SEVENTEENTH JOINT MEETING

of the Members of

THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

and the Members of

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

(STRASBOURG, 17 SEPTEMBER 1970)

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

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NOTE

This edition contains the original texts of the English speeches and translations of those delivered in other languages.

The latter are denoted by letters as follows:

(*F*) = speech delivered in French

(*G*) = speech delivered in German.

(*I*) = speech delivered in Italian.

The original texts of these speeches will be found in the separate editions which are published for each language.

SUMMARY

Sitting of Thursday, 17 September 1970

SITTING OF THURSDAY,

17 SEPTEMBER 1970

IN THE CHAIR: Mr. REVERDIN

President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe

The Sitting was opened at 10.30 a.m.

1. *Opening of the Joint Meeting*

The Chairman (*F*). — I declare open the 17th Joint Meeting of the members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the members of the European Parliament.

I would remind you that the rules of procedure in force are those which were adopted by mutual agreement of the Bureaux of the two Assemblies.

I would ask those who wish to speak in the debate to put their names down on the list of speakers, in Room A 92.

The purpose of the Joint Meeting is to provide an opportunity for an exchange of views between the members of the two Assemblies, without any vote being taken. The subject for the exchange of views selected for this 17th Joint Meeting is "The future of European unification and action by Europe for a policy to benefit the developing countries".

2. *Address of welcome to the President of the Italian Senate*

The Chairman (*F*). — Before calling upon Mr. Triboulet, who drafted the working paper on behalf of the Political Committee of the European Parliament, I welcome the presence in this hall of Mr. Amintore Fanfani, President of the Italian Senate, former President of the Italian Council of Ministers and former President of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

But, Mr. Fanfani, it would take me a long time to enumerate your distinctions. I prefer simply to welcome in you one of the most active personalities in Europe, who works untiringly for the future of this continent.

It is not by chance that you have taken so direct an interest in all the problems of science and technology. After having been the guest of the European Parliament, you have wished to manifest, by your presence here today, the interest which you have in the Council of Europe and its activities. On behalf of my colleagues of the Council of Europe, I thank you.

You will allow me to greet you also as almost a compatriot of mine. We have not—and I do not think that you will have—forgotten that period during the war when, as a refugee in Switzerland, you enriched, by your learning, the teaching in our universities of Lausanne and also Fribourg, and when you helped us to assist Italian students in Switzerland, by giving them the instruction of which they had need. It is therefore almost a compatriot whom I salute in you. (*Applause.*)

3. *The future of European unification and action by Europe for a policy to benefit the developing countries*

The Chairman (*F*). — The agenda calls for an exchange of views on the future of European unification and action by Europe for a policy to benefit developing countries.

I call Mr. Triboulet, Rapporteur of the Political Committee of the European Parliament.

Mr. Triboulet, *Rapporteur of the Political Committee of the European Parliament* (*F*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, if, adopting a procedure unusual at least in the European Parliament, I mount the rostrum, it is not because I have any pretensions but because, my seat not being provided with a microphone, I am indeed obliged to come up here.

I am the author of a working paper which you have perhaps read—at least I hope so—in which I say at once how much I appreciate the honour done to me. I appreciate this honour because I thus have the opportunity to greet, on behalf of the European Parliament, in a spirit of European brotherhood, all our colleagues of the Council of Europe, whom we regret we meet only once a year. But at least that is better than not at all! We warmly welcome this annual occasion.

I would like to say also to all our colleagues that, while valuing the honour done to me, I have tried to treat this subject in an unassuming way. It seems to me, indeed, that the role of Rapporteur is much more to show how the matter stands than to deal with it. Meetings of this kind are given a theme for discussion. I am well aware that, being all parliamentarians, you are free to speak on any matter. Did not a French humourist say: "Everything can be said about anything, and vice versa!" At all events, the business of the Rapporteur is to try to put the debate in its proper setting.

Our subject is "The future of European unification and action by Europe for a policy to benefit the developing countries". Since the subject is essentially a dual one and wide, it seems to me that there is scope for long discussion on these two allied ideas.

The major idea, the overriding one, it seems to me, is that of European unification. That is why I have tried to define what we mean by European unification. I do not think it should be thought to mean the diplomatic steps taken since the end of the second world war towards closer relations among the countries of Europe in general. I do not think we can regard as necessarily leading to European unification each and every effort, laudable as it may be, which has been directed towards greater unity in Europe: treaties, agreements and even the Treaty which yesterday in the European Parliament was the subject of a statement by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Walter Scheel, whose address was followed by a most interesting discussion on the agreement signed with Moscow. But it is clear that that does not directly concern European unification.

This unification seems to me to consist, *stricto sensu,* of the endeavour of six countries of Europe to unify, at first in certain respects and thereafter in general, their economies, and eventually their policies. That, it would appear, is what is called European unification in the European vocabulary, and that is what we should look at.

At the root of this unifying process, there is, of course, the Council of Europe. I pay this tribute to it in my written text, and I wish to repeat it in this introductory address. Besides, I have been a member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe since its inception. It is the first of the European Assemblies. We owe much to it, for having preserved a climate favourable to Europe and for having unceasingly tried to attenuate European problems and to make progress towards their solution. But, in the end, if we look at the present state of European unification as it really is, we cannot but see that it is mainly the work of the Six and consequently, at parliamentary level, that of the European Parliament.

A somewhat pessimistic view could no doubt be taken of this work of unification. Modesty, a sense of proportion, could even lead us to say it is not so very extensive since, after all, it is a question of only six countries in a Europe which is very much larger. We might come to think that this Europe is making progress with great difficulty. Quite a press campaign was launched, especially at the outset of the unifying action of the Six, on the subject of this Europe of the Six, referred to as "the grocers' Europe", which was arguing about the price of agricultural products; all of which seemed very much down to earth.

I have taken pains in my report, and I shall do so in addressing you now, to show that in truth this work of unification is most important. On the eve of the enlargement of the Community and at a time when negotiations about this enlargement are going on, it is well to take stock of the efforts made by the Six towards unification.

This effort is of the greatest importance because it is original and unprecedented. History tells of attempts at European unification, but these were the work of conquests and conquerors. That is not what we call European unification. The first attempt at close union among six ancient European nations was that by the Six, after two sanguinary world wars which had originated in Europe itself. It happens that among the Six are combatants from both sides, if I may so put it. After the second world war, we felt the desire to unite. It was therefore a step of an innovative and difficult kind, for there is no doubt that the current trend throughout the world is rather towards exasperating nationalism and the exacerbation of quarrels, even linguistic ones. We, on the contrary, are striving for unification, and we are, in a way, rowing against the general current of present world turmoil.

You will certainly have followed the progress of this important and original movement over the years. Twenty years ago, we began with coal and steel. I took part in all the discussions—and I still have around me in this chamber some of my erstwhile colleagues—which at the time set the functionalists against the institutionalists. The question was whether the making of

Europe should begin with functions or the immediate creation of European institutions. History has decided, and we cannot go back on it. Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and, in their entourage, the first pilgrims of Europe took functions as the first step towards unification. The first function was very limited—coal and steel; then it was the atom, and finally the Common Market.

Whilst, at the outset, the latter's ambitions might have appeared to concern only customs duties, the text of the Treaty of Rome already embodied all the lines along which the Common Market should develop, that is to say advancing beyond the field of commerce towards common production policies, particularly in agriculture, towards a common economy and currency, and in the end a common global policy. This is the road which you have followed and on which we have progressed step by step; we set out upon it again at a quicker pace after the meeting of the Heads of State or of Governments in The Hague.

This unification is, then, on the way. What seems to us essential is to understand that in the six nations, and certainly in the European Parliament but also, as was made clear to us by Mr. Walter Scheel yesterday, in the six governments, there exists a deep-seated political determination to follow this road to unification. I cite as evidence of this political determination the fact that the majority of the political groups in the European Parliament are impatiently demanding that we go ahead more speedily and continue doing so, although we have already made considerable progress in passing from coal and steel to foreign policy, the well-known report of the Davignon Committee dealing as it does with the first attempt at unification of foreign policies.

It may be added that governments do recognise that the first step, tentative as it is, must be taken and that where so prominent a manifestation of national sovereignty as foreign policy is concerned, rapid progress is not easy. The essential thing is that progress begin and that political determination undeniably exist.

Here and now, this determination to achieve political unification is facing a decisive test—expansion. I say decisive test

because I believe that it is when it is considered as such that the major difficulties presented by the negotiations with Great Britain and the other candidate countries are seen, and that view is, it seems to me, the one which must be taken. Indeed, if it is solely a question of economic interests, that is to say, if it is a matter of discussing the advantages and disadvantages, in the field of prices or trade, of the accession of Great Britain and the other candidates, we shall be engaging in a discussion of extreme difficulty, on a basis of statistics and figures, and, in the end, since the will to co-operate is there, it is apparent that we shall arrive at compromises and solutions of a more or less provisional character or at accession, in spite of the difficulty for candidate countries to board, as has been said, a moving train, in other words, to cover in a few months the distance we have with difficulty traversed in some twenty years. But none of that goes beyond the realm of economic realities. The true point at issue is whether Great Britain and the other candidate countries are to accede in order to strengthen this spirit of unification and to move on to monetary, foreign and defence policies—in short, whether they are truly coming in to join us in going ahead, or whether they do not share this determination.

This, it seems to me, is the point of the present debate. That is why I wished to open the discussion on this subject which seems to me to be of major importance.

One of the participants at the meeting of the Political Committee of the European Parliament said: "In effect, the true debate is that of listening to our parliamentary colleagues from Great Britain and the other candidate countries and to sense whether what they have to say is imbued with the same political determination as our own."

I am well aware that we ourselves have over some twenty years experienced surges of European feeling, but this feeling, when not put to the test of realities, is still somewhat hesitant. Saith the poet "Is a faith without works a sincere one?"

The sincerity of the Six has been severely tested since, for twenty years past, we have come up against hard facts and have taken the measure of the obstacles in our way. My colleagues of the European Parliament whom I see here can bear me out. In all our problems—transport, energy, status of liberal professions, etc.—we have encountered obstacles and we know how we have been able to get round them or overcome them. In short, we know what, in practice, striving for unification really means and, nevertheless, we wish to go ahead.

The question before the candidates for accession is whether, at the moment when they are confronted by very hard facts and when those great difficulties which have progressively become evident to us over twenty years will, if I may so express myself, suddenly leap out upon them, they will share our political determination to forge ahead. That is the main problem, and that is why we shall listen with such great interest to our colleagues from the candidate countries.

The second aspect of the subject which is proposed to us is aid to developing countries.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in treating this subject I have tried to show that the policy of the Six in the matter of aid to developing countries is very closely bound up with our work for the unification of Europe. It is our effort in this latter direction which has led us to create a novel policy of aid to developing countries, which soon became one of the inherent features of that unification itself. Here again, enlargement raises the problem of the spirit in which the candidates are prepared to approach this aspect of our work of unification, that of the creation of a novel policy of assistance to developing countries.

My first thought is that we and the candidate countries will readily agree on the need to help developing countries. Great Britain and the other candidate countries are already doing this; they are thoroughly conscious of the marked centuries-old urge of Europe to spread to other continents.

Favoured by its climate, its density of population and its living conditions, Europe has never confined itself to its frontiers. It has explored the world, and, in successive waves, it has colonised and then decolonised. Allow me to quote from memory a passage from the *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène* which recurred to me this morning. Napoleon, speaking in 1816 of British colonisation—for Great Britain was the colonising power of the time—said "It would be very much in Great Britain's interest to decolonise, for it would retain community of language and culture and its moral influence, while avoiding all the trouble and unpopularity of direct administration."

Thus Napoleon already foresaw in 1816 an era of de-colonisation. In the event, he was a century out, since European countries continued to colonise throughout the nineteenth century. But we are now in the era of de-colonisation.

No one, and certainly none of the candidate countries, contests this necessity for European countries to aid developing countries, in the new form of co-operation.

We can also, I am sure, agree that the European countries have a prior obligation towards these countries with which they have historic ties. On this point we are fully agreed, for yesterday I heard Mr. Malfatti, President of the Commission of the European Communities, recall in his excellent speech that the European aid given by the Six stemmed from the historic ties existing between developing countries and European countries. In this respect, too, everyone knows that Great Britain—I have given the figures in my report—devotes to the members of the Commonwealth more than 90 % of its aid to developing countries. Priority of obligation towards countries previously colonised seems to us to be readily acknowledged on all sides.

It must, however, be said that European aid by the Six presents aspects other than these two—the necessity of aid and priority of aid to the countries which have historic ties with Europe, these two obligations being, after all, susceptible of fulfilment through bilateral aid. That is why we have added to

bilateral assistance a new idea that the candidate countries will be required to adopt, namely that of a specifically European aid.

It has been our wish that some of us, who had no historical ties with countries in course of development, should participate in this effort. We wanted to pool part of our European vocation to help the less favoured countries. That is what we have tried to do. The result has been regional aid, limited I know, to Africa—Mr. Westerterp and Mr. Bersani, in the excellent opinions they wrote, have explained why we are limiting ourselves to this continent—regional aid which we are prepared to defend and which the Six countries regard as one of the essential features of the efforts that have been made over the past twenty years.

Why do they lay such emphasis on this regional aid? Firstly because they appreciate that aid to developing countries ought to be complete in scope. Having exercised governmental functions connected with co-operation, I can speak from personal knowledge. I have seen experts working and I can assert that it is no use making an investment—for example a dam in Africa—if no attention is given to the agricultural exploitation of the lands which are to be irrigated; if no aid in the form of agricultural technicians is provided, or social aid to develop or create villages; in short, if co-operation is not organised in all spheres at the same time. A scheme of assistance to a developing country must be neither piecemeal nor an investment in one isolated financial or technical operation, it must be of a general character. Investment must be associated with aid in the form of technicians, and with social and economic aid. In short, efficient assistance to developing countries cannot consist of a bit here and a bit there. That is simply waste. To distribute money round the globe, as some great powers do, solely with a view to world influence, is of no real use to the developing countries. It is absolutely necessary to devote the aid to given sectors. It is necessarily a matter of selection, and that explains regional assistance.

Now, the countries chosen by the Six are the poorest ones. Such a choice is not open to criticism. It happens that historical ties are much in evidence in this, but the fact remains that all the

criteria for development adopted by OECD or by the United Nations, be it income per head, or the proportion of industrial income in the gross national product, prove that the eighteen States who signed the Yaoundé Convention are among the poorest in the world. Aid accorded on a regional basis to particularly poor States certainly deserves no censure; on the contrary. It is, besides, this poverty which shows how baseless are the complaints made against us, for example and notably by the countries of Latin America, which are no doubt in some respects countries in the course of development but many of which have figures of industrial income in no way comparable with those of Africa. In Mr. Amrehn's excellent report I find in paragraph 8 a passage which, by itself, seems to me to justify our regional aid. Mr. Amrehn says that the aid given has not greatly benefited the eighteen countries and that in particular our exchanges with them have not greatly developed. He adds:

> "However, during the same period, imports by EEC from non-associated African countries and from Latin-American countries have shown a spectacular increase."

In fact, exchanges between the European Economic Community and Latin America have increased proportionately and in absolute terms much more than have those with the eighteen associated States. I can quote the figures from 1958 to 1966. The proportion of imports from the eighteen associated States into the Community fell from 13.3 % to 11.1 %. Nevertheless, the figure in absolute terms rose from 914 millions to 1,717 millions of units of account (1969). For the same period, for the countries of Latin America, the proportion of imports from these countries rose from 23.9 % to 25.9 %, and the absolute figures from 568 millions to 3,165 millions of units of account in 1969. What is the reason for that? It is solely that expansion of world trade benefits much more the countries which are less poor than those which are poorest. This explains why our regional aid is indispensable, since it is directed to places so poor that they derive little benefit, and even that with much difficulty, from world expansion.

I should like to give you unimpeachable evidence of this. It is in documents of the United Nations that doubt is thrown on the idea that the system of generalised preferences in favour of finished and semi-finished products which is being instituted could be to the advantage of the poorest States. The documents in question state that the creation of generalised preferences in favour of finished and semi-finished products will benefit developing countries but only those which already have a certain industrial potential, among them the Latin-American countries. As for our eighteen associated States, which are among the poorest, it is to be feared—as is categorically stated in a United Nations report—that these generalised preferences may be prejudicial to them.

In short, I think I have shown that our regional aid justifies itself, for we wished to give aid of an integrated and not dispersed character because we were concerned with the poorest countries and, it must be said, because this operation contributes also to a certain measure of African unification. For the facts of dispersal of effort in Africa and of some de-colonisations having resulted in the formation of very small States entail the necessity of regrouping. Politically speaking, a group like that of the African and Malagasy States is a happy one.

I think that, in this, we are making a valuable contribution to world action. In my report you will find information which shows that the effort made by the Six, whilst certainly regional, is at the same time bilateral—a policy therefore both European and bilateral—and of considerable benefit to developing countries. The Six are thus in the tradition of the development decades begun by the United Nations. It is these principles which inspire us and we are putting them into effective operation.

Figures have been given, among others by Mr. Westerterp and myself. In relation to our gross national product, the percentage of our aid is considerable. The figures for 1968, the only official figures, for those quoted by Mr. Westerterp for 1969 are not yet official, are as follows: 1.25 % for Germany, 1.17 % for Belgium, 1.17 % for France, 0.76 % for Italy (which in 1969 will have passed the point of one per cent) and 1.17 % for Holland.

Obviously, the assistance we are giving and the guiding principles for its distribution are suited to the very poor countries. The part played in our action by public aid and gifts is particularly notable. In that field, too, we do but respond to the call of the United Nations, which points out how undesirable it is that developing countries should become burdened with debt. The proportion of public aid is 0.44 % of the gross national product for Belgium, 0.45 % for Germany, 0.68 % for France, 0.20 % for Italy, and 0.53 % for Holland. Public aid therefore plays a considerable role and of this the greater part consists of gifts.

A spirit of true co-operation marks the dispensation of our aid. We work along with the States we assist. We endeavour, as you know, to meet with these States in parliamentary conferences and to institute a truly joint effort. This, too, seems to me to be praiseworthy.

Lastly, the price of tropical products is a matter of concern to us. The European Economic Community as such has always favoured world agreements on the stabilisation of these prices. We do all that we can to avoid slumps and to help, through emergency funds, States which would be too hard hit by a slump in the prices of certain commodities. Of what use would it be, indeed, to help the very poor countries, if the only resources, the produce of the soil, they can provide for their peasants—the poorest of the population—were allowed to become valueless? In these circumstances, any aid would be illusory. So we have progressively developed a European concern with the organisation and stabilisation of markets for tropical products.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I come to my conclusion. The two subjects which I have endeavoured to put before you are closely allied. For the candidates for accession must fully understand that the political determination to unify of which I spoke earlier is the very soul of the Community of the Six, as is also the assistance to developing countries which we have effected at European level, and this you would fully appreciate were you to be present at meetings of the European Parliament. Whatever the country or the political persuasion to which we belong, we all

share a common determination to pursue this European endeavour in the spirit in which we embarked upon it. This is for us one of the noblest aspects of the task we have accomplished over the past twenty years; to us it is a matter for pride. We are convinced that it is one of the most valuable features of the European action which we have carried through. Disparagement of this European effort would deeply hurt our feelings.

