Crossing pillars, crossing disciplines?

Comparing institutional logics and evolutions within the EU*

This paper confronts established integration scholarship with evidence from CFSP, the EU’s attempt to work together in foreign and security policy. Why does integration theory refrain from analyzing the evolution in this sector? While CFSP experiences a growing popularity amongst researchers from IR and security studies, it seems to be neglected from classical integration theory. Two reasons for this are more closely scrutinized: Either these theoretical attempts are unable or unwilling to cope with CFSP, or CFSP is not integration and thus does not fall into their realm. Whereas I find evidence for ‘intergovernmental integration’ in CFSP, the problem seems to lie within integration theories. The classical dichotomies between supranational/intergovernmental approaches and between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics can be advanced for this lacunae, as well as the overall diminishing interest of current theoretical approaches to deal with the EU integration process (instead of dealing with policy outcomes). Yet a closer empirical investigation of recent practices in the integration process substantiates the importance of the second pillar for the overall course of integration. CFSP comes close to an affirmation of a ‘second model’ of European integration, next to the Community Model of the economic sector. The establishment of a ‘second executive’ (next to the European Commission) in the Council Secretariat should be reason enough to reopen the discussion on the ‘nature of the beast’. Finally, some propositions for avenues of further research in this direction are advanced.

EUSA Eleventh Biennial International Conference

Los Angeles, California – April 23-25, 2009

Section ‘Integration Theory’
Panel 5D (Friday 8.30-10.15)

“Capturing Diversifying Integration: Beyond the Intergovernmentalism-Supranationalism Dichotomy”

Contact:

Dr. Stefan Seidendorf
University of Mannheim, Faculty of Social Sciences
Chair of Political Science and Contemporary History
D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

Phone: +49-6 21 – 1 81 20 86
seidendorf@uni-mannheim.de

* First draft, please handle with care
Introduction

“Less than Supranational, More than Intergovernmental” (Wessels 1982:15) was, more then a quarter of a century ago, the somewhat resigned conclusion that tried to grasp the ‘nature’ of European Political Cooperation (EPC), the cooperation in foreign policy matters established by member states of the European Community in the 1970s. Fifteen years after this attempt to qualify EPC, we find the same quote as title of a price-winning essay (Øhrgaard 1997). Whereas the author proposes good arguments towards overcoming the theoretical dichotomy that accounts in such unsatisfactory manner for EPC, we can, again with ten years hindsight, retain that his promising attempts were not followed by academic community. Instead, we still lack either an – improbable – ‘general theory of EU foreign policy’ (skeptical: Hill 1988:212) or, more promisingly, a convincing integration of EU foreign policy into our overall assessment of the process of European integration (Weiler/Wessels 1988:229).

The reason for these lacunae may be found not only in the ‘strange’ nature of EU foreign policy, but also in the evolution of integration theory in a more general sense. In fighting ‘phoney wars’ (Peterson 2001:290), recent contributions have an inherent tendency to turn into scholastic debates, at the expense of empirical evolutions that may not fit with their (theoretically established) dogmas and thus are neglected.

This paper wants to contribute to the panel’s attempt to look “beyond the intergovernmentalism – supranationalism dichotomy” in advancing the case of Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the successor of EPC. Whereas the critical assessment made by two leading scholars in the field twenty years ago¹ can certainly be modified, we nevertheless must ask why the by now flourishing scholarship concerned with

¹ Joseph Weiler / Wolfgang Wessels (1988:230) pointed out that the study of EPC contained “too many case studies, ad hoc ‘lessons’ from limited experiences and organizational description [and] too little theoretical mediation”, while deploring an “academic community unable either to relate EPC into any meaningful system theory, integration theory, or international relations theory let alone create a new EPC general theory” (ibid.:229).
European foreign policy still refrains from asking the crucial question of how CFSP relates to
the overall process of European integration. This question can also be turned round, asking
why it is that established integration scholarship refrains from analyzing what must by now be
categorized as one of the most dynamic fields of the integration process in the last 15 years.

In what follows, this argument and the ensuing questions are established in four sections. The
first (1.) asks why established theoretical dichotomies have difficulties with CFSP, and why
this may lead to a lack of theoretically informed, empirical analyses. A second part (2.) briefly
discusses recent evolutions in CFSP and possibilities to link them to definitions of integration
as established in leading integration theories. After approaching our question from theoretical
and empirical angles, a third section (3.) can turn to the overarching question of CFSP’s
importance for the European integration process, before a last section (4.) draws some lessons
for a future research agenda that aims at reconciling integration theory and the evolution in
the EU’s ‘second pillar’ (cooperation in foreign and security affairs).

