The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy in the UN Security Council: Between Representation and Coordination

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About the Author

At the time of writing, Daniele Marchesi was a project researcher at the Comparative Regional Integration Studies Programme of the United Nations University (UNU-CRIS). Previously to that, he worked for five months in the Cabinet of European Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, where he covered mostly UN issues, the ENP and Euro-Mediterranean relations. He also worked for six months for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both in Rome and New York. Between 2005 and 2007, Daniele Marchesi was an Academic Assistant in the Department of European Political and Administrative Studies at the College of Europe in Bruges. He is a graduate in Political Science and International Relations from the LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome (2004) and holds a Master’s degree from the College of Europe (2005).
Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explore the link between the reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU). More precisely, it addresses the question to what extent and how the UN institutional structure has an impact on European integration in the field of foreign and security policy. To answer this question, the paper analyses, on the one hand, the debate on the European presence and representation within the Security Council, and on the other hand, the EU’s increasing coordination on the issues discussed in this body. Finally, it looks at how future reforms of the UNSC would affect the CFSP.

The growing role of regional organisations in the United Nations is increasing the pressure to reform the UN. In Europe, the discussion on the reform of the UN has run parallel to the institutionalisation of the CFSP. Since the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU), the CFSP began raising expectations about the possible role of the EU in the UN, ranging from a common representation to a more effective coordination of the EU member states in the Security Council.

I argue that the reforms of the United Nations and of the EU are mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, further European integration pressures the UN to reform. On the other hand, the UN reform (or the prospect of reform) has an impact on the CFSP. First, it frames the discourse and national preferences of the member states and, secondly, it opens new institutional opportunities and paths for European integration in foreign policy. In this sense, the structure of the new UNSC could have an effect on the future development of the CFSP, either strengthening the current trend towards flexible forms of cooperation or encouraging new patterns of integration, coordination and representation.
1. Introduction

This paper analyses the relationship between the United Nations Security Council reform and the evolution of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy to answer the question of whether and how are these two processes linked. Rather than focusing on the policy discussions, the paper looks at the institutional dimension of the EU’s presence in the UN and at its relation with the debate on the reform of the UNSC. To answer the research question, the paper, firstly, looks at how the debate on reform has framed the EU member states’ strategies towards EU coordination and representation in the Security Council. Secondly, it draws up some educated guesses on what would be the impact of a reform of the UNSC on CFSP.

It is widely recognised that the Security Council needs to be reformed to take into account the new international structure, as it risks losing both its legitimacy and effectiveness. Yet, more than fifteen years of debates and negotiations in and outside the UN General Assembly have not led to any result, and the unreformed and anachronistic UNSC continues to “stick out like a sore thumb”.¹ On this matter, the EU member states are divided in two camps that either support or oppose Germany’s permanent UNSC membership.² Being one of the most influential groups in the UN and an important motor of the broader UN reform process, the EU’s impasse represents a strong constraint on the possibility to find a solution.

Since the end of the Cold War, the discussion on the reform of the UN has run parallel to the institutionalisation of European foreign policy following the Treaty of Maastricht. The building of the CFSP and the UN reform became somewhat intertwined and related issues, as integrationists started to see in the long-term perspective of a single seat for Europe at the UN the culmination of the process of integration in foreign policy.³ In fact, in Europe the division over UN reform is framed by the opposing views on what European foreign policy is and should become: a European common and integrated policy or a more flexible intergovernmental cooperation under the leadership of a directoire of states. Outside Europe, the

pressure to reform the UN is accentuated by the expectations created by the rise of new players such as the EU and their role in global governance. Many, for instance, argue that the new UNSC should take the process of regional integration into account.

The key hypothesis of this paper is that the reform of the United Nations and that of the EU are mutually reinforcing. Further European integration pressures the UN to reform and the UN reform opens new venues for European integration in foreign policy. I argue that the structure of the UNSC has had an important influence on the institutional development of the CFSP and that its reform could represent a “critical juncture” for the future of the EU’s foreign policy.

This research draws on secondary literature, the UN archive of the debates in the UNSC since 1993 and on a series of interviews carried out by the author in New York and Brussels between 2004 and 2008. The next chapter provides the theoretical and conceptual framework of this work, which attempts to temperate the traditional realist perspective toward UNSC reform with insights from historical and sociological institutionalism. A clearer conceptual framework of different member states’ objectives in the context of UN reform is also provided. The third part explains the evolution of the institutional set-up of the EU in the UNSC in terms of coordination and representation and looks at how it has been framed by the different strategies towards UNSC reform. Some of the novelties introduced by the Lisbon Treaty are also discussed. The last part picks up the key proposals of UNSC reform and assesses their possible

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impact on the future of the CFSP. Two scenarios are drafted on how the EU would stand on the world stage, depending on the type of reform actually implemented.

