Nosce Te Ipsum: Positioning the EU’s CSDP as a Regional Ordnungsmacht

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Abstract

The European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an instrument which still lacks strategic guidance. It remains unclear whether CSDP should be primarily used in the EU's vicinity or on a global scale. This paper discusses to what extent it would be beneficial for the Union to focus CSDP on a regional rather than global level. It argues that positioning CSDP as a regional Ordnungs-macht helps the EU tackle long-standing structural security challenges while at the same time offering a viable approach to the EU's global responsibilities. The paper thus proposes a policy reorientation of CSDP that shifts the EU's aspiration from being a global actor to becoming a regional Ordnungsmacht. Such a change would narrow the existing capabilities-expectations gap and strike a balance with other regional actors such as the US, Russia and Turkey. Simultaneously, a withdrawal of CSDP from the global arena could be matched by an increase of EU support to other regional security organisations as is shown by the example of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War produced a complex security environment, particularly so for the European Union. Faced with crises in its own backyard and the decline of its comfortable position under the United States security umbrella, Brussels was obliged to take on responsibilities in the realm of security. As an answer to these demands the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) emerged – a security instrument which in Coelmont's words possesses "no clear strategy" (Coelmont, 2010).

This is even more deplorable as authors repeatedly emphasise that CSDP serves as a motor for the entire Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Marangoni, 2008). Hence, we must wonder where an engine with no sense of direction is taking us: will CSDP remain a EU policy instrument that is "not regional but rather global in nature" (Bono, 2006, p. 431)? Or will the engine slow down and - in the light of limited resources and hesitant member states – focus on its region, as globally it is "not up to the responsibilities of the time" (Robinson, 2010, p. 15)? Still, what does such a region look like, as a regional security system has yet to emerge and the EU "lacks regional delimitations, [and] its geographical boundaries remain as yet undefined" (Bono, 2006, p. 432)? Also, if a regional reorientation occurs, how will the EU deal with other regional stakeholders and its global security responsibilities?

Biscop reminds us that CSDP is at a strategic impasse and that immediate choices are necessary as the EU "cannot be a status quo power that seeks to maintain current conditions: its agenda entails a commitment to proactively shape its environment" (Biscop, 2009, p. 7). The above suggests three interlinked sets of questions about CSDP for our research (Figure 1): what is its scope of action (geography), what is its goal of action (order), and what are its means of action (power)?

Based on these thoughts this paper examines to what extent it would be beneficial for the EU to position the instrument of CSDP in the framework of a regional Ordnungsmacht rather than in the context of a global actor.
To answer these questions we need to identify the underlying key challenges, which materialise as a multiple research lacuna. First, we can identify a policy lacuna, i.e. a lacking vision for the use of CSDP. The 2001 Laeken Declaration asked early on "[w]hat is Europe's role in this changed world? Does Europe not [...] have a leading role to play in a new world order" (European Council, 2001, p. 2)? Nine years later President Van Rompuy still echoes the same question: "Where do we go? [...] Where do we want to be in ten or twenty years time ahead?" (Van Rompuy, 2010).

Second, possible answers offered by a geo-strategic approach are neglected by policy-makers and under-studied by contemporary scholars (Buzan & Weaver, 2003; Kiacioglu, 2008). Hence, a geographical lacuna materialises despite the current trend towards more security activity in regional organisations and the fact that Hill first drew attention to the EU as a possible 'regional pacifier' nearly 20 years ago (Hill, 1993).

Third, the strain between CSDP's regional and global ambitions – most noticeable in the European Security Strategy (ESS), which seeks to "build [...] security in our neighbourhood" and at the same time "build [...] a better world" – is perceived but not addressed by scholars and policy-makers (European Council, 2003, p. 1). Caught "between two stools - globalism and regionalism" the ESS mirrors CSDP's strategy lacuna (Posen, 2004, p. 37).

These three gaps add up to a conceptual lacuna which this paper addresses primarily. The traditional notions of hegemony and empire are not apt to capture the dynamics and ambitions of CSDP (Bailes, 2009). To remedy this lacuna, the paper proposes the concept of regional Ordnungsmacht – marked by the balance of limited means with desired goals in a restrained scope. Institutionalisation, resource-consciousness and a quest for legitimacy are the Ordnungsmacht's defining features. Smart power, defined by Clinton as the use of "the full range of tools at our disposal -
diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural", is another key trait of the Ordnungsmacht (quoted in CBS, 2009).

Situating itself at the juncture of the three interlinked research lacunae, the paper seeks to contribute to the narrowing of this gap in current literature and policy. It argues that positioning CSDP as a regional Ordnungsmacht would help the EU tackle long-standing structural security challenges while at the same time offering a viable approach to the EU's global responsibilities. It proposes a policy reorientation of CSDP that would narrow the existing capabilities-expectations gap and strike a balance with other regional actors such as the US, Russia and Turkey. Simultaneously, downsizing the EU’s aspirations from the global to the regional level could go hand in hand with an increase of EU support to other regional security organisations such as ASEAN.

Following this introduction, part 2 defines the notion of regional Ordnungsmacht and applies these findings to CSDP. It then elaborates on the importance of the region and geostrategy. Finally, it sets out what the paper understands by CSDP's region. Part 3 highlights advantages of CSDP's policy reorientation for the EU's capabilities-expectations gap (3.1.) and the relationship with the US, Russia and Turkey – arguably three key stakeholders in European security (3.2.). In so doing, the paper uses the notions of realisability, acceptability and sustainability as criteria of assessment (Mahncke, 2007). Part 4 then addresses the paper's potential critics who hold that a narrow regional approach might endanger the EU’s global security responsibilities. It evaluates Brussels’ utility as a supporter of other regional organisations as an alternative order to global CSDP actorness. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations – deemed by Murray as the least likely example for EU influence – serves as a case study (Murray, 2010b). Part 5 concludes the paper and provides some policy recommendations.

2. Towards a regional Ordnungsmacht

Bailes emphasises that the traditional notions of empire and hegemony are ill-suited for CSDP and suggests testing alternative concepts (Bailes, 2009). The novel but understudied regional Ordnungsmacht approach has so far only been applied to Australia and its security architecture in the southern Pacific (Der Spiegel, 2006), Nigeria’s position in western Africa (Bergstresser & Tull, 2008) and South Africa’s regional security policy since the end of the apartheid regime (Interview with Davies,
2010). Synthesising these works, the following definition can be derived. A regional Ordnungsmacht balances means (power), goals (order), and scope (geography). Its actions rely chiefly on overlapping interests with the target states, legitimised by home and host audiences' acceptance and expectations of power. To this end, a comprehensive smart power approach is followed to create a mutually beneficial, collective security order. Its efforts spring from an institutionalised setting, guaranteeing respect for rules and procedures. The regional Ordnungsmacht's scope is resource-conscious, bringing to bear capacities in a limited field (security) and a limited locality (the region).

