irrigation projects are densely populated, while sparse densities characterise the nomadic grazing areas.

Population distribution in Africa is strongly influenced by demographic factors. The high rate of population growth implies that the population of African countries doubles itself within a generation of 25 years or so. In spite of the rapid population growth rates,

however, pockets of infertility exist in, especially, Central African countries, and parts of West and Eastern Africa where the low fertility and low rates of population growth have resulted, in part, in low population density.

An equally intriguing aspect of population distribution in Africa is the relatively high rate of growth of rural areas, averaging 2% per year in spite of increasing rural out-migration. The economic stagnation of rural areas is a major factor prompting rural exodus, especially of young educated persons.

The high degree of population concentration in major cities and invariably in the capital cities has been fostered by the rapidly increasing migration from rural areas and small urban places. This situation reflects the absence or relative unimportance of medium towns, the small urban base and the urban bias of planning strategy, and the economic decay of rural areas. The stark reality of the phenomenal growth rate of between 10 and 15% per annum is that the number of people living in the urban areas, and the major cities in particular, may more than double by the turn of the century. At that time, Algiers, Casablanca, Lagos and perhaps Nairobi would each have four million people. Already in 1985, the 19 cities with one million people or more represented 42% of Africa's urban population. In several countries—Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Malawi, etc—over 80% of the urban population live in the major cities. The few cities serve as centres for the major economic, social, political and administrative services.

The prevailing population distribution in Africa has posed tremendous planning problems. In particular, it has become increasingly difficult to provide adequate social services to the widely-scattered settlements while the few and grossly inadequate services in the major cities have been stretched to the limit because of the rapidly increasing population. In effect, rapid urbanisation, accelerated rural-urban migration, increasing urban unemployment, inadequate social services and the social, economic and ecological problems of uncontrolled city growth have compounded development planning and focussed attention on urban areas.

Policy measures

Policy-makers and planners in Africa have become increasingly worried by the problems posed by the uneven distribution of their population. In view of the limited financial resources of these countries, it has proved difficult, indeed uneconomical, to provide services like schools, access roads, electricity, piped water and dispensaries to their widely scattered populations.

In spite of the widespread concern with spatial population distribution, few African countries with distinctively mal-distributed populations have in fact adopted *vigorous* and *effective* policies to modify the prevailing configuration of settlement patterns.

The redistribution of population involves the relation of people in space by altering the destination of migration to meet the objectives of policy goals through incentives or disincentives; persuasion or coercive measures. Migration policies are normally addressed to the three major actors—the area of origin and destination, simultaneously or selectively, and the migrant. In Africa, a strategy mix—direct controls and inducement—have been used to effect the desired population redistribution. These include residence permits, moral suasion, forced return or eviction to rural areas.

Two policy types—urban and rural oriented strategies—have featured in African countries. Five urban-oriented strategies have been pursued: the closed city programmes to prevent in-migration as in the Republic of South Africa; urban rustication or forced return to rural areas as in Mozambique; dispersed urbanisation as in Nigeria, decentralisation through medium city growth poles and regional development as in Zambia and Algeria, and creation of new capitals in Nigeria and Tanzania. A few urban renewal programmes designed to expand the economic and social base of the towns to accommodate the influx of migrants have been implemented, as are policies to make jobs labour-intensive and improve social infrastructure. In countries where governments have experienced high urban unemployment among young school leavers, special youth camps (Somalia, Zambia) or farm settlement schemes (Ghana, Nigeria) are selective programmes de-


signed to absorb the young unemployed migrants.

In African countries, resettlement schemes have been adopted as means of stimulating the development prospects of low density regions where the population is widely scattered and where there are wide variations in climate, soil quality and terrain. Other considerations include the greater ease of providing social amenities to a concentrated population as in the Awash Valley in Ethiopia and Ujamaa villages in Tanzania.

Examples of rural-oriented strategies include frontier colonisation of marginal land, and sedentarisation of nomads in Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda; resettlement and redistribution of colonised land in Kenya; capital intensive agricultural development programmes and large-scale dams in Ghana, Sudan and Nigeria; integrated rural development in Tanzania and resettlement for strategic and political reasons as in Algeria.

A review of these programmes shows that the choice of strategy type, target population, goals, implementation mechanism and success of these policies are closely related to the prevailing political structure and commitment of the national leadership and the available financial and manpower resources. The experience in Tanzania, Zaïre, Kenya, Zambia, Mali, Senegal, among others, to redirect the migration of youths away from the towns through persuasive propaganda (the return to the land campaign), residence and work permits, incentives, even coercive measures, shows that any serious efforts to influence migration and population distribution should focus not only on the migrants but also on the origin and destination of migration.

In all, the success of population redistribution policies depends importantly on a number of socio-political and economic factors: the political system, extent of government commitment, the influence of private sector investment patterns and the effectiveness of government operations. In Africa, the inadequate data base on which policies can be predicated poses tremendous problems: the situation is compounded by the weak policy formulation and inefficient coordinating machinery. Above all, few resources



It has proved difficult and uneconomical to provide services like piped water to widely scattered populations

required over a long period are available to translate the statements of intention on population distribution into concrete action programmes. At any rate, a long-term perspective, and huge investments (financial and manpower) are normally required for population redistribution programmes to exert strong demographic impact.

It needs to be emphasised that population redistribution policies are most often introduced for political, strategic or economic rather than demographic reasons. Two examples will illustrate this observation. Tanzania's villagisation programme, introduced in 1972, was aimed at facilitating the implementation of the policy of socialism or self-reliance. Villages were systematically created or regrouped throughout the country. By 1976, two thirds of the country's population

lived in villages. The policy to shift Nigeria's Federal capital to Abuja stemmed in part from strong security and political concerns in addition to the physical limits to the expansion of Lagos.

Concluding remarks

Planners have come to realise that the fundamental causes of migration and population distribution which lie in social and economic structures and relationships cannot be rapidly altered by policy to redistribute people haphazardly. The trend in city-ward migration appears irreversible but should not be allowed to proceed without due policy guidance. Hence the promotion or the development of medium towns and rural development should be perceived as parallel strategies to slow down the growth of the major cities. Besides directing migration streams,

the development of medium and small towns can be justified on economic, social and political grounds.

At the rural end, sustained efforts should be made to stimulate the growth and expansion of non-farm (rural informal sector) economic activities and, where feasible, the setting up or active support for existing rural industries and craft activities to diversify the rural economy, generate additional employment opportunities and enhance the income of rural dwellers. One desirable result would be to reduce rural exodus.

In order to tackle the problems of migration at both the origin and destination, a balanced development strategy of urban (large and medium towns) and rural areas should constitute an essential part of macro-planning. Since high fertility, and in some countries infertility, is a salient factor in the prevailing population distribution, the moderation of the rapid population growth in several African countries should be of major concern to the various Governments.

Today, Africa's major cities appear overwhelmed by the problems of rapid growth: unmoving traffic, constant power cuts, water shortages, slum housing and squatter settlements, uncleared refuse and deteriorating environmental sanitation. All these render Africa's cities increasingly unmanageable. It is now obvious that the major urban problems and especially the creation of sufficient productive employment and the provision of adequate housing and services should be tackled on a national rather than on an urban basis. These are the causes, and the solutions to Africa's urban problems must be sought in the broader context of economic growth and social change nation-wide, rather than in the city itself or in its structure. Partial, ad hoc solutions to urban problems would only scratch the surface. Comprehensive policies need to be designed and concretely implemented for both the urban and rural areas and effectively integrated into the national development strategies and programmes. These include migration-influencing policies and employment policies to reduce the strong attractiveness of the cities and to direct migratory streams to other destinations.

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A.A.

Family planning in Africa: a necessity

by Professor R.L. CLIQUET (*)

Africa, the continent where humanity originally emerged, is nowadays experiencing in many of its regions a population growth which threatens the quality of life of its inhabitants, its cultural and economic progress, and its ecosystems.

Birth rates in Africa are the highest in the world, on average 45 births per thousand of the population, compared to 28 per thousand for the world as a whole. Death rates are substantially lower — on average 16 per thousand — though still higher than on other continents (world average = 11 per thousand). The considerable discrepancy between fertility and mortality levels leads to a population structure with 45% of individuals below 15 years of age and causes an average annual population growth of 3%, a figure which results in a doubling of the population every 23 years!

Whereas at the global level, the annual population growth rate started to decline since the beginning of the seventies, most African countries have experienced a further increase. For the future, the United Nations Population Division expects that the population of the African continent will, supposing that fertility is reduced to replacement level around the middle of the next century, stabilise around the end

of the next century at around 2-2.5 billion people, i.e. 4-5 times its present population size.

These figures suffice to show that the largest part of Africa is still confronted with extremely strong exponential population growth, the full effect of which, expressed in absolute population numbers, is still to come in the coming decades and the next century.

Background of sustained high fertility

The proximate cause of the current exponential population growth in Africa is easy to understand: it follows from the uneven decline of birth- and death-rates — in some cases mortality and fertility are even evolving in opposite directions.

The relatively rapid decline of mortality is largely due to the impact of Western public health measures. The maintenance of high fertility or the slower decline of fertility is caused by the fact that the major decline in mortality occurred at a very fast pace and was insufficiently accompanied by other features of modernisation which the African population could have experienced at the individual and the family level as sufficient motives to limit

fertility and to adapt it gradually to the declining mortality risk.

On the basis of comparative fertility research, population scientists have obtained a relatively satisfactory explanatory picture of the prevalence of high and of low fertility levels.

In sociologically pre-modern living circumstances, having a large number of children is, in several respects, a great advantage for the parents: it compensates for high infant and child mortality, it supplies labour in the household enterprise, it secures economic and other support in old age and in time of need. For men it is a sign of virility, moreover, and for women a major status symbol. The pre-modern norm systems were selected to support the adaptive value of high fertility and thus fulfilled, in that type of culture and society, an adaptive function. In Africa, moreover, the prevailing family systems — the Islamic family in the North and the sub-Saharan family system with its strong descent lineages and weak conjugal bonds — are extremely resistant to fertility decline.

Low fertility, on the contrary, is favoured by low infant and child mortality, by a shift from a household to a market economy, by opportunities for enhanced education, employment and status achievement outside the home by the development of social security systems, and, of course, by changing values and norms with respect to reproductive performance. Most of these fertility-reducing agents have not yet reached full development in African societies. So it is not surprising that, notwithstanding decreasing mortality, desired family size remains high, far above the replacement level, even after childhood mortality is allowed for.

The Western importation of mortality control was originally not only dissociated from fertility control, but in colonial times high fertility was even favoured in view of increasing the cheap labour force in the overseas territories. Moreover, Western religions, in particular the Catholic Church, opposed effective fertility control, a position which the latter maintains even today, even though its followers in the developed countries have long since



The traditional birth-spacing practices in Africa almost halve potential fertility

(*) Population and Family Study Centre, Ministry of the Flemish Community, Brussels.



The present rate of population growth in Africa leads to decreasing opportunities for education and health care

adopted different attitudes and behavioural patterns.

The fertility increase which is observed in several African regions or the slow decline of fertility even where family planning is spreading, is due to decreasing infecundity levels and/or the relaxation of the traditional birth spacing practices such as breastfeeding and post-partum sexual abstinence. On the basis of the high fertility levels in Africa, it would be erroneous to presume that the biological fecundity potentials are being maximised. The traditional birth spacing practices in Africa almost halve potential fertility. In some regions a multiplicity of pathological causes and behavioural patterns (favouring sexually transmitted diseases) form additional factors suppressing natural fertility levels. Hence, it is not surprising that as soon as attitudes towards prolonged breastfeeding or post-partum abstinence change, or health care measures are introduced, fertility increases in the absence of sufficiently compensatory contraception.

Last but not least, fertility has so far remained at very high levels in most African countries because ethical, medical and governmental authorities tended not to actively promote family planning. On the contrary, in many cases, and for a variety of reasons, high fertility was advocated.

Consequences of exponential population growth

Experience shows that it is extremely difficult to make people, even policy-makers, aware of the effects of exponential growth phenomena. Is it because that type of growth transcends individual existence or manifests itself in a time perspective which lies too

far beyond individual perception? Or is it because exponential growth, especially in the field of population, is of such a recent nature that people and policy-makers lack conscious experience about its possible effects?

Whatever the reasons may be for this lack of awareness, exponential population growth is a phenomenon which should have the primary and full attention of policy-makers. Indeed, whereas a 3 or 4% annual population growth may, at first sight, and for short term purposes, be a manageable matter, caring for a doubling population every two decades is another question, especially in the cultural and economic situation and ecological circumstances which are characteristic present-day Africa.

For clearness' sake it should be emphasised that this does not mean that many African countries would not have room or resources to support a larger population than the present-day one. The essence of the matter, however, concerns the speed with which African populations are growing nowadays.

An exponential population growth requires, as a matter of fact, considerable investment to provide for the larger new generations' proper health and welfare care, nutrition, education, housing, communication facilities, employment and leisure, and to master environmental pollution and prevent ecological decay. Most of those requirements can, perhaps, be met in a situation of high technological development and unlimited resources. Needless to say this is unfortunately not the case of Africa.

Due to a variety of reasons — ecological, cultural and political — Africa

was only recently confronted with the modernisation process. It had, and still has, to acquire modern culture at too fast a pace, with all the unfavourable side effects that that entails. It was, and still is, confronted by an uneven adoption of the various features of modern culture. For a long time its populations suffered from colonial exploitation, a practice which was, in many cases, taken over subsequently by large sections of the countries' own elites, favouring developmental strategies which were, or still are, commodity- instead of humanity-oriented.

And finally, Africa has to deal with ecosystems which are very vulnerable to inappropriate human action.

Developmental policy goals

In order to accommodate the overall social transition Africa is facing nowadays, the continent has to make considerable efforts to catch up on its developmental lag, to integrate into its own culture modern scientific knowledge and applications, to emancipate all its inhabitants, women and men alike, to enhance the standard of living and to improve the health of its populations, to treasure and manage intelligently its natural resources and ecosystems and preserve them for future generations. All in all, a huge and difficult task!

The present rate of population growth in Africa not only impedes developmental efforts, but may, in certain circumstances, interfere so badly with human living conditions and environmental crises, that it not only nullifies all efforts being made, but moreover worsens human and environmental conditions.

Population policy implications and strategies

In order to achieve the above-mentioned goals at the individual as well as at the societal level and to avoid or limit the further deterioration of the physical and biological environment, it is necessary to restore as soon as possible the equilibrium between fertility and mortality. Again, this re-establishment of the fertility/mortality balance is aimed mainly at slowing down the speed of population growth, and not necessarily population growth itself. However, in a number of cases,

developmental and ecological circumstances are such that any further growth in the population is inappropriate. The need for getting current fertility levels down is the more urgent the longer the fertility/mortality imbalance exists. As a matter of fact, population growth is not only determined by current fertility/mortality imbalances, but also by demographic inertia resulting from the age composition of the population which results from demographic imbalances in former generations.

One still encounters the mistaken view that there would be two policy alternatives to decrease fertility levels: development versus family planning. The real controversy, in fact, concerns the dichotomy opposing ideological approaches to realistic approaches. Convinced about their absolute salutariness, ideologies of a strict sort usually propagate development as the sole strategy to be applied to resolve population problems. At the Bucharest Population Conference in 1974 the Vatican and Marxist-inspired governments took this position. At the Mexico International Population Conference in 1984 this type of reasoning was advanced by a Western government who wanted to convince the world community that free enterprise would rapidly lower fertility!

A more realistically-based approach to the interrelations between demographic and other societal processes shows that those matters are not so simple. On the basis of the European demographic transition, it is of course tempting to conclude that modernisation leads to low fertility. Indeed, in most European countries, people spontaneously — without governmental or other guidance, and even notwithstanding governmental or other establishment positions — succeeded in limiting their fertility, thus more or less re-establishing fertility/mortality equilibria at low levels. However, the European type of experience cannot be transferred as such to the situation in most developing countries. The nature and the speed of the acculturation processes which are taking place in less developed countries, the "North-South" differentials in various development matters, and the much more vulnerable nature of the ecosystems in (sub)tropical regions require a specific approach. Such an approach can only

be of an integrated nature. Developmental efforts, mainly in the field of education and health care, should systematically include serious, active and sustained efforts in the field of family planning.

On the basis of current knowledge, it must have become obvious to all that development efforts alone will only induce substantial fertility reductions in the long run because the economic and cultural changes associated with the modernisation process evolve at a much slower speed than the introduction of mortality-reducing procedures. Moreover, the spontaneous behavioural adaptations to the modernisation processes with respect to desired family size also occur only with considerable delay.

On the other hand, individual family planning policies cannot be expected to be very successful if they are not accompanied by broader societal and cultural changes. Why would a woman in a traditional society considerably limit her number of children if her major source of prestige and life satisfaction exists in bearing and bringing up a large number of children? Or if her security still largely depends on a large number of children and if all traditional normative pressures, coming from her partner, her family, her religion and her society at large, continue to push her towards having a large family?

It has been stressed recently that the introduction of family planning strategies in African societies should take into account the specificity of African culture. While this is only too true, this consideration should not divert attention from the essential need to lower, as soon as possible, the desired and achieved completed family size. Fully justified efforts to favour spacing traditions in Africa can only complement or be part of a broader birth limitation policy.

Considering the uneven demographic-societal-ecological developments most African nations are facing, and given the very nature of these developments and their dramatic consequences for the future of African populations and ecosystems, considerable responsibilities fall on all who are in a position to influence the behaviour of people with respect to the size of families — governments, religious leaders,

health professionals, educators. This is particularly true of the African governments, because it is only by means of enlightened overall policies that it will be possible to even up the present demographic-societal-ecological imbalance. Developing such policies is an immense and thankless task, not only because of the dimensions of the problems to be faced, but also because those policies will run counter to public opinion, traditional beliefs and institutions, and even to various foreign influences such as non-African oriented development strategies and the Vatican's teachings.

As far as the population policy options of African governments are concerned, a favourable outlook seems to have developed since the United Nations World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974. Whereas, before Bucharest, few African governments — not well informed, misguided by ideological prejudices and quite rightly suspicious of some Western strategies — were aware of the population issue in their country and of the possible future effects of continuous and even accelerating population growth, the Bucharest Conference and the developments which came about since then have produced considerable changes in governmental attitudes and policies, as can be witnessed from documents such as the important "Kilimanjaro Declaration" of the United Nations' Economic Commission for Africa, issued at its Second African Population Conference in Arusha 1984, and the "Harare Declaration" of the All-Africa Parliamentary Conference on Population and Development in 1986. However, the bulk of the job still has to be done, and in many cases has yet to be started.

However, the need for urgent policies in this field cannot be overstressed, as was so correctly stated by the Kenyan Vice-President Mwai Kibaki at the 1984 International Conference on Population in Mexico City: "Governments have a responsibility to promote family planning. You can no longer say it is a family matter, leave it to private agencies or the private sector. Intellectually, everyone agrees about family planning, but the sense of urgency that it cannot wait is what is missing from the continent."

R.L.C.

The decision belongs to couples an interview with Kenyan MP Rose Waruhiu

Family planning might still be a delicate subject in Africa but its no longer taboo. In early February in Arusha, the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly discussed a report presented by Kenyan MP Rose Waruhiu on Women, Demography and Development, and further adopted a resolution calling for a whole range of policies in the family planning field. *The Courier* met her after the adoption of her resolution.

► *In your resolution you call, very cautiously, on ACP countries to implement birth-control measures. Are you sure your call will be heard, and how do you envisage such policies?*

— I have not referred to birth-control policies — the word control is very sensitive.

► *Family planning?*

— Yes, family planning, because family planning is one method of controlling the rate of population growth. It's the most effective way, because if you plan the families — ultimately you should end up with better spacing, more healthy children, and fewer children.

► *So in fact you're asking ACP countries to apply family planning policies?*

— Well, our resolution is addressed to people at all levels. I have first addressed myself to governments, because they have to mobilise opinion within the countries about family planning, about the rate of population growth in relation to people's standards of living, and what standard of living they would like. Then, of course family planning has been proved to be the most successful way of reducing the very high rate of growth that many of the ACP countries have already agreed exists. They already have agreed, many of them, that they have a rate which is too high in relation to economic growth.

► *But you insist also that individual couples should be able to say if they wanted family planning or not?*

— Yes. It's not contradictory — after all it is the family which has children. So all the country can do is mobilise opinion, provide information, but the decision ultimately must be made by a couple, or by parents. But I'm saying it must remain voluntary — there should be no coercion. However, a family needs information if it is to make the right decision, so the government,

NGOs, or other leaders who are well informed about these issues can give information on the basis of which couples can make the decision.

► *You assume that once they have access to the right information they will space their children?*

— Yes. This is already the evidence where family planning has been accepted.

► *In Africa?*

— Yes.



► *You also said during the debate, that family planning is a long-term issue, that in most African countries, even if it's applied now, the population will still be doubling. So in other words, the ill effects on health, education and employment cannot be avoided?*

— No, no. That's not what I meant. I was trying to show that we have overcome health problems, we have overcome infant mortality rates — especially in the last 20 or 30 years. The population structure is such that 60% of the population is below 35, they are therefore of child-bearing age. Now in 20 years they will be parents again — some of them are already parents, in 20 years you have another generation ready to be parents, so whatever you do now, you've also got to plan for the fact that, by the end of the century the population will be double still, but that

doesn't mean you stop developing, or improving your health facilities, your education, but you must do it knowing that the demand will be more than double what it is today.

► *But the countries are poorer and poorer?*

— No, no. I think many of our countries are developing. It's a question of priorities and if you now try and integrate this information about what are likely to be the challenges to a family in the year 2000, many are going to succeed. A parent who has five children today in our countries will tell you he's already feeling the pressures, whereas his parents had ten children and they managed. Now, does he see his daughter having two, or three or seven? So obviously that has got to be projected until he must be reminded that in the year 2000 there will be double the number of people living in this country. Where would you like to be, what would you like to be doing then, or what would you like your children to be doing...?

► *In some European countries the one-child family seems to be almost the rule now. What would be for you the ideal size of an African family by the year 2000?*

— I don't think we have actually discussed an ideal African family. In Europe they have reached this one-child family. That is not a problem for us yet.

► *What's your own opinion?*

— It's all related to economic growth to me. I do know that there are some European countries where they would like at least to have more younger people because they have more older people in the population than younger people. But that's not going to happen to us for another century.

► *Would you agree that the three-child family would be a good size for an African couple?*

— We are so different, our cultures and so on. All I can say is that in my own country the standard number of children, what you call the fertility rate is 8.1. That, I can say, is high — definitely!

► *How many children do you have?*

— I am not answering. In Africa you don't count children. I am superstitious. ◊

Kenya: time to defuse the bomb

The preamble to the Kenya Government's Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 on 'Economic Management for Renewed Growth' states the problem facing Kenya in the starkest possible terms: "This opportunity (to determine the shape and form of Kenya's future economy) must be seized now, before the pressure of population growth overwhelms the economy's capacity to produce and provide for its people". This is strong language, but the urgency of the problem has been faced squarely by the Government and the language reflects this.

Kenya's population growth rate, currently 3.9%, is the highest in the world, and its fertility, though in decline from a high of 8.1 in 1977, is currently at around 7.6 and the rate of decline is a very slow one indeed. It is perhaps a sad reward for a country which has kept clear of economic stagnation and internal disorder, notching up impressive growth rates around 5% between 1975-83 and with an enviable record for maintaining the rule of law. Yet the country's present success is leading it towards a situation where the population is set to rise from the current 20.6 million to a projected 35 million in the year 2000, and an even more frightening 83 million by the year 2025. Economic and social projections by the Kenyan Government postulate a worst-case unemployment level of over 20%, most of it concentrated in urban areas. It is in the urban areas that the problems have already begun to appear, which is no surprise. During the time when the population as a whole was rising by about 4% per year, the urban population was increasing at a rate of almost 7½%. And despite the overwhelmingly rural nature of Kenya's economy, the projection shows that a quarter of the population will be urban by the year 2000, unless steps are taken. Public service employment can no longer be seen as an effective tool to mop up the surplus. There must be new initiatives, whether in the field of employment creation or the establishment of rival poles of attraction in the rural areas or in smaller towns.

The birth rate is ascribed to a number of physical causes. Historically, infant mortality in East Africa stood at

around 50%, due to a combination of causes which included malnutrition, vulnerability to a number of diseases, tribal wars and slave raids. By 1948, infant mortality was down to 20% and in 1985 it had dropped to below 10%. In addition, life expectancy has increased, from about 39 on average in 1955, to 55 for a Kenyan born today. But in addition to the purely physical factors, there are also cultural factors to be taken into account. In Kenya, according to health workers, wives continue to bear children to their husbands in order to confirm their value and to prevent the husband seeking another wife. In a compound with a number of wives, the production of children at regular intervals is seen by the wives as a sort of jockeying for position in the affections of the husband. In rural areas, there is also the fact that must be taken into account, that children provide welcome additions to the labour force at very early ages, especially in pastoral societies, and everywhere provide for their parents the assurance of some support in old age. And there is also the factor of rising expectations: in a country such as Kenya, where economic progress has been continuous, and where the rule of law prevails, children are produced because there is a rising chance that one of the children will succeed academically, and go to become an important figure in politics, business or administration. But the most telling cultural factor of all hitherto has been the low status of women in Kenyan society, and their lack of a determining say in the eventual size of the family. Indeed, one of the few ways in which a Kenyan woman can obtain an improvement in her status is by the production of a large number of children. This is by no means a Kenya-only phenomenon. Rose Waruhiu, the Kenyan rapporteur of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly's working group on population was obliged to delay her group's report after a very disappointing response to her questionnaire sent out to all ACP governments. It is not, seemingly, a matter of concern to many African governments, and several actually prohibit the sale of birth control devices.

But nowhere is the situation as grave

as it is in Kenya. A World Bank survey, conducted in 1982, of countries with a population of more than 15 million throughout the developing world, showed that Eastern and Southern Asia and Latin America were far more concerned about the problem than Africa. Of the African countries covered, only Kenya had made more than a token attempt to get to grips with the problem. Apart from Tanzania at the time, it was the only African country with more than very weak commitment to family planning. Apart from Sudan, it was the only country which possessed up-to-date data on fertility, mortality and contraceptive use. It was the only country in the survey with a stated political commitment to reduce population growth, and the only one with a high-level coordinating body which set population policy, monitored its implementation and evaluated results. Along with Tanzania, it was also the only country which had set up public family planning services.

All this was before the President's Conference on Population in 1984, at which he reaffirmed and intensified his country's commitment to reducing population growth. The National Council on Population and Development has adopted a target of slowing growth down to 3.3% by 1988, although this is said by experts to be more than somewhat optimistic. All the cultural and physical factors mentioned above tended to militate against a radical approach until recently, and the NCPD's approach was characterised by conservatism and a lack of staff. These aspects are now being remedied, and there has been upsurge in such important areas as surgical contraception, contraceptive distribution by non-professional workers, and the setting up of purpose-built family-planning clinics in urban areas. And better education for women is also having its effect. A fertility survey, carried out by the International Statistical Institute of London in 1984 showed that Kenyans were no longer near the head of the African league table for the number of children desired. That figure is now seven, while some of Kenya's neighbours show preference for eight or nine. But seven is still far too many for a country whose future problems are intimately bound up with the time-bomb of a rapidly-rising population. ◊

Tom GLASER

Rwanda's demographic policy (*)

Rwanda is a long way (1 750 m) above sea-level. It covers an area of 26 338 km² and is landlocked in the eastern-central part of the continent of Africa, with Uganda to the north, Burundi to the south, Tanzania to the east and Zaïre to the west.

The fact that the country is landlocked is behind all the problems it has with its export and import trade. Rwanda is essentially an agricultural nation. It is overpopulated and has the serious problem of the increasing scarcity of arable land, on which the present population density is 524 people per km², to contend with. More than 96% of the population lives by farming and herding.

Estimates produced in December 1986 put the population at 6 500 000, with an annual growth rate of 3.7%, one of the highest in the region. Recent statistical studies (Demographic Projections, ONAPO, 1985) suggest that the population will double (10 million) by the year 2000 if nothing is done about it.

The birth rate is 54% and the death rate 19% at the present time. An estimated 58% of the population is under 20 and 48% under 15. The average age at the first marriage is 21 for girls and 24.5 for men, some of the highest averages in Africa.

The high reproduction rate may well be due to the short time between pregnancies in Rwandese women.

The average family has a plot of land of anything from a couple of acres to a third of an acre in some areas. The fact that the family holdings are so small speeds up the rate at which the soil deteriorates as it leads to increasingly short fallow periods.

In 1983, per capita GDP was an estimated US\$ 270. The economic growth rate is currently 2.8% p.a. and it constantly lags behind the population growth rate of 3.7%. There is therefore a serious imbalance between the growth of the economy and the growth of the population and it is a problem as far as the nation's future is concerned.

(*) Article provided by the Delegation of the EEC in Rwanda.

The situation is made all the more precarious by the fact that housing is scattered and the splitting up of existing land is a major barrier to the modernisation of agriculture and the installation of communal infrastructure.

The Government handles the socio-demographic issue

Back in June 1974, the Rwandese Government set up the Scientific Advisory Council for socio-demographic problems, with the job of evaluating how far the population increase would affect the country's development and suggesting ways of coping with it. Lastly, the Council had to suggest to the relevant authorities what would be the best way of integrating family planning into the nation's public health programmes.

It applied important recommendations in the field of population programmes and policies, in particular the general population and housing census of 1978 and the setting up of the mother and child health project, family planning and various rural development projects.

On 16 January 1981, the National Population Office (ONAPO) was set up, thus enabling the Council to do more than just offer advice.

With the 2nd Five-Year Development Plan, the Government made its main aim that of strengthening indi-

vidual and collective awareness about the country's demographic problem and continuing with a campaign to contain, and educate people about, demographic growth.

Aims of the National Population Office

In 1981-84, the Office confined its attention to four pilot zones—Kigali, Butare, Ruhengeri and Kibungo. Doctors were detailed to these areas to:

- instal family planning units in the health and welfare centres;
- act as a link between ONAPO and the health establishments in their respective zones by ensuring active collaboration;
- supervise the family planning services in collaboration with the medical cadres.


Since 1985, ONAPO has integrated the family planning and population programme into the various sectors of national development—i.e. into primary, secondary and higher education, people's education and adult classes in community development and adult training centres and in agricultural and rural development projects.

The ONAPO prefectural offices (opened in 1985), have put priority on:

- staff training and school programmes;
- telling the public about socio-demographic problems;
- socio-demographic research;
- promoting mother and child health and family planning;
- school programmes.



Mother and child health care centre in Kibuye



Information session on population issues for community leaders



Population pressure on arable lands is increasing. The average farm is already less than a hectare

ONAPO's school and training programmes

These are aimed at:

- setting up and running programmes to train and retrain medical, paramedical and socio-educational staff in family planning and population problems in the country;
- ensuring that these population and family planning programmes are an integral part of the school syllabus at all levels of formal education;
- promoting training and retraining for the staff of ONAPO and any departments directly concerned with population programmes both at home and abroad;
- evaluating ONAPO training programmes and the school programmes on population and family planning matters.

ONAPO has so far trained 833 medical assistants, social workers and nurses from medico-social centres in all of the country's prefectures as family planning auxiliaries.

It has brought out a brochure called "Education for family life (Uburere Mbonera-Rugo)", which is a useful publication, particularly for teachers, as it gives them the resource material they need for lessons on socio-demographic problems.

Information, education and communication

In a country like Rwanda, where there is a very high illiteracy rate, a popular education programme is needed to awaken the public to the consequences of an imbalance between demographic growth and eco-

nomie development as far as the wellbeing of the people is concerned.

ONAPO is improving this awareness campaign in a number of ways, including radio broadcasts and plays, songs, drama in schools, in the chief towns, smaller towns and communes, film and video shows in some areas and some establishments, meetings and lectures, brochures (three issues of Twiyongere Twongere Umusaruro⁽¹⁾, a review on family, health and rural development which comes out three times a year), teaching material distributed to health and welfare centres and some schools, and calendars and posters.

Socio-demographic research

The aim here is systematic investigation of the various demographic phenomena and other factors determining Rwanda's demographic growth.

In this particular field, ONAPO has run a survey on attitudes and practices related to reproduction in the communes of Birenga and Rurika (Kibungo) in 1982-84, the national reproduction survey (1983) and the survey of traditional contraception (1984), evaluated the awareness campaigns in the pilot areas (prefectures of Kibungo and Kigali, 1983-84) and produced demographic projections of the Rwandese population in 1982-2000 (1985). It has also made a study of unsatisfied mother and child welfare and family planning requirements (1985), produced a report on the use of various methods

(1) "Let's all get together to harvest more".

of contraception (1985), surveyed communications and health (1985), studied the way demographic growth and development interrelate and investigated pupils' educational needs in relation to family life.

Mother and child health and family planning

The aim of this programme is to protect the health of both mothers and children and promote family planning. Mothers and children make up a large slice of the population of Rwanda—72.5%—and they are therefore very important to the country's socio-economic future. This programme is aimed at reducing the morbidity and death rates among mothers and children by offering efficient family planning and mother and child health services.

The programme is also concerned with integrating the family planning services into the basic health service and suggesting to health service leaders the best way of going about this. Lastly, the idea is to ensure that family planning methods are applied properly.

So everything ONAPO does in this field is geared to making family planning an integral part of the country's health and welfare system. This has involved it in extending the infrastructure in some regions by building or renovating health centres. The doctor detailed to each prefecture and the clinic staff provided mean that anyone can avail himself or herself of family planning services. There are already 20 000 women using contraception and the number is increasing all the time. ○

Controlling India's teeming millions

by Jeremy HAMAND(*)

In 1952, soon after Independence, India became the first country in the world to adopt an anti-natalist policy. Since then, every Indian leader, from Nehru onwards, has been determined to bring down the rate of population increase.

The current Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, is no exception. "Population is our number one problem", he told a press conference soon after taking power. Since then, the Government has launched a new strategy for the national family planning programme, aiming at revitalising it and bringing it out of the doldrums of the past few years.

The new programme lays down ambitious targets. The long-term goal is to reach zero population growth by 2050, by which time the country's population will be nearly 1.300 million: current standard projections suggest a population of over 1.500 million by that date, and still rising.

The medium-term goal is an average two-child family and a reduction in the birth rate from the present 33 to 21 per 1 000 by the end of the century.

By 1990, in under four years' time, the percentage of fertile couples using family planning is to rise from 35 to 42, and the population growth rate is to be reduced from 2.2 to 1.9% per year.

The new programme has been described as "highly improbable", with critics arguing that since the birth rate has remained stubbornly static at 33 per 1 000 over the last decade, it is unlikely to fall to 29.1 in under four years. What is more, the Indian Government's track record of achieving their targets has been patchy at best. In 1962, the government target was to reduce the birth rate to 25 per 1000 by 1973; this goal was revised in 1969 to a birth rate of 32 by 1974; in 1974, to a birth rate of 30 by 1981, later post-


poned in 1978 by another five years to 1983—and has still to be reached.

These failures were by no means righted by the National Population Policy announced in 1976 with its excessive emphasis on sterilisation targets which led to abuses and a serious backlash against the whole programme, all the harder to understand when one considers the unique experience and degree of commitment to family planning which has existed in India for over 50 years. As early as 1930, the enlightened Maharajah of Mysore had ordered birth control clinics to be opened in Bangalore and Mysore City—the first government-sponsored clinics in the world. Madras State followed suit in 1933. The Family Planning Association of India was founded in 1949 by a group of progressive women, social workers and doctors, and the Association was subsequently one of eight FPAs which sponsored the creation of the International Planned Parenthood Federation at the Third International Conference

on Planned Parenthood held in Bombay in November 1972.

Despite this long history of government and voluntary involvement in family planning, India's population has been growing at over 2% per year for at least 20 years, and by the middle of 1987 will have passed the 800 million mark. Fertility has declined, mainly in the last decade, to the current average level of around 4.5 live births per woman. Mortality has also declined (which explains the constant rate of population increase), and life expectancy has increased to around 50 years. Infant mortality fell to around 130 per 1 000 by 1970—but has failed to fall much further since.

It might not be unreasonable, therefore, for the leader of an African country, where family planning was just starting to be introduced because of concern at the rate of population growth or at the effects of high fertility on maternal and child health (or both), to throw up his hands in despair at the example of 30 years of family planning in India. How can India have done so much "worse" than China, a country whose vast population now seems more or less under control and which will, barring miracles, be overtaken by India as the world's most populous nation within the next 40 years?



Vivian Univers

Population is India's number one problem

(*) The author is a member of the London-based NGO Population Services.



India is one of the rare countries where clinics can advertise abortion

Historical differences

In comparing the world's two biggest countries, we must of course make allowances for the huge historical differences in Indian and Chinese political traditions and in the degree of social and community pressure which can be harnessed by the central authorities. It must not be forgotten, either, that India has always been a far more open and accessible society than China, so that India's failings and shortcomings are far better known than China's.