1) Dichotomies of integration theory and ‘phony wars’

The argument that this section is going to establish is twofold. It argues (a) that the
establishment of two competing theoretical schools trying to explain integration in the
economic sector (the ‘first pillar’) forced both sides to sharpen their arguments. This process,
to be welcomed per se, had yet another effect. It resulted in a dichotomization that made it
increasingly difficult to analyze new or unexpected evolutions, or simply events lying outside
the precisely defined realm of the respective theories. More recently, as the second part of the
section argues (b), the particularities of EU studies have led to further escalation of theoretical
battles, that however were not always of the same ‘substance’ as the debate treated under (a),
nor allowed for ‘new’ empirical insights into the complex integration process (Peterson
2001:313). The advanced ‘particularities’ of EU studies are due, amongst other factors, to an
‘unclear’ disciplinary attribution residing in the uncertain ‘nature of the beast’ that is the EU and to differing, not always compatible research traditions (due to different national and social backgrounds of researchers). They may also be the “result of careerism and the imperative to establish ‘exclusive protected zones of knowledge’ (Cox 1999:3)”, what in turn leads to “largely complementary perspectives masquerading as incompatible rivals” (Peterson 2001:290). Inherent to the evolutions treated under (a) and (b) is the effect, as we will see, that an ‘outlier’ as CFSP cannot aspire to be treated ‘on equal footing’ – yet this comes at the price of neglecting a potentially crucial empirical evolution within the integration process.

(a) Two competing theories and the process of European integration

As often in political and social sciences, a ‘new’ empirical phenomenon (in this case ‘supranational’ cooperation in Western Europe’s coal and steel sector in the 1950s) was accompanied by a theoretical attempt to explain this phenomenon and, at the same time, to legitimate it. In the European case, the theory that explained ‘integration’ of the coal and steel sector was Ernst Haas ‘neo-functionalism’ (1957, 1968, 2004). In a first period (up to the 1960s) it seemed able to ‘explain’ what was going on in Western Europe, and even to ‘predict’ the future course of this evolution. Yet the ‘counter-evolution’ that took place in the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s, the standstill of the integration process and the pronounced ‘national’ behavior of General de Gaulle’s France, equally found its theorist. Stanley Hoffmann (amongst others) pointed to the continuing relevance of ‘realist’ (in IR-terms) explanations of state behavior in the European case, thus challenging Haas’ theory (Hoffmann 1966, 1995, 2000).

The controversy, of course, did not stop in 1966. Instead, the continuing ‘swings’ of the European integration process between at times a tendency to supranational ‘spillover’ towards a European federation (Haas’ expectation) and (at other times) a tendency towards

2 Should International Relations (IR) or Comparative Politics (CP) deal with EU? This was heatedly debated at the end of the last century, see Hix 1994, Hurrell/Menon 1996.
intergovernmental standstill (Hoffmann’s claim) gave further ammunition to both theories, forcing them at the same time to precise and specify their theoretical expectations.

Of course, as much as about correct theory and academic glory, the dispute between the two camps was about politics. Behind the two paradigms stood fundamentally differing expectations as to the movens and nature of the European integration process. Whereas Haas explicitly expected a transformation of the international, or at least the European, system towards a new (probably federal) political community, Hoffmann saw the process merely as controlled by and through nation states. ‘Rescued’ (Milward 1992) through the benefits of liberalization of trade that had occurred amongst them after the establishment of the EC, they continued to behave as they always had done – maximizing power and influence, while being suspicious of the power and influence of ‘the other’. This political situation and the theoretical works of the two brilliant scholars that were Haas and Hoffmann thus established explanatory paradigms that resembled Weber’s ‘ideal types’ in their reliance on clear-cut dichotomies. The way they dominate the study of European integration for now more than forty years proves their ongoing relevance.

The first dichotomy established by the two theoretical paradigms was an institutional one, distinguishing between ‘supranational’ and ‘intergovernmental’ organizations and between the respective role and influence that each theory attached to this quality. For Haas, ‘supranationalism’ was the decisive difference between older international organizations and the new attempt at European integration. If it existed, its effect on the European system rendered a process of integration possible, and even probable. For Hoffmann (and ensuing intergovernmentalists) ‘supranationalism’ as understood by Haas did not exist. At the very most, sovereign nation-states would decide to pool or delegate parts of their sovereignty temporarily to agents that they – the principals – continued to control. This decision was in principal reversible. Transformation of the system was not to be expected.
Yet with the European Economic Community’s progress in the 1980s, with the European Commission and the Court of Justice alive and at work, intergovernmentalists had some tough nuts to crack. The way out of the dilemma was to distinguish between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics. “In areas of low politics, integration is deemed possible through technical harmonization, while in areas of high politics, considerations of national or state sovereignty prevent cooperation from developing into integration.” (Øhrgaard 1997:2, the author establishes the presented ‘dichotomies’ and provides further references).

