

TWENTY-SECOND JOINT MEETING

of the Members of

THE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

and the Members of


THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

(LUXEMBOURG, 14 SEPTEMBER 1976)



OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

LUXEMBOURG



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NOTE

This edition contains the original texts of the English speeches and translations of those delivered in other languages.

The latter are denoted by letters as follows :

(*D*) = speech delivered in German.

(*F*) = speech delivered in French.

(*I*) = speech delivered in Italian.

(*NL*) = speech delivered in Dutch.

The original texts of these speeches will be found in the separate editions which are published for each language.

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MEETING OF TUESDAY,
14 SEPTEMBER 1976

IN THE CHAIR : MR SPÉNALE
President of the European Parliament

(The meeting opened at 10.10 a.m.)

1. Opening of the Joint Meeting

Chairman. — Ladies and gentlemen, I declare open the 22nd Joint Meeting of Members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and of the European Parliament.

I extend a very special welcome to our colleagues from the Strasbourg Assembly, who have agreed on this occasion to leave their usual meeting place. This is in fact the first time that the Joint Meeting has been held here in Luxembourg and it is also probably the first time that the Council of Europe, on whose premises we so often meet in Strasbourg, is the guest of the European Parliament.

I wish to thank Mr Czernetz and his colleagues for having accepted that this Joint Meeting should be held in our building,

and on behalf of my colleagues in the European Parliament I welcome them and all the members of the Council of Europe.

I also wish to greet Sir Christopher Soames, who will report on the deliberations of the Commission of the Communities on the subject which we are now to discuss.

The theme of our meeting is European responsibilities in the world. It was chosen by the common consent of the two rapporteurs, Mr Vedovato and Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, in accordance with the procedure agreed by the Bureaux of our two Assemblies.

I should like to offer the two rapporteurs our warmest thanks for the excellent work they have performed in preparing papers which, while reflecting their personal points of view, provide all the necessary material for thorough discussion. Mr Vedovato rightly reminded us in his working document of the great importance of international solidarity in the worldwide reorganization of North-South relations, urging the need for joint European action in this field.

Sir Geoffrey analysed the same problem in the light of the achievements of the European Communities, stressing, among other things, the role of the democratic European assemblies in the development of our relations with other continents. Thanks to the quality of this preparatory work, I am certain that we shall be able to hold a fruitful and constructive discussion.

I would ask those members who wish to speak to have their names entered on the list of speakers.

It is customary in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and in the European Parliament to limit speaking time to ten minutes, except for rapporteurs and group spokesmen, who are normally allowed fifteen minutes. I think it would be desirable to adopt the same rule at this meeting.

There are no objections ? Then that is agreed.

2. Welcoming of various personalities

Chairman. — Before opening the debate, I wish to greet a delegation from the Canadian Parliament led by Senator Georges and Mr John Robers, of the House of Commons, who are in the visitors' gallery. On behalf of you all, I extend a hearty welcome to them and thank them for taking an interest in our work and for coming to hear us.

(Applause)

3. European responsibilities in the world

Chairman. — I call Mr Vedovato to present his working paper.

Mr Vedovato, rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. — (I) Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, at this 22nd Joint Meeting between the members of the two European parliamentary assemblies we see Free Europe at a parting of the ways. A choice has to be made between, on the one side, the acceptance of fatally deepening divisions, of a bi-polarity which is daily revealing its great dangers, and, on the other, the creation of genuine unity, admittedly gradual but above all political. Political unity alone can afford us any prospect of genuine guarantees for peace, progress and stability in the international community.

In the working paper submitted to this assembly for examination and debate in the name of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, I have tried to bring out the most important aspects of the question of 'European responsibilities in the world'. I am deeply convinced that political unity is the essential condition for making Europe's international role effective. I am also convinced that Brussels

and Strasbourg must seek a pragmatic method of work which shall overcome the difficulties of organizational structures and institutionalized nationalism. There is no doubt that Europe must provide for herself a political system based on the popular will of her member nations. The fact is that Brussels is no longer enough on its own when Europe is confronted with the international community and its immense problems, the Third World, the underdeveloped countries and also the Communist East. It is here that Strasbourg must be given an active part of its own, which it may well play in an extremely flexible manner, though always in a sincere spirit of constructive cooperation.

In connection with unity and a European role, I have also drawn attention to the Mediterranean. For a number of obvious reasons Europe is politically weak today. It is not always recognized that one of the reasons for the weakness is the lack of a concerted policy not only towards the nations on the shores of the Mediterranean but also towards those that are arising between the Indian and Atlantic oceans.

History, geography and now, in addition, oil and the problems of coexistence between the various States and nations from the Persian Gulf to Suez provide us with a constant lesson which is all too often forgotten. Throughout the history of our common civilization, the Eastern and Western Mediterranean have together guaranteed peace and civilized progress in Europe. And the peoples between the Indian and Atlantic oceans want to remain faithful to that civilization, which must be the basis for any European policy of no matter what kind. Indeed, I would say that this common civilization has a permanent part to play precisely because it is a universal one, founded as it is on the rights of man and the human spirit.

I should like to close my introduction to the debate by emphasizing that it is above all in the recognition of these values and these principles that Europe must find her unity, so that she may then project her personality abroad in favour of peace and progress : in the first place together with her allies

and friendly peoples near and far, and subsequently, indeed, with her present enemies.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Sir Geoffrey de Freitas to present his working paper.

Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, rapporteur of the European Parliament.—Mr President, it is a great pleasure for me to welcome our friends from the Council of Europe and particularly President Vedovato. I have had the experience of presiding in Strasbourg with President Poher over joint meetings, but I have never before had the experience of being a rapporteur at a joint meeting. Of course my role is not really a rapporteur's role, because in the two weeks after the Bureau asked me to be rapporteur of the appropriate committees of our Parliament met and therefore there could be no preliminary discussion; so my report is a working document and a personal one. And, of course, you have the problem too that we had to translate everything into five other languages during the holiday period of August. However, here it is—my report—and I want to pick out one or two of the points in it which I think will be best calculated to provoke debate.

My theme is that the world is increasingly interdependent; that world factors increasingly shape our lives; that what we do in Europe has a great effect on economics and politics all over the world and Europe must therefore play a more positive role in world affairs; and that to do this we must develop a coherent European approach on the great issues that face us.

Since the war, our chief concern has been rebuilding Europe and, more recently, adopting social policies to alleviate poverty. We haven't finished that job at all. There are groups who are not as well placed as others; there are regions which are not as well placed as others—we know that, just as we know that there are many Europeans who are still poor; but whereas Europe's primary concern has so far been internal,

that is no longer possible. We have done a lot for other countries, but we did it rather in the sense of looking out at these other countries. In future we must regard ourselves as being part of the world—we're inside it and so are they. We are going to be faced with more and more problems of the kind which in the past we were able to leave to other, particularly to the United States of America.

What should we do to make it possible to play this more active role? The problems are immense. Let us consider first of all the Atlantic partnership. An immediate need is for Europe to speak with one voice in its relations with Canada and the United States of America. There are two main reasons for this: the first is the relative decline—I don't want to dramatize this too much—of the United States in the world power balance; and the second is the immediate economic need for the developed Western countries to agree on economic and monetary cooperation. It is beginning to look as though the recent recession is not one black spot in thirty years of unceasing growth but the first blast of what may turn out to be a new economic Ice Age. Predictions of the growth of world trade are not nearly as encouraging as they were a few years ago. The outlook for the world economy is indeed uncertain. We got through the recession of 1975 without too much damage, but we may not be so lucky next time.

Now it is easy to establish close relations with parliamentarians from the democratic countries of Europe or North America, because we have the same parliamentary system, and it is also possible to look out to other such countries, and I mention just four—Australia, Israel, Japan and New Zealand—but there are not many more outside Europe and North America. It is not only, then, institutions and the rule of law which enable us to work with other people: we must consider geography and world power.

Taking geography, it is obvious that Europe and the Mediterranean are linked, and I am very glad that President Vedovato dealt so fully with the Mediterranean. It is only

recently that the Community began a policy of looking at the European Mediterranean.

The first phase was, of course, the agreements with Turkey and Greece, with the thought that they would eventually join the Community ; but, as I say in my report, the crucial question of extending the European Community has not been thoroughly thought out by our governments and the problems arising from Greek membership are immense—the future relations between Greece and Turkey, the poverty of Greece, and even the working arrangements of our institutions, not least our own Parliament. However, the European Communities can be a great force for stability in the Mediterranean, and Greece, like Portugal and Spain, has an interest in maintaining stability and democracy if she is to develop her relations with the Community.

I think it is right to say that the other part of Europe, the Eastern bloc, is also geographically linked with us. It is only very recently that we began to open relations with the Comecon countries, and I wish I could be quite as optimistic as Mr Vedovato is in his report in believing that relations between the East and West could be developed in such a way as to benefit the South—certainly I hope that it will be possible. After all, we should do more : we agreed at Helsinki that the two parts of Europe should work together with greater cooperation. There are enough genuine obstacles put up by the Soviet Union without any of us falling back on the old traditional temptation to distrust Russia. It was pointed out to me not long ago that, at the Congress of Vienna over 150 years ago, when a Russian delegate died during the night a British diplomat was heard to say : 'Died, did he ? I wonder what his motive was'.

One of the most important developments in our external relations is, of course, the dialogue with the Arab countries. This dialogue, which arises from the recognition by the Community of the importance of Arab oil and of the immense wealth concentrated in their hands, can prove a means of

establishing a triangular cooperation harnessing European technology to Arab oil and wealth for our mutual benefit and also to meet the needs of the developing world. It is also an attempt to come to an understanding with the Arab world, which is now such a powerful economic force.

As to the developing countries, to which I frequently refer in my working paper, we have done a great deal for them and we have done it on the whole altruistically, certainly without hope of immediate return. The reason I dwell on this subject is that I believe it is one of the major problems of our time ; it is also one which has involved me personally for most of the last thirty years—in the United Nations, in Africa and in the British Parliament. What is the Community doing ? There is, of course, the Lomé Convention—a very important step. There are attempts to help the non-associated countries with aid of various kinds. The Community also has a system of generalized preferences which are more advanced and more generous than those of any other trading group, and the suggested improvements for 1977 represent a dramatic increase in both volume and value. Nevertheless, the gap between the very poor and rich countries continues to grow, so what are we going to do ? First, we must, I suggest, increase development aid. The United Nations objective, which we accepted, is 0.7% of the GNP for official development assistance. Of all the countries represented here, Sweden comes top with 0.8%, and of the nine countries of the Community only the Netherlands has reached this figure. I am convinced that although the problems in our various countries are extremely grave—unemployment, inflation, balance of payments, regional problems and so on—we are so much better off than the developing countries that delay in reaching the target—a target we agreed upon—will be regarded by history as unforgivable.

Besides increasing development aid, we must heed the developing world's demand for some coherent commodity strategy. Then we must make a determined attempt to solve the debt problem. Finally, we must present ourselves at international conferences as a coherent unit. The Third-World

countries are thoroughly confused by the different opinions which come from Europeans at international meetings.

I have time only to refer briefly to the philosophy of using the power and influence of our European civilization. I have no time to develop this, I hope that Sir Christopher Soames, who has spoken on this before, will be able to take this up.

May I summarize what I ask for ?

It is : the development of the Atlantic partnership ; greater commitment to the European Mediterranean ; greater recognition of the power of Arab oil and the need for closer relations with the Arab countries ; the improvement of political and trade relations with the Eastern bloc ; the development of a coherent European policy towards the Third World ; greater readiness to speak up for the philosophical ideas for which Europe stands. We may differ, and I am sure we do, on how Europe must meet her responsibilities in the world ; but I am sure we all agree that the time has come for Europe to meet her responsibilities towards herself and the world outside. I regard this debate primarily as a debate on how Europe is to meet her responsibilities.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Sir Christopher Soames.

Sir Christopher Soames, Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities.—Mr Chairman, in his admirable report on behalf of the European Parliament, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas remarks that the history of Europe is one of diversity and individuality and President Vedovato, in his equally interesting report on behalf of the Council of Europe, makes, in a different language, much the same point. One form which this diversity of our continent has taken can be seen in the variety of our efforts to develop living organizations of unity in Europe—for instance, the two bodies whose representatives

are meeting today, the Council of Europe and the European Community. Another reflection can be found in the variety of approaches which the countries of Europe adopt in their relations with the world outside.