In closing, I should like to express my optimism for the future and to appeal to you all as Europeans, convinced as I am that the Six have acted well and that their neighbours are imbued with the same spirit. That is why we should be able to count upon the accession of new candidates while preserving the desire we have to show to the world that Europe has a new soul and a new inspiration. For let us not forget that it is we, the centuries-old nations of Europe, sharing a common culture, who have presented the scandalous spectacle of responsibility for having started two world wars and of having torn ourselves apart in fratricidal strife. Let us now show to the whole world that we have a new soul, that we are conscious of this common inspiration and culture and that we wish to enable our own peoples and those beyond our frontiers, especially in the less fortunate countries, to enjoy the benefits of peace in Europe. (*Applause*)

The Chairman (*F*). — Mr. Triboulet, you have just added much to the excellent written report you laid before us, unfortunately at a rather late stage and somewhat upsetting the preparation of our programme. We cannot blame the Secretariats of our two Assemblies. The September meetings are a race against the clock.

I thank you very much for having enhanced your written report with so many pertinent observations and courageous assurances.

I call Mr. Amrehn, Rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly.

Mr. Amrehn, *Rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee of the Consultative Assembly* (*G*). — Mr. Chairman, the Consultative Assembly has approached the debate on the subject of

its choice on the basis of two premises. One of these is that enlargement represents a significant step in the direction of European unity and, although there may be some scepticism attached to this, is at any rate an expression of the hope—which Mr. Triboulet, too, has voiced—that we are making progress towards the unification of Europe, whatever the particular legal form we expect it to take. And the second premise is that then, and only then, may we pursue a more positive development policy.

Starting from these two premises, the Political Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe has presented a report which sets out to examine how the political conditions of increased development aid stand in relation to each other, and what the effects of development aid are on the degree of unity and progress towards unification in the European Community. It cannot be denied that, as development aid grows, criticism both of the aim itself and of the means used to attain it also becomes more intense. Because of the importance of this matter, therefore, and despite all the criticisms, despite the many shortcomings and frequent disappointments, I should like to emphasise once again, very strongly, that development aid must be given. It is not simply a moral imperative, it is a political imperative of social responsibility in the world and for the world, it is a condition of peace and thus, basically, a condition of our own self-preservation. It is an enormous task the true magnitude of which cannot be accurately estimated, and we do not know whether we shall succeed in really mastering it. We do not know whether we shall discharge this task on time, or in time. Nor do we know whether we shall succeed in transforming the restlessness and resentment of the under-privileged masses into productive, fruitful activity in a spirit of partnership and co-operation. But we do know that, between the poles of obvious and unashamed industrial and material welfare in the industrialised countries and the desperate needs of a still hungry world, tension exists and that we must do everything in our power to prevent that tension leading to an explosion. In such circumstances, the high priority which the Community must attach to development policy, now and in the future, stands to reason. There is, therefore, no need to explain why, to our way

of thinking, development aid is not simply a subsidiary matter of merely technical or economic concern; the Community's attitude to development aid is an essentially political decision. It is apparent unfortunately, that even in political circles this fact is quite insufficiently appreciated. It is therefore very right that we should be discussing this matter at our Joint Meeting.

The significance of the enlargement of the Community in the context of development aid is already apparent when we realise that an increase in our share of world trade from about 17 % to more than one quarter, following the enlargement of the Community, will give rise to a mass of additional questions of responsibility for the third world. It is almost a matter of course that, following enlargement beyond the current association arrangements, where development aid is concerned, the Community will acquire new representativeness throughout the world; further, that we shall be made responsible, and not simply feel ourselves to be responsible, but will be made responsible by the countries of the third world for improving living standards even in those areas where the Community has so far not been involved. Thus, our own political attitude to this question will in fact be significantly determined by the wishes, needs and claims of other countries, many of which feel that they have been discriminated against in development hitherto. Mr. Triboulet has already explained that such a feeling is unjustified in material terms, since the increase in the volume of trade, particularly with the countries of South America, has been relatively much greater than the increase in in the Community's trade with the associated African States. This is true. Nevertheless it must be pointed out that the discrimination cannot be removed, as these third States maintain, simply by expanding trade in terms of quantity—which would then, moreover, call for a study of the absolute figures—but there must also be structural and organisational changes if we here in Europe admit responsibility for development policy as a whole, responsibility for all continents, inasmuch as we are already responsible as a Community and will have even greater responsibility in the future by reason of the responsibility of the candidate States. In this sense we shall inevitably have to move on from a regional responsibility to a global one.

Mr. Triboulet says in his written report that, judging from figures in the report of the Council of Europe's Political Affairs Committee, global responsibility seems to be interpreted simply as the sum of erstwhile bilateral activities and an increase of responsibility in the purely mathematical sense, as if global responsibility did not also mean greater and more immediate responsibility on the part of the Community. But surely not. In my opinion, careful study of the whole report presented by that committee makes it clear that we are concerned with this political dimension of the Community's responsibility as a Community. That is what we mean by global responsibility. We take the view that this is an opportunity for greater responsibility to be assigned to those bodies in the Community which act on its behalf. This is an opportunity, not merely for the member States, but preferably for the Commission, to involve Europe as a whole in development policy. To that extent the enlargement of the European Development Fund and the geographical expansion of the Commission's activities involving that Fund would constitute a first step towards a common foreign policy.

In our report, we avoid discussing the specific question of forms of unification. We have considered the two aspects of the joint theme in relation to each other and have not dealt separately with the first aspect, which of course deserves a debate of its own, because this would have led us all too quickly into a discussion about the past. We share Mr. Triboulet's view that progress towards unification in the way I have just described can also be achieved by pragmatic solutions. To this extent it seems to me that any contradictions which may appear to emerge from a reading of these reports are in fact non-existent if the Commission of the Communities—like the Rapporteur a moment ago—is imbued by a strong and effective political determination to make it clear that Europe is united on development policy, by strengthening the development aid machinery and giving greater responsibility to those in charge of it. So there do seem to be points of very close contact, if we can approach a question such as that being discussed here not solely from the standpoint of functionalism or structuralism, but seeking a solution to these problems in the light of

practical possibilities, albeit, too, of the necessities which impose themselves upon us. And so we do believe that the Commission and the institutions of the Community are the right instruments—serviceable, available and capable of expansion—to make the transition from a limited or regional responsibility for development aid to a greater, global responsibility.

Then again, global responsibility does not mean that the Community can do everything, all over the world. It means that we must integrate the possibilities which we have with other development aid facilities throughout the world, provided by other countries or other continents. And the transition from regional responsibility to global responsibility cannot, of course, mean that we should dismantle any existing preferences. We must understand the anxiety of those who have enjoyed preferential relations with the Community in the past that this close relationship might possibly be weakened. That is not the intention, of course; the intention is to remove those distinctions and preferences which have placed others at a disadvantage, or may have given them the impression that they were placed at a disadvantage. Moreover, this varies with different areas and consequently calls for detailed study; the details have not been set out by the Political Affairs Committee but are contained in the complementary report of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development.

To conclude, I would point out that the aim of our endeavours, once we assume this increased global responsibility, is above all to master the task that we have acknowledged as essential, and to master it in such a way that at the same time the rewards of the services we render, and the need for the available resources to be properly adapted to the needs of the third world, will strengthen the Community and strengthen the responsibility of its leaders, so that this particular area may mark the beginning of a common foreign policy for the Europe which has so far achieved unification and whose existence it is not intended to challenge, and for the Europe which will emerge from the enlargement now under discussion. (*Applause*)

The Chairman (*F*). — Thank you for your statement, Mr. Amrehn.

I would inform you that Mr. Westerterp has had to go to Luxembourg, so Mr. Bersani will present the opinions of the Committee on External Trade Relations and of the Committee on Relations with African States and Madagascar of the European Parliament.

I call Mr. Bersani, the author of the opinion of the European Parliament's Committee on Relations with African States and Madagascar.

Mr. Bersani, *Rapporteur for opinion of the European Parliament's Committee on Relations with African States and Madagascar* (*I*). — I shall try to sum up briefly the attitude of the European Parliament's Committees on External Relations and on Relations with African States and Madagascar to the topic for debate today. As Mr. Triboulet, the General Rapporteur of the European Parliament, has so rightly said, there is indeed a close connection between the unification of Europe and the gradual and ever more responsible development of our policy for international co-operation on a world scale. I am convinced that the methods, value and "measure" of our aid for developing countries will depend on the way in which we continue the process of uniting Europe.

The process of European union moves by steps. It is often characterised by basically pragmatic methods. Nevertheless we know that in essence it is inspired and guided by the principles of integration, i.e. by those principles which have profoundly revolutionised the historical forms of politico-economic relationships between the nations.

Integration means overcoming nationalism; it means pooling our destinies and our efforts; it is a completely new vision, based on ideas of peace and collaboration, which increasingly imprints its positive influence on international reality.

It is in relation to all this that we view the work done by the European Commission in connection with countries with which it has been associating and which belong to the third world. Although originally the way in which the problem was tackled could be regarded as instrumental, there is no doubt that the basic inspiration of the Community process linked with the overcoming of outdated political concepts and characterised by a whole-hearted support for a new concept of relationships between the nations has had a beneficial influence on the internal development of the process of associating the European Community with various countries and in particular with the African countries and Madagascar.

I tried in my report to demonstrate that many criticisms of the various conventions—particularly of the Yaoundé Conventions which are the main ones in this connection—are in essence relative, especially if account is taken of the central trend revealed from one convention to another, from one conference to another within this experiment which is in a sense intra-Community. There is the increasingly institutionalised process towards an effective equal relationship, the progressive freeing of the association agreements from the original shackles—which might also be regarded as being linked with the original neo-colonialist situation; there is the gradual transition from an aid policy to an effective policy of co-operation in which aid is given without strings and without real set-off. This is an outward-looking approach to problems which have so far had no equivalent in international experience.

It is this trend, this progressive unfolding of the inner potentialities of the Conventions, which, in my view, should be taken into account when we judge the past and try to derive motives for our future action from past achievement and experiences. The Conventions with the associated African States have gradually revealed, particularly as our talks on an equal footing with our African partners went deeper, their intrinsic aim: a wider and more thorough solution of the problem of Europe's co-operation

with the third world. Those who maintained that there was a basic contradiction between the regional policy of Yaoundé and the ever more widely recognised demand for a world solution to the problem of development aid did not take sufficiently into account the progress, especially in recent years, of the Euro-African dialogue. Both we and our African partners have gradually evolved what might be called a political doctrine for our collaboration, the foundation of which is that regional policy does not conflict with global policy. In fact it sets out to pave the way to a general and comprehensive policy which will in any case have to be broken down into specific policy measures at the level of regions and sectors.

It is the gradual elaboration of that international policy that we are better able to consider today on the basis of our experiences, besides having regard to the fact that many things have changed since 1957—i.e. since EEC came into being and consequently its policy towards the associated States. First there is the internal development of the European Community and particularly the evolution towards an effective economic and above all political unit. Mr. Amrehn, who spoke before me, rightly emphasised what in my view is one of the most important arguments in his report, that the development of the demand for a joint foreign policy, the conviction that we must of necessity hammer one out, opens up new prospects for the achievement of a joint European aid policy for the third world. A joint foreign policy will find one of its most significant testing grounds in the concrete implementation of a comprehensive aid policy. Any progress we make therefore towards the enlargement of the Community, the meeting of requirements for a political union and the gradual preparation of a joint foreign policy is a decisive contribution towards the transfer of a truly international aid policy for developing nations from the field of wishes and theories to that of reality.

The Chairman of the Council spoke yesterday with enthusiasm of the enlargement of the Community from Six to Ten. If it takes place more rapidly than is normally considered probable, it will constitute a second important factor, if only because the English-speaking countries of Africa, the Caribbean, part of Latin

America and other parts of the world will be directly involved. That process, by approaching in a new context the relationships of the Community of Ten—in which England will become a full partner—with certain areas of the world, will clearly raise a whole series of practical questions. In Mr. Westerterp's report, as in my own, attempts were made, by considering a number of specific problems and concrete solutions on legally defined bases, to single out economic, tariff, technical and trade proposals and arrangements for which we shall henceforth have to adopt specific measures.

On the initiative of the United Nations and the large international agencies, various steps have been taken with a view to drawing up a world strategy for development aid.

The Second Decade which is starting after the New Delhi Conference—at this moment whilst we are meeting here, an important phase in this process of the effective internationalisation of the problem is taking place in Tokyo with the Development Aid Committee—will constitute a fundamental element in this effort to give a world dimension to the problem of under-development.

From that point of view, it is quite significant that, starting from the various "Charters", including that of Algiers, up to the New Delhi Conference, the developing countries themselves have gradually and increasingly begun to fashion their own active policy. They have become partners with whom we must indeed reckon, since it is extremely important that the relations between the industrialised and the developing countries move gradually towards a democratic dialogue which respects the personality of all parties.

That is a new aspect of the problem from which arise specific responsibilities for the European institutions. It is not by chance that the European Parliament has on several occasions emphasised the need for the European Community, after having taken part in the UNCTAD Conferences as a mere observer, to intervene fully as the spokesman for a joint European policy which should be drawn up without delay.

Meanwhile a new world awareness of the problem has developed. In my report I tried for example to show how wide sections of young people throughout the whole world were showing a more mature interest in the problem through the volunteer organisations. I also referred to a section of the Pearson Report which describes the concrete contribution which volunteers and private aid had so far made towards wider co-operation with the developing countries. There has been a remarkable number of social achievements, but above all a contribution of enthusiasm, witness, personal endeavour and ever more responsible collaboration which has gradually matured both in the industrialised and in the developing countries. These are projects which we should indeed know about, understand, support and promote.

And since on this point there has not always been agreement between a part of our Parliament, at least within the Committee on Relations with Developing Countries, and the Commission, I should like to stress here once more the need for this aspect of the question to be carefully assessed. In particular, I hope that the voluntary agencies working in Europe will co-ordinate their organisation at continental level, so that they may become active protagonists and valid partners in a constructive dialogue with the Community bodies.

Fortunately a series of factors are contributing to give the problem a fuller and more accurate dimension. What EEC and the AASM have done together must be properly exploited in the future. The Yaoundé Convention, the association between EEC and Africa, is a positive reference point for all concerned.

A few days ago some colleagues and myself paid a visit to the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam, which are associated with the Community. On that occasion, in addition to fruitful and extremely cordial conversations with the rulers of those countries, whom I should like to thank most sincerely—also on behalf of my colleagues—we had some contact with representatives of other countries of Latin America. Some of them pressed the familiar argument that, since the Community policy in its dealings with the African countries was a result of discrimination against others

and more especially Latin America, that system should be demolished and replaced by a universal scheme for all developing areas.

We tried to make our courteous questioners understand that this point of view was partial and unrealistic even if it raised problems concerning their continent to which EEC must henceforth give urgent attention. The association between Europe and the African States is the only attempt made in the world to bring about collaboration on an equal footing, without conditions and conditioning, with modest set-off—the obligations which tie the free trade areas of GATT are well known—in a way which respects the economic autonomy and political independence of all concerned. Therefore we must strive for enlargement around this nucleus in addition to attempting constantly to introduce new improvements to the existing system.

Both we and the leaders of the Latin-American countries must endeavour not to destroy everything positive that has so far been done, but to improve on the experiments carried out and respect the specific aspects of such experiments linked with differing aspects of geographical and economic conditions in the various areas. For some time now the countries of Latin America have found understanding and support in the European Parliament and the Council of Europe. All the debates we have had on these matters bear witness to this. Only yesterday I requested the Chairman of the Council, Mr. Scheel, to put the problem of Latin America on the Council's agenda. In any case, the problem must be looked at in this way. I endorse the important remarks made by Mr. Vedovato in this connection, and also with regard to a coherent European policy for the Mediterranean area. As a necessary complement, following the entry of the United Kingdom and other candidate countries, to our policy in Africa and elsewhere, beyond the areas which are today covered by the various Association Conventions, it is also necessary to give urgent priority to Community action both with respect to Latin America and the Mediterranean.

As regards the Mediterranean, I should like to draw attention at this Joint Meeting to a statement made yesterday evening,

following a request by the Chairman of the Council, Mr. Scheel, at the close of the political debate. He said that the time for particular trade agreements was past and that it was now essential to arrive at an overall conception. To repeat his own words, he said that it was necessary to go beyond the fortuity of particular trade agreements and move on to an organic conception. He also added that, although it was not felt advisable at the present time to draw up a memorandum defining the exact lines of a programme of action, at least whilst the present situation in the Middle East remained as it was, he still hoped that in the near future it would be possible for the Community institutions to do something in the matter; and he undertook to take up the problem in those terms at one of the forthcoming sessions of the Council of Ministers.

Thus, as you see, the problem is open and is being looked at positively, as we have seen so clearly in the report presented by the President of the Commission, Mr. Malfatti, at the beginning of this session of the European Parliament.

In approaching my conclusion, I should like to refer to the sincere conviction of all concerned of the need to intensify, with renewed will and awareness, the efforts made to improve the present situation, beginning with the exploitation and improvement of steps so far undertaken, to bring out all their potentialities and to stress their peculiarities and most original characteristics, with a view to incorporating our everyday work in a final and comprehensive framework. The separate efforts we are making can be co-ordinated to fit into that framework in the conviction that there is no contradiction between regional initiatives due to particular circumstances of history and the prospect of co-ordinated action on a world scale organised over areas and regions in accordance with a balanced and reasonable vision of the future.

Europe has a growing responsibility in this process. Each day we have figures (our share in world trade will increase with the enlargement of the Community from 17 to 25.6 %, and the volume of imports from 30 to 43 % of worlds imports), facts and a growth of moral consciousness which justify increasing our action. Circumstances oblige us to leave behind aid formulas

for the sake of higher conceptions calling for co-operation with developing nations.

We must achieve the active participation of the European Community as such through a system of trade agreements which, alas, have not yet yielded the hoped for results, to the grave detriment of all developing countries. That is a key point which Mr. Westerterp illustrated abundantly in his report: it concerns a number of basic ways of correcting the world market in the interest of international justice, the redistribution of incomes, the more equitable participation of all peoples in the benefits of economic and technical advances. All the Rapporteurs agreed that this was a fundamental argument.

Then there is the problem of European structures, which must be strengthened in that context. I agree with the Council of Europe's Rapporteurs. The structures must necessarily be strengthened to face up to the increased responsibility, the greater weight of contemporary Europe, above all an enlarged Europe and a wider and fuller vision of our action throughout the world. If we want to be responsible we must deal with that problem too. Our present structures make it difficult for us to give a coherent, expeditious and adequate answer to the problems under review.

With that, I think I can conclude my intervention by referring back to what I said at the beginning when I stressed the need for a growing awareness of the essential connections between development aid policies and international collaboration in other political measures which directly condition peace, disarmament and international coexistence. The mainstay of integration and the urgent call for peaceful collaboration on which our European edifice must be based and on which it has been developed, both internally and in its relations with developing countries, must be a more courageous assumption by us of responsibility in dealing with one of the world's greatest moral, economic, political and social problems. It must act as a guarantee for those who expect so much from a more adequate and juster policy on our part.

The Chairman (*F*). — I thank Mr. Bersani for his interesting statement.

I will now give you some brief indications of how our work is progressing.

This morning, we still have to hear one Rapporteur, Mr. Vedovato, and then the President and a member of the Commission of the European Communities, as well as three other speakers. Eight speakers are already down for this afternoon. If each of us would play his part in speeding up the tempo of our proceedings and make an effort to express himself succinctly, that would be helpful to all.

I call Mr. Vedovato, Rapporteur of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Mr. Vedovato, *Rapporteur of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development of the Consultative Assembly* (*I*). — In January this year there was a wide-ranging debate here—based on a report of mine—concerning a policy for aid to and co-operation with the developing countries which, in view of the number of European and indeed world representatives who took part, constituted—together with the results achieved—something comparable even on a scientific plane to the Pearson and Jackson Reports. The Committee on Economic Affairs and Development, which I have the honour to represent, regards our meeting at European Parliament level as a continuation of that debate.