As a consequence of this ‘double dichotomy’, empirically existent attempts at cooperation in foreign policy were practically absent from theoretically informed, analytical studies of the time. For neofunctionalists, the absence of a true supranational actor was the primordial reason not to expect integration in this sector. For them, integration, understood as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas 2004[1957]:16), crucially depends on the existence of a new ‘central actor’ of ‘supranational’ quality. This implies the power to sanction the members of the new political community if they defect or fail to respect their obligations. The absence, up to nowadays in CFSP, of a central actor or formal sanctioning mechanisms in the field of foreign policy cooperation makes this sector an improbable case to search for ‘integration’ and we find accordingly little, if any, studies that analyze ‘intergovernmental integration’ (Øhrgaard 1997, 2004 is an exception).

For intergovernmentalists, the theoretical differentiation between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics, together with the apparent continuity of an ‘intergovernmental’ institutional model in EPC as in CFSP, just confirmed the theory and thus did not pose any particular problem. Hoffmann’s focusing not on institutional particularities, but on the characteristic nature of specific policy fields provided another perspective on the prospects for integration, yet came to the same
result as Haas’ neo-functionalism: foreign policy was an impossible candidate for integration. In short, and in the words of Jacob Øhrgaard: “The supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy ruled out integration in the absence of supranationality. The high politics-low politics distinction ruled it out in areas of high politics. In other words, integration could only proceed on issues of low politics within a supranational setting.” (Øhrgaard 1997:8). The consequences in terms of theoretically informed studies of European foreign policy cooperation were only logical. Neither neo-functionalism, nor intergovernmentalism found it worth while to invest into a phenomenon apparently so unpromising as the European attempts to cooperate in foreign and security policy.

The story, however, does not end here. With EU ‘constitutionalization’ during the 1990s, scholars witnessed the advent of “new, innovative and (sometimes, at least) testable theoretical models” (Peterson 2001:289) that reflected the ‘transformation of governance’ (Kohler-Koch 1996) the integration process had witnessed. A closer look will help to understand why this renewed interest in European integration did not encompass the newly established CFSP, that rested a ‘phenomenon apart’, often treated by a ‘community apart’.

(b) ‘Phoney wars’, competing theories and the study of EU integration

Two general tendencies can be perceived when trying to classify the literature concerned with explaining EU phenomena after the ‘constitutional’ turn of Maastricht (1992). One is a tendency to distinguish between approaches located in International Relations (IR) and in Comparative Politics (CP). The other tendency points toward further specialization and theoretical differentiation. Both tendencies, as we will see, do not foster attempts to bring CFSP back into the larger study of integration.

Whereas the affirmation of the ‘political system of the EU’ (Hix 1994, 1998) in its own right during the 1990s and the growing interpenetration between domestic and European levels of governance (Hooghe/Marks 1997, Marks e.a. 1996) explain comparativists’ intensified
interest in the European Union, this interest came at a price. One of its basic premises is that the underlying cleavage of politics, in the European case as in any other political system, is subsumed by the political ‘left-right’ dimension (Hix 1998). In the European case, this claim may only be maintained if other important cleavages are neglected. However, these other cleavages are always present (pro-/anti-integration, federal vs. unionist, regional vs. national vs. supranational) and shape the system, but also the policies it produces (Peterson 2001:292). If the proponents of this tenet are probably right in their claim that the ‘left-right-dimension’ grows in importance, neglecting the other cleavages comes close to giving up the initial aim of integration studies, analyzing the integration-process over time and asking if it leads to ‘transformation’ or not. Of course, this shift of focus behind CP analyses of EU politics makes them less eager to deal with the process of institutionalization (understood as ‘institution building’ in a broad sense, as happened in the ‘second pillar’ during the 1990s). CP rather assumes the existence of a settled institutional system, prone to only minor changes.

But integration theory is not dead for that. In the form of Andrew Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI, 1993, 1998), the 1990s witnessed also another major attempt (after Haas’ and Hoffmann’s) to explain the process of European integration from an IR perspective. Moravcsik’s study can be acclaimed for this perspective, as well as for its empirical richness and its encompassing theoretical foundation. While at first glance a challenger to Haas’ theory and firmly settled on the ‘intergovernmental’ side of the established dichotomy of integration theories, one could also ask if LI and NF do not have more in common than one may expect (Peterson 2001:297-98; Haas himself 2004:*xvii, FN 5 sees more similarities then differences, equally Moravcsik 1999:175 asks for ‘dismembering’, not ‘refuting’ NF). Amongst the common sources is certainly the ‘liberal’ part of both theories, concerned with opening up the ‘black box’ of national interest. At the same time,

---

1 Moravcsik’s (1998) reliance on ‘new’ and ‘better’ sources, giving ‘harder’ evidence, was heavily criticized by historians (Lieshout e.a. 2004), yet it amounts still to more than what ‘usually’ can be found in political science.
this begs a focus on economic integration in the first place, while neglecting other policy sectors. Whereas NF foresaw political spillover as a decisive step to reach a new political community (what should have made the analysis of CFSP a potentially interesting field), Moravcsik’s intergovernmental paradigm ultimately does not expect ‘transformation’. Accordingly, he has denied the ‘relevance’ of LI for explaining CFSP (1993:494), what in turn constituted a good argument not to look at all at CFSP.

