Department of Political Studies - University of Catania

Jean Monnet Chair of European Comparative Politics

Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics

 Stefania PANEBIANCO

University of Catania 

European Citizenship and European Identity:

from the Treaty of Maastricht to public opinion attitudes

December 1996 - JMWP 03.96

In order to answer the question whether the establishment of European citizenship helped to develop a European identity, both institutional and empirical aspects of European citizenship and European identity will be taken into account. The distinction between the formal meaning of citizenship as established in the Treaty of Maastricht on the European Union (TEU) and the attitudes of the Europeans is useful as it results from the Eurobarometer (EB) data on whether European public opinion is aware of the attempts to bring the European Union (EU) closer to the citizens.

To understand the contemporary debate on the meaning of European identity, issues such as the relationship between European identity and national identity, and the necessity of strengthening the europeanness in order to indirectly increase the public support to the EU, will be addressed.

The process of European integration is today faced with contradictory trends. On the one hand, there is increasing economic interdependence, the advantages of a large scale economy, the necessity of co-operation to cope with environmental disasters or epidemics, etc. On the other, there are local movements claiming for independence in the name of a particular local identity. In an era of globalization and fragmentation, the only way to cope with the clash between identities is to develop and spread a broader concept of European identity.

The Maastricht Treaty established a "multiple citizenship". In a similar way, we can refer to a European "multiple identity" by considering local, regional, and national identities as compatible without excluding the one from the other.

Recent empirical results indicate that the majority of Europeans declare having both a national and a European identity, demonstrating that they consider them compatible. But when asked to make a choice, the national attachment prevails. In reality, in the TEU the citizens are not asked to choose to have either a national identity or a European one. Identity cannot be analysed in terms of zero-sum games.

The origins of European Citizenship

The process leading to the establishment of European citizenship was rather long. The first reference to European identity goes back to the Copenhagen summit in 1973. Then, in 1974 at the Paris summit the question of a ‘citizens’ Europe’ arose officially. The heads of states and governments agreed on the establishment of special rights, in order to bring political and civil rights acknowledged by the European Community closer to rights traditionally acknowledged to the national citizens.

In 1984 at the European Council of Fontainebleau an ad hoc Committee was set up to address issues relating to a ‘people’s Europe’. The Adonnino Committee prepared two reports concerning the enlargement of economic rights and the establishment of new rights. The Committee put forward proposals on rights of citizens, culture, youth exchange, health, social security, free movement of people, town twinning and symbols of EC identity. Some community symbols were then adopted in order to increase the sense of belonging to the EC: the European passport, the European flag, the European anthem. And exchange programs for students and professors were created to favour an open-minded European culture through mobility.

In 1986 the Single European Act (Art. 8A) clearly referred to the right of free circulation of people. But a big step forward was made with the inclusion in the TEU (1992) of a chapter on ‘Citizenship of the Union’, adding political rights to economic and social rights. (1)

European Citizenship as established in the Treaty of Maastricht

In the TEU, European citizenship appears among the main objectives of the Union listed at the beginning of the treaty: The Union shall set itself the following objectives: [...] to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union (Title I, art. B).

Title II Part two establishes the ‘Citizenship of the Union’ stating that: Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union (art. 8, 2). The nationality of a member state becomes then the conditio sine qua non for European citizenship.

European citizenship entitles the EU citizens to some new rights, namely the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (art. 8a); the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections and in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which one resides under the same conditions as nationals of that State (art. 8b); the diplomatic protection of any Member State in a third country (art. 8c); the right to petition to the European Parliament (art. 8d).

The aim of the establishment of European citizenship was clearly to reduce the gap between the EU institutions and its nationals, and it has been welcomed by many scholars both for its high symbolic value and concrete effects. For example, in his analysis of the new electoral rights of the European citizens, De Guttry (1995) positively greets the political rights established by the TEU underlying the great number of citizens directly affected by these new rights (2).

Telo (1995, 49) underlines a peculiar aspect of the European citizenship as dual citizenship (3). A dual citizenship is usually destined to transform into a federal citizenship. However, the European citizenship is a special case, because the evolution towards a unique supranational citizenship is clearly excluded in the declaration on the nationality of a member state annexed to the TEU. European citizenship is not comprehensive of national and local citizenship, but it goes along with them.

The visibility of European Citizenship: some empirical evidence

Besides the formal meaning of the TEU and the positive analysis of scholars and European practitioners, I shall concentrate here upon the EB empirical findings in order to verify whether this positive attitude is shared by European public opinion.