I intend to present problems rather than review data because, in today's debate and those which we hope will follow, the intention is to sharpen our wits and take action.

What characterises the policy of the European Economic Community towards the third world? First of all it is a marginal policy, i.e. it is not the Community's main aim. Secondly, the Community's co-operation with the third world, even in respect to the economic and financial problems of aid, has in many re-

spects corresponded to a specific interest. Therefore it can be said, if we analyse the Community's policy towards the third world in depth, that there has been a constant search for a balance between the responsibilities of the European Community's economic policy towards all the countries of the third world and the legal obligations contracted by the Community in particular agreements with countries outside Europe.

The problem which faces us European parliamentarians today is whether this balance can still be considered as such or whether it should not give way to other considerations, at a time when three extremely important phenomena exist: the enlargement of the Community; the beginning of the Second Development Decade proclaimed by the United Nations; the transfer of the concept of aid policy from the humanitarian plane of aid to the more or less legal sphere of co-operation.

To answer this question let us survey various horizons in Africa, Latin America, Asia and also the other Europe.

With respect to Africa, undoubtedly EEC's policy towards that continent, which came into being by virtue of specific links existing between the countries of the Community and the overseas territories which later became independent, was basically inspired by a conservative attitude—it can be seen in the first and second Yaoundé Conventions, and in the Arusha Convention. That is to say allowing the associated countries certain tariff preferences which by definition discriminated against other developing countries. The inverse tariff preferences, i.e. those granted by African countries to the countries of the European Community, are in many aspects irreconcilable with the general principles of international trade as these were interpreted in the discussions by the developing countries in New Delhi and after.

The system of relationships connected with the association with Africa exercises a magnetic attraction in dealings with all other countries which remained outside such relationships. This gives rise to a particularly grave problem which is linked with that of preferences and hence discrimination. That makes it very

difficult for Europe to close the door, let alone remain indifferent and cold, when confronted by requests coming from other African countries. Hence the need for Europe to broaden its views and to pursue a coherent policy in its dealings with other areas of Africa and the world. The prospect of a forthcoming enlargement of the Yaoundé Association makes it even more urgent to define this policy.

When looking at Africa, European thought cannot avoid the neighbouring Mediterranean; and it was in connection with the preferential relationship with these countries that a number of particularly sharp criticisms came from GATT and UNCTAD.

There are countries with a form of association, such as Turkey, which will probably soon become full Members; there are others which, without thinkings of joining EEC, are beginning to gravitate towards the European Community, such as Spain, Yugoslavia and Malta. For other countries—Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria—the Treaty of Rome already provided forms of association. Lastly, there are such countries as Israel, the Lebanon and the UAR which are gathering at the Community's doors to seek the possibility of establishing relations of co-operation. But a comprehensive policy towards the Mediterranean countries, which, may I remind you, has always been advocated by the Italian Government, requires a coherent vision of the problem. And it must not be forgotten that half these countries overlooking the Mediterranean are European. That vision is essential to avoid a proliferation of bilateral agreements between European and African countries. This proliferation is often interpreted as a lack of full support for the spirit of European co-operation since these bilateral arrangements are mostly concluded as a result of individual requests from separate African partners.

It must not be forgotten that authoritative members of our Assembly—Mr. Goedhart and Mr. Blumenfeld—have emphasised on several occasions in WEU and the Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly the need for this comprehensive European policy towards the Mediterranean African countries. Even if in that context they were mainly concerned with facing up to the strategic

position in the Mediterranean, later events have shown that, in view of the permanent state of affairs there, our Community must approach all the countries bordering on the Mediterranean within the context of European co-operation, far more than hitherto.

Thanks to the presence of leading Latin-American parliamentarians at the January debate referred to just now, we have seen that, after Africa, Latin America is the continent in which the European Economic Community and all its activities concerning the third world has received the greatest approval and also the most criticism.

Approval in that this policy was considered to be a factor making for equilibrium; criticism because certain aspects of that policy were regarded as discriminatory.

That reveals another aspect. So far we have received requests from Latin-American countries to establish contacts and relations with the Community, contacts and relations which have been arranged with the Commission through the diplomatic missions of the Latin-American countries. But a few weeks ago, on 30 July this year, at a conference in Buenos Aires, the Foreign Ministers of the Latin-American countries issued a declaration in which they called for the institutionalisation of that relationship in order to deal with the problems of the joint agricultural policy, the transfer of capital, technological and industrial collaboration and sea transport.

Either the Community fails to respond to this detailed and pressing request, in which case the relations between Europe and Latin America will deteriorate still further, or the Community accepts; but if it did so before having worked out a comprehensive policy towards developing countries, that would make negotiations meaningless.

Asia has a place of its own with respect to problems of underdevelopment. That continent is more inclined, as far as development problems are concerned, to look to the United States or America and above all Japan. That does not rule out the need

for a co-operation relationship of Europe with developing countries in Asia. And I endeavoured to show in my report, after discussions in our committee, that this attitude of co-operation and collaboration can find its best expression through co-operation with the Asia Development Bank, which at present is the most suitable way of enabling Europe to make its presence felt actively in that part of the world.

But when we talk of Europe we must also think of the other Europe. And there could be a long discussion on that subject. In my report I referred, on the basis of a very detailed study by Vassilief published by OECD, to Eastern Europe's policy towards developing countries. Looked at quantitatively it comes to an eleventh of the development aid of the member States of OECD and a fifth of United States' aid. But it is not the quantity which should concern us, but rather the way in which the aid is given and, implicitly, its aims. It can be and has been shown how the Eastern world has pursued a triangular policy towards the third world which can be summed up as follows: the purchase of raw materials at low prices from developing countries; the sale to those countries of capital goods; the use of the credit balance thus acquired to purchase from Western countries other equipment required for Eastern Europe's own economic development.

In our view all this clearly indicates the need to consider the policy towards the third world within the context of Europe's responsibilities which, as Mr. Malfatti rightly said the day before yesterday, increase as the Community expands and Europe makes its presence felt throughout the entire world. And it is this very enlargement with the assumption of new and wider responsibilities which could provide the hoped for occasion to reconsider the Community's development policy in order to make a fresh start on different bases.

Above all, we believe the Community must abandon that rather passive attitude which it has adopted towards requests submitted from developing countries outside Africa, and an attempt must be made to do away somehow with the discrepancy—as the world sees it—between the position adopted by the Com-

munity towards African countries with which particular agreements are being renewed or concluded and its attitude towards the rest of the third world. Hence the advisability of applying to the other countries of the third world, and in particular certain areas, a very liberal system of co-operation so as to eliminate or reduce the negative consequences of certain trade preferences which, through their interpretation and often through their application, undoubtedly lead to discrimination.

Clearly, this joint approach which Europe must adopt in its dealings with the countries of the third world must be inspired by traditional and classical guidelines: namely financial and trade co-operation. Financial co-operation can be arranged through the various financial institutions already operating within Europe. It should be possible to develop economic co-operation increasingly by facilitating access to raw materials in developing countries and making it easier for these countries to market their semi-finished products in Western Europe. In other words, the existing preferential agreements with European countries would be merged in world agreements for the organisation of the marketing of basic commodities and the introduction of a general system of non-reciprocal tariff preferences for all developing countries.

Lastly, the picture would not be complete if I did not emphasise in particular—with respect to both economic and financial co-operation—a factor which in the world of development co-operation has recently assumed dramatic aspects. In other words European responsibility cannot evade the duty of finding a system for guaranteeing all kinds of investments which the West have made or may make in the developing countries. If I refer to this it is not so much because my country has recently been the victim of incidents which have unfortunately failed to arouse European solidarity, but above all because it was our Council of Europe as long ago as 1957 which put out the idea that a way should be found to provide guarantees, by means of international undertaking, for both public and private investments.

That idea came to nothing; it was taken up by OECD and the World Bank, but no concrete results have yet been achieved.

So that once more we are witnessing, not a proliferation, but sporadic cases of bilateral agreements designed to guarantee these investments in some way.

We hold that the time has come when all European countries should face up to this problem again because there have got to be forms of co-operation in this field, if not universal then at least regional and multilateral. That raises once more the responsibility of European parliamentarians for the joint policy which has to be worked out towards the developing countries, and I conclude my report with that remark and with thanks for your attention.

The Chairman (*F*). — I call Mr. Malfatti, President of the Commission of the European Communities.

Mr. President, I am delighted, as President of the Consultative Assembly, to give you the floor for the first time in this chamber in which I hope that you, like your predecessor, will appear not only in the occasion of Joint Meetings but also from time to time to keep the Council of Europe informed.

I give you the floor.

Mr. Malfatti, *President of the Commission of the European Communities* (*I*). — Mr. Chairman, may I thank you for your kind remarks. I will say at once that I appreciated them particularly since I am anxious to preserve the closest possible ties between the two institutions of which you and I are respectively Presidents.

I shall observe your request to speakers to be brief because in fact I simply want to greet the Joint Meeting of the members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.

This new gathering of representatives of European nations confirms once again the validity of the ideals and aspirations which, twenty-one years ago, brought into being the Council of Europe, the foundation stone of the attempts and efforts made over a generation to give our continent a new structure.

The topic chosen this year shows indeed that the building of Europe is not an end in itself. The Europe we are building is and seeks to continue to be open to the demands of the world in which we live. We could never find the inspiration and courage necessary to overcome once and for all the centuries of history in which our peoples have been torn by national struggles in the name of dreams of hegemony if we did not give European unity a meaning and an outward-looking mission in relation to the other nations and in particular the developing countries.

I have listened with keen interest to the reports which have been expanded in this gathering by eminent parliamentarians and I can assure you in the name of the Commission that the Commission itself will pay careful attention to all the statements and proposals which have been and will be made or formulated during the debate. I am extremely sorry not to be able to take part in this debate because I am about to leave for an official visit to Bonn; my colleague Mr. Jean-François Deniau will talk to you about one of the most important current problems faced by the European Communities: the development policy pursued by our Community and the effects which enlargement might have on that policy.

In a speech made on 19 September 1946 in Zurich at the meeting which resulted in the first European negotiations leading to the Council of Europe, Winston Churchill, speaking of the need to unite our countries which had been divided and prostrated by war said: "In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living."

We believe in that message, and we are working to achieve that objective which, in our view, is an essential part of international equilibrium, namely an active policy of détente and peace, and to give developing countries assistance in keeping with our tradition and mission, through collaboration on a basis of equality. (*Applause.*)

The Chairman (*F*). — Thank you, Mr. Malfatti.

I call Mr. Duncan Sandys, leader of the United Kingdom delegation to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Mr. Sandys. — I am sure that we all greatly appreciate the encouraging words of the President of the Commission and that we all wish him success in the momentous task which he has undertaken for the future of Europe.

I am sure also that all members of the Consultative Assembly warmly welcome these Joint Sessions, which provide precious opportunities to exchange views with our colleagues in the European Parliament.

We have arrived at a crucial stage in the development of European unity. During the coming year, major decisions will have to be taken which will profoundly affect Europe's economic strength, political influence and military security. Negotiations for the enlargment of the European Community have begun again. In the last decade two previous attempts failed. This time we have got to succeed. A third failure would leave behind it a deep sense of frustration and bitterness, which in my opinion would make a renewal of negotiations impossible for many years. In the meantime, the pattern of economic and political development in the Community and outside would crystallise more and more along different lines; and in consequence the obstacles to unification would become progressively greater, if not completely insuperable.

It would serve no useful purpose for us to debate the specific issues which are at present the subject of negotiation. On the other hand, we can, I believe, by our speeches here and in our national parliaments, help to create a political climate which will make it easier for our governments to reach agreement at the conference table. We must do all we can to encourage those responsible for the conduct of the negotiations to retain a proper sense of perspective and not to lose sight of the wood for the trees.

The task of uniting Europe must not be tackled like a commercial amalgamation or business deal. Our decisions must not

be dictated by precise mathematical calculations of short-term national advantage. We must try to think as Europeans and look to the future. We must regard each other, not as rivals, but as partners, engaged in a common enterprise the success of which will be of inestimable value to all. The fact that we seek unity by peaceful and constitutional means does not alter the fact that we are engaged in bringing about one of the most revolutionary changes in European history.

Up till now attention has, quite naturally, been concentrated on the problem of economic union, but we cannot much longer ignore or brush aside the question of integration in the political sphere.

Mr. Triboulet, with whom I have worked for many years for the cause of European unity, expressed some doubts about the sincerity of Britain's European convictions; and he questioned our willingness to advance beyond economic unification. I can assure him that his doubts are totally without foundation. The new British Conservative Government and the Labour Government before it have repeatedly emphasised the fundamental importance which Britain attaches to political as well as economic union. This will, I am sure, be confirmed by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Michael Stewart, who until recently was Britain's Foreign Minister. If Mr. Triboulet will not mind my saying so, I must admit that we in Britain have sometimes had our doubts about the enthusiasm of the French Government for political union and their readiness to accept the limitations of sovereignty which this would involve.

We in Britain consider it humiliating and totally unacceptable that the nations of Europe, who for centuries led and inspired the world, should now have virtually no say in the great international decisions—on vital issues such as the Middle East conflict and the negotiations for arms limitation. Until we can speak with one voice, these and other crucial problems, upon which the peace and other crucial problems, upon which the peace and progress of the world depend, will continue to be settled over our heads in Washington and in Moscow.

The Summit Conference at The Hague gave us hope that at long last some progress towards political union would begin to be made. But, as far as one can judge from the information available, the concrete proposals which seem likely to emerge are, to say the least, not very daring. No realistic person imagines that European political union can be brought about overnight by some clever constitutional formula. Unity cannot be created. It must grow. It must be the expression of a genuine European consciousness, based upon common material interests and common moral values. This will be a gradual process and will have to be achieved by successive stages—first consultation, then co-operation, and finally integration. But the fact that progress must be gradual is no reason for not starting at all.

The initial step is to establish the habit of genuine consultation on all important issues of external affairs and defence. Consultation must, of course, be a reality and not just a polite formality. Above all, it must take place before and not after national decisions have been reached. It is true that at present there are many important international issues on which the governments of our countries hold divergent views. But the existence of these differences does not mean they cannot be resolved. Up till now we have considered these problems from our respective national standpoints. They will look quite different when we approach them collectively with a sincere desire to find common European solutions. I am convinced that as we examine and discuss these questions together, an identity of view will increasingly emerge.

It is, of course, not enough for Ministers to meet occasionally and exchange views for a few hours. The development of a common European policy requires continuous joint study of international problems from a collective European standpoint. To perform this task we need to create an independent European political Secretariat, whose recommendations would be considered at regular intergovernmental meetings of Ministers or officials. In asking for the creation of a independent political Secretariat, I stress the word "independent". The members of this study group will no doubt be chosen from the ranks of government officials. But, during their term of service on the Secretariat, they must be

completely free to formulate joint proposals without instructions from their governments.

Unless we are prepared to set up some simple independent machinery of this kind, it is a farce to talk about consultation; and it is sheer hypocrisy to make eloquent speeches about political union. Our willingness to take this first modest step is, I believe, a test of the sincerity of our intentions.

It is quite possible that circumstances outside our control will, whether we like it or not, force us to accelerate the process of political unification. During the course of 1971, it is virtually certain that the United States Government will announce its intention to withdraw a substantial number of American troops from Europe. The gap in our defences which this will create will have to be filled by an increased military effort by the European Members of NATO.

If the cost of this effort is not to be unbearably heavy, we shall have to take all possible measures to eliminate avoidable duplication and waste, both in the composition of our armed forces and in the development and manufacture of their equipment. This will inevitably necessitate the creation of some form of European defence organisation. This in turn will have to be controlled by some kind of political authority, capable of formulating a joint defence policy and a common armaments programme—if necessary, by majority decisions. If such a development takes place, we shall have taken a first important step along the road towards political union.

Finally, let me once again emphasise that the time has come to decide whether Europe is to be an economic and political reality or merely a geographical expression. The answer to that question depends upon the decisions of our national parliaments. The ultimate responsibility thus rests with us. I trust that we shall prove worthy of this historic opportunity.

The Chairman (*F*). — I call Mr. Jean-François Deniau.

Mr. Deniau, *Member of the Commission of the European Communities (F).* — I should like first of all to thank you all for the opportunity which you have vouchsafed me to speak in this debate, since it so happens—whether luckily or unluckily, I do not know—that your meeting is concerned with the two questions which fall directly within my province in the Commission of the European Communities, namely problems of development and of the enlargement or unification of the Community.

I must say that, after listening to the statements of the Rapporteurs and to the various speeches made this morning, and after reading the documents submitted to us, we must conclude that all the basic prerequisites for a fruitful debate really are combined here.

I do not think that I need to add to the statement made by Mr. Triboulet and to the speeches of the different Rapporteurs on the opinions by introducing further statistical information or other matters, since the whole range of circumstances and approaches has been broadly considered. I believe, nevertheless, that it may useful if, in the context of this debate, the European Commission emphasises or recalls some of the main guidelines for what could or should be done—or for what has already been done—by Europe in these different fields and also, as the question is twofold, if it defines the links and the interplay between these two realms which form the subject of our debate.

If you will allow me, I should like to begin by drawing up a sort of balance-sheet of the development aid provided by the Six, and by considering what has been done and what could, as several Rapporteurs implied, be done better.

On the basis of this profit and loss account and of our thoughts in the stage now reached, we should be able to see how the problems of enlarging the Communities and of the negotiations in which we are engaged—and which we all hope will soon be crowned with success—can have an impact on our policy of development aid in the form practised by the Community.

Although the actual negotiations for membership and enlargement of the Community are not the subject of our debate today and therefore do not call for any special comments on my part, I believe nevertheless that I should make a number of observations on the intrinsic conception of enlarging the Community and on the negotiations in view of their bearing on the two subjects chosen for debate.

With regard to the action taken by the Six, it is perfectly clear that, in our case, development policy has been organised mainly to encompass the Association of eighteen African and Malagasy States. This is due to historical circumstances which are very clearly explained in the various reports, and from special ties which existed between these various countries and three member States of the European Community. The nature of these links changed, however, when these countries became independent. Moreover, besides Part IV of the Treaty which was framed to answer the needs at a certain stage in our relations, we have the Convention known as Yaoundé I and the new Convention known as Yaoundé II.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that your Assembly is already broadly apprised of the nature of these links and of the effects of this Association. I should like simply to add two comments which are perhaps somewhat more political in character.

Since these ties are really historical in origin, I consider that, as several speakers have said, it is rather significant that, some years ago, when the European countries decided to do something to further their own interests—in other words, to set up a system among themselves which would create a new solidarity and would at the same time not be prejudicial to their interests—that it is rather significant, I repeat, that the Treaty that they worked out in the light of their problems should also have a facet which is not concerned with Europe, but which is designed for the developing countries outside Europe.

If we forget the origins of Part IV of the Treaty and of the two Conventions, and if we consider the situation as it is today, I

believe, like all the Rapporteurs who spoke on this subject, that we have here something exceptional and remarkable upon which we can congratulate ourselves, in the fact that our joint action is not simply pursued amongst ourselves, but is also designed to further the interests of others. This is a basic aspect of our Treaty of which we must not lose sight.

I would make a second remark: I also find it somewhat remarkable that this Treaty, including its Part IV, was drafted at a time when the developing countries concerned were in a special situation in relation to the European countries and that, on achieving independence, they decided of their own free will to continue this co-operation, of course in a new form, with the appropriate means and after a new style. These links and this friendly, equal co-operation between the independent developing countries and the European nations is pretty exceptional and we must not forget it! It would, above all, be a matter for deep regret if this aspect, whose positive value politically is absolutely undeniable, should be disparaged on the European side.

If we consider the actual make-up of the Association we observe that it is built around three elements: a free trade area that conforms with the GATT regulations, financial assistance whose principal instrument is, of course, the European Development Fund, and equi-representative institutions at different levels.