Yet if not for itself, Moravcsik’s oeuvre is worthwhile reading for all the critics it engendered. Interestingly, those critics do not present ‘better’ theories for explaining EU integration. But as Moravcsik’s account is by far the most explicit and precise (with the exception of neo-functionalism, probably) of ‘history-making’ decisions, it offers at the same time the broadest surface for attacks from different theoretical perspectives.

Especially Moravcsik’s nearly exclusive focus on member-state governments bargaining at the international level offers itself for critique – by this, his theory is obliged to neglect all those actors, forces, institutions and policies that take place ‘between’ international and national, at the EU-opean level and that arguably may have an impact even on treaty change or –evolution. Yet what do the critics have to offer?

Explaining mainly the outcome of policy-making at the European level (the ‘systemic’ level in the terminology of Peterson 2001), the ‘new institutionalisms’ provide several promising avenues for research. Themselves of different origin (CP and IR), they can overcome a scholastic focus on ‘disciplinary’ questions. Whereas rational choice institutionalism (RI) is settled in CP, sociological institutionalism (SI) has developed an impressive oeuvre on the role of international institutions (Checkel 2001, 2007 amongst others) and thus can be attributed to IR. Historical institutionalism (HI, Pierson 2000, 2004, Thelen/Steinmo 1992),
the third contender, can be seen as ‘overarching’ the two others, integrating both logics and taking a processual view on the evolution of institutional orders.

This seems to turn the ‘new institutionalisms’ into excellent candidates for studying CFSP, and we find interesting and sometimes impressive studies of all three obediences. They deal with the institutionalization of CFSP (HI), its policy-making (RI) or its alleged influences on actors (SI). However, I have two problems with these approaches. Both were already formulated in the literature, I can confine myself to reproduce these caveats. John Peterson (2001:303) claims that “we […] lack a fully developed institutionalist theory of systemic [=EU] decision-making. What institutionalism really offers is a set of assumptions upon which theory may be built, as well as a ‘method for deriving analytical insights’ (Armstrong & Bulmer 1998:61)”. In contrast to Moravcsik, institutionalism does not provide a full-blown theory that could be applied to the EU as such. It provides useful concepts that may form parts of a theory. In itself not that much of a problem, this claim is problematic when dealing with the EU integration process over time and the question of ‘transformation’ or not.

The second problem with institutionalist theories, formulated with regards to their studying of the EU by one of the leading scholars of institutionalism, is: They are “mid-level theories, concerned largely with the effects of institutions as intervening variables in EU politics. As such, neither theory constitutes in and of itself an adequate theory of European integration, the ultimate causes of which typically remain exogenous to the theory” (Pollack 2004:154).

Pollack himself (2003) has provided an excellent account in RI-perspective that aims at explaining integration via delegation to and agency of supranational institutions. Yet, the above critique of neo-functionalism applies again, this begets an exclusive focus on the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – and neglects events in the

---

4 This view is contested in HI itself – see the debate opposing Hay/Wincott (1998) and Hall/Taylor (1996, 1998).
5 The institutionalization of CFSP is for example treated in HI, see M. Smith 1998, 2004. For a rational choice institutionalist view, see Wagner 2003, Koenig-Archipugi 2004a+b. For an attempt to apply sociological institutionalism to processes of socialization and norm-building, see Juncos/Pomorska 2006.
second pillar, where something similar to integration happens in the absence of prominent roles of the Commission and the ECJ.

This section then has established two claims. For one, the dichotomies established in the initial theoretical debate around neo-functionalism and (realist) intergovernmentalism did not favor the study of European foreign policy cooperation. Either theoretical pre-conditions did not apply (‘supranationalism’ in NF) or they seemed too obviously fulfilled (‘high politics’ in IG) as that a study of EPC or CFSP would have deemed auspicious. Second, the theoretical diversification and empirical boost of studies dealing with EU politics engendered by the constitutionalization of the EU since the 1990s mainly focused on Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union and the policies that developed at the ‘systemic’ level of the community sector. These theories were either not interested in explaining the integration process over time, or they refrained from taking into account evolutions outside the community model. Other studies, that have more or less extensively dealt with CFSP, however did not link this sector to the more general process of European integration.

All this would of course not be of a problem if CFSP was (a) marginal and insignificant in its results or (b) if it was negligible for the overall integration process. The next section therefore has to establish (a) the dynamics of the second pillar and (b) open avenues to analyze the institutionalization of CFSP as part of the process of integration.

(2) The dynamics of CFSP: amounting to integration?

The argument of this second section, concerned with the empirical evolution of foreign policy cooperation and the institutionalization of CFSP, again splits into two. A first part (a) is concerned with establishing the relevance and dynamics of this sector, compared to evolution in the first pillar. A second part (b) aims at linking this evolution to the integration process.