As far as European citizenship is concerned, EB has systematically conducted surveys on the electoral rights, namely the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at local and European elections. What emerges from these surveys is a dichotomy between local and European elections.

In general, there is strong and increasing support for the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in one’s country of residence at European elections. In spring 1994 it was respectively 74% and 64% (EB 41, tab. 3), both plus 3% in comparison to autumn 1993. When referring to the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in one’s country of residence at local elections, an increasing trend is also registered, but at a much lower level: 53% and 42% (spring 1994); in comparison to autumn 1993, it was plus 6% for the active electoral right, plus 3% for the passive. EB 43 (fieldwork spring 1995) still indicates an increasing trend: 54% of the respondents were in favour of voting at local elections and 45% in favour of the right to stand as candidate at local elections.

To some extent, Europeans seem to be rather jealous of their local affairs, and they are not enthusiastic about letting non-nationals represent their local interests. Even though a majority is still against, this attitude is slightly but continuously changing. Moving to the European elections, two Europeans out of three are already for the extension of both passive and active electoral rights.

In spring 1995 an EB survey inquired about some specific issues such as ‘teaching in schools how the EU works’, ‘a common defence’, ‘a common foreign policy’, ‘a European Central Bank’, ‘a single currency’, ‘local electoral rights’, etc. (EB 43, fig. 3.8.). It might appear surprising, but respondents were much more in favour of technical proposals such as a common defence, a common foreign policy or a European Central Bank (between 75 and 65%) rather than local electoral rights (54% in favour of the right to vote, 45% in favour of the right to stand as candidate) (4). In reality, when dealing with the right to stand as a candidate or vote at local elections, we refer to issues which have a more concrete appeal for Europeans, who are personally entitled to exercise these rights. Therefore, the influence of political élites and media in forming an opinion is much slighter, and personal interests much stronger.

The public support of European integration: a historical overview

The creation of the European Community is often considered as the result of the project of a strict group of pro-European politicians who did not take into any account European public opinion. Integration was at first realised in a functional sector (coal and steal) by Adenauer, De Gasperi, Schuman, following Jean Monnet’s idea to spill over later into other areas. Although integration has often been seen as the bulwark of liberal-democracy, integration has been almost totally a creature of this élite (Shepherd, 1975, 1).

Even though Lindberg and Scheingold’s analysis (1970) of the process of European integration indicates that public opinion had not played a decisive role (5), public support for "Europe" was quite high and increased from the late 1940s to the late 1960s. There was an element of utilitarian sentiment in the Europeans’ expectations: ‘The support for supranational institutions or policies [was] more marked than feelings of shared needs and interests. Publics [did] not yet conceive of common interests or needs, they [were] attached to the Common Market only in so far as it provide[d] clearly perceived benefits and accord[ed] with an underlying affective-identitive sentiment’ (ibid., 156-57).

In general there was permissive consensus, because the Community enterprise was seemingly taken for granted as an accepted part of the political landscape, making it relatively easy to mobilize support for projects to advance or protect the economic programs of the Community. There was a favourably prevailing attitude towards the subject, but it was generally of low salience as a political issue, leaving national decision-makers free to take steps favourable to integration if they wished, but also leaving them a wide liberty of choice (Inglehart, 1970, 773).

According to Slater (1982) public opinion was in favour of European integration, but without any knowledge of the connected implications. Consequently, when it was clear that the process of European integration could also imply personal sacrifices, the support of certain sectors decreased. This means that nationals were in favour of the integration in the same way they favoured peace: both were desirable goals, but when the costs of attaining a goal such as European integration were considered, some doubts arose.

In the 1970s support for European integration suddenly decreased both due to the international economic crisis and to the internal impact of the first enlargement of the EC (Handley, 1981). Thanks to the first European election this public support crisis was overcome. According to Handley the EP, with its periodical elections, could stimulate the European identity. But the great optimism which had welcomed the first European elections decreased as a consequence of the low participation rate and of the second-order rank of the European elections soon revealed (Reif, 1985) .

European integration and public opinion in the 1990s

In order to measure public support for the European Community, specific EB surveys have been systematically conducted since the early 1980s. What emerges over the past ten or fifteen years is, on average within the Twelve, a general pattern of public support for Europe. It was characterised by a rise until 1989 (for basic approval of EC membership until early 1991), a downturn thereafter, continuing until late 1992- early 1994, followed by a consolidation at lower levels of support and, as of late 1994, by the first signals of recovery (EB 39, tab. 1.7, and following EB data).

