

Euroscepticism Revisited - Regional Interest Representation
in Brussels and the Link to Citizen Attitudes
towards European Integration

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Abstract

Recent scholarship has suggested that nation-states will gradually fade away in favor of regions and super-regions as the main actors within a European Union characterized by strong regional identities. At the same time, recent developments have shown that citizen support for European integration is essential for any future development of the Union. The puzzle inspiring this paper is the finding that the greatest support for the EU increasingly stems from minority nationalist, or strong identity regions seeking to bypass their central states to achieve their policy goals at the EU level. This paper empirically tests this suggestion, while shedding light on the relationship between the quality of representation of regional interests at the EU level and positive citizen attitudes towards the EU. In particular, it finds two explanations for cross-regional variation in the relationship between Euroscepticism and representation: (1) a cultural explanation, embodied by differences in the nature and quality of representation between regions that are linguistically distinctive and regions that are not; and (2) an institutional explanation, embodied by differences in the nature and quality of representation between regions from federal and non-federal member states. The paper uses an eclectic methodological approach, first utilizing multivariate regression analysis, estimating logistic and ordinal logit models that help explain variation in Euroscepticism at the regional level. The results are then complemented by the findings of in-depth elite interviews of regional representatives—more specifically the directors of a selection of the many regional information offices present in Brussels. This paper takes the study of Euroscepticism to a new level, as most previous scholarly work has focused on explanations at the individual or at the member state level. At the same time it strengthens the notion of a growing importance of a “Europe of the regions.”

Introduction

Today a number of paradoxes characterize the European Union (EU). First, one can observe the trend of a simultaneous centralization and decentralization, with power shifting vertically from the member states to the EU level, and from the EU level to the regional level. Second, there are contradicting trends of *Euroscepticism* and *Europhoria*, both among and within EU member states. Third, one can observe contradicting trends of state nationalism characterized by Euroscepticism and xenophobia, and minority nationalism characterized by Europhoria and openness (Keating 2001). Fourth, there is a trend of diminishing focus on sovereignty among regions and ethnoterritorial minorities, breaking the traditional linkage between nationalism/regionalism and protectionism (Keating 1996). What these paradoxes have in common is that they involve a new political mobilization of sub-state regions at the EU level. This points towards yet another paradox: the suggestion that the populations in minority nationalist territories are among the most positive toward European integration, in most cases more positive than their majority compatriots. In 2005 and 2008 it became clearer than ever—following the referenda in France and the Netherlands on the ratification of the European Constitution, and the referendum in Ireland on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, leading to the failure thereof—that any further integration of Europe is heavily contingent on public support. Subsequently, these trends underscore the practical value of analyzing the puzzle of EU support among sub-state regions.

Inspired by this puzzle, the purpose of this paper is to seek a basic explanation to the variation in attitudes toward European integration at the sub-state, or regional level, by empirically answering the following questions: Is support for European integration greater in strong identity regions than in other regions within and across the EU member states? Is support

for European integration greater at the regional level in federal member states or in unitary member states? Finally, can variation in support for European integration at the sub-state level be explained by variation in the quality of representation of regional interests in Brussels? I thus seek to establish whether a cultural explanation, embodied by the question of different levels of regional identity, or an institutional explanation, embodied by the question of established sub-national institutions as agents of regional mobilization, or a combination thereof, is more viable in explaining Euroscepticism.

Not surprisingly, given its effect of slowing down the pace of European integration in recent years, the study of public attitudes toward European integration—and in particular the phenomenon referred to as Euroscepticism—has received a lot of scholarly attention. Multiple studies confirm that the level of public support for the EU varies both within and among member states, but most scholarly work has focused on explanations at the individual or at the member state level. This paper thus first and foremost makes a contribution to the scholarly literature on Euroscepticism, as it finds evidence of systematic variation in public attitudes toward European integration at a level that has largely been overlooked in the member state and individual level analyses conducted by scholars so far—the regional level.