There is however one important factor in the Chinese experience which was vital to the success of the family planning programme: family planning was introduced in China through the existing primary health care system, and was thus immediately perceived by the people to be part of the maternal and child health programme. The system, with its "barefoot doctors" at village level and carefully managed upward referral process, was far more effective than India has so far achieved.

The great failing of the Indian programme, on the other hand, is precisely that family planning has never become internalised as part of the health system and that maternal and child health and family planning have never become mutually supportive and reinforcing components of a total system. Although the basic policy may say that family planning should be integrated into the primary health care system and encourage popular participation, by the time it reaches the grass roots level, this has all been forgotten, and only the targets survive, and of those only the sterilisation targets are taken seriously.

Indeed, such is the Government's unswerving orientation towards sterilisation that even targets and statistics for other methods are expressed as "sterilisation equivalents". Of other methods, only the condom has been an unqualified success. Within 10 years of its introduction in 1968, the condom was being used by some 3.5 million men, and by 1982 about 4.4 million couples, or 55% of all acceptors, were using the condom. This suc-

cess is largely due to a pioneering social marketing programme under which government-subsidised condoms are sold (under the trade name of "Nirodh") at a nominal price through 400 000 retail outlets. A massive advertising campaign made a hitherto unknown product a household word.

But other methods have not fared so well. The IUD was promoted enthusiastically in the 1960s and 1.7 million were inserted in two years. But pre-insertion checks and follow-up were poor, with disastrous results, and for many years the IUD programme was virtually dropped. The pill has been neglected as a spacing method, and the injectable has never been used. Vasectomy suffered, too, from over-enthusiastic promotion, especially during the Emergency, when in 22 months 11 million people (mostly men, many of them unmarried, over-age or with less than two children) were sterilised compared to 1.3 million in the preceding year. Over the last 10 years female sterilisation has increased in popularity.

Female literacy

As a vast country—most of its states many times more populated than most African countries—India naturally shows variations in family planning achievement. In fact these variations are larger than might be expected and are not necessarily correlated with economic performance or even investment in family planning. Kerala is one of India's poorest states yet its family planning performance is one of the best, no doubt because of its high level of female literacy, low infant mortality rate and high expenditure on health.

To quote only one of many impressive statistics, the number of live births per woman in Kerala fell from 5.9 during 1965-70 to 3.7 during 1975-80—a fall of 38%. Fertility declines of this magnitude have usually been associated with high per capita income, rapid economic growth and a high proportion of the population living in urban areas.

But Kerala is one of the poorer states of India, with a per capita income below the national average, nearly half the labour force employed in agriculture, and calorific consumption only 70% of requirements. Obviously, easy access to a comprehensive family planning service was a vital factor in this fertility decline, although Kerala has actually spent less per head on family planning than most other Indian states. But more important are the reasons which prompted more women to use contraceptives or be sterilised.

Most observers agree that the main factors in Kerala have been a sharp increase in female literacy and a concomitant rise in the age of marriage, improvements in general health services and reduction in infant mortality, a reduction in poverty through better wages and land reforms, and a reduction in child labour because of better and longer schooling for all children.

It is also notable that, although the sterilisation rate in Kerala is one of the highest in India, the performance there was not greatly affected by the Emergency and its aftermath. Thus in the Emergency year of 1976/77 Kerala achieved 96% of its target, while Uttar Pradesh, one of the northern states where excesses were at their worst,

achieved 209%; the following year, Kerala achieved 55%, but Uttar Pradesh only 3%.

Uttar Pradesh, with a current population of over 125 million, is one of India's problem states and the other side of the Kerala coin. Infant mortality is around 180 per 1 000 as against Kerala's 55, female literacy is 14% as against Kerala's 64%, and Uttar Pradesh's per capita expenditure on health and schooling is much lower. Under 12% of Uttar Pradesh couples are using family planning as against over 30% in Kerala.

A drop in the ocean

In many respects Uttar Pradesh exemplifies what is wrong with the Indian family planning programme, with its insistent emphasis on targets, steril-

isation and incentives, and its relative disregard for caring family health services. Only recently, *India Today* magazine (15 February 1987) reported that the Uttar Pradesh health authorities were resorting to desperate measures. After using incentives such as television sets, refrigerators and mopeds to boost sterilisation figures to a record 600 000 in 1985-86, the state government was still dissatisfied and has now resorted to punitive measures to "shake up" the 32 000 employees of the Family Welfare Department. Those failing to exceed 50% of the target allocated will get bad entries on their character sheet; those attaining 10-25% will be denied annual increments, and those failing to reach 10% will face disciplinary action. According to State Health Minister Lokpati Tripathi, the target of 800 000 for the current year will now be exceeded,

**Population Services:
the role of NGOs**

"EDUCATION NOW... BABIES LATER" is the bold slogan on the T-shirt of a young Sierra Leone footballer. He is participating in an imaginative scheme to educate adolescents about the dangers and prevention of teenage pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. Implemented by an indigenous women's organisation with technical and financial assistance from Population Services, a British NGO, the project illustrates well the positive contribution which can be made by European Non-Governmental Organisations to health care and family planning programmes in developing countries.

NGOs are widely respected for their ability to reach the needy, specialist knowledge and pioneering role. Yet few European NGOs are actively involved in the family planning field and fewer still specialise in this important work.

Population Services provides assistance with a wide variety of innovative and caring projects in the developing world. The emphasis is on cost-effective projects implemented by indigenous organisations. This ensures that projects are culturally acceptable to the communities



they serve and that the local organisation is strengthened and can eventually become self-sufficient. Their largest and longest-running programme is in India, where Population Service's Indian affiliate runs 16 health care/family planning clinics, helped by European Community funding. Serving low-income urban women, the efficiency and friendly atmosphere of the clinics have won the recognition of the Indian Government.

Experience gained in India is being utilised in Africa. A maternal health and family planning clinic programme is being co-funded by the EEC in Kenya. But in Africa there is still a great need for well-planned education about the benefits of child spacing—which is where the footballer in Sierra Leone comes in. ◊

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
but “even this”, he lamented, “is a drop in the ocean”.

A drop in the ocean it may be, but it should not be forgotten that the immediate and most important benefits of family planning accrue to the individual, the couple and their other children. Spacing methods are at least as important to them as terminal methods. Spacing methods, later marriage, better infant and child health—all have demographic effects which will be greater in the long run because the people perceive that the family planning programme is run for their health and benefit. It was because the Indian programme *in its implementation* failed on the whole to provide a caring service which would give the best benefits to families that the Swedish Government, which had provided \$12 million to support family planning over the previous five years decided to discontinue its aid in 1979. It is also worth mentioning that most of the non-governmental organisations—including a number of European charities—which provide family planning assistance in India have services which are popular and effective, not least perhaps because all of them carefully distanced themselves from the excesses of the Emergency, but also surely because their approach is more “client-oriented”.

Is the Green Revolution enough?

These, then, are the lessons that India's successes and failures hold for other countries. But it is perhaps worth answering the question increasingly posed since the Reagan Administration upset the apple-cart at the 1984 International Conference on Population. There the US delegation, inspired by the writings of Julian Simon (author of *The Resourceful Earth*) declared that rapid population growth was not a problem. Such people argue that the Green Revolution has transformed India's capacity to feed its population (which is true) and point out that population growth was positively helpful in the industrialised countries during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

But in Europe population growth rates were much lower—in Britain, for example, the rate was only rarely as high as 1.5%, and the average during



Vivant Univers

“The immediate and most important benefits of family planning accrue to the individual, the couple and their other children”. Here, a rural school for girls.

the European population boom was around 0.7%. These countries also had an outlet for excess population via migration, and were also relatively wealthy before they began to industrialise. India has none of these advantages, and its economy has for long suffered from under-utilisation of labour. Nor are there any conceivable economies of scale (an old argument in favour of larger populations) for a population of 800 million which were not obtainable for a population of 400 million.

So, yes, India does have a population problem, and it is a problem which is going to increase as its annual number of labour force entrants increases, so that before the end of the century India will need to find more jobs than China to satisfy young people reaching employment age. But it is a problem that might solve itself if family planning were better integrated into the health services, if the effort put into targets and incentives were directed into involving the village communities in their own primary health care and family planning, and if top political priority were given to improving women's status.

Grounds for optimism

There are elements in the latest policy statement which give some grounds for optimism. The Government is to intensify the female literacy programme, offer better employment opportunities for rural women, try to reduce the infant mortality rate to below 60 per 1000, shift the emphasis from propaganda to information and education, using schools, colleges, trade unions and adult education programmes. Better use will be made of non-governmental organisations, which are most effective at motivating people at the grassroots level, and a two-million strong village-level volunteer corps is to be set up to motivate people and act as catalysts for social change. Finally, taking a leaf out of China's book, the Government will give couples with only one child old age pensions, and in an attempt to remove the deep-rooted preference for sons, those with two daughters and no sons will be given bonds worth 25 000 rupees if they accept sterilisation, as well as “honoured citizen” cards entitling them to preferential treatment in employment schemes, land allotment and loans. ○ J.H.

Demographic trends in the Federal Republic of Germany

by Professor K. SCHWARTZ^(*)

Many articles in this dossier point to the risks of high fertility in developing countries. There are also, however, certain adverse consequences involved in low fertility, as is seen in the following article based on the example of one European country, Germany.

In many respects we are living in a world of contrasts. That is also true if we look at demographic trends. In many parts of the world we have a situation which sometimes has been described as a "demographic explosion". As to the demographic situation in many industrialised countries, however, we are inclined to characterise it — certainly exaggeratedly — by the slogan "demographic implosion". The demographic situation in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is one of the best illustrations of how the use of such a slogan came about.

Not very long ago population increases in West Germany were not very much less than those in the developing countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa to-day, though many parts of the world were still open for emigration. In the 50 years after the the foundation of the German Reich in 1871 the population increased from 20 to almost 40 millions, or by nearly 100%. Thereafter there was an additional increase of 20 millions, or 50% within 40 years. The climax came in 1974, when West Germany reached a population of more than 62 millions. Population density therefore rose from 80 people per km² to almost 250. Surprisingly such a development could occur in spite of the terrible loss of men and women during two World Wars (two million during the first and three and a half million during the second).

The development before World War I was due to a high surplus of births over deaths. This had much to do with the high number of children born to couples in the last century and in the early part of this century. Marriages contracted towards the end of the last century produced — on average — five

live births, with those at the beginning of the 20th century still producing four. On the other hand, a hundred years ago only 60% of children born alive reached the age of 20 and were therefore able to become parents; around 1930, 90% of children reached this age. Nowadays, child mortality is so low that only 1-2% of the new-born die before reaching adulthood.

Another push that accelerated population growth after World War II was the entry of more than 10 million refugees from the eastern territories of the former German Reich, of three million persons from the German Democratic Republic (DDR) and, finally, of nearly 4.5 million foreigners. The number of children of couples who married after World War II became lower and lower. Nevertheless, the FRG had a surplus of births over deaths until 1972. By 1985, however, there were 704 000 deaths and only 586 000 births. This surplus of 118 000 deaths reaches 164 000 if births and deaths of foreigners living in the FRG are excluded. In 1973 about 58 million people of German nationality lived in West Germany; now their number is about 56.5. On the other hand the number of foreigners increased to 4.5 millions or more than 7% of the total population of 61 millions in 1986.

Naturally great interest is expressed in future trends because so many fields of public and social life are closely linked to the demographic situation. Are Germans really dying out slowly, as is maintained by some people who exaggerate the facts?

There are three components which determine future population trends: fertility, mortality and migration. Migration can be almost discounted if we restrict our considerations to the German population living in the FRG.

We have, however, to consider that a further decrease of mortality or — which amounts to the same — a further increase of life-expectancy is probable. New-born boys now have a life-expectancy of nearly 71 and new-born girls of nearly 78, and it may well be that in the next 10 to 15 years this will reach 73 and 80 years respectively. So far population forecasts have a reliable base. But what will the future prospects of fertility be?

In 1985 the number of live births to parents of German nationality was about 530 000. To ensure that population levels are maintained in the long term the number of births should, however, have been nearly 800 000. To demonstrate the low level of fertility let us refer to other examples:

(a) to "reproduce" the population under present mortality conditions, 100 women must have 210 children in the course of their lives. However, the real number of children born to women born after 1950 will not be higher than 140 or 150. That means that one third of the children needed to maintain population levels is missing.

(b) Couples who married 10 to 15 years ago will certainly not have more than 150 children per 100. Between 15% and 20% will perhaps remain childless and only 15% will have three or more children. On the other hand marriage has decreased very much in the last 10 to 15 years and illegitimacy has remained relatively rare. Thus couples had to have about 230 to 240 children to maintain population levels.

It would be fair to say, therefore, that a decline in the population can only be prevented by migration or by behaviour which avoids planned childlessness and which leads 40% of couples to have three children. Some should even be ready to have four or more. The number of children born to couples would have to be even larger if the present low inclination to marry and the present high inclination to get divorced should prevail. We think that in future only 75%-80% of the younger male and about 80% of the younger female generation will marry during their lives, which could lead to a situation in which 25%-30% of women never have children.

This situation is unlikely to change in the near future. To have one child or two children seems to be the gener-

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ally accepted norm. Contraception and abortion are important means to avoid exceeding this norm. Why would German women wish to have more children anyway?

More and more women wish to remain independent and know very well that to have children is a life-long engagement. They want to have a paid job that makes them independent from men, who are not, so far, ready to take over duties in the household or to participate fully in the rearing of children. Besides this we should not forget that children in our society do not contribute to the income of the family, but rather cost money, because child-labour is forbidden and because the time spent in education has become longer. We should also not forget that in modern societies families with several children are under social pressure, because they are not able to compete with couples without children or with only one child who can spend much more money on themselves. To have children can therefore only be justified emotionally, and often be satisfied by having one child or two children only.

If we take into account all these arguments it is impossible to foresee a fundamental change in present attitudes towards children. This interpretation of current observations is not an extraordinary one. It is shared by almost all German demographers.

What does that mean for the future?

The Federal Statistical Office thinks that on the basis of this situation the German population living in the FRG will decrease until the year 2000 by nearly two millions — not a great deal. But the rate of decrease will rise more and more rapidly when the generations born since 1970 reach the age of parenthood. It may therefore be possible that the number of Germans living in the FRG in 2010 will be more than 5 million lower than to-day, nine millions lower in the year 2020 and 14 millions lower in the year 2030. The 42 millions remaining will amount to almost the same number of inhabitants as those living on the territory of the FRG in 1939. But this population would have an age structure of a quite different pattern. In 1939 only 10%

were more than 60 years old, while the present-day proportion is now about 22%. It will be about 26% in the year 2000 and about 38% in 2030. In the same period the proportion of young people becomes smaller and smaller, as would the proportion of the age group of those between 20 to 60 years old, who, through the revenue they generate, not only have to ensure the subsistence of children who do not yet participate in the work force, but also the subsistence of the oldest who are living off pensions. Today the ratio of men and women over 60 years old to those between 20 and 60 is about 40 to 100; towards the end of the century this ratio may perhaps be 47 to 100. But the "burden" of those in the labour force will be much higher in the next century. According to many estimates we may then be living in a world in which one person in the labour force has to support another person who has retired.

This trend has been described at some length to illustrate that very low fertility (as well as very high fertility) is not without risks. One consequence of the age structure with a decreasing proportion of children and an increasing proportion of older people is the low number of persons per household. One hundred years ago this number was, on average, 4.6, as compared with only 2.4 now. Formerly the percentage of those living alone was so small that it was almost negligible. But now nearly one third of all households are one-person households. Thirteen per cent of the total population now live in such households, most of them widows. It has become rare for parents to live with their children and grandchildren in old age. The total number of households, that means dwelling units, in which people are living together or alone, is about 25 million. But there are only 500 000 households consisting of three or more generations. That does not mean that there is no contact between different generations of a family, but it has become usual for children to leave the home of their parents when they are 20 to 25 years old, whether married or not.

Another interesting feature of modern times is the growing number of households in which unmarried men and women are living together, because marriage has lost a good deal of its attractiveness. Until recently about



Large families like this one are becoming rare. To have one child or two children now seems to be the generally accepted norm

95% of men and more than 90% of women married, most of them, when they were between 20 and 30 years old. In future it may well be that only 75% to 80% of men and about 80% of women will ever get married in their lives. In any case, age at marriage will be higher than it was 15 to 20 years ago. It is unusual, however, for couples living together to have children. Even to-day most young men and women think that children should be born legitimately. So the decreasing incidence of marriage may be interpreted as a consequence of a decreasing wish to have children.

Nevertheless there is a growing number of women — and to a certain degree also of men — who are unmarried but nevertheless living together with children. This observation of more and more one-parent families is due to a widespread inclination to get divorced where marriages fail. About 25-30% of marriages end in divorce and this proportion is now about 50% in the bigger towns.

If we make an attempt to summarise our findings, there can be no doubt that the demographic scene has changed very greatly and very rapidly in a few years. This change is certainly not restricted to West Germany but can be observed in many other countries. But there is no other with such a low level of fertility, however. The long-term danger of the consequences of this situation are clear, but nobody knows as yet how to avoid them. ○

K.S.

Demography: how the EEC can help

by Marina BARALDINI (*)

Most developing countries are experiencing rapid rates of population growth for which there is no historical precedent. The foreseeable effects of such unrestrained growth on continued economic development and sustainable improvements in standards of living are at the heart of the policy debate on population and development and appropriate responses to the problem.

A young population which is growing rapidly has major repercussions on agricultural production, on food requirements, on natural resources and the environment, on rural development and urbanisation, on employment and on the demand for education and health services.

The Commission regards population as a critical element of development policy in general. The Development Council of the European Communities recently adopted a resolution on population and development that sets out the general principles and guidelines which will form the basis for Community action in this area. Most of the Commission's aid to population programmes has been traditionally channelled through specialised NGOs. The adoption of an explicit policy in support of Governments' efforts in this area will, in all likelihood, result in a gradual but steady increase in the Commission's involvement in this sector.

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This article examines the Commission's policy, particularly as it relates to the improvement both of mother and child health and of women's socio-economic status.

The socio-economic and cultural context

The relations between population growth and development are complex and are more easily perceived at a national economic level instead of household or family level. Yet population growth is a function of couples' desired family size, which is determined by deeply rooted cultural and religious values, as well as by prevailing levels of economic development, education, and by the status of women.

In most rural societies, particularly where poverty is widespread, there are powerful cultural and economic incentives for having large families. Social prestige and acceptance, especially for women, are attached to large family size. Children are often an important source of pleasure in remote rural areas. The economic costs of having children are very low, indeed non-existent, where parents have little or no access to educational facilities for them. They are a source of cheap labour—it has been estimated that children will have more than repaid their costs by the age of eight to ten. In addition, they provide safety and security for parents in their old age in the absence of social security and

family welfare systems. High infant mortality is thus a major determinant of high fertility, and it induces long-lasting behavioural patterns in respect of fertility.

The relationship between known fertility determinants is complex and is still a matter of some controversy; however, thorough analysis of the results of the World Fertility Survey and the accumulated experience in this field have established that desired fertility is influenced by:

- women's education (it needs to exceed seven years, otherwise a little schooling only tends to promote fertility), employment and social status;
- infant and child mortality rates and life expectancy;
- cultural factors related to age of marriage, breast-feeding practices, and child-spacing;
- income and employment opportunities for the poor;
- security of land tenure.

Clearly any effort to change any of these factors requires commitment, investment and coordination. Some factors can lend themselves to direct policy measures, but others, such as overall economic growth, income distribution, employment, education and health, will take a long time before having an effect on population growth. The complexity of the population equation counsels for great caution and sensitivity in dealing with population issues, and requires a realistic understanding of the timescale involved as well as of the limited impact that even the most successful direct measures can have.

This awareness does not militate against the need for such policies, but places them in their proper context and recognises their necessarily multidisciplinary nature.

Community policy

At its meeting of November 1986, the EEC Development Council adopted a Resolution which sets out the basic principles and guidelines for the Community's policy in this area. The Council particularly stressed the need for population policies and programmes to form an integral part of overall development policies, to be neither coercive nor discriminatory and to be based on the fundamental right of individuals and couples to



There is a well-established link between the rate of child and infant mortality and the birth rate; here a health and social services centre in N'Djamena (Chad)

choose voluntarily the number and spacing of their children.

The Commission is prepared to assist those countries which wish to further develop and define a population policy, and to implement those projects which both parties agree are appropriate responses to prevailing conditions and constraints.

Several main areas of cooperation have been identified, and are referred to in the Council's resolution. One

area not considered here is regional development, whose purpose is to bring about a more balanced spatial distribution of investments and population so as to encourage the take-off of areas with high potential for economic growth.

The first area of cooperation concerns the development of national capacity for demographic studies; this involves data collection and analysis, the strengthening of national sample

survey programmes, and the development of new data collection and analysis techniques.

Thus the EDF has financed under Lomé II a population census in the Solomon Islands.

Aid has also been provided to several ACP countries for census and sample survey activities as well as the strengthening of central statistical offices.

The second main area for cooperation essentially seeks to influence the socio-economic determinants of fertility: the main aspect of what is a very complex relation essentially concerns the role and the status of women in a particular society.

The World Fertility Survey has revealed the fundamental importance of the level of women's education on fertility. The beneficial aspects of women's education extend to general family welfare. Rates of survival for the children of literate mothers are significantly higher than for those of illiterate women.

The fundamental role that women play in agriculture, family welfare and education is now universally acknowledged. The Community's policy is to increase the involvement of women, making them a target group in agricultural and rural development projects in particular. This will enable women both to improve their productivity as well as their ability to satisfy the basic needs of their family, which has traditionally depended on the income of women. A secondary effect of increasing women's income will be to enhance their social status and self-esteem. Experience in the implementation of specific population projects such as family planning has revealed time and time again that demand for family planning is more likely to be expressed when people—not just women but also men—feel that they are somehow in control of their lives, and can try and plan a better future for themselves and their children; the desire for a smaller family is often a result of these deep-rooted changes in fundamental values and traditions.

Rural development, a priority target of the third Lomé Convention, increasingly involves a substantial Community development component. Women are a fundamental part of that process.

The Zaire-Nile Ridge

— an answer to Rwanda's population challenge —

The EEC does many things to help ACP populations (see opposite). In some countries, Community aid has reduced the pressure on arable land by making fresh land available and the Zaire-Nile Ridge in Rwanda, which is outlined below, is one example of this.

On 15 July 1982, Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana, the Rwandese Head of State, opened the rural development project (worth ECU 13 800 000) on the Zaire-Nile Ridge, with Edgard Pisani, who was then the EEC Development Commissioner. The aim was to attract landless farmers to a medium-altitude area, install them on uninhabited former forest land and help them develop it.

It was to be run against the background of the food strategy, the backbone of Rwanda's policy of achieving self-sufficiency in food for its people by the year 2000 by boosting agricultural output and developing and marketing the produce and extending the non-agricultural sector so as to ease the pressure on the land and develop a market for agricultural products.

Rwanda had the immense challenge of a constantly expanding population. It needed arable land in the overpopulated medium-altitude areas and had to make the most of what land was still available at high altitude. Hence this project.

It involved a series of coordinated schemes aimed at developing agriculture, herding and forestry in the area. Agricultural plots, for example, were marked off and allocated to

families living at medium altitude (about a thousand today). Back-up was provided for installation, collective pastureland was developed, work on replanting the edge of the Nyungwe natural forest was begun (3 000 ha has already been completed) and schools and dispensaries were set up.

In only a few years, the countryside in the project zone has altered. Whereas yesterday it was empty, inhospitable mountain land, today it is lived in and organised and really thriving. These new pioneers have planned their building of scattered dwellings and the agricultural plots that were allocated are being worked, making a tangible and happy impression on these fine highlands.

Although there are still many problems—and fertility of the soil is not the least of them—the Ridge area has a promising future. More money income (a combination of farming, herding and wage-earning), a better food balance (more and more diversified production) and better coverage of water, wood, education and health requirements are already contributing to improving the standard of living and they will make an even greater contribution tomorrow.

The originality, aims and size of this programme to colonise land that is still available is in line with Rwanda's development priorities and is a first response to the vast challenge facing the country of a thousand hills. ◊

Daniel GERMAIN
Desk Officer for Rwanda



Family planning programmes must be integrated into the health services

The third main area of cooperation concerns the development of primary health care, with programmes for mother and child health being strengthened and extended to cover child spacing or family planning.

There is a well-established link between the rate of child and infant mortality and the birth rate. A woman, a couple or a family cannot be expected deliberately to reduce the number of births if too many of their children are likely to die in infancy. A high child and infant mortality rate is thus one of the main factors leading couples to have a large number of children. For a specific region or area, this rate is generally correlated with the prevailing socio-economic situation: it is higher where poverty and malnutrition are the rule.

Birth rates and infant and child mortality sometimes vary greatly within a country, or indeed within a region, thus reflecting considerable socio-economic and cultural differences and illustrating yet again, as if that were necessary, that considerations of social justice and better distribution of available resources have much to do with population matters.

It is well established that mortality amongst children and mothers can be reduced directly by birth control: illness and death amongst both children and mothers are higher if childbirth occurs too early or too late or too frequently (less than every two years), or if each mother has more than four or five children.

The recent Nairobi International Safe Motherhood Conference (February 1987), organised by the World Bank, the World Health Organisation, and the United Nations Fund for Pop-

ulation Activities, focused international attention on the extremely high rates of maternal mortality in developing countries. These countries commonly have maternal mortality rates 200 times higher than those of Europe and America; this gap constitutes the widest disparity in all public health statistics.

There are two basic strategies to attack this particular problem as far as the health system is concerned: making adequate health services available to women who currently have little or no access to them, and reducing the lifetime *cumulative* risk a woman is exposed to *each time* she is pregnant by reducing the number of pregnancies. This can be done through family planning or child spacing.

However, there are several conditions which must be met when implementing family planning programmes.

The first of these conditions is that any action concerning family planning be integrated into the health services. The experience of governments and organisations which have adopted a vertical approach has clearly shown the risks of coercion and abuse of power. For example, access to health services has been limited to women (and the children of women) agreeing to practise contraception. Integration of these services into the health system will ensure protection of women's human rights.

Secondly, no female contraceptive is totally safe. Follow-up and supervision need to be provided to treat complications. Indeed, integration into the health services offers the guarantees necessary for the success of any programme since ultimately its credibility

depends on its ability to deal with difficult cases: high-risk pregnancies, complications arising from induced abortions, rejection of contraceptive devices, sterility, etc. It is essential that such cases be treated and referred, when necessary, to intermediate health structures or a referral hospital.

Thirdly—and this point cannot be over-emphasised—the ethnic, social, cultural and economic context of any family planning or child-spacing action must be understood. Socio-economic factors such as the literacy rate, per capita income, access to information and the quality and degree of access to health services vary greatly within countries. Such cultural factors as the age of marriage and the duration of breast-feeding also vary greatly and can have as much influence as socio-economic factors. Moreover fertility should not be dealt with exclusively as a women's issue, since men also have a say in the decision.

The Commission has a long-established tradition of assistance to the health sector. Recently it has stepped up its involvement in mother and child health in several countries. Truly effective mother and child health programmes require properly trained staff, a well-functioning referral system, including transport, access to drugs, etc. The training of health auxiliaries and midwives to expand coverage and improve access holds great promise but it is yet another policy instrument which requires a major investment in training and supervision; both are highly labour-intensive activities. No-one can deny the priority, but there are no short cuts to improved mother and child health.

The Commission's direct involvement in family planning projects themselves has so far been extremely limited. However, it has co-financed a considerable number of NGO projects in the population sector. Some 80 projects have benefitted from Commission funding since 1976 for a total of ECU 4 million.

Project activities range from setting up health delivery systems and provision of services, to community information and education campaigns, the setting up of community-based services, and national and regional seminars for opinion leaders. ○ M.B.

MADAGASCAR

The Higher Management Training Centre

An EDF training project standing on its own feet

by Benoît AUBENAS (*)

On the highlands 170 km south of Madagascar's capital, Antananarivo, stands Antsirabe, a tourist and health resort with all the discreet charm of a spa town. Surrounded by greenery, it combines the calm of a backwater with the bustle of an economically developed area with a number of industries. It also has good communications, by road and by air, with the capital.

This is the location that the Malagasy Government chose in 1978 for a training centre for managers, "le Centre de Formation et de Perfectionnement des Cadres dirigeants (CFC)". The Centre is housed in the Hôtel des Thermes, an elegant building which in the past attracted many visitors, some in rather special circumstances, such as Mohamed V, the King of Morocco, sent there in exile just before his country achieved independence.

What is the role of the CFC?

The Malagasy Government was anxious to provide a back-up for foreign technical assistance and ensure the smooth and speedy development of industry in Madagascar and so in 1978

it decided to offer "assistance for managers of enterprises" in the form of a training scheme for executive and managerial staff.

There were three components to the scheme:

(i) a Malagasy management consultancy firm would help firms to identify their objectives, manage their resources and provide basic and advanced staff training;

(ii) a Malagasy audit firm would provide accelerated training for auditors (3 to 5 years), set up management control systems for state-run companies and give specialist training in auditing to young graduates or government officials;

(iii) a training centre which would organise short seminars and practical, on-the-job training exercises for executive officials of Malagasy state-run enterprises and their principal deputies. The Centre would train them in all aspects of management techniques from both the technical and the personnel relations angles. This personnel relations aspect was particularly important at the time because of the new Charter of Socialist Enterprises, which called for the participation of all employees in management and the achievement of targets.

This scheme for assisting Malagasy businesses completed the existing training infrastructure provided by the "Université pour les formations générales" and the Institut National Promotion-Formation, INPF, (set up in 1972) for middle management, foremen and technicians.

The Government then approached the Community to ask for a financial contribution to the scheme under the fourth EDF indicative programme (1975-89).

The proposal to aid a major training scheme in Madagascar met with a favourable response since it would usefully dovetail with the training work already being carried out. The Community was already financing on-the-spot training and extension operations for peasant farmers and rural businesses under the project to aid the "Fokonolona" local groupings. These groupings produce the rice which is the staple food of the Malagasy population (400 gm per person per day — a record!). Interestingly enough, the Community was also putting up finance to promote industrial exports (agri-food, tobacco, cotton, etc.) through better management⁽¹⁾.

The Community's financial contribution (about 2 million ECU in addition to parallel financing of 0.5 million ECU from the Malagasy Government) was used to finance short seminars with the participation of international



General view of the Hôtel des Thermes at Antsirabe

(*) Principal Administrator, Commission of the European Communities.

(1) Or import substitution.

experts who would train their Malagasy counterparts. These seminars were designed primarily for some 800 executives in some 150 state-run enterprises (1).

The proposed themes for the seminars were as follows:

- management
- financial control
- project feasibility and evaluation
- personnel management
- procurement and stock management
- production and maintenance
- distribution
- accountancy and finance.

In addition to financing international technical assistance, either on a permanent or one-off basis, the Community equipped the centre (seminar rooms and offices for the administration) and provided teaching and other types of materials, not forgetting the all-important transport equipment.

The Malagasy Government, for its part, undertook to equip part of the Hôtel des Thermes, by then abandoned by leisured takers of the waters, to host the decision-makers of today and tomorrow.

The programme had a number of goals:

- promotion of modern and dynamic management of national enterprises;
- encouragement of continuous managerial training in a specifically Malagasy context rather than rather than a foreign—and much more expensive—one;
- fostering of fruitful exchanges of experience between managers;
- last, but not least, making firms themselves contribute to the cost of the seminars; this offered the triple advantage of motivating enterprises and trainees to participate, providing the centre with income to cover some of its running costs and testing the value of the teaching offered by the volume of demand.

What is the situation in 1987?

One thing has to be said—the centre has been successful in three key areas which were shown to be vital for

(1) Namely all medium-sized firms and upwards at that time.

the future of the centre when its activities were evaluated in 1982:

- (i) “Malgachisation” of staff;
- (ii) diversification of its activities;
- (iii) self-financing.

The Malgachisation of staff is a sensitive area where persuasion is needed. In the case of a centre for modern management techniques, enterprises often prize the work of expatriates over that of local staff. Fashion and the belief that anything foreign is best mean that new, or even revolutionary, techniques are more acceptable or more credible if they are presented by an expatriate rather than a local expert, even one trained abroad.

It must be said that the aid dispensed by the international community has often confirmed this belief and that acceptance of the value of local élites has not been conspicuous on either side.

At the outset all the seminars were given by outside experts but by 1985 the situation was as follows: of 35 seminars, 29 were led by permanent CFC staff, 2 in cooperation with outside technical assistance and 4 with temporary staff.

One of the initial goals has thus been achieved, and it has been achieved without any falling off in trainee numbers.

This shows that the centre has gained credibility in the country, no mean achievement in the field of the transmission of knowledge.

Diversification of training has taken two forms. First, there have been developments related to a fairly traditional range of subjects as described earlier. Successful themes to have emerged include “budgetary control”, “training of teaching staff”, “organisation of work” and “general management” but this diversification, which reflects developments in the business world and managerial science and changes in demand, do, it must be admitted, run up against a certain prejudice in favour of known standard subjects that are sure not to fail. New topics do not always meet with immediate success and this gives birth to fears about the Centre’s credibility as a whole in a field regarded as critical.

Another aspect is the work “prospecting” to find out about firms’ wants and requirements. This, howev-

er, requires time, money, staff and the skill to do it, which is not always possible in a fledgling organisation.

Another form of diversification has been an effort to take the training to the enterprises themselves, training at the workplace. This is carried out only in the larger companies such as ZEREN, JIRAMA and SONPL. While taking seminar participants away from the firm helps them shed the constraints of their everyday working environment, practical, on-the-job training gives an immediate illustration of the training given, often showing trainees a solution to the problems they have encountered. This kind of recipe is often what the trainees are looking for.


Getting out of the “ghetto” has thus boosted the Centre’s credibility and it has no hesitations about working outside. There is still room to develop this form of training but for this to happen the Centre needs more staff, a status as a business consultancy centre rather than just a training resource and a more aggressive public relations campaign to win over firms.

Another of the Centre’s goals is financial autonomy. It received start-up assistance from the Community and the Malagasy Government to cover initial investment on the understanding that running costs would be covered by fees charged for the training given.

We should pay tribute, in passing, to this attempt to finance a training centre from own resources, something which is rare in a developing country. To raise finance from courses depends on two things: first, that the enterprises take a favourable view of the courses offered and second that they have enough resources to pay to have their staff trained by the Centre.

The pitfall is that if the seminars cost too much they will fail to attract clients.

The situation was difficult for a centre finding its feet in a country in the grips of an economic crisis. Let us not mince words. The Centre has not achieved the level of income hoped for and must juggle to find the right balance, increasing its prices to reasonable levels and offering more seminars that are better tailored to firms’ requirements or even the specific re-



The left wing of the Hôtel des Thermes where the CFC is housed

quirements of a firm or number of firms. This is a teething problem that is almost resolved.

It is interesting to point out in this respect that if the Centre successfully carries off its financial balancing act in 1987—as looks likely—it will have proved that it is able to manage its own business activities, something that will add not a little to its credibility.

Another problem that was dogging the centre until 1985 at least was the drop-out rate. Any training programme in a developing country has this added difficulty: late registrations and a high drop-out rate. It has also afflicted the Centre and is caused by the fact that the scarcity of skilled staff means that they are often responsible for a number of tasks. The drop-out rate makes a hole in the centre's finances and affects the structuring of its activities. Two figures suffice to illustrate the point: over the past four years the number of seminar participants has risen by 10% a year but the drop-out rate has remained constant at about 13%.

Another interesting item to close the balance sheet: the youth of the trainees. In 1985 the average age of the female participants (16% of the total) was 35 while the average age of the men was 39. This indicates that firms are recruiting young managers and have no compunction in spending time and money on training the decision-makers of today and tomorrow.

This is an encouraging sign for both the centre and the Malagasy economy.

What does the future hold in store?

Between 1982 and 1985 1 357 trainees passed through the Centre, which is now operating without any Community financing. This means that the growth period is over and the Centre is running on an even keel.

Community financing did not stop abruptly on 31 December 1986, it left behind a guide for the future in the form of a detailed study. It is indeed important for a higher management centre to look to the future.

Two questions have to be answered:

- (a) How will the Centre adapt to technical and technological developments in business management?
- (b) What will the Centre do when all managers, numbered at about 1 500, have passed through it at least once and even twice in some cases?

The Centre has to have the equipment and staff to cope with new technologies, particularly computers, if it is to help Malagasy industry keep up with industrial office management techniques. This is an area where external aid donors could usefully intervene since it would build up the competitiveness of Malagasy industries.