To better understand this trend, it is now necessary to recall some concepts which are often used in public opinion analysis. Utilitarian support for supranational institutions is support for integration which stems from a recognition of common interests and positive, mutual benefits that will result (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970). Affective support is emotional support which may exist between peoples, and which may also comprise a sense of common identity (Deutsch, quoted in ibid.).

When defining permissive consensus, Reif (1993) refers more to a declaredly negative attitude towards European integration rather than supportive: it ‘allows for integration by political, economic, military and cultural élites, as along as those segments of these élites that are opposed to integration (or to more integration) do not succeed in mobilizing significant support. If and when they do, they slow down the speed of integration, stop it or even reverse its direction’. Public support of Europe is more permissive, acceptive, benevolent, than demanding, challenging, pressing or pushing.

EB 43 [Fig. I.1] illustrates that the erosion of a ‘permissive consensus’ started long before the December 1991 Maastricht meeting of the European Council and the February 1992 signing of the Treaty on European Union, as from 1989 to 1991 the "not benefited" curve climbed considerably.

The early 1990s were characterised by a certain degree of optimism. The collapse of communist regimes in eastern Europe was accompanied by a strong confidence in democratic institutions and, therefore, in closer European integration. So, in spring 1991 the curves ‘support for unification’ (81%), ‘EC membership’ (72%), ‘benefits from the EC’ (59%) and ‘regret of dissolution’ (50%) were all at their highest levels (EB 39, fig. 1.7). Enthusiasm and hope then suddenly decreased for events which slowed down the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty: the Danish referendum saying no to the Treaty, the slight 52% at the French referendum, the British hostilities leading to the opting out in the social field. But apart from these internal events, there were also external causes to the decreasing of public support. At the end of 1992, the level of insecurity among Europeans had risen, as Western Europe entered an economic recession accompanied by high levels of unemployment.

EB 43 (fig. I.7) confirms that utilitarian support, constitutional support and general support reflect events both internal and external to European integration. The Maastricht summit and the controversial discussion which accompanied the ratification of the TEU, the Danish and the French referenda, the withdrawal of Pound Sterling and the Lira from the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS, the recession hitting many member state economies, the official start of the Single Market, but also the Gulf War, news from Eastern Europe turning sour, all have resulted in drops in public support since spring 1991.

As a consequence of the recovery from the economic recession in many member states and the appeased Maastricht debate, the most recent public opinion polls register a new consolidation, even though at considerably more modest levels than four, five or six years before (6).

Most studies agree that support for European integration tends to be utilitarian. Public attitudes towards integration reflect the perceived costs and benefits of EC membership: ‘support for the EC does not translate into a willingness to make sacrifices for other member states in economic difficulties’ (Laffan, 1992, 123). Empirical evidence to the utilitarian support is given by an EB survey enquiring about the worries of European public opinion. When asked ‘In your opinion, which of the following should be the most important objective of the European Union policies towards less favoured regions?’, the great majority of the respondents indicate the creation of jobs as the most important (44%) (EB 44, tab. 7.6).

As the alive debate on the ratification of the TEU revealed, European public opinion is now more attentive to what happens in Brussels. Recent political events demonstrate that ‘the public is neither as supportive of European integration nor as deferential to élites on EC issues as previously assumed. European integration [...] is not merely an élite process, but depends on fluctuations in public sentiments as well’ (Gabel & Palmer, 1995, 3). Today consensus does not seem then to be as permissive as in the past, because it is very much influenced by the events. As Franklin, Marsh and McLaren (1994, 458-9) argue ‘Maastricht pushed the "permissive consensus" regarding Europe beyond its limits’.

As EB surveys demonstrate, European support for European integration is influenced by contingent events. If international migration fluxes, environmental disasters, economic crisis and unemployment, constitute a threat to Europeans’ interests and lives, they might negatively influence the attitudes towards European integration. Unless the EU will be able to find a solution in the direction of higher life-standards, local separatism could be considered by European nationals as an attractive alternative: ‘continued support for integration will depend on the EC’s ability to respond to the economic demands of its citizens’ (Gabel & Palmer, 1995, 13).

The Treaty of Maastricht judged by the Europeans

Due to the Treaty of Maastricht a big public debate has arisen on European integration, and the two referenda on the Treaty of Maastricht brought to the fore the distance existing between populations and the European Union. It was then clear that a good deal of the population fears that the Community would threaten their national interests acting in fields previously regulated by national governments.

