The EU and Sub-Saharan Africa: developing the strategic culture of the Union's Foreign Security and Defence Policy

Abstract

The EU’s engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa through the panoply of instruments of its CFSP and ESDP has been a characteristic of the development of the Union’s foreign, security and defence policies since the 1990s.

The paper proceeds by examining how the EU’s engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa can be used to identify strands of developing EU Strategic Behaviour (SB) and Strategic Culture (SC). The paper identifies three strands to the EU’s Strategic Behaviour and which derived from its definition of what constitute security threats, how these threats are characterised on the African continent, and how the EU has used its foreign, security and defence policy interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa to test and refine its policy instruments.

The paper identifies the strands of the EU’s Strategic Culture by examining both Strategic Declarations on Sub-Saharan Africa that have played a key role in defining policy infrastructure and the civil-military instruments that the EU has utilised. This paper uses these aspects of EU policy to advance the argument that Sub-Saharan Africa presents a valuable case study through which to study the evolution of an embryonic strategic culture for the EU.

Professor Richard G. Whitman
Professor of Politics
Department of European Studies and Modern Languages
University of Bath
Bath BA2 7AY
UK

Tel. + 44 (0)1225 386490
Fax. + 44 (0)1225 386987
Email. r.g.whitman@bath.ac.uk
The EU and Sub-Saharan Africa: developing the strategic culture of the Union’s Foreign Security and Defence Policy

‘There is now a need for a new phase in the Africa-EU relationship, a new strategic partnership and a Joint Africa-EU Strategy as a political vision and roadmap for the future cooperation between the two continents in existing and new areas and arenas.’

‘Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries like Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. We have sought to break this, both through development assistance and measures to ensure better security. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of postconflict stabilisation and reconstruction, and have been a focus of our missions in Guinea-Bissau or DR Congo. This is most successful when done in partnership with the international community and local stakeholders.’

1. Introduction

The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its attendant European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have had an engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa as a central strand of activities since their foundation.

Commentary upon this Sub-Saharan African strand of the CFSP/ESDP has consequently been an important component of the wider literature describing the evolution of the ESDP. To-date this literature on the CFSP/ESDP and Africa has for the most part sought to explore CFSP towards third countries and issues and individual ESDP operations and activities as the EU has engaged in more activity which, in turn, have provided scholars with greater opportunities for empirical work.

The interest for this paper in the SB of the EU means that the focus is not on the fully array of the EU’s CFSP towards Sub-Saharan Africa but rather limited towards examination of its ESDP operations. We now have a range of studies which have examined the ESDP operations in some depth. Sub-Saharan Africa is of considerable interest as a ‘test-bed’ of ESDP activity as almost the full panoply of both civilian and military types of ESDP activity
have been used on the continent since the initiation of ESDP activities in 2003. The EU has deployed military operations in support of Petersberg tasks, peace support operations, policing and police support operations, security sector reform operations, (and only rule of law and border assistance missions have not been utilised). And furthermore Sub-Saharan Africa has been the sole location for some distinctive military operations: the ESDP’s first naval operation EUNAVFOR, the Artemis non-Berlin + operation and the AMIS peace support operation. With nine of the EU’s total of twenty three ESDP operations to-date taking place in Sub Saharan Africa the continent has therefore been an important theatre of operations for the development of the operational practices of the ESDP. This has given rise to a particular characteristic to the EU’s strategic behaviour and which we will explore in section 5 below.

Examining the decision-making processes that resulted in some of these operations has also been an important generator of theoretical insight. Case study analysis has been used to analyse EU decision-making processes as the basis for accounting for particular policy outcomes. We will side-step these decision-making processes in the body of this paper but return to this issue in the conclusion to the paper.

Where there is currently a gap in the literature is the extent to which the EU’s ESDP activities in Sub-Saharan Africa have contributed to the development of an EU ‘Strategic Culture’. This paper contends that there has been an analytical neglect of the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa to the refinement of the EU’s definition of what constitute security threats, how these threats are seen by the EU to be particularly acute on the African continent, and how the EU has used its foreign, security and defence policy interventions on the continent to test and refine its policy instruments.
As an attempt to generate a debate on the relationship between the EU’s ESDP activities in Sub-Saharan Africa and its Strategic Culture this paper is very much a preliminary exercise in theoretical and empirical agenda setting. The paper is intended as something of a tentative exercise to facilitate further and future empirical work.

The paper proceeds by introducing the notion of Strategic Culture as applied to the EU before then seeking to refine the concept. It then makes a preliminary examination of what is considered to be a symbiotic relationship between the EU’s Strategic Culture and Sub-Saharan Africa.