(a) The dynamics of the second pillar
Beginning with the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and up to the current attempts to ratify a ‘Reform Treaty’, the European integration process is characterized by two seemingly contradictory dynamics: Whereas during recent treaty reforms, the policies that made up the ‘third pillar’ of the European Union (EU) (‘Justice and Home affairs’) were continuously integrated into the decision-making framework of the ‘first pillar’, thus further confirming the ‘community model’, the ‘second pillar’ saw an evolution apart. To date, it was not only impossible to integrate this sector into the community framework, but moreover, it has developed its own institutional and political dynamics. They led first to the establishment of a ‘European Security and Defense Identity’ (ESDI 1997), turned later into a ‘European Security and Defense Policy’ (ESDP 1999/2000), and, if the Lisbon treaty is ratified, are establishing a ‘Common Security and Defense Policy’ (CSDP).

Behind these acronyms stands a unique institutional framework that in nearly all aspects is different from actors’ role, the procedures and institutional arrangements that govern the first pillar. Moreover, the dynamics and mechanisms that guided its establishment are different from ‘treaty reform’ in the first pillar: while parts of the institutional setup were developed through treaty revisions, others are the result of decisions on the level of heads of state and government (with no legal binding force), and finally there are elements that developed incrementally, due to functional needs (yet in absence of supranational agency) or through a logic of appropriateness along an established path.

Thus between 2000 and 2007, we can witness the confirmation of a ‘second model’ of West-European institutionalized co-operation that however always existed, be it as an idea (Parsons 2006[2003]: 38, 43, 92, passim calls it a ‘confederal’ model). ESDP was institutionalized in the General Secretariat of the EU’s Council of Ministers (the ‘Council Secretariat’, CS). Around the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in the CS (a body regrouping national representatives, personnel from the CS and the Commission and ‘steering’ CFSP), a range of
bodies have developed with executive and administrative tasks. They show a general tendency towards an affirmation of the European (not intergovernmental) character of the CS – without becoming, and often to the detriment of, a supranational administration (Juncos/Reynolds 2007). Instead, several authors speak of the differentiation of executives (Christiansen/Vanhoonacker 2008), with a ‘second’ actor, next to the European Commission, established in the CS. The ‘Policy and Early Warning Unit’ (Policy Unit), initially set up to brief directly the ‘High Representative for CFSP’ (and Secretary General of the Council), Javier Solana, is currently merged into Directorate General E of the CS, that deals with foreign policy (Christiansen/Vanhoonacker 2008:760; Dijkstra 2008:159). This further strengthens the CS (now with over 200 A-grade officials, Dijkstra 2008:159). A similar evolution can be found in the military and civilian dimension of crisis management. The military branch encompasses the EU Military Staff (EUMS, >200 nationally seconded personnel, Dijkstra 2008:161), based in the CS and providing military expertise to EU bodies, as well as the EU Military Committee (EUMC). During 2007, a further structure was created for civilian crisis management, with the establishment of a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and a Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). While still in the early phase of establishing working practices, rules and norms, one observer remarks that “the EUMS and the CPCC can more and more be characterized as expert bureaucracies, which have gained their autonomy through expertise” (Dijkstra 2008:164), thus challenging the notion of a purely intergovernmental co-operation in CFSP that would consist of ‘agents’ fully controlled by their ‘principals’.

Instead, the close and permanent interaction of EU-opean civil servants, seconded national civil servants (working permanently in the European institutions during 3-5 years) and national civil servants (meeting in Brussels) has led to rules, practices and norms that are not the same as in the supranational community model, yet cannot be understood in terms of traditional diplomatic interaction either (Nuttall 1992 and 2000 gives excellent overviews on
the development and confirmation of these features). Especially the strategic and planning tasks and the autonomous and permanent crisis management capabilities have let to the establishment of a permanent bureaucracy that is not national, nor supranational – and that makes up for the particularity of the field of foreign policy cooperation. While the dynamics of the second pillar seem beyond doubt, this does not turn it automatically into a case for integration theories. They should only feel concerned if the ‘second pillar’ is neither a traditional model of diplomatic interaction amongst states, nor a mere extension or appendix of the *eigentlich* relevant community model, but develops a sort of integration on its own. Investigating this point is the task of the next sub-section.

(b) Institutionalization of CFSP: amounting to integration?

Haas’ initial definition of integration as *process* (s. supra) that leads to the establishment of a new center with jurisdiction over the members of the polity has two main problems for our purpose. One is analytical, the other definitional. Analytically, it raises the question how to study a *temporal process* in an other way than *conditional* (= establishing at different moments in time if certain conditions are fulfilled). Haas himself originally proceeded in this way in order to assess if the *integration process* had an influence. To be analyzed, “a set of specific indicators” has to be provided and “Integration being a process over time, certain identical questions can be raised for purposes of analysis at regular intervals.” (Haas 2004[1957]:15) – while this is most certainly a successful proceeding to find out about the effect of the integration process, it does not yet explain what social mechanisms are driving this process. A second problem is that Haas’ framework crucially depended on the existence of a new center whose “institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas 2004[1957]:16). If this is understood in a strict sense, the only ‘truly supranational’ actors are the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, yet both are rather marginal in EPC and CFSP and it seems hard to see how they could play the
role theory provides for them in the foreign policy sector. Along with these two more fundamental problems, the ‘liberal’ dimension of the theory, according an important place to societal actors, poses problem – in contrast to the economic sector, the business and labor elites, interest group representations etc. that ally with the supranational actor once they have understood the benefit they can win from the newly created opportunity structures seem difficult to identify in foreign policy.