When explaining the reasons why the respondents are hostile to the treaty, they describe a Community which is basically organised according to the treaty itself (Panebianco, 1994). The Europeans fear that the EU as described in the TEU would threaten national identity and cultural diversity, that their governments would be forced to carry out decisions they do not want. They do not like a too centralised European decision-making process guided by bureaucracy in Brussels.

To some extent, they are against a community that is distant from the citizens. They want different cultures and identities to be respected, their governments to play an important role in the decision-making process and sovereignty not to be transferred completely to the common institutions. They do not know, then, that they are in favour of the system which is established in the treaty, where the principle of subsidiarity disciplines the level of intervention.

EB 43 (fig. 3.4) clearly demonstrates that those who are traditionally against an "ever closer Union" and the increasing of common policies, the Danish and British, but also the Finnish, are those who prefer the EU to be responsible only for matters that cannot be effectively handled by national, regional or local governments.

On the other hand, Europeanism does not necessarily mean having a precise knowledge of the EU machinery or of the EU agenda. The Italians, for example, have always been pro-Europe and the most in favour of the creation of a European government directly accountable to the EP and of the increasing of EP powers, included legislative powers. Nevertheless, they do not know the decision-making process well and indicate the EP as the most powerful institution in adopting EU legislation (Panebianco, 1995). On the contrary, despite their slight opposition to the EU, the Danish are better informed about the distribution of normative powers (7).

National identity and European identity: conflict or compatibility?

Passing from the above severe public judgement on the European Union, mainly stemming from economic considerations and dissatisfactions, to a more ideal level, the EB surveys offer a different picture of European public opinion.

The ‘feeling European’ survey indicates that in spring 1995 the majority of the Europeans (60%) declared having a European identity (EB 43, fig. 1.7). This majority is divided into three categories of identity: ‘national and European’ (45%); ‘European and national’ (9%); ‘only European’ (6%). 37% of the respondents declared having only a national identity.

The same survey has been conducted again late 1995 and showed a slight increase in ‘only national’ responses (plus 3%) (EB 44, fig. 2.13). But the most interesting data emerges from a distinction in responses according to the nationality. As a matter of fact, it is in the three new member states, in United Kingdom, and in Danemark, but also in Greece, that the ‘only national identity’ category is more consistent (between 64% and 50%). Except for Netherlands, the original member states and Spain are above the average EU rates.

The variables influencing the ‘feeling European’ are first of all age, sex and political ideas. In general young people, men and leftists are more pro-European than elderly people, women and rightists.

Although being aware that these data might be interpreted in negative terms, I would stress rather the importance of the coexistence of two identities, national and European. The "feeling European" question is based on the assumption that one does not need to give up one’s national identification in order to adopt a European one. If citizens are asked to choose between having a European Identity and a national identity, they consider national ties stronger than the European ones. To feel European does not mean to be ready ‘to die for the European Union’ (Attinà, 1995, 125).

Moreover, in the TEU also the relationship between national identity and European identity is defined according to a principle of respect and compatibility. As a matter of fact, Title I, art. F, states that: The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy. The EU does not aim then at substituting national and regional identities with a European one.

Undeniably, in Europe there are common historical origins and a common cultural heritage. But at the same time the EU is characterised by a plurality of cultures, languages, and ethnic groups. And, in view of any further enlargement, Europe is destined to be a continent of pluri-belonging. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine a cultural ‘unification’. Then talking about a common identity cannot imply a uniformity of European cultural identities. The deepening of the common European values does not necessarily imply a cultural unification of the European peoples. This would be in contrast with the TEU articles giving way to a certain regional decentralisation and establishing the right to respect local and regional identities (artt. 126-128) (8).

A comparison can be made between the coexistence of different levels of sovereignty and powers, and of identities. As a matter of fact, Europeans are used to democratic participation at different levels, and regional, national, European levels have each a special specific logic. Europeans are at the same time citizens of their town, their region, their nation, and of the EU. The EU does not aim at substituting the member state nations, and the principle of subsidiarity is the weapon aimed at protecting the different levels, and consequently, different identities.

The point of departure here is the ‘evolution towards a post-étatique entity of the EU made up of different levels: local, national, and supranational’ (Telo, 1995,5). Wæver clearly points out that the complexity of the EU political system is strictly linked with the definition of European identity, as ‘the emerging complexity of various co-existing layers of identity forces us to rethink what kinds of identity might be possible to function here. In a post-sovereign space like Europe, identity cannot be connected to the idea of primacy, of the one "real" identity’ (Wæver, 1996).

