Europe and the Maghreb: Its Impact and Importance in US Foreign Policy

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... The expectations that accompany my presidency around the world ... are ... rooted in a discontent with a status quo that has allowed us to be increasingly defined by our differences, and outpaced by our problems. But they are also rooted in hope – the hope that real change is possible, and the hope that America will be a leader in bringing about such change ... when many around the world had come to view America with skepticism and distrust, part ... due to misperceptions and misinformation about my country...part ... due to opposition to specific policies,... and a belief that on certain critical issues, America has acted unilaterally, without regard for the interests of others... More than at any point in human history – the interest of nations and people are shared... (Obama speech to the UN General Assembly 24 September 2009).

Abstract

It is recognized transatlantically that the United States will not single-handedly shape a New World Order as some speculated at the turn of this century. Instead, a neo-regionalism appears to be developing in many parts of the world, including the Euro-Mediterranean, with aspiring potential regional hegemons, such as Turkey, Iran, possibly Syria, as well as an enhanced presence in the Mediterranean of Russian and Chinese non-commercial vessels. This rapidly changing greater Euro-Mediterranean region has the potential for a more democratic paradigm in which to approach new and old security threats of neighboring countries – and yet perhaps a fear of an all-too powerful America being replaced by a fear of its imminent weakening (British Council 2008). The role of the expected continued presence of the U.S. in the (greater) Mediterranean and Middle East, through NATO, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as a number of (ad hoc) peacekeeping missions (such as in and off the coast of Somalia) are analyzed from its bilateral as well multilateral structural embeddedness in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

Especially the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)¹ would fit Van Langenhove’s (2007) concept of a (hypothetical) “Third Regionalism”, whereby the institutional environment for dealing with ‘out of area’

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consequences of regional policies would become fully consolidated, regions become more proactive in engaging with inter-regional arrangements and agreements, going beyond purely trade issues with a multidimensional character, and having the potential to affect more relations at the global level. The UfM’s potential in contributing to regional security and stability (i.a. as nested in the EU’s permanent delegation to the UN beyond its goal in terms of political, economic and social-cultural development), has the potential to consolidate competing preferences intra-regionally, while building on the shared history and cultural and institutional structures existing today in the Euro-Mediterranean “region”.

This chapter will extrapolate the security implications of this region in terms of the revision, which previous research suggested (e.g. Boening 2008; 2009), to a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex (in light of the complexity of the internal securitization processes and the degree of security interdependence in the region) from the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex, which Buzan and Waever’s (2003) had proposed.

Introduction

The transatlantic relationship, whether between the U.S. and the EU, or with NATO as the hard security common platform, is complex, rich, and far from a fait accompli. As global threats evolve and emerge, this strategic alliance continues robust in their light.

It is in the Mediterranean that they meet, a sea of enriching trades, desperation and newcomers to seek benefit. Multilateral strategic inter-regionalism, such as the “north-eastern inter-regionalism”, e.g. “Mediterranean-Black Sea,” have strategically and economically played a significant role over centuries (compare Sanfelice 2009c, 2), whether for the Ottomans vis-à-vis the Silk Road, or for the recent growth in Russian trade in coal, oil or manganese (Ibid.) – or illegal trafficking - making the Black Sea the Asia-connection to the Balkans and the Mediterranean an international sea trade routes (Ibid.).

As “outsiders” (to the Mediterranean), such as China’s oil companies (seeking ever larger foreign deals) proliferate in the trans-regional areas of the Euro-Mediterranean, state interests continue to extend to the inter-regional dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean (such as into Iran and Kazakhstan (Hoyos 2009) as well as to the Middle East and Africa as some of the most prolific traders, investors, and immigrant population, their oil shipments from the Middle East protected to a large extent by NATO naval operations in the Persian Gulf.