However, to what extent does CSDP as the instrument of a multinational security organisation fulfil the criteria of such a definition which is based on the classical conception of states (see Annex 1)? Three of the definition's nine points are uncontroversial as current CSDP practice and the model of Ordnungsmacht overlap: First, current CSDP power accumulation relies on reciprocal justification, i.e. third countries "demand and desire its presence" (Hardeman, 2010). Second, CSDP's order is highly institutionalised (e.g. the involvement of numerous committees and decision-making bodies in the launch of a mission) and subject to formal and informal rules and procedures. Third, the functional scope of CSDP's activity is limited to the security sector proper. These three fitting points function as the stepping stones of a regional Ordnungsmacht's global responsibilities (part 4).

A further four points of the definition are only partially in line with the Ordnungsmacht model. First, CSDP's power is maintained by a redistribution of resources to other actors to enhance security. The 24 CSDP missions underline this logic. Still, the regional focus of action is lacking and hence CSDP has taken up tasks mostly as a reaction to calls by third states but not in an active, preventative manner (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009). Uncoordinated redistribution of the resource security also has repercussions for the nature of the approach: comprehensiveness is compromised as resources are spread and not concentrated (e.g. the only punctual military engagement in Chad). In Lecoutre's words, the "balance between the three D's – defence, diplomacy and development" (Lecoutre, 2010, p. 5), i.e. the combination of "hard and soft power into a winning strategy" (Nye, 2006), also known as smart power, is less pronounced in today's CSDP. Second, and as a result of the previous point, Kemic et al. stipulate that CSDP's power might decline as legitimacy solely arises from government support, whereas there has "thus far been no concerted [...] effort to educate the public about the salient issue" of CSDP (Kemic
et al., 2002, p. 12). As studies show, public diplomacy, as a key component of smart power, is crucial for enhancing legitimacy in both home and host audiences (Council on Foreign Relations, 2003). The highly heterogeneous identity of the EU and its CSDP lend this point additional prominence. Third and fourth, since CSDP lacks a clearer regional focus, the Ordnungsmacht's premise of structuring the security environment in a mutually beneficial way and accommodating regional partners is harder to achieve. The absence of security strategies for neighbouring actors is testimony to this trend. These partially fitting four points build the core of a policy reorientation, the advantages of which are outlined in part 3.

Lastly, two points of the Ordnungsmacht concept appear out of line with current CSDP practice. First, the geographical scope of CSDP action arises from an over-ambition and not a realistic assessment of resources at hand. The Council repeating in February 2010 that "[t]he European Union is a global actor, ready to undertake its share of responsibility for global security", while at the same time barely mustering an extra handful of helicopters for European Union Force (EUFOR) Chad/Central African Republic (CAR), is but one example (Council of the European Union, 2010, p. 1). This leads, secondly, to the possible decline of scope since a material overstretch is not countered by a clear regional agenda. These two points relating to geography, which do not fit the concept's definition, are now explored further.

Having defined the concept of Ordnungsmacht and applied it to today's CSDP, one must wonder what justifies the attribute regional? Put differently, why not follow a German newspaper calling for a global Ordnungsmacht (Westfalenpost, 2008)? Similarly, Brzezinski opposes the paper's argument stating that "[g]eopolitics has moved from the regional to the global dimension" (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 39). However, in the CSDP context we should not neglect the following: geostrategy's core task is to "bring [...] a distinction between enduring and transient interests" (Koc, 2009, p. 10). When analysing the 1999-2009 European Council/Presidency conclusions and External Relations Council meeting press releases, one can observe that security issues in the neighbourhood have been continuously mentioned, thus qualifying them as enduring interests, while more distant localities, for example the crises in Congo, have been discussed only when crises arose and while missions were active, hence rendering those interests transient (European Council, 1999-2009). Lannon supports this analysis, elaborating that the neighbourhood profits from a genuine common interest of all member states (Lannon, 2010).
Moreover, geostrategy is "a question not just of having power in the sense of human or material resources, but also of the geographical context within which that power is exercised" (Sloan & Gray, 2009, p. 2). Since resources are limited states "are unable [...] to conduct a tous asimuths foreign policy. Instead they must focus [...] on specific areas of the world" (Grygiel, 2006, p. 23). In a time where governments are forced to cut military spending and "legitimacy will be the hard currency in international relations" necessary to mobilise resources in society (Gnesotto & Grevi, 2006, p. 198), public opinion will be crucial. In fact, the European public cares only marginally about a global role for CSDP, while support for regional engagement is high (Biscop, 2009; Brummer, 2007; Isernia & Everts, 2006). This assessment is shared by neighbouring countries, 75% of which regard an enhanced regional role for the EU as positive (European Council in Foreign Relations, 2007). Hence, the region remains of key importance for what can best be understood as a mutually enforcing geostrategic triangle of interests, resources and legitimacy (Figure 2).

Figure 2: The geostrategic triangle

![Figure 2: The geostrategic triangle](image)

Having outlined why the region remains of key importance, what then is understood by the CSDP's region in the context of a regional Ordnungsmacht? Calling a certain area one's region serves to "obtain certain goals", namely to create discourse and policies which induce and assure security responsibility for a given sphere (De Lombaerde et al., 2010, p. 5). Hence, promising security responsibility for the entire globe, as is insinuated in the ESS, creates little effect. "Politicians should resist their current inclination to dream up a policy on all issues, regions and conflicts in the world", instead one ought to pick three or four policy priorities which will "increase the chance of producing one or two much-needed successes" (Everts, 2004, p. 42).
As Elissalde notes, such a region resembles the current European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), but adds to it the civil-military teeth it has so far been lacking (Elissalde, 2006). He stresses that “[c]e voisinage peut être le cadre privilégié d’exercice de la puissance européenne [...] dessinant une sphère d’influence propre” but not “une aire d’influence exclusive”; therefore, urging us to differentiate between different spheres of influence (ibid., p. 275).

Accordingly, three spheres emerge. The first is an appeased sphere in the northwest which demands little or no attention of CSDP. It includes among others Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. According to Guney, it is in the east and south where the EU’s core security interests lie and where it has strived for stability and appeasement since the end of the Cold War (Guney, 2008). Second, the Western Balkans constitute an “exclusive sphere of influence” (Interview with Bailes, 2010). Brussels’ security interests are so pronounced there that Bailes even calls it “part of the EU’s territorial defence” (ibid.). Other “active geostrategic players”, i.e. “states that have the capacity and the national will to exercise power or influence beyond their borders in order to alter [...] the existing geopolitical state of affairs”, such as Russia, Turkey and the US (see 3.2.), maintain some stakes in this sphere but are sidelined, mainly because the Western Balkans’ membership perspective dedicates them to Brussels (Brzezinski, 1997, p. 40). Third, a shared sphere of influence consists on the one hand of six “geopolitical pivots”, i.e. states that are of geostrategic importance because of, for example, resource transportation, and are hence influenced by several players (ibid.). The three Caucasus and the three Eastern European countries belong to this group, with the former being under a triple influence of the EU, Turkey and Russia, and the latter being influenced by Brussels and Moscow. On the other hand, the five Mediterranean countries form an “interlocking region”, i.e. a region that belongs both to the EU and African Union (AU) regional security complex (Lake, 1997, p. 54). Their ambiguous security character and the long-standing EU interests in the region necessitate CSDP involvement and simultaneously intense coordination with the AU (see part 4). The Middle East is a shared sphere with the US, and to some degree Turkey, underlining the necessity for a clear strategy towards Washington and Ankara.