Why Regions Matter

The notion of a “Europe of the Regions,” the idea of which dates as far back as the 1920s, resurged first in the 1960s as a way to promote a federal Europe, and then in the early 1990s following the EU structural fund reforms, the creation of the Committee of the Regions, and the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity (Dumhamel 1928, Fouere 1968, Treaty on European

Union 1992, Lynch 2007). An obvious consequence of this growing importance of the regions within the context of the EU is an increased scholarly interest in sub-state regionalism.¹

The surge of theories attempting to explain regionalism as a result of European integration in the early 1990s can undoubtedly not only be attributed to the changing intensity of European integration and the following resurgence of regional mobilization at the time, but also to the failure to explain this mobilization by the two main approaches to theorizing European integration since its infancy—*intergovernmentalist* or *state-centric* and *neo-functional* theories. It is therefore not surprising that one of the main contenders for an emerging alternative theory of European integration in its current form—the *multilevel governance (MLG) approach*—attempts to move away from this dichotomy, while seeing the region as one of its corner stones (Jeffery 1997, 2000; Keating 2005; Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Marks et al. 1996). These theorists conceptualize the EU as a single, multi-level polity, where “subnational and national governments are not simply differentiated layers of decision-making, but institutions of interest aggregation based on different constituencies with potentially conflicting interests and identities,” and it is characterized by the interaction of political actors across these levels (Marks et al. 1996, 169). This has manifested itself as an increasing politicization of all regions in Europe, whether or not they are historic minority nationalist regions, evident through the increasing influence of regions in the policy process of the EU, and through the resulting drastic increase in the number of regional information offices in Brussels (CoR 2007; Hooghe 1995; Keating 1998a; Keating and Hooghe 2001; Lynch 2007; Mamadouh 2001).

Michael Keating has emphasized the mutual reinforcement of the two processes of European integration and regional devolution as “twin challenges to the nation-state in western

¹ I will use the term ‘sub-state regionalism,’ rather than the more common term ‘subnational regionalism,’ simply to avoid unnecessary confusion with nationalism at the regional level, which constitutes a subset of sub-state regionalisms.

Europe” and as a key to understanding the resurgence of regionalism in the post-War era (Keating 1995, 1). This process, also referred to as constantly resurging “crises of territorial representation,” (Keating 1998b, 15) facing states each time a regionalist wave occurs, can be formulated in terms of a *bypass-theory of regionalism*, according to which regions increasingly seek to bypass their central governments to achieve their policy goals at the EU level by forging direct links with the EU (Downs 2002; Keating 1990, 1995; Keating and Hooghe 2001; Weatherill 2005). A number of scholars have adopted this notion of a regional-EU bypass strategy in their own work, and it has often been used as an explanation for the somewhat paradox phenomenon of traditionally protectionist minority nationalist regions becoming among the strongest supporters of European integration (Downs 2002; Fleurke and Willemsse 2006; Olsson 2007; Sturm and Dieringer 2005).

Paradoxically, by the early 2000s, the concept of a “Europe of the Regions” was largely seen as discredited by scholars of European regionalism, although the level of regional mobilization in Europe continued to grow exponentially (Lynch 2007; Moore 2007). In a recent book Loughlin argues that the setting up of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) in 1994 seems to have somewhat deflated the mobilization of sub-state regions, and he finds evidence for this in the absence of regional questions in both the Amsterdam and the Nice treaties (Loughlin 2005). Others pointed to the danger of regional disappointment already a year after the introduction of the CoR, largely due to the limitation of CoR competencies to advisory powers; to the fact that members are appointed and not elected; and to the internal division of the CoR through the representation of both local and regional authorities (Christiansen 1996; Hooghe 1995). The debate surrounding the most recent Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe has given new momentum to the regions, however, resulting in yet another surge of regional mobilization. The

number of regional information offices in Brussels has continued to increase dramatically, doubling in size from 140 in 1995 to over 280 in 2008 (CoR 2008; Mamadouh 2001; Marks et al. 1996; Moore 2007). It thus appears likely that regions of all kinds, whether or not they are granted any greater political influence through direct incorporation in the EU decision-making process in the near future, will continue to attempt influencing this process in alternative ways. Based on this, and on the fact that strong sub-state regions increasingly display support for the EU at the elite level, the purpose of this paper is to bring the question of sub-state regionalism into another well-researched area which to date largely lacks any discussion of the role of regions—support for European integration.