The December 1994 Essen European Council summit declared the Mediterranean region an area of strategic importance for the EU (Schumacher 2009, 183), where geography still matters in an era of globalization (Biscop 2009, 25): While there was agreement about the reciprocal economic, political and social significance between the countries bordering the Mediterranean, there was no EU membership perspective for the Southern Mediterranean countries. The EU has been developing a regional strategy involving the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries as well as the South-South Mediterranean linkages, i.a. through the EMP and now the UfM, overlapping with NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Initiative: At present, with the end of the U.S.’ combat mission in Iraq (and the strength this provides Iran with the new role of Iraqi Shiites), Turkey’s foreign policy and trade re-orientation, Syria’s possible external re-alliance, Russia’s role in the Near-East’s balance of power, and, last but not least, the re-opening of direct talks between the Mideast Quartet and Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Hence both the EU’s and the U.S.’ interests towards the Mediterranean are, beyond the economic, from a security perspective, i.e. to main regional stability, utilizing hard and soft power.

1 The restructuring of the UfM (as an “upgrade” from the EuroMed Partnership) addresses many of the qualms practitioners and academics had vis-à-vis the EuroMed Partnership (“Barcelona Process”), such as through the diffusion and transfer processes both from the UfM into the EU and/or those from inside the EU out to non-EU UfM member states (i.e. those on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean) in addressing the Euro-Mediterranean region’s opportunities, threats, strengths and weaknesses in meeting its diverse and complex mandates.
As the U.S. has indicated several shifts in its foreign policy under the Obama presidency, in particular with respect to the inter-regional dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean, so the EU can be expected to assert its foreign policy more focused (i.e. supranational) since the passing of the Lisbon Treaty and the appointments of Herman van Rompuy as permanent president, and Catherine Ashton as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy.

The Transatlantic Link: Nationalism, Realism, and Shared Interests – Convergence in “Globalized” Regional Security

Since World War II the transatlantic relationship has involved extensive political, economic and social-cultural cooperation. Security challenges in a globalized world require increasingly not national solutions alone, but multilateral approaches, as the transatlantic approaches exemplify, such as the new transatlantic Energy Council which represents a new forum for cooperation in the field of energy (EurActiv 2009), and a step in achieving limitations in global warming. Neither the European nor U.S. security dilemmas are solved through a simple binary choice between coercion and engagement (Stephens 2009c), but are increasingly embedded in the formulation of new global orders, its leadership continuing to be to a considerable extent the U.S., but likely with a strong influence from emerging powers and continued solidarity with the EU.

Chua (2009), quoting George Friedman of Stratfor, argues that the U.S., because it controls both the Pacific and the Atlantic, has actually just started its ascent, rather than its decline. However, the age of American Exceptionalism of the past may yield to an era of greater multilateralism: far from the end of history, international peace, stability and prosperity are far from guaranteed (compare Kagan 2008).

While some authors (e.g. Ellis 2009, 361) advocate a U.S. Grand Strategy now, based not on formal international organizations “because of a significant divergence of security interests and capabilities with its European allies” (Ibid.), I would take exception to that. Rather, U.S. transatlantic Grand Strategy following the G.W. Bush presidency will not only reduce the focus on the War on Terror, but appears to give way to a greatly evolving (broadening) strategic environment, involving more flexible coalitions to accommodate domestic and international policy restraints, as well as operating stronger within international law (some authors viewing this as based on “Western liberal international law” (Ellis 2009, 361)) to enable more nuanced responses to proliferating threat types and the actors promulgating them. The emerging new global world order, and the transatlantic relationship in particular, will not be able to limit themselves to bilateral agreements, but will need to incorporate a much more “democratic” representation of state- as well as non-state actors in achieving these goals.

This transatlantic multilateralism exists not only between European countries and the U.S., or the U.S. and the EU, but involves non-state actors and transnational actors such as MNCs, as well as their products and services investments, competition, transparency of public-procurement markets and trade facilitation and trade liberalization, with an eye towards the threats to the transatlantic community that can arise from legitimate actors, not to mention illegitimate ones, all potentially weakening the power of the state, as simultaneously new structures will evolve. In terms of the EU this is the case most currently with the UfM, “which configured a multi-layered ‘Barcelona Process’ in which the UfM is working side by side with the Neighborhood Policy and the array of Commission’s policies towards the Mediterranean… to [effectively] replace the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” (Xenakis and Tsakonas 2010, 32), hereby reducing the centrality of the EU in favor of the role of all memberstates’ governments and NGOs. Since the UfM, like its predecessor, the EMP, is an integral part of the ENP, with the majority of its substantial funding continuing to derive from the EU for the time being, the role of individual states region-wide is more likely shared with the EU’s role in the region, especially in conjunction with the common External

