The global financial crisis is forcing Europe to become an ever closer union. Governments are still balking at the idea and many EU citizens continue to be rather sceptical. Yet the situation calls for a new approach to how we think about and do things. We believe that we need the United States of Europe. We also think that we need to fight for our future. It is surely detrimental to the democratic cause to give people the impression that policymaking consists of nothing more than a set of decisions to which there is no other alternative.

People in favour of the United States of Europe are usually motivated by pragmatism, not idealism. If European partners want to move ahead together, if they want to be stable internally and if they want to be in a position to take collective action externally, then embarking on a close political union would seem to be dictated by reason. This is not currently being called into question by many Heads of State and Government, EU Commissioners, Members of Parliament, academics and opinion leaders alike. But what kind of union are we talking about? We believe that by voicing support for the establishment of the United States of Europe, we are making a greater contribution to the much-needed democratic debate on the subject, than those who are given to talking about deeper integration or the advantages of a political union. In a forthright debate about the future, people who are against the establishment of the United States of Europe will be able to make their views heard and map out their proposed alternatives to the same extent as people, like us, who are very much in favour of the idea (annot. 1). In doing so, it would help to shed light on a democratic dispute between competing political options. This would also refute the widespread impression that policymaking consists of nothing more than a set of decisions, to which there is no other alternative.

Nowadays people who talk in a cautious way about a political union are often referring to the United States of Europe and are merely
afraid of calling it such, on account of its divisive connotations. A good example of this is Chancellor Merkel’s interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung on 26 January 2012. When she was asked, “Is the United States of Europe part of your vision?” the Head of the German government replied: “my vision is of a political union. Europe must follow its’ own unique path.” However, the Chancellor’s very next response outlined a blueprint for the United States of Europe. “In the course of a very long process we will hand over more competences to the Commission, which will then function as a European government when it comes to European matters. This includes a strong Parliament. The second chamber, as it were, is formed by the Council with the Heads of Government. And, last but not least, we have the European Court of Justice as a Supreme Court. At some stage in the future, Europe’s political union might indeed look like that ...” (2).

A federal two-chamber system with the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary having responsibility for selected “European matters” is what the Chancellor has in mind. The above, sets out what would be needed in terms of the institutions but provides no insight whatsoever into how they would interact or about the checks and balances that would be part and parcel of the democratic oversight of power.

German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle recently admitted that he wanted “to live long enough to witness the United States of Europe.” And his cabinet colleague Ursula von der Leyen has declared that her “goal is the United States of Europe.” (3) Thus leading members of the German government are finally catching up with former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, who in 2005 wrote a manifesto in which he championed the establishment of the United States of Europe. This manifesto was written in conjunction with Altiero Spinelli (1907-86), an idealistic Italian pioneer of a federal Europe. The crisis has mercilessly exposed the weaknesses of the European polity. We now need to talk about ways of overcoming them.
The future for the fifteen biggest market economies

Percentage share of the world economy in 2030.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2030 Share</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>CHINA</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>INDIA</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>SOUTH KOREA</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>CANADA</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>INDONESIA</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>BRAZIL</td>
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<td>9.</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>MEXICO</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>RUSSIA</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>TURKEY</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>JAPAN</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>SOUTH KOREA</td>
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Source: IWF, Maddison 2007; IWF, September 2011
© Bertelsmann Stiftung

iscal pact was compiled also illustrates the limits of intergovernmental decision-making and what Angela Merkel calls the “Union method.” European economic government, which many believe to be a good idea, is not going to emerge in this manner. Not for the time being, at least.

An example of this is the following. The European Central Bank, which is certainly a federal institution, is reliant on the good intentions of the Member States and on voluntary undertakings of 25 actors (as the UK and the Czech Republic are currently not participants) that they will exert some kind of self-discipline. As part of their routine, actors meet one another, express their views and reach agreement. The new European economic governance architecture is a sign that people have seen sense. It is definitely an improvement. But from a decision-making point of view, oversight by means of voluntary commitments is simply an expression of weakness. You want to believe that States will adhere to their voluntary commitments, but you are distrustful, unsure if they possess the requisite courage of convictions to do so. Not yet, at any rate. The situation was suitably summed up by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas in 2011, when he said that “there is a growing feeling that the European treaties will have to be changed, but it is not quite clear what actually needs to be done.” (4) Proponents of the United States of Europe still have a long way to go.