Explaining Support for European Integration

Whether or not people support the idea of European integration is a matter of fundamental importance for the political development of the EU. This has been proven both by the 2005 referenda on the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands, and by the 2008 Irish referendum leading to the failure of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Whereas the EU has long been considered an elite-driven project, the consequences of the increased use of referenda and their hampering effect on the process of European integration have made it obvious that the future of the European project also relies heavily on public support. In a recent article Hooghe and Marks discuss this change from a “permissive consensus” characterizing EU policy making in the 1970s and 1980s to a “constraining dissensus” characterizing EU policy making since then, while in the same article arguing that the two dominant theories of European integration—*liberal intergovernmentalism* and *neofunctionalism*—both fail to acknowledge the role of the public in this process (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). In the light of these facts, it is

becoming increasingly important to examine the extent and the causes of citizen attitudes towards the EU and European integration. Consequently, a growing scholarly literature has emerged on what has been labeled “Euroscepticism” (Taggart 1998).²

This large literature on citizen attitudes towards the EU and the process of European integration can be theoretically divided into three dominant perspectives: (1) a utilitarian, or economic approach; (2) a political approach; and (3) a cultural, or identity approach. Furthermore, within these three approaches a differentiation can be made between two levels of analysis at which Euroscepticism has been studied: (1) a micro level, focusing on individual, or mass level explanations to Euroscepticism; and (2) a macro level, focusing on state or system level explanations to Euroscepticism.

Utilitarian approaches to Euroscepticism rely on evidence that self-interested individuals are more likely to support European integration if it provides them with higher economic benefits than costs. At the macro-level several analyses show that aggregate levels of support for European integration are positively related to macro-economic, member state level indicators such as inflation rates, GDP and unemployment rates (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Anderson & Kaltenthaler, 1996). Different from these macro-level approaches, Gabel and Palmer develop a model based on the costs and benefits citizens derive personally from a deepening integration process, finding strong indications that support for the EU is related to personal gains and the professional and educational skills necessary to take advantage of opportunities provided by European integration (Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Gabel, 1998b). Similarly, Anderson and Reichert find evidence that individuals who can be expected to benefit from European integration because

² The term Euroscepticism in the non-scholarly world originated in the mid-1980s. A Eurosceptic, as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, is “a person, esp. a politician, having doubts or reservations regarding the supposed benefits of increasing cooperation between the member states of the European Union,” citing a first reference to the term from a 1985 *Times* article (OED)

they have professional skills that are more valuable in an advanced industrial economy, or because they belong to a professional group that systematically benefits from EU funding, tend to be more positive towards European integration (Anderson & Reichert, 1995).

The second type of approaches reviewed here—political/civic approaches—includes three theories that are all in some way related to the formation and representation of political attitudes and interests: (1) cognitive mobilization; (2) cueing theory; and (3) interest representation. In a very early account Inglehart argued that higher levels of cognitive mobilization, or “the increasingly wide distribution of the political skills necessary to cope with an extensive political community,” (Inglehart, 1970, 47) thus rendering citizens less fearful of the EU by being increasingly exposed to it, are related to support for European integration. More recent empirical analyses have confirmed that citizens who are better educated, who are more interested in politics, who are better politically informed, and who are more knowledgeable about the EU are more positive towards European integration, arguing that “any explanation of opinion toward the EU should, then, stress factors such as voter knowledge and access to information (via, for example, the media)” (Karp *et al.*, 2003, 273; Bruter 2003, 2009).