Now, obviously, if European integration is to become a reality, we must find ways of reconciling this variety and distinctiveness of our national approaches with the concepts of European unity and common action. Hence the importance of the contacts between the Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, which is why, Mr Chairman, I am so happy to be here taking part in your meeting today and grateful to have been invited. But, although the paths to European unity may be the more difficult because of the obstinate tenacity of our particular national traditions, let us never forget that a large part of Europe's strength lies in her characteristic diversity and individuality to which your rapporteurs refer. As much in our efforts to develop a united European policy towards the outside world as in our efforts to develop a deeper unity within Europe, we must build up our strength on the basis of our diversity, of the diversity of our historical experiences and of our interests, and not against it.

In the case of the European Community, for whose external relations I have some responsibility, some may assume that all we have to do to fulfil our responsibilities and pursue our joint interests in the world is to find a shared understanding of Europe's place in world affairs and then to find words to express them—rhetoric, in fact—but they would be wrong. We cannot make progress together towards common external policies which will genuinely project and protect the external interests of our Member States and our peoples merely by thinking about it or talking about it. We can only do it by living through it and by finding and applying common solutions to the challenges which are constantly confronting us.

The fact is that the European Community's external policies, like those of the States of which she is composed, are

in part a function of her interests, in part a function of the political and social values of her peoples, and in part a reflection of the external pressures under which she must operate and of the international environment within which we must live. Now, each of these three elements—our interests, our values, our external environment—is to some extent determined by the situation in which Europe finds herself and, although each of them may be influenced in some degree by our deliberate choice, none of them is entirely the subject of our free will. And so, while a successful foreign policy might be defined as a policy by which choice is made to prevail over circumstance, let us be under no illusion that our task can be reduced simply to that of formulating a grand design for Europe's external relations.

Building is more than a matter of architecture, it is also a matter of making skilful use of the materials that we have to hand. And, if I may start with the first of the elements that go to make up the Community's external relations, what are the Community's major interests within the sphere of its present competence? In commercial and economic matters, the interests of the Community are rooted in the structure of its economy. This means, more precisely, that we are condemned to be dependent upon international trade, for we have such a unique economy. The facts speak clearly. One is that our ratio of foreign trade to GNP is twice what it is in the United States, for instance, and three times what it is in Soviet Russia. Another is that trade with the developing countries accounts for no less than 40% of our total trade, being divided between the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and South-East Asia in such a way that no one of these regions stands out as a pre-eminent trading partner for the Community.

At the same time, the pattern of international economic interdependence in which we are involved, inevitably, is one which embraces the whole world. While we do half our trade with the other advanced industrial open-market economies, a significant and growing proportion of our imports of raw materials and our exports of manufactured goods is done with

the State-trading countries. And it is facts such as these which impose upon the Community a strong interest in the maintenance of an open world economy and the further liberalization of international trade.

The Community's approach to trade expansion contains two elements : the preferential element and the global element. There is no need for me to explain to representatives of the Council of Europe why we have preferential relations with Mediterranean countries and with the countries of the Free Trade Area—all the reasons underline the Lomé Convention. But these bilateral links must be seen in the perspective of the Community's wider interest in the global and multilateral approach to the expansion of international trade, as demonstrated, for example, by our comparatively low external tariff, by our sponsorship of the multilateral trade negotiations now going on in Geneva, and by our generalized scheme of preferences for developing countries. Thus do we pursue one of our crucial interests, which is trade expansion. Another is the economic development of the Third World, in which the Community, for a variety of reasons, not only has a special interest but also a very special contribution to make.

So, these are but two examples of the interests which shape the Community's external policies. What, now, of the values which inspire them ? Just as our interests are rooted in the structure of our economy, so our values spring from the character of Europe's political society. Their essence is our commitment to the concepts of pluralist democracy, and our engagement in a dialogue with the other great civilizations and cultures of the world. Our attachment to the concept of liberal and social democracy is the most fundamental determinant of the Community's attitude to the continuing division between East and West. Europe's close ties with the United States and the other industrial societies of the open-economy world are more than a matter of coincident economic interests. We are bound together by shared values, and these bonds are, to quote Burke, 'light as air but strong as iron'.

At the same time and by the same token, there is inevitably something of a gulf between a society like ours in Western Europe, based upon the values of pluralism, social reconciliation, representative government, the rule of law and the responsible State, and societies organized around dictatorships of all kinds.

I think that the last thing we should ever seek is for our Community to act as a kind of global policeman, nor do I think that we should pose as the moral conscience of mankind, but there is undoubtedly a sense in which the destiny of the values upon which our way of life depends is bound up with their fate elsewhere in this increasingly closeknit and interdependent world. And the ideals for which we stand are not ours alone. Over centuries past they have made an imperishable contribution to human progress, and we in our time have the duty to see that they can continue to develop in strength and in freedom. That is why the Community has responded as it has done to claims made upon us by the reestablished democracies in Greece and in Portugal, who share a common interest and a common destiny with us. That is why the Community will respond in the same fashion to the claims of Spain, if and when that country at last firmly set on the path of pluralist democracy.

But this said, it is surely also true that it is neither desirable, not in our interests, that a rigid separation be maintained between the countries of Western Europe and those to the East. We should hope that warmer and progressively more extensive relations with the countries of Eastern Europe should cause tensions to be reduced, should help to weave a beneficial network of reciprocal interdependencies between our societies and should foster the historical evolution of the Eastern countries away from the monolithic structures of the immediate post-war period.

So much then for the way, as I see it, that our interests and values guide the external policy of the Community. But what of the third element, the external influences which press

in upon us and the international environment with which we must come to terms? Indeed, both the Community and the Council of Europe were brought into existence largely because they were needed if we in Western Europe were to respond successfully to the challenges of sustaining our independence and freedom of action against the Russian super-power and of preserving and developing Europe's distinct identity within the comity of Western societies. We see that these challenges are with us still and that they will continue to shape our approach to external policy for many years to come. And added to them there is now a third challenge: that of adjusting to the material growth and rising aspirations of the countries of the Third World.

The fact is that the movement of events in the world outside Europe is increasingly imposing upon us the obligation to give form and substance to Europe's international personality. The Community is proving to be, whether we like it or not, a powerful new pole of attraction in world affairs. We may still find it difficult, through lack of development, to initiate policies, but there is no doubt about the pressures we are under to find policies in response to the interest which the Community arouses in the world outside. Countries all over the world are looking to us, some with hope, some with some trepidation, to define our relationships with them. Some have been seeking closer commercial cooperation, whether it be India and the other countries of that subcontinent, or the countries of South-East Asia, or Mexico and other countries of Latin America. Others, such as Canada and Iran, are seeking a relationship of a wider economic character. China has begun to open up a connection with the Community which both hope to see possessing a profound geo-political significance.

And now, after years of cold-shouldering and ignoring the Community, the Comecon countries have begun to respond to our desire for a more normal relationship between us.

In modern circumstances, it is only by acting together that the States and peoples of the Community can hope effec-

tively to meet the demands placed upon them by the outside world. But if the Community is to operate successfully in the field of external policy, as in every other field of policy, our governments and our peoples will have to comprehend the realities of their situation and set about their task with the necessary will. This is, of course, a political will. It is the will to enable Europe to find her strength and to exert it. The people will have to be involved and this, above all, is where the importance of direct elections to the European Parliament comes out—that is to say, in its capacity to engage the imagination and the interest of the citizenry of the Community.

But at this stage in the development of the Community, with its limited institutional powers, the primary responsibility for its future rests upon the governments of its Member States. They must recognize the limits of their capacity to master their problems by acting separately, and accept that European solutions can work only if they are prepared to act together to make them work. The European interest can prevail only when our governments are prepared to take proper account of it in arriving at their national decisions. And although some progress has been made in political cooperation and its machinery, who would not agree that Europe has had too many missed opportunities, too many muffed chances ?

Each of our countries has its own tradition of foreign policy, a tradition which is the compound expression of its national history and culture and of a continuous re-assessment of enduring national interests amid the flux of world events. What we have to do is to press beyond the limits set by national approaches. The foreign policy of a united Europe must gradually take shape according to its own tradition. And although this tradition will be moulded by the same considerations which have shaped our national policies, it must inevitably reflect a synthesis of the historic elements and abiding interests that go to make up our Community. Indeed, it will have to be more than a synthesis, it must be something quite new and different, reflecting the emergence of a quite

new and different factor—the European factor—on the world scene.

The great variety of traditions from Europe's past will have to find their place in the pattern of the external relations of our young Community. But they are not going to do so in the forms that they previously took, nor can they continue to be defined exclusively by one or other national connection. For we are being challenged to fresh creativity, as new subjects take their place on the agenda of international relations, as new preoccupations emerge and as new instruments of international policy are forged.

Within the Community, in the progressive interweaving of political cooperation and Community action, we are already giving proof of the kind of creativity that is needed. But we have a long way yet to go in our governments' admitting that in these great issues the long-term national interest is one and the same as the long-term Community interest. For our job, surely, is to secure for our continent the greatest possible degree of independence in what is essentially an interdependent world. And we must measure our success, ladies and gentlemen, not by what we think we can do but by what we know we must do.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I thank Sir Christopher Soames for his important contribution to our debate.

I call Mr Artzinger to speak on behalf of the Christian-Democratic Group.

Mr Artzinger. — *(D)* Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, my first remark is one of principle. Our topic today is European responsibilities in the world ; but responsibility can exist only where there is a possibility of change, where whatever is unsatisfactory can be changed for the better.

With the world as it is today, Europe does not have unlimited possibilities as regards change. To that extent, I am glad to read in Mr Vedovato's excellent report that he found this topic daunting. We simply cannot, in fact, talk today of Europe's responsibilities in the world as though they were unlimited, and we realize that, if we are to change unsatisfactory conditions, we need the help of others and especially of those primarily concerned. This does not, however, absolve us of our responsibility : it is a limiting factor, certainly, but the responsibility remains.

On behalf of my group, I therefore welcome this meeting of the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. We are hoping, Mr Chairman, that closer ties will perhaps soon be established between the political groups, for while this topic concerns Europe, it is certainly not just the Europe of the European Community that is meant, not just the Nine, but *at least* the Nineteen. Perhaps the circle should be widened still further, but in any case the Nineteen belong to Europe just as much as the Nine.

Now, Europe's responsibilities in the world clearly cover many fields : the political field, the social, the economic and also the cultural field. We shall not be able to do justice to all these in the space of this short discussion. I shall therefore confine myself to one aspect : the new world economic order.

The reason is that we in the Christian-Democratic Group of the European Parliament have discussed this question repeatedly. I therefore feel I can speak on my colleagues' behalf, too. The subject was discussed in great detail at the UNCTAD IV Conference in May of this year, and I am very grateful to our colleague, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, for his very clear account of relations with developing countries in the third chapter of his excellent report.

A remark about this before I continue : we approve of development aid, of course, if only because we agree with the

words of the Papal Encyclical *Populorum progressio*. Development is the new name for peace. If we want peace, we must say yes to development, and development policy.

On the other hand, we cannot but acknowledge that, with the Third and Fourth Worlds' demands for a new world economic order, developments may sometimes occur which we are unable, owing to the responsibility we have towards our own peoples, to accept unreservedly. Sacrifices will inevitably be demanded of our peoples—for instance, in the implementation of the integrated commodity strategy which has just been accepted in principle in Nairobi—and I can see no way of evading this ; in other words, anything we wish to transfer to the developing countries must be deducted from our own revenue. In the countries of Europe this will lead to an intensification of the dispute over how the burden is to be shared—although I am of the opinion that, before taking any definitive steps, we should explain clearly to management and labour at home what exactly is being done abroad.

I believe that we should not quarrel over principles. It is not a question of choosing between a free world economy and a controlled world economy. There is no overlooking the fact that the so-called free economy has been very heavily indebted to the developing countries for decades. In the course of the century the prices paid to the developing countries for their exports have undeniably fallen. Apart from occasional rises, those prices have gone steadily down, so that the 'terms of trade' between developed and developing countries have deteriorated almost continuously to the detriment of the latter : is it any wonder, therefore, that the developing countries will not accept this kind of world economy ?

Perhaps it may—and we hope it will—be possible to build on the Stabex scheme for the stabilization of export earnings, embodied in the Lomé Convention, although, of course, very much more is being demanded under the integrated commodity strategy than Stabex can offer. Nonetheless, an attempt should

be made to incorporate some of the very reasonable rules of the Stabex scheme into this integrated commodity strategy.