Overall, the exclusive and shared sphere of influence host a considerable number of conflicts and security challenges, which form an “arc of instability” around the EU’s southeast, requiring CSDP’s particular attention (Menotti, 2003, p. 15).
3. Advantages of positioning CSDP as a regional Ordnungsmacht

Part 2 has tackled the conceptual and geographical lacuna by developing the Ordnungsmacht approach and defending its regional outlook. Part 3 now seeks to further clarify the policy and strategy lacuna by outlining advantages of the proposed CSDP reorientation. In so doing, 3.1. explores the capabilities-expectations gap linked to the overarching question of power/means, while 3.2. evaluates the triangle of regional stakeholders (order/goals). Both parts touch on the impact for the EU's neighbourhood (geography/scope). Policy changes are feasible only if they are (financially and politically) realisable, accepted by the various actors involved and sustainable, i.e. rooted in a long term effort (Mahncke, 2007). Hence, the sub-parts will employ realisability, acceptability and sustainability as benchmarks for the evaluation of the proposed changes.

3.1. Capabilities-expectations gap

"We should not lower our ambitions but, rather, give ourselves the means to realise them."\(^1\)

Catherine Ashton

The 2009 and 2010 analyses of the International Security Information Service (ISIS) and the IISS find that CSDP's two key capability shortcomings of strategic air lift and force projection have "in large part remained" since their identification in 1999 (IISS, 2010, p. 107). Progress is deemed unlikely as CSDP "has proved to be very slow" with regard to procurement and results only materialise in the long term (Herz, 2009, p. 5). Forces analyst Bach of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) agrees, estimating that if all necessary procurements were made immediately it would still take at least ten years for those capabilities to be delivered (Interview with Bach, 2010). Requests to deploy helicopters - situated at the juncture of air lift and force projection - to distant places such as Chad have been denied due to both a lack of political will and the fact that "both aircraft and crews were often unable to fly in demanding operational environments such as deserts and mountainous areas" (IISS, 2010, p. 108). These shortfalls lead to an average theoretical deployability rate of only 30% of EU forces which in practice has not surpassed 5% (Witney, 2008). Such a situation should "confine [CSDP's] security interests and activities to [its] near neighbours" (Buzan &

\(^1\) Ashton (2010), p. 4.
Weaver, 2003, p. 46). Instead, CSDP aims for a global role when it is barely able to fulfil a regional one.

The European Parliament stresses that the CFSP budget, which finances non-military CSDP activity, "continues to be underfunded" and casts in doubt the EU's ability "to play an active role in the world [...] and consequently] to conduct a credible and proactive foreign policy" (European Parliament, 2010). With an envelope of €2.064 billion for the period of 2007-2013, it only represents 0.24% of the overall EU budget (€864.3 billion) and breaks down to an annual average of €294 million, an amount which barely matches that of Médecins Sans Frontières ($400 million) (Grevi et al., 2009). In this situation, 29% of the €220 million allocated to crisis response in 2007-2008 went to Sub-Saharan Africa, an area outside the proposed region which does not qualify as an enduring CSDP interest (ibid.). In the face of continuous member states' disputes about the increase of the budget, liberal MEP Duff's demand to augment the overall EU budget from today's 1.1% of Gross National Income (GNI) to 2.5%, thereby growing the absolute CFSP budget to approximately €725 million, is progressive, but hardly a viable option (Interview with Duff, 2010).

In addition, declining member states' defence expenditure and defence budgets hardly support a global role for CSDP. While global expenditure has increased by 45% between 1999 and 2008, leading to a 2.4% average of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2008 (SIPRI, 2009), combined EU member states' expenditure has declined from 2.1% of GDP in 1997 to 1.7% in 2007 (Grevi et al., 2009, p. 77). Due to the economic crisis most member states have further cut their expenditure since 2008/2009, with the Czech Republic (-12%) and Romania (-17.4%) leading the way (IISS, 2010, p. 109). Average EU budgets have declined from 1.8% of GDP in 1998 to 1.4% in 2008 (Grevi et al., 2009, p. 77). Analyses by Agence Europe indicate that EU-26 budgets in 2010 will decrease by an average of 2% as compared to 2009 (Agence Europe, 2010). Low budgets lead to diminished material investments per soldier; e.g., where the US invests about €100,000 per soldier, the EU average figures at around €20,000 (Witney, 2008). This in turn causes, for example, poorly trained helicopter staff and decreases the intensity of operations that can be carried out (Howorth, 2007).

These shortcomings are due to four reasons. First, Morgan points to the correlation between decreasing defence spending and the development of post-modern entities, such as the EU and its member states, towards a pluralistic security community (Morgan, 1997). The presence of an internal peace arrangement and
the absence of imminent external threats diminish the incentive to increase spending. Second, economically liberal-minded European countries traditionally resist high resource extraction for military purposes (Solingen, 1997). This tendency is, third, exacerbated by the European public, "which will not tolerate the massive increases in military spending", necessary for a global role of CSDP (Moravcsik, 2003). Finally, scattered and rival European defence industries have lost a share of their influence after the Cold War and cannot function as a driver to remedy shortcomings (Solingen, 1997). These reasons further substantiate the argument that the above-mentioned shortfalls are permanent and structural, hence highly unlikely to change.

Bearing in mind these findings, Ashton's introductory quote turns into a farce. Instead, the model of a resource-conscious Ordnungsmacht follows Hill's thought to decrease expectations and to "communicate the fact to outsiders, so that the limits of European actomess and intentions are clearly visible" (Hill, 1993, p. 322). Bailes claims that such a regional repositioning "would certainly narrow the capabilities-expectations gap" as strategic lift and force projection would be de-emphasised due to a reduced radius of CSDP action from maximum 12,000 km (2005 Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)) to 3,500 km (proposed Ordnungsmacht region) (Map 2). Moreover, existing Cold War capabilities conceived for regional activities would find new usability, and current training of professional soldiers and conscripts would fit better with the anticipated missions (Interview with Bailes, 2010). Moreover, Papayoanou stresses that government and public resource extraction capacity increases, the more specific the reference to a particular region (Papayoanou, 1997). Additionally, turning CSDP into a regional instrument of intervention "would also make CSDP a greener army" and, due to the topicality of climate change, catch on with publics to facilitate resource extraction capacity further (Interview with Bailes, 2010).
Nevertheless, what are the chances for CSDP’s expectations-capabilities reorientation in terms of realisability, acceptability and sustainability? The shift requires no new procurement and leaves national and EU budgets untouched. It is thus primarily a political decision which could be announced in a rewritten ESS. Existing missions outside the Ordnungsmacht’s realm (currently seven) would continue their mandate but then be phased out. Hence, the still relatively modest overall role of CSDP facilitates change and enhances realisability.