2. An EU Strategic Culture?

Debate around whether the EU possesses a Strategic Culture has been ongoing since the foundation of the ESDP in the late 1990s. The central issue of debate is whether the EU is developing a Strategic Culture and, furthermore, what are its characteristics? Why is the notion of the EU’s possession, or not, of a Strategic Culture of such importance? To address this question it is necessary to briefly examine the wider literature on generic strategic cultures in addition to the literature that deals specifically on EU Strategic Culture.

Strategic Culture defined

The literature on Strategic Culture (SC) is concerned with the assertion that there is a relationship between the strategies pursued by individual international actors and that these actors ‘...have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural, cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.’
Literature on SC developed during the Cold War with a predominant focus on the two superpowers and with generalisations about the superpowers appetites for risk and the propensities in the use of force used to inform strategies for the conduct of nuclear war in the U.S. From this starting point has emerged a burgeoning literature that examines the SC of a variety of states, including those of individual EU member states. Applying the concept to the EU represents a particular set of empirical and theoretical challenges as there is the existence of twenty seven distinctive security cultures in existence alongside a putative EU SC. The interrelationship between the individual member state security cultures and the EU’s emergent SC raises the question as to whether the process at work is symbiotic? Furthermore, if the EU is developing a SC how and where can this identified?

As with all concepts in the social sciences there is considerable contestation on the deployment of the notion of SC. All of these arguments cannot be rehearsed here. For SC theorists a key area of debate around the relationship between SC and Strategic Behaviour (SB). This is a distinction which is of crucial relevance for study of the EU as will be explored below. For Gray SB “means behaviour relevant to the threat or use of force for political purposes.” The relationship between SC and SB can be further conceptually distinguished:

‘strategic culture can be conceived as a context out there that surrounds, and gives meaning to, strategic behaviour, as the total warp and woof of matters strategic that are thoroughly woven together, or as both’

This distinction between SC and SB is important because, as will be seen below, these are often conflated in discussion on the EU and SC.
The EU and Strategic Culture

Since the inception of the ESDP in the late 1990s there has been debate on the existence of an EU SC as an important necessary component of the EU realising its ambitions for its foreign, security and defence policy. For the most part this literature glosses-over definitions of SC itself in a rush to judgement as to whether the EU has an embryonic SC. The nature of what is a SC has been much less contested than whether the EU is acquiring one.

A dividing line within the literature on the EU and SC that Rynning identified in 2003 still holds. Rynning distinguished between optimistic and pessimistic assessments on the EU’s possession of a SC. What divides these assessments is the conclusion as to whether the EU is gaining both the ability and the confidence to use military force to address perceived threats to EU security.

The most frequently cited and well-rehearsed discussions on the EU and SC are the two companion articles by Cornish and Edwards. Cornish and Edwards seek to evaluate whether the EU has acquired a SC by examining four areas: military capabilities; whether ESDP experiences are engendering a sense of reliability and legitimacy for autonomous EU action; whether policymaking processes of the EU now ensure a political culture with the appropriate level and depth of civil–military integration; and the evolving relationship between the EU and NATO. Cornish and Edwards entwine elements of SC and SB in their analysis and the conclusion drawn in 2005 is that the EU has a SC that is a work-in-progress. Four years from this analysis – and ten years from the foundation of the ESDP – general stocktaking exercises on the ESDP conclude that the policy domain, and by implication the EU’s SC, is something of a curate’s egg.
3. EU Strategic Culture and Sub-Saharan Africa: making the case

Examining the EU’s SC with reference to Sub-Saharan Africa represents a two-fold challenge. First, and as indicated above, the EU’s SC is a work in progress. Second, that the wider literature on SC has not been applied systematically to the EU itself and which, consequently, does not provide a well-trodden path of established frameworks of analysis by which to analyse the EU’s SC through examination of policy towards a region, continent or theatre of operations.

Furthermore, Sub-Saharan Africa may not appear to be the most appropriate case study through which to explore the EU’s SC. The Western Balkans would appear to be a more promising case as it has been the location of a sustained engagement of the EU’s foreign and security policies since the foundation of the CFSP in 1993 and onwards through the development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and the eventual creation of the ESDP.

However, there are two distinct disadvantages that accrue to such an examination of the Western Balkans. The first is that the EU has defined a particular endpoint to its engagement with this region and which is to draw these states closer to the EU through a route map to EU accession. The second is that there have actually been more ESDP operations that have take place in Sub-Saharan Africa in comparison to the Western Balkans. 15 This is in contrast to the greater number of ESDP operations launched in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Appendix A).