But all this depends on the future of the Centre, the second big question. Madagascar has a number of institutions, within the university and without, which study management problems and assist Malagasy industry. The Centre, for its part, cannot go on recycling Malagasy executives indefinitely. There are thus two things which have to be done, namely grouping and coordinating the various existing institutions working directly or indirectly to improve Malagasy business management. This could be done under the flexible leadership of the CFC. At the same time the CFC could then specialise in the study of much more specific management problems than in the past such as innovation, mastering administrative flows and productivity.

Lastly, there is an area where the Centre has boundless scope for development, namely regional cooperation. Its four neighbours, Comoros, the Seychelles, Réunion and Mauritius, could take advantage of the Centre, which they have not yet done, and also give it an international dimension that it still lacks. This would be a further test of its value.

* * *

The Centre has showed its worth in an often tricky situation. It must now be helped to develop. It is one of the key factors in the development of Madagascar's industries, which must export to earn the hard currency needed for human and economic development. The Centre can help Malagasy enterprises to improve their solvency. A number, however, are still reluctant to invest in training or advice. It is up to the Centre to persuade them of the need. This is particularly true now that Madagascar—after years of state-control—is privatising parts of its industry. Firms will no longer be able to run to the state for finance and they will either sink or swim.

Revitalisation of the industrial fabric and greater competitiveness are among the objectives set out in the indicative programme agreed by the Community and Madagascar under the third Lomé Convention. This means the Community will be on hand to help the centre in its development. ○ B.A.

Saving the future blind

West Africa's Onchocerciasis Control Programme



WHO

Onchocerciasis affects some 30 million people throughout the world, of whom as many as 25 million are in West Africa. Not only is the disease the cause of great human suffering, leading in its most severe form to blindness (indeed it is commonly referred to as "river blindness"), it is also, because of its prevalence in some of the region's most fertile areas, a major obstacle to its economic development. Campaigns aimed at eradicating the disease have been under way for many years, some of which have met with only mixed success. A major programme, the Onchocerciasis Control Programme (OCP), was launched in 1974, undoubtedly inspired by the success of an earlier EDF project in three infested areas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Côte-d'Ivoire, and has made great strides in controlling the disease in the Volta Basin. Now in its third 6-year phase, the Programme is about to extend its control throughout a wider area still. Six of the European Community's Member States have contributed to the Programme's funds on a bilateral basis in its past phases, and the European Community itself has recently joined no fewer than 19 other donors to make the successful continuation and extension of the programme possible.

Onchocerca volvulus, a parasite, is a worm a few centimetres long which lodges in nodules under the skin of human beings and lives there for anything between 10 and 20 years. The female of the species produces embryos (known as microfilariae) which are "stung" by the female of the black fly *similium*, which needs blood in order to develop its eggs. The disease's association with rivers arises from the fact that these eggs are laid on plants or rocks near watercourses, preferably at sites such as rapids or waterfalls where the flow is particularly fast. In areas of savanna, where such larvae sites are relatively few in number, concentration in valleys is high, and the risk of being seriously affected by the disease accordingly great. In damper forest zones, however, where the vectors would be spread more evenly

through the area, the disease might be widespread, but its effects would be much milder. In such cases the ill effects could be limited to severe itching or to occasional high fevers. The disease is cumulative, however, in the sense that the regular and continuous hosting of new parasites increases its seriousness and can lead to thickening and depigmentation of the skin or even to elephantiasis. If the microfilariae enter the eye, they may seriously damage sight. If there is widespread blindness amongst the young in a given area, the cause is almost certainly onchocerciasis.

The Onchocerciasis Control Programme (OCP) was launched at the request of seven West African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte-d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger and Togo. The target region comprised


some 764 000 km² in the Volta Basin and included large areas of land close to watercourses, where the simuliid is most prevalent. Some 18 000 km of rivers and their tributaries flow through the area, but inhabitants had often deserted the fertile valleys for fear of contracting the disease.

The project, carried out under the aegis of the WHO, has required massive resources for its encouraging results to be obtained. The provisional budget for Phase III, drawn up early last year, came to US \$ 114.3 m, but even this, according to the World Bank—the Programme's bankers—will not be enough for the OCP to extend protection from the disease beyond the present area of concentration. The EEC's contribution of ECU 6 m is destined to help reduce the estimated US \$ 20 m shortfall and to enable protection to be extended beyond the seven countries originally involved and into the neighbouring states of Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Senegal and Sierra Leone. The Programme is scheduled to end in 1997, by which time it is hoped that transmission of the disease throughout West Africa will have been eliminated.

Given that, until recently, no drug had been produced for effectively treating river blindness (see box on research developments), the method adopted for its control has so far been that of destroying the source of the disease—the simuliid itself—by sustained aerial insecticide spraying. The prime targets have been the sites



One of the telltale signs of onchocerciasis is the fibrous nodule which forms under the victim's skin. This child of two already has such a nodule on his head



The area covered by the EDF project of the 1970s. The Onchocerciasis Control Programme's target area extends throughout this area (with the exception of Liberia) and stretches beyond to Benin, Senegal, Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone

where the fly breeds. Spraying is carried out using aircraft hired by the Programme. Up to eight helicopters and one aeroplane are used, usually for three days a week, the insecticide being applied in carefully measured amounts with account taken of the levels of rainfall. Teams visit the sprayed areas to check that the larvae have been killed and transmit the results by radio to the Programme's headquarters in Ouagadougou.

In checking the effectiveness of the control measures in this way, the OCP's epidemiological evaluation unit has acquired extensive knowledge over the years of the life cycle and habits of the fly. It took as a basis for its research 142 representative villages where some 60% of the population

were known to be infected with the disease. The success of the campaign has been such that, by 1984, its transmission had ceased in 90% of the areas initially covered by the programme. In addition, the majority of those with ocular lesions in 1975 no longer showed any evidence of microfilariae ten years later, and damage to eyesight was, in general, far less prevalent. Since the Programme began, an estimated three million children have been protected from all risk of contracting the disease.

The phase into which the Programme is now entering is, arguably, its most important yet. In the six years to come it will aim at safeguarding the considerable results already achieved in the original treatment area by im-

pending reinfestation by infected simuliids from other areas. It will also, however, seek to extend protection from the disease for a further eight million people in the areas into which it will extend its operations, thus bringing to 23 million the total number of people protected from the disease in West Africa.

By the time it ends, the Onchocerciasis Control Programme will have spanned nearly a quarter of a century and will have cost several hundred millions of dollars. If, however, it succeeds—as seems distinctly possible—in ridding West Africa of one of its greatest scourges, few will doubt that the time and money have been anything but well spent. ○

M.v.d.V

Under Phase II of the Onchocerciasis Control Programme (OCP) a substantial sum was set aside for research and development of an effective drug to treat onchocerciasis sufferers. The European Community's Directorate-General for Science, Research and Development has also financed in the framework of its "Science and Technology for Development Programme" studies in this field for several years, principally through the Institute of Tropical Medicine at the University of Tübingen (F.R.G.).

The Institute's research objectives have been, firstly, to conduct chemotherapeutic field trials with new drugs and, secondly, to study the longevity and fertility of the parasite *Onchocerca volvulus*.

One new drug, Ivermectin, has been tested in the field and appears to be both safe and efficient. It could be suitable for mass treatment, moreover, due to its single dose administration.

With regard to the parasite, its mean longevity could be determined after examination of *Onchocerca* nodules taken from inhabitants in areas with a long history of vector control, and a model of the cyclical reproductivity of female worms has been set up.

In conducting their research, the University of Tübingen had frequent contact with institutes in London (Preventive Ophthalmology), Düsseldorf (Genetics and Zoology) and in Heidelberg (Immunology). Links were also maintained with the Institut Ernst Rodenwaldt, Lomé; the Onchocerciasis Control Programme, Ouagadougou, (population dynamics of *O. volvulus*); the IOTA Eye Hospital, Bamako (Ivermectin); the Liberian Institute for Biomedical Research (Ivermectin); the Tamale Hospital, Ghana (Drug trials with Ivermectin etc.) and with the University of Dakar (Ivermectin). ○

FAO: Report moots general changes in agricultural policy in Africa over the next 25 years

Since 1960, per capita food production in Africa has dropped by 20%. Some countries have progressed a lot, but, alas, only a few of them. More than 20% have been stricken by drought, by civil unrest and the effects of unfortunate policies... This is how the FAO sums up the agricultural situation in the nations of Africa after more than two decades of an economic policy geared to giving priority to the rural sector.

In its report on African farm prospects over the next 25 years⁽¹⁾, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation has produced an in-depth analysis of the serious agricultural problems facing the continent and looks at the serious consequences we must expect if the present trends persist for another 25 years.

The causes of the African agricultural crisis

FAO experts have spent more than a year diagnosing African agriculture and they have isolated a series of causes for the present crisis. The first to blame, says the report, is "a distortion of official policies to the detriment of agriculture". This is brought about by a failure to invest enough in the agricultural sector, it says, in spite of the advertised priority which governments put on it... Although, in many countries, more than half of GDP, employment and foreign exchange earnings are accounted for by agriculture, in Africa as a whole the sector gets less than 10% of the national budgets. So it is deprived of the financing it needs to develop and the peasant farmers produce very little more than they need to feed their families, the report goes on. So there is no incentive to produce and the difficulty of finding seed, fertiliser and other agricultural input when there is not enough money helps ensure that potential producers keep their sights low.

Another important aspect of the dis-

tortion of official policies is the particularly unfavourable terms of domestic trade in the rural sector, which suffers the effects of the artificial drop in food import prices due to the overvaluation of national currencies. In Nigeria in 1983, for example, imported maize was about \$ 315 per tonne when the home-grown maize delivered to Lagos was \$ 1200.


One of the consequences of Africa's agricultural policy, the report maintains, is a high-speed change in eating habits—which, in many of the countries, is probably counter to the national interest in the long term. And of course the policy imbalance also has its psychological effects on young potential farmers, who then leave agriculture for the civil service, where they feel they earn more and are, above all, better respected.

In addition to the distortion of policies and the many consequences, the FAO also lists other causes for the crisis—high demographic growth, a slowing down in the extension of arable land, faster deterioration of the environment, an external economic climate that makes it increasingly difficult for most African nations to bal-

ance their books and, lastly, technological stagnation leading, almost everywhere, to a ceiling on or even a decline of crop yield. These various brakes on the development of African agriculture have also been analysed by the World Bank (1986 Annual Report—see Courier no. 100), which reaches similar conclusions to the FAO.

The technological stagnation apparent in African agriculture "since 1970 or even earlier, is evident in the low or zero rates of increase in the yield and productivity of the basis crops and of the livestock sector—and by the still limited consumption of agricultural input such as fertiliser". The estimated consumption of fertiliser is indeed only an average of 5 kg per hectare of food crops, as against more than 30 kg for export crops.

And in spite of the vast unsuitability of many of the imported methods, it is still reasonable to say that the absence of extension services, the far too high cost of obtaining machinery and, in particular, the fact that the countries of Africa do not consume what they produce and do not produce what they consume have helped re-



(1) African agriculture: the next 25 years—FAO, Via delle Terme di Caracalla, 00100 Rome (Italy).



Reducing the amount of arable land in developing countries can have drastic results in the smaller countries such as here in Grenada where peasants have to produce their own food, sometimes from very poor soil

duce the use of the technology that could have helped agriculture advance.

Although exaggerated demographic growth has also led to a rapid reduction in the amount of food available, the extension of often unsuitable crops and soil deterioration (short fallow periods, for example), there is still no doubt that better policies and the proper use of modern farming techniques would have made for substantial improvements in productivity and cushioned the blow of demographic growth. The graph shows the worrying trend in arable land in relation to the population over 20 years.

The FAO report echoes the World Bank's concern with the agricultural problems of the Third World, saying that, when it comes to the way international economic relations affect African agriculture, "world commodity prices have dropped more sharply and more persistently since 1980 than they have for several decades". So, in 1985, the "the terms of trade for primary exports were at their lowest ebb since 1957". And the report goes on to emphasise the fact that Africa has suf-

fered more than other regions from this, particularly since the slump in prices has also gone hand-in-hand with a large decrease in the volume of exports.

Reversing the trend

Africa's future does not have to be like its past, the FAO report makes clear. So the trend has to be reversed. And to do this, the authors put forward a whole series of schemes—or paths to follow—related to the cases of the agricultural crisis just described.

One of the ways they suggest of changing the process of decline of African agriculture is, first of all, developing the land, in particular by a bold irrigation policy. The extensive growing that families used to practise so they could leave the land to rest and become fertile again are not easy ones to manage now that demographic pressure is high and the amount of good land is diminishing, in some cases because of the climate.

The report then goes on to discuss greater use of known techniques as a way of boosting peasant productivity,

starting with the negative trends since 1960 in African agriculture, "much of which is characterised by poor yield... over too long a period". The trend over the past decade in particular could have been much more favourable for most countries, the FAO maintains. Greater use of modern farming techniques should be accompanied by no less technical measures such as the adoption of better and more suitable varieties of seed.

The report looks at the various hypotheses discussed and outlines a scenario for progress in African agriculture by the year 2010. But it stresses that this scenario "is only valid if the Governments adopt policies that create a favourable environment for the application of existing technical solutions and the international community gives them the help they need to do this.

So, it is within a framework of general policy changes that the principal measures envisaged, particularly the four "i"s (incentive, input, institutions and infrastructure) will be effective. ○

L.P.

Leucaena, a tree of many talents

Leucaena is a tree of many and varied talents, growing on slopes and on the flat, and fast, and in most kinds of temperatures and soils, enriching those soils as it matures, providing shade from the sun, shelter from the wind, wood for burning, dye from its bark, nectar from its flowers, fodder from its leaves, nourishment and adornment from its pods and their grains and pleasure to those who look at it. It is a tree with a future, particularly in the context of the land-use concept known as agro-forestry (see Courier no 101).

Leucaena has yet to find a pronounceable name in countries to which it is not native. In parts of Franco-phone Africa it is known as "épil-épil"; in Réunion, "Eastern ebony" and in Indonesia, "lamtoro". Several hundred varieties of the genus exist, of which perhaps 20 or so are grown commonly. Some strains are many-branched shrubs growing to five metres at maturity; others are single-trunked trees which may reach 20 metres when fully developed. As trees go, the leucaena is remarkably fast-growing, capable—at least on good soil—of reaching 4-5 metres within a year. The leaves are long, feathery and mimosa-like and the pointed, flat, pods each contain 15 or so shiny brown seeds, sometimes used for making necklaces or bracelets. Its great bunches of white flowers give it added attraction as an ornamental tree in parks or gardens, as well as providing honey.


The species originated in the South American continent, gradually spreading, by way of Spanish colonisers, to the Philippines, into Indonesia, south to the Pacific islands and, finally, to Australia. Nowadays it is to be found in practically every tropical climate, doing best on well-drained soils at altitudes of up to 1000 metres, but also able to survive in a wide range of topographical and climatic conditions, including that of prolonged drought.

This capacity to function well on marginal land, including on slopes and in rocky soils, means that leucaena has a role to play not only in preventing soil erosion but also in the reafforestation. A number of EDF projects feature the species, amongst them one in Zaïre, due to come on stream shortly, in which 6000 hectares of *leucaena auriculiformis* is to be planted on the Bateke Plateau.

Part of the reason for the species' hardiness in arid conditions lies in its ability to draw water and minerals through its roots deep in the soil and to prevent evaporation of moisture from its leaves by closing them up in the hours of greatest heat. The depth of its roots is such, moreover, that the nourishment absorbed through them is not competed for by other vegetation, with the result that plants can grow in close proximity to the tree without the vigour of their growth being in any way prejudiced. Its capacity to fix nitrogen from the air through fungi adhering to its roots means that it enriches rather than impoverishes the soils in which it grows, thus benefiting the plants around it and making it an excellent hedge, for example, for smallholdings where optimal use of land is vital to peasant farmers. It also means that it can be planted to good effect on land lying fallow either prior to cultivation or at the close of a cultivation cycle, regenerating the soil for future crops.

As if all this were not enough in the way of virtues — and not to speak of its other attractions as a source of firewood, or of building or furniture material, leucaena also has a potentially major role to play in the feeding of livestock.

The leaves, of the leucaena fall throughout the year, and are often used by farmers as a mulch by which to increase the soil's fertility and stability. Often, however, they are used as fodder, either when fallen, or when cut, or when still on the tree. As a year-round crop, the leucaena can act as a useful stop-gap in seasons when other forms of feed—grass, for example—are not available. They are high in protein content, easily digested and, allegedly, (and presumably confirmed by the various cows, sheep, goats and



Leucaena leucocephala de Wit


other ruminants that feed on them), highly appetising. They are also commonly fed to chicken.

The quantities provided by the species are impressive: a hectare of *leucaena leucocephala*, one of the most productive varieties, would provide a 'harvest' of anything up to 100 tonnes of wet leaves over a year, reduced to some 35 tonnes when dried, the content of which would be about 30% protein. Unfortunately, in addition to protein, the leaves also contain mimosine, a toxic amino acid which, even when broken down as it is by ruminants into a compound known as DHP, badly affects animals' health if taken in biggish quantities (over a quarter of total diet, say) over extended periods. At present, therefore, the foliage of the leucaena is only suitable for feeding in smallish quantities to chicken or ruminant livestock, although its potential is stimulating considerable and encouraging research into ways and means of totally eliminating its toxic effects.

Leucaena's performance in responding to today's ecological and environmental demands means that its star is undoubtedly rising, though there is one cloud, alas, on its bright horizon. A tiny insect, a form of aphid known as the heteropsylla, is said to be devastating stands in the South Pacific and spreading with such rapidity that it could well reach other parts of the tropics, including Africa, before coming under control. Leucaena has a talent for surviving adversity, though, and it must be hoped that the heteropsylla doesn't stretch that talent too far. ○

M.v.d.V.

Ouagadougou takes the cinema to heart



The 10th Pan-African Film Festival in Ouagadougou (FESPACO) was held in the capital of Burkina Faso from 21-28 February. Only a few years ago the event was very little more than a friendly meeting of exclusively French-speaking cine-club enthusiasts. But things have changed and now FESPACO is the biggest cultural event held regularly in the whole of Black Africa, with representatives from English- and Portuguese-speaking countries as well as from the Arab world. Although the cinema is still its *raison d'être*, every festival includes an increasingly wide range of cultural meetings and exchanges and so builds vital bridges between the cinema, television, literature and the oral tradition. It is what Lomé would call a "highly representative" cultural event that fully warrants the financial support which the European Community has provided.

The film festival

FESPACO is a festival first and foremost. And this year it was a big one. They were expecting 350 guests, but more than 1 000 people flew in, mainly from Africa, but from Europe, the Caribbean and Latin America too, not forgetting the impressive contingent of black Americans. Film-makers, journalists, producers, distributors, festival organisers and all the friends of the African cinema were there. And celebrities too—Madame Mitterrand, the wife of the French President, South African writer Breyt-

en Breytenbach and Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, the famous Nigerian singer.

Around them, 60 000 enthusiastic people came for the opening ceremony in the stadium on 4 August. And every evening a cheerful crowd gathered outside the 12 cinemas. It was, for once, just what the banner said, African films for African screens, and the audience took the slogan to heart. Enjoyment continued in the cinemas. The judges concentrated hard, but the audiences let themselves go. They were at the cinema—and in Africa, they love it—and they were Africans there

together, with their tales, their dramas and their laughter. Who would dare claim the African film industry has no future?

Princes... and paupers

There were 30 films in the competition. Not bad... although some of them failed to turn up as they were not finished. However, that should come as no surprise, as African film-makers find it hard to get the money they need to finish their work. There are very few long films. Black Africa only turns out five a year, although this is a creditable performance with conditions as they are. But although the many more short films can often be slightly wasted in competitions, they are not without interest, as they bring out young talent and display an ability to use film for educational ends and to help development.

The 10th FESPACO proved that, with its limited means and attendant technical imperfections, the African cinema has something to say and that the images it gives us are what the Africans want. Med Honda's "Sarraounia", the major award-winning

full-length film is not just a (relatively) spectacular, big-budget, historical reconstruction—it is a way for Africa to reassert its dignity by identifying with a queen who both resisted and created around that resistance a regional coalition of peoples who had hitherto been at war. The lesson is clear.

“Yam Daabo (The Choice)”, Idrissa Ouedraogo’s first full-length film, which drew the greatest praise, is not just a marvellous collection of pictures of the Sahel as Virgil might describe it but, once again, an assertion of dignity, this time the dignity of a peasant and his family, who refuse to accept drought and the alienation of international assistance as inevitable. They refuse to be resigned, maintaining that something can be done and that everyone can act and react at his particular level... be he prince or pauper.

Cheik Oumar Cissoko, in “Nyamanton”, also an award-winner, teaches us the same thing, as does Ghana’s unjustly forgotten King Ampaw-in’s “Juju”, in which a young technician argues with his father, the hide-bound traditional chief who is against a well being sunk in his village. “Ironu”, by Benin’s François Oko, goes further and in stronger terms, even with his clumsiness and fatalism. A man of dignity chooses death rather than compromise with a corrupt power.

I may well not have the attitude of the cinema buff from the Latin Quarter. We in Europe may well be too blasé. Or too entrenched in our gratuitous aestheticism. The cinema costs Africa a lot and gratuitousness is out of the question.


I have not forgotten the short footages, the work of young unknowns who produce “useful” films but who do so very well, by which I mean with modesty and simplicity and thought for their audiences, the peasants and craftsmen. These are the people the European Community was anxious to encourage with the prize it offered at Ouagadougou. The winners this year were Didier Ouedraogo, for his “Kasaga bala” (“It’s not always rain”), which was acted by peasants for peasants, and Marianna Hima, a Nigerian ethnologist, for “Baabu Banza” (“Don’t throw anything away”), a real lesson in using rubbish.

Problems of the African film industry


But there was more to it than the festival and the fascinating films. FESPACO is also a two-yearly opportunity to get projects going and the African film industry off the ground. Two years ago, FEPACI (the Pan-African Film-Makers Federation) saw the light of day and, thanks to the dynamic Gaston Kaboré, its Secretary-General, this organisation is now an efficient representative of the profession. FESPACO X saw practical initiatives taken in marketing. A film market was organised and, no less interesting, a videomarket. To complete the range, African TV representatives were there for the first time, as was the General Secretary of the URTNA (Africa’s national radio and TV union) and the Head of the Nairobi Programme Exchange Centre.

The awards

Grand Prix	Sarraounia	Med Hondo (Mauritania)
Best short film	Le singe fou	Joseph Henri Kouba (Gabon)
7th Art Prize	Le choix	Idrissa Ouedraogo (Burkina Faso)
Oumarou Ganda Prize	Nyamanton	Cheik Oumar Cissoko (Mali)
Public’s prize	Nyamanton	Cheik Oumar Cissoko (Mali)
Best actor	Nyamanton	Macire Kante (Mali)
Best actress	Visage de femmes	Mme Cisse Roland (Côte d’Ivoire)
Golden camera	Le choix	Idrissa Ouedraogo (Burkina Faso)



The Grand Prix, awarded to Med Hondo for his film “Sarraounia”. With him is Ai Keita, who plays a leading role in the film



Cheik Omar Sissoko (right) being congratulated for the success of his film “Nyamanton”

It is a step in the right direction. Africa cannot permit itself the luxury of developing its cinema and television separately and it will take a lot of effort to produce a minimum of pictures for both the small screen and the cinema.


There is still a long way to go. The problems brought up at the FEPACI Secretary-General's press conference and in the discussions round the pool at the Hotel Independence are by no means new. Training is inadequate, the African market has to be won and distribution needs to be reorganised. Speeches are no longer enough. Approaches are more practical and more realistic. Film-makers are trying to get together in the light of their economic interests and a spirit of enterprise is gaining ground. The unhappy experience of the CIDC (the Inter-African Film Distribution Consortium), an inter-State body, leads most people to think that the organisations would make a much better job of distribution... if there was less red tape. And they have at last realised the need to coordinate the development of training centres so they become proper regional establishments. Sime, in Nairobi, Ghana and Ouagadougou, for example, are already in existence.

Burkina Faso's plus points

The African film industry owes a lot to Burkina Faso. Some people wonder at it. How is it possible that one of the continent's poorest nations can channel some of its meagre resources into something that is... so futile...? Maybe... But perhaps the Burkinabé realised what was at stake before anyone else. Perhaps they realised the importance of having cultural resources if one is to invent one's development and the importance of the image one has of oneself when it comes to acting freely. Perhaps they realised the importance of the cinema itself.

Perhaps they also realised that, as they had few natural resources, there was every point in developing activities based on their human wealth and on the talents of their young people. Curiously enough, a talent for pictures is no rare thing in Burkina Faso.

Captain Sankara seems to have made this double wager—and not just in words either. Burkina helps its own and other people's film industry. "Sar-



Ousmane Sembène seated on the first step of the Film-makers' Monument

raounia", for example, was a Burkina co-production and it is not the only one.

So the organisational shortcomings of FESPACO X were not too much of a problem. They should not have happened, of course, but they do prove that success came faster than organisational abilities. It won't happen again. That's a promise. Burkina will need a little more support if it is to make a better job of playing its cards. The keynote of cooperation is backing up

personal effort and this holds good in culture as it does in other fields.

* * *

FESPACO X has come to a close. The party's over. One after another, a little sadly perhaps, the guests go to the airport, but the roadside banners are still there. One of them says "Amina is 12. She likes African films". So do we... o

Hubert Ferraton,
with the collaboration of
Ben Saïd Dia and Monique Phoba

Protecting Curaçao's architectural heritage

by Joseph DE MAN^(*)

Curaçao is off the Caribbean coast of Venezuela and part of the political unit now formed by the Netherlands Antilles. This small island, peopled by peaceful Arawak Indians, was conquered first by the Spaniards during the great age of discovery and then, in 1634, by Dutch navigators seeking the salt that was so vital at sea in those times. Over the years it gained considerable importance in finance and trade.

Plantations, never really a profitable proposition and barely self supporting, were gradually established and some of them have retained their original Spanish names — Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, Santa Martha, Santa Catharina and so on. On them, each planter built a central, patrician dwelling (or Landhuis) of a very particular style.

Architecture in the western hemisphere began by reflecting the colonis-

ers and it was only at a later stage that European styles adapted to the surroundings and incorporated features that reflected the local climate and other conditions. And things differed according to whether the former colonisers came from northern or southern Europe. While the Portuguese and Spanish found it easy to adapt their buildings, with their patios and so on, to hot climates, northerners had to look for something different and so it was that open galleries began to be built all round the houses proper to provide ventilation and protection from the sun.

Dutch colonial architecture

This, in Cape Province, for example, and anywhere in the world, means facades often decorated with gable ends and sharply sloping tiled roofs — so, in semi-arid Curaçao, rainwater from the occasional tropical storm could be collected.

Most of the *landhuizen* went up in the middle of the plantations. Townhouses for the tradesmen, financiers and administrators were needed, too, and these were mainly of baked bricks brought as ballast in merchantmen from the Netherlands. But the Landhuizen were made of stone, as transport problems to the interior meant that bricks had to be saved for ornamentation on certain buildings.

The nearby Iberian colonies had their influence on architecture in Curaçao and especially on the synagogue (the oldest in use in the western hemisphere today) of the Portuguese Jewish community and on some of the townhouses, of which the rounded half-buttresses (drainpipes, in fact) are a feature.

Curaçao has 50-odd *landhuizen* scattered over the island, most of them dating from the 18th century. The townhouses are of a later period.


The abolition of slavery ruined almost all the plantations — which had been rarely self sufficient before. Many of them were abandoned and the *landhuizen* left empty and crumbling. But the recent establishment of an oil refinery on the island has attracted a large percentage of the rural population to Willemstad, the capital.

^(*) Commission Delegate to the Netherlands Antilles.

Renovated building at the "de Rouvilleweg"

"Dutch colonial architecture means facades often decorated with gable ends and sharply sloping tiled roofs"





Before ... and after renovation, an old townhouse at the "Molenplein"

The town itself, like every other city, saw its population move from the centre to the suburbs and the old town houses were neglected in their turn, as the owners decided to switch to new areas further out. So the rich architectural heritage of this little island was threatened.

Private initiative

But an individual initiative was taken. An influential banker, who was concerned about the gradual decline, suggested that Shell, the owner of a decaying *landhuis* near Willemstad, sell him the property for a nominal figure, in return for which he would guarantee to restore it. He then had the Stichting Monumentzorg, a foundation for old buildings, formed for this purpose and set about collecting money from both government and private organisations.

Restoration of the Brievengat *landhuis* began in 1954. It was completed successfully and the antique-furnished house, about 6 km from the downtown Punda area, is now an important tourist centre. Traditional folk groups call there and no visitor to the island would dream of missing it.

Spurred on by this success, the foundation began looking for other town and country properties and raised the vital funds. The municipality of Curaçao gave generously to this drive to protect the heritage and the island's Government has been giving NAfl. 200 000 (around US\$ 100 000) to the foundation for several years now. There is also an albeit much smaller contribution from the central Netherlands Antilles Government.

The foundation buys land and decaying property with the subsidies mentioned above and the restoration

is largely paid for by the Netherlands Government — which, once a project has been approved, contributes 75% of the cost of the work from its aid for the development of socio-educational projects.

This drive and the dynamic approach of the foundation's leaders and staff have enabled 15 monuments to be restored since 1954, the movement having gathered momentum since 1980. The restored buildings are now used for a variety of purposes — tourist attractions (Brievengat and the Jewish Museum), administrative offices (de Rouvilleweg, Kranshi, Molenplein and Goede Hoop), recreational centres (Ascencion, Knip and Brakkeput) and an arts centre — and the users pay rent to the foundation, thereby boosting its funds for future activity.

The local community is aware of the wealth of its heritage and doing all it can to preserve it. ◊ J.D.M.

A house in the countryside before and after renovation

"The local community is aware of the wealth of its heritage and doing all it can to preserve it"



The Barbados Museum, past, present and future

by Alissandra CUMMINS (*)

In 1929 the Reverend Watson was in a quandary: he had spent many years making a scholarly collection of fossils and natural history specimens for which an American fossil collector was offering a considerable sum. Watson was reluctant, however, to allow the collection to leave Barbados. He was willing, though, to accept a lesser sum in order to make sure that it remained in the island. The situation remained unresolved until 1933, when a group of concerned citizens met visiting experts from the Carnegie Trust of New York, who focussed their efforts. Later that year the newly-formed Barbados Museum and Historical Society acquired the Watson collection and formulated a policy "to collect, preserve and publish matter relating to the history and antiquities of Barbados, and to gather and preserve articles for a collection".

Nineteen thirty four found the Society and its collections housed in the historic military prison of St. Ann's Garrison, through the cooperation of the Barbados Government. Nowhere in the Caribbean did the Colonial Governments actively encourage the development of museums. So in Barbados, as in other territories, museum development depended on the initiative of private citizens. The origins of the Barbados Museum and Historical Society reflect this initiative; within a few years the collections had become encyclopædic i.e. including decorative and fine arts, archæology, natural history. Certainly the richness of the collections has continued to benefit the Museum in more recent years.

Nineteen eighty one saw the beginning of the Government's active role in upgrading and improving the Museum facilities. Both the Museum and Government recognised the lack of cohesion and balance reflected in the collections and exhibits. The Minister of Education and Culture expressed Government's determination that "the development of a national museum policy [be] aimed at changing the character of the museum in order to make it truly representative of the history, culture and development of Barbadian Society".

With these terms of reference the Museum Committee, set up at the be-

(*) Director of the Museum.

hest of Government, devised a five-year development plan aimed at upgrading the Museum's facilities and building a professional staff. Since 1982, then, the Museum Council and Staff have implemented this plan which is both highly detailed and comprehensive. Commitment to has made the Museum "an institution for national development", and its dynamism is now a positive force in the local community.

The Curatorial Staff has expanded considerably from the one "Curator-of-all Collections" who had sole responsibility for the maintenance and exhibition of the collections during the first 50 years of the Museum's existence.

The staff now consists of a Director, responsible directly to Council, four Curators (including two Peace Corps curators); an Education Officer and a Librarian.

The Natural History Curator preserves what remains of the original scientific collections while building up contemporary study collections. The History/Art Curator is responsible for the research and conservation of the fine art and decorative art collections. Two archæologists (Peace Corps Volunteers) have made invaluable contributions to our Amerindian collections and to a public interest in archæology, and the Education Officer designs tours and activities to familiarise chil-



Front entrance of the Barbados Museum and Historical Society. The building was originally the military prison of St. Ann's Garrison on the island

dren and the general public with the cultural resources of the Museum.

Altogether, including grounds and building maintenance and shop staff (both part-time and full-time), there are some 20 Museum employees. The Society remains a private non-profit institution with over 600 public members governed by a 14-member Council. Five of these are government appointees.

The Museum Council meets periodically during the year while the Director and staff implement Museum policy, advise Council on all aspects of Museum business and carry out the executive functions of the Society.

The Museum's primary concern is that every area of development will encourage greater local involvement. The first initiative included the proper display of the Museum's important collection of early historic maps of Barbados in the newly renovated Aall Gallery. This was followed by a major new permanent exhibition on Barbadian history entitled "In Search of Bim". An ambitious undertaking, it required two years of research (exhibit design and construction) to produce a comprehensive overview of the pre-history and history of the island. The exhibit incorporated the most current data available on the archæology, social, cultural and political history of our island with its immensely rich heritage. Our efforts were well rewarded

by the visit of Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II and the Duke of Edinburgh at the Gallery's opening on October 28th, 1985. Another noteworthy visitor early in 1986 was Mr Lorenzo Natali, Vice-President and Commissioner for Development of the EEC.

We also mount temporary exhibitions both within and outside the Museum. At present the Museum is showing an African exhibition entitled "A Harvest of Knowledge" examining the domestic and cultural life of historic West Africa and showing links with the cultural heritage of the Caribbean. Consciousness of both our African and European heritage has been growing in the Caribbean and this African exhibition, to last at least six months, is the first of its kind in the region.

The Museum also encourages the growth and development of artistic awareness on the island. Temporary exhibition of both contemporary and earlier artists are organised in our Exhibition Gallery. At present Bill Grace, a prolific potter and artist is exhibiting his recent works. This art exhibition is clearly one of the best ever held at the Museum and has raised standards for our future exhibits.

Young and "old"

Within a few months the presence of an Education Officer has transformed children's activities within the Museum. Gone are the days of troops of hot, tired, inattentive young people rushing into the Museum and out again in fifteen minutes. Now careful

and imaginative educational programming has made a visit to the Museum lively and fun. Using worksheets that are coordinated with the information and objects on display, the visiting child retains a clear memory of a particular topic. A chance to go on a "treasure hunt" through the museum, making historical "discoveries" is a stimulating relief from classrooms and text books.

We may in a few years find a young professional determined to pursue archaeology or physical anthropology as a career, having first visited a Museum archaeological dig or examined the remains of a long dead Amerindian. We have the growing suspicion that we are becoming more popular for our tours of a 600-year old skeleton than we are for the wonderful exhibitions we develop! Nevertheless, this highlights another role which we have assumed. We are unofficial guardians of our island's archaeological heritage. Following our work with a research team from the University of London during the past year, a special group of amateur archaeological enthusiasts has been formed under the auspices of the Museum. They have continued to function in a highly effective fashion, performing a number of rescue digs at construction sites on the island with the Museum's archaeologist. Through this work we are beginning to reconstruct Barbados' prehistory far more successfully than ever before.

Over the years, links have been established between the Museum and a wide variety of local and regional institutions. The Museum staff act in an

advisory capacity in a wide variety of areas. Most important of these is encouraging the development of a national Museums policy by the Barbados Government. Particularly we need a policy for cultural preservation, incorporating the protection of archaeological sites (both marine and terrestrial), preservation of historic sites and buildings and the conservation of the unique natural environment of the island. For these purposes the Museum maintains close links with other institutions such as the Barbados National Trust, the National Cultural Foundation and the Caribbean Conservation Association.

The Museum also assists, as far as possible, the work and development of other smaller institutions in the English-speaking Caribbean. With the high level of staff and facilities available, we hope in future to be able to offer training and conservation facilities to other museological organisations in the region. In order to further achieve the Museum's goal, however, the present support facilities need to be upgraded. Storage, conservation and accessibility of the collections remain our greatest problem. For instance it cannot be cost effective when the main work surface for the staff (used for research, conservation, labelling, archaeological reconstruction and various glueing and pasting activities) has to be cleared away for the staff to take lunch every day! Many of these deficiencies will be solved with the construction of a new building to house administrative offices, storage and conservation facilities planned to start within the near future.

We try to be flexible in our relations with the public. Requests come in for assistance in a variety of areas, and the Museum reacts as positively as possible. We assist with exhibitions, historic tours and research in a variety of topics. The Museum's outreach programme is receiving a very positive response from the general public.

We were overwhelmed at the response to International Museum Day which was declared our open day at the Museum. Over 1500 people attended and another 300 who arrived after closing were given passes to come back another day. The Museum is beginning to make its presence felt in the community. ○ A.C.