Acceptability also profits from the still developing role of CSDP. Externally, the American and Australian continent have not been subject to CSDP missions, leaving them a priori indifferent to change. The Asian continent has only witnessed five CSDP missions with limited material clout (€192.6 million, i.e. 4.12% of combined overall costs for the 24 missions). In addition, missions in the Middle East (three of five) would be continued. On account of this, Africa arises as the only external actor with possible objections as ten of the 24 CSDP missions have been deployed there, equalling €2.456 billion (52.58% of combined overall costs) (Annex 2). Internally, the large majority of EU member state governments could accept a limited regional focus of their capabilities (Robinson, 2010). The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, urges CSDP to “sort out its priorities so it could better deploy its limited resources” (Swieboda, 2009). From the implementation report on the ESS we can

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2 Map based on Dalet (2010).
deduct similar signals: "we need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources" (Council of the European Union, 2008), a mantra now even echoed by the United Kingdom; thus somewhat renouncing London's well-known call for global capacities (British Ministry of Defence, 2010). This leaves France, traditionally a key stakeholder in Africa and a main driver behind the CSDP's African missions, as the most pronounced opponent to an Ordnungsmacht approach. Paris' reservations will be addressed in part 4. Concerning the public in the member states, Posen is optimistic saying that "if [...] commitment to the pacification of Europe's periphery were more explicit [...] it might catch on with European publics" (Posen, 2004, p. 36). At the 2009 Göteborg EU defence summit Swedish minister Tolgfors put it as follows: "my priority is to motivate the taxpayer to pay for it. [...] The Nordic Battlegroups have cost €100 million [...] and the taxpayer can expect concrete results" (Der Standard, 2009).

Thus far, most CSDP missions have been little more than a 'symbolic gesture' due to their limited staff and resources (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009). According to Hill, this reflects the current danger of the capabilities-expectations gap, creating hopes and expectations in target states which are frequently disappointed, hence undermining EU credibility and impact (Hill, 1993). Approximately €2.578 billion spent outside the region could have been saved with the proposed policy reorientation. Part of those global savings could be allocated to the regional CSDP missions, which so far have made up only 43.29% of overall combined costs (i.e. €2.022 billion) (Annex 2) (see also 3.2.). This could significantly improve the capabilities' impact, credibility and consequently sustainability. In other words, CSDP would do less quantity, more quality and take responsibility for a region in which its means and power count. In a world developing towards more regionalisation this might also land on fertile ground as regards other players such as the US, to which we will now turn.

3.2. Triangle of regional stakeholders - the US, Russia and Turkey

"We want strong allies. We are not looking to be patrons of Europe. We are looking to be partners of Europe."3 Barack Obama

A repositioned CSDP is more likely to succeed if the Ordnungsmacht concept yields advantages for the different visions of European order of the three essential stakeholders in the region: the US, Russia and Turkey.

3 Quoted in Lecoutre (2010), p. 22.
That said, the paper’s policy proposal comes at a time of a triple window of opportunity: First, on the one hand, the US has not – as predicted by Kagan – fallen out with Brussels and formed an antidote to the EU (Kagan, 2002). On the other hand, increasing convergence between the two – detected by Moravcsik – has not materialised to an extent that fears of Washington shifting its strategic radar to other localities are discarded (Moravcsik, 2003). Rather, the Obama administration supports CSDP but “is expecting concrete proposals by the EU” that help Washington shoulder its worldwide burden (Coelmont, 2010). Second, since September 2008 Russian President Medvedev has repeatedly called for a new pan-European security order, underlining Moscow’s desire to reintegrate into the European security realm after the August 2008 war with Georgia (Emerson, 2008). Finally, at a moment where Turkey is caught between its EU membership aspirations, its internal struggles over the influence of the army, and its own increasing role in the region, Ankara awaits external signals to help define its security identity (Interview with Bach, 2010).

CSDP-NATO relations are at the core of this triangle as all stakeholders are directly or indirectly linked to the two actors (Figure 3). The 2010 New Strategic Concept (NSC) of NATO – to be adopted in the fall – offers the opportunity to react to the Ordnungsmacht’s policy changes and subsequently to get “NATO and CSDP on the same page” (Interview with Duff, 2010). The key question in this respect remains: what division of labour could be envisaged between CSDP and NATO?

Figure 3: CSDP-NATO relations at the core of a regional stakeholder triangle

Ojanen stipulates that there can be either a geographical or a functional division (Ojanen, 2006). Moravcsik favours the latter giving the US and NATO the responsibility for the military instrument while the EU contributes civilian mechanisms
(Moravcsik, 2003). Although his proposal does not explicitly spell out that NATO would do the cooking and CSDP would do the dishes, it bears the risk that both actors would have to act together at all times to be effective, hence undermining each other's capacity for autonomous action. Such cannot be in the EU's interest and Moravcsik's proposal is unlikely to find sufficient acceptance among member states. Conversely, Moïsi suggests a geographical division, with the EU responsible for its region and the US and NATO focusing on the remaining global challenges (Moïsi, 2003). Bach highlights that this is hard to implement as “the Eastern European and Baltic states will not accept a complete disengagement of NATO in Europe due to the importance they attach to the guarantees of the North Atlantic Treaty Art. 5” (Interview with Bach, 2010).

The Ordnungsmacht concept advocates the balancing of legitimacy of power (i.e. Eastern and Baltic states' concerns must be addressed), a mutually beneficial order (i.e. other actors should profit from its goals), its resource-conscious regional outlook and own CSDP interests (i.e. autonomy to act). Consequently, it can bridge the above impasse by offering a division of labour including geographical and functional elements. In so doing, it follows the 2001 proposal of the then NATO Secretary-General Robertson whereby CSDP would have a "regional role [... with] very specific tasks" (quoted in Ojanen, 2006, p. 68) [emphasis added]. CSDP would assume the security responsibility for its region in which it fulfils all extended Petersberg tasks, manages relevant missions and further security related tasks, except for NATO's Art. 5 territorial defence which would remain an instrument of ultima ratio in (the unlikely) case of, for example, a Russian attack on the Baltic. Bach deems such an approach "logical and promising" as it "brings all member states – including the Eastern and Baltic states – on board" (Interview with Bach, 2010).

Moreover, the forthcoming NSC and talks about a revised ESS render the policy change easy to implement and thus more realisable. The CSDP mission EULEX Kosovo demonstrates that US troops are willing to diminish their role in Europe and serve (for the first time) under CSDP command (Lecoutre, 2010). Taking over Kosovo Force (KFOR) from NATO would be another logical – albeit more difficult – step to increase the proposed policy's realisability.

US acceptability can be assumed to be high due to four reasons: First, a clear role for NATO is proposed which seeks to help Washington share its global burdens, while at the same time demonstrating that a US-led NATO is still desired in Europe.

4 This is without prejudice to the proposed CSDP-US Middle Eastern shared sphere of influence.
Striking this balance is seen as crucial by interview partners (Interview with Bach and Duff, 2010). Second, in Lebanon (2006) and Georgia (2008), NATO engagement was not an acceptable solution for the third parties concerned (Biscop, 2009). For this reason, Washington comes to terms with the fact that a strong regional CSDP is a better channel for American influence than no channel at all. Third, US Secretary of State Clinton has recently announced that the US will strive for a global, multilateral division of labour based on a smart power approach – similar to the Ordnungsmacht concept – which can contribute to a convergence of perceptions of power in the future and hence increase mutual acceptance (CBS, 2009). Finally, positioning CSDP as a regional Ordnungsmacht underlines a restrained EU role, which is in line with the long-standing US interest of preventing a global rival (Brzezinski, 1997).