In the debates on this subject and in the thoughts that may be expressed thereon, I should very much like to see these three elements considered as forming a whole, wherein the importance of the third should not be minimised, as it is this element which gives our structure its originality. The fact is that aid accorded by Europe is not merely bilateral but Community aid, that it has both a commercial and a financial aspect, and that all this likewise entails the existence on both the parliamentary and the executive planes of a whole series of equally-balanced organs in which perfectly free and democratic exchanges can take place between the developing countries and the "donor" countries. I am not sure, I repeat, that any similar system of development aid exists

in the whole world. That system is extremely precious and must be preserved for the future.

That does not mean that everything is perfect, or that our Association has received nothing but praise. I heard this morning, and I had already read in the reports, a number of criticisms with which we are all familiar and which are directed both at the Association's make-up and at its consequences for those countries which are not Members.

I must acknowledge that this is really the moment when we should all give thought to these questions. We may come to the conclusion that the trading aspects—let us take, for example, this free trade area that exists between each of the associated countries and the Community—have not achieved all the results for which we could hope. In the various reports, figures are given showing the development of trade; they are not bad, but they might be considered inadequate. A further comment must therefore be made: even if the advantages have proved less than were expected, at least our Association has the merit that it does not penalise countries attaining independence, or cause them to lose advantages existing before that independence. Here again, even if this may not be considered ideal in respect of positive results, it must be borne in mind that our foremost task, which comes before assistance to the developing countries, is to refrain from harassing or penalising them.

With regard to the financial aspect, you are aware that there is a tendency for the various Funds to grow—both that of Part IV and the two Yaoundé Funds—and that the appropriations allocated demanded quite significant financial efforts by the European countries of the Six.

It may be pertinent to point out, as we stand at the threshold of a new form of implementation, that of Yaoundé II, that certain new and interesting technological trends in organising and using

aid, quite apart from the overall increase in the Fund, have emerged.

The first teaches us that it is not enough to produce, it is necessary to sell too; and that, in addition to direct investment, we must contemplate aid for marketing in one form or another. This idea, which still has to be worked out further, must be adopted. The practical and thoroughly concrete problem of selling the products of developing countries cannot in the last resort be divorced from development aid itself.

A second idea, which I believe to be new and which I am glad to find in the Yaoundé Convention, is that of encouraging efforts towards regional integration. It is not for us to dictate to the developing countries what arrangements they may make between themselves. Nevertheless, we can to a certain extent place at their disposal, in the form either of manpower or of financial assistance, certain resources which would enable them to develop trade among themselves, to co-ordinate their investments more effectively—which ultimately constitutes a guarantee that the aid we accord them will be properly evaluated, and thus presumably employed more effectively and more profitably. This is a new idea which is well worth following up.

Finally, there is the idea to which I attach great importance and which was mentioned by Mr. Triboulet this morning, that in development aid it is impossible to dissociate the strictly financial aspects from the technical assistance, or strictly human aspects; and that it is perhaps more worthwhile to make a smaller investment, whilst at the same time providing the human and technical counterpart to ensure its optimum utilisation. There exists, therefore, a very specific problem of co-ordination between strictly material resources and manpower training, education and technical assistance. For our part, we must consider how the different means that are at present available to us can best be co-ordinated.

If a number of criticisms or remarks have been voiced on the limited results we have achieved very numerous observations have

been made—and this aspect also found expression in the debate—especially from sources outside the Community, on the discriminatory nature of the action on which we have embarked. All the Rapporteurs demolished the criticisms that might have been expressed with regard to the Association as destructive of world trade or as causing serious trouble to other developing countries. The figures quoted show that the increase in trade of the countries associated with the Community was about 6 %, whereas during the same period developing countries as a whole increased their exports to the Community still more, the last figure being 7.1 %. This proves that the establishment of the Association, which was a particular action designed to benefit a specific number of countries, taking account moreover of the expansion within the Community already indicated, was not a disturbing factor in international trade. On the contrary, since there was sufficient expansion of trade within the Community, all those engaged in international trade benefited in the last resort from this circumstance, perhaps more so than the associated countries directly concerned.

With regard to the figures illustrating the financial contribution of the Six in relation to gross national product, I should add that these were 0.93 % in 1967, 1.15 % in 1968 and 1.22 % in 1965 for the Community as a whole, whereas the figures compiled by GATT for the same years, covering all the rich industrialised countries, were 0.76 %, 0.79 % and 0.73 % respectively. In other words, the Community effort, not only for Africa but for the whole world at large, is considerable. We must recall that our European edifice has this gratifying aspect.

Lastly, I can add another figure to the very extensive factual information already provided. With regard to the regional character of our aid to the Associated African States and Madagascar and the disadvantages that might accrue to other developing countries which do not form a part of this region, the Rapporteurs and myself have already pointed out that in the field of trade the figures demonstrate the reverse. In purely financial terms, it may be observed that, since 1962, the share of Asia in world aid has increased fairly considerably and the share of Latin America has

varied scarcely at all, whereas that of Africa has shown a marked decline. This piece of statistical information appears to me extremely important in indicating the lines along which we should think. I believe that the increase in aid from the EDF—in other words the European Community—to Africa has partially compensated for this proportionate decline of Africa's share in the total aid received by the developing countries, as this EDF aid has risen by 60 % since 1958. Nevertheless, it has not compensated fully for that decline.

The favourable factors must obviously be looked at afresh in the context of general trade development and of the relations between the developing countries and the advanced countries. I myself have followed other speakers in pointing out the encouraging aspects to be found in the statistics. The reply can be made, as I must say at once, that although the Community has in reality been the grouping where the developing countries most significantly increased their sales, owing to its relatively rapid expansion compared with other industrial areas, nevertheless when the world economy is viewed as a whole the share of the developing countries has not increased in the same proportions as that of the developed countries, but instead has fallen. In other words, the increase in trade has been far more advantageous to the industrial countries than to the developing countries.

The root of the problem is that expansion benefits first and foremost those countries which have the resources to share therein. It is inevitable in the light of economic laws that the advanced countries develop more rapidly in a climate of expansion, whereas the others do not possess the material resources to participate in this movement.

What conclusions should we draw from this? The first is that we must intensify our action, and the second that we must widen its scope.

To intensify our action, we must endeavour to channel our aid differently, perhaps by using more streamlined and effective machinery, and to diversify it to conform with certain guidelines

already propounded in Yaoundé II. As far as the trading aspects are concerned, we must perhaps endeavour to find new instruments that are more effective than tariff arrangements, since it must be honestly acknowledged that these have often had only a relatively limited effect.

We must also widen the scope of our action. I come thus to a point that has been raised by many speakers: the regional character of our aid in relation to the other developing countries. It is very important for us that our action should look sufficiently balanced to the outside world. To the extent that we have already established in practice a special system which, for the reasons that have already been recalled, operates for the benefit of these eighteen States and comprises the three elements to which I have referred, our action vis-à-vis the rest of the world may appear either inadequate or else purely and simply ill-balanced. And although I said that it was necessary to intensify our action, I would also emphasise that in my opinion it is necessary to widen its scope. This means for example, as has already been mentioned by President Malfatti and several other speakers during the past few days, and again this morning, that it is necessary to have a policy towards the Mediterranean region, towards Asia and plainly—since that is a subject which has been discussed for a long time past and which has also engaged my personal attention—towards Latin America.

Now it may readily be seen that we are not starting from scratch and that there is, as you might say, a certain built-in basis in the general policy of the Community: the liberalising trend which has been apparent since the Common Market was created and which led to a series of negotiations designed to lower external tariffs. Everybody has benefited from this even if, for the general reasons I have mentioned, it was not the developing countries which have benefited the most. Yet this general policy, too, must not be forgotten.

There is, furthermore, the need to establish a general system of preferences. In this connection, the Community has stepped in on several occasions to propagate this idea or at least to prevent

the divergences that might arise between different "donor" countries from resulting in inaction. It was, on the contrary, necessary to inculcate the political idea that, even though our systems might be different, that must not be deemed a reason for doing nothing in this field, and that a start must be made in order to see how preferences could be applied in practice.

I should, however, like to make two remarks in addition to what I have said about extending our action to help developing countries both through the general policy of the Community and through the preferences within the framework of UNCTAD. The first is that, when we speak about aid to developing countries in relation to the Community, the distinction between what the Community does as such, and what its member States do, is sometimes lost to sight. This lies at the root of a good many misunderstandings. The Community takes action vis-à-vis the eighteen associated States, for instance, employing the institutions and resources of which you are aware; the member States also take action individually. There is of course a certain measure of co-ordination between these two sets of operations. But if we take, say, a Latin-American country, that country will not from its own standpoint discern the action of the Community, it will see that of the member States. It therefore follows that the Community appears in a totally different light. Indeed, from the standpoint of that country, action taken by a member State might have some aspects that were not entirely constructive, without these being matched by constructive action on the part of the Community, because there is no provision for constructive action in these fields at the present juncture, except that which I have indicated, and because action on traditional lines is taken by the member States.

One of the problems which confronts the Community today and which will arise still more frequently in the future is whether, in our policies governing external relations and our commercial policy, we can confine ourselves to the traditional features of such a common commercial policy—in other words to customs duties and quotas—or whether we should contemplate adopting, as we have done in respect of a certain area of the world, fresh and more

up-to-date instruments to be incorporated in that common commercial policy. These instruments would be adapted to the special situations of countries with which we discuss such matters, and would enable us to widen the scope of our action. In this way, the Community would exert certain constructive efforts running parallel to those of member countries; and these efforts would make themselves felt in the other developing countries. Indeed, President Malfatti had occasion to raise this point yesterday before the European Parliament.

My second remark is this. I spoke of *widening* the scope of our action and not of *replacing* it. That is absolutely clear. First of all, generalised preferences do not, from the technical point of view, replace the systems with which we are at present familiar. They can exist side by side to a certain extent, but as a general rule such preferences to not apply to the same products, since in the one case finished and semi-finished goods are affected, whereas, especially in the associated territories, the producers of such goods are relatively weak and their problems are different. Looking beyond the fact, however, that such generalised preferences cannot replace the existing systems from the technical point of view, and that in my opinion it is therefore necessary to widen the scope of our action and not substitute another for it, I believe that all that has been said on the need for a global approach and for a better balance is perfectly well-founded. For that reason, I myself in the performance of my new duties and of the duties with which I was entrusted until recently, tried to ensure that the Community should play its part both by the use of other and more appropriate means, and also in other areas of the world.

I would stress, however, that our anxiety to take action on a universal and global scale must not be reflected in reality in a backward step. To speak frankly, we must not use globalisation as an excuse to do less for everyone on the pretext of doing the same for all. Thus we see the need for a better balance and for adding to our action; but it must be clearly understood that this must not lead to a retreat, and that the ground gained must not be relinquished, for we must, on the contrary, as I have already said, intensify and widen the scope of our activities.

Finally, one last remark in this connection, which has already been driven home by Mr. Triboulet: I refer to the problem of different levels in development. It constitutes a particularly refined form of injustice to treat people whose situations are quite different in the same way. We must not fall into that error. There exist disparities between the developing countries and the so-called advanced countries. Whilst recognising that the problem of relations between these two groups of countries arises in the general and world context, we must ensure that our means of action are adapted accordingly, and that we acknowledge the realities of the situation, so that we can face squarely the problem inherent in the circumstance that some countries are already potentially able to take action, whereas other countries have not yet reached the threshold which they must cross before being able to take advantage of the opportunities offered.

It is therefore my belief that we must constantly bear in mind the importance of this conception of levels of development, particularly so in the context of enlarging the Community with its attendant problems. For the question of enlarging the Community and of unification in general will lead us to look at all these problems afresh. One of the most important aspects will certainly be the disparities that exist between the developing countries themselves.

As this point is not the central factor, I shall venture to deal somewhat summarily with the matter and simply indicate a few guidelines.

As far as development policy is concerned, the desired enlargement of the Community will bring about quite profound changes which, if these are fully understood and properly handled, can, I believe, have beneficial results for all concerned. The entry of the United Kingdom will increase the scale of the Community very considerably. All the figures mentioned by the Rapporteurs relating to the Community as the world's foremost economic power, the biggest trading power and the world's foremost importer of raw materials, will become at a single stroke significantly increased by the enlargement of the Community, especially by the

entry of the United Kingdom. For her part, Britain herself has historic links with a number of countries which nobody can dispute. What will be the result of this? The general consequence will be that our obligations will increase and that, by reason alone of the larger geographical area covered and the magnitude of the new figures for our trading and other activities, the extension of what might be described as our natural obligations will ensue. The only thing that really counts is that, as has already been said, our means of action and our resolve should develop commensurately.

You will be aware that the Community, when contemplating negotiations involving these problems, considered that two principles must be upheld. The first was that the Association should be open to those countries whose situations were comparable. Besides the logical argument there is also the political argument: it is not for us to divide the Africans, if the Africans desire and find good reason for co-operation among themselves and for uniting. The second principle is that the Association in its present form and the Yaoundé Convention, which has been signed and will soon be ratified by all the member countries, represent a consolidated gain that we must safeguard at all costs.

I do not believe that this position can be changed to any marked extent by the negotiations, but it is obvious that two problems arise. On the one hand, there is the problem of direct competition, to the extent that the countries potentially concerned are, in fact, producers of the same type of commodity. Thus means must be adapted or new methods devised to ensure that the essential substance of the Association is preserved. There is, on the other hand, an indirect problem to the extent that when the Association itself has become so broadly based and when the responsibilities of the Community have grown so large, it will be still more difficult not to widen the scope of our action to embrace other countries. We shall certainly be subjected to observations on that score. We must therefore give thought here and now to the attitude which the Community will adopt towards other developing countries and to the means it will employ to help them.

It is indubitable that this enlarging process will involve practical problems, and in my view the most important thing is that we should react positively when confronted with them. We may reflect that, since our responsibilities will be greater our means of action should also be greater, and we must adopt a common attitude not only to problems that already existed, but also to our new problems and new responsibilities.

I should therefore like to return to what was said in various quarters, and especially from the British side this morning, on the spirit in which the problem of enlarging the Community must be approached. I was very pleased to hear what was said this morning, because a number of expressions that are frequently used were, in my opinion, bred of a misunderstanding or were sources of misunderstanding. When, for instance, I heard the Common Market described as a trading bloc, I must confess that I was not very happy. Similarly, the expression which is frequently used in everyday conversation of "the price to be paid" did not seem to me to fit the problems with which we must deal. The Common Market is admittedly, in practice, a customs union which was set up to further the interests of its member States and which, as a customs union, has a common external tariff and a number of regulations. But it is not just that. Its true spirit is expressed by its official title of Community. Above and beyond the customs union and the strictly trading aspects, such as the balance-sheet of advantages and disadvantages—amongst those advantages being the technical opportunities provides by an enlarged market etc., and among the disadvantages various provisions and regulations—it is the Community aspect which justifies our belief that the whole operation is solidly entrenched and enduring, and as such in the last resort attractive.

With regard to the different approaches to negotiations that are possible, I believe that when all is said and done the most ambitious one is the most realistic. History tells us that this is not always the case. I believe, however, that in a venture of such magnitude as this, we shall only approach negotiations in the proper spirit if we realise clearly that the Community is not merely a commercial undertaking to develop trade, but that it far tran-

scends this aspect, for it draws its inspiration from a different conception and has other more general aims, which are in fact the warranty and justification of its trading operations as such.

Mr. Triboulet has reminded us that Europe has never remained inside its frontiers, it has always moved beyond its own confines and reappears on all continents. I might venture to add that this is both its strength and also its weakness. Although its influence has been so considerable, it may be observed today that there is very little enduring solidarity between the Europeans and very few combined interests. The aim of our venture is not to create frontiers, but to establish a sort of permanent framework which would give the Europeans a chance to feel they were Europeans and to act in concert.

One of the most obvious realms for such concerted action, because it is one in which a European presence is specially necessary both for ourselves and perhaps also for the world at large, lies in our action to help the developing countries. (*Applause.*)

The Chairman (*F*). — I thank Mr. Deniau.

The last two speakers whose names are down for this morning, Mr. De Grauw and Mr. Michael Stewart, have agreed to speak at the beginning of the afternoon, so I can adjourn the Sitting. It will be resumed at 3 p.m.

The Sitting is adjourned.

The Sitting was adjourned at 1.15 p.m. and resumed at 3.10 p.m.

IN THE CHAIR: Mr. SCELBA

President of the European Parliament

The Chairman (*I*). — The Sitting is resumed.

The agenda calls for a resumption of the exchange of views between the members of the European Parliament and the members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I call Mr. De Grauw.

Mr. De Grauw (*F*). — I intend to speak very briefly. Nevertheless, I am taking part in this debate on behalf of the Liberal Group of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe as well as on my own personal behalf.

Mr. Vedovato's report appears to us excellent and has our full approval.

He stressed the opportunities for promoting co-operation in development of the third world both lucidly and effectively.

As a specialist in the socio-economic problems of Latin America, I should like to dwell on the need to embark without delay upon a bona fide dialogue—and I would stress that it must be bona fide—between the European Economic Community and the competent representatives of that part of the world. This would, moreover, be consonant with the wish expressed here during previous sessions of the Assembly of the Council of Europe as well as in the Latin-American Parliament in Bogota last year.

I would add that the European Parliament has also addressed itself to this problem and has reached almost identical conclusions, which are embodied for example in a very interesting report whose author is Senator de Winter, one of my fellow-countrymen.

I should like to remind you that, during the joint discussions between European and Latin-American parliamentarians in Bogota, we learned that EEC had reached a decision recommending such consultations. The recent appointment of the Minister for Economic Development of the Republic of Colombia, as the Andean Group's representative, with instructions to negotiate with EEC, crystallises this decision.

This representative of the Andean Group is at present on his way to Europe to open discussions with the competent authorities of EEC.

It is readily apparent that the problem of stabilising the prices of primary commodities is a crucial factor in the economic recovery of this part of the world. It was stated this morning that an increase in the sales of commodities, and even of primary commodities coming from Latin America in particular, was a sign of prosperity. In my opinion, this is an exaggeration since the volume of sales does nothing to resolve the problem of profitability in export sales.

Similarly, in his statement this morning, Mr. Deniau referred to this expansion in the volume of trade, as constituting a success for countries less threatened by under-development than some other countries of the third world. There are grounds for believing, however, that with this expansion in the volume of trade and with all the countries in the world sharing in the expansion, it is only natural that we should find an increase in sales to the rich countries, which are in a position to buy more. Once again, however, when we take trade at very modest levels as a basis, it is obvious that the development observed has not the same significance as when trade is at normal levels.

I would therefore stress the need for consultations between these countries and the countries of the Common Market. Admittedly, efforts at understanding in the form of tariff arrangements to help semi-finished products from the third world have been made. Such tariff arrangements encourage the export of these products and reduce such discrimination as may have originally existed. We are entitled to hope that similar efforts will bring about an improvement in the profitability of Latin-American exports to Europe, because this is, in the view of the specialists qualified to speak, the crucial aspect of the problem. It is the only way to revitalise the socio-economic process of these countries which are particularly handicapped by the lack of profitability in their exports.

This comment leads me to underscore two dangers which likewise lie in wait for the Latin-American economy.

The first of these dangers lies in the establishment of new uncompetitive industries. We know that some countries are tempted to make this experiment and that heavy deficits generally result. Our own experiences should serve as a warning to these countries and enable them to avoid stumbling into the pitfalls of unrestrained industrialisation.

The second danger is the brain drain. We in Europe complain of the fact that European brains emigrate to countries that are more highly developed than our own, but the countries of the third world experience the same phenomenon. Young research workers of all categories and disciplines, who have been trained in European universities, very often settle in Europe and do not return to their home countries. The result is a shortage of grey matter, and the economies of these countries suffer in consequence.