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2 with the primacy of the U.S. economy projected to be relinquished to China in 2032 (Dadush and Stancil 2009, 3) – though the U.S. challenged defeatist prognosis, such as Paul Kennedy (“The Rise and Fall of Great Powers”) that “the only answer to the question increasingly debated by the public of whether the United States can preserve its existing position is ‘no’” (Plender 2009).
Action Service fully operational by the end of 2010 in support of the EU’s external goals, outlined e.g. by Jose Barroso in his State of the Union 2010-address recently in terms of the EU’s external presence increasingly pulling its weight on the global stag, and building an area of freedom, justice and security (Barroso 2010.1).

The U.S.’ links to the (greater inter-regional) Mediterranean region, besides economic (such as through its free trade agreement with Morocco) and political, involve both hard and soft security through NATO and its regional dialogues (i.e. the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative), and their reciprocal institutional linkages. Progressing from the U.S.’ unipolar moment globally in the 1990s into the beginning of the 21st century, to the speculated “G-2” new global power balance, it is time to assess which role the U.S. and the EU will play in the (greater) Mediterranean: will the EU continue to be more of a payor rather than a player? Is this advisable to further the EU’s as well as its memberstates’ economic and political interest for stability in this region, or should it be a more influential player as other emerging and revisionist powers, be it Russia, Turkey, China, Syria or Iran, flex their maritime, nuclear, economic and/or political muscle, marginalizing the EU in future global power constellations, comparable perhaps with Japan today (Stephens 2010)?

As the U.S. has concluded its combat mission in Iraq, not only opening economic opportunities for the EU there in Iraq’s reconstruction, this has also affected the greater regional power balance, especially involving emerging regional hegemons in the greater Middle East and Mediterranean, such as Iran and Turkey. These will be detailed below.

Furthermore, the October 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon will showcase the new NATO 2020 Strategic Concept to address new dangers under the complex demands of many-sided operations in an era of response capability needs which are versatile, yet under tight resources, in order to support its principle for democracy against totalitarian ideologies, in a more stable long term political environment now.

At the time of writing, the Mediterranean region is particularly salient to both the EU and the U.S., e.g. the renewed Palestinian-Israeli peace dialogue in conjunction with the Mideast Quartet, developing the relationships with Turkey and Syria in terms of their evolving foreign policies, and addressing common threats, such as Iranian weapons grade uranium enrichment.

Shared interests in transatlantic foreign policy are hence specifically i.a. the Arab-Israeli peace talks, START negotiations (and the positioning of any concurrent missile defense), future article 5 and non-Article 5 missions by NATO within NATO’s new “2020 Strategic Concept”, and the global governance of the evolving space policy.

Security

Previous findings (e.g. Boening 2008) indicate the greater Mediterranean region resembling a regional security complex, taking into account security levels and sectors as well as other criteria from Regional Security Complex Theory (Buzan and Waever 2003). Hence all soft and hard power aspects of political, economic and social-cultural “co-existence” in the greater Euro-Mediterranean region, in addition to classical military security, continue to be at play in the greater Euro-Mediterranean, and will likely need to be strengthened in light of the assertion of emerging potential regional hegemons to the east and south:
In the southern Mediterranean, NATO’s projected role for the future as a bridge between the European and the North American member states continues to be strong, if more subtle within non-Article 5 missions as compared to only Article 5 missions. It is well positioned vis-à-vis the ESDP and EU softpower initiatives for crisis management, much more able to integrate Madeline Albright’s “3 D-directive” (of “no duplication of efforts, no discrimination towards any member countries, and no decoupling of member states) between it and the ESDP. Modern state security requires hardware as well as pro-active skills to face modern threats, such as in cyber security, missile defense, sea and airlift capacity. Some NATO’s work for the coming decades is within a newly formalized (as of September 2008) relationship with UN positions within “a framework for expanded consultation and cooperation” (Hamilton et al. 2009, 39), e.g., “to safeguard Kosovo’s fragile stability … (or for the protection) of UN food aid shipments to Somalia against the threat of pirate attacks” (Ibid.).