III

It makes sense in a multi-polar 21st century

Half-hearted pragmatism tends to encourage concerns about “national identity” and “national sovereignty.” Some EU citizens cling to these concepts as if they were actually capable of providing security in times of turmoil and uncertainty (5). If one wants to convince people that such ideas are actually devoid of meaning, one will have to reiterate the reasons why greater European unity is a sensible political response in the context of multi-polar 21st century Europe and explain how such unity need to be organized in democratic terms. Many EU citizens and the vast majority of EU governments prefer not to dwell on the difficulties involved. They would have to forgo something in order to make Europe a success, and they would also
have to let go, in order to get a handle on things. People are slowly beginning to see that all this makes sense. Angela Merkel does, though she has spoken vaguely about it happening at some point in the future. Does Europe still have that much time?

Furthermore, half-hearted pragmatism fosters the financial markets’ mistrust. They sense that the intergovernmental method merely conceals a lack of willpower and a lack of resolve. Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff, who, together with his colleague Carmen Reinhart, has recently completed a study of the various financial crises that have taken place over the last eight hundred years, has issued this warning to Europeans: “the politicians who know what needs to be done say nothing because they are afraid of opposition from the electorate. But the pressure of the crisis may unleash a dynamism that we cannot imagine in our wildest dreams. In the end the United States of Europe may come about much faster than most people think.” As far as Rogoff is concerned, the monetary union urgently needs “a central government and a finance minister. This Minister must be entitled to levy a significant number of taxes and to spend money, as he sees fit.” This can, at best, only be a first stepping stone towards the United States of Europe. The establishment of such a polity would require more than a finance minister, even though he alone would no doubt enhance the Union’s economic clout. This in itself, would not necessarily reinforce the Union’s democratic foundations.

Having been transformed into the United States of Europe, the European Union would continue to be defined by a rich heritage and the diversity of its nations and regions. In this respect it would be quite different from the early days of the United States of America. And why not, one is tempted to ask, since federal structures such as those found in Austria, in Germany, in the United States and in Canada, are supposed to protect this kind of diversity. So it is not a question of “bigger is better” or “small is beautiful,” but of a sensible and democratic way of arranging the body politic. The United States of Europe will unite nations and citizens and act as an antidote against “centralist temptation.” Where necessary it will supersede nations; it will not abolish them. The United States of Europe will always supersede the nation States in areas where the European federal government of the future is assigned responsibility for common public goods and resources, ranging from the internal market to competition and from currency to infrastructure policy.

This means that there will be a division of competencies. From time to time, these will have to be reviewed and renegotiated by the Union and its Member States. Moreover, it may be possible to give a new lease of life to the old and lacklustre debate on European subsidiarity and to infuse this debate with new ideas. It will enable us to clarify where more Europe is needed and where less seems advisable, though this will have to be monitored on an ongoing basis, in order to remain abreast with new political developments.

A European Convention that meets at regular intervals and is made up of representatives from all EU Parliaments, governments and European institutions might be helpful. Every five years, it might for example, ask pertinent questions of the European Legislature, the European Parliament such as: what has been done with our public goods? And has this been of any use to our polity? Such a division of labour does not have to replicate any of the above-mentioned federal models. They are, after all, based on rather different kinds of federalism. And in the interests of transparency, European federalism should not make the present EU structures even more complex or convoluted. “How” this is achieved is the question that is going to lie at the heart of the debate. At any rate, one can only warn against the adoption of the German model or indeed against an increasingly complex EU federal structure, in view of the inherent weaknesses associated with both.

The national governments no longer have the power to make decisions about the public goods of the Union. Whenever they try to do so, by means of the intergovernmental method and even if it can be plausibly argued that something needs to be done very urgently, the subsequent question that then automatically arises is: who or what is going to exercise democratic control over their actions. Neither the German
Bundestag nor the French Assemblée nationale, for example, could exercise control over the financial conduct and debt related policies of the Greek and Italian governments. Moreover, the control exercised by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council, was to date, to no avail. It was much too weak and ineffective. This was the real reason why both the EU’s own citizens and the “markets” lost confidence in European policymaking.

In this precarious situation, the call for the United States of Europe could be useful for two reasons. It could strengthen democratic legitimacy and potentially improve the relationship between EU citizens and the government. It could also bring about faster decision-making routes, which at long last, will become comprehensible for all concerned. For this the Union does not need new institutions. What it needs are new rules and regulations that govern the relationship between power and authority, representation and participation. Complex, complicated and chaotic. That is how many Europeans see this unfinished and imperfect Union. The word “Brussels” is a way of expressing a state of enduring political alienation. In order to change this state of affairs, the existing institutions must be given the power to make complex decisions with the kind of clarity that EU citizens can understand. Who does what? And who is responsible for what? These are questions which now need to be answered. Trust no longer emanates from good intentions and resolutions about self-discipline. Here once again, we see the shortcomings of the unfinished and imperfect architecture of the European Union.