I shall not expatiate on these two aspects as their amplification would take too long; but I should like to draw the attention of the Chairman of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development, Mr. Vedovato—and indeed I shall have another opportunity when he presents the report to the Council of Europe—and also that of our colleagues to the importance of these two factors, for we must watch these aspects with special vigilance by reason of the concern we feel about some of the developing countries.

I thank you all for the attention that you have kindly given me. My speech is meant as a small contribution to the debate initiated in this chamber.

The Chairman (*I*). — I call Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Stewart. — We are discussing the future of European unification and the problem of aid to the poorer countries. I say "the poorer countries" because, although out of courtesy we often use the title "developing", we should not gloss over the grim fact that there is an immense disparity between the standard of life of

any country whose representatives are here and that of the great mass of mankind.

On the subject of unification, I want to say with great emphasis that we who come here from the British Parliament are greatly concerned for the increasing unification of Europe, both economic and political, that we want to see as a basis for that unification the enlargement of EEC by our entry and that of the other candidates. I trust that that will not be in doubt.

The enlargement of the Community is not to be thought of merely in terms of economic advantage. We are concerned also with trying to get an increasing unity of purpose and action among the countries concerned. That was why, during the years when it did not seem likely that Britain would get into the Community, the British Government placed great emphasis on the process of political consultation in Western European Union, since that was at any rate a forum open to us.

There may be many different notions as to the future form of the increasing political unity of Europe, but, as I think has been stated already, clearly it must begin by a process of consultation with the object among European countries of trying to identify what are the common interests of West Europe as a whole, and then each country giving priority in its conduct of foreign affairs to those interests that it shares in common with Western Europe.

That is the beginning of the process. Of course, it is not the end. The end cannot yet be foreseen. We should approach the process in the spirit that we will not be afraid to create any institutions that we find necessary to give effect to common purposes, while, at the same time, not creating institutions merely for the pleasure of saying that we have done so. That is always an unrewarding activity.

Then, when we speak of the unification of Western Europe, we have to ask what it is all for. President Malfatti reminded us this morning that unification is not an end in itself. We are dealing with a matter which will be a great change in the way of

life and the way of thinking of ordinary people in all the countries concerned. In order to make that change understandable and palatable to them, we need more than economic arguments. We need a vision of what the increasing unity of Europe is for. That vision is to be found by looking outside Western Europe itself.

All the countries from which we who are gathered here come have two important things in common. We are all democratic countries. We are all countries which, certainly by comparison with most of mankind, are prosperous countries; and there has been anxiety expressed that an increasing unity among ourselves might be to the exclusion of the less prosperous countries of mankind or might be an actual obstacle to some kind of better understanding between ourselves on the one hand and countries that live under undemocratic rule on the other. I do not believe that that is so. We have to face the fact that we are talking about the increasing unity of countries that are democratic and prosperous, but to recognise that that presents us with a challenge to perform our duty to the less prosperous parts of the world and to seek to our best ability whatever relaxation of tension can be achieved between countries like our own and those parts of the world which live under undemocratic forms of government and, as far as we can see, are likely to live so for some time.

We must, therefore, ensure that our increasing unity does not separate us from the rest of mankind. That we can certainly do in the field of which there has been so much discussion this morning—the field of help, of aid to the less prosperous nations. An earlier speaker asked the question whether we in Britain realised the need for that. I can say very definitely that we do, both in word and in action. We have been engaged not only in the obvious forms of aid, of gift and of loan, but have pursued trading policies that have been of particular benefit to those poorer countries who rely very greatly on the market for textiles or for sugar.

We have also made a special contribution in the field of knowledge, and I may mention, for example, the particular advances for which we have been responsible in the field of tropical

medicine, which can be of very great advantage to the peoples of Africa. There was discussion earlier about regional aid and global responsibilities, and about some of the criticisms made of the policies toward aid now pursued by the countries of the Economic Community. I do not believe that we ought to be too disturbed about the fact that there are criticisms of aid policy. The whole world is at present learning a good deal still about how aid can best be conducted. Most of the countries here represented—I believe all of them—have many forms of social welfare designed to combat poverty in their own countries; and we still feel that we have a good deal to learn about what is the most efficient way of combating poverty in our own countries and which way is most consonant with the dignity of those to be helped. It is not surprising that the world has still a great deal to learn about the best methods of organising and administering aid to the poorer sections of mankind.

I would hope that increasingly unified councils of Western Europe will help to bring forward knowledge on this subject. I would just add this reflection: I believe that aid that goes through United Nations Agencies has a great deal to recommend it. It can draw on the very considerable body of expertise there is in the United Nations. It can deal with the problems of the administration of aid in a way less likely to alarm the receiving country over its independence if aid goes through a UN channel. That is something to be borne in mind when we discuss aid problems.

A topic which has not been previously mentioned this morning—and I hope I am not stretching the range of debate too far in mentioning it shortly—is the problem of the relationship between an increasingly united Western Europe and the great power bloc in Eastern Europe. I believe that is relevant because, if we look at almost any one of the problems in the world today, we will find that its solution is bedevilled by this great cleavage between the rival power groups in the world. We cannot discuss aid to the poorer sections of mankind without the suspicion that one group or the other is trying to establish a hegemony or unacknowledged dominion in one part of the world or another. We cannot discuss

the possibility of peace in the Middle East without taking into account the mutual rivalries and suspicions of great power groups.

There is a real danger that the world will be full of well-intentioned people trying to solve problem after problem of a kind that could be solved in a reasonable world, but unable to reach a solution because at present the world is governed more by fear than by reason. One of the challenges, therefore, to an increasingly united Western Europe will be: does the increasing unity of Western Europe represent an advance towards conciliation between East and West, or a barrier to it? I believe it can represent an advance towards it, particularly at the present time. At the last meeting of the Ministers of the countries of NATO it was agreed, admittedly cautiously and with many qualifications, that all of the European countries, East and West, and anyone else, ought to try to create a situation in which there could be a general conference of the prolems of European security.

In view of my experiences in recent years, I certainly do not underestimate the difficulties of that, but I do believe that the present juncture, despite the many threats in the world, is one at which there is a greater possibility than there has been for some time of getting a substantial relaxation of tension between East and West; and in a search among Western European countries for a point of common interest among them that they ought to pursue, this surely would rank high. I believe we have all watched with interest and sympathy the work of the German Government in trying to get a better understanding with its Eastern neighbours and have welcomed their wisdom in not doing this exclusively by themselves but in consultation with their friends and allies in the West.

Although this is a matter in which NATO is naturally very closely concerned, it is not a matter for NATO alone. Every country in Europe has an interest in a measure of relaxing tension, but in what circumstances are they most likely to be successful? If the Soviet Union were to believe that the West is in increasing disarray, that there is no prospect of enlarging the Community and that the talk about increasing unification of the West is only

hot air, if the Soviet Union believes that, then there is no reason why she should make any concession or forward move in order to get a more peaceful world. But if she recognises that in the West, among democratic countries, there is an increasing unity of purpose and a belief in their way of life as firm and resolute as that of any communist in his, if she understands that that is the situation, she will then realise that it will be wise for her to make such concessions, such compromises, and show such degree of understanding as is necessary for placing world affairs on a less precarious basis than the balance of terror on which they now rest.

I conclude then by summing up what I have said. I believe most firmly in the desirability of the increasing unification of the countries here represented. The enlargement of EEC is an essential, cardinal point in that progress, but for the justification and purpose of all this we must look beyond Europe to our relations with the poorer sections of mankind and to our relations with those countries under undemocratic rule with whom we live in such an uneasy relationship at the present time.

Politics is in part a science, and it is the business of the political scientist to help one to draft constitutions to get what one wants. But politics is more than a science; it is also an art, and success in an art depends on the truth of one's vision. Although our vision is concerned with European unity, the paradox and truth is that this vision of Western European unity makes sense only if we look to Europe's duties beyond Europe herself. The very word "Europe" means "broad vision". That is Europe's name and that should be her destiny.

The Chairman (*I*). — I call Mr. Schulz.

Mr. Schulz (*G*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is encouraging to see that this now traditional meeting of our two parliamentary assemblies today is imbued with a much stronger conviction and self-assurance than was the case in previous years. The spirit of The Hague is happily still alive and is clearly perceptible in this chamber.

Furthermore, the 1970 Joint Meeting has chosen for the subject of its debate the most topical theme imaginable, and I should like again to thank the Rapporteurs most sincerely for their masterly treatment of it. I agree particularly with our colleague, Mr. Amrehn, when he emphasises that the joint endeavours towards a Community development policy must be regarded as—I think Mr. Amrehn said—a major political decision, as a step towards a common foreign policy.

Integration within the European Communities is a process which has been followed from the outset with hope, and in any event with keen interest, but often also with mistrust—indeed, wholly warranted mistrust, I would say—by the outside world. Will the combined economic potential of one hundred and eighty million people, all living in developed industrial countries, not lead in course of time to a self-sufficient, self-satisfied, self-contained trade area—or rather, a self-contained super-trade area?

Undoubtedly, during the early years of the Communities, certain protectionist tendencies were inherent in the logic of their development, and so unavoidable. To that extent I see today as an enormously important demonstration of common will, psychologically as well as politically.

One hundred and eighty million Europeans—and soon, we hope, two hundred and fifty million—representing a massive economic potential, are acknowledging their duties towards the third world by recognising the need for a common development policy. We should be especially thankful to the Rapporteurs for emphasising that, though existing and future natural preference areas will be respected, this is a task of an essentially global character.

In this connection, Mr. Triboulet is undoubtedly right when he expressly states in his written report that when European unification is discussed, it is associated in people's minds not so much with the Council of Europe as with the European Communities.

I am particularly pleased that at this stage of the discussion we appear to have disposed of a disastrous misapprehension which used to be current in earlier years and was occasionally voiced during the Joint Meeting itself, to the effect that the Communities could accomplish an economic masterpiece without any real underlying political decision and without any genuine political objectives; in other words, that a sharp dividing line could be drawn, both in substance and in time, between the two spheres of economics and politics.

The people who thought that, and perhaps still think it in secret, have either not understood, or not wished to understand, the Rome Treaties.

On the other hand, I think it should be remembered that, not only outside the Communities but also to some extent inside them, there are centripetal tendencies at work and, perhaps more or less consciously, centrifugal ones too. I remember the situation four years ago when I first had the honour to take part in a Joint Meeting. At that time we were all very depressed about the grave existential crisis within the Communities, and there were a number of highly respected members who argued roughly as follows: Further integration in the Communities—highly desirable; enlargement of the Communities—highly desirable; but as things stand at present, both are utopian dreams. We shall therefore take the opposite course and try from the outset to give the Communities a looser form in the framework of a wider free trade area.

Today, the enlargement of these Communities is being discussed in the most concrete terms and will, we hope, become reality in the near future. And so a comparison between 1966 and the present time shows that sometimes—unfortunately only sometimes—the pessimists, too, are wrong.

But we must not overlook the fact that there are in the applicant States—and I should like to be allowed to say this quite frankly and openly—influential groups who accept the political consequences of the Treaties of Rome reluctantly, if at all.

There are forces anxious to obtain a maximum of advantages coupled with a minimum of obligations, or at least to put off for as long as possible a solution to the problem of the obligations to be borne. And lastly, there is in this Assembly a diminishing minority banking on the prospect that the much-discussed European Security Conference might open the doors to a more or less tightly knit system of overall European co-operation in the technical, economic and cultural fields, and hoping that this co-operation might become a kind of substitute for Western European integration; whilst for those who represent legitimate, traditional national pride in one form or other, binding decisions are as unpalatable as they ever were.

I prefer to regard the European Security Conference as a thoroughly salutary challenge to us all to speed up the process of integration and to put the theory of common policy into practice. I am especially glad to note that I fully share this basic view with the honourable member who has just spoken. For when, and in what circumstances, do we stand in more urgent need of such a common Western European policy than at a time when a conference on the security of Europe as a whole is, indeed, in prospect?

Another salutary challenge to us all is that which is the subject of today's debate—the joint responsibility towards the third world of this immense economic power of the European Communities which is gradually taking shape. I should therefore like, Mr. Chairman, to appeal to all our colleagues, in the spirit of today's debate, resolutely to place on the agenda the question of giving the Communities a political character. There are various forms which this political character might take. The course that has been pursued since December 1969, since The Hague, clearly assigns quite decisive tasks to the governments in this matter. Personally, I approve, as long as a time-limit is set on these tasks; for as a convinced federalist, I interpret giving a political character to the Communities as meaning that they must be made democratic and subject to parliamentary control at the same time.

In May 1960—we must keep on harking back to this—our colleagues in the European Parliament submitted a proposal to the Council of Ministers for a system of direct elections to the European Parliament. After ten and a half years, Ladies and Gentlemen, is it not time that the Council of Ministers was told in no uncertain terms that this document must finally be taken seriously? However, I believe—and I wish to make this quite clear—that such a demand can only be made with the necessary emphasis if it is coupled with the alternative that the member States, or some of them, will conduct these direct elections at national level if the Council of Ministers fails within the foreseeable future to discharge the duty which devolves upon it, not only on moral grounds but through the character, intention and text of the Treaties of Rome.

I know that, as in the past, there are tactical and fundamental reservations with regard to this idea of direct elections to the European Parliament, or, perhaps one should say, a tactical pessimism and a fundamental pessimism. The tactical pessimism lies in recognition of the fact that the prospective enlargement of the Communities—not to put too strong a point on it—will certainly not have the immediate effect of bringing a majority of convinced, long-standing federalists into the Community.

But I have no desire whatsoever to dismiss the other, very serious objection, which is always brought up in debates on the holding of direct elections. Of what use are direct elections to a parliament without real powers? But the question can be put another way: who is going to be so generous as to give European representatives the necessary powers if a directly elected parliament does not fight for and acquire them itself?

In conclusion, I should like to put forward one of the strongest, though as yet little discussed, arguments for direct elections—and it is an argument to which some self-criticism is attached. All of us in the European Parliament and in the Consultative Assembly feel that we are committed Europeans. But are we in fact always committed? Or, to put it differently, can we always be? When we go back to our national capitals, when we take off our Euro-

pean hats, as it were, do we not also shed a little of our European commitment? And are not the debates in our Assemblies influenced—often unconsciously, but to an immense degree—by the fact that each of us is just a little mindful of his government's current policies or the animosity of the current opposition in his national parliament?

And thus the "native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought", as Shakespeare's Hamlet says. Are we not all of us much too sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought?

I hope—and I appeal to you all for your support as parliamentarians at national level—I hope in a few years' time to see an elected European Parliament once again displaying the native hue of resolution, a Parliament that goes about its work without inhibitions, in simple faith, and which, above all, regardless of the still hallowed wishes of the Ministers, carries out the will of the people. (*Applause.*)

The Chairman (*I*). — I call Dame Joan Vickers.

Dame Joan Vickers. — I am glad to have this opportunity to take part in this debate because I, with ten other members of this Council, submitted a motion, Document 2652, in September 1969 on this subject. I am rather depressed by Document 2816 because it contains no reference to the seven points we put in that motion. We had hoped that by now some official notice might have been taken of what was a very serious submission to the Council.

In his excellent survey "Partners in Development", Mr. Lester Pearson, a Canadian, was supported by representatives of Brazil, West Germany, Jamaica, France, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom. I am sure that all those who have read his report agree that it shows the practical manner in which developing countries can, if they wish, co-operate. As ten of the European countries represented in this Assembly are members of the Board of UNCTAD, I feel that this is a great opportunity for them to take action in the future.

It was suggested, for example, that the developed countries of Europe should eliminate as soon as possible excise and import duties on non-competing—and I emphasise "non-competing"—products of special interest to developing countries also that no new quantitative restrictions should be imposed on products of special interest to developing countries; and all existing quantitative restrictions on these products should be abolished during the 1970s.

In his excellent document, Pearson recommended that the IMF, in co-operation with UNCTAD, should study the possibility of a clearing arrangement for the financing of trade amongst developing countries on a global scale. I suggest that Members of the Council of Europe might consider this.

In regard to the developing countries, it is interesting to note that the small territory of Hong Kong, which was occupied by the Japanese during the war, is now in a position itself to grant a loan to Indonesia. That should encourage us to support the developing countries.

As for encouraging private investment, I hope that the countries represented at this Assembly will consider a joint insurance scheme with a view to encouraging private investors. This is outlined in the motion that was submitted in Document 2652.

The World Bank, UNIDO, and the Council of Europe should get together with a view to the further expansion of their advisory role in regard to industrial and foreign policies. The DAC report lists 71 countries receiving aid. The average in dollars per head which they received annually in the period 1964-66 was 4.1. However, as the Pearson Report states, it is difficult on economic grounds to understand why, for example, Sierra Leone should receive $5.9 per head, India only $2.5 per head, Costa Rica $13.9 per head, the Philippines $2.7, Ghana $7.6, while Nigeria gets only $2 per head. This type of inequality could well be investigated by Members of the Council of Europe when giving aid.

I suggest that we need more effective aid, and the suggestion put forward by DAC that it should sponsor a meeting of major aid donors and recipients could lead to that end. Among the matters proposed to be discussed are proposals to introduce greater uniformity in the aid regulations of the donors—and I think that the figures that I have just quoted stress the need for greater uniformity—and to improve the procedures in the aid-receiving countries. I well remember when I was working in Indonesia, for example, how aid was given to one of the sugar factories destroyed by the Japanese. However, when the machinery arrived, it was all for beet sugar and, of course, only cane sugar is grown in that country. There are many other examples which I could give.

These are a number of suggestions designed to co-ordinate our aid a good deal better in the future. For example, aid providers might agree to increase grants and capital subscriptions for multilateral development finance to a minimum of 20 % of the total flow of official development assistance by 1975. Furthermore, I hope that the developing countries will be encouraged to do research into their population problems. I suggest that that is a subject which they are well qualified to investigate, and indeed which only they can carry out efficiently.

Emphasis, however, should be laid on helping developing countries especially to do their own research. Wherever possible, students should go to universities or institutions of higher education in their countries of origin. This is essential, as it is necessary for them to get a thorough understanding of the problems of their own people and the facilities available before they go overseas. I do not sugest that they should not come to Europe for post-graduate and other special studies. However, I can say from my own experience of working in Malaysia that it is essential for them to have a fundamental knowledge of their own countries before going abroad.

Reference has been made to what the United Kingdom might contribute if it joined EEC. In that connection perhaps I might mention the British aid programme, which in 1969 amounted to £210.8 million. With repayments amounting to £32 million, our

total aid represented 0.39 % of the gross national product. The total flow of official and private funds counting towards the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was 0.79 % of the gross national product. We still have a certain amount of tied aid; about 38 % of British financial assistance was wholly tied to the purchase of British goods and services.

Where we can be of special help is in the amount of technical aid that we give. By the end of 1969, for example, there were 12,391 British experts, men and women, serving overseas. Of these, 5,007 were in education, 2,621 in works and communications, 1,906 in public administration, 1,145 in medicine, and 1,066 in agriculture and natural resources. All were paid by the British Government.

In addition, we have volunteers serving overseas. Over 1,568 graduates and 328 cadets or school leavers went overseas in the period 1969-70. Three quarters of their expenses are paid by the government, the remainder coming from voluntary contributions. These people do excellent work and any increased co-operation between the countries represented here and the volunteers from Great Britain would be greatly beneficial.

As a previous speaker has said (and one would expect it), 90 % of bilateral aid from Great Britain goes to Commonwealth countries. In 1969, that represented about £157 million. However, I would point out that £21 million went to non-Commonwealth countries and, as paragraph 7 of the report suggests, I would have thought that we could help more in this way when we join EEC.

