



COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

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**COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN  
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL**

**Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean**

# COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

## Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean

1. All of the EU's Mediterranean partners have close historical and cultural links with Europe. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has provided a means to address many strategic regional questions relating to security, environmental protection, the management of maritime resources, economic relations through trade in goods, services and investment, energy supplies (producing and transit countries), transport, migratory flows (origin and transit), regulatory convergence, cultural and religious diversity and mutual understanding. However, the centrality of the Mediterranean for Europe, the importance of our links, the depth of our cultural and historical relations and the urgency of the strategic common challenges we face, needs to be revisited and given greater political prominence.
2. The European Council of 13/14 March 2008 approved the principle of a Union for the Mediterranean and invited the Commission to present proposals defining the modalities of what will be called "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean".
3. The Commission has made an analysis of the achievements of the Barcelona process and its contribution to dialogue, peace, stability and prosperity in this region, shared by the EU and some of its closest partners. They have also taken into account the shortcomings and difficulties in this process of multilateral co-operation which the EU has pursued since 1995. This Communication takes these factors into account and sets out the Commission's proposals for developing the "Barcelona process: Union for the Mediterranean".
4. The Commission has consulted with all partners involved in the European Union and the Mediterranean, in order to gain a clearer picture of their priorities and to see how best to channel a new political and practical impetus into the process.

### Over a decade of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation

5. The Mediterranean region is an area of vital strategic importance to the European Union in both political and economic terms. The Barcelona Process has been the central instrument for Euro-Mediterranean relations since 1995. Representing a partnership of 39 governments and over 700 million people, it has provided a framework for continued engagement and development.
6. The Barcelona Process is the only forum within which all Mediterranean partners exchange views and engage in constructive dialogue, and political dialogue is a regular item on the agenda of the Euro-Mediterranean ministers' and senior officials' meetings. It represents a strong commitment to regional stability and democracy through regional cooperation and integration, and aims to build on that consensus to pursue the path to political and socio-economic reform and modernisation. However, the persistence of the conflict in the Middle East has challenged and stretched the

Partnership to the limit of its abilities to preserve the channels of dialogue among all partners.

7. The partnership has also overseen efforts to strengthen democracy and political pluralism by the expansion of participation in political life and continues to promote the embracing of all human rights and freedoms. However, the aim of advancing and reforms and engaging more decisively in the process of strengthening governance and participatory democracy, has been tempered by global and regional events.
8. A very positive feature of the last decade has been the way in which dialogues with different political and economic agents -civil society, including women's organisations and the media – have become more central to the process.
9. The various cooperation agreements and programmes in the field of education and training have contributed to capacity building in the countries concerned and represent a major tool to develop human capital and promote cultural and societal values in the region. The Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between cultures, as the unique institution financed by all partners, illustrates the common commitment to establish dialogue and promoting mutual understanding on cultural issues and recognises the essential role of intercultural dialogue to promote peaceful coexistence.
10. The EU remains the main partner of Mediterranean countries both in trade of goods and services. Significant progress has been made towards the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area by 2010. Progressive free trade with the EU has favoured exports and investment, but services, and to a lesser extent agriculture, accounting for two-thirds of the GDP, are only now being included in the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. Slow but steady advances have been made in South-South economic integration which remains below potential. There have been improvements in macro-economic stability, inflation down significantly over 10 years, while human development indicators show improvements in health conditions and overall life expectancy.
11. However, it is also true that further and faster reforms are needed if the EU's Mediterranean partners are to reap the potential benefits of globalisation and free trade with the EU and regional integration. Economic reforms, gradual free trade of industrial products with the EU, and improvements in economic governance, have not been enough to attract the domestic and foreign investment needed to boost standards of living in the region. Growth has been good but insufficient. Reforms have been encouraging but short of initial expectations. Free trade with the EU has favoured exports and investment. The combined effect of these shortcomings has been a slower than expected process. As a consequence of the insufficient growth and continued demographic expansion the prosperity gap between the EU and most Mediterranean countries has increased and there has been no real economic convergence. The formula of trade plus investment plus cooperation is as pertinent as it was in 1995. While there is more that the EU can do to promote trade, investment and co-operation in the region, the greatest need is for the countries of the region to take up these opportunities as part of their domestic economic policies.