I said that we should not quarrel over principles. But we may rightly take exception to an attitude on the part of the developing countries which is gaining ground. When I read the Declaration of Manila, for example, or the latest Declaration of Colombo, it seems to me that the revenue of the developed world is disposed of somewhat too casually in those texts. Mention is made of an automatic transfer of resources which we, ladies and gentlemen, simply cannot afford. We must set certain limits and, above all, to my mind, we should reject this idea that the prosperity of the developed countries has been amassed at the expense of the developing nations. I agree that the history of past centuries, colonial history, that is to say, is a tangle of liability and guilt, but this is something that cannot be undone now; in my view, we should refrain from oversimplifying the issue and holding the present generation and the future generations of the developed countries responsible for the wrongs that earlier generations may have perpetrated. I therefore consider that it would be neither right nor wise for this assembly or any other to issue any counter-declaration to those of Nairobi, Colombo or Manila. It is practical decisions, not declarations, that are needed.

Those decisions however, must be made jointly by the developed countries in Europe and elsewhere; for that reason I am grateful to Sir Christopher Soames for the appeal he has just launched to the countries of Europe to show solidarity in these matters, too. I am glad that the report by Mr Leo Tindemans contains a very comprehensive and thought-provoking chapter on relations between a united Europe and the Third and Fourth Worlds. I think we should take his advice and make a determined and courageous attempt to reach a consensus on these matters.

I realize that the interests involved—as Sir Christopher said—are not necessarily coincident, but our situation, which does leave some freedom of manoeuvre, ought to allow us to

adopt a common attitude which will enable limited but definite progress to be made in our relations with the Third and Fourth Worlds.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Mr Ilhan.

Mr Ilhan. — (D) Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I wish to congratulate the two rapporteurs, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas and Mr Vedovato, for having touched on nearly all the problems of the world in their reports. Economically, politically, technically and culturally, Europe is stronger than ever. Only, it is not yet sufficiently united to channel this strength in a definitive direction. As the Belgian Prime Minister, Mr Tindemans, said in his report, it is especially in the foreign policies and defence policies of the European countries that divergencies exist. All those countries must unite in order to be able to act in unison. The idea of a European union started with Victor Hugo, but it did not come alive until after the second world war.

Expressing agreement with Mr Tindemans on the matter of European union, the Federal German Chancellor said in Paris, on 22 April 1975, that anyone who earnestly desires European union is aware that it needs a clear constitution as a basis for joint defence.

How long shall we go on expecting America to defend us? Can we say for certain today that no changes will be made in American foreign policy towards Europe in the next 15 or 20 years? Even the Americans themselves cannot always determine today what their policy will be tomorrow.

In an article in the journal *Les problèmes de l'Europe*, Alfred Frisch maintains that relations between Europe and the United States no longer depend on the Europeans but on the American Congress, and that this applies to defence as well. In this regard, he believes, the future American President,

whoever he be, could well spring some unpleasant surprises on those European traditionalists who aspire to unity but are not prepared to accept world-wide responsibility.

A Europe which cannot guarantee its own defence cannot really assume any responsibility for the world. From the economic, technical and cultural viewpoints, Europe does not lag behind the Soviet Union ; what is more, Europe is ahead of Russia where national revenue is concerned.

It is quite natural that problems and disagreements should arise even among European countries. We should regard such disputes as characteristic of a free, democratic system and as a sign that the community in which they occur is sound and healthy. Naturally, the altercations of its members should not go so far as to lead to war. Because it is not the interests of individual countries, but those of a Community, that are at stake, the members of that Community should show even greater caution than previously. In settling conflicts, it is essential to avoid emotion and prejudice, and be guided by sound common sense. Right, justice and objectivity should be our watchwords when judging Community problems.

A word now about the Euro-Arab dialogue. Europeans made no attempt to engage in discussion with the Arabs until after the oil-crisis. Israel was the greatest obstacle in this regard. As the Arabs wanted to obtain political concessions *vis-à-vis* Israel, the EEC countries chose to talk about economic problems. Various problems were discussed. The talks are still going on. In October, a conference is to take place in Tunisia in this connection, and the outcome may well be very important for both sides. If the Euro-Arab dialogue were to conclude favourably for both sides, this would help to alter the political situation in the Middle East to the advantage of the Western powers.

It is no secret that the more influence the Soviet Union loses—and hence political ground also—the easier it becomes for the EEC to negotiate with the Arab States.

Much has been said and written about the applicability of the Helsinki resolutions. Some people consider them a triumph for the countries of the Eastern bloc. I take the view that it is better for Western Europe to maintain as close relations as possible with the Eastern bloc. Such negotiations will not be detrimental to us ; on the contrary, they will be beneficial.

The dialogue instituted between the EEC and Comecon in the last few years is to be welcomed. I believe it will benefit both sides considerably.

Since the Cold War between Russia and the People's Republic of China began, China has constantly been seeking a *rapprochement* with the countries of Europe. It is China's wish that Europe should become a strong power, capable of holding its own with the Soviet Union and America. It is therefore trying by every means to guide Europe in that direction. In recent years political and economic relations between China and the countries of Europe have greatly improved, and will probably improve still further as time goes by.

Now that Mao is dead, we shall have to wait some weeks or months before we know the political course that China will take.

In paragraph 12 of his report, Mr Vedovato discusses Cyprus. From the start we have held that the Cyprus problem must be dealt with jointly by the two communities concerned, without any outside interference. We have said repeatedly that we are prepared to accept this, and so we still are. Unfortunately, the Cypriots of Greek origin wish to bring the problem into the international arena instead of negotiating directly. The election results, too, have shown that the winners are those who wish to delay the settlement of the Cyprus problem for a long time.

The experience of two years has shown that this is no solution. It will help neither the Greek nor the Turkish Cypriots.

Moreover, the general situation in the Mediterranean is deteriorating as a result and this is doing harm to European solidarity.

One further word : the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr Kurt Waldheim, recently called the representatives of both communities to America : it is to be hoped that the dialogue between the two population groups, which broke down some time ago, will soon be resumed.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Lord Gladwyn to speak on behalf of the Liberal and Allies Group.

Lord Gladwyn. — Mr Chairman, I speak in the name of the Liberal Group but from what I heard this morning it may possibly be that some of my colleagues feel that my expression of thought is perhaps a little too categorical and harsh. However, I think they would probably agree with the general line of what I have to say.

I suppose that all Europeans present here today, whether they are Federalists or Unionists, or Pragmatists or even Laodiceans, are sadder and no doubt wiser men and women than they were a few years ago. For it is obvious that the general position of the Western European democracies has not improved economically or politically ; indeed, it has got much worse. And all this time the vast standardized forces of the Soviet Union—to say nothing of its nuclear arsenal—have been increasing to an extent which now makes it superior, and in some spheres greatly superior, to the combined forces of the West, unstandardized, unintegrated, and uncoordinated as they mostly are.

Now, Mr Chairman, you might have thought that this combination of factors, which if it persists, or gets worse, may well result in the disappearance of our free societies and their replacement by some kind of directed economies—which is

quite possible—would have resulted in greater unity on the part of at least nine countries who had declared to be some form of union their objective. Not at all. Virtually no progress has been made towards the adoption of common policies other than the common agricultural policy, which itself is under heavy fire. As for political cooperation, I have no time to go into that, but it is clear that it is notable for its absence at the present time. Apart from the fact that the Community is still there and its institutions are at least functioning, even if they are only marking time, there is, as I see it, only one really encouraging factor—and whether it is really encouraging we shall know in five days' time from now—and that, of course, is the decision to hold direct elections to the European Parliament in 1978.

I myself believe, though I may be wrong, that the chief reason, perhaps the unconscious reason, why the Ministers have been so hesitant about authorizing these elections is that they realize instinctively that, once directly elected, the European Parliament will be a strong and perhaps a decisive force working for political unity and that this will perforce result in difficult struggles with all those, in all the countries of the Nine, who are reluctant to abandon any shred of what they always refer to as national sovereignty. But once this directly-elected parliament is in being, such struggles will of course be inevitable and on the whole—and this is the optimistic part of my statement—it seems likely that the governments, faced with a difficult choice, will feel that the best way out of their dilemma is, after all, European unity.

Now if so, then the political community of the Nine will undoubtedly take form and substance over the years, incorporating, no doubt, other democratic European States now outside it, and in close association, of course, with several others. Should things turn out this way, what would be the continuing role of the Council of Europe? I spent a good few years as a member of this excellent organization and profited greatly from my membership of the Economic Committee, so I am perhaps in a position to compare it with the Community. And

my considered view is that until—I repeat until—such time as the Community has made irreversible progress towards an actual political union, the Council of Europe has an indispensable part to play. But, as soon as the Community develops into an entity on the lines I have suggested—if it ever does—then, to quote Shakespeare, 'Othello's occupation will be gone'. If on the other hand the Community stagnates, then the Council of Europe will presumably remain as the only basis for any European cooperation or rather any European non-Communist cooperation, since it is difficult to imagine that it could contain within its democratic embrace both free and totalitarian States, even though, of course, it may have very good economic relations with the Eastern countries so long as they are Communist. Let us hope so.

The danger, however, and it is a real danger, would be that, in the event of a stagnation or even a collapse of the European Economic Community and the triumph therefore of economic nationalism, the whole of Western Europe might fall by the force of things—and not, Sir Geoffrey, by any diabolical intentions on the part of the Russians—under the political hegemony of the Soviet Union. When I inspected a few months ago the splendid projected new home for the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, I said—and this was not altogether a joke—that this might prove eventually to be an ideal headquarters for the Comecon.

Some, I am sure, will say that this, which is almost my swan-song, is too gloomy and pessimistic: perhaps swan-songs usually are! However I would myself regard it as simply realistic. Certainly, I would not regard the European democracies represented here today as doomed, only as in very considerable danger. As I have already said, provided the European Parliament is indeed directly elected in 1978, I see a bright future for Western Europe which I do not think can in any way be united with the States of Eastern Europe for so long as they continue to be Communist. Meanwhile, in our two Assemblies we shall, I am sure, as European parliamentarians

continue to peg away profitably in our respective spheres, which, as things are, do not seem in any way to clash.

As for the governments, I myself believe that, before very long, they will have to make a choice, which they have so far in practice avoided making, and when the moment for this choice presents itself, then they may perhaps do well to recall the great words of Dante in his remarkable description of the role of Fortune, 'Necessità la fa esser veloce' (Necessity makes her swift).

(Applause)

IN THE CHAIR : MR CZERNETZ

President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

Chairman. — I call Mr Prescott to speak on behalf of the Socialist Group.

Mr Prescott. — I think the point that the Socialist Group wish to make about a meeting like this is that we certainly welcome the meeting of the two organizations because it emphasizes one very important fact, namely that Europe is greater than the Nine. There is a tendency—and this is almost a trite point perhaps—to think of the nine nations of the Community being Europe, but clearly the nations in the Council of Europe have an extremely important part to play in the developing attitudes and responsibilities which have been referred to, those identified as European responsibilities. Therefore there is a considerable area over which one can attempt to identify this so-called European responsibility and the rapporteurs have done it in their papers over a very wide range indeed. But what I want to do in the short time available

to me is attempt to identify that European responsibility in its reality and determine whether there is a possibility that meetings like this can contribute to changing that present reality of European responsibilities and whether we can take the initiative here to take it further, rather than being two assemblies that come together for an enjoyable occasion to discuss the great strategies of Europe and the world itself. Can we perhaps take some tangible decisions here that we can pursue together as politicians? This is almost a call for the back-benchers of the world to unite, to come together and take political decisions which may be different from those being taken by our nation-states in the international forums of the world. It is in those situations where political decisions are needed that we seem to be faltering, that we seem to be taking a very hard-line attitude towards our European responsibility.