The Warmington Gallery: display of fine plantation rooms with exhibits dating from the 18th and 19th centuries





Alley cropping

Thiendou NIANG (*)

What is alley cropping? What are its potentials? Who is researching it and where? ACP countries as different as Senegal, Burundi and Benin have asked the CTA a large number of questions on this subject, proving the

interest and the need for information generated by this technique.

Our aim in this short article is to direct data consumers to sources of information and, if possible, to trigger a dialogue between agricultural development researchers and practitioners with an analysis of one or two bibliographies available on the subject.

Potentials of alley cropping

This is a relatively new agroforestry system of planting hedges of nitrogen-fixing pulses, trees or shrubs between rows of food crops. It can replace itinerant farming, which calls for vast areas that the tropical countries, with the pressure of their populations, no longer have, although it has to be real-

(*) The author runs the CTA information service.



Alley cropping: a system of planting hedges of nitrogen-fixing pulses, trees or shrubs between rows of food crops.

ised that itinerant farming is still technically completely acceptable as far as soil regeneration is concerned. In practice, the study of these hedgerows has tended to be confined to *Leucaena leucocephala* and *Gliricidia sepium*. However, the IITA (the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture) in Ibadan in Nigeria, a pioneer of alley cropping, tells us that it has wide-ranging potential. The branches of bush hedges feed the soil with green fertiliser or mulch, thus raising the level of fertility. Pruning can yield as much as 150 ha of nitrogen per hectare of food crops p.a. Furthermore, the *Leucaena* pivot embeds itself deeply in the earth and brings nutritive matter and water to the surface^(*).

Another advantage of alley cropping is that the shade provided by the hedges reduces weeds. Prussner also tells us that *Leucaena* hedgerows along contour lines are an excellent way of containing erosion. Obviously, maintaining the trees and shrubs gives the farmer more work to do, but the system does push up yields.

It is true that alley cropping was originally developed to improve soil structure with a view to greater output, but Jim Sumberg's team at the International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA), which is running the humid zone programme, sees it as being extremely important for livestock.

Sumberg says that harvesting the leaves of the trees to feed small ruminants is one of the basic advantages of alley cropping. It also offers the possibility of grazing animals on natural growth on fallow land and on the aerial forage of woody species while the land is being allowed to rest. Pruning, which can give as many as five harvests per year, yields 15-20 t per ha p.a.—the equivalent of five to six t of dry matter. Alley cropping can also go some way to solving the problem of the wood (and particularly firewood) crisis. *Leucaena* produces 20-50 m³ per ha p.a. and encouraging results have been obtained, although research should now be geared to the use of multi-purpose (cattlefeed, firewood, anti-erosion etc.) trees and to alleys with a number of different food crops.

(*) See Myfanwy van de Velde's article p. 88.

Research under way but data dispersed

Research is promising, but the data it yields is still dispersed. Many organisations specialising in tropical agriculture currently have alley cropping research programmes. We have listed some of these, giving their aims and addresses and the names of the people to contact.

• International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA)

Oyo Road, PO Box 5320, Ibadan, Nigeria.
Tel 4132 44/41 33 15/41 34 40
Telex 31 417 tropib

One of the IITA's aims is to replace itinerant farming with a system of continuous alley cropping. This system maintains the agricultural productivity of the soil in the humid and semi-humid tropics.

Contacts: Mr Biaum Tjwan Kang
Mr G.F. Wilson
Mr T.L. Lawson

Publications on alley cropping (see bibliography).

• International Council for Research into Agroforestry (ICRAF)

PO Box 30677, Nairobi, Kenya.
Tel. 29867. Telex 22048. Cable ICRAF

The Council offers encouragement and support for research and training activities in the field of agroforestry.

In addition to bringing out various publications (the "ICRAF Newsletter", "Agroforestry Systems" etc.), ICRAF has two data bases, MTP and AFSIC. MTP is on multi-purpose trees (description of more than 350 species) and AFSIC lists agroforestry systems (about 150 entries on agroforestry systems and practices).

The Council also has an agroforestry information programme going in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. This is based on a library of more than 8 000 works and an information exchange network on agroforestry programmes.

Contacts: D.A. Hoekstra
P. K. R. Nair
M. Baumer

• International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA), humid zone programme

PO Box 5320, Ibadan, Nigeria.

The work here is on boosting the productivity of native species of sheep and goats. The ILCA team is investigating ways of associating food crops and small ruminants in the alley cropping system.

Contacts: Christine Okali
Jim Sumberg

• International Crop Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics (CRISAT)

PO Box 502 342, Pantacheru, Andhra Pradesh, India
Tel. Hyderabad 22 40 16.
Telex 2204.

The Institute is currently researching alley crops. Three tests have been run for semi-arid tropics to investigate the effects of pruning *Leucaena leucocephala* on the performance of various crops (millet, sorghum and *Cajanus cajan*). The emphasis is on the physiological aspect of the interaction between tree and crop and on the colonisation of the soil by *Leucaena* roots.

• Togo Directorate for Soil and General Ecological Studies

PO Box 1056, Lomé, Togo.

This organisation is working on maize between hedgerows of *Leucaena leucocephala* deteriorated land in Glidji (southern Togo) and Sarakawa (northern Togo). This research programme investigates *Leucaena*'s nitrogen contribution to alley maize production and trends in the nutritional elements of the soil before and after testing.

Contacts: K. Kpomblékou-Ademawou
G. Korga

Various results have been published. The following list, which by no means claims to be exhaustive, includes the IITA and ICRAF (already mentioned), as well as KIT (the Royal Tropical Institute of The Netherlands), which has substantial literature on the subject. Contact the organisations direct for any further information. Contact us if you need any documentary back-up—it is the job of the CTA, which aims to capitalise on development research and experimentation, to provide it. ○ T.N.

Capitalise on your work – tell people about it

Alley cropping may become vital to the development of food production in the tropics. First-class research is being run, some has already been completed and we now have sound sources of information on the subject, but they are not known or used enough. This is because there is not enough contact between the data producers (the researchers) and the data seekers and the first result of this is a lack of the feedback that is essential if research programmes are to be properly oriented. The second, no less important, is that extension and

development services only work properly if they get consistent input from the research services. In the case of alley cropping, a blockage in the circuit stops the farmers from getting the information they need.

The IITA in Ibadan (Nigeria) has produced some excellent work, simply set out in its annual report for 1984, on this method of farming. Massey Ferguson published a summary of alley crop potential in the "Agricultural Science Digest" on 4 November 1985. In March 1986, the CTA published the IITA's results in *SPORE* no. 1 and this information was then reprinted in the *Coop News*, a paper that comes out in Ibadan itself.

So it took two years for the information to go along the tortuous path to availability in the very place in which it was produced. This far from unusual anecdote illustrates the kind of glass partition that exists between research and development.

It also shows the effect the CTA can have as an amplifier of data distribution. What photographers would call a bright light on an institute's work can only enhance that institute and the research it carries out. The CTA's job is to help distribute information on tropical agriculture and thereby make more of the work of the people who produce it. ○

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The Courier's ... *mailbag*



Mr Louis Tankoano, a reader who works in agriculture in Boande (Burkina Faso), kindly sent us the photograph

"I get *The Courier* regularly. I use it a lot myself and the people around me get a lot out of it too... I should like to suggest you start a readers' letters column".

Alexis B. Quenum, Niamey, Niger
(Very many readers have said this and we shall be doing our best to satisfy them - Ed.)

"I have filled out the questionnaire for *Courier* readers and I thought it would be a good idea to add a letter to thank you for publishing such an informative magazine... I am a graduate in Statistics and Economics from Makerere University here in Uganda and took International Economics (Trade) as one of my options, which is why I find the trade figures and ACP-EEC activities very interesting".

Okotha George Steven, Kampala, Uganda

"Frankly speaking, *The Courier* is a great help to anyone who makes proper use of it".

Valerian J. Massawe, Moshi, Tanzania

"I should like to wish everyone on *The Courier* a very happy new year and take the opportunity of *The Courier*'s 100th birthday to congratulate everyone involved in getting the magazine out. I was delighted to receive no. 100, which taught me about its history and the way it is produced. I am really interested in *The Courier*—which is why I fret if delivery is late".

Avenié Anoh Justin, Bonoua, Côte-d'Ivoire

"The editors should make an effort to publish research-oriented articles on ACP-EEC relations. The majority of articles in *The Courier* tend to romanticise ACP-EEC relations and an effort should be made to include articles that are very critical in nature".

Ademola Adebo, Ado Ekiti, Nigeria

"I should like to see the following columns: (a) advice about life in rural environments. This column could include such things as running a poultry farm in the country, creating a simple aquarium, "do-it-yourself" in rural surroundings and making village water drinkable, to name but a few; (b) a question-and-answer column, giving readers the chance to express themselves by sending in questions about technical, economic and cultural matters in the ACP-EEC context.

Malapa Ndoï Deville, Kribi, Cameroon

"As one who had the rare privilege in life of working with all races of people with different cultures in different parts of the world, what I appreciate and commend most is the overall emphasis "*The Courier*" gives throughout to development of human resources in all their aspects as well as the material or rather physical resources that God has given to man. I have never come across a magazine that

includes such a fund of information on so many different peoples, cultures and countries as "*The Courier*", and I share the copy I get with friends and recommend it as a must to library staff of University Colleges with whom I come into contact".

Dr. V.T. George, Alwaye (Kerala), India

"Your magazine is amongst the magazines that I always enjoy reading, as it is highly educative and informative. It is a magazine that gives me up-to-date information about developments within the EEC and ACP States. "*The Courier*" can rightly be termed the Development and Cooperation journal. The standard of journalism and quality of information is exemplary. You and your staff deserve every congratulation and encouragement. As your magazine is already bridging the gap between the North and South, at the same time it is promoting South-South cooperation".

Ernest Aabee, Banjul, The Gambia

"I have found the magazine extremely instructive. It has helped me perfect my knowledge and be constantly learning and getting a better understanding of Africa, the Caribbean, the Pacific and Afro-European cooperation".

Humberto Mavacala, Luanda, Angola

"I am happy to take this opportunity of commending Alain Lacroix, the former Editor of your esteemed magazine, for the article: "How time flies". Enthusiastic readers should read it time and again to ensure they get as much out of it as possible".

Bede Ezzo Ojih, Owerri, Imo State, Nigeria
(This article appeared in no. 100 - Ed)

"Some articles fail to cover their subjects in depth. What we need is articles by specialists in economics, science and culture".

Kibunja Mzalendo, Meru, Kenya

"My view of *The Courier* is that it is highly technical and may seem rather dry. However, the articles are precise and honest".

Jean-Pierre Jeanne, Gosier, Guadeloupe

"I take this opportunity of expressing my growing interest in *The ACP-EEC Courier*, as I am proud and privileged to receive free information on all that is happening over more than a third of the globe... What shall I pick out of no. 95 (January-February 1986)?... **Adedeji Adebayo**, the Nigerian Executive Secretary of the UN's Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) for the past 10 years, gave good reason for Africa's economic survival. African leaders would do better to follow his advice and not write him off as an idealist... I am learning a lot about one of the new members of the Community, Spain, whose politics I know nothing about. I knew nothing about Portuguese history either. All I knew was that Vasco da Gama and Magellan were the cause of the black slave trade in America. This leads me to my unhappy memories of the film "Roots", which I saw in 1978. *Ab illud tempus, mutata ratio est. Those times are past. The Spanish and the Portuguese are our friends*".

Oneshore Muvunandinda, Butare, Rwanda

"My view of *The Courier* is that it is a little dry, although that is difficult to avoid if it aims to be serious and profound. Congratulations on the two colours. Do not hesitate to give us charts and graphs. They say more than figures. And congratulations on the pictures. They are more eloquent than lengthy discourse and they brighten the text".

Paul Rosset, Clisson, France

"One suggestion: two indexes—an annual one and a cumulative one".

Martin Mujica, Moncton, Canada

"You spend too much time on the Joint Assembly".

P.R. Mac Crimmon, Bridport, UK

"One suggestion: carry on the good work".

Lamagni Umberto, Rome, Italy

Jean-Louis POULALION — **Histoire du Suriname des origines à l'Indépendance** (History of Suriname — From the origins to independence) — Académie des Sciences d'Outre-mer, Paris — 1986 — 93 pages, including a map and four engravings — FF 50

The troubles in Suriname have put it on the agenda. This study deals with the past, the former Dutch Guyana, from the precolonial origins to independence in 1975.

It begins with the Arawak Indians grappling with the formidable Carib Indians and moves on to the first, difficult attempts (including one by the French) at colonising Paria and then the long Dutch reign, which began in 1667 and was only halted — temporarily — by the English occupation of 1803-16.

However, France has left its stamp on the country, and not just because of nearby Cayenne. There were French pirates and, most important, there was a large colony of French Huguenots who settled there in 1682.

Under the powerful India Company and the rod of the colonisers, Suriname, with more than 50 000 slaves, became a typical plantation colony in the second half of the 18th century. When slavery was abolished — late, on 1 July 1863 — there were still 33 000 slaves there.

On 25 November 1975, the former Dutch territory became independent. It managed it without any upheavals, as it had been preparing for some long time, having had considerable autonomy since late 1954.

The author also analyses the socio-cultural aspects of this "ethnic checkerboard". For it is a pluralist society, with different peoples and languages and religions and cultures where Amerindians and the descendants of all the different immigrants who have settled there live side by side. It has a genuine cosmopolitan tradition which contains the seeds of integration and national unity.

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The Africa Review 1987 (11th edition) — World of Information — 21 Gold Street, Saffron Walden, Essex CB10 1EJ — United Kingdom

As 1987 opened African states were

preoccupied with putting their economic houses in order. Most of them have demonstrated their determination to take the radical action necessary to change the economic climate and live within their means and encourage national production in the towns and, above all, in the rural areas. The emphasis has shifted from large-scale public activity to the private sector, and from government controls to the interplay of market forces. At the same time Black Africa, and especially the Front-line States, is preparing for the next, and perhaps final, stage in the struggle to overthrow apartheid.

The 1987 Africa Review reports on and analyses all these issues and also includes comprehensive coverage of the 52 individual countries that comprise the region. Expert analysis is supported by an abundance of facts and figures. Maps, key facets, key indicators and country profiles deal with the essential infrastructure, while the Business Guides provide the information necessary to the business traveller. As well as hard economic fact and political analysis it is also packed with practical travel information, including entry requirements, trade fairs, public holidays, and listings of hotels, car hire companies and business addresses.

The Africa Review is one of five regional reviews published annually by World of Information. They are: The Africa Review, The Asia & Pacific Review, The Middle East Review, The Europe Review, The Latin America & Caribbean Review — their price: £ 25.

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Inter-American Development Bank — Economic and social progress in Latin America — 1986 Report — Special section: Agricultural Development — 446 pages — Inter-American Development Bank, 1300 New York Ave., N.W., Washington D.C. 20577, U.S.A.

This report on economic and social progress in Latin America continues the series published by the Inter-American Development Bank since 1961. The special theme of the 1986 report is the changing structure of the agricultural sector in Latin America, and is presented as Part II.

It is shown that over the past quarter century, agriculture in the region has undergone more change than is normally assumed and that it is a sector responsive to economic signals. The evolution of the sector as well as its present state vary quite considerably among the 25 countries, but overall the sector's growth has been favourable and sustained over time. One measure of diversity is the rural population, which in some countries is expanding in absolute terms, in others it has ceased to grow while in the rest it has been declining for several years.

In addition to the special subject, the report for 1986 consists of three parts. The first comprises five chapters on the region's recent development trends, covering such subjects as the international environment, development financing and investment, main sector performance, and economic integration.

The third part of the report deals with recent economic trends, economic policies, and the short- and medium-term outlook in each of the 25 Latin American member countries of the Bank.

The Statistical Appendix (Part IV) completes the report.

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Danielle DOMERGUE-CLOAREC — **La santé en Côte d'Ivoire** (Health in Côte d'Ivoire) — Produced jointly by the Académie des sciences d'outre-mer and the Association des publications de Toulouse-Le Mirail — 15 rue Laperouse, 75116 Paris — 1986 — 1319 pages — FF 200

The author is a specialist in the history of the European colonisation and decolonisation of black Africa, where she has spent many years, above all in Côte d'Ivoire, Congo (Brazzaville) and Niger. She is particularly interested in Côte d'Ivoire, the subject of all her research. She holds a doctorate and has taught at the Universities of Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) and Niamey (Niger) and is currently senior lecturer at the University of Toulouse-Le Mirail. Her personal experience of the colonial era has given her a profound understanding of the realities of the period.

This is not a conventional study of Africa, for the author has resolutely

THE CONVENTION AT WORK

Groundwork for the ACP and ACP-EEC ministerial meetings

- The Council Bureau meets in Brussels -
- Dominican PM Eugenia Charles in the chair -

The Bureau of the ACP Council of Ministers met in ACP House in Brussels on 24 March, with Eugenia Charles, the PM and Foreign Affairs Minister of Dominica (Caribbean), in the chair. Dominica's six-month presidency of the Council began in February. Western Samoa's Finance Minister T.Sailele, Angolan Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Venacio de Moura and Uganda's Finance Minister Abbey Kafumba-Musaka also attended this, the ACP Ministers' third Bureau meeting in 10 years. The aim this time was to prepare for the 42nd Council of Ministers and the 12th ACP-EEC Joint Council of Ministers in Brussels from 11-15 May.

The two main items up for discussion were internal matters of the Group and relations with the European Community. At previous Councils of ACP Ministers, and in December 1986 in particular, the Committee of Ambassadors had been asked to speed up revision of the Georgetown Agreement setting up the Group of ACP States and laying down the aims of the development of their economies and cooperation with the EEC. This would not affect the substance of the Agreement. It would concentrate on the decision-making procedures of the Council of Ministers, rotation of the presidency and the composition and status of the Council Bureau. The status, method of appointment and functions and obligations of the ACP Secretary-General could also be reviewed. An investigation of the various reforms of the Georgetown Agreement was scheduled for completion by the May meeting of the Council but would very probably go on after then, adapting the Agreement to trends in the Group and its relations with the Community and other international organisations. The Georgetown Agreement was signed in the capital of Guyana on 6 June 1975.

The Bureau also looked at the development of the conditions of service of the ACP Secretariat-General, noting that there had been progress since the

directives given to the Bridgetown (Barbados) Council in April last year. However, the Secretariat-General's finances were still critical and a further appeal had been made to the late payers to honour their obligations in this respect.

ACP sanctions against South Africa

The Southern African situation and apartheid in South Africa were discussed by the Bureau at length. The Dominican PM expressed the meeting's sentiment at a press conference, when she reaffirmed the ACP States' disappointment at the Community's anti-Pretoria measures. They were not nearly so tough as those the USA had taken, she maintained. "We expected more from the Community" in view of the ACPs' privileged relations with Europe, which was also the opinion of Nigerian Ambassador Iroha, who confirmed the need for ACP Foreign Affairs Ministers to meet and adopt Group sanctions against South Africa. The idea of such a meeting had been agreed on in December 1986. It could actually take place in late September or early October alongside the UN General Assembly in New York.



Session of the Bureau of the ACP Council of Ministers. From left to right, Edwin Carrington, Secretary-General, James Mitchell, Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Miss Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of Dominica and President of the ACP Council of Ministers, and S. J. Mahaka, Ambassador of Zimbabwe and Chairman of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors

With the ratification of Kiribati (9 February 1987) and of Vanuatu (11 March 1987) all the ACP States have now ratified the Third Lomé Convention.

Venacio de Moura answered another question from reporters, referring to the absurd logic of those who linked the Cuban presence in his country to the solution to apartheid and Namibian independence. He thought it was wrong to use Cuban military aid to Angola (under an "Agreement between two independent States" and after apartheid, "a veritable cancer", and the occupation of Namibia) as an argument for not taking any practical action against the régime in South Africa. "Europeans agree with us (on this point)... but they don't want to take measures to reflect their position of principle", the Angolan Minister said, calling for the Community to "follow Sweden's example". The blacks in South Africa and the front-line countries are in favour of severe sanctions against South Africa, he added.

But Mr de Moura said his country had already envisaged the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, a decision freely arrived at by his Government and brought to the attention of the UN Secretary-General in a document on a global plan for peace in Southern Africa.

Eugenia Charles also spoke on Southern Africa, reaffirming that all ACPs were committed to the abolition of apartheid.

The meeting expressed anxiety at the less favourable trends in ACP-EEC

relations as far as ACP trade went. The application of the Sugar Protocol and the consequences of Spain and Portugal joining the Community would have to be dealt with in May, as would a new tax of around ECU 330 per tonne on vegetable and fish oil manufactured in or imported into the Community market.

AIDS - reciprocal measures if the ACP are discriminated against

Since the appearance and rapid expansion of AIDS (the acquired immune deficiency syndrome), a serious disease that could prove a threat to public health, preventive measures have been taken in the countries which, because of their "permissive attitudes", are likely to be most at risk. However, a little while ago, a move towards applying these measures just to Africans and ACP nationals started in Europe. Some Community countries have taken or planned to take steps towards mandatory AIDS-testing of African students. Eugenia

Charles, as President of the ACP Council of Ministers, answered a question at a press conference, saying that the ACPs would support any general preventive measures, but would reject any that discriminated against ACP nationals. She then said that the ACPs might take reciprocal measures against visitors from any European countries which applied AIDS control measures solely to ACP students and other nationals. Africans did not carry the AIDS virus any more than anyone else.

Eugenia Charles held talks with André Kempinaire (the Belgian Secretary of State for Cooperation) and François van Hoek (Head of the European Development Policy Management Centre based in the Netherlands) concurrently with the Bureau meeting. She also attended the opening of a display of photographs on Southern Africa in the hall of ACP House, which various NGOs had organised as part of the UN's international anti-apartheid day and to promote NGO development action. ○ L.P.

of the forest heritage;
— lastly, better subterranean and surface water resources utilisation schemes.

The second thing is a campaign to control coastal erosion. Just as desertification is a major concern of the Sahel countries, coastal erosion has serious consequences for a certain number of coastal countries.

The Community is willing to carry on the coordination already begun in this respect and to increase the effort being made so that schemes that can be financed to remedy the situation are in fact financed in a properly coordinated manner.

B. Participants recognised the fact that roads for inter-regional traffic and to open up the countries are another major concern of the coastal States in their drive for better regional integration.

The Community is aware of the importance of this priority to the countries of the sub-region and particularly certain of them with inadequate connections in the region and with the outside world.

However, the high cost per km of roadworks will considerably restrict the Community's intervention from regional funds, which can only be a complement to national projects run in the light of regionally-agreed standards.

C. The ACP participants and the Commission agreed that, in view of the importance of these two priority regional themes, the bulk of the regional resources (about 70%) that were available should be earmarked for them. It was understood that at least 50% of the regional resources would go to the protection of the environment and the natural heritage.

Other sectors of regional interest were also listed:

- joint marine resources and continental fishing schemes;
- application of the results of agricultural and animal research;
- development-related human, animal and plant health schemes;
- air security operations;
- regional training.

At the end of the meeting, participants jointly signed a report setting out the conclusions of the talks—which had been held in a first-class atmosphere of mutual confidence and friendship.

LOMÉ III PROGRAMMING

Main lines of regional cooperation in West Africa

Cotonou was the scene of a meeting of the National Authorising Officers of the coastal States of West Africa (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo) and a Commission delegation of EEC Delegates in these countries, led by Erich Wirsing (the Director for West Africa), from 3-5 March this year. It discussed regional cooperation programming in West Africa under the ACP Chairmanship of Mohamed Souradjou Ibrahim, Benin's Minister in the office of the President of the Republic responsible for Planning and Statistics.

The excellent atmosphere made for a positive outcome, which augurs well for the implementation of regional credits—ECU 210 million—for West Africa as a whole.

This meeting followed on from a similar session with the National Authorising Officers of the Sahel countries in Praia on 30 and 31 October last. The Cotonou discussions led to broad agreement with the guidelines which the Praia meeting laid down for

the focal sectors of regional cooperation in Sahelian Africa.

The ACP participants and the Commission said they wanted to ensure that regional cooperation was as efficient as possible by concentrating on a limited number of sectors. This would be done within the framework of a general sectoral strategy and coherence with national schemes and policies would be sought.

The meeting outlined two main areas on which Community aid should focus:

- (i) protection of the environment and the natural heritage;
- (ii) inter-regional and other road links.

A. The anti-desertification campaign is the first thing and emphasis will be on:

- population awareness schemes;
- protection of the main river basins;
- schemes to bring about a substantial saving of firewood, leading, further up the chain, to better management

So the Praia and Cotonou meetings were an opportunity to lay down joint guidelines and priorities for both Sahel and coastal countries of West Africa.

The conclusions of both meetings will shortly be put before the appropriate Community authorities and the regional resources for West Africa as a whole can then be implemented without delay.

Netherlands Antilles

The Programming Mission from the European Economic Community, headed by Dr Wirsing, Director for West and Central Africa and the Caribbean, signed an agreement with the Government of the Netherlands Antilles on 19 March. The Government of the Netherlands Antilles was represented by ing. Don Martina, Minister President, Franklin Crestian, Minister for Development Cooperation and Leslie Navarro, Minister of Finance.

This agreement for cooperation between the EEC and the Netherlands Antilles fixes the programmable financial assistance to be supplied by the Community for the coming three years, starting in 1987; the allocation is ECU 20.65 m which represent at the present exchange rate 42.33 m Netherlands Antillean guilders.

Two thirds of this amount will be provided in the form of grants and one third in special loans, with 1% interest rate and a duration of 40 years.

The focal sector for which 70% of these funds will be utilised is the development of tourism.

This includes mainly:

- investments in infrastructure such as roads, port facilities, airports and other tourism-related facilities;
- human resources development;
- tourism promotion;
- protection of natural environment;
- preservation of the cultural and architectural heritage;
- technical assistance.

The balance of the resources will be devoted to the improvement of training facilities and lines of credit.

This financial allocation does not preclude possible additional resources.

The agreement also covers regional cooperation, allowing financing of actions with neighbouring countries. For this purpose an amount of ECU 4.1 m, equivalent to 8.4 million Netherlands

Antilles guilders is available involving both Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.

The agreement was signed in Willemstad on 19 March by ing. Don Martina, on behalf of the Netherlands Antilles Government and by Dr E. Wirsing, on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities.

Aruba

A Programming Mission from the European Economic Community, headed by Dr Erich Wirsing, Director for West and Central Africa and the Caribbean, of the Directorate-General for Development of the Commission, visited Aruba on March 16 and March 17, 1987.

The aim of the mission was to draw up the Indicative Programme of Community cooperation with Aruba.

For the attainment of its objectives, Aruba will be receiving the sum of ECU 6.625 m, equivalent at the present exchange rate to 13.557 million A.F.L as its programmable financial package managed by the Commission. This sum will be composed of: ECU 4.375 m in the form of grants, and ECU 2.250 m in the form of special loans.

In addition, a sum of ECU 275 000, the unused balance of the Fifth EDF Stabex resources, has been added in the form of a grant.

This financial allocation does not preclude possible additional resources which may be allocated to Aruba during the lifetime of the decision by way of non-programmable European Development Fund resources managed by the Commission, nor any other contribution designed to attain, in the most appropriate fashion, priority development objectives receiving Community support.

Furthermore, the European Investment Bank could contribute from the resources which it manages to the financing of productive investment projects.

Reflecting the Government's overall development objectives, it is agreed that approximately 90% of the resources managed by the Commission shall be concentrated on the further development of the tourism sector.

The objectives of the development strategy of Aruba include in particular the optimal utilisation of its resources in the field of tourism in order to

create new employment opportunities, to generate additional revenue and to improve its balance of payments.

The Indicative Programme was signed at Oranjestad on 17 March by Mr. J. H. A. Eman, Prime Minister of Aruba on behalf of the Government of Aruba, and by Dr E. Wirsing, Director, on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities. ◊

EDF

Following a favourable opinion from the EDF Committee, the Commission has just decided on financing for the following schemes.

Sudan

Phase II of the Djebel-Marra rural development project

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 15 800 000

Phase II of this project aims to push up agricultural output and improve food security and the earnings of traditional smallholders in a 33 000 km² area in Darfur province. Emphasis will be on boosting the production of the staple cereals, sorghum and millet. This phase will take five years, starting in 1987/88 and finishing in 1992/83.

It is based on the first, EDF-financed phase of development (begun in 1980), when basic technical support services and infrastructure were set up where there had been little development aid before. The project played and continues to play an important part in helping the Government and other organisations combat the effects of the drought of 1984-85. This is the first scheme in the sub-sector of traditional agriculture of Sudan's Lomé III programme — which focuses on agricultural and rural development.

Ghana

Renovation and modernisation of the port of Takoradi

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 6 900 000

This project is part of a plan to renovate all Ghana's ports with financing from several donors. It will help remove one of the obstacles to modernisation of the national economy — the inadequacy of the ports. Once the work at Takoradi has been done, the port will be in a position to

handle its former volume of traffic, particularly exports.

The project involves surfacing the jetties, providing security fencing, asphaltting the roads, the leeward groynes and the access way and developing a new container storage zone. New covering for the citrus fruit storage area is to be provided, piles and reinforcements on the main jetty and the lighter pier are to be replaced, the main and leeward groynes are to be cemented and filled, the west (lighter) jetty is to be renovated and repaired and the crane rails on the main jetty are to be changed.

Benin

Repairs and reinforcement of the Bohicon-Dassa road

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 2 800 000

The Community is providing support for the sectoral policy the Government intends running in this sector, the second focus of the 6th EDF indicative programme. The scheme is the first part of a general programme.

The Bohicon-Dassa-Savalou road (107 km) was financed with money from the 4th EDF and opened in late 1980. The first section, from Bohicon to Dassa (16 km) is also a part of various international routes, particularly the Cotonou-Niamey highway, and it shows premature general wear of the surface, which will soon deteriorate and destroy the underlying layer too. Eight kilometres of the carriageway are badly deformed.

Gabon

Reafforestation

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 6 000 000

This is an integral part of a sectoral rural development policy stressing environmental protection and the rational exploitation of forestry resources.

The forest has been a fundamental asset to the Gabonese economy and it will go on being so when the oil era is over. With the decline of oil revenue, wood's share of the export trade should go up by 12%.

The project aims to define reafforestation methods and techniques and create a village agroforestry model. It is the continuation and extension of an essentially experimental pilot project.

Mauritania

Extension of Kaedi hospital

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 1 450 000

The Kaedi hospital in Mauritania received ECU 1 925 000 from the Community back in 1979 to finance a substantial increase in capacity and replace almost all the buildings and equipment.

There were problems with implementation, however, and so the present financing is intended to complete the buildings, supply equipment and medical and technical equipment, provide an initial stock of consumables and install technical assistance and aid with operation. The idea is to get the hospital working and enable it gradually to play its rightful part of coordination in the public health service in the Gorgol region.

Côte d'Ivoire

Agroforestry research

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 475 000

The idea here is to set up an agroforestry research station in the savannah in Côte d'Ivoire with a view to defining high yield plant stock that can be used for intensive afforestation around towns and villages and to study multipurpose forest species for the agro-pastoral development of the region. It will be run by the CTFT-CI, the country's technical centre for tropical forestry.

The project, which includes a nursery, experimental plots and work buildings, is located in Korhogo. ○

EIB

São Tomé and Príncipe

The European Investment Bank has made available ECU 2.1 million for installation of a palm oil mill at Ribeira Peixe, in the south of the island of São Tomé, as part of a plantation programme designed to enable São Tomé and Príncipe to achieve self-sufficiency in edible oil. This is the EIB's maiden operation in this ACP State under the third Lomé Convention.

The funds have been advanced for 20 years at 1% to the State, via Banco Nacional, in the form of a conditional loan drawn from risk capital provided

for under the Convention and managed by the EIB.

The Project, costed at ECU 6.9 million, involves extension of the oil palm plantations from 440 to 600 hectares, using European Development Fund resources, together with related infrastructural works, as well as construction of the oil mill, for which the EIB loan is earmarked.

The mill will have a capacity of 3 tonnes per hour, producing 1 400 tonnes of palm oil per annum from 8 400 tonnes of fresh fruit bunches. The plant is scheduled for commissioning at the end of 1988.

The operation follows on from a feasibility study financed by the EIB in 1984 via a ECU 40 000 conditional loan from risk capital resources available under the second Lomé Convention.

St. Christopher-Nevis

The European Investment Bank has announced a loan of ECU 1.5 million, under the third Lomé Convention, to the Development Bank of St. Christopher-Nevis (DBSKN) for financing SMEs in the industrial, agro-industrial and tourism sectors in this Caribbean ACP State.

The funds have been advanced in the form of a conditional loan from risk capital resources provided for under the Convention and managed by the EIB. The terms and conditions of the operation will vary according to actual use made of the proceeds: the portion of the loan (up to ECU 1.3 million) earmarked for allocation to SMEs in the form of smaller sub-loans will carry interest at 4% over 13 years, while the maximum of ECU 400 000 intended for acquiring equity participations in SMEs will bear interest at 2% over 25 years.

In 1983, DBSKN, whose capital is held entirely by the State, attracted ECU 650 000 from the EIB in risk capital financing which helped to fund eight ventures, while the State received ECU 350 000 to assist it in providing an initial contribution towards DBSKN's share capital. The bank is receiving a global loan from the Caribbean Development Bank in addition to EIB financing.

Zambia

The European Investment Bank has advanced ECU 10.5 million, under the

third Lomé Convention, towards financing smaller enterprises in the industrial, agro-industrial, mining and tourism sectors in Zambia.

The funds, drawn from risk capital resources provided for under the Convention and managed by the EIB, have been made available in the form of:

— a global loan for ECU 10 m to the Development Bank of Zambia (DBZ) which will on-lend the proceeds in support of ventures selected with EIB agreement or finance equity participations in SMEs either by DBZ itself or by the Zambian industrial holding company INDECO where the SMEs concerned are INDECO subsidiaries. The terms and conditions of the loan will vary according to the actual use made of the proceeds;

— a direct participation for the equivalent of almost ECU 500 000 in the share capital of DBZ on behalf of the European Community.

The capital of DBZ, established in 1972, is 60% owned by the Zambian public sector, alongside DEG — Deutsche Finanzierungsgesellschaft für Beteiligungen in Entwicklungsländern GmbH, the African Development Bank, the International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group) and commercial banks. In 1978, the EIB subscribed the equivalent of ECU 500 000 towards the Bank's capital on behalf of the European Community.

In 1978 and 1981, DBZ received and deployed the proceeds of two global loans together worth ECU 10.5 m: the funds contributed towards financing 44 smaller enterprises, investing a total of ECU 67.6 m in new ventures or extension/rehabilitation schemes covering a broad range of activities, notably in industry and agro-industry.

Malawi

The European Investment Bank announced two loans totalling ECU 6.5 m, under the third Lomé Convention, for extending the water supply in Lilongwe, Malawi's capital.

The funds have been made available in form of:

— a loan for ECU 4 m to the State, from the EIB's own resources, for passing on to Lilongwe Water Board (LWB), the official body responsible for the town's water supplies. The loan has been advanced for 18 years at 5%,

allowing for an interest subsidy drawn from European Development Fund resources;

— a subordinated loan for ECU 2.5 m to LWB from risk capital resources provided for under the Convention and managed by the EIB. The loan, repayable only after other bank debts have been settled, carries a term of up to 25 years, with interest payable at 2%.

The project, which seeks to satisfy demand in Lilongwe up to 1997, involves constructing both a new 4.5 million m³ storage dam 6 km downstream from the Kamuzu dam which is to be repaired, and the first phase of a new 32 000 m³ per day treatment plant. Four new booster pumping stations, two ground reservoirs, two elevated storage tanks and 53 km of transmission mains will round off the project. Additional works are planned in the longer term as part of this investment programme which is designed to meet rising water demand from a population which increased from 20 000 in the 1960s to 170 000 in 1986—following transfer of the capital from Blantyre to Lilongwe in 1964—and is expected to number 500 000 by the year 2005. The project is costed at a total of ECU 30.9 m.

The World Bank (IDA) and the Overseas Development Administration (United Kingdom) are also financing the works. ○

FISHERIES

EEC-Gambia fishing agreement

The European Community and Gambia have initialled an agreement on fishing off the Gambian coast and the Commission has just transmitted it to the Council for approval.

The agreement, which comes into force on the day the parties announce that the relevant procedures have been completed, is for three years in the first instance, with the possibility of extending it for subsequent periods of two years.

The Community has to pay compensation of ECU 3.3 m for the first three years in return for the fishing facilities offered to Community vessels (listed below).

The Community will also be contributing ECU 80 000 to a Gambian

scientific programme aimed at improving knowledge of marine resources in this part of the Atlantic Ocean and paying for five two-year study grants for advanced courses for Gambian nationals in the sea fishing sector.