12. In sum, the Partnership has witnessed a strong promotion of multilateral and bilateral relations, but now needs a qualitative and quantitative change, to spur investment and employment creation and optimise the use of human resources.
13. A number of shortcomings need to be addressed if the Partnership is to become the multilateral support to jointly agreed policies in political, security, economic, social, educational and cultural cooperation. There is a need to reassert in political terms the central importance of the Mediterranean on the political agenda of all participants. There is mutual concern about the perceived lack of co-ownership by Mediterranean partners. Another area to be addressed is the lack of institutional balance between the weight of the EU on one side, and the Mediterranean partners on the other. An additional deficit of the Barcelona Process has been its weak visibility and the perception by citizens that little is done to tackle their daily problems and their real needs. More engagement and new catalysts are now needed to transform the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration into tangible realities.

### **Scope and main objectives**

14. The challenge of a new initiative is to enhance multilateral relations, increase co-ownership of the process and make it more visible to citizens. Now is the time to inject further momentum into the Barcelona Process.
15. It should build on and reinforce the successful elements of the existing Barcelona Process. Thus the Barcelona Declaration, its goals and its cooperation areas remain valid and its "three chapters of cooperation" (Political Dialogue, Economic Cooperation and Free Trade, and Human, Social and Cultural Dialogue) will continue to constitute the backbone of Euro-Mediterranean relations. The 5-year work programme adopted by the 2005 Barcelona Summit (including the fourth chapter of cooperation on "Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security" introduced at that stage), the 2008 annual work programme adopted by Foreign Affairs Ministers in Lisbon in November 2007 and the conclusions of the sector ministerial meetings will remain in force.
16. Following the views expressed by most EU Member States and Mediterranean Partners, the Commission considers that the current structures of the Barcelona Process, and in particular the Euro-Mediterranean Senior officials meetings, the Euro-Mediterranean Committee meetings and the experts' meetings should be preserved and reinforced where possible. Political and economic dialogues are a major feature of the multilateral dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations and should continue to operate.
17. The "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean" will be a multilateral partnership. By focusing on regional and trans-national projects it should increase the potential for regional integration and cohesion. It will encompass all EU Member States and the European Commission, together with the other members and observers of the Barcelona Process (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Albania), and the other Mediterranean coastal states (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Monaco).

18. It will be complementary to EU bilateral relations with these countries which will continue under existing policy frameworks such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, and, in the case of Mauritania, the African, Caribbean, Pacific framework. It will also be complementary to the regional dimension of the EU enlargement policy, which includes the accession negotiations and the pre-accession process. It will also be coherent and complementary with the EU- Africa Strategy.
19. This new initiative will give a new impulse to the Barcelona Process in at least three very important ways:
  - by upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners;
  - by providing more co-ownership to our multilateral relations; and
  - by making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects, relevant for the citizens of the region.

All dimensions of the process will be open to all participants on an equal footing.

### **Upgrading of relations**

20. A clear signal of the intention to upgrade the relationship will be the proposed decision to hold biennial summits of Heads of Government. The first Summit, due to take place in Paris on 13 July 2008 under the incoming French Presidency, should take the formal decision to launch “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”, and establish its structure, functioning and main goals. The conclusions of the summit should also include a political declaration, and possibly a short list of concrete regional projects to be set in motion. The conclusions should be adopted by consensus.
21. Subsequent summits will follow this format by adopting a political declaration, endorsing a broad two-year work programme for the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” and agreeing on a number of concrete regional projects. Foreign Affairs Ministerial meetings will also take place between summits to review progress in the implementation of the summit conclusions and prepare the next summit meetings.
22. In principle the summit meetings should take place alternately in the EU and in Mediterranean partner countries. Countries hosting summit or ministerial meetings of the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” should invite all countries which are parties to the initiative.
23. The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) has reaffirmed itself as the Parliamentary dimension of the Barcelona Process providing a framework of debate, open dialogue and free exchange of views. It gives impetus to the Partnership by adopting resolutions and recommendations. The role of the Euro-Mediterranean Assembly will be the legitimate parliamentary representation of a Union for the Mediterranean. The Commission strongly supports the strengthening of the role of the EMPA in relations with Mediterranean partners