The speech made by Sir Christopher Soames this morning did identify the problem we are faced with though I am not so sure the reality matches the theme that he has used this morning—and that is that we must agree upon our identification of European values. The European nation, and I use 'Europe' in the widest sense of this debate, is clearly dependent upon trade, more dependent than some of the bigger super-powers are on their trade with the Third World. If I can take one important theme in the world today, it is the interdependence of nations, the new economic order, the North-South dialogue. This is the arena in which Europe has to identify itself and decide whether it is prepared to take that great moral commitment to help the Third World in its development. The rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer, and we belong, despite our political and economic difficulties, to the rich community. The choice for most of our nations here is whether we are to give part of our wealth, in the redistribution of that wealth, to the Third World, not simply as a moral commitment to that principle, but also for our own survival. The oil problem has shown us that our economies are equally dependent upon the poor communities, particularly for raw materials. So there is good economic sense in this, though I prefer to think that the morality of the commit-

ment is a much more important concept for the politicians to consider.

But let us look at the reality. Where have the rich and the poor nations of the world been getting together to agree? In UNCTAD. And how has Europe been identified in the UNCTAD Conference on trade? With the hard line, with reluctance to give so much help to them. There is another area in which Europe has been identified—the UNCTAD Conference on the shipping trade, where Europe has 40% of world shipping and controls it through world liner conferences. The United Nations agreed to give 10% of world shipping to the Third World and now the 7% share held by the Third World is reduced to 6%. In the conference that recently agreed that some of the share of shipping held by our maritime nations, particularly here in Europe, should be given to the Third World to give them a chance to develop their economies, we did nothing but present a very hard line. We are not even prepared to ratify the convention that was agreed except for countries like Germany, France and Belgium, who did sign the convention and hoped to have implemented it. Yet what did the Commission do?

The Commission, with these new values, these new European responsibilities, takes these three countries to the Court of Justice for attempting to give positive help to the Third World. There are more examples to show that Europe has not fulfilled its responsibility. It has the wealth, but it has not shown any positive desire to share it with the Third World.

Our two assemblies in Europe here are interdependent as regards policies. For example, the EEC cannot decide on a shipping policy, or a shipbuilding policy, without discussing with important nations which are in the Council of Europe but not in the EEC. Any development of a shipping policy to counteract the Comecon shipping trade and the tying of trade to shipping cannot be achieved without agreement with nations in the Council of Europe. This is equally true in the Law of the Sea Conference which is now coming to the end of its

present session. It has failed to agree on a convention, which means that nations represented in this assembly will take unilateral action and that, of course, will lead to further unilateral action by other nations. This is not an international solution. It perhaps reflects the reality of the present situation.

Perhaps I could finish on this one point to emphasize my theme and make a recommendation that we should consider as two assemblies in our separate political functions. Under the Law of the Sea, 70% of our earth's surface is now to be subject to the rule of law. Tremendous amounts of wealth are involved, new wealth is being created, and yet Europe tries to keep that to itself when it could be purposefully used to give help to the Third World. And when the United Nations say that the wealth of the sea should be the common heritage of mankind, and everybody agrees there should be an authority, an assembly, to determine priorities in the distribution of that wealth, what do the Community nations do? They oppose the Third World's desire for an international authority to control this wealth in the Law of the Sea Conference.

Mr Chairman, I want to end my speech by saying this: I do not think that Europe's sense of responsibility has been very obvious in the past. I hope there will be considerable changes, particularly in this area. There will be problems caused by unilateral decisions by nations on the 200-mile limit, and I presume the Community will take this decision in January. The Socialist Group passed a resolution last night calling on the Community to adopt the 200-mile limit by 1 January, because other nations are already committed to it and the consequences will be considerable for us if we stand aside. But let us do something more positive: let the Council of Europe and the EEC, as we say in our resolution, call together the ministers of all the nations in Europe to consider the economic, political and social problems that will be involved by the unilateral extensions, to consider how we can perhaps identify with the Scandinavian countries, whose attitude at the Law of the Sea Conference has been much more characterized by a moral purpose than that of the Community. We would

like to propose as a group that the Council of Europe consider bringing together the ministers, as we will call for in our political forum, to discuss the important question of a common European identification on the major moral issue now facing the world—namely, whether we, the rich nations of the world, are prepared to help the Third World. If we do not, we shall all perish.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Mr Radius.

Mr Radius. — *(F)* Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, as Mr Vedovato very rightly pointed out in his report, the theme of this debate may seem exceptionally ambitious in scope, but it does offer the members of our two Assemblies the opportunity to consider from every angle the actual foundations of the Europe we are building. Reflecting on European responsibilities in the world means in fact asking oneself what is the model for society that Europe must promote and defend, what is the solidarity she should build up, what are the tasks she should propose to the international community as a whole. There seems to be a fairly wide consensus in European public opinion that Europe should offer the world an example of a stable, democratic society intent on social progress. But Europeans are still uncertain by what ways and means, in the present unstable and dangerous international environment, our continent can best ensure the continuation, development and influence of this type of society.

When trying to define the role which Europe must play in the world, it is of primary importance that we should take account of historical and geographical exigencies. Where the countries of our continent are concerned, these impose a number of limitations on their international action. European countries generally depend for supplies of raw materials and energy on the countries of the Third World. Their economic activity, being largely concerned with international trade, can develop satisfactorily only if their partners observe certain

rules of good conduct. For their defence the countries of Western Europe, with the exception of France, rely to a large extent on the nuclear shield of the United States. All these economic, military and political factors make the nations of Europe vulnerable to outside pressure and in general to the disturbances and conflicts which all too frequently shake the present-day world. Such conflicts, whether they be economic, political or military, are dangerous for Europe when they directly involve her, as in the case of East-West tensions, or when they become explosive in areas vital to her security, such as the Mediterranean.

It is therefore in Europe's interests to help build international structures and establish dialogue and cooperation capable of ensuring that rivalries and tensions can be overcome. It is for this reason that the European countries, and especially France, attach so much importance to international institutions working for better economic relations, to the progress of discussions in the North-South Conference and to furthering the process of *détente* agreed to at the Helsinki Conference. Self-interest should not be Europe's only reason for extending her cooperation with all countries, whatever their level of development or their social system. Europe is predestined by her history to serve as intermediary and conciliator between the different groups of nations which dominate international relations today. One of Europe's primary responsibilities is to intensify interchange between the two artificially separated parts of the European continent, in the spirit of the Helsinki agreements included in the 2nd and 3rd 'baskets'. In the Third World, and above all in Africa, our continent is able, thanks to the historical links she has preserved with numerous developing countries, to institute a new type, both fairer and stabler, of international economic relations. The Lomé Convention is a first step in this direction.

The capacity for dialogue displayed by Europe and the vital interest she has in better and more peaceful international relations are two factors which have a permanent bearing on any concerted action by the European nations, whether Nine

or Eighteen. These factors must now be reassessed in the light of the difficult and uncertain political climate at this time.

The present situation is marked by the growing risk of more frequent regional conflicts caused by the diminishing power of control of the United States and the USSR. Peace remains fragile, and the disorder in international economic relations, the most striking illustration of which is the chaotic system of international payments, makes it all the more so. Added to that, the growing assertion of national identities, especially in the Third World, is irreversible and in many respects is bound to produce positive results. In this connection, it is important that Europe should display greater unity among the tensions and disagreements that are the inevitable consequence of an international environment which is more fluid than in the past and of a more difficult economic situation. Such unity will be possible only if the States of Europe, first and foremost those which belong to the EEC, are able in international relations to agree on defending and promoting genuinely European interests. In dealings with developing countries, for example, Europe must have wider room for manoeuvre than mere unconditional alignment with the position of a great power, even a friend and ally. Where the stabilization of commodity prices and financial aid are concerned, Europe must make proposals to the Third World countries which correspond to their own interests, even if the United States is reticent. As regards international economic relations, Europe must ensure the success of the proposals for a new and more stable economic order, so as to safeguard the conditions on which her own development depends. The present-day monetary chaos and unbalanced economic relations are not only a threat to growth in Europe but are also likely to split the European Community irreparably into two economic zones, one plagued by inflation and unemployment, the other more dynamic but at the mercy of fluctuations in international trade. It is therefore necessary that Europe should define her international policy in complete independence, and that she should fully respect the independence of the countries with whom she enters into talks. The procedures for concertation

and cooperation in which Europe joins can work only on the basis of equality of rights among all taking part. Indeed, the reason why Europe's policy of cooperation with the 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, or with the countries of the Mediterranean, is so favourably viewed by Third World countries is that her offers of cooperation have no political strings attached. Europe does not seek hegemony, and that is why she enjoys such undeniable prestige today among so many States. May Europe take full advantage of this situation and achieve a sufficient degree of unity to be able to offer a tangible response to the hopes that the many countries tired of great-power manoeuvring place in her! We have no right to disappoint them.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Lord Reay to speak on behalf of the European Conservative Group.

Lord Reay. — Mr Chairman, I think we are fortunate in being able to base this debate on two most valuable and enlightened reviews of the situation from our rapporteurs: from Sir Geoffrey de Freitas we have had a most full and comprehensive picture of the problem, from Mr Vedovato something perhaps more controversial but none the less useful for that.

I feel indebted to Sir Geoffrey for his anecdote about the Congress of Vienna; but I feel that not too much should be built on it, and I would recommend to those reading it that they read at the same time the opening words of Lord Gladwyn.

I would like to take up two points Mr Vedovato makes in his report: the first is where he suggests that the Belgrade Conference is something which could be prepared by the Council of Europe, and the second, where he criticizes the coordination of EEC policy in the United Nations.

With respect to Belgrade, I think that it is unrealistic that the Council of Europe should have authority to prepare the West's position, since two of the three principal subjects which are due to be discussed—defence and economic cooperation—cannot be said to fall within the competence of the Council of Europe. I say this notwithstanding the very obvious interest which the Council of Europe has in the field of Basket Three, about which I shall say something in a moment.

On the question of the coordination of policy in the United Nations, I think that Mr Vedovato underrates the importance of what has been achieved by way of successful coordination of the nine policies : to give a single example, in the 1973 General Assembly the Ambassador appointed by the Nine as their spokesman was able to speak only twice on behalf of the Nine. (When I say 'speak' I do not mean explanations of vote but general statements in debate.) In 1974 he was able to do so on twelve occasions, and last year he did so thirty times. Now there is undoubtedly a very great deal to be done in the field of improving the coordination of the nine foreign policies. There have been various incidents which have displayed the impotence of the Nine, there have been various incidents in the recent past which can only be described as being humiliating for the Nine, and there is undoubtedly scope for rapid improvement ; but I think it would be misleading to give the impression that the way to approach this is to bring the Council of Europe into closer coordination with the Nine for the development of specific foreign policies : I think that this would lead to more problems than it would solve.

For what concerns us both in the future, I have no doubt that, as many other speakers have said, one of the most pressing problems for all of us Europeans is our long-term attitude to the aspirations of the developing countries. I think this is a matter which is of equal importance to the Nine and the Eighteen, of equal importance for all of us Europeans, because it is really more a question of attitude than of the development of specific policies. I think that we in Europe, with our highly-exposed economies and our wealth, which is still—and here I

agree with Mr Prescott—a provocation to the masses in the developing countries, are obliged to adopt an attitude of readiness to adapt ourselves to the demands of the developing countries. Now I do not know what latest manoeuvres there may have been in the question of the Law of the Sea, but in so far as Mr Prescott was giving the impression that the Community was characteristically and continuously unyielding in the face of the demands of the developing countries, I would suggest that this is not a fair and complete picture. If you take into account what was achieved under the Lomé Convention, if you take into account the generalized preference scheme, which Sir Geoffrey de Freitas himself today described as one of the most enlightened of such schemes, if not the most enlightened, in operation in the world at this time, if you take into account the volume of aid given under the food-aid scheme, for example—if you take into account these factors and many others, you cannot arrive at the conclusion that the Community is 'characteristically unyielding and uninterested' in the future of developing countries. That is not, of course, to say that a great deal more does not remain to be done : it certainly does, and there may be many more sacrifices to come, but we shall come on to that when we discuss the North-South dialogue later in the week.

A further point on which we—that is to say, the Nine and the Council of Europe—can act together indeed, where the Council of Europe has already made a contribution of quite inestimable value—is the field of human rights. I think we in the Nine have to recognize the special position and experience of the Council of Europe in this field, which is particularly topical now with Helsinki, the great interest in Basket Three and the quite widespread dissatisfaction with how it has been implemented, and the run-up to Belgrade next year. I think that what the Council of Europe may have to say in this matter between now and then and what they provide by way of monitoring is something that the members of the European Parliament should pay some attention to and should look out for. Similarly, I think that what the Council of Europe has done in the cultural field has made it possible for us properly to pro-

tect and appreciate our common heritage. Each of us, the Community and the Council of Europe, if we are to discharge Europe's responsibilities, must concentrate on what each of us does best. As Mr Vedovato himself says in his report, the Community and the Council of Europe are complementary. That is how it should be, and that is what we must maintain.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Mr Mattick.