2. Conceptual Framework

Since European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970, European coordination in foreign policy has remained largely intergovernmental in character and the second pillar still displays a very limited transfer (or spill-over) of competences to the supranational level and unanimity voting. Although the European Parliament and in particular the Commission do play an increasing role, mainly through their wide range of normative, institutional and financial instruments, the member states remain the key actors. This is definitely the case for the matters discussed in the UNSC. As a consequence, it is tempting to adopt an exclusively realist approach toward these matters and to focus only on member states' preferences. On the one hand, this approach has helped elucidating in detail the interests of member states in the problem of reforming the UNSC. On the other hand, it has shown that these preferences have been particularly stable in the last fifteen years (at least since the entry into force of the TEU in 1993) and that there is little evidence of convergence or of socialisation on this issue. Realist / liberal intergovernmentalist analysis has also concentrated on the big players: the UK, France, Germany and Italy. Indeed, the interplay of this quartet on UNSC reform offers plenty of material for classical rationalist interpretation. Germany, following reunification, has started claiming a permanent status in the UNSC. Italy has immediately opposed this eventuality, fearing a loss of status as the only big EU member state without such a privileged position on the world stage. The UK and, particularly, France have slowly but surely realised that a permanent seat for Germany in its national capacity would legitimise their own permanent seats, which are increasingly seen by the wider UN membership as relics of their colonial past. For this reason, they have progressively supported Germany in order to diminish the pressure inside and outside Europe to relinquish their

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7 Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete: The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe", Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, 1966, pp. 862-915.
8 Laatikainen and Smith, op.cit., introduction, explain that realism is still very insightful in explaining EU actorness in the UNSC.
own seats in favour of a common European representation. Notably, in the first phase of the UNSC reform process in the mid-1990s, their support for Germany had been a lot less enthusiastic: the situation in Europe, with the newly established EU, was perceived as too fluid to allow such a development. German reunification was too close in time, and the Union had not yet embarked upon the endeavour of its enlargement to the East. The evolution of the international situation, with Europe powerless over a collapsing Yugoslavia, convinced the two big states that it was time to forge a smaller club inside the Union, providing leadership and steering and projecting Europe as a global actor.  

However, even in the domain of the UNSC, a purely rationalist analysis that only takes into account member states' interests offers an insufficient explanation. It will be useful to incorporate some of the insights coming from historical and sociological institutionalism. Notably, the concepts of path-dependency and appropriateness can temper the rationalist and realist claims of explaining the current situation and constructing plausible scenarios for the future. Path-dependency explains how institutions can have a long-term impact that goes beyond the intentions of their creators, and how initial institutional choices can restrict the subsequent evolution. The creation and reform of institutions can constitute “critical junctures” and “institutional opportunities” in structuring and influencing future policy-making. These “milestones moments” can be identified both at the EU and UN level (e.g. the Maastricht Treaty and the insertion of article 19 TEU, the UN Charter and the institution of permanent members and, hypothetically, the future UNSC reform). On the other hand, within the sociological/constructivist perspective, “the logic of appropriateness” of each institution (and notably the UNSC) can explain why member states adopt behaviours that do not match their self-seeking strategic interest.

Before entering the core of the analysis, a further conceptual clarification is needed to understand the complexities of the EU’s institutional set-up in the UNSC and the different behaviours of member states and institutions. An important starting point is that the actors in the CFSP have different perceptions of why it is important for the EU to coordinate and be visible within the UN. In this sense, coordination and

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10 For a historical overview of this problem, see Tsakaloyannis and Bourantonis, op.cit.
representation in the UNSC can be seen through the prism of the four main CFSP objectives identified by Keukeleire and MacNaughtan:  

*external objectives* (classical foreign policy goals of being effective towards a determined area or issue), *inter-relational objectives* (increasing cooperation and socialisation with the other member states), *integration objectives* (promoting the process of European integration) and *identity objectives* (asserting the European identity versus the others). Some scholars thus view coordination as a stepping stone towards integration and a common policy, while for others it is just a way to exchange information in the effort to increase the consistency between independent national policies.

Furthermore, coordination can be seen as a series of formal and informal mechanisms designed to increase internal effectiveness (that is, the capacity of the EU to reach a common position and to “speak with a single voice” in the UN) and external effectiveness (that is, the capacity of the EU to actually promote successfully its position in the UN). Although some authors have argued that these two dimensions of coordination are mutually reinforcing, the work of Smith and Laatikainen has shown that this is far from clear, as internal coordination involves often sacrificing on coordination with third countries in terms of time, resources and flexibility. Also here, the perception of the significance of internal and external coordination varies between member states. Some will give priority to internal effectiveness (i.e. intra-EU coordination) as a means to foster inter-relational, integration and identity objectives. This will include promoting forms of common EU representation in the Security Council. Others will give priority to external effectiveness: they will prefer flexible arrangements or core groups to promote Europe’s external objectives and interests, and they will appreciate the sheer number of EU member states seating in the Security Council. In short, because it touches the core of national sovereignty, the issue of EU coordination and representation in the UNSC is characterised by the innate ambiguity enshrined in the process of European integration. Here, however, the clash between federalist and intergovernmental strategies is accentuated by the fact that there is barely any open discussion within the EU on this topic. Member states therefore have not been able to develop a common discursive framework about what is “good for Europe” in the UNSC (and its

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14 Laatikainen and Smith, op.cit., introduction.

and all parties use the EU as a rhetorical argument to justify their rather different positions.

Taking stock of these complexities, the following table provides a conceptual map of the different interpretations that can be given to improvements in coordination and representation in the UNSC, based on the four CFSP objectives.