The EU’s Sub-Saharan Africa ESDP operations therefore provide an extremely important case through which it is possible to examine manifestations of the EU’s SB.16 As noted above SB and SC are in a symbiotic relationship. By examining the EU’s SB, as manifested through the EU’s ESDP operations in
Sub-Saharan Africa, it is anticipated that the paper will be able to draw preliminary conclusions on the wider EU SC. This will be attempted by examining two elements of the EU’s engagement with the continent. First, to clarify in what terms the EU has defined Sub-Saharan Africa as a theatre of operations for its foreign, security and defence policies there will be the examination of key *Strategic Declaratory* instruments used by the EU. Before, secondly, examining SB through the ESDP operations where the EU has used either the threat or the use of force as a policy instrument.

### 4. Sub-Saharan Africa and Strategic Culture: Strategy defined.

There is a longstanding literature which has examined the inter-relationship between the European integration process, EU member states and Sub-Saharan Africa. The ECSC/EEC/EU’s engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa dates to the commencement of the European integration process itself. Consequently, the continent is one of the oldest subjects and objects of EU member state collective foreign policy formation. During the period of the cold war the member states foreign policy was largely pursued through development policy instruments and through the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions.

The purpose of this paper is not to seek to account for the EU’s wider foreign policy objectives within Sub-Saharan Africa or even the full gamut of the EU’s CFSP towards the continent. Rather the intention is to examine the EU’s ESDP activities within the region to more clearly discern its SB. The wider literature on the EU and Africa suggests that the EU’s policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa developed a new dimension in the 1990s with an increasing interest in conflict prevention and conflict management. This assertion will be probed as an important to discerning the evolution of the EU’s SB.
Since this period, and alongside the EU’s ESDP operations, the EU used a set of Strategic Declaratory pronouncements which provide the framework within which EU policy is being defined and organised. There is hierarchy to this informational diffusion and in this paper they will be used as markers of the component of the EU’s SB and which have informed the EU’s policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa. These documents are used to illustrate that the EU has established two key strands through its strategic declarations: the security-development nexus and the human security imperative.

**European Security Strategy: Sub-Saharan Africa within the EU’s Grand Strategy**

A key starting point for analysis of the EU’s strategic declarations is the EU’s first security strategy in December 2003. In the words of the Heads of State and Government;

The European security strategy reaffirms our common determination to face our responsibility for guaranteeing a secure Europe in a better world. It will enable the European Union to deal better with the threats and global challenges and realise the opportunities facing us. An active, capable and more coherent European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.

Furthermore, as the European Council conclusions also noted the appropriate consequence of the ‘strategic orientation[s]’ contained in the document was that they had to ‘…mainstream them into all relevant European policies,’. Consequently the European Security Strategy (ESS) is supposed to provide the EU and its Member States with the road map for a route-march to greater global impact.

The ESS defines Europe’s security interests and priorities across three parts of the document: global challenges and key threats - this identifies what the document calls ‘the security environment’; strategic objectives - how to address
these threats; and *policy implications for Europe*. Sub-Saharan Africa features in each of these three sections of the document.

In the identification of global challenges and key threats the document is very much touched by its historical moment in international relations – terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime all appear. In this section of the document Sub-Saharan Africa is used to illustrate a linkage between lack of development, and its linkage to political instability and conflict and the assertion that security is a precondition for development.\(^{24}\) This is an embryonic expression of the *security-development* nexus that has subsequently become a key strand in the EU’s strategy as will become apparent below.

The second section of the document – on strategic objectives – identifies three strategic objectives: ‘addressing the threats’, ‘building security in our neighbourhood’ and an ‘international order based on effective multilateralism’. ‘Effective multilateralism’ has become an overwhelming objective of the ESS. It is the EU’s equivalent of the U.S. cold war notion of *containment* as the key objective of the EU internationally. In this section of the Strategy Sub-Saharan Africa appears as illustrative of the manner in which the EU has already addressed threats (with reference to the DRC – ‘to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet’) and as illustrative that ‘State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa.’ Sub-Saharan Africa is not defined as part of the neighbourhood but appears later in the document as ‘partner’ alongside Latin America and Asia. The African Union features as a component of the argument for effective multilateralism and the assertion that regional organisations strengthen global governance.
The third section of the document is almost all about capabilities development which has been a collective concern since the early 1990s and West Africa is used as illustrative of the assertion that ‘Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis’. Strikingly, and unlike its references to other continents the EU did not identify an African candidate for the ‘strategic partnerships’ that it was seeking to develop.