Mr Mattick. — *(D)* Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, the time-limit obliges us to deal with specific problems and not, as one might have wished, to make comments of a general nature about the present situation in the Community. I am grateful for the introduction provided for us by the reports, but wish to point out one thing. I have the feeling that, in regard to certain problems, we still have not made up our minds to refrain from beating about the bush. I am thinking particularly about South Africa.

Basically, what we are witnessing in South Africa are rearguard actions of last century's class war. The fact that the opponents are white and coloured is of no decisive importance. What *is* of decisive importance is that a section of the population, which has emerged as the ruling class, is not prepared to give up the privileges arrogated in the process for the benefit of humanity.

In my view, ladies and gentlemen, this meeting should make it clear that all Europeans are wholly united on this matter, and will be united in action also. Dr Kissinger's efforts, like many others, will fail as long as the white ruling classes can go on counting on the disunity of the industrialized nations, and so feel protected against total isolation.

Let us be quite clear about this: if we do not do our utmost to ensure that the South African civil war is brought to a close soon, then we must not be surprised if a second

Angola develops, for which we shall once again have to curse the Communists. I think it is our duty to see to it that such a situation cannot arise. If the oppressed masses in those countries try to obtain help from another quarter, we shall have no one to blame but ourselves. I appeal to this assembly not to treat this matter as one of secondary importance, and not to disregard it, because it is a crucial question and one which confronts us with special difficulties. A united front is called for here. It is not just moral pronouncements we need, but also practical measures to stop whatever support is still being given to such systems.

A second remark : a further fact that will be held against us in future years is that we were not able to cope effectively with burning issues, even on our own home ground. Now, you will probably retort that these are largely national issues. Here I am thinking particularly of Ireland, and especially of Cyprus. A colleague said something about this. I would like to appeal to this assembly. I would like to say that between the two elections, after the election in the Turkish sector and before the one in the Greek sector, I spent a week in Cyprus exploring all the possibilities in an effort to find a basis for discussion, and my experience was this : the two sides on the island of Cyprus have failed to find any way of coming together. The Turkish and the Greek governments are at a loss to know—and here I am being as objective as it is possible to be—how to get out of the impasse. On the other hand, they do not want any interference. But if one regards Europe and Western Europe and the EEC, including the countries which, although not yet members of the EEC, nevertheless feel that they belong to it, as one family, then one must accept that family's endeavours to help those of its members who are sick.

But if, after the United Nations General Assembly, the Turkish sector is actually transformed into a separate Turkish-Cypriot State—and there is something in the wind, although the Turkish Government still does not take the same view in the matter as Mr Denktash—then you must realize that, because of the present-day geographical division, the founding of such

a State is bound to lead to continuing escalation, which will cause us unending difficulties. We shall always be blamed for our failure to secure peace within our own family circle, to take sensible measures to restore peace to this part of Europe.

But then the question arises again : when will matters go so far that the Communists support Makarios, with the majority that he now has ? When will the Communists, seeing everyone else hold back, step in and provoke some new development, for which we shall once again blame Bolshevism or Communism generally ? We must see to it that these matters are settled, and for this we should be more active than in the past.

There is a third remark I would like to make : I share the view that we should prepare ourselves for the Belgrade Conference and ensure that it takes the form of a parliamentary conference once again, for discussion among parliamentarians is franker and freer than among the officials who will be meeting there beforehand.

Chairman. — I call Mr Berkhouwer.

Mr Berkhouwer. — (NL) Mr President, may I make just a few brief comments ? It is good to find that as Europeans we do in fact count for something in the world. Sometimes, in our travels around the world, we discover that other people have a better opinion of us than we do of ourselves.

And we in Europe are frequently unaware that the situation has changed drastically over the last few years. The European nation States which once ruled over large areas of the globe now find themselves in a situation of interdependence. The era of more important and less important States in Europe has gone for ever. In Europe we can no longer get by with dual or triple axes. And there can be no question of our Community consisting of four large and five small States. Meetings like the Puerto Rico and Rambouillet conferences must now belong to the past.

In this situation, where our countries are now in partnership and dependent upon each other, I would like to agree with Lord Reay and impress upon Mr Prescott that responsibility is a two-edged sword. We have our responsibilities, but the Third World too has its own responsibilities, and it wants us to recognize these responsibilities. We can no longer play the tutor to them. They want to be treated as equals.

Let me now move on to the broader horizon about which Sir Christopher Soames has written a very interesting article. We could depict the present state of world politics by two overlapping triangles, one, in terms of purely political power, consisting of China, Russia and America, and the other, in terms of economic power, of America, Japan and Europe. Well then, in the light of the broader horizon to which Sir Geoffrey also referred, should we not gradually be coming round to the possibility that all the free industrialized countries of Europe with a form of government based on parliamentary democracy, together with countries such as the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and possibly even Iran, might begin a dialogue with the rest of the world, in a spirit not of conflict but of candour ?

It so happens that this year marks the 1500th anniversary of the fall of the first European organization—the Roman Empire—in A.D. 476. But what is the present state of civil Europe ? That term means a lot to me. A civil Europe endeavouring to play a role on the world stage through peaceful persuasion, just as the Community has acted in the Mediterranean basin. Is it not high time that we, starting from this ideal, stopped giving in to the terror tactics harassing Europe's airspace ? That we stopped simply paying lip service ? We have always been opposed to terrorism, and it is high time we started taking some real action against it. That is why I am delighted that the Council of Europe has recently been working on a convention in this area. That is why I am also pleased that last weekend, meeting in my country, the ministers of the nine Member States discussed this very matter. It was decided that the Community should support a German initiative at the

United Nations. But at the United Nations there are 150 countries, some with a population of 200 000, others with 200 million, all having nominally the same rights. And some of these countries openly support the terrorists. For this reason, taking civil Europe as my starting point, I will express the hope of each and every one of us that, if the next United Nations General Assembly comes up with no satisfactory result, the free European democracies, some 18, 19 or more countries, should join forces with other like-minded countries with which they have economic relations to work out a charter for the free nations operating civil airlines. Within such a framework, we may perhaps succeed in rooting out this air piracy which is becoming increasingly intolerable.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Mr Spicer.

Mr Spicer. — Mr President, it is perhaps a happy coincidence that I should follow my friend, Mr Berkhouwer, because I wish to refer in large measure to one thing that he touched upon at the end of his speech.

In his opening address to us, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas talked about our responsibilities. I would agree with him ; we have tremendous responsibilities. We have responsibilities to the world, we have responsibilities to our own citizens in Europe, and we also have responsibilities to the citizens of the free world, and I put it in that order. I would like to deal with our responsibilities today to the citizens of Europe and the citizens of the free world, particularly in the light of international terrorism.

Over the last twenty or twenty-five years we have seen the appalling growth of terrorism, and no one can deny that it will go on growing in the years ahead. And, of course, that terrorism is always directed against the democratic countries of the world. It is inconceivable that it should ever be directed

against Russia or China, or other countries behind the Iron Curtain, because there such things could not happen.

In my view, therefore, it is quite impossible for us to look any more to the United Nations to solve this problem. Only last week Dr Waldheim was saying we must have a draft treaty on this within the United Nations. That has been said for the last 20 years. It will never come about, we shall never see it, many of the people within that organization do not wish to see it, because they live outside the law themselves. What we are left with now is a situation in which, unless we take action within a European context with other people in the free world, nothing will be done.

I believe a draft treaty is now being put before the Member States of the Council of Europe, largely on the initiative of the West German Government and with the support of France. That treaty is due to be initialled, we hope, at the end of this month. All I am saying today is, do we in this assembly, and do we in Europe—the wider Europe—give our fullest possible support to that ?

I would like to ask our own Community one or two questions. Do we in the Community support this initiative or are we doing our own thing quite separately ? Shall we have, when this meeting takes place, an observer present in any shape or form to observe exactly what is happening from a Community point of view ? Are we coordinating our activities with the Council of Europe, with the European Community and with the Nato alliance ? I very much doubt it.

All I would say is that if we are not doing that now it is high time that we did do it, because time is fast running out. I hope and pray that that draft convention treaty will be initialled ; it will be a first step towards a wider agreement into which we can draw Canada, the United States and other members of the free world. That is what we want. If that is not the intention, if it is not done now, then for heaven's sake may I follow Mr Prescott with an appeal, while on a different subject,

that we within Europe should come together immediately to deal with this threat to our way of life, which grows week by week, month by month and year by year.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Mr Aano.

Mr Aano. — First of all I would like to reiterate the words of Sir Christopher Soames on the importance of the meeting of the two assemblies.

Coming from a country which is not a member of the EEC, I personally feel great gratitude for the opportunity of holding a meeting once a year between the two assemblies, the Nine members of the EEC and the eighteen members of the Council of Europe, which we hope will soon be increased to nineteen. I would like to say a special word of thanks to our colleagues in the Council of Europe who come from countries that are also members of the Community.

They have shown a full understanding of the wider Europe and helped to dispel the impression that, when people speak about Europe, they mean the Europe of the Nine only. I would like to say a word of thanks to them for their constant reminders to their colleagues that Europe is more than the Europe of the Nine. Democratic Europe is now a Community of nineteen nations that need to cooperate with each other. There are vast areas of common interests and problems. Democratic Europe is larger and must work together to testify to its belief in common democratic ideals, in a world where democratic values are only upheld by an obvious minority. We need each other because of the common European problems that must be solved in a wider context than that of the nine EEC member countries.

Secondly, I want to stress the importance of the issue raised this morning. I am in full agreement with Mr Vedovato's valuable report and the speech delivered by Sir Geoffrey de

Freitas. I am very sorry I have not had an opportunity to read his report, which I only saw this morning.

I am convinced that Europe is at an important crossroads at the moment. The problem of a better and more just distribution of wealth in general, and of food in particular, will, I am convinced, be the paramount political issue for the rest of this century. This was also underlined in the report by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Norwegian Storting of this spring.

This means that we must accept in principle the idea of a new economic world order. And I say that as a convinced non-socialist. Our society is founded on the principle that the governing authorities must intervene regularly in the economy to effect transfers of income, so as to ensure that everyone receives a reasonable and acceptable share in affluence and growth. This, we think, should also be done at the international level, with the aim of reaching a rational system of cooperation which can contribute to a more equitable distribution of the riches of the world community. In this connection, it is as well to remember that a society burdened with great social and economic inequalities is an unstable and unsafe society, and that similarly, a world where great inequalities exist between the nations is an unsafe world. This, in turn, means that we must work to achieve a greater public acceptance of a slower pace in the improvement of our own standards of living for the benefit of people who lack even the most basic material necessities for an existence commensurate with human dignity. This willingness to slow down our own desire for more and more was underlined by the Secretary-General of OECD, Emile van Lennep, in his very serious speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe last October. He wondered, in rather gloomy terms, whether we have many years ahead when we shall still have any freedom of choice.

In closing, Mr Chairman, allow me to quote from the Norwegian Government's report to the Storting of 1974-75, which had the full agreement of our parliament.

Norway finds herself today among the richest countries in the world. We are reaping many of the benefits of an economic system which has made its mark on the relations between the rich and poor nations. At the same time, our people firmly adhere to such fundamental precepts of human values as the Christian philosophy of universal brotherhood and a general feeling of solidarity between all human beings. Guided by such fundamental precepts, we are in duty bound to accept our share of the burden in seeking a more equitable international distribution of wealth. The political parties in Norway have all given their support to the objective of evening out the existing disparity between the rich and the poor countries of this world. Through its resolutions concerning Norway's cooperation with the developing countries, the Storting has laid down that Norway should strive towards a more just and a more rational world, with equal opportunities for all nations as well as for all human beings.

The will of our parliamentary democracies to stand up to this challenge may prove the decisive test case for its ability to adjust to new political necessities. Indeed, if our form of government, based on the lofty ideals of democracy, is to have a chance of survival in the global battle between political ideologies, we must have more to offer our different electorates than competition between parties and politicians who promise perpetual annual increases of 3 to 5 % in net annual per capita income regardless of the state of the starving world outside the borders of a wealthy Europe.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I shall now call three speakers from countries which have not yet spoken, and then resume the order in the list of speakers.