IV

Hamburg is not afraid of Bavaria

At any rate, the United States of Europe should not be a German project, for the simple reason that the geographical position and economic power of the most populous EU Member State, especially when it comes to the smaller countries, is to say almost all other States, can easily spark a backlash and awaken fears of hegemony, “Merkozy,” and a German-dominated governing body.

Such instinctive reactions will disappear only if there is a federal framework. That at least is something that can be learnt from the Federal Republic of Germany. Hamburg does not have to be afraid of Bavaria merely because the southern state has seven times as many inhabitants as the Free and Hanseatic City in the north. For this reason German politicians who are open-minded about integration must begin immediately to try to win over their neighbours. There are of course comrades-in-arms, not only in the Executive, but also in the national parliaments, and of course in the European Parliament, where the cross party- and cross regional Spinelli group, to name but one example, supports this strategy. In February 2012 the French employers’ association Medef came out in favour of the United States of Europe, supporting its’ endorsement of the United States of Europe with a number of interesting proposals (7). The debate will be a heated one. It also needs to be a European one. Once again we should see the opportunities and not only the obstacles. There is such a thing as a European public sphere, but it is multilingual and above all rather weak. And then there are the debates about the Europeanization of political parties, electoral law and lists and citizens’ initiatives. As then, only a few people are interested in these things, but this may change.

When it comes to passionate disputes, much can be learnt from the American constitutional debates that took place at the end of the eighteenth century. The historian Heinrich August Winkler has said of the United States of America that “in its early years the Union was not a firmly entrenched federal state, but a loose confederation.” When one reads this now, one rubs one’s eyes in disbelief. As the Americans tried to find the right way to shape their new polity, there were bitter disagreements and heated quarrels. As Winkler points out, the formation of a federal polity was the work of individual states which “continue to play a significant role in the Union.” The starting point for the European Union is rather different and in many ways far more favourable. Are EU citizens actually aware of this fact?
Citizens want to be sure

German advocates of the United States of Europe face a number of challenges in their own country. Its citizens want to be sure they are doing the right thing, for the goal can be attained only with the help of a large majority. The support of the media must also be secured, since the media forms part of the business of politics. Those who remember that virtually all of Germany’s leading media were totally opposed to the Treaty of Maastricht can now adopt a slightly more relaxed approach. Numerous editors have defended the euro. Political union does not frighten most leader writers. In fact, many of them find this hard to swallow, especially when certain individuals, who may well have a point when it comes to certain specific issues, go around pretending to be know alls.

And then there is another great challenge – the judges of the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. It is their stated wish and their bounden duty to protect Germany’s Basic Law (or Constitution) and democracy. According to constitutional judge Andreas Voßkuhle, Brussels is nothing more than an “expertocracy.” And as far as these judges are concerned, the European Parliament in Strasbourg is not a parliament. The ruling of the Second Senate issued on 30 June 2009 in relation to the Treaty of Lisbon, states that “the unification of Europe in the shape of a treaty-based union of sovereign states may not proceed in such a way that there is no longer sufficient room within Member States for the political organization of economic, cultural and social life.” With this a general caveat has been lodged by Germany, which placed future development of the Union under general suspicion. This can be used by High Court judges as and when they see fit. The judges of the Second Senate of the German Constitutional Court are not however anti-European. They simply do not understand the entity that is referred to as the EU. It goes without saying that they know the Preamble of the Basic Law, which expressly instructs the German people “to serve world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe.” This can certainly be construed as “permission” and perhaps even a mandate for the establishment of the United States of Europe. They are also familiar with Article 33 of the Basic Law, which states: “with a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights, essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law.” Yet the judges simply disregard these articles and arguments. They justify their ruling instead, referring to the concept of sovereignty, which is nowhere to be found in the Basic Law. In Germany the people are sovereign, not the State (8).