Russian acceptability can equally be judged as increasing for three reasons: Firstly, the Ordnungsmacht concept proposes a clear vision of European order. The open character of CSDP allows Russia to influence and participate in – while not obtaining a veto over – European security. This is even more important for Moscow as the NATO-Russia Council has been of little use for both parties so far and since CSDP appears as an active alternative to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Interview with Bailes, 2010). Secondly, Cooper stresses that modern states like Russia still think in terms of relative power (Cooper, 2003). In Bach’s words, a diminished role of NATO “will be welcomed by Russia because Moscow’s generals ‘count tanks’, [...] and it has got more than CSDP” (Interview with Bach, 2010). In short, Russia would be accorded a perceived relative power advantage. Thirdly, while such a comparison of raw capabilities does not figure prominently in EU post-modern thinking, a restrained NATO would, nevertheless, soften Moscow’s fears of this organisation, still described as “one of the biggest security threats to Russia” in its 2010 security doctrine (Tagesschau, 2010). In return, Moscow’s tolerance for CSDP action in ‘its backyard’ – the abovementioned shared sphere of influence – is likely to increase.

Turkey’s acceptance is harder to assess due to the ongoing political changes in the country but appears to cluster around a positive neutrality. On one side, Turkey has an interest in a strong role of NATO as it gives Ankara a way to influence European security which it cannot acquire in CSDP. This is particularly true for the Cyprus issue. On the other side, the above outlined acceptance by the US and Russia (two key economic and security partners of the Bosporus state) exercises a certain pressure on Turkey to accept an eventual policy change (Interview with
Bach, 2010). Moreover, Bailes highlights that Turkey is not a strong peace-keeping nation and is not accepted as a "guardian of neighbouring states" (Interview with Bailes, 2010). Given the amount of conflicts in its vicinity, which would also fall into the Ordnungsmacht's region, Ankara might welcome a more pronounced CSDP engagement. Also, the possibility to participate in CSDP missions - as is already the case to some extent in Bosnia and Macedonia - would allow Turkey to underline its membership aspirations while at the same time becoming active in a region where it seeks to assert its influence (ibid.). In other words, CSDP's policy reorientation would be more acceptable as it would give Turkey the chance to engage in the regional security dynamic and hence overcome its long-standing Cold War status of an insulator or buffer state which "is located in the zone of indifference between [regional security complexes], helping to keep separate from each other two or more sets of regional security dynamics" (Buzan & Weaver, 2003, p. 483).

The favourable evaluation of acceptability by three key regional stakeholders already foreshadows a certain degree of sustainability. Moreover, Gnesotto and Grevi point out that CSDP has a better image than NATO in the eyes of the European public (Gnesotto & Grevi, 2006). Thus, by acting on this 'légitimité propre' of the EU in its region, CSDP could gain public approval and make the policy change more sustainable (Moïsi, 2003). Yet, a mere relative advantage in public opinion over another organisation does not make for deep public sustainability. Hence, Bach and Duff stress that the political leaders of the member states have the prime responsibility of communicating grand policy changes to the public - an exercise neglected by governments after the adoption of the ESS or previous NATO strategic concepts (Interview with Bach and Duff, 2010). The communication of missions and day-to-day policy then needs to be in the hands of well-staffed public diplomacy policy units.

Public diplomacy, however, only stands a chance when rhetoric and policy are in line. The EU employs a global rhetoric that undermines its credibility and public acceptance as words have not matched actions (Interview with Bach, 2010). Hence, 'going regional' would increase CSDP's credibility and in turn contribute to public diplomacy effectiveness, which again helps to convince people; thus creating a 'virtuous circle' between the three (Figure 4). This synergy is particularly important in the EU's neighbourhood because any policy reorientation needs to yield benefits for the primary target states for it to be embraced by them. Thus, stronger regional CSDP engagement is considered advantageous for them due to three reasons:
First, a clearer regional focus contributes to a stronger ENP-CSDP nexus which has so far been lacking (Hardeman, 2010; Witney, 2008). The Commission itself has underlined as early as 2006 that "[t]he ENP has achieved little in supporting the resolution of frozen or open conflicts in the region" and asked the EU "to be more active, and more present, in regional or multilateral conflict-resolution mechanisms and in peace-monitoring or peace-keeping efforts" (Commission of the European Communities, 2006).

Hence, the short-term instrument of CSDP could, secondly, more actively complement the long-term approach of ENP as the Ordnungsmacht's region hosts over forty conflicts and security challenges possibly falling within CSDP's portfolio of responsibilities. To stabilise Europe's vicinity action is not only required but demanded by target states. In 2006, for example, both Moldova and Lebanon called for a CSDP mission. While lack of political will might have been one motive, strained resources also prevented CSDP engagement (Biscop, 2009).

This leads us, third, to the fact that current CSDP missions in the region are frequently understaffed and/or possess insufficient resources. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia, for example, "had to struggle hard, scratch around for leftovers from different budgetary stratagems to put together a mere €14 million" (Gourlay, 2006, p. 109). Confronted with such a situation, the ESS' statement that "as we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions", appears out of touch with reality (European Council, 2003, p. 12). Since capabilities are few, but at the same time CSDP seeks to be comprehensive, one has to prevent a multiplication of limited efforts, i.e. having several short-term missions which only treat symptoms but do not tackle the underlying causes.
Part 3 has outlined advantages arising from a repositioning of CSDP according to the Ordnungsmacht concept. The two key examples of capabilities-expectations gap (based on the overarching question of power/means) and the triangle of regional stakeholders (related to order/goals) have been underpinned by the beneficial impact for the neighbourhood (linked to scope/geography). This exercise has by and large delivered satisfactory results, thereby narrowing in particular the policy and strategy lacunae.

4. A response to critics: addressing disadvantages of repositioning CSDP by strengthening other regional organisations

"To try to identify a distinctive 'role' for Europe in the world is something of a mare’s nest."
Christopher Hill

Positioning CSDP as a regional Ordnungsmacht is not without its critics. Duff, for example, disagrees with the entire paper's argument under part 3, stating that "the atmosphere in Brussels is different. Officials want to use the newly acquired powers of the Lisbon Treaty and forge a global role for CSDP" (Interview with Duff, 2010). More specifically critics might reproach the paper with four points: First, a military is necessary to have a say in global affairs. Without it, the EU's global clout might wither. Second, in the absence of CSDP, who will address global challenges like terrorism or North Korea's nuclear programme? Third, as the ESS highlights, will the first line of defence not often be abroad (European Council, 2003)? To recap, would the Ordnungsmacht concept lead to "[une] Europe [qui] se transforme en une grande Suisse, égoïste, prospère, provinciale et impuissante, dont la neutralité serait essentiellement passive et auto-protectrice" (Moïsi, 2003, p. 522)?

This part is dedicated to addressing the critics' concerns. In so doing, the paper will show that the Ordnungsmacht concept can still contribute to the EU's global security responsibilities despite its limited military power but because of its clear vision of order and its clearly defined scope. The Ordnungsmacht concept does not neglect global responsibilities but encourages an EU vision of order beneficial for Europe and the globe through the promotion of its security model. First, we will situate the EU's security model in the transient character of global order. Second, we will explore what the EU's security model has to offer and to what extent

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it has been neglected so far. Finally, ASEAN serves as an example to show that the EU is internally able to provide, and externally able to offer, its security model to other regional organisations.