In its December 2008 five year review of the implementation of the Security Strategy the EU has summarised the foreign and security policy evolution generally, and for the purposes of this paper, how Sub-Saharan Africa fits within the EU’s wider grand strategy. Human Security is enshrined in the review document as a central concept for the EU. The refinement of this concept as a guiding principle for the EU was an important element of the work undertaken to implement the ESS after its publication. There is also a section of the document devoted to the security-development nexus and with Somalia cited as illustrative of the inter-linkage. Guinea- Bissau and the DRC are both cited as instances where the EU’s intervention has been driven by the drive for post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. This documentation represents a good snap-shot of the various strands of the EU’s policy towards the region as they have consolidated over the last half decade. Stress is also placed on how the EU is working with the AU and also how the Joint Africa EU Strategy is being used as a vehicle through which to enhance African capabilities in crisis management. There is also reference to the development of a more significant relationship with South Africa since 2003.

The EU’s Security Strategy and its implementation across the last five years provide key indicators to the EU’s SB and which are echoed in key documents
that deal specifically with Sub-Saharan Africa. The key CFSP document that encapsulates the EU’s strategic objectives for Sub-Saharan Africa is the Common Position adopted in January 2004 concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa. It establishes a number of principles that have guided EU policy. First, that the EU seeks to ‘...contribute to the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts in Africa by strengthening African capacity and means of action in this field.’ Second, that to implement the policy there is close cooperation with the UN, regional and sub-regional organisations. Third, that conflict prevention, management and resolution needs to be tackled through capacity building at the international, regional and country level. The Common Position has been the platform on which the EU has developed a number of strands to its policy that have focused on capacity-building, and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants and on combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons.

Sub-Saharan African Strategic Declarations

From 2003 onwards Strategic Declaratory statements of the EU on Sub-Saharan Africa have contained significant reference to both the security development nexus and the Human Security imperative. The EU has ‘uploaded’ these two key strands of its strategic behaviour into its strategic objectives for the continent.

The security-development nexus was central to the European Africa Strategy adopted by the EU in October 2005 with both its central objective to guide the EU’s response in assisting with the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) with an objective being to ‘...strengthen its support in the areas considered prerequisites for attaining the MDGs (peace,
security, good governance), areas that create a favourable economic environment for growth, trade and interconnection and areas targeting social cohesion and environment.’

Furthermore the EU outlined its response strategy to these objectives and this being that:

‘The EU will step up its efforts to foster peace and security by means of a wide range of actions, ranging from the support for African peace operations to a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention addressing the root causes of violent conflict. These actions also target cooperation in the fight against terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as support for regional and national strategies for disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and reinsertion in order to contribute to the reintegration of ex-combatants – including child soldiers – and stabilisation of post-conflict situations.’

This theme was reinforced at the second Africa-EU summit which was held from 8-9 December 2007 in Lisbon under the Portuguese EU Presidency and at the level of heads of state and government from Africa and the EU. Running through the key declarations and documents agree at the summit - the Lisbon Declaration and the Joint EU-Africa Strategy - characterised the relationship as ‘Strategic Partnership’. This Partnership is to be structured through 8 strands and with the objectives set out in a two-year Action Plan.

The Joint EU-Africa Strategy is replete with references to Human Security. The Strategy also makes Peace and Security one of the four-fold objectives of the partnership. The security-development nexus is also presented as shared understanding that underpins the objectives for the partnership: ‘Africa and Europe understand the importance of peace and security as preconditions for political, economic and social development.’ The ‘Peace and Security’ section of the Joint Strategy and its attendant action plan are primarily concerned with the EU facilitating African ownership of conflict prevention and conflict management and with the EU playing a facilitating, mentoring and assisting
Two key priorities are given to achieving full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and Predictable Funding for Africa-led Peace Support Operations.

These two elements of the Action Plan highlight a Sub-Saharan Africa region-specific aspect of the EU’s SB. This is to sub-contract operational activity to African third parties – a preference for local enforcement. This aspect of the EU’s SB was systematically codified in the Peace and Security cluster part of the *EU Strategy for Africa*, adopted by the European Council in December 2005. And, in turn, was developed at further length in the *EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts* in November 2006. Measures and initiatives proposed in the concept would directly support the AU’s ongoing establishment of an APSA, including the creation of the African Stand-by Force (ASF).

These activities are being financed via the African Peace Facility (APF) intended to facilitate the African Union taking responsibility for African security. The APF provides EU financial support to facilitate capacity building by African states and the AU particularly for the training of African troops to perform peace and security operations. Building African capabilities also diminishes the requirement for direct European military involvement on the continent. The APF funding is drawn from the European Development Fund (EDF) and for 2008-2010 stands at €300 million. The initial €250 million funding of the Facility at its foundation in 2004 proved to be insufficient and particularly because of the costs involved with the AMIS operation and which saw funding raised to €440 million by 2007.