Janssen argues that the complexity of the European integration process makes it too abstract and too distant for the majority of EU citizens to fully understand, thus rendering them unable to form independent and informed attitudes about the EU (1991). Instead, it is believed that people “compensate for a gap in knowledge about the EU by construing a reality about it that fits their understanding of the political world.” (Anderson, 1998, 576) In Anderson’s view, this lack of knowledge and information causes citizens to use “proxies,” or cues, in their evaluations of the EU, which are based on perceptions of the *national* government, rather than the performance of the EU itself (1998). A large literature has emerged around this so-called

“second-order thesis” which argues that citizen attitudes to European integration are likely to reflect their feelings about the domestic political climate, expressed as support for the incumbent government or the functioning of democratic institutions (Anderson, 1998; Franklin *et al.*, 1994).

Another group of scholars contend that it is not just the national government, but in particular the ideological orientation of the parties present at the national level who provide the most important cues affecting the level of support for the EU. Some scholars show evidence that more extremist parties tend to be more eurosceptic, but for different reasons—leftist parties out of fear of the negative influence European integration might have on the welfare state (economic opposition), and rightist parties because they fear loss of national identity and sovereignty (cultural opposition) (Brinegar & Jolly, 2005; De Vries & Edwards, 2009; Taggart, 1998). Others, such as Hooghe and Marks, emphasize that more polarized party systems, and not necessarily just the presence of any extremist party, will mobilize citizens against the EU (2004, 2009). A final group of studies on Euroscepticism within the political perspective emphasizes the role of political representation for public EU support. Gabel and Anderson argue that because the EU has moved in the direction of a representative democracy, public Euroscepticism may be explained by examining the congruence between citizens’ interests and policy outcomes at the EU level, and they find clear evidence that public preferences over EU policy are far from random (Gabel & Anderson, 2002).

A third dominant theoretical perspective on explaining public attitudes towards European integration—cultural approaches—emerged as a consequence of the transfer of more and more sovereignty from the member states to the EU beginning with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. The basic premise of most theories emphasizing identity as an explanation is the notion that the European integration project poses a threat to the nation-state and to national identity (McLaren

2006). Since this literature tends to focus on national identities at the aggregate level, many authors hypothesize varying causes for this connection in different member states by aggregating public opinion data to the member state level. (De Vries & Van Kersbergen 2007; McLaren 2006; Medrano 2003; Rannio 2007). Diez Medrano, for example, argues that the historical development of national identities is crucial, and finds that British Euroscepticism comes from its legacy as an imperial state while Spain and Germany tend to be less eurosceptic because of a desire to modernize in the former case, and because of guilt over World War II in the latter (2003). McLaren finds evidence that member states where the population still identifies strongly with their nationality, and feels that the EU poses a significant threat to national symbols, tend to display lower support for European integration on average (2006).

At the individual level, Carey finds that feelings of national identity, expressed as national attachment combined with national pride and fear of encroaching cultures, has a significant negative effect on support for European integration (2002). Similarly, McLaren finds that the perceived threat to ones national culture, expressed as negative attitudes towards minorities, bears a strong negative relationship to support for the EU, arguing that Euroscepticism tends to be based “in great part on a general hostility toward other cultures” (2002, 564). Other authors, however, find evidence of a positive link between national identity, European identity, and support for European integration (Bruter, 2003; Haesly, 2001). To explain these conflicting theories of the effects of national identities on support for European integration, Hooghe and Marks make a useful distinction between exclusive and inclusive national identity, while providing evidence that citizens who identify exclusively with their nation can be expected to be more eurosceptic than those who harbor multiple identities (2004). In subsequent work,

they continue to emphasize the crucial importance of identity in shaping public attitudes for European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2004, 2005, 2009).