First, global order continues to be in "geopolitical transition" (Kleine-Brockhoff, 2009, p. 8). According to several authors, this transition will lead to "the emergence of a variety of new regional orders [...] rather than a single world order" (Lake & Morgan, 1997, p. 3), which will interact in a heteropolar rather than a multipolar system. Heteropolarity is described by Copeland as an order in which the military does not materialise as the only and primary vector of power; hence taking issue with the mainstream trend of categorizing the global system as (classical) multipolar or multilateral multipolar (Copeland, 2010; Copeland, forthcoming) (see also Annex 3). Rather every actor possesses several vectors of power each of which can be different in amplitude. Thus for Copeland the diminutive military power of the EU can be balanced by Brussels' regional modelling power (ibid.).

In conjunction with Copeland’s argument, Howorth, Gnesotto and Grevi predict that regional organisations will consolidate further in terms of regional security responsibilities (Gnesotto & Grevi, 2006; Howorth, 2007). Simultaneously, this development will lead to increased complexity in global order. Complexity, in tum, renders straightforward security responses more difficult (ibid.). Following this line of thought, it becomes clear that the EU needs to ensure that in this process of consolidation it capitalises on its comparative advantage, i.e. the promotion of its security model, with the goal of structuring global order according to its vision. In other words, the EU's security model should "aim to reproduce itself through encouraging regional integration around the World [sic]" (Guney, 2008, p. 123). Promoting Brussels' model is also regarded as important by Van Langenhove who links order to the medium and long-term demographic and economic forecasts: "In the next 10 to 25 years Europe's relative demographic and economic power will decline. Subsequently, we will neither have the people nor the money to play a global role" (Interview with Van Langenhove, 2010).

Moreover, Bailes argues that current state-power poles either seek to decrease their global security engagement – the US – or show little enthusiasm to engage to a significant extent – Russia and China (Interview with Bailes, 2010). Consequently, she estimates that regional organisations will by default be burdened with the majority of future security interventions. These organisations will be the EU's potential future partners in international fora, which can be won over more swiftly if
similarly modelled mind-sets exist (ibid.). In the long term Willenberg expects this approach to "transform political adversaries into cooperating allies or even security communities, thereby reducing the instances of raw power politics of modern states and contributing to civilised, post-modern patterns of interactions" (Willenberg, 2009, p. 4). As a result, strengthening other regional organisations' capacities to take care of their own security challenges does not only disburden CSDP globally but simultaneously appears to be a structural imperative.

Second, at the core of the EU's security model and the proposed Ordnungsmacht concept lie its institutions. Traditionally, security institutions have served the purpose of "aggregation of preferences into coalitions, to logrolling partners and to the robustness and longevity of obtaining coalitions" (Solingen, 1997, p. 100). In the post-modern world institutions go beyond this and log in "sustainable stability [which] can be secured only by procedures, instruments and habits of interaction, interest accommodation and peaceful conflict resolution" (Mahncke, 2007, p. 226). The EU institutions possess these characteristics and have the experience and capacity necessary to share them with other organisations. In the realm of economic institutions, the EU's comparative advantage materialised in 1991 when at its creation the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) opted for an EU-inspired model of integration instead of the American free trade model (De Lombaerde & Schulz, 2010). This has, however, not translated into similar activity in the security sector.

As Copeland stipulates, in a heteropolar world, there will be "highly complex balancing between dynamic poles, and knowledge-driven problem solving to address common threats and challenges" (Copeland, forthcoming) [emphasis added]. Knowledge about institutional arrangements suddenly becomes a valuable asset. In contrast with colonial powers, the EU's security institutions are flexible enough not to prescribe a one-to-one implementation of their arrangements, but to offer institutional "frameworks of authority" (Bailes & Cottey, 2006, p. 223), which can be filled with the local security conditions of each organisation. Hence, Moravcsik "challenges the conventional view that Europe's global influence is declining", but claims that it "is, in fact, rising", as its "true geopolitical advantage lies in projecting civilian influence" which rests to a large extent on "its distinctive institutions" (Moravcsik, 2009, p. 403). Biscop adds that it is in the best interests of the EU to spread this value of security institutionalisation (Biscop, 2009). Art. 21, para. 1 of the TEU after Lisbon sets out that "[t]he Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships
with [...] international, regional or global organizations“ (European Union, 2008). Art. 22 furthermore allows for a decision to address a particular region or regional organisation (ibid.). In sum, capacities and legal basis exist for the EU to promote its security model.

Yet, so far the EU has largely neglected other regional organisations in general, and the promotion of its security model in particular. Bailes stresses that European joint efforts abroad have not given highest priority to supporting - or even to monitoring and analyzing - other regions' multilateral processes. [...] Elsewhere, the EU instinct seems to be to handle itself as a quasi-national 'pole' [instead of a regional organisation] and to seek an accommodation first and foremost with the strongest national actor in each region: with the USA rather than NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement], Russia and not the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], China rather than [...] ASEAN, and so forth (Bailes, 2009, p. 13).

Similarly, in February 2010 Van Rompuy demands to "strengthen our relationship with key partners. [...] Above all the United States, Canada, Russia, China, Japan, India, Brazil" (Van Rompuy, 2010). Regional organisations do not figure on his agenda. The security sector, in particular, neglects regional organisations. The ESS only mentions them once, saying succinctly that "regional organizations also strengthen global governance", without, however, putting forth any agenda for action (European Council, 2003, p. 9). Consequently, only one out of nine current CSDP mandates for operations in Africa contains "an element that explicitly aims to strengthen regional organizations" (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009). Moreover, in the few existing region-to-region contacts Brussels relies on just three pillars: political dialogue, development cooperation and trade relations (De Lombaerde & Schulz, 2010). Given the above-mentioned opportunities, institutional security cooperation with regional organisations should become a fourth pillar of region-to-region interaction. Asseburg and Kempin deem such a fourth pillar as "decisive for future burden-sharing in crisis response" (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009, p. 157). Duff and Coelmont though are more sceptical about other regional organisations and are convinced that they will not be capable to take care of their regional security challenges (Interview with Duff, 2010; Coelmont, 2010).

Third, with the example of ASEAN, we can, however, argue that increased EU engagement has the potential to bring about beneficial results for both Brussels and Jakarta. Five points justify selecting ASEAN as a case study: ASEAN's founding document (the 1967 Bangkok Declaration) and subsequent papers give it a legal
mandate for regional security. Moreover, security figures in practice as a "key concern" among ASEAN leaders (Murray, 2010a, p. 67). Recent calls for "increased cooperation on security issues" substantiate this development (ibid.). In addition, the 2007 ASEAN Charter calls for enhanced institutionalisation of the security realm (ibid.). These calls are echoed within and outside of ASEAN, with the Australian Prime Minister Rudd saying that

we need strong and effective regional institutions [to] enhance[ ] a sense of security community (we have something to learn from Europe where centuries of animosity have been transformed into an unparalleled degree of transnational cooperation) (Rudd, 2008).