The emergence of an European identity does not imply the substitution of other identities. Dealing with identity we cannot think in terms of zero-sum games, sociological terms of reference are much more explanatory. As they are used to adapting to different social roles in their life, Europeans should get used to different belonging. Each human being often shares highly contradictory identities and social roles as a member of his family, of his locality, of his professional, social, political and religious adherence, of his region, of his nation and possibly, by the virtue of transnational links, of the world. It is a question of multiple allegiances. Sociologically, human beings can move between their multiple identities according to context and situation. Such identities may be concentric rather than conflictual and there is plenty of historical evidence for the coexistence of concentric circles of allegiances (Smith, 1992, 67) (9).

Smith (ibid. 59) clearly describes the relationship between national and European identity in terms of compatibility, ‘however dominant the nation and its national identification, human beings retain a multiplicity of allegiances in the contemporary world’.

However, several sociological analyses confirm that the lack of affection towards institutions exists at all levels: local, regional, national. In his researches Dogan (1993 and 1994) gives evidence for a decline in the intensity of nationalism in Western Europe. Nationalism, which is traditionally considered as high national pride, confidence in the own country’s army, readiness to fight for the own country, is declining among the upcoming generations ‘because a supranational consciousness is rising, by a progressive interaction at several levels, economic, military, social, cultural, and political’ (Dogan, 1994, 294). The existence of the European Union, and the perception of the EU, is then responsible for the decline of nationalism because ‘Western European counties having achieved their national integration a long time ago, find themselves today in a post-nationalistic phase’ (ibid. 281). Decline in nationalism is typical in mature western European countries which have experienced before others the creation of liberal states where now ‘sovereignty of the nation-states is slowly but progressively reduced by a kind of loose confederal sovereignty, vaguely called "community„’ (ibid. 303).

A constructivist approach:

the necessity of strengthening a European identity

As in all democratic systems, EU institutions should act as identity producers. The EU institutions should then help the Europeans to become aware of their belonging to a common entity. At the same time they should help the development of a feeling of belonging to a common identity, to a common destiny. According to Wallace (1990, 55) ‘political integration is a matter of identity and loyalty: of the emergence of a political community based upon shared values and mutual trust out of previously separate and mistrustful groups [...] There is no simple or inexorable transition from contact through trade to the emergence of political community’.

For many years the Commission has stated the importance of stimulating the feeling of belonging to the same community by the use of symbols and the creation of the European flag, the European hymn, the European passport. But even the single European currency and transnational rights of the European citizen can act as European identity creator. Also the increasing of communication between Europeans can be helpful in developing a mutual understanding. In this view mobility programmes such as Erasmus, Comett, Lingua and Petra have financed the mobility of a great number of students and workers since 1987 (10).

The necessity of spreading the idea of Europe is confirmed by a EB survey on the attachment to different political levels: town, village, region, country, EU, Europe (EB 44, fig. 7.1). There is a big difference between the degree of attachment to towns or villages, regions and countries (about 90%), and rates referring to European union and Europe as a whole, which are much lower (respectively 43% and 42%).

This might be due to the fact that we are just at the beginning of the Europeanisation process. Many scholars refer to ‘top-down’ strategies of state-building applied to the European integration process. As a matter of fact, a parallel can be made between the process of nation-building which occurred in the last century in many European states, and what is happening now at EU level. States used enormous resources and symbols to inculcate a sense of loyalty and identification with the national political community. After having learnt the sense of belonging to the nation (process of nationalisation) it is now necessary ‘to teach the masses to live with an own (state) government and a common (EU) government’ (transl. from Attinà, 1995, 21). The process of nation-building is now affecting the supra-national level (although it might seem a contradiction in terms) and has created the EU federal system made up of the 15 member states. In this context, Europeanism - considered as mobilization of symbolic values - has to be spread in support of European integration. A process of Europeanisation is therefore binding.

Telo (1995, 20) considers the mobilization of public opinion in favour of the integration process as an essential element. He refers to a "learning" process: ‘instead of teaching a national mythology, ethnocentrism and nationalism should be eradicated in the name of a political democracy, in order to give way to an equal European citizenship, independent from the nation, ethnic group and language’ (ibid., 48).

The importance of the ‘top-down’ strategies is stressed also by Neumann (1994, 58) who transfers the nation-building process to the regional level, and refers to a process of region-building: ‘the existence of regions is preceded by the existence of region-builders, political actors who, as part of some political projects imagine a certain spatial and chronological identity for a region, and discriminate this imagined identity to others’.