## Increased co-ownership

24. During the consultations and contacts held by the Commission it has become clear that all countries agree on the need to build a stronger partnership that should come through greater co-ownership of the different processes. Two proposals have received overall support from partners: the establishment of a co-presidency and the setting-up of a joint secretariat. **Co-Presidency**
25. Establishing a co-presidency will increase and improve the balance and the joint ownership of our cooperation. They will be the co-presidents of the Partnership as a whole. One of the co-presidents will be from the EU, and the other from the Mediterranean partner countries.
26. The establishment of a co-presidency from the EU side must be compatible with the provisions on the external representation of the European Union in the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. For the first Summit, the rotating EU Presidency will hold the Presidency from the EU side. From the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Presidency on the EU side will correspond to the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission (at the level of Heads of State and Government), and the High Representative / Vice President of the Commission, at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
27. Given the complex regional environment, the selection of the co-president from the Mediterranean partner countries will require consensus. The co-presidency from the Mediterranean side should be chosen for a period of two years. The country assuming the co-presidency on the Mediterranean Partner side may host the summit of the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”.

## Institutional governance and Secretariat

28. Another key instrument for enhancing co-ownership and promoting a more balanced partnership will be an improved system of institutional governance and the creation of a new secretariat. In order to make the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” more visible and relevant, it should have a strong project focus.
29. Improved institutional governance: A reinforced and more balanced and enhanced governance will be attained by setting-up a committee of specifically appointed representatives from all Member States, Mediterranean Partners and the Commission. They will constitute a Brussels based committee to be called “Joint Permanent Committee” composed of permanent representatives from the respective missions in Brussels.
30. The Joint Permanent Committee:
  - would be steered by the representatives of the co-presidencies;
  - would prepare the meetings of the Senior Officials and Euro-Mediterranean Committee meetings and ensure the appropriate follow up;

- would assist the co-presidencies in the preparation of the Summits and Foreign Affairs and thematic Ministerial meetings;
  - may act as well as a mechanism to react rapidly if a crisis situation arises in the region that requires the consultation of Euro-Mediterranean partners;
  - membership and co-presidencies of the Permanent Committee will be the same as the Senior Officials / Euro-Mediterranean Committee meetings;
  - the setting-up of a Permanent Euro-Mediterranean Committee that would meet regularly could lead to less frequent Senior Officials / Euro-Mediterranean Committee meetings.
31. The Secretariat: In the light of the different views expressed, the Commission has concluded that the Secretariat of the “Barcelona process: Union for the Mediterranean” should be asked to perform the role of making proposals for joint initiatives to be decided by the political bodies and to ensure the necessary follow-up of project-related decisions taken by the Heads of State and Government.
32. The Secretariat could have a separate legal personality with an autonomous status. Detailed modalities will be submitted for approval by the Euro Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers in November 2008.
- **Tasks**: The Secretariat should gather project initiatives (from various sources such as sector ministerial meetings, national or regional authorities, regional groupings, private sector, civil society), examine them, and suggest projects to the Euro-Mediterranean Committee that will act as a clearing house. Once the projects are accepted by the Euro-Mediterranean Committee they will be submitted for approval, through the Foreign Affairs Ministers conferences, to the Summit. If endorsed, the Summit will instruct the Secretariat to give the necessary follow-up in terms of initiating the promotion of the projects, and the search for partners for their implementation. The funding and implementation of projects will be pursued on a case-by-case basis by the various interested partners and according to their own procedures. The secretariat will report to the Euromed Committee.
  - **Composition**: The Secretariat will be composed of officials seconded from participants in the Process. The objective is to achieve a sufficiently higher level of involvement of Mediterranean partners to increase co-ownership and participation. There will be one General Secretary from one side and a Deputy Secretary General from the other side to be selected by consensus. The Secretary General will appoint the staff of the Secretariat on the basis of competence and geographical balance. The organisation of the secretariat and the composition of the staff will be approved by the Euro-Mediterranean Committee.
  - **Funding**: The seconded officials will be funded by their respective administrations. The running costs of the Secretariat (support staff, equipment etc) will be funded on an equal basis by the EU and the Mediterranean partners.

- The headquarters will be decided by consensus. The host country will provide the premises for the Secretariat free of charge.