Now that all the large political parties in the German Parliament have come out in favour of a political union, and that one increasingly hears demands for the establishment of the United States of Europe, it seems that “at some point in the future” (as Merkel has put it) there is going to be a constitutional conflict. It is argued, that both sides probably know that this is the case and will make provisions accordingly. A situation, where the majority of the German Parliament and the German government want to take a decisive step towards a federal political union, but are prevented from doing so by appointed and non-elected judges, who hand down decisions based upon a one-sided interpretation of the facts, should not be tolerated. The appropriate democratic procedure would be to amend the Basic Law, which would make it impossible for judges to base their rulings on such interpretations.

How can demands for the establishment of the United States of Europe be formulated more precisely? The principal concepts are solidarity, security and strength. All three must be generated democratically and organized in an effective manner. All three will take pride of place in the debate, for which only a handful of principles will be defined.

European democracy needs to be strong. The national democracies, despite all of their differences, are already strong and that is something that the EU can be proud of. Indeed, it has a duty to ensure that none of its Member
States do anything which might be detrimental to what has been achieved in this area to date. This emanates from Article 2 TEU. In accordance with article 7 TEU, whenever the values of the Union are infringed upon, the EU is also responsible for democracy at the national level. With regard to European democracy, Merkel was quite right when she said that not a single institution needed to be re-invented on the federal level. However, the Commission and the European Parliament should be given the resources to enable EU citizens to see and experience European democracy at work, and above all to choose between different political alternatives.

The European economy needs to be solid. In the recent past the Member States have made it abundantly clear that they lack the requisite seriousness in this area. They are also simply not ambitious enough. An economy is in good shape if it keeps unemployment down and enhances its level of competitiveness. It is also more likely to be secure if it promotes a social market economy (as set out in the treaties), confronts the challenges brought about by global competition and mass natural resources consumption. These are familiar tasks that should have been tackled a long time ago. The Union will not be successful, particularly in a multi-polar global economy, if it is not placed on a secure footing.

There is no shortage of ideas in Europe. The fact of the matter is that they are not being implemented. Unfortunately the 27 fragmented national economic policies are simply not up to the job. An example of this is as follows. The EU 2020 strategy with its three goals of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth certainly makes sense. Its oversight by the EU Commission will continue however to be weak, as long as its competences are fragmented and divided between half a dozen Commissioners and their directorates-general. Those who wish to see the European Union succeed during the course of this decade see that the EU clearly needs (more) leadership. Fiscal, economic, competition and budgetary policy should be in the hands of one individual in Brussels, or, to put it more succinctly, in the hands of a truly European Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs. This is where Rogoff’s proposal that there should be a finance minister, who is empowered to levy a

![Trade before and after the crisis](source: International Trade Center, 2012 © Bertelsmann Stiftung)
significant number of taxes, comes into its own. “No taxation without representation” was a slogan that was bandied about in the early years of the United States of America. In the European Union the opposite would seem to be true, i.e. representation without taxation. Unlike its Member States, the Union is not permitted to incur debt and is as a result, debt-free. Those who wish to transform the EU into the United States of Europe do not have to change this, but they will need more financial resources, than are currently available.

The co-existence of half a billion people must be based on the kind of solidarity alluded to in Article 3 paragraph 3 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which stipulates that the Union “shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion” and “solidarity among Member States.” The term solidarity has been an integral part of European thought for centuries. This is what the French Revolution called fraternité, and what Christianity is referring to, when it states that human beings are brothers and sisters. Since the Treaties of Rome solidarity has been a key concept in the European treaties. There is evidently a lack of solidarity, in cases where agreements are broken for reasons of self-interest. In a genuine union, this cannot go unpunished. No matter what the punishment is, it will inevitably involve rules and regulations as well as money. The current debate on this subject ranges from a temporary loss of voting rights to the cancellation of subsidies.

The EU is an internal market for capital and goods and to a lesser extent for labour. The Erasmus Programme has made it easy for a whole generation of students to move freely within this market. However, as soon as a student has found a job, the obstacles being to surface and as (s)he moves around within the internal market, (s)he is confronted with 27 different and fragmented labour markets (9). Proposals relating to the European Social Area, a by-product of the internal market and a concrete manifestation of the much-vaunted European social market economy, have in the past tended to be a source of anxiety. Yet whether it wishes to do so or not, the Union will have to concern itself with issues such as vocational training, qualification criteria, social protection and the pension arrangements of Member States. The recent economic governance reforms have certain social ramifications, especially when wage share ratio, pensionable age and employment levels among the Youth, older persons and women are to be explained by means of common yardsticks. This will have to be configured in social terms, that is to say politically negotiated to include all participants. Such experiences will nudge the Union closer in the direction of the United States of Europe. However, the guiding principle must be convergence and not harmonization. Those who talk about economic government cannot be allowed to forget about Social Europe. Those who want to strengthen the polity as a whole must also strengthen the competitiveness of the Member States.