While the literature reviewed above should be given credit for its contributions to a better understanding of what forms citizen attitudes towards European integration, this literature has largely neglected a crucial third level of analysis that can be applied to each of the theoretical perspectives mentioned—the regional level, and for several reasons existing theories only provide an incomplete picture of the forces behind support for the EU. Beside the usual criticism that rational explanations wrongly assume that actors have complete information and knowledge and may thus be incomplete at best, when drawing conclusions about how macro-economic indicators affect national averages of public support for European integration any sub-state regional variation both in the dependent and the independent variables is concealed. Especially since the introduction of the EU regional policy in 1994, the allocation of funds to the member states varies considerably not only among member states, but among regions within member states. Indirect economic benefits, such as benefits derived from trade, are also likely to be unequally distributed among the regions in each member state. Similarly, explanations for public support for the EU that focus on identity as a determining factor while using aggregate data, generalizing the connection between average attachment to one's country and support for European integration will necessarily conceal any variation in both variables at the sub-state level. Although I applaud the recognition of identity as an important variable, this literature still largely lacks any consideration of increasingly strong regional identities. Finally, much of the literature on the role of cues and representation for public support for the EU suffers from a similar level-of-analysis problem, since it ignores the role of regional representation and cues that may emanate from the regional, rather than the national level of government.

My main criticism hence first and foremost concerns those analyses within each of the three approaches that aggregate individual level data to the member state level, thus disregarding and concealing any variation among sub-state regions. Scholars referring to certain peoples within Europe as being eurosceptic thus completely disregard the likely possibility that some territorial groups within their analysis sample may be systematically and radically more or less positive towards the EU than the member state average. As I will argue, this is inappropriate not only because of the existence of such systematic sub-state variation in support for the EU, but because regions in general are becoming a more and more important ally of continued European integration, both in their growing support for the EU, and in the unique link they constitute between the EU institutions and European citizens. The fact that each of the most recent referenda with negative outcomes for the continuation of the European project took place in member states that are unitary and centralist, and where sub-state regionalism is weak or nonexistent, makes the finding that people from strong identity regions are the most supportive of European integration all the more important. What influences people's support for European integration has indeed become an important and a widely researched question, but it is time that some serious attention is given to the sub-state regional dimension in such analyses.

Within the limited scope of this paper, I will not take on a full-scale testing of the reviewed existing theories at a regional level of analysis. Instead, in the quantitative part of this paper I will test the following two hypotheses with a *regional-level perspective* but using individual-level data.

Hypothesis 1: *The stronger an individual's regional identity is, the greater the likelihood of supporting European integration, all else being equal.*

This hypothesis is obviously derived from the literature emphasizing the role of identity in shaping attitudes about European integration, but in addition, it also draws on broad agreement in recent scholarly literature about the changing focus of regionalism and minority nationalism in Europe. This literature, briefly reviewed above, argues that that a deepened European integration has provided incentives to minority nationalist and regionalist groups to rethink their policy stance on European integration, switching from a protectionist, anti-European position to an outward-looking, pro-European position, thus seeking to bypass their states, to achieve their policy goals at the EU level (Downs 2002; Keating 1996, 2004). Thus a positive relationship between the dependent variable—support for European integration—and the first independent variable of interest—regional identity—can be expected.

Another variable that is closely related to sub-state regionalism in the EU which has been largely neglected in existing analyses of causes of Euroscepticism because of the lack of a regional focus is *federalism*. Scholars have investigated the role of federalism for the mobilization of regional elites and interests in Brussels, finding that the sub-state governments with the most extensive political role, or the greatest autonomy within their respective domestic political systems, are the most likely to open an office in Brussels, because they are more affected by decisions that are made there (Marks et al. 1996). Similarly, others have argued that regions resembling federal units tend to be more positive toward the EU because they have the institutional means in place to represent their interests within the complex European governance structure (Bullman 2001). Based on these findings, and on the fact that the most recent referenda with negative outcomes for the progression of European integration took place in member states where sub-state regions have little autonomy, I hypothesize a positive relationship between

attitudes towards the EU and higher levels of autonomy within member states at the regional level:

Hypothesis 2: *Support for European integration stronger in regions that enjoy higher levels of federalism, all else being equal.*