## **Projects**

33. The project dimension should be at the heart of the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”. The programmes developed under this initiative should have a strong potential to promote regional cohesion and economic integration, and to develop infrastructural interconnections. They should constitute visible and relevant projects for the citizens of the region.
34. The selection process will take into account:
  - the regional, sub-regional and trans-national character of proposed projects, including the possibility of cooperation among a limited number of countries;
  - their size, relevance and interest for all Partners;
  - their potential to promote balanced and sustainable development, regional integration, cohesion and interconnections;
  - their financial feasibility including the maximisation of private sector financing and participation; and
  - their maturity or degree of preparedness to be rapidly launched.
35. A number of project proposals adapted to the needs of the region and meeting the criteria outlined above should be ready to be examined at the Summit planned to take place on 13 July. The Commission has identified 4 such projects that it considers to be highly relevant to promote growth, employment, increased regional cohesion and sustainability for the Mediterranean. These projects are attached in Annex I to the present Communication and submitted to the consideration of partners.
36. The priorities set out in the Regional Indicative Programme will continue to apply and any potential EC contribution to the new regional projects in Annex I will not be financed at the expense of the existing bilateral allocations under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument or the Pre-accession Instrument (or in the case of Mauritania the European Development Fund).

## **Funding**

37. The EU and its Member States already provide significant funding in the Mediterranean region (see Annex II for details). To bring added value to existing arrangements, the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” should be designed to mobilise additional funding for the region, mainly through regional projects. Its added value will very much depend on its capacity to attract more financial resources for regional projects.

38. While there can be no prior earmarking of EU funds, certain projects which fit with the objectives of EU regional programmes can be considered for funding. Insofar as funding from the EU budget is concerned, the normal selection and procedural rules will continue to apply.
39. The Commission believes that additional funding for regional projects and activities should come mainly from the following sources:
- Private sector participation;
  - Bilateral cooperation from EU MS;
  - Contributions from Mediterranean partners;
  - International financial institutions, regional banks and other bilateral funds;
  - the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility (FEMIP) was created in 2002 as a tool to foster private sector development in the Mediterranean region to facilitate a higher economic growth. FEMIP combined EIB loans with EU-budget resources to provide technical assistance, risk capital and interest rate subsidies. The Facility was reinforced in 2005, after a review.
  - The ENPI (approx. € 50 million per year already programmed for the period 2007-2010), the Neighbourhood Investment Facility and the cross-border cooperation instrument within the ENPI, as well as the other instruments applicable to the countries covered by the initiative.

### **Conclusions and next steps**

40. The Commission invites the European Council at its meeting in June 2008 to discuss and endorse the proposals contained in this Communication. They can then become the agreed position of the EU to be put to the inaugural meeting of the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” planned for 13 July 2008 in Paris. The Commission will fully involve the European Parliament and the EMPA in the ongoing discussions on this new initiative.

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## ANNEX I

### PROJECT PROPOSALS

#### Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean

##### Examples of initiatives.

The Commission has identified four examples of initiatives that meet the requirements set down in the Communication. This is an indicative and not exhaustive list, opened to other suggestions and proposals. The initiatives comply with the need to ensure reinforced cooperation both at regional and sub-regional levels, have a real potential for regional integration, and are both inclusive and non discriminatory. These initiatives are coherent and complementary with a vast range of activities and programmes that Commission has carried out both on a regional and bilateral level in the framework of the EuroMed partnership. All projects, but one (civil protection), have strong potential to mobilise funding from different IFIs, encourage the creation of Private Public Partnerships and attract investments from the private sector.

**Coastal motorways.** The transport sector has been identified as one of the priorities of the EuroMed partnership. The coastal motorway concept emerged from the EuroMed partnership as a combination of integrated goods transport services along major transport routes *including a coastal stretch* and is designed to make trans-Mediterranean trade more fluid. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean would offer the prospect of speeding up the process, facilitating the mobilisation of stakeholders and financial resources, and embarking on the development of other routes/links/ports/markets. In this connection, the EuroMed transport working groups on "coastal motorways" and "infrastructures" should be supported in their continuing efforts to identify priority ports. Once these have been selected, the financial resources required will need to be mobilised (combination of national, multilateral, private and Community funds, in particular the NIF).

**Linking up the trans-Maghreb Motorway (AMA).** The construction of the AMA is one of the most important infrastructure initiatives of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). It is designed to establish an area of regional economic integration between the five members of the AMU (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya). Three of these countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) have already made considerable progress on this nationally. In order to complete this project in terms of its full magnitude and purpose, these three countries still need to decide to link up their respective networks along a route already mapped out. Nevertheless, this construction of international networks can achieve its aim of facilitating the movement of goods and people only if it is accompanied by government measures aimed at liberalising trade and removing the various non-tariff obstacles that hamper trade. The possible introduction of a concession scheme might be of considerable interest to the private sector.