However, when arguing that the union ‘top-down’ strategies of state-building have a role to play in altering perceptions of the political space to which individual Europeans belong, we do not mean that the Union should set out to replace national identities, but that ‘the extension of political space beyond the nation-state provides a shelter for multiple identity be they local, regional or national’ (Laffan, 1996).

Conclusions

Dealing with European identity implies referring on the one hand to a convergence of cultural values among European citizens, on the other to a capacity of tolerating cultural diversity. Considering the growing danger of international instability, Europe and its institutions constitute a precious intermediate instrument between the local, regional, national and global level. But at the same time, there is an urgent need to build a European consciousness, to create a sense of community which can safeguard and nourish the basic elements of the European culture

The analysis of the EB data indicates that the establishment of the European citizenship apparently has not stimulated a stronger European identity. Due to the difficult economic situation Europe is faced with, Europeans consider European integration in their own utilitarian terms, as their main interest is to find a job. Is it worth then to spread the idea of Europe in such a context? The answer would be yes. Defending and protecting diversities seem to be the only way for the EU to face, on the one hand, the challenges of the global world economy, on the other, the moves towards fragmentation and regionalisation which might risk becoming separation and secession. The reason why public opinion is not aware of these constraints might be that we are experiencing the first phase of the Europeanisation process.

Looking at the future of the EU, we should keep in mind Wæver’s warning that ‘Europe can only be if we avoid renewed fragmentation. [...] integration/fragmentation is not a question of how Europe will be, but whether Europe will be. [...] security, politics, identity and Europe meet in something which is even, self-declared as a project of constructing a "security identity„’ (Wæver, 1996).

Meehan (1993, 185) perfectly describes the present situation and indicates the path for the future: ‘a new kind of citizenship is emerging that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but which is multiple in enabling the various identities that we all possess to be expressed, and our rights to be exercised, through an increasingly complex configuration of common institutions, states, national and transnational interest groups and voluntary associations, local or provincial authorities, regions and alliances of regions [...] A multiple identity allows different identities to be expressed and different rights and duties to be exercised’.

(1) Brigid Laffan (1996) welcomes the establishment of the European citizenship referring to ‘an important shift from EU consumer to EU citizen’. Back to (1)

 (2) According to Eurostat data (1992) roughly 5 million Europeans reside in a EU country which is different from their own country. Back to (2)

(3) Instead of defining the European citizenship as having a dual charachter, I prefer Meehan’s definition of multiple citizenship (Meehan, 1993) because it takes into due account also the local and regional levels (see infra). Back to (3)

 (4) The same survey has been conducted in autumn 1995 (EB 44, fig. 5.13). Rates of respondents in favour of active and passive electoral rights at local elections are unchanged. Back to (4)

(5) Data indicated distinct and reasonably steady increases in favourable attitudes toward Europe between 1950 and 1962 in each of the member states. The rise was from just over 50% evidencing favourable attitudes to just over 70%. But these data give no clues at all as to what it is about the system that was attractive or why (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970, 38-39). Back to (5)

(6) In spring 1995 ‘support for unification’ was 71%, ‘EU membership’ 57%, ‘benefits from EU membership’ 47%, ‘attitude if EU scrapped’ 40% (EB 43, pp. 4-5). Back to (6)

(7) Analysing the most recent data on support of European integration, there is evidence for two groups of member-states with completely different attitudes (EB 44, fig. 2.2). On the one hand, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland and Netherlands are the most in favour of european integration (between 86% and 76%). On the other hand, in Austria, United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland and Danemark support is much lower (between 54% and 65%). Back to (7)

(8) With the creation of the Committee of the Regions (art. 198 A), regions gained a consultative power they did not have before. It is not possible here to refer to the difficulties the Committee is faced with, such as the different status of the European regions, or the different composition of the assembly (some members are directly elected, but not all), to mention just a few. But here I would stress rather the high symbolic value of this newly created institution which gives the opportunity to express regional interests at EU level. Back to (8)

 (9) In the book edited by Garcia (1993) the European citizen is seen as a human being with variable geometry, used to living in a complex world, and the potential development of multiple identities in concentric circles should encourage compatible loyalties from the local to the European level. Back to (9)

 (10) Now Socrates and Leonardo are the new mobility programmes. Back to (10)

References

 © Copyright 1996. Jean Monnet Chair of European Comparative Politics.

Stefania Panebianco

Ph.D in International Relations, Department of Political Studies, University of Catania

stefapnb@mbox.unict.it