In examining a set of the EU’s *Strategic Declaratory* instruments as indicators of the EU’s SB it has been suggested that there are three strands which are
apparent. Two of these strands are considered to be general and generic strands of the SB – the security-development nexus and the human security imperative – and there is a distinctive Sub-Saharan Africa specific strand which is the preference for local enforcement.

5. Strategic behaviour: operational activity

Sub-Saharan Africa has seen the most significant cluster of ESDP activity since the initiation of such operations in 2003. These ESDP operations provide an important basis from which to assess the operational activity aspects of the EU’s behavioural culture. As indicated above the EU has established two key strands of its SB and which can be identified through Strategic Declarations: the security-development nexus and the human security imperative. Through an examination of the Sub-Saharan ESDP operations we can also see the third of strand of SB which is the preference for local enforcement.

Each of the individual ESDP operations has been the subject of academic and policy analysis. This analysis has been primarily to assess the motivations behind the deployment of each of the operations, the difficulties with converting the mandate of the GAERC into an ESDP operation, and whether the operation constituted a successful realisation of its objectives. A summary of each operation is to be found in Appendix A of this paper. The interest for the purpose of this paper is to examine these ESDP operations in totality to see what patterns can be discerned and that are relevant for the characterisations of the EU’s SB.

To analyse the nine Sub-Saharan African ESDP operations they will first be considered against a typology of operational types and then against a set of
rationales providing an indication as to where each fits with the three strands of SB outlined above.

Operational types
The five-fold operational types are presented in figure 1. The Sub-Saharan ESDP operations have been categorised on the basis of the mandate criteria outlined in the Joint Action authoring the operation. All the EU’s ESDP operations can also be placed on both a civilian-military spectrum and also defined in terms of their operation type. Of the Sub-Saharan operations to-date account for four of these five types with only a border assistance and monitoring mission type mission not being deployed. Through the use of these four types of operations the EU has generated a particular set of characteristics to the operational aspects of its SB in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the ESDP deployments to date Artemis, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Chad-Central African Republic, EUNAVFOR Somalia/Operation Atalanta, and the EU’s support to the African Union’s AMIS II operation in Sudan can be viewed as at the military end of the civil-military spectrum. As we shall see below the circumscribed nature of these operations also fits within the human security imperatives identified above.

Policing and police support operations Two out of the nine ESDP operations to-date can be characterised as this operational type: EUPOL Kinshasa and EUPOL, DR Congo. The second of these two operations was a successor operation to the first.

Reform-focused operations: Rule of law and security sector reform Two operations have been conducted under this category to-date the first the on-going EU
security sector reform mission *EUSEC, DR Congo*. The second operation is also ongoing the EU SSR security sector reform mission, Guinea-Bissau.

*Figure 1: A typology of ESDP operations*

*Logistical assistance* Only one ESDP operation to-date has fallen into this category which is the EU support to AMIS (Darfur) and which was EU technical support to the African Union, is to assist it in the mounting of the AU’s first-ever large-scale peace support operation (AMIS II) in the Darfur Region of Sudan. This was concluded on 31 December 2007 when AMIS was succeeded by UNAMID.
Military deployments in support of Petersberg tasks

Four military deployments have take place in support of Petersberg tasks. First, the Artemis operation in the Congo (June-September 2003). Second, the EUFOR DRC (April-November 2006) operation to provide security for the general election process in the DRC. The third operation has also been concluded and was the EUFOR Chad-Central African Republic operation to protect the camps of refugees and displaced persons in the east of Chad and the north of the Central African Republic. The fourth and final operation of this type to-date is the on-going EUNAVFOR Somalia/Operation Atalanta which is devoted to anti-piracy and anti-robbery operations off the coast of Somalia.

ESDP operations rationale-types

Each of the ESDP operations can also be categorised on the basis of their correspondence to the security-development nexus, the human security imperative and the preference for local enforcement (see figure 2).

The assessment of each ESDP operation has been through a combination of examination of the mission mandate, the activities undertaken during the missions duration and the actors involved in the implementation. The material used as the basis for the assessment is the IISS’s Strategic Survey, development indices, EU documentation and secondary source analysis.35

The ESDP operations can be categorised according to their correspondence to different aspects of the EU’s SB.

security-development nexus The majority of the EU’s Sub-Saharan African ESDP operations demonstrate evidence of a the security-development nexus as
providing a rationale for intervention. The locations of EU intervention in the DRC, the CAR and Guinea-Bissau are all countries that are placed both low on the development index and also regions of lack of development and also territories assessed as suffering from political instability and conflict.