Concerning the first of the two problems, social mechanisms, neo-functionalism basically identified three interlinked mechanisms that together explain the dynamics of the integration process. The most important and probably best documented is ‘spillover’, whereby cooperation in one sector “would spill over into new functional contexts, involve more and more people, call for more and more inter-bureaucratic contact and consultation, thereby creating their own logic in favor of later decisions” (Haas 2004[1957]:369). Yet for Haas and other neo-functionalists, ‘spillover’ was not automatic, it depended decisively on changed patterns of behavior and perceptions by actors (Schmitter 2004:55, Haas 2004[1968, 1957]:XXX, 13-15), including changed values and redefined interests of actors. This, according to Haas, should happen “due to the necessity of working in a transnational institutional framework”, what ultimately would lead to the development of “multiple loyalties” of actors (ibid., 14). In current terminology, one could call this a process of socialization that does not depend on a supranational actor, but can take place within a ‘transnational’ framework. It simply occurs by the fact that actors participate in a common framework and do not choose to retire or ‘exit’ this framework. This process has been called engagement by Haas (2004:522) and could explicitly apply to “international conferences”.

The particularity of the European case consists in its longue durée and the gradual development of a community jurisdiction with its own community law. This feature of course does not apply to the second pillar, where no community law is produced and the legislative acts that are concluded fall under international law or ‘soft law’ (Dehousse/Weiler 1991:161).
However, an actor can hardly put into question ‘soft law’ concluded under CFSP and convincingly maintain that he is a trustful partner within ‘community law’. Instead, another process will take place. The existing community law will influence the actors and their behavior in the second pillar. The “impossibility of maintaining prolonged separability of different issue areas in a complex, interdependent policy matrix” was termed *engrenage* by Ph. Schmitter (2004 [1969]:53).

Thus even in the absence of direct jurisdiction, the existence of the supranational community framework, the processes of *engrenage* and *engagement* seem to amount to spillover and can accordingly lead to a sort of “intergovernmental integration” (Øhrgaard 1997:13). Does this argument qualify as ‘concept stretching’, leading to a uselessness of the initial explaining elements? I don’t think so, Haas himself expected that a

“structure could emerge, however, in which a compulsory and binding judicial system is combined with a majoritarian legislative device, supervising the work of a central administration of restricted powers but with direct jurisdiction over groups and individuals, while many major decisions are still made at the level of intergovernmental negotiations. If in such a system governments negotiate and compromise so that one or several severely modify their position in the effort to arrive at a binding common agreement of profound consequence, the resulting habitual pattern of reaching consensus could well fit into the definition of political community, though representing neither the typical unitary nor federal categories of constitutions.” (Haas 2004[1957]:8).

The ‘proof’ of the influence of this structure would be, according to Haas, a transformation of behavior by member states. This could be assessed via their conflict resolution. In leaving behind the ‘traditional’ diplomatic ‘least common denominator’ bargaining and instead developing alternative techniques, notably the ‘upgrading of common interests’ and the ‘splitting of differences’, actors would, even under ‘unanimity’ conditions, marry the exigencies of ‘engagement’ with the demands of their national principals (Haas 1961:367-9).

To the understanding of practitioners and academics, EPC and CFSP are characterized by the ‘consensus principle’ and by the ‘co-ordination reflex’ (with further references and ample evidence: Øhrgaard 1997:21, compare also Nuttall 1992 and 2000). These particularities seem
to have survived enlargement (Juncos/Pomorska 2008). Taken together, Øhrgaard’s (1997:26, 2004:36) claim that the process that led to gradual institutionalization of foreign policy cooperation in Europe amounts to ‘intergovernmental integration’ is absolutely convincing.

What are the consequences of this claim, and why are they worthwhile being repeated and related in another paper? The aim of this section was to establish (a) the dynamics of the second pillar and to ask (b) if these dynamics amount to ‘intergovernmental integration’. Both claims can be affirmed, yet this was not an aim in itself. The argument that ensues from the first section – the inability of integration theory to cope with EPC/CFSP – taken together with this section’s claim – integration outside the economic sector – lead to the ultimately crucial question of this paper, what are the consequences of these findings for the integration process, are they of importance?

(3) Intergovernmental integration: important for the integration process?