As U.S. military power is viewed to be often more “persuasive” with its partners especially in the Mediterranean and the Middle East than European soft power initiatives, the former backed by U.S. willingness for trade agreements for its close partners, such as Morocco (in contrast to the perceived “foot dragging” by the EU towards e.g. Free Trade Agreements, such as with the UAE, NATO’s attractiveness in the Euro-Mediterranean and its inter-regional “dynamics”, such as the waterways bordering the Arabian Peninsula, remains strong.

Union for the Mediterranean

Aliboni et al. (2006, 30) had reiterated scholars’ and elites’ calls a few years ago, especially on the southern Mediterranean, for institutional reform of the EuroMed Partnership (EMP), “based on their wish to play a more active role in the EMP” (Ibid.). The new beginning in terms of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) to this regional Euro-Mediterranean cooperative security process is poised to

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3 in terms of: **Home Missions** (Deterrence and Defense -> lead role. Transatlantic Resilience and Europe Whole, Free and at Peace -> support/selective role; and **Away Missions** (Crisis Prevention -> lead/selective support role. Stability Operations -> support/selective lead role. Working Effectively with Partners -> Support/Ensemble Player) (Hamilton et al. 2009, 23)
address these desires and needs, even though at the time of writing the new UfM permanent Secretariat in Barcelona per se is not fully functional yet (though extensive programs in all three areas, the political, economic, and social-cultural, continue through the European Neighborhood Program (ENP) and/or NGOs, most prominently the Anna Lindh Foundation).

Aliboni et al. (2006, 30) emphasize that a greater effort needs to be allocated to bridging the security “culture”-gap between the Northern Mediterranean countries, who emphasize a regional security concept, and the Southern Mediterranean countries, where the “Arab trans-state community concept” is more natural, with the overall aim to “work towards a more comprehensive approach to conflict prevention” (Ibid., 31), encompassing beyond the three baskets (economic, political, social) also a “spiritual” dimension (Ibid.). Additionally, Aliboni et al. (2006, 31) suggest tackling a common security culture in the Euro-Mediterranean within a larger framework beyond party politics of only the EMP.

The Union for the Mediterranean is hoped not to distract from, or dilute the potential cohesion, solidarity and concerted socio-political evolution between the EU and Arab countries by not adding more bureaucratic layers without true identification with, or shared values and visions, beyond Sarkozy’s original fantasy of guaranteeing France, and French (especially energy) companies, a privileged position vis-à-vis the Southern Mediterranean, to the exclusion of other Southern European countries, and most certainly the EU’s commitments overall. The involvement of the EU Commission in shaping that version into the UfM did not put into question Turkey’s EU applicant status, and involved all EU members in toto (EurActiv.com 5/12/08).

The general goals of the UfM coincide,

- even in terminology, with the Barcelona Declaration…[:] if the goal is to achieve a region of shared peace, stability and prosperity, develop human potential, facilitate understanding among cultures and exchanges between societies, these are precisely the headings of the different sections of the Barcelona Declaration (Escribano and Lorca 2008, 23).

Overall, Sarkozy expressed the hope during the UfM’s launch as surmounting all the hatreds “[of the region] to make space for a great dream of peace and civilization” (Bennhold 2007,1), anchoring the regional cooperation in energy (e.g. a solar energy program), security (including the expanded fight against disasters), counter-terrorism and immigration within a trade agreement (including the building of maritime and coastal land highways), an EU-Mediterranean university (2008) and the creation, at last, of a Mediterranean Investment Bank (MIB) to be modeled on the European Investment Bank (Ibid.). Indeed, upon the launch of the UfM, French Foreign Minister Kouchner specified climate change, access to water and energy, migration, the environment and dialogue between civilizations as key areas for cooperation (AP 7/13/08). While the last three key areas were in fact already also mentioned in the Barcelona Process of 1995, the first three represent an additional focus for the new UfM. These three, climate change, and access to water and energy, are in fact also some of the security sectors identified in this dissertation as common to the Euro-Mediterranean region, contributing to its identity as a (more multi-centric) Regional Security Complex. This also points to an enhanced Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex within the UfM, which is enhanced by other authoritative speech acts, such as “The Mediterranean is a key to our influence in the world. It’s also a key for Islam that is torn between modernity and fundamentalism” (Sarkozy in a campaign speech in Toulon February 2008, quoted in Ibid., 2). A senior Israeli diplomat (anonymous) stated that “[the UfM] gives us another opportunity to have a dialogue with countries that we sometimes have difficulties holding a dialogue with” (quoted in Ibid.). Again, these statements point to a deepening of the Euro-Med as security community, by integrating not only institutions, but also values (e.g. the major religions of the region), as well as a consciousness of its identity vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