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<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>EU Coordination</th>
<th>EU Representation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>• stronger role for common EU institutions&lt;br&gt;• possibility of taking decisions by qualified majority&lt;br&gt;• institutional memory among EU member states serving as elected members in the UNSC</td>
<td>• presence of institutional actors in the UNSC: EU Presidency, Council Secretariat and Commission&lt;br&gt;• EU seat or common representation&lt;br&gt;• mandate from EU to member states of the UNSC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>• development of common positions and alignment of member states&lt;br&gt;• coordination between EU member states both in and outside the UNSC</td>
<td>• more visibility&lt;br&gt;• position voiced by EU actors or representatives of EU actors&lt;br&gt;• EU seat or common representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-relational</td>
<td>• effective communication and inclusion of EU member states in and outside the UNSC&lt;br&gt;• information to EU member states outside the UNSC</td>
<td>• inclusiveness&lt;br&gt;• effective rotation on elective seats among EU member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>• more flexibility&lt;br&gt;• more rapid coordination&lt;br&gt;• coordination in Brussels and New York resulting in guidelines, instead of rigid positions</td>
<td>• major EU member states in the Security Council&lt;br&gt;• more discretion for negotiation&lt;br&gt;• rapid availability of EU tools across pillars</td>
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3. The EU in the UNSC

As is the general rule for the UN, only states can be member of the UNSC. This is the first and definitive institutional impediment to any EU and CFSP presence or actorness in this UN body. However, beyond this legalistic interpretation, the EU has some kind of presence in the Security Council, mainly through its member states. During 2007, as many as five of the 15 members of the Security Council were also members of the EU (France, the UK, Italy, Belgium and Slovakia). In effect, if one looks at the absolute number of members, the EU is in the very favourable position of clear overrepresentation: two permanent members and, at any given time, up to four
elected members (coming from the three different electoral groups). However, while this situation feeds the resentment of the excluded countries and adds to the pressure to reform the UNSC membership, it often does not translate into a cohesive and recognisable EU activity within this body. Yet, a coherent voice of the EU member states on the matters under discussion in the UNSC is crucial to the credibility of the CFSP and of the EU as a whole. Consequently, there is a strong demand to enhance EU coordination inside and outside the UNSC and to then represent this coordinated and coherent CFSP position in an effective way on the UN stage. While this has been done with considerable success in the UN General Assembly and other UN bodies, things in the UNSC have been developing much more slowly and painfully, if at all. This difficulty can be explained with the help of two additional, deeply interrelated factors. First, through UNSC coordination/representation, the CFSP penetrates into the core of the prerogatives of France and the UK and inevitably limits their autonomy as UN permanent members. These two member states have no intention to relinquish their status of "great powers" and have therefore resisted any European interference. Secondly, while the EU has proven capable of designing long-term and comprehensive foreign policy approaches, it has a structural difficulty in coordinating on short-term crisis management and on the use of force, which is the principal domain of competence of the UNSC.

There is therefore plenty of ground to the claim that the prospects for a "common EU policy" in the Security Council are "bleak". Nevertheless, an increasing cooperative effort is displayed on the part of the EU member states, and a number of provisions and practices have been institutionalised in order to enhance the EU presence in the UNSC. This effort has not been constant, but has been somewhat influenced by the debate on the reform of the Security Council as will be shown when looking at the proposals to improve EU coordination.

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16 Up to two from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), one from the Eastern European Group (EEG) and, if only theoretically, one from the Asia Group (Cyprus).
19 Rasch, op.cit., p. 316.
Between Coordination and Representation

EU cooperation on UNSC matters occurs at least at three different levels: in the capitals, in Brussels and in New York. The national policy is formulated mostly in the capitals and this is particularly true for all matters related to the reform of the UN body, which are part of the long-term strategic concept of each member state. It is generally recognised that “Europeanisation” and “Brusselisation” have been rather limited so far. The two caveats mentioned above concerning the prudence of member states and the nature of the issues on the UNSC agenda constitute the main obstacles. In Brussels, UN issues are debated in various Council working groups, and in particular in the CONUN (once a month) and in the Political and Security Committee (PSC). CONUN (also responsible for UN reform matters), however, is often only an information session where issues are debated in general terms following the agenda predetermined by the EU Presidency. Every six months the group meets at UN directors’ level and attempts to provide some steering on UN policy. However, member states rely on their delegations in New York to do most of the work, including feeding them with information; and Brussels is bypassed. Equally, for what concerns the PSC, the attempt to guide EU action in the Security Council is hampered by distance and by the very fact that the member states’ ambassadors in New York are often recalcitrant to receive steering from their junior colleagues in the PSC. Another key organisational problem is having an alignment between these various meetings, both in terms of timing and agenda.

New York, therefore, remains critical both for the day-to-day follow up of the negotiations and for the response to crises. And in the New York scene, the primary audience is the wider UN membership, not the European Union, especially on matters on the UNSC agenda. Although a certain degree of socialisation develops among European diplomats, this is hardly enough to make them forget their job description as representatives of their country’s national interest and prestige on the world stage.

When the EU does have a common position, following the negotiations among the capitals, in Brussels and in New York, this can be “represented” in the UNSC. Paradoxically, it was the UK ambassador Lord David Hannay who in 1993 was the first to bring a Community position to the UNSC during a public meeting on the situation

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20 Rasch, op.cit.
22 See the work of Helen Young, op.cit., on network analysis.
of Yugoslavia. Following this development, there has been incremental progress notwithstanding the initial impediment of the lack of statehood and legal personality of the EU. Today, when there is consensus on a particular issue debated in the UNSC, the EU can put forward its common position and enhance its visibility. Firstly, the Presidency (much more rarely the High Representative for CFSP or, on economic issues, a Commissioner) is invited to speak in the UNSC on behalf of the EU. Secondly, the EU members seating in the UNSC give their statement after expressing their alignment to the EU position which therefore reverberates for as many times as there are member states seating in the UNSC. The EU, however, is invited only to the public meetings of the UNSC, when the decisions have already been taken and the states are just formalising their positions. The Presidency is kept out of the most important moment of negotiation and deliberation, which takes place in the informal consultations, the “sancta sanctorum” of Security Council’s exclusiveness.