While he does not see the EU as an "identikit model" for Southeast Asia, he does stress their modelling power in terms of security organisations (ibid.). Finally, Murray anticipates ASEAN to be one of the least likely cases to respond to the proposed EU effort to strengthen other regional organisations (Murray, 2010b). Thus, if the paper succeeds in finding indicators pointing in the direction of expected beneficial results in this case, a stronger claim can be made for the proposed policy in other regional organisations with a security component, such as the AU.

Three examples underline that ASEAN and its institutions are key for the EU's vision of global order and in line with the Ordnungsmacht concept. First, the AMM is generally seen as a minor but satisfactory CSDP mission (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009). Notwithstanding, it is pointed out that the cooperation with ASEAN was necessary as Asian troops had a better understanding of the conflict and were familiar with the customs and language - expertise that the European part of AMM was lacking (Murray, 2010b). Hence, the institutional capacity of ASEAN, i.e. the ability to take a decision and send Asian staff, became an important factor in the clearing of CSDP responsibilities. As Acharya points out, regional actors are increasingly in demand to amplify the voice of, for example, the EU (Acharya, 2008). This is, second, illuminated even further by the example of the 2009 typhoon which hit Myanmar. In this case the EU did not only need ASEAN to improve its performance but to be able to perform at all. The isolated regime in Pyinmana did not want to accept any direct assistance from the EU. Subsequently, Brussels channelled its aid through ASEAN (Murray, 2010b). Whereas the ESS requires that countries "outside the bounds of international society [...] should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance" (European Council, 2003, p. 10), these examples show that certain comprehensive security concerns cannot be managed by Brussels without other
regional organisations. This is, third, further underlined by Koh, who stresses that ASEAN has played a vital role in stimulating peaceful dialogue between Japan and China – something Brussels has tried to no avail (in Murray, 2010a, p. 11). The examples also demonstrate that while the paper's critics may post that the “first line of defence will often be abroad” (ibid., p. 6), a heteropolar, more complex world might not let CSDP address all necessary security challenges. Ideally, the EU will succeed in strengthening other regional organisations to an extent that they can take on their own regional realm of security.

Promoting its model more actively, and not just regarding 'abroad' as 'a line of defence', also shows a rethinking by the EU on the “referent object of security” (Guney, 2008, p. 129). Whereas ‘the line of defence’ positions the EU as the only referent object, displaying a rather Euro-centric view of security, promoting regional security institutionalization includes other regions as the referent object. It contributes to joint ownership and prevents what Guney calls "other-making" – increasing legitimacy respectively (ibid.).

Nevertheless, today the institutional capacities of ASEAN are still limited, implying that it might not be able to cope with emerging regional security challenges speedily and efficiently in the future (Acharya, 2008). Hence, instead of sending CSDP missions to distant localities, Brussels could seek to prop up the ASEAN secretariat, currently holding 60 recruited staff from only nine member states and approximately 200 local staff (Tavares, 2010). The limited budget added (e.g. €9 million in 2007), this makes ASEAN "a weak organization from a financial and human resources perspective" (ibid., p. 93). Investing the money spent on AMM in ASEAN's budget would have almost tripled it (Annex 2). Increasing finances is one – albeit not the only – means to improve a regional security organisation's responsiveness to threats. Moreover, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) functions as an important channel to guarantee that "many elements from EU are adopted to ASEAN" (De Lombaerde & Schulz, 2010, p. 291). Nonetheless, ASEM is lacking a secretariat despite the fact that Murray estimates that this would increase Brussels' influence (Murray, 2010b). Thus, the setting up of such an institution should feature on the EU's agenda. Finally, the ASEAN Charter has set up three security-related institutions which have been inspired by the EU model: the Coordination Council (consisting of ASEAN foreign ministers, hence similar to the EU's Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)), the ASEAN political and security committee (ASPC) (taking after the Political and Security Committee (PSC)) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN
(resembling the Permanent Representatives’ Committee (Coreper)) (Tavares, 2010). However, so far one can find no evidence of Brussels seeking to provide assistance or to model these institutions in cooperation with ASEAN. The EU might miss a key chance to set the parameters and frameworks in their consolidation. Khong shows that ASEAN’s economic institutions in the 1990s have managed to log in a certain ‘we-ness’ (Khong, 1997). Influencing this identity-building process in security institutions today is of importance to the EU if we follow the proposed policy reorientation. As Bretherton and Vogler highlight, a clear identity can positively condition consistent behaviour – a lesson which is also of crucial importance for today’s rather aimless CSDP and its lofty policy documents such as the ESS (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). Adopting the Ordnungsmacht approach would be a first step towards a beneficial tandem of identity and behaviour. In this context, the presence of public officials and experts’ networks in the security sector, also referred to as epistemic communities, in both the EU and ASEAN can function as a tool to foster the abovementioned ‘frameworks of authority’ in the Asian organisation and overcome the absence of supranationality in the security sector (Sbragia, 2010).

Finally, the described approach could then also catch on with France – singled out in part 3 as one of the main opponents of the Ordnungsmacht approach as it might imperil their engagements in Africa. Strengthening African capacities in the AU framework through CSDP, and enhancing joint ownership, does not only offer a sustainable and continued commitment, but might equally allow Paris to discard its neo-colonial image in some African states.

In sum, this part has demonstrated that in the emerging heteropolar world the EU has a model to offer for regional organisations, which draws its strength from its institutions. The example of ASEAN shows that beneficial results can be achieved. Global policies flowing from the repositioning of CSDP as a regional Ordnungsmacht must of course be phased in consecutively. Thus, global civil-military engagement of CSDP is scaled down over time. In this period support missions to regional organisations, such as African Union Mission Sudan (AMIS), can function as transitory arrangements, as they stimulate joint ownership, financial implications are smaller and public support higher (Vanhoonacker, 2010).
5. Conclusion and policy recommendations

"Maxime peccantes, quia nihil peccare conantur."
Latin proverb

This paper has investigated to what extent it would be beneficial for the Union to focus CSDP on a regional rather than global level. It has put forward the argument that positioning CSDP as a regional Ordnungsmacht helps the EU tackle long-standing structural security challenges while simultaneously offering a viable approach to the EU's global responsibilities. The paper can now propose some initial steps to answering the questions of what means (power), what goals (order), and what geography (scope) for the previously "unidentified political object" CSDP (Zielonka, 2006, p. 4).

The power of CSDP has to be rethought in the face of diminutive means. In the EU resources are scarce, necessary capabilities for global engagement are lacking and member states' defence budgets and expenditures are shrinking. Hence, instead of maintaining a global rhetoric at odds with realities, a regional repositioning of CSDP is necessary to bring power ambitions and means in balance.