Community shipowners will also have dues to pay. These will be scaled to either their actual fishing activity or the size of the vessels.

Since the Community already has fishing agreements with other African ACPs, in particular Senegal, Guinea Bissau and Guinea, which border Gambia, the new agreement is a very valuable economic addition to the Community fishing industry. Although Gambia has a tiny coastline and the area in question is small, its exclusive economic zone offers the same wide range of species as Senegal, the country surrounding Gambia, with which the Community has also initialled a fishing agreement. This agreement covers the period from 1 October 1986 to 28 February 1988 and covers an area fished above all by the French, Spanish, Italian and Greek fleets.

The protocol provides the following fishing possibilities:

Tuna vessels

— freezer trawlers: 48 500 GRT (*)
— canners: 2 900 GRT (increase to 3 500 GRT possible)

Small trawlers (swordfish): 1 200 GRT
Trawlers (fresh fish): 7 000 GRT

Other vessels (fresh crustacea): 570 GRT (at the Community's request)

Freezer trawlers

— Shrimp: 2 325 GRT (increase of 2 575 GRT possible)
— other species: 10 500 GRT.

The agreement aims to protect resources in the Gambian waters by limiting fishing, allowing 1 900 days for fresh fish and 3 100 for the freezer trawlers. This corresponds to an average of, at most, 65 days per vessel p.a.

○

(*) Gross Registered Tonnage.

STABEX

More than ECU 1 billion transferred during Lomé I and II (1975-84)

The Commission has just adopted a report for the Council on the function-

ing of the Stabex system in 1985, the last year of application of Lomé II. This was also the opportunity to give figures for 10 years' operation of this instrument of cooperation.

Stabex is the mainstay of non-programme aid for the ACPs. It was first introduced under Lomé I with the idea of giving the ACPs the funds they needed to make up for losses in export earnings attendant on fluctuating

prices or production of agricultural goods exported to the EEC.

The tables give the transfers by country and by product. Senegal, Sudan and Mauritania were the main beneficiaries of Stabex transfers in 1975-79, primarily for groundnuts in the case of Senegal and Sudan and iron ore in the case of Mauritania. Under Lomé II, it was Senegal, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire which were in the

lead, Senegal, once again for groundnuts, Ghana for cocoa exports and Côte d'Ivoire for coffee exports. o

VISITS

Lorenzo Natali goes out to Mozambique, Swaziland and Malawi

The mission was timed at a critical moment for these three countries in particular and southern Africa in general. It was the opportunity for Vice-President Lorenzo Natali to make complete what amounted to a tour of all the capitals of the region in a period of less than two months.

Lorenzo Natali was received with outstanding cordiality and unusual honours for a visit of this kind. He had a long, open and friendly talk with the new President, Joaquim Chissano, and the meeting was also attended by the three Ministers (for Cooperation, Foreign Affairs and Trade) most concerned.



Mr Natali in Mozambique...



... and in Malawi

Beneficiary countries by total amounts and by number of transfers (1975-1984)

Position	Beneficiary country	Amount paid over (ECU)	Number of transfers
1	Senegal	155 689 719	5
2	Côte d'Ivoire	108 417 020	3
3	Ghana	90 647 339	3
4	Sudan	82 471 623	8
5	Papua New Guinea	50 690 742	7
6	Kenya	44 865 565	2
7	Tanzania	41 565 887	10
8	Mauritania	37 000 450	2
9	Cameroon	33 655 272	4
10	Togo	32 460 639	6
11	Ethiopia	25 719 673	6
12	Gambia	25 669 065	11
13	Benin	25 012 163	19
14	Niger	22 653 960	6
15	Swaziland	21 414 187	5
16	Uganda	20 595 453	8
17	Mali	20 482 142	8
18	Sierra Leone	18 328 403	7
19	Madagascar	15 736 332	6
20	Burundi	15 296 954	4
21	Guinea Bissau	14 937 468	12
22	Chad	13 976 332	4
23	CAR	13 026 305	7
24	Vanuatu	10 362 630	7
25	Rwanda	9 939 496	4
26	Western Samoa	9 326 413	11
27	Comoros	8 901 119	15
28	Burkina Faso	8 308 636	6
29	São Tomé & Príncipe	7 603 763	3
30	Liberia	7 586 943	1
31	Congo	7 361 677	1
32	Gabon	6 703 311	1
33	Solomon Islands	6 508 461	7
34	Dominica	6 427 781	3
35	Somalia	5 512 701	5
36	Tonga	5 219 131	11
37	Fiji	5 115 895	5
38	Malawi	4 934 458	3
39	Jamaica	4 295 408	1
40	Grenada	3 963 333	7
41	Kiribati	3 882 391	5
42	Cape Verde	1 733 525	5
43	St Lucia	1 618 999	1
44	Lesotho	1 290 959	3
45	St Vincent	913 286	1
46	Djibouti	691 851	3
47	Belize	342 364	2
48	Tuvalu	316 364	7
	Total	1 059 173 588	271



Vice-President Natali presents a plaque commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome to King Mswati III of Swaziland

There was also a long talk with Prime Minister Machungo and a visit to the port of Beira, which is the vital point of departure for supplies to and exports from neighbouring Zimbabwe. He also saw an agricultural project near Maputo.

The main points covered in the talk with the Head of State were the general insecurity and the drought which combined to provoke a massive rural exodus to the coast and the neighbouring countries (Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe and even South Africa). Some 3-4 million people are once more threatened with famine.

The economic situation is difficult. The Government, with the agreement of the IMF and the World Bank, has adopted a courageous recovery plan aimed primarily at revitalising family smallholdings (with a relative withdrawal of the State sector).

If Mozambique is to succeed, it needs rapid and highly flexible assistance. Mr Natali gave instructions for the sectoral programme of imports which are essential to get agricultural production and light industry off the ground again, to be implemented with this in mind.

In Malawi, Vice-President Natali had a long meeting with President Banda, who had just announced his intention of taking part in the military protection of the railway between his country and the port of Nacala in Mozambique.

The Government then outlined Malawi's problems, which are to a very large extent linked to the state of insecurity in Mozambique. They are: — serious balance of payments difficulties, in spite of efficient management, due to the combined effect of the drop in agricultural commodity

prices (tobacco, tea, sugar etc.) and the extra cost of transporting goods through Zimbabwe and South Africa (\$100 million p.a.);

— a growing wave of Mozambican refugees fleeing RENAMO, the armed resistance movement. Numbers have doubled since November, there are now 140 000 of them and the flow seems unlikely to stop.

EEC-Malawi cooperation under the various Lomé Conventions was seen by both sides to be particularly satisfactory and, thanks to efficient administration, even exemplary.

In going from Mozambique to Malawi, Lorenzo Natali was the guest of honour at the inauguration of the new airport at Mbabane, Swaziland (built with Community, French and UN financing), which was opened by the new Swaziland Prime Minister.

Mr Natali then had an audience with the young King Mswati III, who came to the throne in 1986 after a

reign of 61 years by his father, and was then invited to a working lunch with the Minister for Trade and various members of the Government.

It was made clear the Community aid and the considerable trade advantages (for sugar and beef and veal especially) attendant on the Lomé Convention were very much appreciated by the Government of Swaziland. ◦

Miss Charles, Dominican Premier, and Mr Mitchell, PM of St. Vincent and the Grenadines at the Commission

The Prime Ministers of Dominica, Miss Eugenia Charles, and St Vincent and the Grenadines, James Mitchell, made an official visit to the Commission on 23 and 24 March to put the Eastern Caribbean countries' point of view on the future Caribbean regional programme under Lomé III. The delegation included, in particular, Mr R. Rainford, the Secretary-General of CARICOM.


The visit was an opportunity for the two Prime Ministers and CARICOM representatives to talk with Vice-President Lorenzo Natali and officials of the Development Directorate.

This led to a Memorandum of Understanding on the programming of the Lomé III regional funds in the Caribbean. The text will be signed by the Commission and CARICOM once the Member States and the Governments of the 13 Caribbean countries have approved the Memorandum. ◦



Miss Charles, Dominica's Prime Minister and President of the ACP Council, during her visit to the NGO Liaison Committee exhibition, accompanied by Mr Pierre Galand, Chairman of the Liaison Committee

New DG VIII Directory



* Specialized services
() = acting as unit head

Delegations in the ACP States

DG VIII

Mr Frans Josef Carel Klinkenbergh takes up his post as Director of Directorate A (Development policy and trade) after a distinguished career in both the public and private sectors in The Netherlands. Born at Sittard in 1928, he obtained a law degree from the University of Leiden and entered the private sector as a manager in the mechanical engineering field, working for firms such as Babcock & Wilcox, Alsthom and Siemens. He entered the public service in 1961 in the Directorate of international relations at the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Between 1965 and 1970 he was seconded to the Dutch permanent representation to the OECD and since 1975 he has been Director of economic cooperation with developing countries. He is a member of the governing board of FMO, the Dutch development finance corporation and of the European Institute of Public Administration in Maastricht.

Philippe Soubestre rejoins DG VIII as Director in Directorate D (Management of Instruments) after an absence

of almost six years. Born in 1939 and a graduate of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, he entered the Commission in 1964 as Administrator in DG VIII. He was invited to join the Cabinet of Mr Deniau and later, that of Mr Cheysson, where he became Chef de Cabinet in 1976. From 1981 to 1984 he was Director in the Direc-

torate-General for Information, in charge of information to Member States and candidate countries, ACP States and other countries for priority areas and trade unions. Since 1985 he has been Chef de Cabinet of Mr Cheysson, the Commissioner responsible for Mediterranean Policy and North/South relations. o

GENERAL INFORMATION

Coffee: OAMCAF's President sees Commissioner

Denis Bra Karon, the President of OAMCAF, the coffee producers' association of Africa and Madagascar, and Côte d'Ivoire's Agriculture Minister, was received by Commissioner Natali, on 25 February this year. The Minister was concerned about the fact that coffee prices have been declining regularly since 1986 and asked the EEC to apply the quota system laid down by the agreement signed in 1983 (and due to expire in 1988). This system, under which quotas are fixed by joint agreement of the signatory coffee-producing and consuming countries, comes into force when prices drop.

Mr Natali said that the EEC Commission was not against new export quotas, provided there was a realistic, in-depth examination first that took all the data, including the market conditions, into account. There was no question of the Commission bringing back the old quotas done away with in February 1986.

In January 1987, the Ivorian Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs brought out a report suggesting that GDP would go up by 1% in 1987, as against the 5.4% of 1986 and 4.9% in 1985. Coffee and cocoa output will also be on the decline, with 240 000 t

and 510 000 t respectively, as against the 260 000 t and 580 000 t of 1986. This drop, combined with lower world prices, will bring about a large reduction in the surplus of Côte d'Ivoire's Agricultural Stabilisation Fund. ○

OECD Development Assistance Committee discusses EEC aid

DAC, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee met under the chairmanship of Joseph Wheeler on 31 March to look at the EEC development aid managed by the Commission and the European Investment Bank. The Commission delegation was led by Development Director-General Dieter Frisch. The examining countries were Italy and Switzerland.

The Committee welcomed the constant increase in Community aid. Net ODA payments were up at \$1.5 billion in 1985 and the increase was due to extra EDF contributions to the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, something which more than made up for the decline of food aid (which was sent in exceptionally large quantities in 1984). To this must be added the sum of \$150 million, not provided on soft terms and principally in the form of EIB loans.

The Committee noted that the Community gave two-thirds of its aid to sub-Saharan Africa, where it was one of the biggest sources of assistance. It welcomed the fact that the Community gave low-income nations, and the least-developed countries especially, a large percentage of its aid — which far outstripped the average of other DAC members. It concentrated strongly on rural development, with transport and communications as the other privileged sectors.

The Commission told the Committee what had been done to implement the sectoral programming for each country set up as part of Lomé III. This approach had made it possible to focus the aid on a small number of priority sectors and, at the same time, to step up the dialogue on sectoral policies and targets and the most efficient means of achieving them. This was something that called for tighter coordination with the other donors and the Committee was pleased to see the Community's more active contribution to orchestrating the aid effort.

Trends in ODA						
	Average (calculated over two years) for the past 10 years			Last three years		
	1974/75	1979/80	1984/85	1983	1984	1985
Net payments:						
ECU '000 000						
Total ODA	511.9	938.0	1 924.4	1 557.2	1 870.1	1 978.7
— bilateral	440.8	806.0	1 660.1	1 364.9	1 631.1	1 688.9
— multilateral	71.1	132.0	264.3	192.3	238.9	289.7

However, it did feel that the Community was still fairly limited when it came to supplying programme aid to developing countries involved in structural adjustment programmes and it encouraged it to seek ways of improving its scope for giving them flexible aid that could be paid over rapidly.

It was worried about the recent reduction in commitments being due to questions of procedure. The Commission said it was still taking steps to speed up commitments like payments and paying special attention to the problems with which countries with relatively weak administrative structures had to cope. It also mentioned the recent changes to the way the Community aid programme, which accounted for a third of all Communi-

ty aid, was administered. The idea was to speed up deliveries of food more and heighten the effect the programme had on development. The Committee encouraged it to continue the drive to simplify aid implementation while maintaining high standards of project monitoring and control.

The Commission reported on what it had done to improve the ability of developing country institutions to devise and implement efficient development policies. The Committee also noted that the Community had a wide range of regional development activities, in spite of the difficulties of producing and running programmes of this kind. It hoped the Commission could step up its regional cooperation drive, which was particularly important for small developing countries. ○

International anti-apartheid day

Joint meeting by the European Parliament and the ACPs

Sharpeville, South Africa, 21 March 1960. The scene of the first popular uprising against the apartheid system the Government set up in 1948. Dozens of people, many of them women and children, massacred in the first public protest against racial segregation in South Africa...

The UN has made 21 March the International Day against Racism and Apartheid and this year, like last, there were many events in Brussels to commemorate it.

And so it was that a meeting, chaired by Michael McGowan, the British Socialist and new Chairman of the EP Development Committee, was held in the European Parliament two days later. It was attended by many Ambassadors from ACP and Arab countries, the Heads of the OAU and UN Brussels offices, Libère Buzingo and Hassan Fodha, the ANC represen-

tative Mr G. Motsepe and, of course, a large number of EuroMPs too.

They began by deploring that fact that there were more victims of apartheid once again in 1987 and that the countries with the key to the solution could still not agree on how to achieve it. In a message read by Mr Fodha, the UN Secretary-General Mr Perez de Cuellar said that racial discrimination was the reason for the instability in South Africa and the whole of the south of the continent. He reaffirmed the support of both the Secretary-General and the UN itself for those in South Africa who are still fighting apartheid. He issued a warning to the South African Government — which, let us not forget, has never adhered to the UN's human rights charter. The fact of not signing the Human Rights Convention, he said, did not excuse a member country from respecting the

Appearance and reality

It may be thought that economic sanctions are the surest way to bring down the system of apartheid in South Africa, but it may also be that before sanctions begin to bite, it could be strangled by its own bureaucracy. According to a report in "Time" magazine of 9 March this year, the Home Affairs Minister Stoffel Botha announced the results of the 1986 racial reclassification exercise. To comprehend this farce, it must be remembered that racial classification is the backbone of the apartheid system and that this classification determines where citizens may live and work. Everyone is classified at birth, but people may have this classification changed if they feel they have been wrongly classified. The 1986 exercise, involving many man-hours of research and documentation, has come up with the following results: nine whites became coloured, 506 coloureds became white, two whites became Malay, 14 Malays became white, nine Indians became white, seven Chinese became white, one Griqua became white, 40 coloureds became black, 666 blacks became coloured, 87 coloureds became Indian, 67 Indians became coloured, 26 coloureds became Malays, 50 Malays became Indians, 61 Indians became Malays, four coloureds became Griquas, four Griquas became coloured, two Griquas became blacks, 18 blacks became Griquas, 12 coloureds became Chinese, ten blacks became Indians, two blacks became other Asians, two coloureds became Indians and one other coloured became black. "According to Botha" concluded "Time", "no blacks applied to become white and no whites became black". ◊

UN Charter. The fact of being the only member of the UN to be the subject of obligatory sanctions ought to give South Africa the measure of the gravity of its policy and the need to abolish apartheid, the Secretary-General maintained.

Abdul J. Koroma, the Sierra Leone Ambassador and chairman of the group of OAU Ambassadors in Brussels, called on the European Parliament to run vigorous campaigns to get European public opinion to increase its opposition to apartheid. This sys-

tem, the Ambassador said, was a "crime against humanity" and a "serious impediment to development", as well as the "negation of all the democratic values the Europeans espouse".

It can take more than a description of apartheid to convey the gravity of the situation. Zimbabwean Ambassador S.J. Mahaka, the Chairman of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors, decided to recall painful memories of his childhood in what used to be Rhodesia, where the political and social system was also based on segregation. "We weren't even allowed to walk on the pavements of Salisbury", Mr Mahaka said, triggering something like a fresh awakening to a reality seen from afar. The leaders of the modern world "have no right to leave the future generations a world like this if it needs improving", he went on, suggesting that South Africa's attacks on its neighbours were more a reflection of Pretoria's fear of seeing a non-racial policy succeed in the countries of the


front line than a fear of communism. "For we are no communists", he said. "Why is Europe hesitant and divided on measures against South Africa? We are hoping for the Community's answer on this", Mr Mahaka said.

Michael McGowan wound up the meeting—at which many MPs and others had severely criticised the "waiting game" the Twelve were currently playing—by saying that a general information campaign should be run alongside the States' political action to convince both economic operators and consumers that they should stop buying South African goods and withdraw their deposits from banks which supported the South African economy. He gave the example of his constituency in Britain, where the local people themselves had—successfully—taken over the boycott. The fight against racism, and apartheid especially, is and will remain one of the priorities of the Committee on Development and of Parliament, Mr McGowan announced. ◊ L.P.

IGADD: First Donors' Conference

Sixteen donor governments and 29 financial institutions, as well as a number of NGOs, were represented at a Donors' Conference held by IGADD (Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development) in Djibouti from 16-18 March. Some 63

proposals for projects valued at \$1 073 m in the six member countries (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) were examined, for which, by the end of the Conference, a total of over \$70 million had been pledged.



The rostrum: from left to right, Mohamed Hassan Abdillahi, Director, International organisations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Djibouti; Moumin Bahdon Fahti, Minister-Coordinator of IGADD; El Hadj Hassan Gouled Aptidon, Djibouti's President and Makonnen Kebret, IGADD's Executive Secretary

IGADD was created on 16 January 1986 and this conference was its first international gathering since then. Opening the Conference on behalf of the IGADD countries, all of whom were represented at ministerial level, President Aptidon of Djibouti, IGADD's current Chairman, launched a pressing appeal to the international community in a message of major political significance and vision for the future of cooperation and peace in the region. He thanked the donors for "the solidarity that had been shown with the peoples of the region, the victims of the recent drought and of other misfortune". He also emphasised the role played by IGADD in normalising relations between its member countries, Somalia and Ethiopia in particular.

Proposals were examined for sub-regional and national projects prepared by IGADD in the fields of food security, desertification control, water resources, agricultural research, livestock resources and intra-regional communications. The Conference supported IGADD's proposed strategy for project implementation by which most of the regional cooperative projects would be executed through already existing national and international institutions, thus minimising the need for new institutional structures and mechanisms and ensuring the best use of scarce resources.

Italy and Saudi Arabia: generous pledges

Of the sums pledged, the \$50 million agreed to by Italy was by far the largest, IGADD and the countries of the Horn of Africa in general being favoured partners in Italy's bilateral development aid programmes. The contribution will be concentrated principally in the fields of food security and communications and will include the supply of technical assistance to the IGADD Secretariat. Saudi Arabia, represented at the Conference by its Ambassador in Djibouti, promised some \$17 m dollars for regional projects. Sweden, which had sent a high-level delegation, promised \$2.5 m, to be spent on food security and environmental protection projects in particular. Japan offered a first tranche of \$450 000, for an early warning system for drought covering the IGADD countries. A number of other donors, including Great Britain, Canada and The Netherlands and the World Bank

expressed interest in participating in one or several of the various projects put forward. France was prepared to provide expertise for a number of projects. Several sub-regional projects call for feasibility studies for joint investment ventures involving two or more member countries in the region. Others aim at providing technical assistance so as to enhance national capacities and facilities in research, resource assessment, training, information exchange and technology transfer, and to enable other member countries to benefit from these capacities and facilities.

The European Community was not able to put up any further funds as such for IGADD, since its assistance to the six member countries under the Lomé III Convention already amounts to ECU 750 m (some \$850 m), and a further ECU 185 m (\$210 m) is foreseen for the sub-region (together with Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi) in the context of its regional funding. IGADD could play an important role in defining regional strategies in the framework of Lomé III project and programme implementation.

In closing the three-day conference, President Aptidon thanked all those donors and institutions which had helped in the rapid establishment of IGADD, and in the extensive preparations for the holding of the donors' meeting. IGADD would probably have wished for more funds to have been pledged, but there was general agreement that the Conference would, in itself, lay the foundation for cooperation between IGADD and a good number of donors, and that its importance was likely to stretch, therefore, way beyond the \$70 m dollars committed in Djibouti. ○ M.v.d.V.

EMERGENCY AID

Aid to control locusts in Africa

The Commission has just decided on emergency aid for several countries in Africa, in accordance with Article 203 of Lomé III. The aid is part of a locust-control plan the international community has adopted, in conjunction with the FAO, for the coming agricultural season and will be used to finance pesticides and technical assistance.

The countries concerned are:

	ECU
Guinea Bissau	45 000
Niger	295 000
Nigeria	180 000
Chad	150 000
Mali	210 000
Burkina Faso	155 000
Benin	90 000
Total	1 125 000

Suriname: ECU 340 000

The Commission has decided to allocate 6th EDF money to finance a scheme in Suriname. It is in the form of a grant of ECU 340 000 and it is intended as emergency aid, for immediate implementation, to contribute to the medical assistance needed as a result of the fighting in the country.

Mozambique: ECU 2.5 m

The Commission has just decided to send Mozambique emergency aid worth ECUs 2 500 000 under the Lomé Convention arrangements.

The persistent drought in central and southern Mozambique is compounded by disorganised production, the destruction of infrastructure and military action hampering the marketing circuits. Grave insecurity has caused hundreds of thousands of people to move to the towns. Their survival entirely depends on outside aid.

Community aid, which is for the Inhambane, Tete and Zambesia regions, will be used to provide extra food, drugs and staple foods. It will also cover medical personnel.

A number of NGOs are running this programme.

Mauritania: ECU 105 000

This is emergency aid, for immediate effect, for the locust-control campaign for the coming agricultural season.

Guyana: ECU 40 000

This is emergency aid, for immediate effect, to finance the recruiting of specialised personnel and supplies of drugs and medical equipment.

Madagascar: ECU 250 000

The recent Commission decision to give ECU 250 000-worth of emergency aid is aimed at helping Médecins sans Frontières with a food and drug programme for people in the Cap Ste

Marie area of the island, where an estimated 20 000 people are in imminent danger because of the persistent drought.

Malawi: ECU 500 000

Emergency aid of an immediate nature for Mozambicans forced to cross into Malawi territory.

Vanuatu: ECU 360 000

The Commission has just decided on more emergency aid, of ECU 360 000, for Vanuatu under the Lomé Convention.

An initial sum of ECU 100 000 for relief and immediate needs was decided on in February this year.

Hurricane Uma, which hit Vanuatu with dramatic consequences, left 45 dead and damage to 95% of the buildings in Vila and Tana and the Government will be using the recent aid to buy preserved meat and fish locally and distribute it to the needy.

Lebanon

Discussions on the situation in the Lebanon on 12 February led the Commission to decide to send ECU 500 000 for people living in the Lebanon who are affected by the present troubles.

This aid will be channelled by and distributed under the supervision of two NGOs, Médecins sans Frontières and the World Council of Churches, in conjunction with the local humanitarian organisations.

It is a complement to the ECU 270 000 of the cofinancing agreement which the Commission intends concluding very shortly and which will involve Caritas buying food for displaced persons in southern Lebanon. The Commission also decided to send emergency aid of ECU 500 000 to this country on 23 December last year.

UNRWA has appealed for relief for both the Palestinians affected by fighting in the camps and the Lebanese living around them, and the Commission has responded to this with its decision to send assistance of a total ECU 2 700 000, broken down as follows:

- **UNRWA — ECU 1 600 000** for a three-month food ration programme and supplies of basic materials and drugs;
- **ICRC — ECU 700 000** for the local purchasing of food parcels and assistance for the Lebanese Red Cross;

- **UNDRO — ECU 400 000** for supplies of medical products and equipment, deliveries of milk and food for babies, the installation of sanitary equipment and repairs to water distribution points.

Peru: ECU 50 000

The Commission has just decided to send ECU 50 000 of emergency aid to Peru, where torrential rain has caused flooding of two rivers in the Villa Rica area. Early information suggests 40 dead, 500 missing and 400 houses and 80% of the industrial zone destroyed.

Ecuador: ECU 500 000

The Commission has decided on ECU 500 000 of emergency aid to Ecuador, which had an earthquake on 5 March. Most recent information puts losses at 300 deaths and 4 000 missing. There are at least 20 000 homeless who need feeding and there is considerable material damage, too.

The aid will be sent via NGOs and the Government authorities and be used for basic relief.

Reunion: victims of Hurricane Clotilda: ECU 250 000

The Commission has decided on emergency aid of ECU 250 000 for victims of Hurricane Clotilda, which hit Reunion on 13 February.

This is humanitarian assistance aimed at covering the basic needs of distressed families and it reflects the Community's solidarity with the people of Reunion who have been struck by this catastrophe. ◊

FOOD AID

The Commission has recently decided to allocate the following food aid from the budget. This follows a favourable opinion from the 24th meeting of the Food Aid Committee on 3 March. See table for details.

Mozambique

The Commission has just decided on the first emergency aid from the 1987 programme for Mozambique —

Food aid allocations					
		Cereals	Milk-powder	Butteroil	Other products
		T	T	T	T
LICROSS	FD	20 000	1 500	1 000	800 S 500 O 2 500 B
UNHCR	FD	35 000	3 500		2 000 S 4 000 O 5 000 B
UNBRO	FD				1 800 S 2 350 B
NGO	FD	90 000	25 000	2 500	1 500 S 2 000 O 1 600 B 480 F
UNRWA	FD		3 000	1 500	2 000 S 1 800 R 870 B 120 L 700 T 480 F 880 CB 50 O

In addition the Commission has allocated to UNRWA:

- ECU 4 m in cash as assistance to the emergency feeding programme;
- a contribution of ECU 490 000 towards in-country transport and distribution costs of the supplies provided.

FD: free to destination.
S: Sugar; O: Oil; B: Beans; F: Fish; R: Rice; CB: Corned Beef; T: Tomatoes; B: Bulgur; L: Legumes.

60 000 t cereals, 2 000 t beans and 1 000 t vegetable oil.

As the situation develops and offers from other donors become clear, the Community will be taking more important decisions in 1987 to ensure this country gets regular supplies.

The decision was taken at the time when the products decided on in October last were being delivered. The situation in Mozambique is still critical and 3 900 000 people need relief. The Commission has made arrangements for the transport and delivery of the food with Mr Hein-Cacere, the UN coordinator. The big problem, in view of the fighting in Mozambique, is reaching the displaced persons, but ECU 2 500 000 were allocated for this purpose on 23 February.

The Commission has continued to

provide this country, where needs are still considerable, with substantial aid. In 1986, it totalled 98 000 t cereals, 100 t milkpowder, 4 000 t beans and 100 vegetable oil, more than the 1985 allocations.

The bulk of the aid was channelled through the Mozambican Government and various NGOs — Oxfam, World Vision, Caritas Germanica and so on. And part of the relief provided last year was bought in Zimbabwe and then taken into Mozambique.

Commission help also goes to the many Mozambican refugees in the surrounding countries, particularly Malawi, in the shape of food and drugs sent through international organisations and NGOs. It has sent food aid worth a total of ECU 30 m out to Mozambique since 1986. ◊

have been achieved by the year 2000).

— The Community is no barrier to their identity or their national, historical, cultural or economic interests. On the contrary, it is the best guarantee of them.

— The United States of Europe is not an outmoded idea. It is something anticipated with realism and enthusiasm. Willingness to vote for the head of a European Government, even if he/she was of a different nationality, reflects the same thinking.

Doubt is cast on some of the accepted ideas of many years' standing.

— The French are seen to be the most nationalistic people, but they turn out to be most in favour of the Community dimension (70% are even willing to vote for a European Government Head who is not necessarily French).

— The most spectacular positive trend is in the UK, where favourable attitudes went from 30% to 52% and unfavourable attitudes from 48% to 37% between 1970 and 1987.

Young people, who display an obvious commitment to Europe, still betray a certain amount of anxiety about the future.

— They think, no doubt rightly, that the possibility of civil war in Europe is out of the question and that the existence of a Community of six, nine or twelve is for good. And they find it difficult to understand the complexity and the slow pace of our enterprise. We have to offer them a genuine European project. We have to respond to their desire for a European democratic, legal and cultural Community, for a tangible Europe that is accessible and simpler and more effective, one that is the best possible guarantee of their identity and their legitimate interests.

The question today is not what alternative to Europe, but what Europe we want to live in and how to help build it." ◊

Lord Cockfield speaks

"Although the internal market is not the only achievement necessary for the economic integration of Europe, it is by far the most important one."

In a speech to the British Chamber of Commerce in Brussels, Lord Cockfield, Commissioner responsible for

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

30th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome

Euro-Barometer 2000 presented by
Carlo Ripa di Meana

"It is now only a few days to the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome and I should like briefly to present the main events that the Community—the departments I am in charge of in particular—has suggested or organised, resolutely under the banner of the future, of course, although not forgetting the lessons of the distant and recent past.

As can be seen from the programmes in the press folders, there are three series of events — 25 March, of course, and the ceremonies and celebrations at the Capitol; 9 May, which is Europe Day, and 29 June, the date of the European Council in Brussels.

I should like to draw your attention to two events that I am particularly keen on — the conference on The Cultural Challenge in a Changing Europe in Florence on 28 March and the public festival that closes the 30th anniversary celebrations at the Parc du Cinquenaire and coincides with the end of the Belgian Presidency.

The posters for the 30th anniversary are on the theme of "Europe — our future", naturally, and so I thought it was vital for us to know, identify and

gauge just what the people of Europe expect from Europe — that is to say what they hope and also what they think is necessary or ineluctable.

I shall hand over to Professor Karlheinz Reif in just a minute and he will present the results of the Special Euro-Barometer 2000 and answer any questions. But for the moment, I should like briefly to give you one or two of my thoughts.

I shall make three, what I believe to be essential, remarks. First, the citizens of Europe take up more advanced positions than their Governments. This is what they said.

— It is important, extremely important even (in the eyes of 74-80% of subjects in the founder Member States), for their countries to be part of the Community in which, going beyond any ideological considerations, they have confidence for the protection of what are practical and, to my mind, fundamental interests — "télévision sans frontières", a common fight against disasters and terrorism, currency, freedom of movement and freedom to work and stay in other countries (71-92% think all this will

the Internal Market outlined the efforts the Community had made to create the internal market and called on business and industry to seize the opportunities the Commission programme offered.

He mentioned the Treaty of Rome 30th anniversary celebrations, saying that completion of the internal market would be the Community's greatest achievement ever. Success depended on two things — political will and the ability to translate that will into practical action. The Single Act and the declaration of the Heads of State and Government clearly showed that the political will was there. The challenge facing the Community now was how to translate it into practice. "We have started—and it is a good start—moving towards the target. The Commission will maintain the pace and even step it up" he maintained, "and the

Council could, and clearly must, do more. And, of course, Parliament, which has supported the objectives unflinchingly, must not let itself be eclipsed".

"But", Lord Cockfield went on, "the active support of the people of Europe has been an absolutely fundamental and necessary factor. We are giving trade and industry in the Community the biggest chance it has ever had. If we can convince them of this", he said, "of our ability to complete this programme and complete it in good time, then we will trigger an increasing wave of investments for the future. And these investments will, in turn, contribute to the growth they have to encourage. But this is a mutual thing. What we have to do is convince the industrialists — but the industrialists have to be with us to convince the Governments". o



Michael McGowan

Chairman of the Parliament's Development Committee. A Labour MEP elected in 1984, he was born in 1940 and is a former journalist with experience in the fields of health and the cooperative movement

Mali celebrates the 30th anniversary of its partner, the EEC

The 30th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome was celebrated in several ACP countries, including, and in great style, in Bamako, the capital of Mali, thanks largely to the good relations between the Commission's Delegate in Mali, Mr Jacques Collet, and two very pro-Community Ambassadors, Mr Francis Plateau, who represents France, and Mr Klaus Holderbaum, the West German Ambassador. Mr Robert Fitchett, the UK Ambassador based in Dakar came to Bamako specially for the occasion.

The ceremony was marked by two events in particular. Firstly, by a press conference at the French Cultural Centre, which began with a Contact-Magazine file "Europe ... why?", followed by a speech by Mr Auclert, and by questions from two Mali journalists, the answers to which were supplied by the three Ambassadors, by the Delegate, Mr Collet and by the Deputy Director-

General.

A magnificent reception was given in the evening by the French Ambassador, on behalf of the Ambassadors and of the Commission Delegate, at which there were some 800 guests, amongst whom the Prime Minister and several government ministers. The evening opened, under the lights of television cameras and in front of the massed Community flags, with a stirring ceremony which included the singing of the Malian and European national anthems and a speech by the French Ambassador recalling the words of Winston Churchill, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Alcide de Gasperi, Paul-Henri Spaak, Sicco Mansholt and General de Gaulle. Among other speeches—including one by the West German Ambassador and a short, improvised word from Mr Auclert—was a fine one made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and of International Cooperation, Mr Modibo Keita. o

date of the conservatives, liberals and Gaullists, Emilio Duran (ED/SP). The green light for the somewhat difficult election of Michael McGowan was ultimately given by the EPP, whose Chairman, Egon Klepsch, came to the meeting in person to say that his political group would stick to the political groups' agreement on the distribution of committee chairmanships.

Mr McGowan succeeds the legendary Katharina Focke (S/D), who had announced in November 1986 that she would be stepping down, as a German Social Democrat in fact had to leave the ranks of committee chairmen when Spain and Portugal joined the Community. Thus ends a period that was propitious for development if sometimes stormy for EuroMPs on the Development Committee and officials in DG VIII and I... and heavy on reports... But Mrs Focke, whom the *Scotsman* called "the Iron Lady" at the Joint Assembly in Inverness, is still a member of the Development Committee.

The Vice-Chairmen of the Committee are Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago-Cerretti (PPE/I), Francis Würtz (COM/F) and Margaret Daly (ED/UK). o

European Parliament's Development Committee gets new Chairman

EP group and committee chairmen are being elected now, half way through the parliamentary term. At the constituent meeting of the Devel-

opment Committee in Strasbourg on 18 February earlier this year, Michael McGowan (S/UK) was elected, with 30 votes against the 17 of the candi-



INDUSTRIAL OPPORTUNITIES

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REGIONAL COOPERATION MEETING: EAST AFRICA

EXPORTING MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS FROM ACP COUNTRIES

A "watershed" event was how the CDI organizers regarded the Regional Industrial Cooperation Meeting for East Africa held in Kenya's capital, Nairobi, from February 17-19, 1987. The meeting had as its specific theme: "Export Marketing of ACP-Manufactured Products".


This was a major policy meeting which brought together more than 100 participants from 11 East African countries (Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda), the twelve EEC Member States, the EEC Commission, the ACP Secretariat and various regional organizations.

In two ways, the meeting was particularly important for CDI. Firstly, one of CDI's new tasks under the Lomé III Convention is to organize an industrial cooperation meeting in each of the six ACP regions during the five years of the Convention's life. The Nairobi meeting was, therefore, the first of its kind. Secondly, Lomé III has introduced assistance for marketing of ACP manufactures as a priority area of activity for CDI.

SHIFT IN FOCUS

Moving the focus of ACP export development away from trade in primary commodities to trade in value-added processed goods, implies a host of challenges which must be of concern to those involved with the international trading framework and with the rules which govern the access of ACP manufactures to regional and external markets, including the EEC. But this shift in focus must be of even more concern to policy makers, entrepreneurs and industrial promotion agents within the ACP countries (both indigenous entrepreneurs as well as ACP-based foreign investors).

Nairobi was a forum for these key parti-



Members of two East African delegations to the marketing meeting in Nairobi. First row, Kenya. Second row, Mauritius.

cipants to air the constraints and practical problems facing them. It also enabled them to examine the challenges confronting exporters of ACP products, and to take away with them practical proposals and ideas for follow-up action.

PAPERS PRESENTED

Two plenary sessions were organized during the first day of the meeting at which a total of seven papers were presented.

The first session, entitled "Framework for Export Marketing", covered such topics as the rules of Lomé III relating to the export of manufactures to the EEC, the performance of East African exports, international trading procedures (GATT and the Multi-Fibre Arrangement).