Article 19 TEU

In terms of Treaty provisions, the pivotal element of EU cooperation at the United Nation is article 19 of the Treaty on the European Union. On the one hand, this is the result of the intergovernmental bargaining leading to the Maastricht Treaty; on the other hand, it codifies a practice that had already slowly developed in New York within the European Political Cooperation. As it is clear from the second part of the provision, the TEU established three types of obligations for the member states serving in the UNSC: information (to the wider EU membership), concertation (among the states serving in the UNSC) and the “defence of the positions and interests of the Union”. Formally, then the article does not mention coordination nor

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24 Ibid., p. 38.
25 “1. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora. In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1 and Article 14(3), Member States represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.”
representation, although there is a general duty to coordinate within international organisations.

The implementation of this article in New York acquires different formats according to the actors and issues involved and the importance of the question under discussion. Cooperation started with meetings on Friday mornings at the Heads of Mission level, already before the TEU. At this stage, the issues discussed were the general ones on the agenda of the UN, while the UNSC was absolutely “taboo”\(^\text{27}\) mainly due to the resistance of the UK and France. This gradually changed through the EPC process but remained a rather formal information exercise even after the Maastricht Treaty. A major breakthrough in the actual implementation of article 19 was realised only in the year 2000, at a moment at which the debate on the UNSC was at a pause, when, under the French Presidency, Spain proposed a weekly “briefing” on UNSC matters. The practice was later standardised by the Council in 2002.\(^\text{28}\) These meetings are held on Thursday afternoon on the premises of the Commission Delegation, where a Liaison Office of the Council Secretariat has also been installed since 1995 to support the general EU coordination effort across the UN bodies. Chairing the meeting is a diplomat of the member state holding the Presidency, supported by an official of the Secretariat, while on the other side of the table seats a representative of the Commission. Even if limited mostly to an information exercise, the briefings are “something that is absolutely advantageous for the EU member states”\(^\text{29}\) providing access to first-hand information. Other UN members on the contrary have to rely on information leaking out of the UNSC or on the statements of the President of the UNSC, which are watered down, made public and do not assess the different national positions inside the UNSC.

The content and scope of the discussion at these meetings is rather indefinite. The EU Presidency circulates among the European missions the agenda of the meeting, which remains flexible. Firstly, the members that are sitting inside the UNSC brief the other EU members on what has been discussed during the week. Secondly, the monthly agenda of the UNSC is informally “debated”, with delegates from the various member states raising questions to the members sitting in the Council. This practice was strongly sponsored under the Swedish Presidency in 2001 with the objective of transforming the briefings into more meaningful and forward-looking

\(^{27}\) Fulci, op.cit., p. 39.
\(^{29}\) Interview at the Commission Delegation in New York, February 2005.
meetings. The states that want to maintain a higher profile in the UN but are not permanent members (especially Germany, Italy and Spain) are those that are keener towards this practice. Their idea is to institutionalise it to transform it into a real preparation of the UNSC meetings. Achieving this “integration objective” - in the sense that it would promote further transfer of power in the CFSP - would allow them to participate in the formulation of the policy of the UNSC, even when they are excluded from it.

Having described the complex institutional set-up of EU cooperation and representation on UNSC matters, it is possible to analyse its relationship with the debate on the UNSC reform. This relationship emerges more clearly when looking at the variation in the member states' positions towards improving coordination and representation and, particularly, at the position of Germany, which is the crucial player with its bid to become a permanent member of the UNSC.30

Proposals of Improvement in the Shadow of UNSC Reform

It took almost ten years to put in practice article 19 of the Maastricht Treaty. Following its reunification, Germany became more confident of its chances and rights to obtain a permanent seat and France and the UK quickly undertook to support it. After the first diplomatic confrontation of Italy and Germany on the issue of UNSC reform ended with a procedural resolution of the General Assembly in 1998,31 the debate on reform was internalised in the EU. The events that led to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, with the bypassing of the UNSC, increased the determination of some EU member states to better coordinate their action in the UNSC and to raise the profile of the EU. However, it was also the stalemate on the UNSC reform that induced a change of strategy in Germany. The German government under Kohl was divided and criticised at home for having pushed too much for a national seat, so at least until the end of 2001, there was an attempt to “Europeanise” the approach to UN reform.32 The left-to-centre Schroeder government, and in particular Foreign Minister Fischer, was favourable to an EU seat in the UNSC as a long-term goal.33 This had a dual consequence for the German strategy:

30 For a similar view and an analysis of the evolution of the German position see Roos, Franke and Hellmann, op.cit.
32 See for example former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, quoted in Deutsche Welle, German UN Aspirations Backed by Europe, 24 September 2004, dw-world.de (22/3/2005).
externally, Germany proposed to devote its possible permanent seat to the European interest; internally, it supported the idea of a “European embryonic seat” or “European laboratory”. The diplomatic services of Germany, Spain and Italy worked intensively between the capitals and New York for about two years in preparation for the German and Spanish elective membership to the UNSC for 2002-2004, where this idea could have been experimented.