*human security imperative* Here the rationale for EU intervention is where the EU has placed the individual, rather the state, as the primary security concern and has consequently intervened for reasons of the search for human security. The EU’s Artemis operation is the most dramatic illustration of this imperative at work.

*preference for local enforcement* The EU has demonstrated a preference for local enforcement in the characteristics of its operations. First, all ESDP operations have been of a set duration and with the EU not seeking a prolonged duration to its commitment. Second, the EU preference has been to engage in activities to supply know-how to increase indigenous capacity as through the EUPOL and SSR operations. Or to provide support for African peace keeping capacity through the AMIS operation.

The majority of the EU’s Sub-Saharan African ESDP operations demonstrate more than one aspect of the EU’s SB. The only ESDP operation which cannot be easily located within this three-fold schema of the EU’s SB is the Atalanta operation. This operation is undertaken under the auspices of a UN mandate as with all other EU ESDP military deployments. As this operation is at an early stage of operation and the most recent of the EU’s ESDP Sub-Saharan Africa operations it may demonstrate other aspects of SB as it unfolds.
This analysis is a provisional attempt at considering the EU’s ESDP operations as a part of a specific exercise in attempting to map the EU’s SB. However, there is considerable scope for drawing appropriate comparisons between the EU’s activities and those of other actors in future work. A key comparator for the EU’s activities in Sub-Saharan Africa is that of the United States. There are some potentially interesting comparisons to be drawn here. As Olson has noted it is striking to see how willing the European Union has been use military forces in Africa in contrast to a greater US reluctance in recent years.36
6. Conclusion
As this paper is a preliminary undertaking it is also appropriate to reflect upon a number of issues which will require further consideration and examination in the further empirical work needed to refine the analysis.

First, the EU’s activities in Sub-Saharan Africa raises the attendant question to the extent the experiences have been ‘downloaded’ into the EU’s wider SC. To what extent have the EU’s policies pursued through the CFSP/ESDP towards Sub-Saharan Africa played a key role in impacting both on the direction of development of the totality of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy Strategic Culture and, crucially, in the forms of military intervention contemplated in the future?

Second, what is the relationship between the EU’s SB in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Strategic Cultures of the individual member states? In particular, because decisions as to when and where to undertake ESDP operations have been driven by individual member states. Analysing EU involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa in a manner that facilitates the study of the duality of the ESDP structure and which involves both the SC of individual EU member states as well as EU institutions and EU decision-makers has been previously identified by analysts.37

Third, where to best seek the evidence for how the EU SC has been generated and so to gauge its characteristics and development? This is a problematic recognised within the general literature on SC:

‘Just as all strategy has to be ‘done’ by operations which consist of tactical behaviour, so all strategic, operational, and tactical behaviour is ‘done’ by people and organisations that have been encultured supranationally, nationally, or sub-nationally.38
It is, however, still possible to draw a number of conclusions from the analysis within this paper. The case study examination of the EU’s foreign security and defence policy engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa has allowed for the identification of components of the EU’s SB. The use of *Strategic Declarations* that the EU has made towards the continent have allowed these to be identified and these have been further validated through examination of the ESDP operational activity that has been undertaken. Using the concepts of SB and SC the paper tentatively suggests that the EU policy pursued towards Sub-Saharan African demonstrates three characteristics to the EU’s SB.

Sub-Saharan Africa has proved to be an invaluable case study through which to conduct this examination as over recent years the continent has become an increasingly venue for the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy. However, as the EU has had a small ‘footprint’ in the region confining its activities for the most part to the Great Lakes region and conflicts within Central Africa. Consequently it remains to be seen if the EU will expand the scope and range of activities on the African continent and whether the SB identified in this paper gains greater depth.
APPENDIX A: Sub-Saharan African ESDP Operations to date: an overview