It is particularly interesting to note that some writers, such as Escribano and Lorca (2008, 21) have explicitly viewed the proposed Union for the Mediterranean as a “constructive approach” to progress beyond the EMP in building a true geopolitical space, involving i.a. all twenty-seven EU member states, as well as all MENA states that are currently EMP members, in a spirit of “deepening” the relations
between them (Ibid.). As such, the UfM should be considered a potentially significant institutional structure to assist in the consolidation addressing security challenges in the Mediterranean region internally, as well as in fortifying it to external or inter-regional threats, from a softpower position against NATO’s hardpower backing there, such as through NAVSOUTH, CINCSOUTH and SACEUR (Germond and Grove 2010, 5).

In light of this, it would be foolish to belittle the UfM in favor of near-sighted and local interests, rather than maximize its potential to not only support regional stability, but in the end security for all its member states: this is not the time for fear of failure (Gonzalez 2010), but to rise above it to face tremendous challenges beyond the capabilities of sub-regions or even nation states.

**Intra- and interregional Emerging Hegemons**

The following sub-sections provide a very abbreviated sampling of the inter-regional political reordering pertaining to the Mediterranean:

**Iran**

Strengthened by the weakening of their old adversaries, the now subdued Sunnis in Iraq (following the U.S. military presence) in favor of the newly empowered Shia there, the approach of weapons-grade uranium production in Iran, and a strong mutual trading relationship with China, Iran is also adopting a new approach in its ties to Africa (Isria 2010a). Geographically, this could be interpreted as i.a. supportive of the extensive Chinese economic presence – perhaps lending teeth to an ally who seeks its economic rise “peacefully” (without blood on its own hands?). In terms of potentially increased Iranian engagement in Africa, the significance to the Euro-Mediterranean might be in terms of illegal immigration into the (southern) EU, as the Maghreb is frequently used as a transit point for immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa.

Furthermore, the Iranian “tangent” to the Euro-Mediterranean – and the U.S. presence there – is the Russian “component” in this very multi-level dynamic and its broad security implications (e.g. bringing Russia into the NATO and transatlantic “dialogue” anew in terms of the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe – vis-à-vis potential threats, such as from Iran, which it supplies at the same time with nuclear fuel). As Frost (2010,2) refers to Iran: “Great Powers Collide”. While some countries do not appear to be threatened by Iranian nuclear enrichment (whether due to geographic distance or a friendly relationship with it), such as Brazil and Turkey, who brokered an agreement with Iran earlier this spring to hold about half of Iran’s enriched uranium (permitting it to keep enough to continue to enrich the remainder), after last year’s US-EU-Russian agreement with Tehran was reneged on by the latter. While this “showcases” an example of the nascent regional security dynamics of intra- and extra-regional emerging hegemons in the Mediterranean, existing actors in the effort to control Iran’s enrichment efforts were a. not pleased, and b. perhaps admonished to strengthen the priority allocated to their cooperation, acting under UN Security Council decisions, as well as beyond them, if they are to be effective in addressing the arms race anticipated by Iran’s neighbors, who “are wary of falling behind on nuclear technology” (England 2010).

**Israel-Palestine**

In addition to the Arab-Israeli conflict which is at the time of writing addressed anew in the current round of peace negotiations at the initiative of the U.S., with the continued support of the other partners of the Mideast Quartet as well as especially Egypt and Jordan. Without the U.S.’ active and sustained influence, the security concerns inherent in the conflict (territory, refugees, etc.) might not have gained sufficient momentum to give the current efforts the necessary initiative. The EU’s consistent efforts, both within the EMP and now the UfM/ENP initiatives have been consistently supporting security as well as economic and social empowerment programs for both parties, solidifying the basis for the actual resUfM peace talks
now on a basis which is fair to all parties. This means compliance with international law, such as “bringing Israel’s Bomb out of the Basement” (Cohen and Miller 2010), so that evolving nuclear strategies by its neighbors can be addressed rationally, rather than based on speculation by Israel’s neighbors, contributing the anticipated regional nuclear arms race.