The idea came from Italy that wanted to tame the German position with a concrete integrative proposal (integration objective or “integrative balancing”). This consisted in having one of the European non-permanent members “hosting” a delegate from the EU Presidency or from the Council Secretariat while seating in the UNSC. The idea varied from that of simply assisting to the UNSC meetings and collecting information to that, eventually, of the national delegate leaving the floor to let the EU delegate intervene in the debate. Arguably, this project would not necessitate any amendment of the UN Charter and would grant the EU greater visibility and access. However, the two permanent members have not been ready to accept the presence of a representative of the EU in the UNSC by default. They prioritise “external effectiveness” and, in their view, it is not desirable to maintain in the Security Council a too cohesive profile among the European members. This would be interpreted as a sort of “blockism” by the other UNSC members, who would then probably also try to create among themselves artificial groups and similar structures, as a result paralysing the UNSC. A common position requires an effort of internal negotiation among the EU member states and, once specified, it generates a static, often ineffective, negotiation profile. That is why the permanent EU members prefer negotiating informally among themselves in the UNSC, with the United States, Russia and China. In this way they can maintain a position of power and more autonomy towards the rest of the EU membership.

Eventually, as the elective term of Germany and Spain in the UNSC was starting during the worst phase of the Iraq crisis between 2002 and 2003, the laboratory proposal was abandoned. Rather, the German government launched its second bid or not there will be a European seat. I am very much in favour of this. However, we cannot realistically expect this to be achieved quickly.”, www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Interview/Archiv/2004/040728-FischerNTV.html (5/5/2008).


35 Ibid.

for a permanent seat in the context of the momentous run-up to the 2005 World Summit in New York, which had to agree on a of far-reaching reform of the UN system. Subsequently, more conservative proposals for EU “concertation” in the UNSC were explored by Italy and Belgium during their term as rotating members.\footnote{See Drieskens, Marchesi and Kerremans, op.cit.} These include increasing the coordination within the group of EU members seating in the UNSC, in the capitals, in Brussels and in New York. The EU Presidency is also invited to these meetings and serves as a link with the rest of the membership. Clearly, though, these efforts are not fully institutionalised and can vary depending on the EU members actually elected in the UNSC and on whether they are interested in EU coordination. Furthermore, one may expect a general preference towards favouring a roll-back in these practices on the part of the UK and France.\footnote{Antonio Missiroli and Sven Biscop have suggested a possible “window of opportunity” for France and the UK in that sense, with the new term for elected members, when it is likely that the WEOG and EES will have non-EU members (Croatia has been already elected; for the WEOG Austria, Iceland and Turkey are running). \textit{“IAI Conference: The Contribution of Italy and the European Union to the Collective Security System of the United Nations”}, Rome, 30 November 2007.}

Constraints and Opportunities: Three Differing Perspectives

There are three main factors that limit the cumulative trend of EU cooperation on UNSC matters and that make this a gradual and ambiguous process with an uncertain outcome. Firstly, from a realist point of view, there is the resistance of the two permanent EU members to any attempt to interfere with their exclusive prerogatives as permanent members of the UNSC. Traditionally, these two have promoted proposals that would create incentives for Germany to separate itself from the rest of the EU membership and to orient its strategy towards the \textit{directoire}. An example of this is the offer by France to include a German diplomat in the French delegation to the UN.\footnote{Hugh Williamson, \textit{“Germany to Fight for Seat on Security Council”}, Financial Times, 9 November 2004. Apparently the pact was proposed by France already in 2003 as a fall-back position in case of a failure to reform the UN. This would have meant a “sharing” of the permanent seat between the two countries forming the “Europe motor”. Germany refused in order to avoid diluting the pressure to reform the UNSC. A similar arrangement was actually put in place by Brazil, which in 2004-2005 hosted an Argentinean diplomat in its delegation to the UNSC.} In this sense, France and the UK pursue an “inter-relational objective”. They seek to increase coordination as a means to share information among members, increasing the sense of ownership and participation, while at the same time diluting the pressure to reform the UNSC.\footnote{Mählmann, op.cit.} A similar but reverse logic pushes the temporary members to cooperate with the other EU member states and inform them, although
this effort varies.\textsuperscript{41} In this sense, the deadlock at the UN institutional level (no UN reform) produces pressure on them to coordinate/integrate to gain a degree of permanent access to the Security Council through the EU (integration objective). This was clearly the case following 1998, when also Germany, frustrated in its bid for a permanent seat, became more interested in promoting the EU presence in the UNSC.

Secondly, the French and British behaviour is only possible within an institutional context, which locked them into a privileged position that they are unlikely to renounce freely. If it is true that their position in the UNSC hinders a certain type of development in the CFSP, this condition/context is historically and legally established in the UN Charter. It is further safeguarded by the TEU provision that in the very last sentence of article 19 prioritises their responsibilities towards the UN as permanent members over their membership of the EU.\textsuperscript{42}

Thirdly, from a sociological perspective, the practices and norms surrounding Security Council membership hinder the capacity of member states to push for change. As a Belgian Permanent Representative put it, when the EU member enters the Security Council, it “enters into another world with its own rules of procedure, tacit understandings, negotiation culture and political dynamics”, where rigidly defending EU common positions could be counter-productive.\textsuperscript{43} Even the most reformist and integrationist member states are restrained by what is “appropriate” in the UNSC\textsuperscript{44} and, once they actually enter the UNSC, they have to act in symphony with the permanent members, if they do not want to be marginalised. Generally, EU elected members serving in the UNSC have to maintain a difficult equilibrium during their term between being “pro-EU” and the temptation of taking full advantage of their temporary privileges as UNSC members.\textsuperscript{45} The somewhat cautious 2007-2008 Italian and Belgian term in the Security Council provides a good example in this sense. Italy and Belgium had publicised their intention to enhance Europe’s profile in the UNSC, yet the long-term audacious idea of the “European laboratory” was wholly abandoned well before the mandate began. In short, nothing revolutionary

\textsuperscript{41} Interview in the Commission Delegation in New York, April 2005; see also Drieskens, Marchesi and Kerremans, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{42} Tsakaloyannis and Bourantonis argue that this sentence was introduced to “foreclose” the debate on EU representation, op.cit., p. 200.