I call Mr Frangos.

Mr Frangos. — (*F*) I should like first of all to pay tribute to Mr Vedovato, Chairman of the Council of Europe Political

Affairs Committee, for the very interesting report which he has submitted on European responsibilities in the world. The subject is a very wide one, as he himself has pointed out as rapporteur to this joint meeting of the two Assemblies. To attempt to deal with every aspect and every implication would be ambitious and perhaps inconclusive. Nevertheless, the fact that the problem has been raised in this Chamber, in the presence of the leading and best-qualified representatives of the peoples of democratic Europe, is of considerable importance for future policies in this sphere.

Europe is at present endeavouring, through various types of organization, to establish her identity. The work of integration is proceeding at two different, but complementary rhythms among the Nine and the Eighteen. However, as Mr Tindemans states in his report, as long as no single decision-making centre is created and no common policy is worked out and systematically applied, Europe's ability to speak with one voice will remain a pious hope. Europe must assert her identity. There is only one way to that goal: the democratic way. The European elections by direct universal suffrage scheduled for 1978 will no doubt be a very important step in this direction. For that reason, we believe that one of Europe's foremost responsibilities is to prepare for and to hold those elections. This is something which Europe owes to herself, for she cannot fulfil her mission in the world or assume her responsibilities in the wider sphere of East-West and North-South relations without having achieved the necessary degree of organization and democratization.

Before embarking upon practical action, she must take constant action to strengthen her institutions by adapting them to present-day social and economic conditions. Such an achievement is fundamental to European union and to Europe's political and legal identity.

The rapporteur very rightly mentioned the Mediterranean as being one of Europe's foremost responsibilities. We are in broad agreement with his point of view on that region. We

share his opinion on Greece, that that country, having been freed from dictatorship two years ago, is anxious to arm herself against those of her citizens who still favour an authoritarian régime. For that reason Greece, by taking a decisive step forward in her relations with Europe, hopes to acquire greater freedom of manoeuvre in regard to the United States and above all to bar the way once and for all to those who hanker after the former régime.

We have some difficulty, however, in sharing the rapporteur's view with regard to Turkey. When referring to the European policy towards that country, Mr Vedovato says that she must not be psychologically obliged to abandon her desire to consolidate and broaden special relations with the European Community and, through it, with the West. To our knowledge, that has never been the case : despite her geographical position and the—shall I say—policy which she has pursued for some years with regard to the Western world, Turkey has benefited from substantial privileges in the European Community. The extension of the Community's Mediterranean policy has brought no changes in the application of the Community's Treaty of Association with Turkey. On the other hand, in her aggressive policy towards Greece, pursued in violation of the principles of international law, Turkey is trying to impede our country's relations with the Community and to postpone our accession to it. This has upset the balance and caused tension which is threatening the peace and stability of the region.

It is also difficult for us to agree with the rapporteur on the need for a more definite European commitment towards Turkey, for the supposition that Turkey is on the point of a diplomatic change of front is quite unrealistic.

Finally, we subscribe wholeheartedly to all that Mr Vedovato has said in his report in criticism of the European attitude towards Cyprus. He writes : '... democratic Europe as represented by the Council of Europe can but acknowledge its powerlessness to help this Member State which is being rent asunder...'

And asks : 'Where is there any sign of solidarity on the part of Europe ? Surely Europe, with its great tradition, should have come forward and tried, as a first step, to bring about a just and lasting peace by laying the foundations of equitable social and economic conditions for the island's population as a whole ?'

To conclude, we believe that a just and impartial assessment of the situation in the Mediterranean region, accompanied by action commensurate with developments, is one of Europe's paramount responsibilities and is bound up with her willingness to assert her identity in the world.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Mr Cifarelli.

Mr Cifarelli. — *(I)* Mr President, according to a French statesman hypocrisy is the tribute paid by vice to virtue, and there is hypocrisy in the very title of this colloquy, which speaks of 'European responsibilities' rather than 'Europe's responsibilities'. How can something which does not exist assume responsibilities, something that is, which exists only in words, only in a great tradition of civilization and in two organizations each of which seeks to keep and increase its own field of action as against the other's, but which does not exist as a political entity capable of asserting itself ?

Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, we have read and heard so many comments on the death of Mao. For my part I have made one single comment, which I should like to repeat here—namely, that Mao and, through him, China have said to us, 'Unite, you Europeans, if you want to preserve your independence and contribute to world peace !' That warning has acquired particular significance in these last few days, when we have no idea where the future of China will lie : in tripolarity, in intestine struggles or in the pursuit of a great policy to make that country one of the pillars of world equilibrium. While we are talking the present imbalance in arma-

ments between the USSR and America—on this I agree with Lord Gladwyn—is becoming increasingly serious and dangerous. And while we are talking, two dangers are taking shape in the world : Tito has been declared seriously ill, and *senectus ipsa morbum est*—Tito is 84 years old—and Ceaușescu, a young and shrewd man, has suddenly drawn closer to Moscow.

That must mean something for us Europeans ; we have more urgent things to do than to discourse eternally on our relations with the Third World. Of course we welcome such relations. I agree with Mr Berkhouwer that they must entail rights and duties on both sides, but in our relations with the Third World we Europeans must give of our civilization, which means helping the hungry and those who need vocational training, but we must not sell arms to all and sundry. On various pretexts we in Europe are the largest suppliers of arms to the Third World, and that is a blatant display of irresponsibility on Europe's part for which we must blush before history.

Also while we are talking, Mr President, discussions are going on about the sale of gold but, alas, this is not just an International Monetary Fund debate. We in our Assembly—I am speaking of the European Parliament, but I believe it is the same everywhere—talk regularly about the activities of the multinational companies (which are a modern personification of the Devil : just as in the Middle Ages exorcism was used against the Devil's evil doings, so today we should act against the multinationals). But we do not realize that behind those sales of gold stands the dollar, which practically excludes other forms of international payments, reduces the possibility of using gold and is thus confirmed in its position as the only means of payment for international transactions.

I am not against the United States—a democrat cannot be—but I remember what has been said by an enlightened man who is now at the helm in Greece, I mean Mr Karamanlis : 'Small countries that have a great friend who is, however, a super-power either unite or inevitably become vassals of that super-power.'

But these are matters we should consider amongst ourselves if we do not want yet again to indulge in empty talk. We must ask ourselves what is the function of the European Parliament—and hence of the Nine—and what is the role of the Council of Europe—and so the Nineteen. In my view, the European Parliament should go forward with the utmost urgency and decisively, but with real decision, not just words, orders of business and motions, to advance political union, using the Tindemans report and going beyond it. Barricades are erected in Europe for the most absurd and stupid reasons, but they are not put up to protect the life and liberty of our children. That is a cause for tremendous sadness.

With regard to the Council of Europe, which after all is Europe looked at from another angle, it is clear that we need to recognize all the very important things it has done—for example in the whole field of fundamental rights, culture and protection of the environment and of our heritage from the past—and we must draw attention to one function which it can perform, that of constituting a meeting-point where Europe can become European. For while we are faced with the unknown quantities of Yugoslavia after Tito's death and relations in the Mediterranean—though we well understand the difficulties of Spain and Portugal—while we have the problems of Cyprus, and above all the problems of the Arab countries, we must remember that the smell of oil distorts our decisions. Above all, let us not forget that these matters are determined by the competition between the two super-powers, and it is useless for us to step in when Russia is behind one producer-country and America behind another. While we have these problems to face, in Eastern Europe there are also extremely grave problems: not only Czechoslovakia, but Poland and Hungary as well.

Mr Chairman, I will not indulge in lengthy forecasts, indeed I have finished, but I would say that we can rely on the wisdom of the Council of Europe to perform the function of a forum for increasing agreement, a meeting-place making for understanding among peoples that need to cling to Europe,

to a Europe that is not completely mature, that does not even exist yet, but which is nevertheless our democratic and highly-civilized Europe within which they may claim their own independence, their own freedom and their own significance in the life of the world.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Mr Hofer.

Mr Hofer. — *(D)* Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I wish to thank the Chairman for intervening to restore the balance as far as the nationalities of the speakers are concerned ; for a time one might have thought that this debate was taking place in the British House of Commons, although naturally we are all of us willing to learn from our British colleagues.

I propose to present the views of a small neutral State, with regard to the problems raised, but would emphasize that I have no mandate to speak on behalf of the other neutral States.

In recent years the question of neutrality has been discussed a great deal in the European institutions. In the sixties, neutrality was widely held to be an anachronism. Today, I am glad to say, the situation has changed and neutrality is again recognized as a constructive attitude in foreign policy. This is borne out, for example, by the treaties which the EEC has concluded with neutral States ; but the Helsinki Conference, too, referred to neutrality as a factor for European stability.

Neutrality is in no way synonymous with passivity, ladies and gentlemen. The reports mention the noteworthy political initiatives taken by the Austrian Federal Chancellor. We in Switzerland are perhaps somewhat more reticent in this respect, but even we are fully aware that the fate of our country is closely bound up with that of Europe. Even though Switzerland is not a member of the European Community, its economy is integrated in the highest measure with that of Europe. We

welcome all initiatives designed to strengthen the position of Europe in the world. Furthermore, we too welcome the idea, expressed here several times, that democracies throughout the whole world should close their ranks, for despite our neutrality we consider ourselves as belonging to the circle of parliamentary democracies.

Just as Switzerland and the other neutrals could not survive without the freedom and prosperity of Europe as a whole, it is difficult to see how the democracies of Europe could survive without the USA. In his report, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas says that Europe's power lies not in the arts of war but in the arts of peace. These are fine words but, ladies and gentlemen, they do not alter the fact that we continue as before to live in a world bristling with weapons, and the countries of Europe are quite clearly in no position to defend themselves. The cynical remark that Stalin once made to Churchill, 'How many divisions does the Pope have?' still has some relevance. Even today, security cannot be built on treaties or on words.

Also, ladies and gentlemen, I cannot rid myself of the suspicion, even in the historical perspective, that European security is a false issue, a red herring which certain people have deliberately thrown into the discussion, for European security is naturally an integral part of world security. We saw this again in the case of Angola. Angola is outside the sphere of the CSCE, we were told; however, it is quite clear that these and similar events also endanger European security.

Our country has the honour of taking part in the North-South dialogue and actively cooperating in the construction of a new world economic order.

Let me conclude by commenting on what Sir Geoffrey de Freitas said about Switzerland—namely, that it is one of the richest countries but is among the last when it comes to development aid. There is no denying this, unfortunately, and it is a cause of concern to us; but, ladies and gentlemen, in a direct democracy, which in other respects has earned world-

wide repute, the goodwill of the government and parliament is not enough if the people in the end say no. Remember that the Swiss were the only nation able to vote on whether they wished to give development aid or not. In some European press commentaries, it was stated that similar referendums in other European countries might perhaps have produced similar results. Switzerland was also the only country where the men were asked to decide whether women should be given the right to vote—and that is surely sufficient to explain why women's suffrage was somewhat later in being introduced there than elsewhere.

However, the main reason, ladies and gentlemen, is mistrust *vis-à-vis* the international organizations; and here I wish to emphasize what both rapporteurs have said: the deplorable state of the United Nations is to blame for the deterioration of public confidence in the international organizations.

Let me say, to sum up, that we welcome all European initiatives designed to increase Europe's influence in world affairs, and for that reason, we also welcome particularly the cooperation between the two European parliamentary institutions today in this assembly; I believe it to be one of the most important ways of giving Europe's voice a wider hearing in the world.

(*Applause*)

Chairman. — I call Lord Walston.

Lord Walston. — Mr Chairman, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas told us, quite rightly, that the world is increasingly interdependent and that Europe must play an increasing role in world affairs. Those words brought to my mind a story of Ernest Bevin when he was Foreign Secretary some 30 years ago. He sent for a group of young international newspaper correspondents and he said to them: 'Gentlemen, I have been thinking. I have been thinking about Africa. It's a hell of a big continent. I don't know how many hundreds of millions

of people live there, I don't know how many hundreds of thousands of square miles it covers, but I do know that before very long it is going to play a vital role in world affairs.' He went on: 'I am too old now and I am too busy with all these European countries, with Russia, with the United States, with Germany, with disarmament and things of that kind, but you are young men. I want you to think about Africa, gentlemen, because it is going to be very important'.