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VI

Is it a transfer union? No. It is a transformation union!

The forthcoming Union will continue to be a transfer union, though at a reasonable level. The experience of the German fiscal equalization scheme, in which the weak states merely receive assistance from the strong, suggests that it would be better to adopt a different system, at the European level. Every transfer union should contribute to the transformation union, helping to shape change both in Europe (and that includes demographic factors) and further afield. A number of ideas have already been discussed to this end, although experts (and politicians) will have to do more to make them more widely known. The goal was defined by the Union a long time ago. It must now be given the means with which to attain same.

Article 3, paragraph 3 of the consolidated Treaties of the EU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon states: “The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy aiming at full employment and social progress and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scien-
tific and technological advance. It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion and solidarity among Member States. It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”

These seem to be the beliefs and values which hold Europe and Europeans together. It would indeed be good if they continued to be honed and enhanced further. European instruments and institutions are far too weak for this.

A lack of democratic control is far more serious than a lack of (economic) policy efficiency. Article 121 TFEU contains a glaring example of this: “The Council shall, on a recommendation from the Commission, formulate a draft for the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union and shall report its findings to the European Council. The European Council shall, acting on the basis of the report from the Council, discuss a conclusion on the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the Member States and of the Union. On the basis of this conclusion, the Council shall adopt a recommendation setting out these broad guidelines. The Council shall inform the European Parliament of its recommendation.” The national parliaments are not even mentioned. And the prerequisite to “inform” saves one the trouble of putting the matter to a vote. This can hardly be called democratic control.

Effectiveness and control are the two main tasks facing the Union, which considers the European economy to be a common good and its policymaking as common democratic practice. So far, the EU has failed to do either of these things, fuelling feelings of mistrust and scepticism among ordinary citizens.

More cannot be achieved with the existing polity. The European Union is tethering at the United States of Europe threshold. If it dithers, it will have to pay a steep price for its indecision. On the other hand, taking the next step forward should of course, not be entered into lightly. But it needs to be done and it needs to be done now with solidarity, security and strength as its stated goals. For this reason, every democratic debate is worth having.
Since 2009 the Bertelsmann Stiftung has supported the idea of establishing the United States of Europe. However, the philosopher Hermann Lübbe and the former Constitutional Court judge Paul Kirchhof reject these proposals. See:

2
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/bundeskanzlerin-gibt-interview-zur-europapolitik-merkel-will-europas-wirtschaft-ankurbeln-1.1266583

3
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,782879,00.html
and:

Habermas is in favour of a transnational democracy and against the model provided by the United States. It is not entirely clear why this should constitute an obstacle when it comes to setting up a “cosmopolitan (community) of states and global citizens.”

A Zeit-Online survey conducted in September 2011 revealed that 44 percent of French interviewees, 35 percent of German interviewees and 13 percent of British interviewees believe that the United States of Europe is a suitable model “in the long term.”

Collignon provides updates on his intriguing republican alternative to the United States of Europe. Both approaches want to develop the Union in democratic terms (as do Franzius and Preuß). The differences cannot be discussed here.

In February Italian prime minister Mario Monti and French MEP Sylvie Goulard stated in Le Monde and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that they want more democracy in Europe “on all levels,” without (or perhaps already?) advocating in favour of the United States of Europe, though maybe not stating as much in so many words.

Hans-Gert Pöttering, the former Speaker of the European Parliament and current Chairman of the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 February 2012, p. 8.

These arguments have been advanced by Medef, the French employers’ union. See:
www.besoindaire.com/pdf.html
Further Reading:


Claudio Franzius/Ulrich K. Preuß: Die Zukunft der Europäischen Demokratie. Heinrich Böll Stiftung. 2012. The authors wish to promote the cause of democracy on the basis of the Treaty of Lisbon.

Jürgen Habermas: Zur Verfassung Europas, Frankfurt am Main 2011, p.7.

Interview with Kenneth Rogoff, Der Spiegel, 8/2012. p.81.


Joachim Fritz-Vannahme: Europas neue Story, Spotlight Europe, April 2009. This led to a debate at the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, the results of which were later published under the title Solidarität und Stärke – Zur Zukunft der Europäischen Union. See also: http://www.boell.de/internationalepolitik/europatransatlantik/europa-transatlantik-dossier-zukunft-der-eu-13073.html

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Long live the United States of Europe

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