Four papers on the "Problems and Requirements of Export Development" were presented at the second plenary session and these included a case study of export marketing from the Industrial Free Zone of Mauritius, marketing strategies for breaking into the European market and the

role of CDI in assisting export marketing.

Six papers are summarized on pages 2 to 4.

WORKING GROUPS

Day two of the meeting gave the participants time to react to the above papers when two working groups commented on the themes of the plenary sessions, drew conclusions and formulated recommendations. The results are summarized on page 4.

In tandem with the meetings of the two working groups, industrial visits were organised to Nairobi manufacturing enterprises and industrial estates.


Both organizers and invitees were well pleased with the two-day gathering. The theme was felt to be right, the papers were well received and the arrangements were stream-lined enough to focus discussion and avoid extraneous or superfluous comment.

Continued on page 2

EXPORT MARKETING MEETING, NAIROBI



Mr. Edgar Makota, East African member of CDI's Joint Governing Board, who presided at the opening ceremony and chaired a plenary session of the Nairobi meeting.



Professor M. Pedini, Italian member of CDI's Joint Governing Board, who chaired a plenary session of the Nairobi meeting.

Continued from page 1.

Asked by CDI to evaluate the usefulness of the meeting, country representatives described it as an "outstanding and very useful forum" and lamented only the limited time for discussion. It was also felt that if the recommendations of the meeting were implemented ACP exports would do better on EEC markets.

COMMERCIAL PROBLEMS

Mr. Lorimer D. MacKenzie, of the EEC Commission's development directorate (DG VIII), reminded delegates in his address that "commercial problems are not easily solved by high level political debates about principles, but rather by an understanding of the practical difficulties faced by the commercial entrepreneur". It was perhaps this recognition of the problems of the commercial entrepreneur which guaranteed the success of the Nairobi meeting.

Participants were welcomed by CDI's Director, Dr. Isaac Akinrele, but the meeting was officially opened by the Kenyan Minister for Planning and National Development, Dr. Robert J. Ouko. The opening ceremony was also addressed by the Ambassador of Zambia to the EEC, Mr. Bitwell Robinson Kuwai, who chairs the Brussels-based ACP-EEC Committee on Industrial Cooperation, and Mr. William Poeton, Vice-President of ECOSOC (the Economic and Social Committee of the European Community).

The meeting was closed by Professor Jonathan Ng'eno, Kenyan Minister for Commerce and Industry. He referred to the uphill task facing ACP countries in improv-

ing their export performance in a world market dominated by Industrial goods of the developed world where ACP manufactured products are still viewed with suspicion for a variety of reasons.

"These hidden factors", said Professor Ng'eno, "tend to dampen the world market even for those products for which our industries would be expected to enjoy comparative advantage".

Members of CDI's joint governing board also participated in the meeting. Plenary sessions and Working Groups were chaired by the Board members for East Africa, Mr. Mahamoud Ali Nadeem (Sudan) and Mr. Edgar Makota (Tanzania).

The Vice-Chairman of the Board, Dr. Subhas Mungra (Suriname) likewise participated along with the member for Italy, Professor M. Pedini.

EXPORTING UNDER LOMÉ REGULATIONS

*Lorimer MacKenzie,
Commission of the
European Communities*

The depressing trading performance of the ACP countries in manufactured goods was acknowledged by Mr. Lorimer MacKenzie, Head of Division (Commercial Development) in DG VIII of the EEC Commission. But this problem should not be tackled, he said, by looking for faults in the Lomé regime itself.

In a paper entitled "Export from ACP Countries to the EEC under Lomé Regulations", Mr. MacKenzie presented the Lomé

trade regime to delegates, dwelling on its specificity. "Success in using the provisions of Lomé has come to those countries or enterprises who have identified the market and the product and used the provisions of the Convention to assist them", he said.

Citing complaints that rules of origin under Lomé are too restrictive, he added that the European Community did not believe that the rules were the cause of any significant problem.

The "myth of restrictive safeguard measures" was also discussed and condemned for its harmful effect on investors. However, evidence showed that the safeguard measures were not liable to be the source of an arbitrary interruption in trade.

NEED FOR COMPETITIVITY

However, Mr. MacKenzie thought that a liberal access regime for ACP manufactures was not enough in itself to create exports.

Products also have to meet the quality and standards demanded by the market as well as catering for a multiplicity of tastes.

Mr. MacKenzie's paper had two main conclusions:

1. The most important precondition for improving trade performance was an environment in which trade could flourish. This could not be provided without a political commitment from each government to provide that environment.
2. The ACP States could not hope to influence the current world trading problems by relying only on the Lomé Convention. They had to become actively involved in the Uruguay Round of GATT and to reassess their own interests inside political groupings like the Group of 77.

MARKETING CASE STUDIES

Gary Aylmer, CDI

Mr. Gary Aylmer, Technical Adviser (food sector) with CDI, addressed the Nairobi meeting on the export performance of selected manufactured goods from East Africa under the Lomé Convention (1976-86).

He gave a detailed report on the export marketing experiences of such countries as Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya and Mauritius, in products like leather, textiles, instant coffee and horticultural products.

EXPORT MARKETING MEETING, NAIROBI

What emerged clearly from this report was that an abundant supply of raw materials is not enough to ensure success in exports. "Meticulous" attention to marketing in all its aspects is required if products of the right quality are to reach the customer at the right time and at the right price.

A case study of the Ethiopian leather industry revealed that two main areas of weakness were technology and marketing. Quality was low because of factors such as poor animal husbandry, delays in curing hides and skins and shortages of the appropriate chemicals, etc... Moreover, marketing was abysmal, with a lack of regular contact with buyers, inadequate market research and hardly any promotional activity, and little or no training in the field of export marketing.

Textile exports from Mauritius on the other hand were described as "a remarkable example of government and private sector setting common objectives and changing the direction of the economy". Mauritius developed its textile and clothing industry in order to diversify away from an economy entirely dependent on sugar for foreign exchange earnings. The textile industry has by now generated more than 60 000 new jobs. The study stresses that it was **trade** with the European Community and not **aid** that helped to create these jobs.

EXPORT RESTRICTIONS ON TEXTILES AND CLOTHING

Dr. Carol Cosgrove

The "critical importance" of the textile and clothing industries of developing countries, including those in East Africa, was raised in a paper entitled "ACP Manufactured Exports under International Trade Procedures and Regulations." This was delivered by Dr. Carol Cosgrove of CTA Economic and Export Analysts, Ltd. (UK).

Dr. Cosgrove said that textiles and clothing is a sector in which developing countries can be increasingly competitive, but the sector has become the object of specific and increasingly restricted international trading arrangements embodied in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) which in 1984 covered exports amounting to more than US \$ 100 billion.

No ACP States, she said, are represented in the MFA but these States are not totally exempt from the restrictions imposed by the ECC under its MFA agreements. The ACP line is an agreed overall

quota for textile and clothing imports from ACP States.

Indeed textile exports from ACP States, according to Dr. Cosgrove, are under permanent surveillance and any significant increase would probably lead to pressure from the EEC to impose voluntary export restraints.

Dr. Cosgrove advised the East African countries considering downstream processing from yarn to textile fabrics to cotton clothing and made-up articles, that the United States market is more important than that of the EEC with respect to cotton clothing. East African suppliers, however, could well find themselves facing very severe European competition in American markets.

She furthermore emphasised that the ACP States currently have only very limited opportunities for representation regarding the MFA, when this arrangement in fact represents the most potent threat to Africa and other least developed countries seeking to initiate or expand textile exports.

It was decidedly in the ACP States' interests, Dr. Cosgrove's policy proposals remarked, that they lobby collectively to increase their MFA quotas, and to work as a group to bring textiles and related products back within the GATT framework.

BENEFITS OF INDUSTRIAL FREE ZONES

*Benoit Arouff,
MEDIA, Mauritius*

In 1960, the island of Mauritius was a monocultural country producing some 600 000 tonnes of sugar annually, of which 95 % was exported. Sugar was virtually the sole foreign currency earner. Today Mauritius is the third largest exporter of woollen pullovers in the world.

The island's economic transformation since the creation of its Industrial Free Zone in 1970 was documented by Mr. Benoit Arouff, Chairman of the Mauritius Export Development and Investment Authority (MEDIA), speaking in Nairobi at the second plenary session on "Problems and Requirements of Export Development".

Describing the impact of the Industrial Free Zone on the Mauritian economy, Mr. Arouff noted the benefits for foreign exchange earnings, job creation, incomes, government revenue, in addition to related effects on the construction industry, reduced inflation, etc.

Some of statistics quoted by Mr. Arouff were very impressive. For instance, the Industrial Free Zone now provides 54.3 % of total exports from Mauritius, surpassing the importance of sugar. "It is thanks to the Free Zone", said Mr. Arouff "that we now have a favourable balance of trade and a positive balance of payments".

In 1986, the Zone, with its 380 enterprises, created over 20 000 jobs. Some 50.4 % of the capital in the Zone is Mauritius owned ("an exceptional situation") and its largest enterprise employs some 7 000 people. The Zone as a whole employs over 70 000 people.

Mauritius is aware, however, of the continuing need to diversify its industrial operations in order to protect the economy from sectoral upsets. Mr. Arouff told the meeting that he believed the secret lay in training, and reducing dependence on foreign technicians and managers.

It was obvious to participants that there were lessons to be learned from the Mauritian story, even if the creation of an Industrial Free Zone on its territory was not the answer to every East African or ACP State's needs.

BREAKING INTO EUROPE

*H.V. Melchers,
Deputy-Director CBI, Netherlands*

If the Nairobi meeting was all about the practical problems faced by commercial entrepreneurs and exporters, then remedying such problems in practical terms was perhaps most directly addressed in the paper entitled "Marketing Strategy for Europe" delivered by Mr. H.V. Melchers, Deputy Director of CBI, the Dutch Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries.

Western Europe, said Mr. Melchers, was a "buyers market" so that the manufacturer had to transform himself into a marketer. Unknown markets, containing many potential pitfalls, would cost ACP exporters time and money, so field research prior to exporting was essential.

Mr. Melcher's nine-point recipe for success in marketing to Western Europe emphasised to ACP manufacturers the need to understand the European buyers' requirements before trying to fulfill orders. (See issue No. 52 of "Industrial Opportunities".)

Sensitivity to quality and price would determine success or failure and the approach to manufacturing and selling should be above all consumer-oriented.

Continued on page 4

EXPORT MARKETING MEETING, NAIROBI

Continued from page 3

HOW CDI CAN ASSIST EXPORT MARKETING

Dr. H. K. Naidu, CDI

Dr. Hari K. Naidu, CDI's Marketing Adviser, recalled that the African manufacturers' share of the European Community's imports had changed very little since 1976 and that ACP preferences in EEC markets risked being eroded by the extension of Community trade preferences to non-ACP States in Asia and Latin America, or by other forms of bilateral trade arrangements with third countries.

CDI's ability to assist ACP States to break into non-Community markets was, he said, marginal, but CDI could effectively assist with marketing in the EEC.

CDI's priorities in the selection of ACP industrial projects would focus on those projects which processed local raw materials, had an export component with significant manufacturing-value-added, were in a priority sector for development in an ACP country and were economically and financially viable.

With respect to trade fairs, Dr. Naidu pointed out that it was the direct responsibility of the EEC Commission to schedule and finance ACP participation, but that CDI's assistance would emphasize participation in specialized **industrial and technology** fairs.

CATEGORIES OF ASSISTANCE

CDI can provide marketing assistance within three categories:

- export trade development
- direct assistance to ACP companies
- trade promotional activities.

Since 1986, CDI has undertaken interventions in the form of marketing assistance for projects involving wood and wood products, textiles and garments and processed food products.

CDI has plans to identify ways of promoting further processing and marketing of local raw materials by launching missions to look at specific sectors in each of the six ACP regions.

ACP REGIONAL TRADE

In this paper, Dr. Naidu remarked on the significance of the high priority given under Lomé III to the processing and marketing of ACP raw materials.

ACP countries must take advantage of

this change, he said, by providing the right climate for investment to take place and by developing regional trade performance.

East African countries will have an uphill task to develop intra-regional trade given that transport and communication facilities are often inferior to those linking Africa and Europe.

Financial institutions, payment arrangements and marketing channels are also geared to facilitating trade with the former colonising and other industrialized countries.

The potential for increased regional trade does exist, however, and can be exploited if the countries of East Africa devote the same effort to facilitating regional trade as they have done to securing improved access to the EEC for their goods, under the Lomé regime.

Furthermore, Dr. Naidu saw no reason why other ACP States could not follow the example of Zimbabwe when formulating their Lomé III indicative programmes, by taking advantage of the integrated programme of assistance for trade in goods and services, now available to them.

WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS

FRAMEWORK FOR EXPORT MARKETING

The conclusions of the first working group included the firm statement that under the Lomé Convention (1976-1986), there had been no significant percentage increase in the ACP countries' manufactured exports in the total volume of their trade with the EEC.

It was recognised that there were serious structural problems to the development of trade (lack of institutional support services at the national level, little product diversification...), but that East African countries had not established sectoral priorities for the development of export industries. These States must be sure to make use of the Lomé Convention to their own advantage.

The following recommendations were adopted:

1. East African countries should establish national indicative programmes for trade promotion, with the EDF.
2. Intra-regional trade should be strengthened and expanded.
3. The ACP States should be represented in the Supervisory Council of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA).
4. The ACP States should coordinate their position with the European Economic Community (EEC) in the next Uruguay Round of GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations. This is desirable because of its implications to preferences currently enjoyed by the ACP States, including GSP Schemes.

PROBLEMS AND REQUIREMENTS OF EXPORT DEVELOPMENT

The second working group's conclusions enumerated constraints in production and in marketing which affect the export trade development of East African enterprises.

It was observed that the growth of textile and garment industries in the Industrial Free Zone in Mauritius is a successful case of export diversification under the Lomé Convention.

The following recommendations were adopted:

1. Measures required to remedy constraints to production and marketing are of paramount importance if ACP industries are to compete successfully in export markets — and CDI's Intervention Programme should be utilized by East African countries for this purpose.
2. To take advantage of the existing regional facilities of development banks and other financial institutions, the manufacturing sector must be made cognizant of the significance of making their project proposals viable and acceptable for financing.
3. CDI should identify EEC markets for cut-and-finish and other forms of subcontracting for manufactured goods.
4. CDI should assist in reinforcing the export capacities of existing industries in East Africa.
5. CDI should acquaint ACP manufacturers with the characteristics of the EEC markets and the changing pattern of customer demand — recognizing that the market in general and the customer in particular, determine the success of a product as a saleable item.

INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL SURVEYS OF ACP STATES

In recent issues of "Industrial Opportunities", we have been publishing summaries of industrial potential surveys undertaken by CDI in ACP States. In this issue, we carry a similar survey undertaken in

the Southern African State of Malawi.

All ACP countries have now been surveyed. The surveys are a form of assistance to ACP States and include recommendations for each country on how

best to stimulate industrial development.

Each survey also proposes industrial projects, suited to the local economic situation, which may benefit from CDI's assistance.

Malawi: favourable climate for foreign investment



INITIAL ASSISTANCE TO MALAWI UNDER LOMÉ III

Below, we list some of the projects already assisted (or being considered for assistance) under CDI's initial programme of assistance for Malawi, under Lomé III.

The projects were derived largely from the industrial potential survey of the country undertaken by CDI.

PROJECTS ASSISTED IN 1986

- **Portland cement** - Technical assistance
- **Pharmaceuticals** - Updating of a feasibility study
- **Infusion solutions** - Identification of a partner
- **Ceramic products** - Diagnostic mission
- **Paper sack plant** - Evaluation of equipment
- **Renewable energy** - Completion of a comprehensive study
- **Charcoal production** - Assistance with a feasibility study

PROJECTS UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR ASSISTANCE IN 1987

- **Wood industry** - Market survey
- **Infusion solutions** - Co-financing of a feasibility study
- **Shoe manufacturing** - Training assistance
- **Edible oil production** - Training assistance
- **Brick-making** - Training assistance
- **Ceramic products** - Co-financing of a feasibility study
- **Fish canning** - Co-financing of a feasibility study

Despite being landlocked and despite limited natural resources, Malawi's economic performance since independence has been impressive, with an average growth rate from 1967 to 1979 of 5,5 % per annum (slowing down to under 4 % in the 1980's). This is the conclusion of CDI's recent industrial potential survey of the country.

The survey points out that Malawi's economy is primarily based on agriculture which also provides the bulk of locally available resources for the manufacturing sector. Industrial development has been steady, even though in its infant stage; and the prospects for small scale enterprises are promising.

However, a major obstacle to Malawi's industrial development will continue to be the shortage of skilled manpower, while the high rate of population growth may be a hindrance to raising the standard of living.

MINERAL DEPOSITS

Malawi's few economically exploitable mineral resources include deposits of bauxite (Mulanje Plateau) and coal (Karonga district) which are estimated, however, to be significant only in the long run.

The following minerals have been identified as existing in commercial quantities: nepheline syenite (used in the manufacture of glass and porcelain), salt, graphite, gypsum, kaolinistic plastic clay etc. The possibility of salt production and graphite processing is at present being investigated.

Malawi is, however, rich in water resources and therefore in hydro-electric energy.

IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURE

Agriculture will continue to be the mainstay of the Malawian economy. The agricultural sector "supports over 85 % of the population, provides some 40 % of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and accounts for over 90 % of the country's exports". It is divided into two subsectors: **estate** (tobacco, sugar, tea) and **smallholder** (maize, tobacco, groundnuts, cotton, rice, etc.).

Estate agriculture has expanded rapidly since independence and currently represents 28 % of the total added value of agricultural production and accounts for

two-thirds of agricultural export earnings. Yet, in terms of the number of people involved and the value of its production, the smallholder sector remains the most important of the two.

However, the **smallholder sector** is still dominated by subsistence production even though the economy is becoming increasingly monetarised. The diversification of this sector into crops such as macadamia nuts, oilseeds, rubber, sunflowers, etc. could form the basis of improved local processing industries, and plans are underway to implement several of them.

With regard to livestock, greater price incentives could stimulate milk and meat production for both estates and smallholders, while the hides could form the basis for a few small tanneries.

Malawi possesses 3.9 million hectares of forest with an annual consumption of about 9 million m³ (most of which is used for household fuel). The local sawmilling and panel industry accounts for only 1 % of consumption. Plans are underway to set up small scale pulp and paper production for the domestic market and investigations are going on into the possibilities of making pencil slats from cedar.

MANUFACTURING SECTOR

The manufacturing sector currently contributes about 12 % of GDP, if not a great deal to the expansion of exports. Malawian industry is based largely on agro-industrial processing, aimed largely at the domestic market. But with the exception of tea, sugar, and tobacco, the volume of manufactured goods remains slight.

The survey recommends that possibilities for industrial exports should be investigated and the price control mechanism for manufactured products reviewed, with a view to offering more incentives for investment in promising, but hitherto undeveloped, industrial activity.

Most of the industrial enterprises in Malawi are owned and managed either by parastatals or by a few foreign companies (or by joint ventures between both). The most important foreign industrialists are involved in sugar, brewing, vegetable oils and chemicals.

Government intervention in industrial development is restricted to policy formula-

Continued on page 6

Continued from page 5

tion and approval of major investment decisions. This approach seems to have worked well and the manufacturing output has grown satisfactorily. The government's development policy and strategy have been export-oriented. However, dependence on expatriates is very high in the upper skilled categories of employment.

Industrial development for both exports and import-substitution will continue to be based on agriculture (including livestock, fisheries and forestry) and to a lesser extent, on minerals. Foreign capital and expertise

are invited to participate in both agricultural and industrial development.

INVESTMENT CLIMATE

The general climate for foreign investment in Malawi remains favourable. Both local and foreign investors are granted the same incentives (monopoly or tariffs for new industries, protection against unfair competition from imported products, etc.).

Local participation in the share capital of foreign companies is strongly recommended, but not mandatory. Foreign investment and profits may be repatriated in accordance with exchange control procedures. There are generous tax concessions

for industrialists (including investment and depreciation allowances).

Subject to submission of the appropriate papers, interests, dividends, royalties, service fees as well as directors' and consultants' fees are transferable. Expatriates may repatriate up to two-thirds of their emoluments after tax together with end-of-contract gratuities.

The philosophy is liberal even if the administrative procedures involved are often cumbersome. Industrial sites are available with basic facilities — water, electricity and transport. The three major industrial sites are located in Blantyre (Southern region), Lilongwe and Liwonde (Central region).



INDUSTRIAL PROPOSALS FROM EEC FIRMS ACP ENTREPRENEURS, PLEASE REPLY

The proposals in the table below have been put forward by EEC firms interested in setting up production in ACP countries, under joint venture, franchising, or licencing arrangements, with local businessmen. ACP entrepreneurs interested in any proposal are invited to write to CDI quoting the corresponding reference number.

CDI will not be in a position to act upon letters received unless ACP entrepreneurs provide all the information requested below.

Please ALWAYS mention the CDI reference numbers when reproducing these proposals.

All equipment costs are quoted in Ecus (European currency units). The value of the Ecu may easily be ascertained from its relationship to other European currencies. Thus, on 2nd April 1987: 1 Ecu = £ 0.713007, or FF 6.90202, or DM 2.07441.

Product	Minimum capacity	Minimum investment required for equipment (FOB)	Type of cooperation proposed	Country of origin and reference
Vegetable oil extraction, refining, packing	300 000 tonnes per year	Ecu 1.4 million	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> joint venture technical & marketing assistance 	Portugal 87/4
Power generating sets (small units: 4,5,7 KV _a)	15 000 units per year	Ecu 2.6 million	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> joint venture technical assistance 	Italy 87/6
Brooms with wooden support (made from local materials)	600 000 pieces per year	Ecu 170 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> joint venture licencing agreement technical & marketing assistance 	Italy 87/7
Multi-purpose electrical motors (0.5 HP to 5.5 HP) and generators (1 to 3 KV _a)	20 000 pieces per year	Ecu 200 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> joint venture technical assistance 	Italy 87/9
Grinding mills for flour and animal feed	800 to 1 000 units per year	Ecu 543 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> joint venture technical & marketing assistance 	Italy 87/10
Decorative ceramic garden figures (10 models) for local and export markets	50 000 pieces per year	Ecu 100 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> joint venture technical assistance & marketing assistance in Europe 	Germany 87/11
Extruded bricks & tiles of different sizes up to 300 × 240 × 238 mm	45 000 tonnes per year	Ecu 1.5 million (second hand equipment ready to be dismantled)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> joint venture technical assistance training 	Germany 87/12
Refractory materials such as fire clay and other ceramic materials for steel-making industries and foundries	20 to 40 tons of finished products per day	Ecu 4.8 million	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> technology know-how training licensing agreement 	Germany 87/13

Product	Minimum capacity	Minimum investment required for equipment (FOB)	Type of cooperation proposed	Country of origin and reference
Veterinary antibiotics and fortified medical equipment	Turnover should be around Ecu 1.3 million after the 2nd year of production	Ecu 350 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • joint venture • training • marketing assistance 	Ireland 87/14
Printing works (web offset)	Turnover should be around Ecu 2.5 million at full capacity	Ecu 1 million (second hand)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • joint venture • technical assistance 	Ireland 87/15
First farming (tilapia)	200 000 kilos per year	Ecu 700 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • technical assistance • marketing • studies • long term contractual agreement 	Belgium 87/16
Windmills for power generation (10-50 Kw)	According to needs	Ecu 115 000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • joint venture • equipment • studies • training 	Belgium 87/17

Information required of ACP entrepreneurs when replying

- Show why it would be worth-while to manufacture the products in question in your country, e.g. give market data, indicate that raw materials are available locally, etc.
- Describe your present activities plus your industrial and/or commercial experience, enclosing any available information such as your latest balance sheet.
- State how much capital you yourself could contribute.
- State the maximum portion of the equity your country legally allows to an EEC partner.
- Can you obtain finance and if so from where?
- If you need a foreign loan or supplier's credit, can you obtain a local guarantee?
- Is your project a national priority?
- Outline the incentives your country offers to foreign investors.

OFFERS FROM ACP SPONSORS EEC INDUSTRIAL PARTNERS WANTED



EEC industrialists are invited to contact CDI, quoting the reference number, in response to any offer outlined in this section.

However, CDI will reply to enquiries only if EEC industrialists give brief descriptions of their current operations and are prepared to provide the kinds of cooperation requested by the ACP sponsors.

Organisations reprinting these offers in their own publications, are asked ALWAYS to include the corresponding CDI reference numbers.

SAW MILLS, PARTICLE BOARD AND WOODEN PACKAGING MATERIAL

ANGOLA

661.ANG.2.WOO

A parastatal company wants to increase its production of timber and wood-based products partly for export, partly for the local market.

Its expansion and diversification programme envisages a new sawmill in Uige province (10 000 m³/annum, of which 50 % would be for export). It also envisages a new smaller sawmill near the capital, expansion of the mill in Cabinda (by adding a slicer), setting-up the production of wooden packaging material and establishing a plant for the production of wood particle board (25 000 m³, of which 80 % would be for the local market).

Timing and the order of implementation of the programme will depend on the interest of foreign investors, but the Uige sawmill has top priority.

The project has the full support of the Government of Angola which invites a foreign investor, or group of investors, to participate in this expansion and diversification programme.

Interested investors are expected to provide know-how for the new activities and for the improvement of current products, in addition to export markets for some of the products.

Proposals for the supply of equipment and sources of finance are welcome.

ELECTRONICS - SUBCONTRACTING OFFER

BARBADOS

662.BAR.4.MEC

A private company currently concentrates mainly on the production of printed circuit boards to military specifications for a leading US supplier of military equipment. It is also experienced in cable harness assemblies. This company wishes to attract new clients for contract manufacturing.

The company seeks an EEC partner in a position to channel assembly work into new lines, for the export market.

The present Barbados workforce can easily be trained to handle new product lines.

Continued on page 8

METAL PRODUCT MANUFACTURING

BARBADOS

662.BAR.5.MEC

A Barbados company has been manufacturing metal products for the past 20 years (mainly bus bodies for the local transport system and metal furniture).

It currently has 75 000 sq.ft. of covered factory space and employs 120 persons.

It is not a mere assembly plant as, wherever possible, it manufactures components.

As it has spare capacity, the company would like to diversify into new products for export to USA, Caribbean or local markets.

The company wishes to find an EEC partner interested in entering USA or Caribbean markets, through a Caribbean manufacturer.

The partner should provide technical assistance and, if possible, be open to a licencing arrangement.

CLAY BRICKS

BOTSWANA

662.BOT.03.EXT

A private company, currently producing concrete products, wishes to diversify.

The management envisages the production of stock bricks and various qualities of face bricks (22 million bricks a year with the plant operating at full capacity).

The total output would be for the domestic market which is mainly supplied at present by imports from RSA. The local development bank is interested in participating in the project.

The Botswana company would like to obtain an EEC joint venture partner who could help with a feasibility study and provide technical expertise and training.

LIME JUICE AND LIME OIL

GAMBIA

441.GAM.05.FOO

A publicly owned company manufacturing lime juice and lime oil wishes to expand and modernise.

The company's existing annual production capacity is 160 tons of lime juice and 4500 kgs of distilled lime oil. It has a nucleus estate of over 200 hectares planted mainly with lime trees.

Financial support is sought under a joint venture (or similar arrangement) with an EEC partner. The partner should be able to provide training, technical assistance (especially with quality control) and export markets in Europe.

ELECTRONICS: MANUFACTURE OF COMPONENTS AND ASSEMBLY

JAMAICA

662.JAM.13.ELC

So far, the potential of the above area of activity has remained unrealised in Jamaica. However, it has been among the governments top priorities for the past five years.

A large private Jamaican group proposes to enter this field, to concentrate on the assembly and repair of printed circuit boards (imported in kit form) for re-export.

This product could qualify for exemption from customs duties for exports to the USA, Canada and the EEC.

Up to 49% of the equity would be available to a European partner capable of providing technology, technical assistance and marketing know-how.

SALT MINING AND REFINING

NIGERIA

662.NIA.10.CHE

A well-known private businessman wishes to produce 50 000 metric tons of salt, using brine from the Uburu salt lake.

The salt mining and refining project would be located in Iburu (Imo State).

The current local market is estimated to be 350 000 tons per year and is almost completely supplied by imports. (Present producers import raw salt).

The Nigerian promotor is seeking an EEC partner who could provide technical assistance, access to export credits and, possibly, a share of the equity. The local development bank supports the project.

CERAMIC TABLEWARE (POTTERY)

NIGERIA

660.NIA.12.EXT

A successful private businessman wishes to expand and modernise and on-going ceramic tableware plant.

Production would include mugs, plates, tea cups, gift items, flower vases and could eventually include insulators.

The quantity of locally available raw material would be around 500 tons per year, which would be enough to produce about 1 100 000 pieces.

One hundred percent of the production would be for the local market.

The local development bank supports the project.

The Nigerian promotor seeks an EEC partner who could provide technical assistance, training, access to export credits and, possibly, a share of the equity.

CAUSTIC SODA

TANZANIA

661.TAN.18.CHE

A parastatal organisation involved with the promotion, development and control of chemical and allied industries wishes to set up a plant to manufacture caustic soda by the soda ash/lime process. The project has been accorded high priority by the Tanzanian government.

The proposed production capacity should be about 30 000 metric tonnes a year of which about 40-50% would be for export to neighbouring countries (e.g. PTA countries) and the balance would be for the domestic market (currently served by imports).

An EEC partner is sought who could participate in the feasibility study, provide technical know-how, supply machinery and, possibly, take a share of the equity.

Foreign investment is protected by law through the foreign investment protection act, 1973; and a company can retain a certain portion of the foreign exchange earned through its own exports.

HUMAN VACCINES AND RELATED PRODUCTS

ZIMBABWE

661.ZIM.15.CHE

A private entrepreneur envisages setting up locally the production of human vaccines and related biological products.

The project has strong government support based on local needs and potential future exports to SADCC and PTA Member States.

Implementation is planned in 3 phases over five to seven years:

1. Diluting imported concentrates and filling
2. Development of local raw material
3. Production of blood grouping sera and related products.

The project must comply with WHO standards.

For Phase I, the annual capacity should be 2 million units (10% measles, 15% BCG, 25% DPT and 50% protein D).

The promotor seeks a foreign investor who, under a joint venture agreement, could provide know-how and start-up assistance.

Interested investors, who provide information on their background and experience, will be sent detailed project information and local market data.

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

No. 39 — May 1987

(position as at 16 April 1987)



EEC-financed development schemes

The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EEC development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows:

Geographical breakdown

The summary is divided into three groups of countries, corresponding to the main aspects of Community development policy:

- the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), which signed the multilateral conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), Lomé II (31 October 1979) and Lomé III (8 December 1984), plus the OCT (overseas countries and territories) of certain member states of the EEC, which get the same type of aid as the ACP countries;
- the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and Mashraq), which signed cooperation agreements with the EEC in 1976 and 1977;
- the ALA developing countries of Asia and Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of annual aid programmes.

The information within each of these groups is given by recipient country (in alphabetical order).

Note

As the information provided is subject to modification in line with the development aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, or with the conditions laid down by the authorities empowered to take financial decisions, the EEC is in no way bound by this summary, which is for information only.

Information given

The following details will usually be given for each development scheme:

- the title of the project;
- the administrative body responsible for it;
- the estimated sum involved (prior to financing decision) or the amount actually provided (post financing decision);
- a brief description of projects envisaged (construction work, supplies of equipment, technical assistance, etc.);
- any methods of implementation (international invitations to tender, for example);
- the stage the project has reached (identification, appraisal, submission for financing, financing decision, ready for implementation).

Main abbreviations

Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority
Int. tender: International invitation to tender
Acc. tender: Invitation to tender (accelerated procedure)
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to tender
TA: Technical assistance
EDF: European Development Fund
mECU: Million European currency units

Correspondence about this operational summary can be sent directly to:

Mr. Franco Cupini
Directorate-General for Development
Commission of the European Communities
(ARCH.25/1/1)
200, rue de la Loi
B-1049 Brussels

Please cover only one subject at a time.

DESCRIPTION SECTOR CODE

A1	Planning and public administration	A5B	Industrial development banks
A1A	Administrative buildings	A5C	Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities
A1B	Economic planning and policy	A5D	Export promotion
A1C	Assistance to the normal operations of government not falling under a different category	A5E	Trade, commerce and distribution
A1D	Police and fire protection	A5F	Co-operatives (except agriculture and housing)
A1E	Collection and publication of statistics of all kinds, information and documentation	A5G	Publishing, journalism, cinema, photography
A1F	Economic surveys, pre-investment studies	A5H	Other insurance and banking
A1G	Cartography, mapping, aerial photography	A5I	Archaeological conservation, game reserves
A1H	Demography and manpower studies		
A2	Development of public utilities	A6	Education
A2A	Power production and distribution	A6A	Primary and secondary education
A2Ai	Electricity	A6B	University and higher technical institutes
A2B	Water supply	A6Bi	Medical
A2C	Communications	A6C	Teacher training
A2D	Transport and navigation	A6Ci	Agricultural training
A2E	Meteorology	A6D	Vocational and technical training
A2F	Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-power)	A6E	Educational administration
A3	Agriculture, fishing and forestry	A6F	Pure or general research
A3A	Agricultural production	A6G	Scientific documentation
A3B	Service to agriculture	A6H	Research in the field of education or training
A3C	Forestry	A6I	Subsidiary services
A3D	Fishing and hunting	A6J	Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc.
A3E	Conservation and extension		
A3F	Agricultural storage	A7	Health
A3G	Agricultural construction	A7A	Hospitals and clinics
A3H	Home economics and nutrition	A7B	Maternal and child care
A3I	Land and soil surveys	A7C	Family planning and population-related research
A4	Industry, mining and construction	A7D	Other medical and dental services
A4A	Extractive industries	A7E	Public health administration
A4Ai	Petroleum and natural gas	A7F	Medical insurance programmes
A4B	Manufacturing	A8	Social infrastructure and social welfare
A4C	Engineering and construction	A8A	Housing, urban and rural
A4D	Cottage industry and handicraft	A8B	Community development and facilities
A4E	Productivity, including management, automation, accountancy, business, finance and investment	A8C	Environmental sanitation
A4F	Non-agricultural storage and warehousing	A8D	Labour
A4G	Research in industrial technology	A8E	Social welfare, social security and other social schemes
A5	Trade, banking, tourism and other services	A8F	Environmental protection
A5A	Agricultural development banks	A8G	Flood control
		A8H	Land settlement
		A8I	Cultural activities
		A9	Multisector
		A9A	River development
		A9B	Regional development projects
		A10	Unspecified



PABLI – Blue page informatics

Direct access to the blue pages via on-line terminal or telex

The blue pages are on computer and available either directly via a terminal or micro-computer.

Selected extracts of the blue pages may be obtained.

The cost of these two services has been fixed and will be applied from 1987.

To obtain any information concerning PABLI please write, specifying the option chosen (terminal or telex) to:

Mr A. BOLDRIN
“Data base Section” – B9/69
Directorate-General for Development
Commission of the European Communities
200, rue de la Loi
1049 Brussels
Belgium

ACP STATES

New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left

Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics

ANGOLA

Rural Water supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie et des Ressources Naturelles. HYDROMINA. Parallel cofinancing with UNICEF. EEC contribution 2.250 mECU. Study, T.A. and supply of hand-pumps, tubes, drilling equipment, vehicles. Project in execution.
ALA ANG 8425 A2b

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Livestock development - Phase I. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 1.9 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. T.A.: Short-list done. Project in execution. 4th and 5th EDF.