Turkey

Having voted positively on its new constitution in September 2010, Turkey’s role to modernize itself, i.a. in preparation for its EU-accession, it has simultaneously broadened its foreign policy presence towards its southern and eastern neighbors recently. Its relationship with the U.S. has been traditionally very constructive, especially as a NATO member, despite its reservations over the U.S.’ use of its airspace during the former’s military action in Iraq. NATO’s Istanbul Initiative (ICI), which “extends to Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE … engages its partners on a 26+1 basis, and equips the [Mediterranean Dialogue] MD with both a multilateral and a bilateral dimension … [to promote] regional security and stability, better mutual understanding, and the dispelling of misperceptions among NATO and partner countries” (Schumacher 2010, 6).

While the success of this transatlantic link is difficult to quantify, the demand for – and success of – NATO non-Article 5 missions in the greater Mediterranean inter-regional dynamics is unquestioned, even if NATO cannot guarantee each aligned country’s every security need.

Turkey’s relationship with the EU has been hindered by political, and some claim religious, insecurity on the part of the EU, despite Turkey’s official EU candidacy status. Nevertheless, Turkey has confidently positioned itself as a very effective economic partner to, and skilled political mediator with, its neighbors around the Black Sea, as well as with Iran, Syria – and Greece (Allessandri 2010, 6; Evin et al. 2010, 14), while upholding its values towards its old ally Israel, i.e. not succumbing to security blackmail by the latter (e.g. during the first “Gaza flotilla” in the spring of 2010), but supporting the Palestine-Israeli peace process.

Hence such a skilled regional and inter-regional foreign policy actor, who has overall consistently continued to support the security dilemmas of the West, needs to continue to be part of its hard and soft institutional dynamics to ensure its future role in them. While the Cyprus “dilemma” continues to be resolved, albeit in baby steps, irrational religious phobias used by politicians in the West for purely selfish gains should not hinder overall Mediterranean stability⁴ and development – or Turkey’s pivotal role in enhancing Europe’s energy security/reducing European energy over-reliance on less reliable suppliers. The alternative might otherwise be a marginalization of Turkey to Europe’s periphery politically and strategically, an option which the West may not be able to afford longterm in addressing the security of the (greater) Mediterranean regional dynamics – and their consequences on greater European and transatlantic stability as well. Rather, Turkey as an anchor in the greater inter-regional Mediterranean economic and political complexities cannot be overestimated – last but not least for the EU, for its part, not to lose its own influence in its southern neighborhood (Kirisci, Tocci and Walker 2010, 26).

Syria

Syria, while still playing both to Russia, also aims to establish “best relations” with Iraq (ISRAI 2010b), while being wooed not only by its neighbor, Saudi Arabia⁵, but also by the West, when Europeans and the U.S. decided to end Syria’s international isolation, and facilitate its relationship with Iraq and Lebanon, affecting the latter’s potential strength also in international organizations, such as the UfM, and, it is hoped, its support of Hezbollah (traditionally along with Iran). As this shifting tactical alliance may not signal Syria’s break with Iran, its success remains to be confirmed in the inter-regional Mediterranean security constellation (Khalaf 2010; ISIRA 2010b).

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⁴ Such as the Greek-Cypriot veto of Turkey’s participation in the European Defense Agency (Alessandri 2010, 11).
⁵ which, after the Shiite-“empowerment” in Iraq, left Saudi Arabia little choice by to reach out to Sunni Syria (Schumacher 2010, 18).
Gulf States

The Gulf States (GCC), alarmed by the rise of Iran, continue to rely on NATO to protect their oil shipments and proximate security. At a time when non-U.S. NATO members plan drastic defense cuts, it would leave the U.S. to compensate for these to maintain i.a. the Gulf’s security and oil shipments to the West (as well as its energy security) and to Asia. This region reflects the overlapping regional and transatlantic actors and strategies in the inter-regional Mediterranean dynamics between relying on the soft power of the EU in terms of their economic cooperation agreements (even if these often lag in ratification and implementation) (Schumacher 2010, 11), and relies on – and cooperates with - the hard security, which is supported to a large extent by the U.S.