**De-pollution of the Mediterranean and sound Environmental Governance.** The quality of the Mediterranean environment has been increasingly affected by unsustainable development. The EuroMed Ministers of Environment decided in 2006 to launch the **Horizon 2020 Initiative**, and adopted a timetable in this respect for the period 2007-2013. The main objective of this programme is to accelerate these ongoing initiatives to de-pollute the Mediterranean. Three main components will be developed: support to the implementation of the Horizon 2020 Initiative and Promotion of Sound Environmental Governance, support to pollution reduction investments and set up a Mediterranean Shared Environmental Information System (SEIS). Several regional and bilateral programmes are under preparation or implementation in the framework of the ENPI, and will directly contribute to the objectives of the "de-pollution of the Mediterranean. In this context, the added value of the BP: UpM is twofold: first, it will reinforce the political dimension of this depollution of the Mediterranean; second, it will facilitate the financial leverage for pollution reduction investments, and capacity building projects.

**Civil protection.** At European level, a Community mechanism (Monitoring and Information Centre - MIC) was set up in 2001 with a view to promoting closer cooperation in the field of civil protection assistance. Strengthening this type of cooperation in the Mediterranean is particularly important as the region faces major and increased risks of disasters, notably on account of the effects of climate change. One specific dimension of this issue is **maritime safety** and the role of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). At regional level, the EuroMed Programme for Disaster Prevention, Preparation and Response (DPPR) is designed to develop heightened awareness of the exposure to disasters and of the response capabilities in the region, to strengthen the measures for preventing existing risks at international, national and local level, and to enhance the response capabilities of those concerned. This programme is aimed, therefore, at strengthening cooperation between key civil protection actors and at progressively forging close links between the Mediterranean countries that are partners in the MIC. It will operate in close collaboration with the European Civil Protection Mechanism and will also ensure that there is synergy with the activities of the Commission, the Council of Europe and the UNO. Accordingly, it represents a political strengthening of the EuroMed partnership that offers genuine value added at regional level, that plays a federative role from a political viewpoint, that is visible to the population at large and that has the potential to bring about sub-regional integration. The fresh political impetus provided by the PdB:UpM will add considerably to the programme's scope and, where appropriate, attract additional funding.

**Mediterranean Solar Plan.** In 2007 the EuroMed Energy Ministers restated the general objectives of cooperation, namely closer integration of energy markets and promotion of sustainable development, including solar energy. The development and implementation of a Mediterranean Solar Plan must be an integral part of this framework. Active promotion of solar energy in the region is in the interests of all parties. The EU is at the cutting edge as regards the relevant technologies and is keen to develop them further. Ultimately, the EU could be an importer of solar electricity. The Plan in question will initially have to mobilise the political authorities at the highest level and the multilateral and financial institutions within the framework of a regional conference. The European Commission could contribute to the preparation of the Plan and could offer a framework for maintaining the necessary dialogue on energy policies and sectoral strategies, on the one hand, and could provide the back-up for the Plan's implementation, on the other. This work could be carried out in conjunction with the PdB:UpM Secretariat by using, for example, the resources of the MED-EMIP technical assistance project<sup>1</sup>. Other parties could also be involved.

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<sup>1</sup> "Euro-Mediterranean Energy Market Integration Project", which was launched in 2008 using MED funds.

## ANNEX II

### EU Financial Support to the Barcelona Process

Between 2000 and 2006 the EC supported the Barcelona Process through its MEDA budget line. Since 2007 support has been provided under the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) budget line for the Barcelona countries.

From **2000-2006**, the Commission made **€4.6 billion** available to the eight Barcelona Process partner countries\* in bilateral cooperation and regional programmes. In **2007** under ENPI the Commission made **€ 1.3 billion** available to ten\*\* partner countries.

Total financial support for 2000-2007 is € 5.9 billion.

Country details:

#### Commitments € millions

	2000-2006 under MEDA	2007 under ENPI
<b>Bilateral Cooperation</b>		
Algeria	339	57
West Bank and Gaza	522	453
Egypt	593	137
Jordan	331	62
Lebanon	133	50
Morocco	980	190
Syria	180	20
Tunisia	518	103
Israel	0	2
Libya	0	2
<b>Total bilateral</b>	<b>3595</b>	<b>1076</b>
<b>Regional Cooperation</b>	1052	178
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4647</b>	<b>1254</b>

\* Algeria, West Bank and Gaza, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia.