\textsuperscript{43} See for instance Verbeke, op.cit., p. 54.

\textsuperscript{44} Interview at the Council Secretariat, New York, December 2006.

\textsuperscript{45} Drieskens, Marchesi and Kerremans, op.cit.
was attempted.\textsuperscript{46} The same explanation is valid for the tenaciously low profile maintained by the EU supranational actors on these issues, beyond the few extemporaneous declarations of support for an EU seat in the long term.\textsuperscript{47} From the same sociological view, the absence of an open debate on UN reform among EU members in the Europeanised context of Brussels has hampered the development of a common analysis and discourse on these issues. This explains how EU member states have been able to frame conflicting strategies towards coordination and representation in New York, within the same pro-European rhetoric.

Notwithstanding these constraints, rational, institutional and sociological logics are also conducive to a certain degree of limited institutionalisation.\textsuperscript{48} As is typical for the EU system, federalist and intergovernmental strategies coexist within a complex institutional configuration, where the overall EU presence is increasing incrementally while, at the same time, the member states maintain and actually enhance their control.\textsuperscript{49} Equally typical is that these practices do not simplify the EU policy processes. On the contrary, also on UNSC matters, there is an increasing complexity and differentiation with the creation of new and overlapping instances of coordination (meetings, committees, focal points), at various levels and with varying memberships. If ratified, the Lisbon Treaty\textsuperscript{50} would build on this complexity, without necessarily tilting the balance towards either a supranational or intergovernmental CFSP.\textsuperscript{51} There is some evidence that the various innovations introduced in the external relations domain would establish further incremental improvements in the institutional context of EU presence in the Security Council.\textsuperscript{52} On the one hand, the legal personality undercuts a (small) part of the arguments used against the EU seat.\textsuperscript{53} On the other

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Luk Van Langenhove and Daniele Marchesi, “The Lisbon Treaty and the Emergence of Third Generation Regional Integration”, Working Papers Monnet Schuman Center, University of Miami, Vol. 8, No. 9, June 2008.
\textsuperscript{53} New article 47 TEU.
hand, the new figure of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission would be equipped with the necessary status and tools (e.g. the External Action Service) to increase the EU’s visibility in the current configuration and in the future one, if any reform is agreed upon. Overall though, notwithstanding the worries of some member states\(^5^4\), the ambiguity between intergovernmental and supranational tensions in the EU’s institutional structure will remain. Similarly, the new article 34 of the TEU would slightly reformulate article 19, but is unlikely to change the fundamental characteristics of European coordination in the Security Council (e.g. no delegation from the EU to the members serving in the UNSC, priority of responsibilities towards UN over EU membership, substantial control by the UNSC members over the extent of information provided to the EU and over the presence of the High Representative in the UNSC).\(^5^5\)

4. UN Security Council Reform and Implications for the EU

The stalemate in the reform of the Security Council in the last fifteen years, notwithstanding the general recognition of the need to reform, reveals the huge importance that is attached to this issue. Nobody is willing to give in and all the attempts to attenuate the fear of the irreversibility of any reform are not working. The idea,\(^5^6\) for instance, to have a temporary reform with a compulsory review in 2020 does not really convince anybody and the same well-known positions are applied to the temporary period. In the multitude of ideas for reform that were proposed in the years within the infamous Open-Ended Working Group,\(^5^7\) the main issue of contention remains the problem of membership expansion and in particular of whether or not to establish new permanent members. In Europe, finding a consensus was impossible and the resistance of the two European permanent members to

\(^{54}\) See the Declarations 13 and 14 annexed to the final act of the intergovernmental conference adopting the Lisbon Treaty, promoted by the UK to limit the potential of the new provisions particularly at the UN.

\(^{55}\) New article 34 TEU: “Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States and the High Representative fully informed. Member States which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.”


discuss a common seat in the framework of the CFSP “back-fired” in the acrimonious competition between Italy and Germany, as the latter decided to take the national path towards a seat. Similar logics and regional rivalries, though, apply to all the other continents: Pakistan against India, South Korea and China against Japan, Mexico and Argentina against Brazil, and no agreement in Africa.

In this context, the important 2004 report of the High-Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Changes did not pick sides over this basic question, and decided instead to propose two alternative models both expanding the UNSC to 23 members (Model A introduces new permanent members; Model B proposes no new permanent members but a new category of longer-term renewable seats). These two options can still be considered as the two main ideal-types in the negotiations. In the EU, Model A was promoted and embraced by Germany (who signed in September 2004 with Japan, Brazil and India - the G-4 - a common declaration of mutual support in their bid to a permanent seat); while Model B is more congenial to states that oppose an expansion of permanent members (particularly Italy and Spain).