In addition to the hypotheses presented above, and partially based on the results of the quantitative data analysis, this paper will perform initial testing of the following hypothesis assuming that the variation in regional level support for European integration is a result of varying levels in the quality of regional interest representation in Brussels:

Hypothesis 3: *Support for European integration is stronger in regions whose interests are better represented at the EU level.*

The representation of regional interests in the European Union has most commonly been analyzed within the theoretical context of pluralism and lobbying, much because the lack of formal, direct representation of regions within the institutional structure of the EU has resulted in the use of informal ways to influence EU policy (Hooghe 1995; Keating 2001; Keating and Hooghe 2001; Mamadouh 2001; Marks, Haesly, and Mbaye 2002; Marks et al. 1996; Nielsen and Salk 1998).

Data

The quantitative part of the analysis, testing the first two hypotheses, uses cross-sectional individual and aggregate level survey data, collected through Eurobarometer survey 65.2 (EB 65.2) between March and May 2006 (Papacostas). The data is unique both in its scope and in its characteristics, as 29,170 citizens from all EU member-states and the candidate states are interviewed in face-to-face interviews.³ Since this paper is limited to the analysis of public opinion towards European integration in the 15 EU member states that constituted the EU until the 2004 enlargement (EU15), all respondents who were not interviewed in an EU15 member state were dropped from the sample. Furthermore, since one of the survey questions used for operationalizing the dependent variable in this analysis asks for the respondent's opinion on his or her country's EU-membership, all respondents who were interviewed in, but who were not citizens of an EU15 member state were dropped from the analysis sample. Finally, since the aim of this paper involves analyzing the respondents' opinions on their *own* countries' EU-membership, all respondents who were interviewed in an EU15 member state other than that of their citizenship were dropped from the analysis sample. In addition, after a small number of respondents who were not coded on the variable "region" were dropped a total of 14,957 individuals remained in the analysis sample. Data was missing on one or more of the variables included in this analysis for additional respondents, which were consequently dropped from the

³ The population universe for the surveys was all persons aged 15 and over, and the samples of all surveys were designed as multi-stage probability samples in the single countries. The fact that each individual interviewed was not only coded on the country in which the interview took place, but also on the region in which the interview was conducted, makes the data extraordinarily useful for the purposes of this analysis. In addition to this, the datasets have been widely used in scholarly analysis since their release. For more details about the Eurobarometer Surveys, see the survey codebooks and documentation, available through the web site of the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), at <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/>.

analysis sample. The final analysis samples for each of the three dependent variables were additionally reduced to 14,014 (Model 1), 14,147 (Model 2), and 12,577 (Model 3) respectively.⁴

To attempt to further explain the variation in Euroscepticism at the regional level that is tested in the first two hypotheses, and consequently to test the third hypothesis—that support for European integration is stronger in regions whose interests are better represented at the EU level—a qualitative component was added to the analysis. To control for both variation caused by institutional factors and by cultural factors, the quality of representation was evaluated by examining the activities and goals of a number of sub-national representation offices in Brussels. To capture differences between federal and unitary member states, on one hand, and between strong identity (minority nationalist) regions and weak identity regions, on the other hand, cases were selected that reflect both these dimensions. Between May 1 and June 11, 2008, forty face-to-face interviews were conducted with the directors (in a few cases deputy directors) of the regional representation offices from three member states: Germany, the United Kingdom, and Sweden.⁵ The interviews were conducted in the native languages of the interviewees, they lasted between 34 and 90 minutes (with an average length of just under one hour), and with only two of the 42 existent regional offices from the selected member states declining an interview, the response rate was very high.⁶ Due to the limited scope of this paper, however, only a select number of interviews have been analyzed, and thus only preliminary findings of these interviews will be presented here.

⁴ The cleaning process is summarized in Appendix A.

⁵ The interview questionnaire can be found in Appendix D.

⁶ The director of one UK regional office did not want to participate, and another interview with a UK regional office director was cancelled due to personnel change.