Rational Actors: National Self Interest

Securing regional unity and stability is the goal across the Northern Atlantic, be it pertaining to the U.S. national interest in terms of petroleum resources, to NATO in terms of its member states’ security, the EU in terms of its southern neighborhood, and the Southern Mediterranean in terms of a bulwark amidst a pervasive sense of distrust and suspicion among their Southern neighbors. These south-south connections are one of the goals of the UfM to strengthen with certain programs incidentally, contrary to statements by some authors that the EU inhibits sub-regionalism (e.g. Smith 2006). Rather, globalization processes need to be approached beyond systemic theories to recognize additionally “the diversity of social processes” (Oke 2009, 310, emphasis added). A short-term polarization within a U.S.-EU-Mediterranean security region for personal political goals is a cost-benefit calculation and luxury we cannot afford in the name of international law on humanity and the global order with its respect for national boundaries: in the end we pay for the maintenance of inequalities, as economists inform us, in that the propagation of a lower economic segment in a population leads to longterm threats to economic growth (Wade 2009) as well as socio-political stability.

Additionally, the compromises both the EU and the U.S. have made with cooperative leaders in the southern Mediterranean, even if they do not conform to the Western ideal of democracy, respect for international law and universally agreed rights, in order to maintain dialogue with “incentive conditionality”, often leads to surface results, but without deeper reforms taking place. It is this “niche,” which the UfM will address considerably once the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be removed as the modus operandi of its actual mission (Final Statement of the UfM Ministerial Summit, Marseille 3-4 November 2008).

In this trans-Atlantic environment of innovations i.a. in the security and foreign policy areas (such as an anticipated soft-balancing of power), it is essential that this opportunity for the EU-U.S. security dialogue is maximized, not squandered to achieve not only continued prosperity and stability within it (an area encompassing approximately 500 million Europeans, 308 million U.S. and almost 34 million Canadian citizens), but also in the greater trans-Atlantic neighborhood. While many expected to enjoy the peace dividend after the end of the Cold War, stability and prosperity continue not to be guaranteed in this greater trans-Atlantic security complex (compare Boening 2008b). In fact, many threats can only be solved jointly, such as energy security (both sourcing

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6 The UK is proposing 10-20 percent defense cuts, and Germany aims to reduce its army by thirty percent (Domby and Luce 2010).
7 As exemplified by the attendance of all GCC states (with the exception of Kuwait) at the 2007 Annapolis conference, together with Israel (Schumacher 2010,15), and the Saudi-Qatari Peace Initiative, presented at the Arab League’s 2002 Beirut, and re-endorsed in 2007 by Jordanian King Abdullah (Ibid., 16).
8 Incorporating i.a. multilateral security aspects, such as a follow up on our Pittsburgh Summit commitment to implement the G-20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth
9 With several candidate countries on track to join, potentially enlarging the EU’s area and population substantially. This enlargement process per se encompasses a dynamic which in itself, which, if not carried out effectively, could destabilize the EU and loose its leverage, as might become the case with Turkey’s EU candidacy, which might turn east to build its influence in the Middle East, if its candidacy continues to be sabotaged by some EU members (Stephens 10/23/2009).
and shipments), management of Iranian and North Korean nuclear proliferation, environmental
degradation, or food and water security for millions, especially when other potential multilateral partners’
security dilemmas do not enable their cooperation (compare Blitz and Bozorgmehr 2009; and Buck
2009).

In conclusion, contrary to declarations of the demise of post-modern security, the current time
represents just the very beginning of it pertaining to the greater Euro-Mediterranean region. That means
that not just national governments have a voice, but socio-economic interest need to be recognized, not
only of the haves, but also those whose voice needs to be heard. This may mean access of southern
Mediterranean farmers to northern Mediterranean markets, and some type of positive inclusion of
improving the odds on a genuinely sustained and comprehensive conflict resolution effort that could
change realities in the region. This new approach should be parallel [to other initiatives, such as the UfM],
rather than sequential, thus creating mutually reinforcing processes” to create regional stability, rather
than have it be taken hostage to Western interest in oil and gas (Spencer 2009, 2) – as the nature of
“positive sum” would indicate that a stable southern Mediterranean is more beneficial to just these
interests than the achievement of zero sum goals. Finally, an expansion of a transatlantic “regionalism”-
and convergence of practices and complementary interests (rather than the hostile suspicion of previous
administrations) might serve these old friends well in the future in light of those further away who have
arrived in the Mediterranean, and the seas it connects to, and with whom the relationship is less tested or
tried by heritage and tradition. The transatlantic relationship cannot be taken for granted, but should be
optimized by rational calculation and effort, rather than just be tolerated as inevitable, as a manner of
strategic concept to express a Grand Strategy, rather than a strategy of limited aim (Sanfelice 2009a).