In general, Model A is more simple to understand and, probably, to implement. A number of respected states are elected and co-opted among the permanent members, in order to make the UNSC more representative of the realities of today’s world. Depending on the vision that one has of the future CFSP, Model A can present advantages or serious shortcomings. While a permanent seat to Germany would enhance the voice of Europe in the world, the rest of Europe would lose an elective seat and 43 states from Western and Eastern Europe would have to fight over two two-year non-renewable elective seats. It is no wonder that countries such as Italy and Spain are not very enthusiastic about the proposal. This explains why most of the campaigning effort by the states bidding for permanent membership - including Germany - is carried out outside of their regional constituency, where rivals are less active. Notwithstanding this, according to positions expressed in the General Assembly, an important number of European states support Germany. Though it is difficult to clearly identify these countries, since the positions on this issue are often maintained only implicitly, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Ukraine

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58 Hill, op.cit., p. 57.
have all expressed their support for the position of the G-4.\textsuperscript{60} Often, expressions of support are motivated by the overarching lack of confidence that the reform will actually ever occur. In this sense, taking sides with a powerful country aspiring to permanent membership can guarantee considerable short-term diplomatic gains at zero cost.

Model B’s main difference with Model A is that all new seats would be elective, which, as argued by the proponents, would stimulate transparency and competition and enhance the accountability of the UNSC members towards the rest of the United Nations. In particular, a certain category of states that are prominent in their region for their contribution to the UN according to article 23 of the Charter would be eligible for a second mandate.\textsuperscript{61} This option could eventually also entail the setting up of some kind of regional mechanism for electing the rotating members. Model B is complicated and the concept of renewable or rotating seats, on which it stands, has been criticised for creating another category of membership without a clear-cut understanding of what would be the criteria of eligibility. Finally, the model is looked upon with suspicion by the small member states that would see a relative reduction in their already bleak chances of serving in the UNSC. Nevertheless, while Model A creates members, Model B creates seats, therefore avoiding establishing new status quo situations that would not be flexible and adaptive to a changing world.\textsuperscript{62} In this sense, it is worth to mention the “Green Model” proposal\textsuperscript{63} presented by the movement “Uniting for Consensus”, led by Italy, Spain, Pakistan and other members of the so-called “Coffee Club”, which has traditionally opposed any new permanent seat.\textsuperscript{64} This model proposes ten new short-term seats, equally distributed to the regional areas and with the possibility of re-election. All states would be eligible to the twenty non-permanent seats, without preconditions, and regional groups would be free to develop their own rotation mechanisms for these seats, in order to have some states achieving membership more often than others. This model would then also channel a potentially growing role for regional organisations, while

\textsuperscript{60} For constant updates on the member states’ position on the UNSC reform, see www.reformtheUN.org.

\textsuperscript{61} Paragraph 254 of the High-Level Panel Report states that in electing the new permanent members or the longer-term members, preference should be given by the General Assembly to those states that are among the top three financial contributors or voluntary contributors or troop contributors, in their relevant regional area, op.cit., p. 82.

\textsuperscript{62} Interview via electronic correspondence with an EU member state diplomat, 25 April 2005.


leaving the door open for more ambitious solutions needing Charter modifications, for example allowing for regional representation.

As was shown above, the stalemate in reforming the UN level has had an impact on the CFSP since it has increased the willingness of key EU member states to coordinate on UNSC matters. Similarly, the success of either one of the models of UNSC reform could have a lasting and different effect in terms of institutional opportunity and path-dependency on the evolution of European foreign policy. The final section will advance some educated guesses on what would be the impact of a possible reform on the development of the CFSP. There are two possible scenarios.

Scenario A: Directoire in the CFSP

In the context of an enlarged EU-27, it seems inevitable that the EU member states endorse some kind of flexible engagement into foreign policy issues, so that those “willing and able” can take the lead. This pattern is already at test with the EU-3 on Iran, where Germany was associated to the contact group of the permanent five (called P5+1 or G-6), and Italy also insists to be included. Currently, this model of cooperation is not institutionalised and can serve optimally the purpose of the EU, with different groups forming according to the issue, in a sort of division of labour.

With a reform of the type prospected in Model A and with Germany as a permanent member, this flexible system would become more and more institutionalised and stabilised. The influence of the core of the big three member states would grow in Europe and in the world. Germany, as the biggest state in the EU should be able to triangulate between the interests of its closest partner, France, and those of the UK, taking advantage also of its important relationship with the United States.

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66 Stephan Keukeleire, “EU Core Groups - Specialization and Division of Labour in European Union Foreign Policy”, CEPS Working Document, No. 252, 2006. However, see also the concept of “permanent structured cooperation” introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (new article 42 TEU), which would allow states willing and able to meet certain standards to move forward in military cooperation and integration.
68 Keukeleire, op.cit.
69 Helga Haftendom and Michael Kolkmann, “German Policy in a Strategic Triangle: Berlin, Paris, Washington ... and What about London?”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs,
The problem with this approach is twofold. Firstly, it is static in nature. This is inherent to the concept of creating a new permanent member.\textsuperscript{70} Even though the traditionally integrationist approach of Germany leaves room to believe that it would use its weight to enhance the EU interest and profile in the UN,\textsuperscript{71} this attitude would probably not be sustainable in the long-run. Model A lacks intrinsically accountability and this could lead to an inexorable drift of German foreign policy towards privileging national concerns. This is to be expected especially when taking into account the social-institutional logic of what is the appropriate behaviour within the UNSC. In short, even though in its rhetoric Germany appeals to a permanent seat as a temporary solution in view of a common EU representation, there is a concrete risk that it will become itself part of the establishment.\textsuperscript{72} Therefore, it is plausible that this reform would hinder the progress made by the EU in UNSC coordination or, at least, it would deprive it of meaning by circumscribing and shifting the problem of coordination to the three member states having permanent membership in the UNSC. On the other hand, the efforts to create ascending mechanisms in the EU towards the expression of “a single voice” (e.g. forward looking article 19 meetings, qualified majority voting) would be put on the backbumper.