How right he was, Mr Chairman! It certainly is very important now, and what is happening there at the moment must make even those who are most doubtful about it realize the truth of those remarks. Now, I am foremost in wishing Dr Kissinger well on his expedition to Southern Africa and in what he is trying to do there, but I cannot help having a sense of shame that it is a United States Secretary of State who is carrying out this mission. After all, the main countries of Europe have for centuries been closely connected with Africa. The Netherlands, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom—we have all played a major role there, and we should continue to do so, helped by our other colleagues in Europe. Southern Africa, as a whole, is about to erupt, and it is very doubtful if it can be stopped. But we must remember the words of Sir Christopher Soames that we must be guided not by what we can do but what we know we must do, and we must do all in our power to make sure that this eruption in Southern Africa, with the countless suffering to millions of people and the detriment to the Western position, is brought to an end.

There are the three problems: South Africa itself and *apartheid*; Namibia; and Rhodesia—all enormously important; but the most urgent of these is Rhodesia itself. There is fighting there at the present time, and if it is not brought to a halt by the end of the year there will be full-scale war on the continent, and that cannot be stopped once it starts. The present régime, so long as it is there, is incapable of bringing about a proper settlement in Rhodesia. The power rests with the South African government to see that the present régime comes to

an end. All it has to do is to turn off the petrol tap to deprive Rhodesia of its essential fuel, and the Smith régime will crumble. Then it will be possible—but only then—to have a peaceful settlement, and by that means Mr Vorster and his government will give an indication, a marked and serious indication of their willingness to do something positive to solve the problem of Southern Africa. I appeal to all parliamentarians here to bring what pressure they can upon their governments. I appeal to Sir Christopher to bring pressure upon the Council of Ministers to ensure that the initiative is not left only to Dr Kissinger and the United States but that the combined voice of Europe is raised and raised urgently to ensure that the holocaust which is just about to erupt in Southern Africa is at the last moment avoided.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Mr Critchley.

Mr Critchley. — Mr Chairman, what is the reason for Europe's lack of self-confidence? Is it that we are unable to believe in our good fortune? We all call ritually for European unity, especially on occasions such as this, but Europe very plainly has all the unity it wants. The Europe of today is a confederacy rather than a union; a united Europe would be a federation controlled or dominated by France and Germany, which is why, despite all our ritual incantations, few unfortunately seek real progress towards a united Europe. We should perhaps remind ourselves that the motive for European integration was to control the Germans, to control Germany, and we should remind ourselves also that that could only be achieved in the 50's by the involvement of the United States in the politics and security of Europe. Thus the debate on European unity has been as much about the relationship of Europe to the United States as about relations within Europe.

How long, Mr Chairman, will the existing US-European relationship last? While nobody can say when the United

States will finally leave Europe, no one can seriously maintain that it will not eventually do so, and when that happens Europe will have to be a European Europe—a thought which at this moment today frightens many of us and frightens many Europeans.

What, then, are our fears? There is a fear of Russia, of course, but, and this is more important, there is a fear of uncertainty. We fear, very deep down, that the natural state of Europe is one of violence and excess, and we believe this still despite the prosperity and stability of the past 30 years and we believe it still despite the fact that for the same length of time the US has exempted the Europeans from the need to think seriously or to pay a real price or to struggle for their external security. Thus our anxieties over the natural condition of Europe, which we suspect to be chaos, have led us into dependence upon the United States for the solution of most of our political problems. America's sheltering presence in Europe has solved not only the Russian problem but the German problem as well; it has solved the problem of Trieste and of the Oder-Neisse frontier, and even now we in Europe wait, impatiently or apprehensively, for America to solve the problem of Italy—will the Communists be allowed eventually to participate in government?—the problems of Spain and indeed the problems of Portugal.

But why is it that we are so hesitant in Europe, why is it that we lack self-confidence—because every European who opens his eyes and looks about him knows that the major States of Europe are great powers in all important respects—population, size and sophistication of our industry, GNP, education and sophistication of our work-force. In very many crucial respects Sweden, Germany, France and the Netherlands are societies more modern than that of the United States of America. France and Britain both have a capacity for assured destruction in nuclear terms, being the third and fourth nuclear countries in the world, and even in conventional warfare a military alliance of France, Germany and England adds up to an industrial and a military force of almost the same scale as

that of the Soviet Union. France and the Germans together form an agglomeration somewhat larger than the Soviet Union. The Nine possess a combined GNP twice the size of that of Russia, and we have a larger population as well. We have nothing like the military force that Russia has, but that is because we choose to spend on average 2.5% of our GNP annually on defence—half as much as does the Soviet Union and the United States. The truth, Mr Chairman, is surely that Europe can be as secure with respect to the Soviet threat as it needs to be or wishes to be, and one reason why it does not do more to make itself secure is that we Europeans do not really believe that the Soviet Union poses a very serious threat to us and since the Americans are still in Europe, we can excuse ourselves from worrying over the consequences of being wrong. Unity already exists in Western Europe: there is a commercial community, there is also a moral unity which is derived from what European civilization has survived this century. But the real issue for us Europeans today is how to accomplish the psychological transition towards political unity, how to rid ourselves eventually of a trans-Atlantic dependence which cannot be sustained either by Europe or by America indefinitely.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Mr Faulds.

Mr Faulds. — I wish to pursue the problem discussed by Lord Walston and I shall try to be as brief as I can. The tragedy of Southern Africa is really only just beginning. The leaders who took over after independence were ardently pro-European and pro-Western: there was very little, if any, Communist influence in Southern Africa. But most countries of the West adopted an ambiguous attitude; on the one hand giving half-hearted support to the new African régimes and on the other strengthening the white régimes by maintaining our trade and investment. Every one of the new African leaders believed that Southern Africa could move towards indepen-

dence by peaceful means, but those hopes have been sadly frustrated by the intransigence and increasing oppression of the white régimes. The West—sadly I have to say this—has gone along with all this and none of its governments—except, perhaps, the Swedish government—has really made its opposition clear. Yet it is this continent of Europe that has had the longest and closest contact with Southern Africa during its long colonial period. Nevertheless, when the liberation struggle broke out we stood aside, and in their desperation and in their determination the Africans turned first to the armed struggle and then politically to those who would provide them with the equipment for that struggle. Now in South Africa itself that struggle has started, the citadel of racism itself is under attack. We cannot here in Europe stand aside and wash our hands as the murder and repression of Africans goes on. We must shout our total disapproval of that murderous, racist, anti-democratic régime until it is changed and until we get majority rule in South Africa.

(Applause)

Instead of the European leaders trying to bring the white régimes to their senses, all our foreign secretaries have sat back and passed the buck to Henry Kissinger, and here I want to pursue the very point made by Lord Walston. Kissinger's record of intervention has hardly been a happy or successful one. His intervention now in Southern Africa raises great doubts—and let us not fool ourselves—among the majority of African leaders. His involvement is interpreted simply as a desperate attempt to stem the Communist flood. And when the Africans look at the Kissinger record in the Middle East they understandably feel disturbed at their prospects. They see how Egypt was neutralized by the Sinai agreement and how Arab disarray and discord spread from that. They see how the Kissinger-Assad meeting was followed a few months later by the Syrian intervention in the Lebanon, which was carried out to cut down and control the Palestinians—another people struggling for their own land. How do the Africans—let us try and see it from

their point of view—see Kissinger's purposes in Southern Africa? Some of the leaders may be convinced of his good interventions, but the African guerilla leaders will not be deterred from their intention of liberating Southern Africa by armed struggle. They simply will not accept the credentials of Kissinger and it is here that, I think, Europe's foreign ministers have nearly totally failed. An initiative launched by them would not be quite so suspect as one launched by Kissinger. The African guerrillas, who have the real muscle, are the ones who decide whether there is to be peace or war in the liberation struggle. They may be forced to turn even more to Russia and Cuba but they can still be won over even now if we Europeans launch a genuine attempt to bring about a peaceful settlement. It can be done. It needs a clear declaration that the withdrawal of trade and investment with the white régimes will be imposed. It needs a promise of massive aid to get the liberated countries onto their feet, mutually advantageous contacts in trade and education and health-support schemes. These could win the Africans back to the West. At the same time, however, we must underwrite the maintenance of minority rights for those whites who want to stay on in Africa—my sister is one of them in Southern Rhodesia. We need, too, massive financial funding (which we Europeans must provide—don't let's leave it all to the Americans) for those whites who want to get out and start a new life somewhere else.

African majority governments are coming to Southern Africa. We Europeans can play, and must play, our part in bringing all these changes about. It's late in the day—God knows it's late in the day. We need a major initiative from our Foreign Ministers in the next few weeks; otherwise, I gravely fear that the Kissinger journeyings will be as unsuccessful in Southern Africa as they have been in the Middle East. Can the most powerful grouping of democratic governments in the world, here in Europe, really not get off its comfortable parliamentary backside and do something about Southern Africa? The result of our lack of effort and our lack of concern will be that Africa will be progressively lost to the West and

—tragically, and more importantly—lost to the best interests of the Africans themselves.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Mr McNamara.

Mr McNamara. — Mr Chairman, when my colleague from Hull was speaking earlier, he mentioned some of the ways where we, as Europeans, have failed in our attitude towards the Third World and he was taken to task by Lord Reay, but the important matter in our relationships with the Third World is that we give so much from our own largesse but we fail to encourage and recognize the right of the developing countries to build up their own wealth and their own potential.

If we look at what has been done in the OECD declaration on multinational companies and consider that the United Nations is also discussing this problem of transnational cooperation, we again see an area of potential conflict between the Third World, the developing world, and the richer nations of the world. As many of these multinational cooperations are domiciled in our countries, it is in our interests to maintain an attitude of flexibility and not to seek to curb the activities of these great corporations properly. It is a significant criticism of the role played by many European countries—one would exclude the Swedes in particular from this—that when the OECD was discussing multinational companies we could not reach agreement on any formula for international enforcement, we could not reach agreement for any formula for proper nation-by-nation disclosure, but just a vague generalization on disclosure of geographical areas.

Again, if we look at what has been said today, we have had much talk about the grand strategy but very little about the nitty gritty and I refer again to the point raised by my colleague from Hull, Mr Prescott. We in the Council of Europe have one particular advantage over the EEC and that is that we have there all the democratic nations of Europe,

those that are not represented in the EEC. There is an issue coming up which is fraught with danger for members of the Commission and for members of the Council of Europe and that is the whole question of fishing.

At the end of November the agreement between Iceland and the United Kingdom comes to an end. A year hence Iceland's agreements with the Federal Republic and with Belgium come to an end. If Iceland refuses to come to an agreement, if the Commission cannot adopt a proper fishing policy, then we are going to be in a grave and perilous situation because we will not have Iceland merely in conflict with three countries who happen to be members of the Community, we will have Iceland in disagreement with the whole of the Community and this is something which has to be considered very seriously. We already have the Norwegians' declaration of a 200-mile limit, we have the Faeroes' declaration of a 200-mile limit, the Greenlander's declaration of a 200-mile limit, North America's declaration of a 200-mile limit and we get the impression, as Parliamentarians, that our political lords and masters are conscious of this problem both within the Commission and the Council of Europe but they do not seem to have injected that note of urgency into this matter which we would wish to see pursued and therefore in the Socialist Group...

Sir Christopher Soames. — Am I right in thinking that what Mr McNamara is saying is that he hopes the Commission will make a better job of the negotiations with Iceland than Her Majesty's Government did ?

Mr McNamara. — The Commissioner will recall that both this present HAM Government and the one before that, and indeed the Icelandic Government, by precipitate action one way or the other, by foolishness at sea, put lives at jeopardy, by unilateral action and declarations, prevented a proper civilized attitude towards the problem. The Commission indeed failed to support its Member States properly when they were in difficulty with Iceland and non-Member States, and the

Commissioner should bear that in mind too. So I would say that it is very important for members of the Council and for members of the Commission in particular to bear in mind that this is a problem which can cause great difficulty in the near future.

(Applause)

Chairman. — I call Mr Hamilton.

Mr Hamilton. — Mr Chairman, I assume that the purpose of our meeting this morning is to express as far as possible our collective European views on those issues which threaten world peace and which are an affront to the common principles of democracy and social justice which unite us. And I want to say just one or two words on what, in my view, are the main issues which fall into those categories. They have all been referred to by previous speakers, but I think they are worth emphasizing.