Methodology

For the first part of the paper, the use of quantitative methodology, particularly regression analysis, was especially suitable, considering the nature of the data used in this analysis: large-scale survey data representing the populations of all EU member states. Also, since previous use of multivariate regression analysis controlling for regional-level variables in research on the topic of this paper has been limited, such analysis may lead to insights that would otherwise be lost. To test the first two hypotheses described above, and to answer the research questions of this paper, the independent variables were regressed on each of the three dependent variables. In the case of the first two dependent variables—satisfaction with EU membership, and EU image—(here called SatEUMem and EUimage respectively) I estimated ordinal logit models, and in the case of the third dependent variable—relative satisfaction with EU democracy—(here called SatEUDem) I estimated a logistic model.⁷

⁷ The choice of the ordinal logit for the first two regression model is motivated by the fact that the dependent variable is an ordinal variable, and the choice of the logistic model for the third regression model is motivated by the fact that the dependent variable is a binary variable.

The three regression equations to be estimated can be summarized in the following equation:⁸

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{federalism}_i + \beta_2 \text{regionalID}_i + \beta_3 \text{representation}_i + \beta_4 \text{minorityregion}_i + \beta_5 \text{minority} \times \text{regionalID}_i + \beta_6 \text{polfreq}_i + \beta_7 \text{polnev}_i + \beta_8 \text{finsit}_i + \beta_9 \text{male}_i + \beta_{10} \text{age}_i + \beta_{11} \text{education}_i + e_i$$

where

- Y_1 = Assessment of own country's membership in the EU as a "generally good thing," a "neither good nor bad thing," or a "bad thing" (2,1,0)
- Y_2 = Assessment of whether the EU conjures up a "very positive," a "fairly positive," a "neutral," a "fairly negative," or a "very negative" image (scale: 4 = very positive to 0 = very negative)
- Y_3 = Relative satisfaction with how democracy works in the EU compared to own country, coded one if satisfaction with democracy in the EU is greater than satisfaction with democracy in one's own country, and zero otherwise
- federalism = level of federalism, coded on an index ranging from 10 (= most federal) to 0 (= least federal)
- regional ID = regional identity, coded one if the respondent is more attached to their region than to their country, and zero otherwise
- representation = Assessment of whether or not the respondent agrees with the statement "My voice counts in the EU" (scale: 2 = agrees; 1 = DK; and 0 = disagrees)
- minority region = region identified as predominantly minority nationalist (1,0)
- minority×regionalID = interaction term between minority region and regional identity
- polfreq = discusses politics frequently (1,0) } reference category:
 polnev = never discusses politics(1,0) } discusses politics occasionally
- finsit = Assessment of own financial situation (scale: 3 = very good; 2 = fairly good; 1 = fairly bad; and 0 = very bad)
- male = Sex (1,0)
- age = Age in years
- education = Age when stopping full-time education

⁸ Initially I intended to include both country and region dummy variables, but this proved to be unsuitable due to lack of variation. All models were tested for multicollinearity, however with negative results.

The construct “support for European integration,” which can also be seen as the antithesis of Euroscepticism, is operationalized by three separate dependent variables based on three different questions from the EB 65.2 because they capture slightly different variations of respondents’ attitudes toward European integration. The first question asked whether the respondent sees one’s country’s EU membership as a good thing, a bad thing, or a neither good nor bad thing, and answers were coded two if the respondent answered “a good thing,” one if the respondent answered “neither good nor bad,” and zero if the respondent answered “a bad thing.”⁹ This is by far the most widely used Eurobarometer question in existing analyses of support for European integration (See among others Anderson, 1996; Anderson, 1995; Carey, 2002; Fuchs & Magni-Berton, 2009; Gabel, 1998a; Hooghe & Marks, 2004; McLaren, 2006; Ray, 2003). The second question, which is not as widely used in the literature, asked the respondent whether the EU conjures up a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative, or a very negative image, and the variable was re-coded to a five-point categorical scale ranging from 4 (very positive) to 0 (very negative). The third question asked, in two parts, whether the respondent was satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU and in one’s own country. With answer options ranging from one (very satisfied) to four (not at all satisfied), the direction of the scale was reversed on both questions; then the a new binary variable was generated and coded one if the respondent was more satisfied with democracy in the EU than with democracy in one’s own country, and zero otherwise.