### MILITARY OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Overview</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artemis</td>
<td>Serious unrest erupted in Ituri, a province in eastern Congo, in 2003. The town of Bunia was besieged. The EU, pending the arrival of a larger United Nations force, and taking over from 750 blue helmets, conducted in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003)</td>
<td>2,200 troops, mostly from France (1,700) and Sweden from a total of 16 EU (11) and non-EU (5) countries, under the EU’s ‘framework nation’ concept with, in this case, France providing the framework. This first operation outside of Europe a short-term ‘autonomous’ operation (that is one conducted without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities).</td>
<td>5th June 2003 - 1st September 2003</td>
<td>COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003</td>
<td>COMPLETED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Support to AMIS (Darfur)</td>
<td>The EU’s technical support to the African Union, is to assist it in the mounting of the AU’s first-ever large-scale peace support operation (AMIS II) in the Darfur Region of Sudan. The EU - like NATO - also provided strategic transport aid. The operation was broadened in May 2005 into a consolidated support package. With a staff of around 50 people (military and police), this civilian and military action provided support for the African Union troops deployed in Darfur. The latter included: support to the African Union’s civil police element, planning and technical expertise to their military chain of command, airlift, logistic support, training assistance and advisory teams, aerial observation, media support, military observers, finance, and an administration and management coordination cell, all in transparency and complementarity with partners such as NATO. Assistance to the African Union is ongoing.</td>
<td>June 2005 – 31st December 2007</td>
<td>COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2005/557/CFSP of 18 July 2005</td>
<td>COMPLETED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>The second of these type operations was the EUFOR DRC (April-November 2006) aimed to provide security for the election process. During the election campaign in the DRC in the spring of 2006, maintenance of order in Kinshasa was recognized by the UN as a key element for the success of the electoral process. Therefore, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council decided, temporarily, to support the UN mission (MONUC) already in the country. The EUFOR DRC was conducted within the framework of the ESDP and was assigned to support MONUC to stabilize the situation during the election process, protect civilians and protect the airport in Kinshasa. The military deployment with the operational headquarter provided by Germany included an advance.</td>
<td>April-November 2006</td>
<td>Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP – 27 April 2006.</td>
<td>COMPLETED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The European Union (EU) had available a mix of forces to support its peacekeeping activities in various African conflict zones. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the EU deployed a significant element of almost 1,000 soldiers in and around Kinshasa.

The EU also had available 1,200 troops on-call ‘over the horizon’ in neighbouring Gabon from where they were quickly deployable if necessary. The mostly French, German and Spanish, were commanded by German Lieutenant-General Karlheinz Viereck from the headquarters in Potsdam (Germany) and by French Lieutenant-General Christian Damay in Kinshasa.

The third operation is the EUFOR Chad-Central African Republic (15 March 2008-15 March 2009) and established to protect the camps of refugees and displaced persons in the east of Chad and the north of the Central African Republic. The mission had the objective of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel. Soon after the UN Security Council passed a resolution in September 2007 authorizing the deployment of a military force for one year in Eastern Chad and in the North-Eastern part of the Central African Republic, the EU signalled it was ready to take on the responsibility for implementing the military mission. After months of negotiations and discussions among the member states and the EU institutions, the Council of Ministers finally decided on 28 January 2008, to launch a military operation of up to 3,700 troops to support and to protect refugees from Darfur and internally displaced people from the region. As with the Artemis operation this was intended as a prelude to the deployment of the UN’s peacekeepers. The European force is made up of 3,500 people. Run by Irish General Pat Nash (operation commander based in Mont-Valerien) and French General Jean-Philippe Ganascia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The third operation is the EUFOR Chad-Central African Republic (15 March 2008-15 March 2009) and established to protect the camps of refugees and displaced persons in the east of Chad and the north of the Central African Republic. The mission had the objective of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel. Soon after the UN Security Council passed a resolution in September 2007 authorizing the deployment of a military force for one year in Eastern Chad and in the North-Eastern part of the Central African Republic, the EU signalled it was ready to take on the responsibility for implementing the military mission. After months of negotiations and discussions among the member states and the EU institutions, the Council of Ministers finally decided on 28 January 2008, to launch a military operation of up to 3,700 troops to support and to protect refugees from Darfur and internally displaced people from the region. As with the Artemis operation this was intended as a prelude to the deployment of the UN’s peacekeepers. The European force is made up of 3,500 people. Run by Irish General Pat Nash (operation commander based in Mont-Valerien) and French General Jean-Philippe Ganascia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(force commander), it has had to overcome several political, logistical and security difficulties.

EU NAVFOR Somalia

The fourth and final operation of this type to-date is the EUFOR naval operation in Somalia (December 2008-December 2009). Faced with the increase in the cases of piracy affecting merchant or fishing vessels, the European Union decided to put in place what is its first naval operation under the ESDP. Before legal and political difficulties, it has been decided to put in place a small coordination cell, called EU Navco, made up of a few officers within the EU’s headquarters in Brussels, in order to ensure the liaison with all interested parties (ship owners and marine organisations, World Food Programme and NGOs, military coalition CTF 150 run by the Americans). Decided in November, the military operation should officially start in December, and last for one year. It is run by British Rear Admiral Philip Jones, based in the British headquarters in Northwood.