Perhaps I might mention one other suggestion. In our country, we have a statutory body called the Commonwealth Development Corporation which helps the economies of developing countries by investing in development projects. The Overseas Resources Development Act, 1969, now allows the Corporation to operate in all developing countries. At the present time, it is particularly active in public utilities and housing. Investments are often made in power and water supplies. Why should not

there be a European Development Corporation? Such a body could be an enormous asset.

Pioneer work has also been done by the Commonwealth Development Corporation with the formation of industrial development companies. In Northern Nigerian Investments Limited, for example, £5 million has been invested covering a wide number of projects such as textiles, food, agriculture, tobacco, metal manufacture, and tanneries.

One must not forgest, too, the co-operation between voluntary organisations. To give an example, the United Kingdom Freedom from Hunger Campaign has given £77,000 for research and action projects and £18,000 to Reading University for agricultural research. It has also given £14,000 to Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University, a research project at village and farm levels. The sum of £45,000 has gone to the Food and Nutrition Institute in Kingston, Jamaica, as malnutrition contributes to about half of the preventable deaths of infants in the Caribbean.

I would like to suggest today that far more of the aid that we give in Europe should go to research projects which will be very beneficial to the countries concerned.

Co-operation between the countries of Europe could lead to financing worthwhile projects. Many projects are spoilt as too many begin without adequate technical advice and for lack of capital. Therefore, if progress can be made in the future, I hope that consideration will be given to Document 2652 introduced by me and ten other colleagues in September 1969, as this would, at any rate in our opinion, prove to be a helpful contribution.

Mr. Chairman, I hope it will not be long before adequate action is taken along the lines I have suggested.

The Chairman (*I*). — I call Mr. Lücker.

Mr. Lücker (*G*). — Mr. Chairman, the report which our colleague, Mr. Triboulet, has presented to us for today's Joint Meeting is a truly excellent one. In saying this, I would apologise

to the other Rapporteurs, for I in no way mean to disparage their reports. I shall refer mainly to Mr. Triboulet's report because I should like to say something in particular about the first part of it on behalf of my political friends in the European Parliament.

Mr. Triboulet has presented his report in a form of his own choosing. The report is no less significant for bearing the strong imprint of its author. This has been the customary practice hitherto and, given Mr. Triboulet's political eminence, it should come as no surprise to us this year.

This joint debate with our colleagues from the Council of Europe gives us an opportunity to discuss the two themes of Mr. Triboulet's report, and of the other reports, at a time when we are able to take an overall look at Europe's position and role in the world of today and tomorrow. This, for me, is not only an advantage but a necessity; for we are holding our political exchange of views at a time when we inside the Community are getting ready—as a result of the impetus provided by The Hague Summit Conference at the end of last year—to extend the Community internally, after having completed the transitional period and put the finishing touches to the Common Market, and at the same time to enlarge the Community, whilst ensuring some parallelism between substance and time. These—inevitably— are the vital issues for the future of the Community.

If we look beyond our Community, we can observe that political relationships in Europe and in the world as a whole are in a state of flux. This should prompt us, particularly in connection with our subject today, to ponder on Europe's role and place in the world of today and tomorrow and on what we can do for Europe and the world in order to achieve the common goal. In a few days' time the Second Development Decade will be officially inaugurated by the United Nations. The ensuing discussions will, I am sure—like those held so far—emphasise the universal nature of our responsibilities.

I should like to single out from Mr. Triboulet's report one or two points which I consider to be important, and use them as a

basis for my own remarks. I am very grateful to Mr. Triboulet for clearly stating in his report that the political unification of Europe is more necessary now than ever and that we must achieve it. I am also grateful to him for making another point, namely that, in their present form, the Community's institutions—particularly with the prospect of the Community's enlargement—will not be adequate for dealing with the great tasks awaiting us. This means that, if we are to be successful in solving the problems under discussion, our institutional and constitutional system will have to be altered and improved—improved constructively, dynamically and in a manner that is designed to meet future needs.

With these two points, then, I am in full agreement. It should like however to add a third point: Mr. Triboulet's report implies that the Hague Conferences and the decisions taken by the meeting of Foreign Ministers on behalf of the six Heads of State or of Government set a good pattern for future policy. This could, broadly speaking, be agreed with. The report further states that a highly pragmatic approach ought to be adopted, that we ought not to be maximalistic but should begin in a small way and proceed step by step in order to avoid the mistakes of the past and be sure of making headway. Now, the pattern which the Hague Conference set for Europe's future is a matter open to discussion, but here too I am broadly in agreement. The other proposition, however, needs to be subjected to scrutiny, I think. Mr. Triboulet has not set out with the ambition of answering every question. He stops at a very intriguing point in his analysis and, in effect, asks the parliamentarians of Europe to try to answer the questions raised according to their different national origins—or, to put it in European terms, according to their regional origins—and according to their political attitudes. Such a method is undoubtedly a highly appropriate one for a Joint Meeting of this kind. It offers us an opportunity to hold a useful exchange of views. I am sure that in our discussion we shall not be able to work out any comprehensive plan for a future Europe. We should nevertheless try, each in his own way, to make a contribution to that end.

At this juncture, Mr. Chairman, I should like to state two basic principles to which my Christian Democrat friends inside

and outside the European Parliament subcribe. The first is this: The Christian Democrat movements, particularly the Christian Democrat group in the European Parliament, have always been in favour of the enlargement of the Community and have emphasised that the Community must be an open one if it is to fulfil its function. I agree to this extent with all that was so excellently said by the previous speaker, Mr. Stewart. Europe cannot survive if it is inward-looking. It can survive only if it is open to the world around it. It is our fundamental belief that the enlargement of the Community is desirable. In stressing this yet again, I should simply like to add that, in holding this view, we do not of course want to jeopardise Europe's political solidarity and unity. We want political union to be achieved through economic union. That, indeed, is the ultimate objective of the Treaties of Rome and Paris, as the texts themselves very clearly show.

In his report, Mr. Triboulet puts a question to the applicant countries. Without being indiscreet, I may say that we discussed this in the Political Committee, too. I was very pleased to hear my esteemed colleague Duncan Sandys saying in plain terms this morning what the attitude of his political friends was, and also the attitude of his government and parliament. I have the impression that Mr. Stewart's attitude was also: "Yes, we are indeed aware that we must accept political union and recognise it as our aim when we join the Community." I am fairly sure that the same is true of the other applicant countries.

Another principle of our Christian Democrat policy has always been that the organisation of the community of Europe should be geared to the ultimate political aim of a federation; at the same time we have always made it clear that we are fully prepared to accept interim arrangements of one kind or another. Anyone who has read the document by Jean Monnet on the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, which was made available to the public early in August—a few weeks ago, therefore—but which he submitted to his government in the early fifties, will know that a European federation was stated already in that document as the aim of political unification.

Whilst these two principles were always valid for our policy in the past, it should be asked whether they are still valid today, or whether conditions have somehow fundamentally changed in our favour, which would enable us to depart from these principles. If we look around us—at the Middle East and at the SALT talks in Vienna—if we think of the European Security Conference of which there is so much talk in diplomatic circles or of we consider the recent Germano-Soviet Treaty: if we look at all these things, we must ask ourselves in general terms whether the international political scene has undergone any changes in the last few years. That is undoubtedly the case; but if that is so, we must also ask whether such changes have consolidated East-West relations in the West's favour. That is a matter of opinion. I am not one of those who believe that the events of the last decade, particularly of the last few years, have—to put it very circumspectly—greatly strengthened the West's position. If this is true, however, it must be said that Europe should continue along the path on which it has embarked. On this point I join company again with what the Rapporteur says in his report.

The political unification of Europe is a necessity. It is now as ever a matter of urgency.

If that is so, however, we must ask ourselves by what process and means we are to achieve it. For the inner development of the Community it is, in my view, important first of all to establish the economic and monetary union on which the six Heads of State or of Government have decided. The Werner Committee has submitted an interim report in which a phased plan is put forward for achieving this union. I refer to this because we in the European Parliament have come to realise that there is nothing that can advance the inner development of the Community more expeditiously. The establishment of economic and monetary union is the acid test whether we shall achieve the economic and political unification of the Six—and subsequently, let us hope, of the Ten.

I should like to say this about these two aspects: in order finally to achieve unity we need, in the development of our

Community, to go further than sectorial policies—agricultural policy, social policy and the like—and to start to evolve a broad, common economic policy, with ever-increasing co-ordination. This should be done in the monetary sphere, too, and this development should have a positive effect on the other spheres; otherwise we would have to admit that we are on the wrong path.

Economic and monetary union is bound to mean ever-increasing progress towards political union. That is why I stress this so emphatically today. I wonder, however, whether we shall have ten years for this purpose. I have in mind the answer which the Chairman of the Council gave yesterday; he did speak of ten years but added that there was every desire to do things more quickly. All well and good! We European parliamentarians, however, have learnt from experience not to rely upon faith and hope, nor upon the sometimes highly optimistic declarations which our governments make from time to time. We know that we must constantly watch them and take them up on what they say, so as to make sure that they keep their promises. I would therefore say: "Better 1975 than 1978."

In this connection I would point to the advice and assistance which the applicant countries can give in the preparation of economic and monetary union. This is particularly true of Great Britain in view of her position in world economic affairs and international finance.

The second issue is the Foreign Ministers' report which we were told yesterday has been adopted by governments but for various reasons cannot yet be officially transmitted to Parliament. The question is whether the report can achieve what it is aiming at. I repeat: the Foreign Ministers' report on political union in relation to the prospect of enlargement envisages no obligatory consultations, either on external questions, defence matters or questions of security.

I should like to say in this connection how pleased I was at the official statements made in the House of Commons by the previous and present British Governments. The British Foreign Secretary's latest speech on 6 July was particularly candid. The need to be clear about European security and defence policy in an enlarged Community is talked about openly and freely. I sometimes have the impression that we in the Six are much more reticent in such utterances.

Consultations were envisaged by the Chairman of the Council in the very broad and co-operation-minded statement he made yesterday. We shall need, however, to see to it that these consultations are actually carried out, as a very modest beggining. If we are to win the race against time, there will very soon need to be a quickening of the pace and a widening of the political substance.

A further remark I should like to make is that in this report by the Foreign Ministers the European voice is missing. In this respect I was not quite able to agree with what the Chairman of the Council said. I believe it does matter whether the Heads of Political Departments, who are directly dependant on national Foreign Ministers, meet, or whether an independent European voice tries to identify Europe's needs in consultation with governments, so that governments no longer decide by themselves what they consider to be European. We are familiar with this problem from our experience of the development of the European Economic Community.

A third question, Mr. Chairman, is that of the negotiations with a view to enlargement. We, my political friends and I, are anxious that the negotiations with Great Britain and the other applicants—as well as with the other countries which are outside this group but with which we need to maintain relations—should be conducted simultaneously and expeditiously. In this regard I would readily share the optimism of the Chairman of the Council and express the hope that these negotiations will be concluded by the end of next year at the latest. In saying this, I have in mind what we must achieve.

Mention was made today of the need for international organisations to have a common policy towards the Mediterranean area and towards Africa.

With regard to EEC's relations with the Soviet Union and the East European countries, I should like to make two remarks. The first is that a plan for a European policy needs to be worked out. This policy should include an overall political strategy. In saying this, I am aware that this cannot come about overnight. We should, however, make a start on this—and not just at the pace which has so far been traditional in diplomacy. On the contrary: we should take account of the time factor so that the balance of power in the world, to which I referred earlier, is not altered in the near future, perhaps—I almost said "once more" —to the detriment of our role and place in the world. Is that asking for too much, Mr. Chairman? It seems to me that the interests of the European countries, in the framework both of the Six and of the Ten, are not so far apart. If their actual substance is subjected to scrutiny and analysis, then they may be seen to differ somewhat. But the really vital interests of the European countries and nations, which is what our discussion today is about, are very close together.

The second remark is that whilst Europe—as I have just indicated—still depends on others for its security and will continue to do so for a long time, it is nevertheless true, and will be all the more true when its membership is increased to Ten, that Europe represents in the world—I say this calmly and dispassionately—an economic and financial power which can exert a definite influence on the decisions of both the super-powers, even if we have no nuclear force. Our economic and financial strength, our technology, everything which we as Europeans can offer the world now and in the future, will have an influence even without a nuclear force. To be sure, even when British and French strength are combined, we shall not—in my view—inspire much awe in the super-powers. Even so, Europe will be a factor for order, equilibrium and peace in the world.

For that reason, I believe we should waste no time and should unite as soon as possible in the framework of the Six and of the Ten.

A final observation I should like to make—again one which is in line with the views put forward by my esteemed colleague Mr. Triboulet—is this: if we are to achieve these things, we shall need to improve our Community's constitutional and institutional system. I shall not go into details, but this means that the European institutions in general, and in particular the European Parliament which is represented here today, must be strengthened.

My conclusion, Mr. Chairman, is that we should waste no time but should tackle the tasks confronting us with determination, courage, boldness and imagination in order to ensure, in the limited time at our disposal for dealing with them, that Europe can fully play its part in the world of tomorrow.

The Chairman (*I*). — I call Lord Gladwyn.

Lord Gladwyn. — I should like to begin my brief remarks by associating myself, if I may, with the plea by my colleague Dame Joan Vickers for the early formation, if possible, of the European equivalent of such bodies as the Commonwealth Development Corporation which have done enormously good work in my country from the point of view of founding and financing schemes which have already added a great deal to the gross national product of many of the developing countries. But, of course, such schemes as these are only conceivable given some kind of European authority which, I regret to say, as far as I can see, does not exist at the present time.

It is an excellent thing, if I may say so, that parliamentarians of the Communities and of the Council of Europe should occasionally meet together to compare notes on how they are progressing, by different means, towards the attainment of what is presumably their common, ultimate ideal, namely, the gradual constitution of some central democratic body that will speak, in certain sectors at

any rate, for all the nations lying between the Curzon Line and the Atlantic Ocean.

We are indeed a long way off that objective at the present time. In the first place, the Iberian nations are not in a position to join in the construction of the sort of body we favour, not only for economic but also, of course, for political reasons. In the second place, the States east of the Iron Curtain but west of the Curzon Line are, after the latest *coup de Prague,* to an even greater extent Soviet satellites than previously, and even if they were not they remain police States with which, it is true, it may be possible to entertain increasingly friendly cultural relations and no doubt do increasing trade, but which could not possibly be an actual part of the eventual complete Council of Europe that is our great objective.

In the third place—and most importantly—we have even now not achieved the most rudimentary form of union between the fourteen Western European democracies themselves. Only among six of them can such institutions be said to exist and even that Community is not functioning very well at the moment. Certainly, and with all respect to my present audience, it cannot be said to be particularly democratic at the present time, seeing that the Parliament of Europe up till now has, most unfortunately, as I would think, had precious little influence on the course of events.

It is commonly said—and it is true—that only by enlarging the present union of the Six can any genuine European union ever be achieved, for the very extension of the Communities will in itself make it impossible to continue with the present rather hybrid system under which decisions, if they are taken at all, are only arrived at by an extremely long and complicated system of bargaining between all six sovereign entities.

Once Britain, Ireland and Scandinavia, and possibly one or two other countries as well, come in, however, such a system as the one I have described will be quite unworkable and the whole

enlarged Community will then quite soon be faced with the choice between either abandoning the whole idea of union or of taking the crucial step, which they have not taken yet, of accepting a limited degree of majority voting in the Council of Ministers where laid down in the Treaty of Rome, and increasing the powers of the Parliament of Europe. This truth has, I think, just been enunciated by that admirable new Commissioner, Herr Dahrendorf. If Britain is in the Community when that moment comes, in any case I have little doubt, in spite of what Mr. Triboulet said this morning, on which side she will find herself. We can only hope that France, too, will be on the same side.

It is quite true that at the moment the mood in my country seems to be one of a rather suspicious nationalism—and that is not altogether unnatural after the way our previous approaches were rather summarily rejected. But once we have a part responsibility for operating the new system, I have no doubt at all what the majority opinion among our parliamentarians will be—and so far as we are concerned it will then be on our parliamentarians and not on the mood of the nation that the decision to advance or to retreat will in practice rest.

At the moment, the difficulties in the way of enlarging, and thus of consolidating, EEC are, on the face of it, economic, and, of course, they are real. But the chief hazard in the way of enlargement is not economic; it is political. And here I touch on the great problem which was referred to in his admirable speech by my colleague, Mr. Michael Stewart, although I think that I shall approach it in a slightly different way.

The overriding present foreign political objective of the Soviet Union is to prevent the emergence in Western Europe of any supranational political entity of which Western Germany would be a part. This is why they have been so obliging in their attitude towards the recent Treaty with the *Bundesrepublik*; this is why they may even be prepared to make certain concessions as regards Berlin; this is why they are constantly holding out the possibility of a genuine détente emerging from their much desired European

Security Conference, designed, as they would think, above all to assist and accelerate the process of American withdrawal from the continent of Europe.

The reason for all this intensive activity is pretty clear. If the Russians succeed in their objective of preventing if not the enlargement, at any rate the political development, of Western Europe, they will be able, over the years, to make separate arrangements wih the various individual States in this part of the world. Since, according to their theories, as we know, an economic crisis in America will, sooner or later, both weaken these countries and lessen the economic influence of the United States, the whole of Western Europe will inevitably turn towards the Soviet Union; and I am afraid that our existing democracies in that event will become the equivalent of modern Poland and Czechoslovakia. This is what the word détente implies to the rulers of the Soviet Union, and it is important that this fact should be clearly recognised by Western leaders at the present time.

No doubt these grim possibilities are as clear to the Government of the *Bundesrepublik* as they are to certain outside observers. Certainly that government have been most circumspect in their dealings with Moscow, and we must all recognise that fact and be grateful for it. No one in any case criticises Chancellor Brandt or Herr Scheel for at least attempting to improve West German relations with the East and thus securing some limited détente—so long as they have no illusions at all about what the Soviet Government are actually up to. We can only trust, therefore, that now that the Treaty with Russia has been signed, the chief activity of the Government of the *Bundesrepublik* will be directed towards the far more important objective of achieving the consolidation and hence the preservation of the democratic way of life on this side of the Iron Curtain. And it is becoming increasingly clear that this can only be achieved by enlarging the existing European Economic Community.

As I see it, the whole future of liberty in this part of the world is bound up in this operation, and therefore it must not in any circumstances be allowed to fail.

The Chairman (*I*). — I call Mrs. Klee.

Mrs. Klee (*G*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, in the winter of 1969-70 my colleagues of both the European Parliament and the Consultative Assembly concerned themselves with the question of how relations with Latin America could be strengthened and extended. This is reflected in the reports of Mr. de Winter and Mr. Flornoy and in the resolutions adopted by the two Assemblies.

As a result of the numerous personal contacts I have had with South Americans for many years, I can only confirm what our colleague Mr. Vedovato said in his excellent report, namely that precisely South America is especially interested in European unification from which it expects:

(*a*) a stabilising of the balance of power in the world;

(*b*) better support for its own interests in these times of great upheaval;

(*c*) and also an example for the political and economic unification of its own continent.

It is therefore understandable that there is growing disappointment at the stagnation of endeavours towards Europe's political unification—an unedifying spectacle; nor is there much food for rejoicing at the neglect of the already existing sound bilateral relations benefiting Africa, or at the fact that the Common Market, rather than promoting economic relations, has, if anything, been detrimental to them.

It has been said repeatedly today that in comparison with South America, Europe's trade with Africa has increased appreciably less. This comparison is simply unsound; the starting point must be borne in mind. As a result of political associations, wholly different and far stronger economic ties already existed with Africa than with Latin America.