★ EDF AB 5003-4003 A3a

BAHAMAS

Rural economic infrastructure (Family Islands Energy). Resp. Auth.: Bahamas Electricity Corporation. Estimated cost 2.4 mECU. Works, installation, supply of generators, cables, renewable energy systems. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF BM 6001 A2a

BELIZE

Belize City Hospital. Phase I. Estimated cost 7.494 mECU. Work constructions and supply of equipment. 4th and 5th EDF. Project stage: identification.
EDF BEL 4007-5002 A7a

Hummingbird Highway. Estimated cost 5.6 mECU. Road reconstruction. Study to be done: design plan and bridge and int. tender dossier. Short-list already drawn up. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF.
EDF BEL 6001 A2d

Community Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Social Services. 0.150 mECU. Project preparation study. Short-list done. 6th EDF.
EDF BEL 6002 A8b

BENIN

Upgrading of health service infrastructure in Porto Novo Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. Estimated cost 9 mECU: renovation and construction of the hospital building and equipment.
★ Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF BEN 5010 A7a

Road maintenance programme (phase II). Resp. Auth.: Ministère Equipements et Travaux Publics. EDF part 23 mECU. Resurfacing of the roads Malanville-Parakou and Comé-Lokosa-Dogbo. Works and supply of T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF BEN 6002 A2d

BOTSWANA

Palapye water supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Mineral Resources and Water Affairs. 2.3 mECU. New water supply net-

work. Supply of pipes and accessories. Supervision of works. Works by acc. tender.
★ Supplies by int. tender *launched* in February 87. *Project in execution.* 4th and 5th EDF.
EDF BT 5017 A2b

Services to livestock owners in communal areas (SLOCA), Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 4.100 mECU. Works by acc. tender, supply of vehicles and equipment by int. tender. T.A. T.A.: B.M.B. (NL). Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF BT 5003 A3a

Geophysical exploration of the Ncojane and Nosop sedimentary basins. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs. 1.6 mECU. Int. tender with prequalification *launched* in *March* 87. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF BT 5020 A2b

Initial measures for the conservation of the Kalahari ecosystem. T.A. and supply of equipment. Monitoring and protection of the natural reserves. 2 mECU. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF BT 6001 A8f

Kasane airport. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Communications. Estimated total cost 6.6 mECU. EDF 4.5 mECU, Italy 1.6 mECU, local 0.5 mECU. Construction of 2 000 m runway, bush clearance of 170 ha, buildings, two main apron stands, air traffic control equipment, telecommunication network, crash fire and rescue equipment, car park. Works supervision. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF BT 6002 A2d

Support programme for dry land agriculture. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Lands. 3.5 mECU. Masterplan for Pandamatenga, soil laboratory, Pandamatenga Research Farm, price study. Works, supply of laboratory equipment, agricultural machinery, studies and T.A. Studies: Pandamatenga masterplan. Price study: short-lists not yet drawn up. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF BT 6005 A3a

BURKINA FASO

Drinking water supply in the Yatenga region. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Eau. 5 mECU. Boreholes and wells. Supplies. All by int. tenders. T.A.: BURGEAP (F). Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF BK 5016 A2b

Improvement of halieutic production in Burkina Faso. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement et du Tourisme. Estimated total cost 3.850 mECU. EDF 2.850 mECU, local 1 mECU. Infrastructural works, buildings, supply of equipment and vehicles, T.A. and training. Works by direct labour, supplies by int. tender, T.A.: M. Baijot (F). Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF BK 5018 A3a

Ouagadougou-Kaya railway. Resp. Auth.: Ministère Promotion Economique. 5.5 mECU. Supply of rails, equipment and ballast. *Int. tender (conditional) foreseen*

in the 2nd quarter 87. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF BK 5019 A2d

BURUNDI

Extension of "Institut Pédagogique" (IUSE). Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education Nationale ± 1 mECU. Construction and equipping of educational buildings (general teaching classes, laboratories, workshops). Int. tender dossier: TETRA Consultants (Lux). *Int. tender (conditional) foreseen in April or May 87.* Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.
EDF BU 4124 A6b

Social-economic development of the Kirundo Province. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage. 15.5 mECU. Works: spring wells catchment, well boring, buildings, feeder road. Supply of agricultural inputs, equipment, vehicles, T.A. and training. Works by acc. tender, supplies by int. tender or direct agreement. T.A. and training by restr. tender. Short-list done. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF BU 5005 A3a

Support to "Département des Eaux et Forêts". Resp. Auth.: Département des Eaux et Forêts. Estimated cost 3.350 mECU. Reforestation works, supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF BU 5020 A3c

Roads and bridges in Bujumbura. Estimated cost 8 or 9 mECU. Road and bridge construction. Supervision of works. Study of the execution and preparation of the int. tender dossier for roads: short-list not yet done. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.
EDF BU 5023 A2d

Rural development in the Mosso Buyogoma. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage and Département des Eaux et Forêts. Estimated cost 40 mECU. Improvement of the feeder roads and secondary roads, rural hydraulics, rural stock-farming and reforestation development. Support to cooperatives. Feasibility study for secondary roads and hydraulics: short-list not yet done. Project stage identification. 6th EDF.
EDF BU 6001 A3a

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

National Livestock Programme. Supply of agricultural inputs, monitoring training, T.A. Feeder roads. EDF part estimated 10 mECU. Cofinancing with France, EIB, local, IFAD. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing June 87.* 6th EDF.
EDF CA 6001 A3a

Conservation programme for the ecosystem in the North. National game and natural reserves. Supervision for protected areas. Monitoring, management. Supply of infrastructures. EDF 25 mECU. *Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing June 87.* 6th EDF.
EDF CA 6002 A3a

Development programme of the Central and Southern region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural. Estimated cost 25 mECU. To strengthen coffee plantations in the villages and the infrastructure, diversifications in ex-cotton zones; rural health and human hydraulics, T.A., studies, following and evaluation. Studies to be done: hydro-geological study and health expertise; studies to reconvert cotton zones and on producers cooperatives; if necessary, expertise on agriculture and reforestation. Short-lists not yet drawn up. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF. A3a
EDF CA 6005

CHAD

Priority actions programme in the educational field. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et de la Reconstruction. Estimated cost 5.2 mECU. Works, supplies, scholarships and T.A. T.A.: ADITEC (Lux). Project in execution. 5th EDF. A6a
EDF CD 5003

Agricultural programme in the Sudan zone. Estimated cost 5.5 mECU. Various actions for: organising the peasantry, stocking and marketing, utilisation of improved seeds and production techniques. T.A.: AGRER (B). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 1st half 87. 5th EDF. A3b
EDF CD 5010

★ **Strengthening of Road maintenance brigades.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics, de l'Habitat et de l'Urbanisme. 19.5 mECU. For Sarh-N'Djamena: supply of road equipment, logistics and T.A. For Sarh-Lere: works by int. tender and supply of T.A., training and supervision of works. Date financing April 87. 6th EDF. A2d
EDF CD 6001

Rural development priority programme in the concentration zone. Resp. Auth.: Office National de Dév. Rural (ONDR). ★ 15 mECU. Hydro-agricultural works, infrastructure, education, health. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 87. 6th EDF. A3e
EDF CD 6002

★ **Support programme to strengthen primary education.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale. 1.275 mECU. Supply of teaching equipment and training and integration scholarships. Date financing April 87. 5th EDF. A6a
EDF CD 5022

★ **Strengthening of the health sector in the Sahelian prefectures.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. Estimated cost 12 mECU. Supply of essential medicines, training programme and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 87. 6th EDF. A7e
EDF CD 6003

COMOROS

★ **Artisanal fishery.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Production et des Industries Agricoles et de l'Artisanat. 1.092 mECU. Supply of equipment, boats, engines, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing June 87. 5th EDF. A3d
EDF COM 5017

COTE D'IVOIRE

Rural development of the central region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 10.5 mECU. Development of irrigated rice-growing. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 5th EDF. A3a
EDF IVC 5021

★ **Rural oil palm plantations for the 2nd palm plan.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Rural. EDF 20.850 mECU. 22,945 ha in rural areas. Project in execution. 6th EDF. A3a
EDF IVC 6001

★ **Agroforestry research and experimentation in intensive afforestation in the northern savannas.** Resp. Auth.: Centre Technique Forestier Tropical de Côte d'Ivoire (CTFT-CI). 0.475 mECU. Research station, supply of equipment and T.A. Works by direct agreement. Supplies int. tender in 87. Project in execution. Date financing decision February 87. 5th EDF. A3e
EDF IVC 5020

DJIBOUTI

Ranch construction. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Studies and Works. Works by int. tender. 1.030 mECU. Int. tender dossier prepared by Dubois (ACP). Project in execution. 5th EDF. A3a
EDF DI 5005

★ **Rural development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EDF part estimated at 4.9 mECU. Improvement of the rural development, farm and livestock monitoring, rural hydraulics, palm-tree plantations, pump-station maintenance. Studies to be done: evaluation of the rural development programme; study on possibilities to improve rural development. Short-lists, not yet drawn up. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF. A3a
EDF DI 6001

★ **Urban development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics, de l'Urbanisme et du Logement et Ministère de l'Intérieur. EDF part estimated at 4.2 mECU. Rehabilitation, construction of waste water controlled network, works and supplies, road assessments to improve rain waters. Studies for rehabilitation and to prepare int. tender dossiers (drainage, roads, drinking water, fire protection): short-lists not yet drawn up. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF. A2d
EDF DI 6002

DOMINICA

Tourism development and marketing programme. 0.620 mECU. Improvement of different tourist sites and their access. Launching of a marketing campaign in Europe and USA: Short-list already drawn up. 6th EDF. A5c
EDF DOM 6002

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Rural interventions. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. A3a
EDF EG

★ **Rural development in the Bata district.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l'Élevage et du Dév. Rural, Ministère de la

Santé. 1.350 mECU. T.A.: B.D.P.A. (F). 5th EDF. Project in execution. A3a
EDF EG 5004

★ **Malabo electrification (Phase II).** 2.7 mECU. Purchase of generator sets, repairing of the power station and town mains extension. 2 int. tender launched in June 85. Project on appraisal. Supervision of works: S.G.I. (Lux). Date foreseen for financing decision 1st half 87. 5th EDF. A2ai
EDF EG 5003

★ **Assistance to the road maintenance service in Rio Muni. 2nd phase.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 1.1 mECU. T.A., training and purchase of road equipment. Project in execution. 5th EDF. A2d
EDF EG 5009

ETHIOPIA

★ **Rural Water Supply.** Resp. Auth.: Ethiopian Water Works Construction Authority. 1.9 mECU. Supply of equipment. T.A.: J. Taylor and Son (UK) and GITEC (D). Project in execution. 5th EDF. A2b
EDF ET 5016

GABON

★ **Continuation of the Fernan Vaz project (II). EDF ± 6 mECU.** Improvement and diversification of agricultural production, social action and feeder road construction. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing June 87. 6th EDF. A3a
EDF GA 6001

★ **Support to the S.M.E.** Resp. Auth.: Fonds d'Aide et Garantie. 2.1 mECU. Line of credit and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. A4e
EDF GA 6003

★ **Bokué reforestation — Phase II. 6 mECU.** Continuation of the existing project and agroforestry experimentation. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. Date financing decision February 87. 6th EDF. A3e
EDF GA 6002

GAMBIA

★ **Brikama College, Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Communications. 1.925 mECU. Construction and equipment of academic and residential buildings. Works by mutual agreement. Equipment for Phase II: int. tender, 1st half 87. Project in execution. 4th EDF. A6b
EDF GM 4005

★ **Second highway maintenance project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Communications. EDF part 1.2 mECU. Supply of road construction-maintenance equipment. Bulldozer, motor grader, truck, water tanker. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 87. 6th EDF. A2d
EDF GM 6001

GHANA

★ **Second Line of Credit to the National Investment Bank (NIB).** Resp. Auth.: Development Service Institute of NIB. 2.9 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. T.A.:

- P.E. Int. (UK). Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF GH 5013 B3a
- Line of Credit to the Agricultural Development Bank.** Resp. Auth.: Agric. Dev. Bank (ADB) 6mECU. Purchase of marine diesel engines, spare parts, fishing nets, and T.A. Int. tender for fishing nets launched in February 87. T.A.: Mac. Allister Elliot (UK). Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF GH 5009 A5a
- Agricultural Rehabilitation through the Rural Banks Scheme. Phase II.** Supply of equipment to small scale farmers and fishermen launched in January 87. T.A. 8.760 mECU. T.A.: ALLIX (GR). Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF GH 5004 A5a
- Supplementary finance for Twifo Oil Palm Development.** Resp. Auth.: Twifo Oil Palm Plantation Ltd. (TOPP). 5.043 mECU. Infrastructure, housing construction by direct labour. Supply of crop inputs, vehicles, tractors and T.A. T.A.: Harrison Fleming (UK). Project in execution. *Project in execution.* 5th EDF.
EDF GH 5003 A3a
- Twifo smallholder Oil Palm Project.** Resp. Auth.: TOPP. 3,715 m ECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Int. tender for supplies and vehicles launched in January 87. T.A.: Harrison Fleming (UK). *Project in execution.* 5th EDF.
EDF GH 5021— STA A3a
- Takoradi harbour rehabilitation.** Resp. Auth.: Ghana Ports Authority. EDF 6.9 mECU. Works and supply of equipment. Tender for works in execution. *Project in execution.* Date financing decision February 87. 5th EDF.
EDF GH 5028 A2d
- Programme for the improvement of the transport infrastructure in the South-Western part. First actions.** 21 mECU. Rehabilitation of the Axim-Axim junction road, construction of a road link (including bridge) to Enchi and studies. Feasibility and design study for Wiawso-Awaso-Mim corridor, short-list drawn up. Date financing decision April 1987. 6th EDF.
EDF GH 6001 A2d
- Support to Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Service (GRATIS).** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Industries, Science and Technology. EDF part estimated at 1.200 mECU. Supply of equipments, vehicles, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing May 87.* 6th EDF.
EDF GH 6004 A4g
- Rehabilitation of Dawhenya smallholder rice irrigation scheme.** Estimated total cost 2.5 mECU EDF part 2 mECU, local 0.5 mECU. Rehabilitation works over 244 ha. Provision of agricultural equipment and other inputs. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF.
EDF GH 6005 A3a
- Accra Plains Livestock Development Project (APLDP).** Estimated total cost 4 mECU. EDF part 3 mECU, local 1 mECU. Provision of veterinary and animal husbandry extension services, including construction of cattle treatment centres, water points and other inputs. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF.
EDF GH 6006 A3a
- Transport infrastructure programme. Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Ghana Highway Authority. Estimated cost 5.140 mECU. Rehabilitation of drainage structures and minor bridges of first priority on trunk and feeder roads. T.A. and supervision of works. Technical study: short-list not yet drawn up. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF GH 6007 A2d
- GRENADA**
- Eastern Main Road. Phase III.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Communications and Works. EDF 3.5 mECU. Strengthening the road base by coal mix surface course and improving drainage structures. Works by direct labour. Supply of equipment by int. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF GRD 6001 A2d
- GUINEA**
- Semi-industrial fishery project "SO-GUIPECHE".** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération Internationale. Secrétariat d'Etat à la Pêche. 8.555 mECU. Rehabilitation and renovation of the existing plant and buildings. Supply of specialised equipment. Int. tender for works and supplies launched in September 86. Date financing decision April 87. 5th EDF.
EDF GUI 5031 A3d
- Rural development programme in Upper-Guinea.** Resp. Auth.: Coordination team composed by representation from: Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération internationale, Ministère du Finances, Secrétariat d'Etat à la Décentralisation, Ministère du Développement Rural, 30 mECU. To modernise agricultural systems and to improve the way of living. Development of the crop production, infrastructure (roads, social, rural hydraulics), micro-projects, lines of credit, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 87. 6th EDF.
EDF GUI 6002 A3a
- Rural development programme in Maritime-Guinea.** Resp. Auth.: Coordination team (see EDF GUI 6002). 40 mECU. Crop production and fishery, road network, social infrastructure, rural hydraulics, micro-projects, lines of credit, research actions, vulgarisation, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 87. 6th EDF.
FED GUI 6001 A3a
- GUINEA BISSAU**
- T.A. for trade reform measures.** 3 mECU. Short-list done for restr. tender. *Project in execution.* 6th EDF.
EDF GUB 6001 A4e
- Minor bridges.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement Social. Estimated total cost 3.7 mECU. Construction of 4 bridges to open four agricultural regions. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF GUB 5011 A2d
- GUYANA**
- Ferries service. Immediate action programme.** Resp. Auth.: Transports & Harbours Dept. EDF 2 mECU. Provision of spare parts, materials, equipment and T.A. Int. tender supplies (conditional) launched in February 87. *Date financing decision April 87.* 6th EDF.
EDF GUA 6001 A2d
- JAMAICA**
- Rural road and bridge reconstruction.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction. Estimated cost 7.3 mECU. Rural roads and bridges damaged during heavy flooding during May-June 86. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF JM 6001 A2d
- KENYA**
- Rehabilitation of Kigano-Namyuki Road.** Resp. Auth.: Minister of Transport and Communication. 14 mECU. Works and supervision. *Int. tender for work (conditional) launched in March 87.* Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing June 87.* 5th EDF.
EDF KE 5027 A2d
- Minor roads rehabilitation and maintenance programme.** Estimated cost 5 mECU. Works by direct labour. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6002 A2d
- Agricultural research programme.** Estimated cost ±20 mECU. Soil and water management research. Soil fertility and plant nutrition. Civil works and libraries. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6003 A3e
- Development of commerce and industry.** Estimated cost 5 mECU. Export promotion and marketing, trade development promotion and support to informal sector and small scale industries. Studies, short-lists not yet drawn up. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6004 A5de
- LESOTHO**
- "Highlands Water Scheme" Project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and Mining. Estimated EDF contribution 9.5 mECU. Final planning study on hydraulics and T.A. to the Lesotho Highlands Development Authority. Two short-lists already drawn-up. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF LSO 6001 A2b
- Mphaki area development. Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 3.7 mECU. Feeder roads, livestock, veterinary and marketing installations, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF LSO 6002 A3a
- Asparagus expansion programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Trade and Industry. ±4.7 mECU. The project aims to increase within 10 years smallholders asparagus growing areas from present 80 to 670 ha. Works: wells, tracks, houses and other infrastructures. Supplies: vehicles, tractors and farm equipments, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing June 87. 6th EDF.
EDF LSO 6003 A3a
- LIBERIA**
- Monrovia Port.** Resp. Auth.: National Port Authority. 1.9 mECU. Management assistance. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF LBR 5019 A2d

Rural health training centre. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Provision of services, supplies and equipment (including drugs), T.A. for management and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 1st half 87. 5th EDF.
EDF LBR 5020 A7a

MADAGASCAR

Assistance to the Malagasy handicrafts industry. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie. Estimated cost 1 mECU. Supply of raw materials for handicrafts by int. tender. T.A.: APRODI (F). Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF MAG 5017 A4d

Microhydraulic programme in the village sector: consolidation and extension. Programme to improve the management of water in the village sector on 21 000 ha of small enclosed irrigated rice fields. Works by direct labour. Acquisition of equipment and supplies by int. tender and tech. assistance by restr. tender. 8.35 mECU. T.A. Short-list done. **Project in execution.** 6th EDF.
EDF MAG 6001 A2b

Soalala iron: prefeasibility study. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie. Estimated total cost 6.1 mECU. EDF 1.9 mECU, Italy 4 mECU, local 0.2 mECU. EDF part: soil prospection by acc. tender and supply of vehicles. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 87. 5th EDF.
EDF MAG 5032 A4a

Support to the social integration of youth in Antananarivo. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Fonction Publique, du Travail et des Lois Sociales and Ministère de l'Intérieur. 0.5 mECU. Construction, buildings, storage, purchase centres and schools. Supply of equipments. Works by acc. tenders, supplies by direct agreement. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 87. 5th EDF.
EDF MAG 5033 A8e

Water supply in the South (phase III). Improvement of water supply conditions for population and livestock. Estimated total cost 5.8 mECU. EDF part 5.1 mECU, local 0.700 mECU. Wells, boreholes, supply of specialised equipment, T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF MAG 6003 A2b

MALAWI

Central and northern region fish farming development, training and research. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated cost: 3 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 1st half 87. 5th EDF.
EDF MAI 5019 A3a

Strategic fuel reserve. Resp. Auth.: Office of the President and Cabinet. Contingency Planning Unit. 4.2 mECU. Construction of tanks for diesel, petrol, ethanol. Associated infrastructure and equipment. T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF MAI 5020 A2a

Small Enterprise Development Organization of Malawi (SEDOM) — Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Sedom secretariat. EDF 4.8 mECU. Works by direct labour. Supply of vehicles and equipment by int. tender in

87. T.A.: GITEC (D). Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF MAI 5021 A4e

Mwansambo Rural Growth Centre. Resp. Auth.: OPC, Rural Development Division. 0.900 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF MAI 5028 A3a

Mpherembe Smallholder Tobacco Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. EDF 4.680 mECU. Works and supplies. Int. tender for supplies launched in December 86. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF MAI 6002 A3a

Smallholder coffee project. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance/Smallholder Coffee Authority (S.C.A.). Total cost 9.59 mECU. EDF 4.62 mECU, local 4.97 mECU. T.A. by restr. tender, supplies by int. tender and civil works by loc. tender. T.A.: Short-list done. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF MAI 6003 A3a

Smallholder agricultural input support programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated cost 28 mECU. Establishment of fertiliser buffer stock of 70 000 tons, building of 3 warehouses + auxiliary facilities, T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF MAI 6005 A3a

MALI

Strengthening of sanitary infrastructure in the Nioro region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé et des Affaires Sociales et Ministère des Transports et T.P. 2.570 mECU. Buildings, equipment, training. Architectural and technical studies and T.A.: Dominic Michaelis Associates (UK). 4th EDF.
EDF MLI 4016 A7a

Support to establish businesses and to employ young graduates. EDF 2.8 mECU. Supply of T.A. training and line of credit. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF MLI 5021 A4e

Pharmaceutical sector restructuring. 0.880 mECU. Supply of equipment. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF MLI 5022 A7a

Support programme to the food strategy. Estimated cost 27 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing June 87. 6th EDF.
EDF MLI 6001 A3a

MAURITANIA

Extension of Kaédi regional hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. 1.450 mECU. Construction, equipment and TA for Kaédi hospital (100 beds). Works under way. Medical-technical equipment int. tender, foreseen in the 1st half 87. 3rd, 4th and 5th EDF.
EDF MAU 5018 A7a

Aioun El Atrouss hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. 1.050 mECU. Renovation and supply of equipment for 3 buildings. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF MAU 5012 A7a

Centre de Formation Professionnelle Maritime de Nouadhibou (C.F.P.M.). Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. 2.5

mECU. Construction, supply of equipment, T.A. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF MAU 5014 A6d

MAURITIUS

Development of Ile Rodrigues. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 3 mECU. Development centred on agricultural production. Economic and technical study under way. T.A.: Luxconsult (Lux.). 5th EDF.
EDF IM 5001 A3a

MOZAMBIQUE

Rural development in the Moamba District. Resp. Auth.: Ministerio da Agricultura. Estimated total cost 9.15 mECU. EEC 7.5 mECU. Supply of equipment, rural inputs and T.A. Supplies: int. tender launched in January 87. Project in execution.
ALA MOZ 8333 A3a

Fishery development and rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Secrétariat d'état pour la pêche. Total estimated cost 8.885 mECU. EEC 7.4 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution.
ALA MOZ 8507 A3d

Nacala Railway Rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Government of Mozambique. EDF part 25 mECU. Cofinancing with France, Portugal, Italy, Canada and Finland. **4 Int. tenders launched in February 87. Project in execution.** 6th EDF.
EDF MOZ 6001 A2d

Rehabilitation of the Port of Beira. Reconstruction of parts of berths 2 to 5. National and regional project with Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia. Estimated total cost 40 mECU. Resp. Auth.: Beira Corridor Authority. Reconstruction of about 390 m of quay including the construction of the associated container-multi purpose terminal area. Int. tender (conditional) launched in December 86. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing June 87.** 6th EDF.
MOZ 6003. REG 6401 A2d

NIGER

Air Valley development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural. Estimated cost 2.052 mECU. Hydro-agricultural works. Construction and equipping of wells. Equipping and operation of nurseries. T.A. and training. Works and equipment: int. tender. T.A.: VAKAKIS (GR). Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF NIR 5002 A3a

Training for Cooperatives. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural. Estimated cost 2.8 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. T.A. by restr. Tender short-list done. Supplies by int. tender or direct agreement. 5th EDF.
EDF NIR 5004 A3b

Repair of traditional wells in the Oualam Region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Hydraulique. 3.1 mECU. 100 wells. Works, supervision and training. Supervision of works: M. Botz (F) and M. Motte (B). Project in execution. 5th EDF
EDF NIR 5010 A2b

Rice-growing in the river valley. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Cultivation of 1,800 ha, electrification, feeder roads, T.A. for management. Project preparation

★ study: short-list **already** drawn up. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDR NIR 6001 A3a

Small irrigation programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. **21.560 mECU.** Rehabilitation of the Tarka down valley, irrigation, boreholes and wells. Feeder roads, environmental protection, T.A. Works and supplies. Studies: short-lists not yet drawn up. Date financing decision April 87. 6th EDF.
EDF NIR 6002 A3a

★ **Road maintenance on R.N. 1.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 15 mECU. Maintenance works for 160 km and supervision. Date financing decision April 87. 6th EDF.
EDF NIR 6003 A2d

Zinder-Agadez road. Rehabilitation works for Takieta-Nigeria border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des T.P. Estimated cost 9.4 mECU. Supplementary financing. Works: int. tender after prequalification. Prequalification done. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 87. 5th EDF.
EDF NIR-REG A2d

NIGERIA

Kaduna afforestation project. Resp. Auth.: Federal Department of Forestry. 9.4 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. T.A.: Hedeselkabet (DK). 5th EDF.
EDF UNI 5001 A3c

Abakaliki Zinc Feasibility Study. Resp. Auth.: NMC (Nigerian Mining Corporation). 1.220 mECU. T.A. by restr. tender after short-list. Supply of equipment by int. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF UNI 5007 A2b

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Magi highway. Resp. Auth.: Department of Transport. 3.5 mECU. Upgrading and sealing of a road section. Works: int. tender foreseen 2nd half '87. 5th EDF.
EDF PNG 5006 A2d

Diesel Power Replacement Programme. Resp. Auth.: Electricity Commission (ELCOM). Estimated cost 4.850 mECU. 4 small hydroelectric power plants with transmission line extensions from existing grids. 1st int. tender (conditional) launched in October 85. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF PNG 5011a A2a

Kimbe-Talasea Road. Resp. Auth.: Departments of Works and Transport. Estimated total cost 9.5 mECU. EDF 7 mECU, local 2.5 mECU. Upgrading of ±35 km of the road. Works and supervision. Int. tender for works launched in January 87. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF PNG 5013 A2d

RWANDA

Development of the small-scale tin industry. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie, des Mines et de l'Artisanat. 2.840 mECU. Sysmin. Works, supplies, training and T.A. T.A.: Short-list done. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF RW 5016 A4a

ST. LUCIA

Roseau agricultural resettlement and diversification project. Phase II. 1.4 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SLU 6001 A3a

ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

Kingstown Hospital redevelopment (phase II). 1.8 mECU. Works and supplies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 87. 6th EDF.
EDF SVG 6002 A7a

SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE

Riberia Peixe rural development. Resp. auth.: Ministère de la Coopération. Development of agricultural output (palm oil) and industrial exploitation. Estimated total cost: 6.79 mECU as follows: EDF 4.00 mECU, EIB 2.00 mECU and local 0.791 mECU. T.A., works, training and supplies. T.A.: Short-list done. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF STP 6001 A3a

Strengthening of the electricity production capability. Supply and installation and works for electricity production of ±2 000 KVA. Estimated cost 0.950 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing June 87. 6th EDF.
EDF STP 6002 A2ai

SENEGAL

New energy research and testing in rural regions. Resp. Auth.: Secrétariat d'Etat à la Recherche Scientifique. 1.5 mECU. Creation of pilot unit for solar energy, biomass and wind energy. Studies, T.A. and equipment. Studies: AGIP-AFOR (I). Equipment: int. tender in 87. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF SE 5005 A2a

Consolidation of the livestock development programme. Resp. Auth.: SODESP. Estimated cost 1.6 mECU. Study under way by Bessel Ass. (UK). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF SE A3a

Artisanal fishery development in the Casamance Region. Resp. Auth.: Secrétariat d'Etat à la Pêche Maritime. EDF 1.6 mECU. Works, supplies and training. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF SE 5024 A3a

★ **Support programme to the development of the Podor region.** Estimated cost 90 mECU. Rural hydraulics, support to promote S.M.E., micro-irrigation, road and urban infrastructures, telecommunications, electrification, health, training, promotion of women, fight against desertification. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 87. 6th EDF.
EDF SE 6002 A3a

SIERRA LEONE

Rehabilitation of the Telecommunications Network. Resp. Auth.: Post and Telecommunications Dept. Estimated cost ±1.4 mECU. Study to prepare technical specifications and int. tender dossier: British

Telconsult (UK). 2 int. tenders (conditional) launched in January 87. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 87. 5th EDF.
EDF SL 5024 A2c

Port Loko rural development programme. 6 mECU. Infrastructures, T.A., training and supplies. T.A.: Short-list done for restr. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF SL 5006 A3a

Creation of regional centres for small enterprises. Estimated cost 1.25 mECU. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.
EDF SL 5017 A4d

Rural health development programme. Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Buildings, equipment and training. Works by acc. tender already launched. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF SL 5025 A7a

Tourism development project. Estimated cost 0.850 mECU. T.A. for Ministry of Tourism and supply of equipment. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.
EDF SL 5026 A5c

Bennimix baby food production programme. Estimated total cost 3.6 mECU. EDF 2.8 mECU. Improvement of the nutrition and health status of children by producing from local raw materials low cost, high quality weaning food, which can be afforded by the low-income groups. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.
EDF SL 5028 A7a

Construction of the road Fadugu-Kabala. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Estimated cost 12 mECU. Bituminised road, 40 km. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF.
EDF SL 6001 A2d

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Coconut industry development project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Land and Natural Resources. Study under way by Agrar und Hydrotechnik (D). Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.
EDF SOL 5009 A3a

★ **Rehabilitation programme after cyclone Namu.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Planning. 1.722 mECU. Works and supply of equipment. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SOL 6002 A7a

Development of human resources in the rural sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Planning. 4 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF SOL 6003 A3a

SOMALIA

Bardheera Dam. Resp. Auth.: Bardheera Dam Authority (BDA). 600 mECU. (Estimated) Dam Project 500 mECU. Powerline to Mogadishu 100 mECU. Funding: EDF, Italy, Germany, France, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait Funds, FADES, Isl. Dev. Bank. Local. Power and river regulation for agricultural development. Construction of a concrete gravity dam with hydro-power station, associated infrastructure and electrical

transmission lines. The dam will provide water, flood protection and power for up to 223 000 ha of irrigated agriculture in the Juba Valley, and energy to Mogadishu. Civil works: first int. tender launched in 1984. Transmission lines int. tender in 1986. Equipment: powerhouse main equipment and auxiliary equipment, int. tenders in 1987. Gates, valves, intake equipment, int tender in 1988. Int. tender with prequalification launched in February 86 for hydraulic tests. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SO 5003 A2a

"Aula Magna" Mogadishu National University. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. ±2.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. 4th EDF. EDF SO 4015 A6b

Upgrading of the road Afgoi-Shalambot-Goluen. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Works by int. tender in 87. Supervision of works. Studies: AIC. PROGETTI (I). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF SO 5017 A2d

Food Early Warning System. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. EDF ±3.1 mECU. Supply of meteorological and office equipment and T.A.: Transtec (B). Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SO 5015 A8f

North-West agricultural development project. Estimated total cost 36 mECU. EDF: 7.6 mECU, World Bank 14.9 mECU, IFAD 9.9 mECU, local 3.6 mECU. Infrastructural work and supply of equipment and T.A. T.A.: DARUDEK (DK). Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SO 5016 A3a

Construction of Juba and Shebelli bridges. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. 5 mECU. Construction of bridges across the Shebelli and Juba rivers to improve communications. Design and construction by int. tender. T.A.: Consulint. (I). ★ Int. tender launched in January 87. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SO 5006 A2d

Development of inshore fisheries in the Mogadishu region. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Fisheries. EDF 3.0 mECU, local 0.3 mECU. Upgrading of fisheries infrastructure. Civil works local restr. tender, materials by int. tender/restr. tender or direct agreement. ★ Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SO 5024 A3d

Rehabilitation of Mogadishu General Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Ministry of National Planning. Estimated cost 3.6 mECU. Works and supplies. Works: int. tender (conditional) in February or March 87. Supplies by direct agreement. ★ Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May or June 87. 5th EDF. EDF SO 5021 A7a

SUDAN

Jebel Marra Rural Development Project — Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 15.8 mECU. Civil works, supply of vehicles and equipment by international tender (conditional) launched in November 86, and T.A. by restricted tender. Project in execution. Date financing decision February 1987. 6th EDF. EDF SU 6001 A3a

Nuba Mountains rural development programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 13.5 mECU. EDF 10 mECU, local 3.5 mECU. Construction works, supply of vehicles and equipment and rural inputs, T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF SU 6005 A3a

SURINAME

Rice project at Coronie. Resp. Auth.: Ministerie van Landbouw, Veeteelt, Visserij en Bosbouw. 7.650 mECU. Rice production developments. T.A.: EUROCONSULT (NL). Project in execution. 3rd and 5th EDF. EDF SUR 5002 A3a

Biomass energy project at Wageningen. Resp. Auth.: Government. Installation of an energy generator on the basis of rice husks. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF SUR 5009 A2a

Artificial Insemination Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries. 0.72 mECU. Building of a new station and provision of equipment and material. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SUR 5010 A3a

Rehabilitation of the Burnside-Wageningen road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Planning. Estimated total cost 7.5 mECU. Study to be done: technical methods for the implementation of the project: Delft Universteit (NL). Int. tender for works (conditional) launched in April 87. Date foreseen for financing June 87. Project on appraisal. 4th and 5th EDF. EDF SUR 5011 A2d

SWAZILAND

Rural hydraulics. Resp. Auth.: Rural Water Supply Board. Estimated cost 2.456 m ECU. Study, construction, works supervision. 12 villages. Supply of equipment and material. Study and works supervision: Carl Bro (DK). Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SW 5001 A2b

Smallholders Support Project, Credit and Marketing. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 3.550 mECU. Works, line of credit, T.A. and training. T.A.: Coopers Lybrand (ACP branch). Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SW 5005 A4e

In-service maths and science teaching improvement programme. Resp. Auth.: University of Swaziland. Ministry of Education. 2.3 mECU. Supply of teaching equipment, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 87. 6th EDF. EDF SW 6003 A6a

TANZANIA

Mtwara water supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. 5 mECU. Works: drilling of new wells, and construction. Supply of equipment and T.A. Drilling activities and power supply connections by direct labour. Supplies: int. tender in 87. Supervision of works: G.W.E. (D). Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF TA 5003 A2b

Ports of Zanzibar and Pemba. Resp. Auth.: Zanzibar's Ministry of Communications and Transport. 12.5 mECU, T.A. for management, organisation, pricing and financial systems, training. Restoration of infrastructure. T.A.: NEDECO (NL). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing June 87. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF TA 5024 A2d

Cooperative Rural Development Bank (CRDB) Project. 3.15 mECU. Provision of equipment, training and T.A. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF TA 5026 A3a

Rehabilitation of Zanzibar Hospitals. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health, Zanzibar. EDF 2.705 mECU. Cofinancing with Italy. Works, supply of equipment and training. Works by acc. tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 87. 5th EDF. EDF TA 5017 A7a

Agricultural sector support programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Planning. 94 mECU. Measures to improve food security, support for coffee production and processing, assistance to co-operative unions, repair and maintenance of vehicles and tractors, feeder road maintenance and assistance to institutions implementing the programme. Supplies by int. tender/restr. tender or direct agreement. T.A.: Short-list done for restr. tenders. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF TA 6001 A3a

TOGO

Lomé hotel training centre (CFH). National and regional project (French-speaking countries of the sub-region). 3.450 mECU. Works, training and T.A. Project in execution. 5th Reg. 6th EDF. EDF TO 6001. REG 5147 A6d

TONGA

Vava'u Airport Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation. 2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and training. Works by direct labour, supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d

Integrated regional development study for Vava'u. Short-list done. Project stage identification. EDF TG A3a

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Training programme, health sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Environment. 1.2 mECU. Training awards, laboratory equipment (sound-meters, chemical chromatographs, spectrometers) by int. tender. Short-term T.A. to coordinate and establish new laboratory. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF TR 5003 A8c

Goat development project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.750 mECU. Works and supply of equipment. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF TR 5005 A3a

UGANDA

Karamoja Development Programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Government of Uganda. EDF 6 mECU. Works and supplies. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF UG 5001 A3a

Support to emergency relief and rehabilitation programme. Resp. Auth.: Government of Uganda. EDF 3.860 mECU. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing May 87.* 6th EDF. EDF UG 6104 A8e

Hima cement power supply project (Kilembe hydroelectric power scheme). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water and Mineral Development. Kilembe Mines L (KML) and Uganda Electricity Board (UEB). 3.1 mECU. Rehabilitation works for the existing power station, supply of equipment and T.A. *Date financing April 87.* 5th EDF. EDF UG 5024 A2ai

Sleeping sickness and trypanosomiasis control project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health, Ministry of Animal Industry and Fisheries. 2 mECU. Supply of drugs, chemicals, equipment, tools, vehicles and T.A. *Date financing April 87.* 5th EDF. EDF UG 5020 A3a, A7e

Forestry rehabilitation programme. Resp. Auth.: Government of Uganda. Estimated total cost 32 mECU. EDF part 9 mECU. Natural forest protection and management; reforestation; improved charcoal production, fuel wood plantation preparation. Works, supplies, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF UG 6003 A3c

Tea rehabilitation programme. Resp. Auth.: Government of Uganda. Estimated total cost 97 mECU. EDF part 8 mECU. Project will rehabilitate tea factories, estates outgrower tea areas, repair roads, improve fuelwood supplies and assure inputs to the tea sub-sector. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF UG 6002 A3a

WESTERN SAMOA

Afulilo hydro power project. Estimated total cost 18 mECU. EDF part 7.5 mECU. Construction of a dam, reservoir, penstock, 4 MW power station, 40 km transmission lines, T.A. and training. Cofinancing under discussion with EIB, IDA and Asian Dev. Bank. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF. EDF WSO 6001 A2a

ZAIRE

Kalemie port rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Département des Transports et Communications. 5 mECU. Prequalification for int. tender *launched in February 87.* Works and supplies. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing decision 1st half 87.* Regional project. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5215 A2d

Butembo-Beni hydro-electrical development. Preliminary study done by Tractonnel (B) on local funds. Detailed economic and technical studies: WLP (UK). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF ZR 5006 A2a

2nd intervention Sysmin. Gécamines Working and SNCZ. EDF part 41 mECU.