Secondly, the other EU member states would have to rely on the big three for information and leadership, as the possibility of being elected to the remaining Security Council seats would be reduced considerably. In the long-term this could reduce their sense of shared responsibility, diminish their activeness within the CFSP and overburden the directoire.

Scenario B: Enhancing Coordination and Accountability in the CFSP

It seems that the Model B ideal-type, avoiding the creation of new permanent seats would accommodate better an EU willing to speak with “a single voice”. Some of the members of the “Uniting for Consensus” movement went as far as to propose a “regional model”, in which new permanent seats would indeed be created, but would be allocated to states rotating in representation of their regional group. While


\textsuperscript{72} Simon Nuttall, Compact seminar on EU CFSP, College of Europe, Bruges, March 2005.
pursuing integration and identity objectives, the position of both the Italian and Spanish government is strongly informed by national interest. Their strategies also cover the fear to lose status and the frustration of not being able to themselves strive for a permanent seat. Tactically, the audacious project of opening the UNSC to regional organisations also serves the purpose of delaying a quick and functional reform.

Overall, the regional model of UNSC has a clear potential to stimulate an integrated EU CFSP. The EU would be allotted one regional seat, while another (allocated to the EES group) would be shared among all the European states that are not members of the EU. The member states would then establish a mechanism of rotation or election of the state responsible for expressing the interest of the whole EU. The member state elected to hold the regional permanent seat would be accountable to the membership and would therefore maintain strong links of information and coordination with the other member states. Even the fall-back positions, e.g. the “Green model”, would end up having similar effects simply by removing the prohibition for immediate re-election to non-permanent seats. Logically, some member states would try to be re-elected and would therefore enhance their accountability towards their regional constituency.

Eventually this reform would increase the pressure on France and the UK to relinquish their permanent seats, as it would become more difficult for them to play an autonomous role in the UNSC. Whether this would enhance the EU’s external effectiveness and its capacity to promote its policies at the UN, is not clear. Certainly, it would open the institutional door to a common EU seat supplemented, possibly, by the introduction of some degree of majority voting in the CFSP.

5. Conclusions

The problem of an EU presence in the UNSC has been at the centre of CFSP development, as it constitutes one of the most noticeable points of friction between intergovernmental and supranational thinking on the future of European integration. Moreover, the UN is a crucial stage for the credibility and visibility of EU foreign policy. The purpose of this paper was to unveil the link between the debate on the UNSC reform and the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The CFSP is

74 Spatafora, op. cit.
driven mainly by domestic and external factors that are independent from the UN level. However, it was argued that the UN arena also plays a role in carving institutional paths and opening opportunities that can catalyse or hinder the build-up of a European foreign policy. UN institutions and processes should be given here a broad and not only legalistic interpretation, as a series of unwritten rules, norms and codes that constrain a purely rationalist understanding of states' behaviour. Within this institutional context, the sociological “logic of appropriateness”, for instance, can offer interesting insights regarding the EU’s presence in the UNSC. Therefore, even in the domain of the Security Council, realist approaches can be usefully tempered by insights from other conceptual frameworks such as historical and sociological institutionalism.

The paper looked mainly at the case of EU coordination and representation in the UNSC in the dynamic context EU and UN reform. In this sense, the link between the two reform processes was identified in two steps: (1) by showing how a lack of UN reform has induced, so far, a certain type of behaviour in the EU member states, notably pushing them to promote internal coordination; (2) by offering educated guesses on the plausible impact on the EU of two alternative models of UNSC membership expansion. Concerning the first analytical step, the paper provides evidence that some member states are promoting more coordination for integration and identity objectives, while others are supporting this increase of coordination for inter-relational and external objectives. The consequence of this ambiguity is a process of institutionalisation, where an increase in EU presence has gone hand in hand with the resilience of member states' control. This process has been stimulated and informed by the discourse on (the lack of) a UNSC reform.

Concerning the second, more speculative step, the paper argued that the possible reform of the Security Council could represent a “critical juncture” for the future development of the CFSP. A reform granting permanent membership to Germany would probably consolidate and institutionalise the directoire structure that is already emerging in the EU. Not surprisingly, France and the UK support Germany in its ambition: while European overrepresentation in the UNSC would worsen, Germany’s presence in its national capacity would actually legitimise their own position as permanent members. The success of this strategy would have a double effect. In the short term, it would be strongly divisive in Brussels. In the longer term, the institutionalisation of the directoire could either produce the rallying of the states behind the leadership of France, Germany and the UK in a flying-geese kind of
pattern, or re-launch national foreign policies in a pattern of dispersion and sporadic cooperation on a “coalition of the willing” basis.

The other trend of CFSP goes towards further integration, more coordination and, ultimately, towards the need for qualified majority voting. This study has flagged out some areas of development: there is some dynamism in the way the EU coordinates on UNSC issues and there are some opportunities, mainly on the representation side, which could be opened by the Lisbon Treaty, if ratified. A Model B reform, which does not create new permanent members, could revitalise this trend. This model would keep some institutional venues open for increased EU coordination and more accountability of the member states serving in the UN Security Council towards the rest of the EU membership.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the emergence of the EU as a political union with a strong foreign policy has played a big part in sparking the call for a UNSC reform to take into account the new international order. The fact that today, beyond the rhetoric on “effective multilateralism”, the EU is not capable of taking a common stand on this crucial issue, is probably the most instructive lesson that the UN reform has to teach to the CFSP. Eventually, the EU, by choosing between its federal and intergovernmental natures, will have to play a part also in finding the final solution.
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