It therefore seems to me that another comparison is far more conclusive. Latin America's share in overall world trade decreases continually; in 1960 exports amounted to 6.6 % of world trade, in 1965 only to some 5.9 % and they have now fallen by about 10.6 % of this last figure. Where EEC is concerned, the figures are still more serious—6 % and 5.2 %, or a decrease of 13 %—and imply, at a time when world trade is undergoing considerable expansion, a far greater loss to the Latin-American economy. This development is being followed with grave concern on the other side of the Atlantic, particularly after various attempts at strengthening co-operation with Europe have more or less failed.

All Latin-American governments therefore have taken a new and highly important initiative: in the context of the Special Latin-American Co-ordinating Committee (CECLA), they adopted unanimously the *Declaración de Buenos Aires* of 29 July last. In this Declaration they not only enumerate all the questions they would like to discuss with Europe, but also propose that a joint committee composed of governmental representatives of Latin America and representatives of the European Commission be set up. This proposal corresponds entirely to what our colleagues in the European Parliament requested this year in their resolution.

Ladies and Gentlemen, today we have the rare opportunity of holding a Joint Meeting of our two parliamentary bodies. I would like to seize the occasion to urge each one of you to bring influence to bear on your governments so that the Declaration of Buenos Aires is given the most serious consideration and the utmost is done to implement it.

I would, however, urge the European Commission to do all it can to ensure that the flow of information towards Latin America is improved considerably, since at the moment one sometimes comes across travesties that are positively grotesque. I would also appeal to the Commission to take action on the proposals of CECLA as soon as possible.

Please ensure that the proposed joint committee is set up as speedily as possible so that better co-operation develops and a continuous dialogue between equal partners can be maintained. Anyone who like myself has just returned from South and Central America and has had the opportunity to have intensive talks there with senior officials of seven countries knows how seriously this Declaration of Buenos Aires is taken.

We stand today at an especially critical juncture—a time when many people are showing signs of resignation, of saying "There's nothing we can do to change matters". This is the very time when we ought to recognise a gesture of goodwill as quickly as possible. (*Applause*)

The Chairman (*I*). — I call Mr. Molloy.

Mr. Molloy. — I would like first to join with those who have already paid tribute to Mr. Triboulet and other Rapporteurs for presenting many of the essentials for us to have this very important debate. I found particularly attractive the very title of this debate and the fact that we are not only concerned with the future Europe and its unity but at the same time equally concerned in the provision of aid and help to the poorer nations of the world. I hope note was taken of the point made by my colleague, Mr. Duncan Sandys, that we should not be over-concerned with the fact that to unite Europe on the basis of a commercial and business undertaking is not likely to move very quickly to any great success, and that there are other aspects of which we have to take cognisance.

I believe, too, that we must never lose sight of the fact that ultimate success will be achieved only when all of Europe, East and West, is united. I know that very often, at least in my country, people quite erroneously assume that Europe means those countries that are banded together in the Common Market. I am not going to say that it is their fault, but I believe it is a complete misuse of words to suggest an assumption that because one portion

of Europe is joined together, as they see it for their benefit, this means that Europe is united.

The kind of Europe I want to see ultimately united will embrace not only those who are not yet Members of the Six, but ultimately—no matter how idealistic it may sound—those who are now called "the Eastern European countries" as well. In our own history we have the name "Great Britain" or very often "the United Kingdom". The latter name suggests correctly that our Island of Britain was at one time anything but united, but fortunately we have done away with the fields of war on that island, although we have maintained war on the field of sport, which I believe is a really excellent substitute.

It is in this particular context that I would suggest to the Assembly that we should not be too happy about the fact that in the past twenty odd years there has been an absence of war in Europe. This is wonderful, of course, and is to be encouraged, but it does not by itself mean that we are moving towards European unification. I was very pleased when my colleague, the former British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart, mentioned that in this particular context we should perhaps pay more attention to the creation—and there is certainly a need for it—of a European peace and security council to try, at least, as I feel, Herr Willy Brandt has started, to set up a dialogue with those we describe as "Eastern Europeans".

It seems to me that all of us, whether West Germans, French, Scandinavians or British, are in grave danger of assuming that there is some fundamental difference in the make-up of our fellow-Europeans who come from what we call the Eastern European countries. I do not believe that this is a healthy way in which to look at the problem which faces us. It might well be that the initiative shown by Herr Willy Brandt and his colleagues may encourage many of us to think along the lines of being prepared at least to talk, to commence a dialogue and to follow the dictum of Churchill that war-war was frightful and that jaw-jaw was much better.

I hope, therefore, that the Assembly will have taken note of what my colleague Michael Stewart said.

In our European history we have had a remarkable ambivalence. In some of our activities as Europeans in the past fifty odd years we have been very vulgar, our behaviour has been disgraceful and we have done anything but give a lead in sanity to the rest of the world. The 1914-1918 war and the 1939-1945 war are examples of that vulgar behaviour of Europeans. At the same time this remarkable continent has done a great deal to enhance the status and dignity of mankind. It has done so much in science, technology and education to help raise living standards not only on the continent of Europe but throughout the world. This side of the balance-sheet is something of which all Europeans can be justly proud.

I want now to address my remarks to what might be called a more earthy approach to the problem on the one hand of uniting Europe and on the other of making certain that a rich continent such as we are is making its proper contribution to try to uplift the standards of life in poorer parts of the world. All over the world, in our own continent, in Asia, in Africa and in other parts, I believe there is always an element of fear. We are probably terrified of the possibility of a nuclear holocaust. A starving Indian, Asian or African is probably not quite so concerned about that; he is more concerned as to whether his child will live or where he will get next day his daily bread. Too often I hear not only in my own country but in other European countries also that it might be honourable and proper to concern ourselves about the poverty of other parts of the world. But what about our own people here in Europe—our own old age pensioners, our own poor, our own ill-housed, our own folk who are in ill-health whom we are not doing much to help? Should they not come first? I do not think that this is a greedy—even if it might be a myopic—attitude.

If, therefore, we want to move forward towards helping the poorer nations of this world, we here in Europe must be con-

cerned about helping the poor amongst us, not whether they are the poor in Britain, the poor in Germany, the poor in the Netherlands or France or any other European country, but the European poor. We want also to be concerned about the industrial and other forms of ill-health that continue to afflict millions of our fellow-Europeans.

We in Great Britain are very proud of our National Health Service introduced by Aneurin Bevan when he was Minister of Health. This, in my view, is one of the most civilised pieces of legislation ever placed on the statute book of my country or any other nation in the world. We in Europe should move towards this idea. Whilst nowadays more Germans, Frenchmen and Italians come to my country—and I am glad that they do—and more Britons now go to Germany, Italy and Scandinavian countries—and I am glad that they do—there should not be the fear, "What if I should have an accident or should be ill, what will it cost me, and will anyone help me?". If a Britisher is helped in Italy, Spain, Germany or Norway when he is ill, whether it be on a visit or whilst working in one of those countries, he will it cost me, and will anyone help me?" If a Britisher is other words, the reciprocity does not stop merely at healing the wounds; it goes on to enhance the spirit between the people of this Europe of ours.

If some thought could be given to the ideals of a free European National Health Service, two things would be achieved. Not only would Europe become more unified, but it would also become more efficient. I cannot now deploy the full arguments about industrial efficiency being increased by preventive medicine. However, if that were done, the result would be a much larger economic surplus which could be distributed to the poorer of this world.

A great deal of attention has already been given to military alliances within Europe. Let us now turn our minds to medical alliances. The desire I believe is there, particularly amongst the young people of Europe. Let us see if we cannot

institute some sort of action to make this a reality. If the social and welfare facilities that exist in most of our nations could now be translated on to a European basis, it would not then matter whether one was a German, a Frenchman, an Italian or a Britisher who was sick and it would not matter where one was, because the best that medicine could give would be at one's disposal. That, I believe, is the real way to attempt to achieve a unified Europe. Indeed, if we are prepared to look after the poor and sick of our own continent, we will then have much more right to draw to the attention of all Europeans the plight of those in the developing and poorer countries.

Some people are also apprehensive as to what sort of regimes will emerge in some of these developing countries which are very much poorer than we are, but we must not be too superior in that attitude. Let us not forget that the old system of government amongst all nations has been the authoritarian form of government. The new system is the democratic system. This democratic system has not existed all that long and it has taken a long time to develop. Therefore, when we are apprehensive about some of the poorer nations that we want to help and will help to develop and about whether or not they will develop towards a democratic way of life, let us not forget that they now stand where all of us in Europe once stood. If we can give that temperate patience in thinking about this matter it will help us enormously.

In addition to giving material aid to the poorer nations, I hope we will consider opening up all our teaching resources in Europe. A start has been made, but regrettably it is too much on a narrow former colonialistic and national basis. Naturally my country helps its former colonies, but in my view our approach should be much broader. I believe our technical universities throughout Europe should be opened up to the people of poorer lands to allow them to be in a position to help themselves. In short, we want to give not only of our resources. Let us also try to give of our remarkable European resourcefulness.

In my view, we in Europe should make our contribution to bring about freedom from hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance in many parts of the world, allowing them at the same time political and personal freedom to flourish and develop more rapidly. Where we see aid being given, whether by the Soviet Union or the Americans, in extraordinarily generous amounts, and we feel that it is given with an ulterior motive, we must have the courage to say so. If it appears that we are doing the same, we must be self-critical. Where we see activities which make us apprehensive, we must voice our apprehension, as we have about some of the activities of the Soviet Union. I, for one, am extremely apprehensive, for example, about the activities of the Americans in Latin America, especially in Chile. They cause me grave concern. I hope that the Americans will consider carefully what they propose to do in that poverty-stricken land which is trying to struggle towards a democratic political institution.

If Europe can unite to erase the vulgar poverty which is now extant amongst millions of our fellow human beings in other continents, our endeavours will be more speedily and efficiently achieved once we ourselves ensure that our health and social welfare facilities are made European-wide. This is a very important aspect in the debate. Our joint endeavour should be to make social, hospital and medical benefits common and free to all throughout Europe. From the larger cake thus provided, we should see to it that we pass on as much as possible to the poorer parts of the world. It is in that way, I believe, that we can direct our united action as Europeans to a more decent and honourable cause.

The Chairman (*I*). — I call Mr. Blumenfeld.

Mr. Blumenfeld (*G*). — Mr. Chairman, we are slowly approaching the end of a highly interesting, comprehensive and, may I say, profound debate, for which I who have followed almost all the whole of it would like to express thanks. May I take this opportunity of recalling also that during the preceding

session of the European Parliament, the President of the Commission, Mr. Malfatti, and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of the European Communities, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Scheel, both made statements whose importance deserves once more to be brought to the attention of this meeting.

Mr. Malfatti urged that EEC, which already today is the biggest trading power in the world, as he put it, should assume its international responsibility and show itself equal to it. This was one of the statements. If I am correctly informed, Mr. Scheel explained yesterday, when making his statement, that the Treaty concluded by Chancellor Brandt and himself in Moscow had been entered into by the Federal Government more or less as a representative of Europe and the European Communities. I wish to support this statement; I consider that it is highly important principle, a declaration that is important not only for yesterday's discussion but also for our joint debate today, Mr. Chairman.

But if we all interpret it thus, it is all the more necessary to emphasis once more today—and I welcome the fact that so many of my colleagues have already done so—that in face of this new development the unification of free Europe, if I may so express myself, has now become all the more urgent and even pressing. What will be decisive here is the requirement that European unification should progress very speedily from economic integration to a genuine political union.

Mr. Chairman, our colleague Mr. Triboulet devotes a chapter of his report to European unification. Mr. Lücker has already commented on that report on behalf of the Christian Democrat Group of the European Parliament, and I support him on behalf of our political friends in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe: "We are convinced it would be foolhardy" says Mr. Triboulet "to try to begin European unification all over again and, so to speak, deal out the cards once more." Mr. Triboulet continues: "Anyone wanting to talk seriously about the future of European unification—which is our subject—must start with the European Economic Community." I entirely agree with this. I would, however, like to say to my colleague Mr. Triboulet, expres-

sing myself in words somewhat different from Mr. Lücker's: just where your report becomes interesting you really stop giving us indications. Mr. Lücker thought that you had done this deliberately so that we could continue painting in the picture here.

Mr. Chairman, I will try to do this with a few strokes. If I speak of political union as a relatively near goal, I am really only expressing something which our European Assemblies have for years repeatedly sworn to achieve as a great necessity, as a step towards genuine European unification. What we propose here is therefore nothing new. But I believe that the time for action has now come: we must urge our governments to take a big step beyond what they decided in Viterbo in May of this year. However useful they may be, the bi-annual consultations decided on in Viterbo cannot really be described as a major step forward. "Fireside chats", as I called them at a meeting of Western European Union, cannot take the place of systematic consultations. I therefore welcome what our colleague Mr. Duncan Sandys said today very clearly, with the support of others, namely that this is the starting point and that we must set up an independent political body. I would even go so far as to describe it as a permanent political body, as the organisational embodiment of the interests of the Community. On this, we agree. I hope, Mr. Triboulet, that you will not only agree to this first fundamental concrete point, but that you will also actively support it, because it really goes beyond what was decided on in Viterbo. We must realise that at that conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs it was still too early to reach agreement within the six-power Community and its governments.

The voluntary consultations between member governments must therefore be replaced as the very next step by systematic consultations and co-operation.

It is equally necessary, however, for the organs of the European Communities to take part in the framing of the common policy. I would regard it as infortunate if a kind of negative

parallelism were to develop rather than a gradual integration of the stages leading to this political union. It is therefore necessary to call in the Commission. I earnestly appeal to the governments of the six-power Community and to the candidates for accession to it to provide, when concluding the present agreements on political co-operation, for a minimum of common bodies as a first step towards political union. But, in order to prevent a parallelism, as I just said, or even a co-existence with the existing European Communities, the organs of the latter, and particularly the European Parliament and the Commission, must be associated with the framing of this common policy from the outset. For the aim is to turn into reality once and for all and as quickly as possible a common foreign and security policy, as some of our British colleagues expressed it, so that the obvious —and to us regrettable—weakness of the European governments, in the face of today's major dangers and problems, not least those of the Mediterranean area, may finally give way to an active, clear and resolute attitude on the part of this old continent of ours.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a further proposal for concrete action which is not new either, not only because it has often been made by the Commission, but also because it is contained in the Treaty. For Heaven's sake, let us now demonstrate what we mean by a European political objective! Let us at last begin to conduct an external trade, investment and credit policy that is common to the European Community, particularly vis-à-vis third countries but also—in view of the latest development following from the Moscow Treaty—vis-à-vis the countries of COMECON.

Mr. Chairman, I consider that this demand for a common external trade policy leads on directly to the other subject, the main topic discussed by us today, i.e. the common development policy. But before I say a few words on it in conclusion, I would like to raise a third problem now due for settlement, in my view, and one which will have to be pursued energetically during the coming weeks and months. I warmly welcome the fact that on this

question, too, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Scheel, not only said some optimistic words yesterday but also hinted at chances of success. The problem is that of the achievement of the European economic and monetary union. May I add that in my view and that of my political friends this is a problem that should be tackled in accordance with the phased plan of the European Commission, and common instruments created to replace or reinforce individual national instruments. We cannot afford to continue to mark time in these practical questions which, admittedly, presuppose a political will. The foremost need now is political determination to achieve political union. In other words, let us get down to brass tacks!

Mr. Chairman, may I add something on this subject which has not yet been touched on today, otherwise I would not repeat it. I refer to the relations between the European Communities and the United States of America. We all know that the USA has from the outset supported the efforts made towards European unity and that it continues to do so in principle. It must be admitted that some shadows have fallen on this relationship between Europe and America, primarily because the United States is simply no longer prepared to accept, apart from the various problems raised by the defence alliance, disadvantages in matters of trade and economy so long as on the other side the unification of Europe does not make noticeable progress. Here, then, is another reason for taking the practical steps which have just been defined. As a result, the climate between Europe and America, on which, whether we like it or not, we depend in large measure, will improve appreciably.

In conclusion, may I, Mr. Chairman, add a comment on development policy. I have been greatly impressed by the reports of our colleagues, MM. Amrehn, Vedovato, Westerterp and Bersani, with their profound knowledge of the subject, their extraordinarily valuable documentation and their political implications. May I thank the Rapporteurs for these reports.

In view of the tardiness of the hour I would like to add only two comments which are not meant to be critical but may nevertheless be so.

Mr. Chairman, there has been a natural tendency for the development policy of the European Communities to be concentrated on certain areas. Here we have not overlooked that in South America—as Mrs. Klee has so cogently stressed—the hopes placed in Europe in the past were far too great for us to be able to fulfil them, although Europe has a wealth of resources and possibilities for meeting the big social tensions to which South America is a prey. Europe will not be able to do this alone, however.

So far as our development aid and development policy are concerned—much as we agree with all the Rapporteurs have said—we should do well, I feel, to consider whether there is not one particular region to which Europe should give priority consideration. There is the Mediterranean area, on our very doorstep, to which Mr. Vedovato has draw particular attention in his report. Mr. Chairman, there is no need for me to say this to you, who are from Italy and know the problem far better than I who come from Northern Europe; to whom am I saying this? The whole Mediterranean area bristles with problems and the imminent danger of war; we are faced, among other things, with air piracy and the fact that the European governments and the United States are powerless to combat such criminal acts and attempts at blackmail. Yet we have not even succeeded—leaving aside military questions on which I will not dwell here—in establishing a plan for dealing with the causes of these developments in the Mediterranean area, in the coastal areas of the Maghreb and of the Near East. Nor have we any plan to meet the immense need for help in economic, investment and social matters or to provide the conditions for the flow of European private capital to these regions.

None of this has as yet been tackled by us. Many plans lie in the drawers of such excellent organisations as the World Bank,

OECD and also the Community in Brussels, but, alas, dust is settling on them. It is a fact that in the past months and years nothing practical has been done to establish a European plan for the Mediterranean area. Mr. Chairman, I would urge that after today's discussion and the excellent reports of the Rapporteurs, the European Commission and the European Communities not only adopt this idea but implement it. This would be far better than repeatedly trying to establish new plans or set up new organisations.

Only if we prove it to other peoples by accomplishing this major task can we claim to keep faith with our tradition and our future opportunities as Europeans. (*Applause*)

The Chairman (*I*). — I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. Cifarelli (*I*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I must say that although this morning, after the reports had been presented, it seemed to me that this debate was tending to stress only the by no means negligible problems of the relationships between Europe and the developing countries, this afternoon the discussion seems to have become more balanced in that attention has been turned towards the first and decisive part of the problem covered by the topic chosen for this Joint Meeting, namely the future of European unification.

That subject is tremendously vast but also extremely topical, not least because recent events and situations which are still developing, confirm, if that were necessary, the urgent need to overcome constructively the obstacles in the way of European unification.

I still remember the first time I came here, to the *Orangerie* opposite Europe House, with the federalists from my country and other nations, to call for something more than the originally purely consultative institution set up by men like Schuman, De Gasperi, Sforza and Spaak. On that occasion, to recall the words

of Luigi Einaudi, we said that the building of Europe was a race against time, "*une lutte contre la montre*".

Today this is truer than ever, since in various ways the European nations, now one and now another, have allowed themselves the luxury of wasting vital time and failing to keep their appointments on the road to European unification.

Today I heard our colleague Duncan Sandys predict that should Great Britain's third bid to enter the European Community end in failure, the situation might be irreparable and it would no longer be possible to devise a formula to enable that historic step to take place. I agree that we should look to the past, but above all we must look clearly at the world around us. The situation in the Mediterranean, as has been said, is certainly dramatic, and that in Central Europe is delicate as indeed in the rest of the world—we heard the echo of this in the heated discussion which took place in this hemicycle yesterday. We have only to think of the United States of America, their economic situation and the danger of an involution in their foreign policy. Everything around us confirms that we have indeed reached a phase when it is essential to take decisive steps to unify Europe.