The first is the enormous gulf, which still exists and is tending to deepen and widen, between the rich and poor nations of the world. This Community, with all its aspirations and hopes, still presents itself as a rich man's club in which every face, or almost every face, is white.

The second issue is probably more alarming than that—namely, the spread of nuclear power. European nations are conspiring in the spread of nuclear power to underdeveloped countries, which will give them the power to create worldwide devastation for relatively small outlay.

The second issue is related to the first, touched on by my friend, Andrew Faulds, and others—the relationship between white and coloured people. I do not like those expressions but that is the nearest one can get to describing the issue. Successive speakers, in the latter part of the debate, have expressed the fear that today Southern Africa is the powder-keg of the world and I think it is a grave fault, a grave dereliction of duty that this assembly and, as far as I know, the Council of Europe itself,

have not discussed these matters in any great detail nor formed a view on them. We have said nothing on these things.

I want to express a few words of cynicism about the activities of Mr Kissinger in South Africa today. I rather suspect, and I hope I am not being unkind, that it has got something to do with the United States elections and the black vote in America rather than the moral principles involved. But here, I must say, the European countries are not guiltless in these matters. We have had members of the Community breaking sanctions against Rhodesia ever since the United Nations passed its resolution asking us all to bring this régime to an end. European countries are selling arms to South Africa, they are selling nuclear know-how to underdeveloped countries.

Many multinational companies are still operating in Europe and have greater power and influence in world affairs than this political assembly itself. We have read about and been disturbed by the activities of companies like Lockheed and Hoffman-La Roche and others. International capitalism of that kind must be countered and controlled and made politically accountable. And I hope that, when we get direct elections in Europe—as I hope we soon will—they will be fought on those issues. I suspect there will be a considerable political polarization of the European Parliament. Quite frankly I do not like consensus politics and I hope that the direct elections and the issues that have been raised this morning will result in a much more profound political polarization because only then will we get our own people at home in all our countries interested in what we are doing.

(Applause)

Chairman. — The debate is closed. I still have five speakers listed, but unfortunately there is no more time for them to speak.

I call Mr Lewis on a point of order.

Mr Lewis. — I wish you had called me, because I was going to get up and say that I was going to follow the advice of our Swiss colleague and relinquish. Had I been given the opportunity, I would have done that.

Chairman. — I call Mr Vedovato to sum up.

Mr Vedovato, rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe — (I) Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, as a member of a European assembly taking part for the last time in a meeting of this kind, and as a Florentine senator making his final speech as rapporteur for the Council of Europe, I was extremely pleased to hear so many speakers, although I should like to have heard even more.

I was especially happy to hear the reference at the beginning of the debate to Dante Alighieri's words referring to fortune, 'Necessity makes her swift'. Unfortunately, having listened to so many speakers, I am bound to say that we are not swift. We are not quick to pinpoint the limits within which we should be prepared, in a world based on interdependence—as Sir Christopher Soames rightly said—to renounce even a tiny part of our absolute independence, be it economic or political. We are not quick to see what is the European identity referred to by Mr Prescott. Yet our voice and our presence in the world depend on our identifying these limits.

With regard to the Belgrade Conference, in my report I did not try to give its place to the Council of Europe, as Lord Reay said, I merely took the liberty of proposing coordination—which in any case already exists and is functioning—with a view to discussing a strategy for *détente*, particularly after the signing of the Final Act at Helsinki and before the forthcoming meeting of 35 countries to be held in Belgrade. I should like to say, for Lord Reay's information, that for a long time now, as the result of a proposal I myself made when I was President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, at the conferences of the Interparliamentary Union all the European countries devote a meeting to the problems

of Europe, extended to include Canada and the United States, with a view to working out a common approach. On Sunday, for example, we shall have representatives from the Belgian parliament as our hosts at just such a meeting.

As for the United Nations, Lord Reay will, I hope, not mind if I say that the number of occasions on which the representative of Europe, or of European groups, speaks at the United Nations is not sufficient ground for satisfaction. What is important is not the number of pages in the report but the substance. I remember that at the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on 10 November 1975—it is still a vivid memory, because, alas, I was present in person—three countries from the Council of Europe voted in favour of the decision condemning Israel and likening Zionism to a form of international terrorism, and one abstained. If the European countries do not even succeed in coordinating their position on such fundamental and important questions, which demand respect for historical truth and awareness of our own moral duties towards mankind in the centuries to come, then we must indeed fear for the future of the United Nations and for what our contribution as Europeans may be in that forum.

We are not swift enough to coordinate our actions as parliamentary assemblies. I want to point out this in particular: for the past four or five years the Council of Europe has been arguing the need for some sort of concrete approach to reduce terrorism in the air; yet all our initiatives have failed because the Committee of Ministers, before which I myself went in order to support this case on behalf of the Assembly, has objected that such provisions, even if they have only the force of warnings and not of legal rules, must be adopted unanimously. And because of the opposition of a single member of the Eighteen unanimity has not been achieved, and so we have seen an escalation of terrorism which has led us to the present pass. Do you believe that, if it is not possible to achieve coordination between our two assemblies, we shall be able to make a contribution to what has just been described as the megaphone of the United Nations, where majority votes are

what count and where it is even difficult sometimes to achieve qualified majorities ?

That is why coordination between our European parliamentary assemblies is urgent and essential and must brook no exceptions.

And since at the end of the session reference was made on several occasions to the events in southern Africa, I think you will at least agree that the Council of Europe has certain merits. Today at half-past two, in this building, the Political Affairs Committee, of which I have the honour to be chairman, is meeting yet again, solely to discuss the problem of sub-equatorial Africa and the attitude which the European States should adopt towards it. In our view this problem should be more or less permanently on the agenda, for it is an illusion to believe that it can be solved through the adoption of resolutions or recommendations.

We have not been quick enough to seize this unique institutional opportunity offered to us here today. The only existing institutional opportunity for coordination between our two assemblies is the Joint Session. Yet, echoing and replying to some of the criticisms which have been made in this chamber, I have to say that we even had difficulty in agreeing on the theme, because the Assembly of the Council of Europe and its Bureau had urged that the Mediterranean problem should be tackled rather than that we should drown in the immense ocean of world problems.

I should also like to make one further remark, this being the last time I shall speak. It has rightly been pointed out by many of our members that there is a need for coordination between the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, since they are two complementary bodies.

But they are so strongly complementary, institutional nationalism is so fierce and privilege, prerogatives and organ-

izational ambition are so pronounced that for the first time we shall not at the end of our meeting be publishing a joint communiqué under the responsibility of the Presidents of the two assemblies. I condemn that in the name of clarity and fair dealing. We are to have a joint communiqué signed under the responsibility of the two rapporteurs—as far as I am concerned I am very happy to accept that responsibility—but not of our two Presidents.

Having paused to point out this lack of speed, I should like, as your rapporteur, before signing the final communiqué, to express the hope at the end of this joint debate that all concerned will take greater responsibility for Europe's fortune.

(*Applause*)

Chairman. — I call Sir Geoffrey de Freitas.

Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, rapporteur of the European Parliament.—Mr Chairman, we have had over 20 speakers in this interesting debate, and on behalf of the European Parliament I wish to thank all our visitors, especially our old friends Mr Vedovato and Sir Christopher Soames. And, if it is in order, I wish to thank you, too, Mr Chairman.

(*Applause*)

Chairman. — I wish to thank the two rapporteurs, Mr Vedovato and Mr Geoffrey de Freitas, as well as the representative of the Commission, Sir Christopher Soames, and all those who have spoken.

The two rapporteurs started out from different standpoints, but were animated by the same spirit. I believe the debate has also impressed upon us the need to adopt a like-minded moral attitude in the world, and stand by it. I would like to emphasize particularly how vital it is that there should be cooperation and coordination between these two assemblies. Despite pessimistic views to the contrary, I believe that the

number of speakers in this debate, and the even greater number of those who would have liked to speak, are evidence of the fact that the Joint Meeting has a vitality and power which will persist.

Lastly, with regard to the communiqué drawn up jointly by the two rapporteurs, we agreed today that the rapporteurs should assume responsibility for the content, but that the communiqué will be published with the formal authorization of the Presidents of the two assemblies. This is something I consider very important.¹

Finally, I should like to thank Mr Spénale and the European Parliament most sincerely for inviting the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to hold this 22nd Joint Meeting here in Luxembourg.

4. Closure of the Joint Meeting

Chairman. — I declare the Twenty-Second Joint Meeting of the Members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Members of the European Parliament closed.

The meeting is closed.

(The meeting was closed at 1.20 p.m.)

¹ See Annex.

ANNEX

JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ

**of the 22nd Joint Meeting between Members of the European
Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe¹**

(14 September 1976)

on European responsibilities in the world

A — The parliamentarians, members of the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, meeting in Luxembourg on 14 September 1976 for the 22nd Joint Meeting of the two Assemblies, examined the reports presented by Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, rapporteur of the European Parliament, and Mr Vedovato, rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and discussed the responsibilities of democratic Europe in the world and towards the developing world in particular.

B — The rapporteurs of the two Assemblies, in their personal capacity :

1. Consider it essential that democratic Europe as a whole should play an active role in its relations with other parts of the world and with the developing world in particular ;
2. Note world-wide interdependence, which has given rise to a multitude of economic, social and moral crises ; and that Western Europe, whose existence depends on economic and political interdependence on the world-wide level, must join with the new world forces in solving the problems confronting them ;

¹ Communiqué drawn up jointly by the two rapporteurs (Sir Geoffrey de Freitas and Senator Giuseppe Vedovato) on their responsibility, and published with the authorization of the Presidents of the two Assemblies Mr Spénale and Mr Czernetz.

3. Note that democratic Europe has laid the foundations for cultural, social and economic cooperation with the rest of the world and has thus been accepted as a special partner ;
4. Underline, as a first objective for democratic Europe, the establishment of an economic, social and political balance between the countries of Northern Europe and those of Southern Europe ; and, consider that, in the non-military field, the European Communities and the Council of Europe, through complementary activities, offer an appropriate framework for the realization of this aim ;
5. Consider the progressive development of a model for a coherent and emancipated European society, ensuring progress for all its peoples and, at the same time, promoting equality and justice in the world, as a joint assignment for democratic Europe ;
6. Consider that in the field of human rights, a field in which the Council of Europe has been a pioneer, democratic Europe has to stand up in public and condemn behaviour which it believes to be against the principles for which it stands ;
7. In the field of development aid, welcome the Lomé Convention and call specifically for :
 - (a) Continued action in reducing tariffs within the context of the GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in the furtherance by other countries of schemes like the EEC's Generalized System of Preferences ;
 - (b) Preparation of a common, constructive position at the international conference on commodities agreed upon at UNCTAD IV, and scheduled for March 1977 ;
 - (c) Immediate action to alleviate the situation of those countries which are dangerously in debt ; longer-term measures (including investment guarantees) to encourage private investment, and the transfer of technology to developing countries ;

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 - (b) Preparation of a common, constructive position at the international conference on commodities agreed upon at UNCTAD IV, and scheduled for March 1977 ;
 - (c) Immediate action to alleviate the situation of those countries which are dangerously in debt ; longer-term measures (including investment guarantees) to encourage private investment, and the transfer of technology to developing countries ;

- (d) Study of the possible selective restructuring of those domestic industries which compete with major industries in developing countries ;
 - (e) Greater attempts, by all European countries, to attain, as soon as possible, the UN target of 0.7% of GNP for official development aid, and, also, to increase the quantity of selected food aid to seriously affected areas ;
8. Call upon Western European States to concert in order to initiate common action towards other countries and developing countries in particular ;
9. Consider that on the basis of Article 230 of the EEC Treaty, cooperation between the European Communities and the Council of Europe is appropriate in elaborating and consolidating a common policy between the States of Western Europe ;
10. Consider that such concertation would facilitate :
- (a) The working out, together with Canada and the US, of a common strategy for *détente*, particularly in view of the preparation of the forthcoming meeting in Belgrade in June 1977 of the 35 countries which took part in CSCE ;
 - (b) The agreement of a joint policy and of the objectives to be attained at the Conference on international economic cooperation (North-South Conference) ;
 - (c) Action complementing that already taken by the Nine within the UN ;
11. Are of the opinion that the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe should, by means of their public debates, draw the attention of European governments, the press and the public to the impact on Europe of world interdependence and to Europe's responsibilities to give the lead in this context.