Why should the two separated findings mentioned under (1) and (2) ultimately be of relevance for students of European integration? Whereas the evolution of theorizing about European integration apparently went towards more specialization, one could claim that this led to more ‘precise’ and ‘better’ theories or theoretical elements explaining their respective ‘midrange-phenomenon’. After all, we have, next to Øhrgaard’s essay, several theoretically informed accounts of CFSP that allow to make sense of the evolutions that took place in the second pillar. However, two questions come to mind. (a) Would these explanations hold out in the absence of the integration that had occurred in the first pillar? And, (b) if not, can ‘integration theory’ afford to neglect the evolutions that have taken place in the second pillar?

(a) Explaining CFSP in the absence of supranational integration?

We have already seen the, even indirect, importance of an existing supranational actor for the evolution of EPC in Øhrgaard’s model. Another account that deals with the institutionalization of CFSP finds similar factors behind this process. M. Smith (1998, 2004)
advances ‘transgovernmentalism’ (that is the intensive and permanent exchange between national actors on different European levels), ‘codification’ (of originally informal rules, after enough ‘trust’ has developed between the members) and finally ‘institutional dynamics’, the ‘turf wars’ between the European Commission and the CS around competencies and responsibilities in the realm of foreign and security policy, as responsible factors behind the dynamic process going on in the second pillar. Yet while the existence of a supranational model of integration in the first pillar seemed primordial for the evolution of that particular CFSP, we must also acknowledge that the result in the second pillar is original and different from the setup of the first pillar. This exactly is the reason why integration theory cannot afford to neglect the second pillar as either ‘marginal’ or ‘gradually behind but on the way’ (to supranationality). Possible explanations can be found in the study of international institutions and their socializing power (Egeberg 1999, Johnston 2001, Trondal 2007).

What about RI-attempts, then, that account for CFSP? If they can account for the absence of supranationality due to the nature of CFSP as ‘fast coordination game’ (Wagner 2003), they seem at pains when it comes to explaining the particular relationship between first and second pillar that has shaped a good part of CFSP setup (and what, of course, is not in RI’s analytical focus in the first place). Others (Koenig-Archibugi 2004a+b) insist, while fostering an explicitly rational approach, on the importance of cultural and identitarian factors in the shaping of CFSP, yet provide no analytical ground to integrate the (potential) European experience of the first pillar that led to a sort of ‘EU-culture’. Integrating this dimension seems however important in order to understand the ‘nature’ of CFSP and in turn its influence on the integration process as a whole.

(b) The challenge of CFSP for integration

This said, the evolution of CFSP poses a challenge to integration theory that it had not foreseen originally. In Haas’ words (see supra), a ‘hybrid’ form of political community that
brings together more and less integrated parts is possible. Yet what are the consequences of the actual realization of this vision for the integration process?

Several authors (Christiansen/Vanhoonacker 2008; Juncos/Pomorska 2008) point to the fact that by now, we can speak of a ‘second’ European executive established in the CS, next to the European Commission. This of course challenges the existing institutional set-up of the first pillar and one could even go a step further: Not only can we acknowledge ‘integration’ in the second pillar, but what we see comes close to the establishment of a full-blown alternative model of European integration. This has considerable consequences, as the ‘second model’ has not developed out of the blue, but it also bears its own legacy. It was influenced by NATO and WEU-cooperation, yet is also the expression of the particular ideas of actors. Especially older French conceptions (Fouchet-plans, de Gaulle’s plans for a ‘political commission’ and a ‘permanent secretariat’, Parsons 2006[2003]: 129-133; Mitterrand’s plans for an independent Secretary General for CFSP, Dijkstra 2008:154) seemed to serve as general roadmap and ideational compass for the evolution of institutions.

If we accept this affirmation of a ‘second model’ of European integration with its own legacy, practices, norms and rules (Petrov/Dijkstra 2007, Duke/Vanhoonacker 2006) than this has considerable consequences for the integration process and these consequences are also of paramount importance for integration theory. One consequence, raised by M. Smith (1998:333) would be that “the decisive battle between supranational and intergovernmental visions of European political integration may just be beginning”. We can also go back to Stanley Hoffmann’s initial reasoning. One of the reasons, he argued, why integration in high politics would not appear was that this would require a political choice about “the ultimate political direction of the community” (Hoffmann 1966:877). Yet the available integration theories in their current state give only little prospect for analytical or only ‘reasoned’ guidance in this situation. In addition to the dramatically under-theorized factors of growing
‘ politicization’, enhanced Euro-skepticism, and enlargement (with ‘not yet’ socialized actors), it seems as if the integration process lacks an adequate theorizing at a most decisive moment. The last section briefly sketches out some avenues for integration theory to come back in.

(4) Bringing integration theory back in?

What can be lessons from this essay? If we accept its general plea that integration theory matters and that it matters now, in the light of recent fundamental and dramatic evolutions, several avenues for ‘widening and deepening’ integration theory may be pursued.