With respect to Great Britain's entry into the Community, I think that we should take note (even today we have received further confirmation of this) of the constructive political will which exists, quite apart from assessments of advantages or disadvantages with regard to particular aspects of economics, trade and customs duties.

It has been said here, and for me this constitutes an extremely important starting point in the present decisive phase, that we must turn our attention to political requirements, proposals and intentions. This links up with the other decisive topical point which concerns everything that is being done, studied and considered as a result of the decisions of the Hague Conference to take the decisive step towards the political unity of the Community.

In that connection, the Rapporteur for the European Parliament, Mr. Triboulet, whom I, too, should like to thank for the effort he made in preparing his report (as I thank the other Rapporteurs of both Assemblies) reminded us that in essence there is a fundamental divergence in our attitudes: some are thinking of a federation and others are in favour of a confederation. And I am old enough to remember the passionate discussions between institutionalists and functionalists on the ways in which Europe should be developed. It seems to me, however, that at the present time we should at least accept what can be accepted at once: namely permanent and institutionalised consultations. I believe we should work in that direction in order to arrive at a concrete solution.

Indeed it is unthinkable that we should continue to have so many incoherent policies. The need to round off economic union and to bring about a monetary union brings us into the field of foreign policy and defence and makes us get down to what we are wont to call Politics with a capital "p". The enlargement of the Community itself, with the participation of England and the other candidate countries, obliges us to face up without delay to the problem of a common policy at least within the modest limits possible at the present time.

I know that those who have a federalist approach will find this disappointing. I myself am deeply aware of the inadequacy of such solutions. But I will remind you today, as I have done so many times in the past, of the danger of reaching for the moon. I think therefore that permanent consultation and its institutionalisation by means of a Secretariat competent to deal which problems of foreign policy and not dependent on individual governments but endowed with a functional autonomy to work out solutions of its own, is a step towards that political union which we all feel to be urgently necessary.

All this is the more important since, as I said, there is another factor which we must take into account: the new German policy which Foreign Minister Scheel, as present Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Community, explained to us

yesterday so clearly and enthusiastically. He said that there is nothing new in Federal Germany's policy with respect to the Atlantic Alliance; there is nothing new in the demand that the American forces should remain in Europe as a guarantee of peace; above all, and that is what matters to us, nothing has changed with respect to Federal Germany's full participation in the Europe of the Communities, today and in the future. Mr. Scheel said lastly that everything must be done to speed up Great Britain's entry into the Common Market. I am among those who regard Federal Germany's policy as not only necessary, although, if I may say so, belated, but also opportune: in view of that country's fundamental ties with Europe and the Western Alliance, it is a good thing for Germany, for Europe and for the peace of the world.

But clearly one cannot rely for ever on the strength of a party or on a particular political situation. There could be so many new situations which might produce a crisis in the relationship between Federal Germany and Europe if Community co-operation were not institutionalised definitively and developed in the directions of federalism and democracy. We must not be influenced by the ghosts of the past when we consider the new German policy. I am not one of those who at once thought of the Treaty of Rapallo when Chancellor Brandt, after long and difficult negotiations, signed the Treaty with the Russian leaders. But I must say that a Germany which is not a fully integrated part of a Europe which is developing dynamically, could be tempted in other ways (historical evolution cannot be predicted) to break away and to consider an alternative to its European policy, a policy which might give it other satisfactions. Therefore for that reason, too, we must demand that the two things which are today indissolubly linked be carried forward with devotion and energy. I refer to the enlargement to the Community with the participation of England and the other applicant countries and the strengthening of the Community at political level thanks to the solution, by means within our power today, of the urgent problem facing us: namely the creation of the political Community.

That is all the more important since, as we have seen from the remarks of Duncan Sandys and Lord Gladwyn for example, European-minded people in the United Kingdom are aware of these problems and their urgency. And we of the European Parliament, who are obliged to refer back constantly to the Europe of the Six and are used to considering these European problems in the context of the long and slow process of building Europe piece by piece in the spheres of economics, trade, customs policy and so on, are particularly impressed by such voices and by the political attitudes they reveal. They are extremely significant in connection with the entry of Great Britain and the other candidate countries into the European Communities.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I was very anxious to emphasise what seems to me the fundamental political point of the question which is the subject of our discussion, since it is indeed the development of European unity which makes our attitude to the whole complex problem of relationships between Europe and the developing countries concrete instead of vague, historically pertinent instead of apologetic or, if you wish, moralising.

Clearly we must turn our attention to these relationships with due political seriousness and therefore without the inferiority complexes of an anti-historical Europe which would have to turn its back on everything that it has done in its dealings with other peoples and continents.

I believe that Europe should always be considered in the light of its glorious past and with a desire to make that past the foundation for outstanding new achievements in the fields of civilisation, labour, social justice, democracy and freedom.

Therefore we must act without inferiority complexes and without moralising, as though every nation was not called by God to face up to its own problems and to build its future with its own hands.

Looking at things realistically however, it is clear that the problems of relationships with the developing countries can be approached—from the point of view of economic resources, social possibilities, and political attitudes—only on a European basis. Otherwise we should see only futile waverings and a withdrawal into a past which stands condemned by the historical developments of our century.

Therefore I think that the Rapporteurs have presented the topic extremely well, since they view Europe's action in its dealings with developing countries as linked up with the process of European unification. In that connection Mr. Deniau, the representative of the Commission, made a number of very interesting comments in his speech this morning to which I listened with great attention. He asked us to bear in mind constantly that the problems posed in connection with Europe's relationships with developing countries and the solutions found are different for every case, for every situation and for every continent.

I think that is fundamental, because it would be to go against history, it would be an illusion and sheer absurdity to approach all situations in the same way. If we consider for example the large continental groups (each nation is the child of its own history), we must agree that when we speak of the under-development of the Asian countries, of Central Africa or Latin America, these are historical realities and therefore extremely different concrete situations which can certainly not be equated.

That is why to study the problems of development means considering a series of countries which cannot be classified according to the far too general criterion of per capita income.

We must indeed take into account specific individual situations. And that can be understood all the more clearly by someone like myself who is Italian and is bound to remember constantly the situation in his own country, two thirds of which are comparable to the rest of the Community area with respect

to development and industrialisation whilst the remaining third is still in the development phase.

But Mr. Deniau made another remark this morning which seemed to me very important. I refer to his comment that as regards the action Europe ought to take with respect to the developing countries, it must not be thought that a fresh start is necessary. It is at the same time essential to take more uniform action, through the United Nations and its international organisations or by means of international agreements in specific economic sectors. Here, too, there have been implicit and sometimes explicit criticisms of what the Community has done, is doing and, I would say, must continue to do in favour of the developing countries.

Although it is right, from the practical and political points of view, to improve our combined action and efforts, we cannot share the opinion that the action taken by the Community has been spoilt by a concept of relationships with African countries which, even when the Treaty of Rome was concluded, differed from what was later to develop thanks to the dissolution of the earlier colonial system.

Therefore in my view, we must go ahead in a critical and alert spirit and organise our action in such a way that experience itself makes it increasingly effective.

In this connection many other questions could be brought up. For example we could consider that progress towards political union might lead to a reduction in expenditure on defence and in military effort thanks to the détente which we all hope for and which can only result from proper understanding between peoples.

We could also think of what Europe's economic potential will probably, and I would say, fortunately, be, especially when we have achieved—as I hope we shall as quickly as possible—a common economic policy, a common industrial policy, a reformed agricultural policy and a monetary union. But I should like above

all to emphasise that when we raise the problem of relationships with developing countries, we undoubtedly do so as a historical requirement: I mean that we face up to it and must face up to it as a great moral task, as the maximum outward expression of the significance of building a united Europe in the world of which it forms part. Doubtless that is also a sector of activity and a task which is justified on the basis of political and economic interests, but we must see it above all in human terms.

When dealing with relationships with developing countries, which vary from country to country because of our and their historical background, we must stress the human realities, for example by paying attention not only to the volume but also to the motive of our aid. Experience has taught us that technical aid is considered the most important. Whether we wish to emphasise the contribution of voluntary organisations, as Mr. Bersani did this morning, or whether we desire to consider the organisation necessary for the implementation of a development aid policy, we must always place the emphasis on technical aid. It can take various forms: it can have cultural, economic, productive or social aims. Technical aid must not be restricted merely to the relationship between one State and another, or between organisations operating in the contemporary world; it must also inspire relationships between human beings, ethnic groups, and peoples. Here the difficulties, the risks of failure, the uprooting, the estrangement from their normal human and social environment to be observed among some of those sent abroad for technical training are well known.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, the range of problems is vast. I do not want to take up your time by covering the field any more widely, but I do believe that, as in every speech, there is a central point of reference in this series of problems—a series which embraces trade and capital policy, the international repercussions of European economy and trade relations: it is the human aspect of technical aid which is decisive for the achievement of constructive results and for the future.

Mr. Chairman, I wanted to emphasise that point and I hope that my contribution will help the debate to encourage that growing awareness of our problems which must give rise to a greater, swifter and more intense effort to carry forward the great historical process of European unification. (*Applause.*)

The Chairman (*I*). — I call Mr. Roser.

Mr. Roser (*G*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I take the liberty to draw your attention to a series of questions which, seen from a long-term standpoint, I consider to be equal in political significance and importance to the topical questions discussed at such length this morning, although I would express my thanks for the wide-ranging character of the debate and particularly to Lord Gladwyn for his support.

There is always talk—and there has been talk again today —of the expectations placed in Europe by the countries of the third world. I consider that we should also spend at least a short moment thinking of the expectations placed in us by the youth of Europe, in us who currently bear political responsibility, particularly as regards development aid and the attitude taken by this continent and these free united peoples of Europe. Let us ensure that this unification process makes real progress and is concluded. The young generation are eager to know whether, if we all pull together, we can discharge our major obligations towards the third world.

In one of the reports this morning—I believe it was the report of Mr. Amrehn—reference was made to the political advantages to be derived from a development policy conceived jointly on a multilateral basis and conducted under joint responsibility. In his view, one of these advantages was the laying-down of the basis for a common foreign policy of the European Communities.

In my view, a considerable advantage would reside in the fact that through a strong commitment towards the third world,

we would be able to counter the feeling of resignation which is spreading more and more among the young generation of Europe. These young people are witnessing the birth of a great universal civilisation and universal culture, influenced considerably and perhaps even determined by a European way of thinking and living. At the same time, however, they are also witnessing the slow process of the political unification of the free peoples of Europe—too slow, say the young.

The real danger is that if this European frustration spreads, young people will lose faith in the power of action of a freely constituted State, a democracy. In my view, by far the greatest part of our young generation still has hopes in Europe, in a politically, legally, economically and culturally unified Europe. They still have hopes! But whether they really believe that it will come about I am unable to say at the moment.

If we can re-arouse the interest of the young generation in a common development policy conducted and intensified jointly under joint responsibility; if we can secure their nation-wide and indeed continent-wide agreement to a society that is founded in justice, then particularly in the eyes of youth, we shall truly have seized the chance provided by a common development policy.

Mr. Triboulet spoke earlier this morning of the European enthusiasm of twenty years ago. In these circles it is, I fear, waning. Young people fear this still more. We must give them new courage, and this we can do if our development policy is right. (*Applause*)

The Chairman (*I*). — I call Mr. Scott-Hopkins.

Mr. Scott-Hopkins. — Mr. Chairman, the debate today has been very interesting.

I agreed with the last speaker very much when he highlighted the problem confronting the youth of Europe and our own countries today. They are frustrated, they do not know which way to go and they are not sure that we, the older generation, know the right way to lead our countries forward in the days to come.

I wish to make two points only concerning the debate and the main theme running through it. The report of Mr. Triboulet on which I congratulate him—it was one of the best I have heard—seemed to underline the importance of the efforts of my country, of Ireland and of the Scandinavian countries, to join the Common Market. This is our third time of trying now. I repeat what Duncan Sandys said: we cannot afford to fail again. If we do it will be difficult, if not impossible, to restart the negotiations.

Several speakers, including Mr. Triboulet, seemed to question the political will of my country to join the Common Market. Again I repeat what Duncan Sandys and, indeed, what Michael Stewart have already said: we intend to join the Common Market, and if we are successful we intend to adhere to the Treaty of Rome. We have also the political wish see European countries, including our own, moving closer together and working out common policies for the future. However, I would be lacking in my duty if I did not say that the people in my part of England and, indeed, in England generally are looking at Europe and wondering whether Europe itself has the political will and whether Europe itself wants other countries to join it, and by "Europe" I mean the Europe of the Six. As Lord Gladwyn said, the present mood in England is one of doubt, of wonderment as to what the future really holds for Europe.

This brings me to my second point. Our political will has been queried, and it is right that we also should query the political will of the countries of the Six to work together for the future. I do not criticise the wish of Chancellor Brandt and the German Government to conclude an agreement with Russia, but I entirely agree with Lord Gladwyn in my belief that the Russian intention is still to control Western Europe, it is still to drive a wedge between European countries. I still believe that the Russians are prepared to make concessions in order to gain their ends so to do. I believe that in dealing with them, in making agreements with them and in coming to some form of treaties with them, one must be extremely careful: one must guard against what their eventual objective is, one must consult one's friends and allies to

the maximum extent. Europe as yet is not united. Maybe it will be, but at the moment we are going through a dangerous phase.

I hope that in the near future the governments of Western Europe, particularly the West German Government, will pay particular heed to the dangers that lie ahead of allowing the Russians to drive a wedge between our countries in Western Europe. The Russians have not given up their intention to dominate and their intention to do away with our democratic form of life. But if we all have the political will—and I believe the candidate countries have it—to join the Six, and if the Six can demonstrate that they have it too, then the idea of Duncan Sandys to set up an independent political bureau is a very useful, indeed, a very exciting concept, although not perhaps as new as all that.

Should there be an independent political bureau established to bring forward views and subjects for discussion amongst the Council of Ministers and parliamentarians, when the day comes for an elected European Parliament to be established, that independent political bureau must become subservient to that elected European Parliament, as, indeed, one hopes the existing Economic Commission in Brussels will also. Then indeed we shall find a European Parliament elected, as one of our German colleagues mentioned, by the people of Europe, running Europe's affairs with the authority of and speaking for Europe, and with the means of directing its policy and giving effects to its policy decisions. This is the future I want to see for Europe, a Europe which includes my own country and the other candidates to join the Six. When we are together, as I believe we shall be, we shall represent a great force for peace and security for the future.

The Chairman (*I*). — I call Mr. Aano, the last speaker on the list.

Mr. Aano. — Representing one of the small EFTA countries, I have followed today's discussion with very deep interest. At this late hour I will concentrate my remarks on that part of the discussion which has concerned itself with the aid policy towards

developing countries, seen in the light of future European unification. Like others, I would congratulate the Rapporteurs for their very valuable reports on this crucial question. I am pleased to note the deep concern with which the Rapporteurs have gone about their task and the plea which, with one accord, they have placed before this Joint Meeting of the European Parliament and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and thus also back to our respective governments and national Assemblies; and well may this be so.

Generally, I am in complete agreement with the main conclusions of these reports. Naturally, the Rapporteurs, like many other speakers, have concentrated much of their comment on the change that will take place in the whole relationship of Europe with the developing countries by the prospective entry of the United Kingdom into the European Community. Representing one of the smaller nations within EFTA, however, I should have liked to see more mention of EFTA as such, and of the other applicants to the Community, and some comment of their contribution, now and in the future, towards the same cause.

Secondly, and as a corollary of my first comment, I wish to stress the importance of a better balance between bilateral and multilateral aid, whether through the Commission or through the United Nations Agencies which has also been stressed in the reports as a very important goal to which to work. For years the Scandinavian countries have given a high percentage of international or multinational aid. Norway, for one, had a two-thirds allocation up till a few years ago, and it has had as a political objective, which it has now reached, the stabilisation of its multilateral aid at 51 % . I feel that this is not a bad example to the rest of the rich world when this 51 % is compared with the multilateral aid recommendation of the Pearson Report—that such aid should be increased from 10 to 20 %.

The next point I wish to stress, with some regret, is that I missed specific mention of aid for education as one of the important factors for the development of any society. I was pleased

to note that Mr. Bersani in his report inserted a lengthy quotation from the Pearson Report in commenting favourably on the vast role played in the past by voluntary agencies, mainly Christian missions, in the field of education:

> "In some countries, especially in parts of Africa, primary and secondary education would until recently have been almost non-existent were it not for the activities of mission schools or of private youth volunteering to serve in a developing country during their period of military service."

In later years, however, most of the newly independent nations of Africa have taken over the schools and the responsibility for the education of their peoples, often in close co-operation with the former owners of churches and missions. But the provision of universal education for their children is still a long-term goal which, in my view, is of paramount importance for the attainment of any of the other goals such as social, agricultural and industrial development. This must not be forgotten when our plans for future aid are drawn up.

Some countries, like Tanzania, have special so-called "self-help" schemes for their own development, relying mainly on the will of people to work for their own progress. But where education is a key question they are still dependent on outside help, for instance for the cost of raw materials for school building and equipment. As an example of close co-operation on an equal footing I would mention only one such non-profit organisation, sometimes known as "Operation Bootstrap", which in many parts of Tanzania is at work at grass roots level helping to lay the foundation of universal education for a new society.

With all our big aid plans, we should not forget how much can be done with limited outside help in this particular field. I am fully convinced of the importance of this topic we are discussing as far as it concerns aid to developing countries; and whatever setbacks and disappointments and even frustrations may have been experienced in the past, we must not give up. As politicians with

influence on public opinion in our respective countries, we must never tire in our task of "selling" the idea of responsibility for the closing of the terrible gap between the rich and poor nations. We should not be surprised to find that task perhaps more difficult than we had thought at the beginning of the last decade.

In view of the past history of Europe, representing as we do a continent where we had the major colonial powers and where two world wars started, a continent which is still looked upon as a very rich man's club, it would have been surprising if the developing world had not looked upon our new endeavour with at least some suspicion, wondering whether these countries, some of them very often called imperial powers, had really had a change of heart or were still thinking of their own gain, and whether development aid might be not a blessing but a subtle way of achieving domination and even suppression in disguise.

Certainly we should not be surprised when we meet such thoughts, sometimes openly expressed, sometimes only felt in our relationship with those developing countries. The only way to meet them is by proving that we mean business and not just want to do business with them, that we want to share. We have at the same time to convince them that our will to share with them will be to the benefit of us all, making the world a better place in which to live and making it possible for this globe to hope for a better future.

4. *Closure of the Joint Meeting*

The Chairman (*I*). — Ladies and Gentlemen, we have now completed the discussion of the Orders of the Day for the 17th Joint Meeting of the members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.

It was a particularly interesting meeting because of the importance of the theme and the topical nature of the subjects discussed.

At the close of a debate which was both concise and on a high level, I should like above all to congratulate the Rapporteurs on the excellent way in which they performed their difficult and complex task, both in their written reports and their presentation of them. I should also like to congratulate Mr. Deniau, the representative of the Commission, for his wide-ranging and detailed statement as well as all those who took part in the debate for their very constructive contribution to the discussion. We can all be extremely satisfied with the debate and the contribution it offers the governments of the European countries represented here as well as the authorities of the European Communities towards the solution of such serious and interesting problems. It is to be hoped that their solution will bring about the right conditions for the future economic, social, political and moral progress not only of the European nations but also of the developing peoples for whom we have such a deep and warm sympathy.

The 17th Joint Meeting is at an end.

The Sitting is closed.

The Sitting was closed at 6.10 p.m.