Conclusions

On occasion the EU is perceived as a “payor, not as a player,” an entity perceived outside its member
states as having its actions limited by an “expectations-capability gap” (Farrell 2006, 30). This
shortcoming is hoped to be remedied by the new External Action Service, enabling the EU to speak with
one voice, and as a power (i.e. a strategic actor) which is able to actively pursue longterm objectives and
acquire the necessary means to do so (Biscop 2009, 3).

The EU’s modus operandi has been its softpower to persuade external actor to see, and sometimes
adopt, its values and norms. The “EU as a power” was not mentioned in the European Security Strategy
(ESS), although the Laeken Declaration (December 15, 2001, quoted in Biscop 2009, 20), refers to the
EU as “a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism” (Ibid.) without
turning a blind eye against the world’s heartrending injustices. However, if the EU wants the cynics,
nationalists, or radicals to be persuaded, it needs to be more than a market, but also a strategic actor
(Biscop 2009, 20).

While prevention is the first choice to achieve economic, political and regional security, the leverage of
conditionality is limited, especially in relation to other regional organizations and global powers, due to
the scale of its interdependence with them (Ibid.). But not only in terms of relations with state actors does
the EU seek to influence political or economics, but also in terms of its partners, such as the U.S., should
the EU continue to enhance a cooperative, rather than the morally superior position displayed on occasion
in response to perceived U.S strength to maximize the effectiveness of a “joint transatlantic position”
towards common threats, beyond the “traditional” (such as threats to ideology of democracy and open
markets, fight against poverty, hunger, disease, and regional destabilizing actors using weapons of mass
destruction and piracy and narcotics) also newly emerging threats from non-traditional sources, such as
weapons smuggling to the West Bank on a large scale from Miami, or illegal supplies of electronic parts
for explosives (which could be used to target American soldiers in Iraq) to Iran via South Florida (Weaver
2010), to maximize the fight contra these against the background of historical shared transatlantic security
challenges, such as the Arab-Israeli peace process.
In terms of hard security, the ESS fosters a strategic culture of early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention in a context of the UN Security Council as the primary organization responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, with the use of force as a last resort at times of threat. Howorth (2010) argues specifically in favor of greater integration in security and defense by EU member states and to overcome national “inhibitions” during a climate of “inward looking re-nationalization.” NATO enlargement would be part of the EU’s grand security strategy, although, as the EU’s success during the Georgia crisis of 2008 has shown, its softpower approach with Russia continues to be successful on certain occasions. Europe’s new narrative for its new defense and security strategy needs to be more unified – and internally and transatlantically more coordinated and cooperative - to face global-scale threats when the micro national perspective will not suffice any longer to address these successfully to enable the nation states of the transatlantic alliance to survive in the future at the level they strive for. This should include encouragement of sub-regional integration efforts, such as energy integration in the western Mediterranean, but discourage these subregional groupings which at the same time attempt to sabotage the stability of tried and true alliances for their local benefit only.

The U.S. under President Obama, while encouraging multilateralism in its foreign policy, continues a proactive grand security strategy, be it the new START agreement with Russia, its initiative – and major support - of NATO and its future (including cyber security), or the U.S.’ National Space Policy of 2010, to name a few of particular relevance in the Mediterranean.

The upcoming US-EU Lisbon summit, in conjunction with the NATO summit and its launch of its new “2020”-strategy, are hoped to be an affirmation of the transatlantic partnership in addressing Mediterranean regional and inter-regional (such as with Arab states) traditional and non-traditional historical and evolving security challenges – and to expand the untapped potential of this relationship (Dombey 2010).

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