Supply of mining equipment, machine-tools, engines. Int. tender for SNCZ launched in January 87. *Project in execution.* 5th EDF. EDF ZR-SYS 5001 A4a

Reafforestation of the Bateke plateau. Resp. Auth.: Département de l'environnement, conservation de la nature et affaires foncières. 6,000 ha of plantings. Int. tender with pre-qualification launched in November 86 (conditional). Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing May 87.* 6th EDF. EDF ZR 6001 A3a

Kivu programme. Estimated cost 40 mECU. Action for crops (coffee, corn, palm-tree, rice) environment (Parc de la Virunga), lines of credit. *Project on appraisal.* 6th EDF. EDF ZR 6002 A3a

Kinshasa hinterland programme. Estimated cost 35 mECU. To improve crop production. Project stage identification. 6th EDF. EDF ZR 6003 A3a

Oso-Osokari road. Resp. Auth.: DG Travaux Publics et Administration Territoriale. Construction of an asphalted road. 74 km. Estimated total cost 37 mECU. EDF 18 mECU, KfW (D) 19 mECU. Int. tender (conditional) launched in April 87. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF ZR 6004 A2d

Matadi-Kinshasa-Kenge road. Resp. Auth.: DG Travaux Publics et Adm. Territoriale. Estimated cost 22 mECU. Road rehabilitation and training for the staff of "Office des routes". Project stage identification. 6th EDF. EDF ZR 6006 A2d

ZAMBIA

Animal vaccine unit production. Laboratory construction. Supply of equipment and T.A. Estimated cost 3.79 mECU. EDF 3 mECU, local 0.79 mECU. T.A.: Central Diergeneeskundig (NL). 5th EDF. EDF ZA 5018 A3a

Mkushi electrification. Estimated cost 6.07 mECU. EDF 3.07 mECU. Cofinancing needed. Study on hand: Mertz-McLennan (UK). Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF ZA 5007 A2a

EEC vehicle repair and transport support programme. Resp. Auth.: ZIMCO. 15 mECU. Part supply for trucks and related transport equipment, T.A. control and maintenance services. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing decision 1st half 87.* 5th EDF. EDF ZA 5025 A2d

Rehabilitation of 3 grain silos. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. NAMBOARD. EDF 7 mECU, Germany F.R. 7 mECU. EDF part works, supplies and work supervision. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing decision 1st half 87.* 5th EDF. EDF ZA 5026 A3f

Zambia Centre for Accountancy Studies (ZCAS). 4 mECU. Training and management. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing May 87.* 6th EDF. EDF ZA 6001 A6a

ZAMSTEP. Zambia Mathematics and Science Education Project. 3.5 mECU.

Supplies, training and management. T.A.: Short-list done for restr. tender. *Project in execution.* 6th EDF. EDF ZA 6002 A6a

Agricultural inputs import support programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia. Estimated total cost 40 mECU. Procurement after int. tender of raw materials, catalysts and other chemicals required for the production of fertiliser by NCZ. Supply of agric. inputs, equipments and spare parts. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF ZA 6003 A3a

Smallholder development in copper belt province. Resp. Auth. Ministry of Agriculture and water development. 12 mECU. Basic infrastructure by acc. tender. Supply of vehicles and materials by int. tender. T.A. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing June 87.* 6th EDF. EDF ZA 6004 A3a

Smallholder development in central province. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and water development. 8 mECU. Basic infrastructure and social facilities. Works, supplies and T.A. Project stage identification. 6th EDF. EDF ZA 6005 A3a

Batoka cross-breeding ranch. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agricultural and water department. Veterinary Dept. 1 mECU. Provision of further equipment and refurbishment and continued T.A. Project stage identification. 6th EDF. EDF ZA 6006 A3a

ZIMBABWE

Small-holder Coffee and Fruit Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development. EDF 4.2 mECU, local 1.65 mECU. T.A.: I.R.F.A. (F). Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF ZIM 5006 A3a

Mashonaland East Smallholder Fruit and Vegetable Programme. Resp. Auth.: Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA). 2.9 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and materials, T.A. and credit line. T.A.: Short-list done for restr. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF ZIM 5012 A3a

Rural water supply in South Matabeleland. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Energy, Water Resources and Development (MEWRD). Boring wells, supply of hand pumps. 4.1 mECU. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF ZIM 5005 A2b

Zimbabwe export development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Trade and Commerce, Export Promotion Dept. Estimated total cost 6.3 mECU. EDF 4.4 mECU. Sector and market development, human resource development and institutional development and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ZIM 6001 A4a

Construction of Bulawayo grain silo complex. Resp. Auth.: Grain Marketing Board (GMB). EDF 7.010 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Supply of T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing June 87.* 5th EDF. EDF ZIM 5017 A3a

Land Use Project for Kanyati and Gatshe-Gatshe Communal Lands. Cultivation and development and proper utilisation of wildlife potential. Works, supply of vehicles and rural equipment and T.A. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF.
EDF ZIM 6004 A3a

Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT)

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Hanavave electric line. Supply and installation of 8 km of electric lines. M.T. Estimated total cost 0.319 mECU. EDF 0.267 mECU. Date financing April 87. 4th EDF.
EDF POF 4004 A2ai

Tahiti hydro-electric rehabilitation. Estimated total cost 13.7 mECU. EDF 1.8 mECU, France 2.6 mECU, EIB 4 mECU, local 3.1 mECU, SODEP 2.2 mECU. EDF part: supply of pylons, cables and materials. Project on appraisal.
★ Date foreseen for financing June 87. 5th EDF.
EDF POF 5005 A2ai

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Line of credit to the Aruba Dev. Bank to improve agriculture, livestock and fishery. Resp. Auth.: Departement voor ontwikkelingsamenwerking. Estimated cost 0.3 mECU. Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.
EDF NEA 4003 A5a

Tourism improvement . Curaçao. Phase I. Otrobanda sewerage. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Estimated total cost 5 mECU. EDF 3 mECU, Netherlands 2 mECU. EDF part: sewage, road works, piping. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF NEA 5013 A5c

Aruba Airport Extension. Estimated cost EDF part 5 mECU. Supply of navigational aids, equipment and construction of a service road. T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF NEA 5014 A2d

MONTSERRAT

Water Supply Project. Resp. Auth.: Montserrat Water Authority and Ministry of Public Works. 1 mECU. Project planning: SCET Int. (F). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 1st half 87. 4th and 5th EDF.
EDF MON 5001 A2b

PACIFIC OCT

Regional programme rural photovoltaic electrification. Resp. Auth.: SPEC. Estimated total cost 4.365 mECU. EDF 3.184 mECU. T.A.: short-list done for restr. tender. Supplies by int. tender in 85, 86 and 87. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5715 A2a

Regional Projects

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF CEAO

ESITEX Ségou (Mali). Resp. Auth.: CEAO Secretariat. Management training for textile industry. Complex construction in Ségou. Supply of equipment. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5118 A6d

GUYANA — SURINAME

Guyana — Suriname ferry link. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works and Ministerie van Openbare Werken. Link ferry on Corentine river. 12.1 mECU. T.A. for Phase II: Short-list done for restr. tender. Project in execution. 4th and 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5602 - 4084 A2d

NIGER BASIN AUTHORITY

Protection and reforestation in the "Haut Bassin Versant du fleuve Niger en Guinée". Works, supplies and T.A. Estimated total cost 1.5 mECU. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5112 A8f

BURKINA — NIGER

Timber development in the future reservoir of the Kompienga Dam. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement du Burkina. EDF part estimated at 7 mECU. Timber trees recuperation and processing to obtain building and service timber, fuel-wood, charcoal for their commercialisation. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6102 A3c

EQUATORIAL GUINEA — SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Improvement of port facilities to develop trade in the Guinea Gulf. Estimated total cost 2.04 mECU. EDF 0.690 mECU, F.R.G. 1.350 mECU. Works in the port of Bata, T.A. and supply of handling facilities equipment in the port of Sao Tome. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5222 A2d

ZAIRE — CONGO — GABON — SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE — EQUATORIAL GUINEA — CAMEROON

Fishery development in the Gulf of Guinea. Estimated cost ±5 mECU. T.A. to prepare these projects: Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5206 A3d

SENEGAL — MAURITANIA

Establishment of cultivated areas in the Senegal River Valley. Special hunger programme. 2.380 mECU. Project in execution.
958-REG 5140 A3a

PACIFIC ACP COUNTRIES

Pacific Regional Tourism Programme. Resp. Auth.: Tourism Council of the South

Pacific (TCSP) and SPEC. 3.2 mECU. Study to be done: data base, organisation and strategy. Short-list already drawn up. for restr. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5714 A5c

Pacific Regional Aircommunications. Stage I. Resp. Auth.: SPEC. 4.6 mECU. Buildings, runways and supply of navigational aids. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5717 A2d

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF CILSS

Provisional survey of natural renewable resources in the Sahel. Resp. Auth.: CILSS Secretariat. Setting up of an observation unit to forecast crop production. Remote sensing by satellite, air survey and ground control. Project in execution. T.A.: Sodeteg - (F). 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5116 A8f

Millet, maize, sorghum and niébé project. Resp. Auth.: CILSS Secretariat. Estimated cost 2 mECU. To provide improved varieties for farmers. Local tests. Purchase of vehicles and equipment and to take charge of local test control staff. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5116 A3a

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF U.A.P.T.

Satellite telecommunications project. Resp. Auth.: U.A.P.T. Secretariat in Brazzaville. R.P.C. Parametric study under way by national organisations of I, UK, F and D. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5307 A2c

INDIAN OCEAN ACP COUNTRIES

Tuna fishing in the Indian Ocean. EDF 6.3 mECU. Determination of different methods of tuna fishing. Evaluation of resources and T.A. to the countries. Madagascar, Comoros and Mauritius to select models for development. **Project in execution.** 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5504 A3d

Aircraft maintenance centre for Indian Ocean countries. EDF 3.2 mECU. Strengthening of the existing centre in Ivato (Madagascar). Works, supplies and training. **Project in execution.** 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5508 A2d

TANZANIA — ZAMBIA

Tazara Ten Year Development Plan (phase I). Resp. Auth.: Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority. EDF part 13 mECU. Programme to improve maintenance of track and rolling stock, supply of equipment and T.A. **Project in execution.** 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5026 A2d

EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Statistical training centre for Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 2.0 mECU. Widening of the capacity. Construction of class-rooms, offices and housing. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5311 A6b

Migrant pest control in Eastern Africa. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Desert Locust Control Organisation for Eastern Africa (DLCO-EA). Estimated total cost 6.4 mECU. EDF 4.3 mECU, DLCO-EA 2.1 mECU. Research rapid survey, control and spraying of insects. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6302 A3a

CAMEROON — COTE D'IVOIRE — GHANA — MAURITIUS — SENEGAL — ZAIRE

Strengthening of scientific and technical capacities in the field of food and nutrition in Africa. Resp. Auth.: Association des Universités africaines. AUA. 1.5 mECU. T.A., training, supply of equipment, production and diffusion of scientific information. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5054 A3a

BURUNDI — RWANDA — TANZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — KENYA

T.A. to the Central Corridor. Estimated cost 10 mECU. Building of a rail-road terminal in Isaka, improve the traffic on the TRC and facilitate transit through the Kigoma, Kalemie and Bujumbura ports. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5341 A2d

Northern Corridor: Masaka-Mbarare-Kabale Road Rehabilitation. Reconstruction of 277 km of road including drainage work lime stabilised base course and double surface dressing. Supervision. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6304, (UG 0000) A2d

AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Campaign against rinderpest in African. Resp. Auth.: OUA and IBAR. Estimated total cost for 2 years 50 mECU. Supply of equipment T.A. vaccines and research. T.A.: Dr. Cheneau (F). Project in execution. 4th and 5th EDF. EDF REG 5007 - 4085 A3a

Fight against onchocercosis in Western Africa. EDF part 6 mECU. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5148 A3a

SADCC

Maseru Container Terminal. Resp. Auth.: Government of Lesotho and SADCC. 1.350 mECU. Construction of container terminal and supply of containers, handling equipment. Study required: detailed design of works. Short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5421 A2d

Karonga-Ibanda-Uyole Road. EDF 19 mECU. Works and supervision by EDF. Int. tender (conditional) launched in October 86. Date financing April 87. 5th and 6th Reg. EDF REG 5423-6402 (MAI 6004) A2d

BOTSWANA — SWAZILAND — ZIMBABWE

Regional Railway Training. Phase II. Estimated cost 2 mECU. T.A.: Sofrerail (F). Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5410 A2d

MALAWI — ZAMBIA — ZIMBABWE

Regional Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control Programme. Resp. Auth.: Technical and financing responsibility: Zimbabwe national authorising officer. 19.150 mECU. Works by direct labour. Vehicles, veterinary products, aerial spraying and equipment by int. tender. T.A. by direct agreement. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5420 A3a

CARIBBEAN AND ACP COCOA PRODUCERS

Cocoa Research Unit (CRU), Phase II. Resp. Auth.: CRU in Trinidad. 2.624 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and agricultural inputs, T.A. and training. Study: I.R.C.C. (F). Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5043 A3a

ALL ACP COUNTRIES

Programme for the Control of AIDS. To provide technical and financial assistance to countries in implementing national AIDS control programmes modelled on the World Health Organisation's Special Programme on AIDS. Initial assessment, public health intervention and education and information campaigns, control activities (surveillance systems) public health-operational research, T.A. and evaluation. 35 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing June 87. 5th EDF. INT/EDF 002 A7e

MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

ALGERIA

Training for heavy industry. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie Lourde(MILD). 3.9 mECU. T.A., training, supply of teaching equipment. T.A.: C.R.G.I. (B). Project in execution. SEM AL 2003 A6d

Training for Ministry of Public Works. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Direction de la Formation. EEC contribution 2.75 mECU. T.A., training, scholarships and supply of teaching equipment. Project in execution. SEM AL 2002 A6d

Support to the «Ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la recherche scientifique» (MESRS). Resp. Auth.: MESRS. 2.2 mECU. Training and supply of scientific equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. SEM AL 2004 A4g

CYPRUS

Sanitation in Nicosia. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Sewage Board of Nicosia and the Department for Water, Geology and Mining. EEC part 2.4 mECU. Increase in capacity of the treatment plant. By local tender and by int. tender. Project in execution. SEM CY A2b

EGYPT

Soil improvement programme in Kaffre-el-Sheikh Governorate. Resp. Auth.: Executive Authority for Land Improvement Projects (EALIP). Provisional amount 8 mECU. To reclaim an area of 65 000 acres of saline soil, located in Hamoul district of the Kaffre-el-Sheikh Governorate. Short-list already drawn up. Project in execution. SEM EGT 1001 A3e

Egyptian Renewable Energy Development Organization. EREDO. Resp. Auth.: Egyptian Government. EEC contribution 7.7 mECU. Construction and equipment for the centre. Works and supplies: int. tender with prequalification foreseen in 1st half 87. T.A.: GET/KFA (D). Int. tender dossier: Phoebus (I). SEM EGT 1002 A2a

Training Institute for Egyptian Labour Representatives. "Workers University". EEC contribution 1.970 mECU. T.A. and supply of kitchen, cafeteria and laundry equipment by int. tender. Project in execution. SEM EGT A6d

Sinai water resources Study — Phase II. EEC contribution 3 mECU. Project on appraisal. SEM EGT A3e

JORDAN

Sheep improvement project: breeding unit. Estimated total cost 4.018 mECU. EEC 2.1 mECU. Establishment of a breeding unit to provide improved species of the local breed, Awassi, to farmers. Project on appraisal. SEM JO 2004 A3a

A.T. to the Royal Scientific Society-Phase II. 2 mECU. Supply of equipment, training, scholarships and seminars. Project on appraisal. SEM JO 2006 A6a

SYRIA

ISSAT. Institut Supérieur des Sciences Appliquées et de Technologie. Resp. Auth.: State Planning Commission. Estimated total cost 70.3 mECU. EEC part: supply of teaching and training equipment for the institute and T.A.: 8.250 mECU. Date financing decision: July 86. SEM SYR 2002 A6b

Rural Water Supply Suweida Region. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local Administration and Ministry of Housing and Utilities. EEC 3.8 mECU. Project in execution. SEM SYR 2001 A2b

TUNISIA

Date-palm plantations study project in Régime Maatoug. Resp. Auth.: Banque Nationale de Dév. Agricole (B.N.D.A.). 1.9 mECU. Feasibility study, drillings and access roads. Works by direct labour. Study: Short-list done. Project in execution. SEM TUN 2001 A3a

Water resources research and training study. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 1.0 mECU. Supply of soil equipment and data system. T.A. and training. T.A.:

Short-list done for restr. tender. Project in execution.

SEM TUN 2004 A2b

Evaluation of soil resources and their liability to desertification in Southern Tunisia. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Estimated cost 1.2 mECU. EEC 0.400 mECU, local 0.800 mECU. T.A. and training. Supply of specialised equipment. T.A.: Short-list done for restr. tender. Project in execution.

SEM TUN 2005 A3c

Management improvement in the public irrigated areas in Tunisia. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EEC contribution 2.5 mECU. Rehabilitation of hydro-electric equipment, training and T.A. Project in execution.

SEM TUN 2006 A3A

T.A. to the "Unités Coopératives de Production Agricole (U.C.P.A.). Resp. Auth.: B.N.D.A. 1.800 mECU. T.A., training and supply of equipment. Project in execution.

SEM TUN 2007 A3a

A.L.A. developing countries ASIA and LATIN AMERICA

ASEAN

Aquaculture development and coordination programme. 6.77 mECU. Project in execution.

ALA ASN 8604 A3d

Industrial standards and quality control programme. 5 mECU. Project in execution.

ALA ASN 8609 A4a

Marine fisheries resources assessment. Resp. Auth.: South-East Asian Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDEC). EEC contribution 0.652 mECU. Supply of equipments and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 87.

ALA ASN 8618 A3d

BANGLADESH

Small-scale irrigation sector project. Resp. Auth.: Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB). Estimated total cost 82 mECU. EEC contribution 12 mECU. Cofinancing with ADB (Asian Dev. Bank). Works, supply of equipment and vehicles, T.A. and supervision. Works: acc. tender. Supplies: int. tender, 1st half 87.

ALA BD 8112 A3a

Building of storage for fertilisers. Resp. Auth.: Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADCO). Cofinancing: EEC and Netherlands. Total cost 4 mECU. EEC 2 mECU Netherlands 2 mECU. EEC part: Works by int. tender. Netherlands part: buildings and T.A.

ALA BD 8201 A3f

Rangpur. Rural Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Central Coordination Committee. (CCC). Total cost 40 mECU. EEC 25.5 mECU, NL 7 mECU, local 6 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender or direct agreement. Project in execution.

ALA BD A3e

Cotton Development. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Central Coordination Committee (CCC) and Cotton Development Board (CDB). EEC 4.9 mECU. Supply of T.A. training and equipment. Int. tender for supplies launched in May 86. Project in execution.

ALA BD 8504 A3a

BHUTAN

Water supply. Resp. Auth.: Inter dep. Commission on water and sanitation. Works by direct labour. 4.5 mECU. Supplies int. tender or direct agreement. T.A.: UNICEF. Project in execution.

ALA BHU A2b

T.A. programme to the Department of Agriculture. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Forests. 1.1 mECU. Two experts during 3 years. 1 rural development engineer and 1 agro-economist. Short-list already drawn up for restr. tender. Project in execution.

ALA BHU 8513 A3a

BOLIVIA

Flood protection programme. Santa Cruz. EEC 9 mECU, NL 1 mECU. Works, supply of equipment. T.A. for NL. Project in execution.

ALA BO 8510 A8g

Rural self-development programme. Resp. Auth.: CORDEPO-CORDEOR. 20 mECU. Supply of equipment, materials, line of credit, T.A. Date financing decision January 87.

ALA BO 8701 A3a

CHINA (PEOPLE'S REP.)

Fruit Cultivating and Preservation Techniques. Estimated total cost 4.350 mECU. EEC 1.600 mECU. Cofinancing with Italy. T.A. and transfer of technology. T.A.: Apples: B.D.P.A. (F). Citrus: Media Coop (I). Int. tender for supplies launched in February 87. Project in execution.

ALA CHN 8337 A3a

Flood forecasting and management of Beijing River. Estimated total cost 5.5 mECU. EEC 1.7 mECU T.A. and transfer of technology. Project in execution. TRACTIONNEL (B).

ALA CHN 8338 A8g

Prawn farming development. Estimated cost 0.700 mECU. Supplies and T.A. T.A.: Fish Farming Int. (UK). Project in execution.

ALA CHN 8341 A3d

Hainan Cashew Development. Resp. Auth.: Prefecture of the Autonomous Department of Li and Miao National Minorities. Estimated total cost 2.350 mECU. EEC 0.800 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. T.A.: K.I.T. (NL). Project in execution.

ALA CHN 8340 A3a

Gansu Sugar Beet Development. Resp. Auth.: Gansu Province Department of Agri-

culture. EEC contribution 1 mECU. T.A., training and supply of equipment. Project in execution.

ALA CHN 8517 A3a

Strengthening of soil and water conservation measures in Sichuan Province. 1.5 mECU. Supply of equipment, training and T.A. Project in execution.

ALA CHN 8526 A3a

Improvement of the rubber quality. 0.900 mECU. Supply of equipment, training and T.A. Project in execution.

ALA CHN 8527 A3a

Pilot project to improve production from fish farming. 2.1 mECU. Project in execution.

ALA CHN 8528 A3d

Study of rural water supply and technical strengthening of institutions. Estimated total cost 3,080 mECU, EEC 1.1 mECU and 1.980 mECU locally. Study, T.A. and training in Europe. **Project in execution.**

ALA CHN 8515 A2b

Decentralised energising systems. Phase III. Supply of services and equipments to conceive, supply and install a set of wind-generators of 150 KWA and an operating system to exploit in an integrated way a mixed system of wind-generators/diesel sets. Conception, supply and installation of a test centre for mixed systems of wind-generators/diesel sets. Development of mixed systems wind-generators/diesel sets susceptible for joint manufacturing operation and commercialisation in the People's Rep. of China and in the Pacific countries. Plans to extend use of these sets are envisaged and also training actions. Supply of a diesel generator set of 280 KW, an electric submarine cable of 10 KVA, 4 km length, supply and installation supervision of a television-satellite receiving station and several re-transmitting stations (powered by solar generators or by the grid). Estimated cost 2.180 mECU. Int. tender to prequalify services and int. tender for supplies foreseen in the 2nd quarter 87.

ADE 933-87-01 A2ai

COLOMBIA

Reconstruction Programme. Resp. Auth.: Corporation de Reconstruction de Cauca. Total cost 5.9 mECU. EEC 3.9 mECU. EEC part: supply of materials and T.A. Project in execution.

ALA CO 8403 A8a

Microprojects programme in the pacific coastal. Line of credit, T.A. and training, EEC contribution 4 mECU and supply of equipment. Project in execution.

ALA CO 8516 A3a

COSTA RICA

Productive projects programme for refugees in Costa Rica. T.A. and line of credit. 3.6 mECU. Project in execution.

ALA CR 8501 A8b

Integrated rural development of the region of OSA/GOLFITO. Total cost 21.635 mECU. EEC 9.95 mECU. Supply of equipment, infrastructural works, maintenance, lines of credit and T.A. Project in execution.

ALA CR 8506 A3a

**COSTA RICA — HONDURAS —
NICARAGUA — PANAMA —
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

Latin American qualified nationals reinstatement in 5 Central American countries. Resp. Auth.: CIM (Comité Intergouvernemental pour les migrations). 1.4 mECU. Reinstatement of 75 qualified nationals via CIM. Date foreseen for financing decision 1st half 87.
ALA CIM 8302 A8b

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Integrated rural development pilot project in Western Cibao. 6 mECU. Special hunger programme. Int. tender for supplies launched in January 87. Project in execution.
958-DO 8402 A3a

ECUADOR

Rural development in the region of the Chambo river. Resp. Auth.: Institut Equatorien des Ressources Hydrauliques (INERHI). EEC 9 mECU. T.A. and training, irrigation works, line of credit, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing **May 87**.
ALA EC 8701 A3a

EL SALVADOR

Rehabilitation Programme. University of El Salvador. Resp. Auth.: U.E.S. Total estimated cost 5 mECU. EEC 3.3 mECU. Italy 1.7 mECU. EEC part: supply of equipment, T.A. and training for Agronomics and partly for Electrotechnology. Italian part: supplies for Electrotechnology, Physics and Mechanics, T.A. and training. Project in execution.
ALA ES 8519 A6c

GUATEMALA

Support to smallholder farmers. 12 mECU. Supply of equipment, line of credit and T.A. **Project in execution.**
ALA GU 8612 A3a

HONDURAS

Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Feeder Roads in Coffee Producing Areas. Resp. Auth.: Instituto Hondureño de Café (IHCAFE). EEC 2.750 mECU. Supply of T.A. and work construction equipment. Project in execution.
ALA HO 8524 A3a

Water supply, health in the rural sector. Resp. Auth.: Consejo Directivo de Saneamiento (CODISA), and Ministerio de Salud Publica. EEC contribution 14.5 mECU. Supply of equipment, materials, vehicles, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing **May 87**.
ALA HO 8620 A8bc

INDIA

Development of Water Control Systems for diversification of crops in Maharashtra. Resp. Auth.: Irrigation Department of the Government of Maharashtra. EEC

contribution 15 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. and training. Project in execution.
ALA IN 8418 A3a

Co-operative rural storage, Bihar. 21.19 mECU. Project in execution.
ALA IN 8607 A3f

Integrated watershed management in U.P. 0,980 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing April 87.
★ALA IN 8619 A3a

INDONESIA

Bali Irrigation Sector Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. DG for Water Resources Development. EEC 12 mECU. ADB ± 37 mECU. Local ± 55 mECU. Rehabilitation and expansion of 50 village-level irrigation schemes, establishment of a water-management training centre, and establishment of climatological stations. T.A. Works: acc. tender. Project in execution.
ALA IND 8114 A3a

MEXICO

Hospital construction. EEC 5.2 mECU. 144 bed hospital. Works, supplies and supervision. Int. tender launched in December 86. Project in execution.
ALA ME 8602 A7a

NEPAL

Nepal Administrative Staff College. NASC. Resp. Auth. NASC Secretariat. Estimated total cost 6.5 mECU. EEC 5 mECU, U.K. 1.5 mECU. Renovation and construction works, supply of equipment and training. Project in execution.
ALA NEP 8407 A6b

Soil and water conservation in Bagmati Watershed. Special hunger programme. 5.5 mECU. T.A.: I.D.C. (D). Project in execution.
958-NEP 8401 A3a

Arjun Kuhola Irrigation Project. 1.536 mECU. Project in execution.
ALA NEP 8521 A3e

NICARAGUA

Rural integrated development in San Dionisio and La Meseta. Estimated cost 8.5 mECU for the EEC contribution. Supply of equipment, vehicles, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal.
ALA NI 8614 A3a

PACTO ANDINO MEMBER COUNTRIES

Technical cooperation (industry and economic planning). Resp. Auth.: Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena, Lima, Peru. Estimated total Cost: 1.7 mECU. EEC 1.1 mECU. To place experts, equipment and T.A. and training at Junta's disposal. Contracts, T.A. and experts by the Junta and the EEC.
ALA JUN 8107 A4a

Andean Programme for technological development (Rural PADT). Resp. Auth.: Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena, Lima-Peru. Estimated total Cost: 7.560 mECU. EEC 3.927 mECU. Supply of equipment, training and T.A. Vehicle purchase: int. tender.

T.A.: Short-lists to be drawn up by the EEC and decision by the Junta.
ALA JUN 8108 A3a

Regional programme for technical cooperation: food strategy. Resp. Auth.: JUNAC. EEC contribution 7 mECU for European T.A. and supply of data-computerised equipment by int. tender. Project in execution.
ALA JUN 8406 B1a

Regional programme for technical cooperation: industry and sub-regional exchanges. Resp. Auth.: JUNAC. EEC Contribution 7 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution.
ALA JUN 8503 A4a

PAKISTAN

Talli irrigation project. Dam construction and infrastructure. Supply of equipment and T.A. EEC contribution 7.8 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing April 87.
ALA PK 8615 A3a, A9a

**PANAMA — COSTA RICA —
NICARAGUA — HONDURAS —
EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA**

Regional programme of technical cooperation for food security. Resp. Auth.: CADESCA (Comité de acción para el desarrollo economico y social de centroamerica — Panama). Total cost 9.07 mECU. EEC 4.82 mECU, France 0.350 mECU, local 3.9 mECU. T.A. training and supply of equipment. Project in execution.
ALA REG 8505 A3a

Regional programme for child survival in Central America. EEC 16.5 mECU, Italy 16 mECU. Supply of T.A., training, equipment, medical equipment and medicines. Project in execution.
ALA REG 8520 A7a

**EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA —
HONDURAS — NICARAGUA**

Regional programme to eliminate rabies in Central America. Resp. Auth.: Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO). EEC contribution 2.9 mECU. Supply of equipment and materials and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing **May 87**.
ALA REG 8625 A8c

PERU

Support programme to the agro-pastoral microprojects PAMPA-PUNO. EEC 16 mECU. Supply of T.A., equipment and recurrent expenditure. Int. tender launched in July 86. Project in execution.
ALA PE 8601 A3a

Lake Titicaca. Reconstruction-prevention programme. Resp. Auth.: Corporacion de Desarrollo de Puno (CORPUNO). EEC contribution 5 mECU. Studies, works and supplies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing **May 87**.
ALA PE 8603 A3a

PHILIPPINES

Integrated development project of the Aurora region. Resp. Auth.: NACIAD. Total estimated cost 12.6 mECU. EEC 10.8 mECU. Irrigation works, feeder roads, reforestation, supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. ALA PHI 8525 A3a

★ **Cordillera development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF). EEC part 18.5 mECU. Rural micro-projects in the Northern Luzon. Irrigation, roads, bridges, water supplies, rural credit. Supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing April 87. ALA PHI 8616 A3a

THAILAND

Oilseed crop development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture — Oilseed Project Steering Committee. Total estimated cost 4.2 mECU. EEC 3.3 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. T.A.: Crown Agents (UK). ALA TH 8203 A3a

Mae Nam Chi River Basin. Water Management Development. Resp. Auth.: Min-

istry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Royal Irrigation Department. Estimated total cost 5 mECU. EEC 4 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Int. tender for supplies launched in July 86. Project in execution. ALA TH 8412 A3a

Strengthening of planning capacities for diversification and rural development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 2 mECU. T.A. for coordination, management, training needs, project identification and planning. T.A. for central and peripheral computer system for rural areas. Training and supply of computerised equipment. Short-list done. Project in execution. ALA TH 8420 A3a

Rural credit and rubber planting. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 35 mECU. Supply of lines of credit, T.A., training, rural inputs, equipment. Project in execution. ALA TH 8509 A3a

★ **Huai-Mong. Phase II. 5.6 mECU. Works and supplies.** Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision May 87. ALA TH 8613 A3a

YEMEN — ARAB REPUBLIC

Rehabilitation and maintenance of Al Mahwit road network. Supply of equipment and materials by int. tender. T.A. and training. EEC contribution 7.5 mECU. Projection appraisal. Date foreseen for financing April 87. ALA YAR 8611 A2d

YEMEN — PEOPLE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Rural development of Al Mahwir. Estimated cost 6.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 1st half 87. ALA YDR A3a

LATIN AMERICAN AND ASIAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Studies and external expert reports. "Contrat-cadre" LAA DC. Resp. Auth.: CCE DIV I-H-3. Berl. 8/31, Brussels. Pre-qualification of consultants, research and training institutes, experts. For rural development, industries, trade and services, training, scientific cooperation and research, health. Prequalification on May 87. ALA 86 E/AT/C

INTERNATIONAL CALLS FOR TENDER

All international calls for tender (int. tenders) referred to in this Operational Summary are notified in due time in the Official Journal (O.J.) of the European Communities' «S» supplement. This information is also available by computer link via the "TED" data base.

Subscriptions to the O.J. «S» supplement should be addressed to the «Office for Official Publications of the European Communities», L-2985 Luxembourg, Tel.: 49 00 81, or contact Mr A. Boldrin (see box page II).

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left the well-trodden paths and embarked upon France's public health activity in one of its colonies. The idea was to shed fresh light on a subject that has traditionally been dealt with panegyrically by doctors or politicians. Many questions need to be asked. What was the health policy? Was it one of the main concerns of the colonial power? What were the results? This extensive and very detailed study was compiled from many sources in France and several countries of Africa. By choosing Côte d'Ivoire, whose economic development was said to be a model of its kind, the author has suggested that this country had the best conditions for a health service that was in line with this development and to observe the way health and economy interacted.

There are four main themes.

1. Health infrastructure — What means are there? What types of infrastructure were encouraged? What was the geographical spread of the health service?
2. The health policy — When was it laid down and by whom? By what principles? How was it put into practice?
3. The means, in terms of staff and finance.
4. The results, a vast area of investigation, in which the fight against the great endemic diseases, trypanosomiasis in particular, is very much to the fore. This was also the period when French tropical medicine emerged. An attempt should also be made to measure the effect of health schemes on demography.

This straightforward report comes up with some surprising answers to many a question and it sheds doubt on the standard view of colonial health services. It comes with plenty of tables, illustrations, maps and plans and should help the people who decide on West Africa's health policies, now and in the future, to have a more specific approach to today's health problems.

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George PSACHAROPOULOS —
Maureen WOODHALL — **Education
for Development** — Oxford University
Press — 323 pages — 1985 — Obtain-
able free on demand from the World
Bank, Washington D.C., U.S.A.

For more than 20 years the World Bank has been lending for educational projects in developing countries. Out of that experience comes this book, which brings together the results of research and development both within and outside the Bank, including much material not widely available until now. The authors, George Psacharopoulos and Maureen Woodhall, examine theoretical and practical issues that face policymakers, planners, and administrators in developing countries as they choose among strategies for investment in education. Among the topics discussed are the contribution of education to economic and human development, cost-benefit analysis, the demand for educated manpower, finance, the efficiency and quality of education, equity considerations, and the links between investment in education and in other sectors.

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Growing Power — World Resources Institute — 1735 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington D.C. 20006 — 1986

Bioenergy has the potential—even in an era of cheap oil to satisfy much of the energy needs of both developing and industrialised countries, improve much health and protect the environment, according to a new World Resources Institute report.

For more than half the world's people, the energy crisis is not over. For them, "oil is an increasingly unaffordable luxury, despite recent price declines. Biomass—wood, crops and crop residues, and human, animal and industrial wastes—is the major or ex-

clusive energy source", according to the authors.

Addressing the questions of bioenergy's technical potential and social and economic acceptance, "Growing Power" incorporates new research with the products of a 1985 conference sponsored by the World Resources Institute and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

Biomass energy plays a surprisingly large role in industrialised nations, including the U.S., where wood supplies 6% of its energy use—more energy than nuclear power. Developing nations obtain more than 40% of their energy from biomass; more than half of this is from woodfuel.

Where biomass is used but not replenished, the consequences can be devastating, perpetuating and increasing cycles of poverty as forests and soils disappear, and leading to loss of biological diversity and climate change. The direct human toll is also grave: women and children in some countries spend 100 to 300 workdays a year gathering fuelwood. In some urban areas, an average of 20-40% of cash income must be set aside to buy wood or charcoal. Indoor air pollution from the inefficient combustion of wood is one of the greatest public health problems in many parts of the world.

The key to bioenergy's future lies in strategies that integrate multiple objectives, respond to human needs, and consider factors of energy efficiency, environmental protection, health effects and economic burden. "Growing Power" makes these, and other, recommendations for bioenergy's future.

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