\*\* Israel and Libya began receiving bi-lateral assistance in 2007.

**Official Development Bilateral Assistance Grants to MED Countries - Commitments - million dollars**

Year	Recipient	France	Italy	Germany	Netherlands	Sweden	Spain	UK	DA CEU
2004	Algeria	172.4	2.8	4.5	0.1	0.6	5.4		188.2
	Egypt	127.1	16.5	76.4	8.9	4.6	2.3	5.6	265.3
	Jordan	5.9	0.6	50.4	0.5	1.2	2.3	4.7	70.5
	Lebanon	51.2	4.8	13.1	0.2	0.9	3.3	0.3	77.8
	Libya								
	Morocco	258.4	4.6	71.9	5.4	0.1	106.1	0.1	460.6
	Palestinian adm.areas	33.4	10.3	46.4	16.5	33.9	20.7	29.5	238.9
	Syria	23.1	6.6	21.1	4.2	0.0	0.7	0.1	60.0
	Tunisia	96.1	23.7	19.0	0.6	0.3	6.8		150.5
	<b>TOTAL MED</b>	<b>767.5</b>	<b>69.8</b>	<b>302.7</b>	<b>36.3</b>	<b>41.6</b>	<b>147.5</b>	<b>40.2</b>	<b>1511.6</b>
2005	Algeria	234.3	5.5	17.1	0.1	2.2	4.2		275.8
	Egypt	124.6	7.7	60.7	38.7	0.5	3.7	2.1	256.3
	Jordan	5.1	1.2	22.0	0.6	0.3	3.2	6.1	41.2
	Lebanon	56.0	1.9	1.4	0.1	0.4	2.5	0.6	65.2
	Libya	2.5	8.8	0.2	0.2			0.1	12.3
	Morocco	245.5	3.6	2.2	0.4	2.4	50.0	23.5	327.6
	Palestinian adm.areas	19.4	13.1	63.4	28.0	51.6	24.8	0.2	258.3
	Syria	30.7	1.3	19.4	2.2	2.3	1.1		61.0
	Tunisia	95.9	22.0	15.6	0.5	0.7	5.1		143.6
	<b>TOTAL MED</b>	<b>813.9</b>	<b>65.3</b>	<b>202.1</b>	<b>70.6</b>	<b>60.4</b>	<b>94.7</b>	<b>32.3</b>	<b>1441.3</b>
2006	Algeria	171.8	7.1	5.2	0.1	0.6	46.9		245.3
	Egypt	130.6	6.9	89.3	41.9	1.7	4.4		287.1
	Jordan	4.8	1.0	41.7	0.1	0.1	14.4	0.9	67.7
	Lebanon	75.7	45.5	45.9	13.3	9.4	15.1	6.9	9.5
	Libya	2.4	2.7	3.9			0.0		
	Morocco	240.9	7.0	80.0	0.1		73.3	35.1	416.4
	Palestinian adm.areas	47.3	6.5	82.4	38.6	52.3	39.2		351.9
	Syria	29.0	9.1	39.1		0.1	2.6		82.9
	Tunisia	105.3	24.4	24.4		0.9	6.0		166.3
	<b>TOTAL MED</b>	<b>807.8</b>	<b>110.1</b>	<b>411.8</b>	<b>94.2</b>	<b>65.1</b>	<b>201.8</b>	<b>42.9</b>	<b>1627.0</b>

## Support to the Palestinians

As well as receiving financial assistance from the MEDA and ENPI budget lines, the Palestinians are beneficiaries of funding from various other budget lines including those for the Peace Process, UNRWA (for providing social services for 4.5 million refugees), ECHO (humanitarian aid) and the Food Aid and Food Security budget line.

From these various budget lines **€ 2.4 billion has been made available from 2000-2007**. This represents an average of € 300 million per year.

Financial support to the Palestinians has sharply increased over the last few years due to increasing needs and the evolving political situation.

While the average annual EC support amounted to € 245 million in the period 2000 to 2004, in 2005 the EC support reached € 280 million, € 340 million in 2006 and € 550 million in 2007. Member States are equally important donors contributing € 315 million in 2005, € 385 million in 2006 and € 405 million in 2007.

Total EU support to the Palestinians reached therefore € 955 million in 2007 (€ 725 million in 2006 and € 595 million in 2005).