CIVILIAN MISSIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Overview</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Legal basis</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>EU security sector reform mission EUSEC, DR Congo (June 2005-June 2009) was launched as a further contribution to capacity building in the DRC. This was the EU’s first deployment in the field of security sector</td>
<td>June-September 2003</td>
<td>Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
reform. Only nine-staff strong, with a budget of 1.6 million euros, the EUSEC DR Congo is intended to promote security sector reform in the Congolese army. The mission provides advice and assistance with the aim of contributing to a successful integration of the Congolese army. In the framework of the mission, experts are assigned to key posts within the Congolese administration such as the Private Office of the Minister of Defence, the General Military Staff and the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-assignment. One key project addresses the chain of payments as in the past, the pay of ‘ghost soldiers’ had been embezzled. The implication is that by being able to impose a proper chain-of-payment programme, EUSEC will be able to ensure that Congolese soldiers actually receive their wages. This has involved the biometric census of troops (to create ID cards that are impossible to forge and checks of ranks) and the organisation of a rapid reaction force.

EUPOL Kinshasa

EUPOL Kinshasa was launched in April 2005 and entailed supporting police reform in the DRC through the training of a specialised integrated police unit (IPU). The IPU was created in order to secure the transitional institutions and assure the protection of the leaders of the former warring parties in Kinshasa. The IPU included 1,008 staff, who were selected by the warring parties. As distrust prevailed among these, the IPU played a major role in the confidence-building process in Kinshasa and contributed to international assistance and security for the 2006
The 30-strong EU mission was deployed operating with a budget of 4.37 million. And operating in the country at the request of the DRC Government, as a capacity-building operation to contribute to the protection of state institutions and reinforce internal security.

**EUPOL RD CONGO**

_EUPOL, DR Congo_ (July 2007-June 2009) succeeded _EUPOL Kinshasa_, with the aim of developing an organised crime unit and a command centre in the capital to facilitate interaction between the police and the judicial system. _EUPOL, DR Congo_ is staffed by around 40 criminal justice experts from nine member states, as well as Switzerland and Angola, and is currently commanded by a Portuguese national.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Council Joint Action</th>
<th>July 2007-June 2009</th>
<th>Council Joint Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2008/38/CFSP of 20 December 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EU SSR Guinea-Bissau**

EU SSR security sector reform mission, Guinea-Bissau (June 2008-June 2009) aims to assist in the reform of the security sector (police, justice, army), already begun by the government with the support of international organisations.

Made up of about 40 people (21 international specialists and 18-19 locals), it is run by Spanish General Juan Esteban-Verastegui.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Council Joint Action</th>
<th>June 2008-June 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008/112/CFSP of 12 February 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes and references


3 It is, however, noteworthy, how the agenda issues have shifted across time for South Africa a predominant concern in early phases and with a wider set of agenda issues subsequently.

For accounts of the development of the CFSP see:

For a definitive account of the development of the ESDP see:

4 See the ‘secondary source’ section of f.n.35.


7 Johnston, Ibid.


10 Gray, Ibid. p.51.


12 Cornish, Paul & Edwards, Geoffrey, ‘Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginning of a European Strategic Culture’ International Affairs 77, 3, pp.801-820.


15 There have been six Western Balkans ESDP operations to-date: Althea; Concordia; EUPM/BiH; EULEX Kosovo; EUPAT/FYROM; Proxima/FYROM.
This paper will largely confine itself to examination of the ESDP, rather than CFSP, strands of the EU’s foreign and security policy as it provides the best basis from which to assess Strategic Behaviour.

These are key statements about the EU’s intended strategy guiding its relationship with third parties.

For a full exploration of the concept see:


The idea is much refined and presented by Manners as Informational diffusion which is ‘the result of strategic communications’ p.244.


On the same date as approving the Common Position the Council also adopted conclusions on this subject, stressing that it was committed to assisting the African continent in developing a comprehensive conflict prevention policy with a view to long-term conflict prevention (Bull. 1/2-2004, point 1.6.185.)

On 13 December 2004, it approved guidelines on implementation of support to peace and security in Africa under the European security and defence policy. The guidelines deal with the legal instruments required, budgetary and management aspects, and logistical and operational support. (Bull. 12-2004.)


The four objectives are:

(a) peace and security, (b) governance and human rights, (c) trade and regional integration and (d) key development issues.
31 Africa-EU partnership on peace and security


32 Council Conclusions on Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts 2760th General Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 13 November 2006

33 For a full discussion of the funding arrangement and its support for APSA see:

34 See ‘Secondary Source material’ f.n.35.

35 Primary source material

CFSP Joint Actions for each mission – for references see Appendix A.

Secondary source material


38 Gray, Ibid, p.56.