To be prepared for these challenges, the ESS should clearly state CSDP's regional ambitions and reduce its radius of activity from 12,000 to 3,500 km. Money saved from diminishing global engagements should be reinvested in the following regional priorities: First, understaffed CSDP missions need to be propped up to increase chances of success, whilst missions under NATO mandate should have a fixed date for CSDP to take over. Second, comprehensiveness of CSDP engagement is a priority of the Ordnungsmacht concept. So-called "civilian battlegroups" of judges and civilian experts can help CSDP make an impact in troubled neighbouring countries (Coelmont, 2010). Third, one key pillar of the proposed CSDP's smart power must be strengthened: public diplomacy. As the Ordnungsmacht concept offers a clear regional message, this point must be communicated. A revised ESS should contain a provision obliging EU governments to promote the grand strategy at home. A newly created European public diplomacy unit should then gather continuous day-to-day support for CSDP missions. Underlining the green footprint of a regional actor should be developed as one of the selling points in this respect. To kick off this process of public diplomacy, a region-wide campaign could spread the core message of CSDP's new security identity: a regional actor for regional challenges.
Order is rooted in two goals. Regionally, a functional and geographical division of labour between NATO and the EU is envisaged. This new impetus in NATO-CSDP relations eases tensions in the traditional triangle of regional stakeholders: the US, Russia and Turkey. Globally, a heteropolar world incites a rethinking of order along the lines of regional organisations as key units of the system. Strengthening them, particularly their institutional capacities, is seen as an alternative to global CSDP engagement, as is shown through the example of ASEAN. In the future, the EU's comparative advantage of institutional knowledge might not only be necessary to facilitate cooperation but needed to bring about cooperation at all.

To produce the proposed order, the ESS and NSC need to incorporate this division of labour. Moreover, a revised ESS needs to outline distinct sub-strategies for the three regional stakeholders. In this context, Moïsi's idea of a "European Monroe doctrine" (Moïsi, 2003, p. 520) to clearly delineate the EU spheres of influence and facilitate this division of labour is encouraging. In the same vein, sub-strategies for the regional organisations with a security component (ASEAN, AU, MERCOSUR etc.) must be set out. To complement these efforts, institutional security cooperation should be elevated to a fourth pillar of region-to-region contacts. One could think of 'institutional battlegroups', staffed with experts from EU security organs, to provide a framework toolkit for other organisations.

Geography highlights the scope of action. Reducing CSDP's scope to the neighbourhood appears to be of mutual benefit to the EU and target countries. The virtuous circle of regional commitment, credibility and public diplomacy underlines this (Figure 4). Consequently, an improved ENP-CSDP nexus and more tangible results in a limited but conflict-prone region can be expected. Thus, taking one step back geographically might translate into doing less but better and will eventually "mean two steps ahead for [CSDP's] performance as a security actor" (Franke, 2009, p. 24). These steps are facilitated by endowing CSDP with a clear regional identity which is deemed to produce more coherent and consistent behaviour.

To ensure mutual benefit a revised ESS ought to include sub-strategies on the respective target states. These strategies should spell out clearly what security challenges exist in each country, how and in what timeframe they will be tackled, what means are necessary and how public and domestic support for the activities is gathered. These and future efforts taken together have the potential to pave the way for CSDP's journey to itself. CSDP, nosce te ipsum!
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Annexes

Annex 1: Ordnungsmacht in comparison with today's CSDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Concept</th>
<th>Ordnungsmacht</th>
<th>Today's CSDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means</strong> (Power)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rise to power</td>
<td>Reciprocal justification</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of power</td>
<td>Comprehensive, Redistribution center - periphery</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline of power</td>
<td>Internal and external necessity for legitimacy</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal</strong> (Order)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rise of order</td>
<td>Dense network of rules</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of order</td>
<td>Structuring mutual beneficial security environment</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline of order</td>
<td>Partners to be accommodated</td>
<td>Partially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scope</strong> (Geography)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rise of geographical scope</td>
<td>Resources determine ambitions - regional scope</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of geographical scope</td>
<td>Security sector only</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decline of geographical scope</td>
<td>Limiting overstretch</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author's compilation
Annex 2: Estimates of CSDP missions' expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Common Costs (in Mio €)</th>
<th>Overall Costs (in Mio €)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Concordia (c)</td>
<td>4.7 (nA)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Proxima (c)</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPAT (c)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUJUST Themis (c)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td></td>
<td>122.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>~1506</td>
<td>~1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM Georgia</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 missions</td>
<td><strong>154.7 (49.36% of total)</strong></td>
<td><strong>2021.86 (43.29% of total)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATION Artemis (c)</td>
<td>7 (nA)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Kinshasa (c)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT Amis I + II (c)</td>
<td>1.3 (in 2007 for Amis I)</td>
<td>212 (from EDF for Amis II)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 The initial reference amount for the common costs amounted to €71.7 million of which only about €30 million were spent in the first year. If we assume a constant annual expenditure of approximately €30 million in the five years of operational activity we reach common cost of €150 million. Marangoni op. cit. assumes a ratio of 1:10 between common and overall costs, which explains overall costs of €1.5 billion. This figure would be supported by selected, indicative member states' expenditure on mission Althea: Germany, for example, has spent €178 million in three years, while Italy spent about €90 million in nine months.

7 based on previous research by Agence Europe, op. cit.; Council Secretariat, 'Financing of ESDP operations', EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, Brussels, Council Secretariat, 2007; Grevi et al., op. cit.; Marangoni, op. cit.; Overall costs generally include common costs. Common costs refer to the Athena mechanism if not specified otherwise. Figures are based on data available as of March 2010 and include, where possible, the budgetary year 2009.
cont.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Cost (in millions)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUPOL RD Congo</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU SSR Guinea-Bissau</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU Naval Operation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.4 (for first 12 months)</td>
<td>~800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Atalanta</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUTM Somalia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.6 (planned)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in preparation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>158.7 (50.64% of total)</td>
<td>2455.5 (52.58% of total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 missions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**3. Asia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Cost (in millions)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMM (c)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUJ USTLEX</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUBAM Rafah</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUPOL COPPS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EUPOL Afghanistan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>107.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>192.6 (4.12% of total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 missions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total All**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Cost (in millions)</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>313.4 (100% of total)</td>
<td>4669.96 (100% of total)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) = mission completed
(nA) = not financed by Athena mechanism

Source: author's compilation
### Annex 3: Classical multipolarity, multilateral multipolarity and heteropolarity compared

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Classical Multipolarity</th>
<th>Multilateral Multipolarity</th>
<th>Heteropolarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Character of power</strong></td>
<td>military</td>
<td>military (?) with taming influence of rules</td>
<td>different in kind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diffusion of power</strong></td>
<td>clustered around military</td>
<td>clustered around military or other power</td>
<td>widely dispersed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comparison of power/ poles</strong></td>
<td>easy: military as benchmark</td>
<td>medium: clustered power as benchmark, taking into consideration respect for rules</td>
<td>hard: heterogeneous character of power impedes comparison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy</strong></td>
<td>anarchy in system, legitimacy of the strongest</td>
<td>tamed system, legitimacy is important and relies on respect for rules</td>
<td>tamed system, legitimacy vital, relies on rules and public support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poles</strong></td>
<td>states</td>
<td>regions</td>
<td>regional organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poles’ mode of interaction</strong></td>
<td>competitive</td>
<td>cooperative</td>
<td>cooperative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s compilation
List of Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers

1/2008
Kennedy Graham, Towards a Coherent Regional Institutional Landscape in the United Nations? Implications for Europe

2/2008
Sieglinde Gstöhl, ‘Patchwork Power’ Europe? The EU’s Representation in International Institutions

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