(a) Deepening integration theory

If we accept the general analytical perspective that aims at explaining the process, not the outcome of certain policies, two points can be made. It seems clear from the overview of the different strands of theorizing that to understand the process, both the ‘super-systemic’ level of ‘history-making decisions’ (Peterson 2001) and polity-building and the ‘systemic’ level of ‘policy-making’ must be brought together. On the super-systemic level, it seems of crucial importance not only to account for the bargaining process (with Moravcsik’s LI?), but also to integrate the role of ideas and their influence on actors (Parsons 2002, 2003 on this). Furthermore, the different social mechanisms that were identified as accounting for integration in diverse and different settings must be identified, theorized and brought together. In this respect, Moravcsik’s claim to ‘dismember’ neo-functionalism in order to test selective hypotheses seems to go in the right direction (Moravcsik 1999:175). On the systemic level, institutionalism’s evolution should lead from a reasoned set of (general) assumptions into a more complete theory. Of course the building of a ‘general’ theory seems utopia, yet a focus on the particular European case a rewarding, if demanding exercise. Only this evolution would allow for reasoned claims on the future evolution of the European process.

---

(b) Widening integration theory

Yet next to ‘deepening’ integration theory, recent evolutions seem to advise a ‘widening’ in order to integrate new factors. One possibility could be a turn to the study of practices, a way of overcoming theoretical constraints and starting from empirical observations (Rytövuori-Apunen 2005, Bauer/Brighi 2008). Ernst Haas himself, in his late writings, made a plea for a ‘pragmatist constructivism’ (Haas/Haas 2008, Haas 2001). This perspective was always present in neo-functionalism, with its focus on actors’ perceptions of interests and the overall focus on shifting values and loyalties (Haas 2004[1957]:3, 5, FN 1, 11).

Yet after nearly sixty years (two generations) of European integration, another perspective can be added. In fact, one could argue that one of the major weaknesses of LI is its strict separation between ‘national’ and ‘international’ (European) level. This perspective cannot integrate the social transformation that has taken place in Europe since the end of the war and that was predicted by neo-functionalism (with respect to ‘identity-discourses’ see Seidendorf 2007). Even if Haas’ theory initially was limited to analyzing the elite level and the effects of mainly functional spillover, political spillover was foreseen, as well as a growing politicization of the European process (Haas 2004[1957]:12). Yet this part of the story was not explicitly theorized in NF. It may well be that this is the task lying ahead of us.

This than would come close to a ‘sociology of European relations’. We can already witness beginnings of such an analytical enterprise, especially in France and Italy – at the same time characterized by growing popular Euro-skepticism and traditionally founding members of the integration enterprise (della Porta 2007, Seidendorf 2009, Delanty/Rumford 2005, Cohen/Vauchez 2008). Currently, these studies aim to open up and differentiate the ‘pro-/anti-integration’-cleavage, and some claim (politicians and academics alike) that ‘another Europe is possible’ (Manners 2007). While one may doubt this, it is a sign for the politicization of the integration process itself.
This turn in the history of European integration, together with the duration of the process, and the still under-theorized role of ideas in the integration process finally lead to a third point. If the argument of this article is accepted that by now we witness the maturing of two distinct, yet intimately linked models of European integration and that the ideas underlying these two models were always present since the beginning of the process, the time could be ripe for a ‘history of European integration ideas’. This endeavor could identify the different elements, trace the legacies, the antecedents and the evolution towards entanglement of the two models. It could also analyze the respective understandings of such key terms as legitimacy, accountability, sovereignty, planification, subsidiarity…to name but a few. It thus would help to better understand the evolution of the process, but also the future challenges of European integration (Haas 2004[1957]:19-29, “‘Europeanism’ as a doctrine” treated this point).

Conclusion

If we accept that integration took place in the intergovernmental sector of CFSP, the question must be asked why we do not have an integration theory that deals with this. While we have interesting and at times impressive attempts to come to terms with CFSP, we lack an analysis that would allow to link the evolution in the second pillar to the overall integration process. This paper argued that existing integration theories with their focus on supranational/intergovernmental dichotomies and the economic sector miss out an important part of the integration story that took place in the last 10-15 years. Even worse, Institutionalism and approaches in CP refrain from taking into perspective the broader integration process. Yet this would be particularly crucial at a moment where the ‘decisive battle’ over European integration might just begin. At the end, we may well find us confronted with the alternatives of ‘transformation’ or ‘disintegration’. Both seem alternatives fundamental enough for social science theory to be interested in. Ernst Haas would have most certainly agreed.
References


Haas, Ernst B. / Haas, Peter (2008): “Pragmatic Constructivism and the study of international institutions”, in: Bauer/Brighi pp. 103-123.


Hoffmann, Stanley (1966): “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe”, in: Daedalus 95:3, 862-915.


Øhrgaard, Jakob C. (2004): “International relations or European integration: is the CFSP sui generis?”, in: Tonra/Christiansen, pp. 26-44.


Tonra, Ben; Thomas Christiansen (eds. 2004): Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy. – Manchester: Manchester University Press