In addition to the dependent variables, the EB 65.2 was also used as a source for seven independent variables. First, to operationalize the key independent variable “regional identity,” a two-part question asking about the degree of attachment to one’s region and to one’s country was used to create a binary variable, coded one if the respondent reported being more attached to

⁹ The exact wording of all survey questions can be found in Appendix C.

their region than to their country, and zero otherwise. Second, to operationalize the control variable “representation,” a question asking respondents whether they agree or not with the statement “My voice counts in the European Union” was used to create an ordinal variable coded two if the respondent agreed, one if the respondent did not know, and zero if the respondent disagreed. Third, to control for and test the cognitive mobilization theory, a question asking the respondent about the frequency with which he or she discusses politics when getting together with friends was used, coded as a set of dummy variables for each answer category.¹⁰ Fourth, to test existing theory on utilitarian explanations for support for the EU, a question asking the respondent to assess his or her financial situation was used. Finally, three questions asking about the respondent’s sex, age, and age when stopping full-time education were used to create control variables for sex, a variable for age in years, and a variable for education.¹¹

In addition to the variables based on the individual level survey data, three independent variables were coded at the aggregate, regional level. First, to operationalize the key independent variable “federalism,” an ordinal variable was created that assigned different scores on a zero-to-ten point federalism scale, based on the regional governance index used by Marks, Haesly and Mbaye (2002).¹² Second, a binary variable was generated, indicating whether or not a respondent was interviewed in a region dominated by minority nationalism. The main reason for including this variable in addition to the variable “regional identity” was on one hand to create a broader category of individuals that are likely to have a strong regional identity, and on the other hand to

¹⁰ This question has been used in previous analyses. See for example Gabel 1998a and Inglehart, Rabier and Reif 1991.

¹¹ Although I initially intended to include a variable based on the respondent’s answer to a question about household income, I decided against this since the response rate was so low that it would have decreased my sample size by almost half.

¹² Marks, Haesly, and Mbaye rate each EU member state, and in cases of asymmetric federalism—such as in the UK and Spain—each sub-state region, on three dimensions of federalism: constitutional federalism, the role of the regions in the central government, and the presence of regional elections. The methodology of this measure can be reviewed in its entirety in Appendix B of their 2002 article “What Do Subnational Offices Think They Are Doing in Brussels?”

enable the inclusion of an interaction term identifying individuals who are both residents of a minority nationalist region, and express a strong regional identity. The decision on whether a region should be classified as a minority nationalist region was based on previous analyses of regional secessionism and minority nationalism in Europe, and carefully assessed in each case. This resulted in identifying 37 of 155 regions as minority nationalist, dispersed among nine of the fifteen EU member states included in the analysis.¹³ Finally, to control for the presence of non-minority respondents in regions coded as minority nationalist regions, an interaction term was generated from the regional identity variable and the variable minority region.¹⁴

Results I: Cultural and Institutional Causes for Variation in Euroscepticism among Regions

Table 1 displays the effects of each of the independent variables on each of the three dependent variables, and based on these results, the following conclusions can be drawn.

Overall, the results of the three different regressions were mixed, which is somewhat surprising considering the fact that they were chosen to represent the same overarching construct: support

¹³ In Austria, the regions Burgenland and Kärnten were included due to the relatively large numbers of inhabitants in these regions speaking the languages of the neighboring Hungary, Croatia, and Slovenia (Cordell and Wolff 2004). In Belgium, the Flemish regions Antwerpen, Limburg, Oost-Vlaanderen, Vlaams-Brabant, and West-Vlaanderen, were selected, motivated by their longstanding linguistically based, autonomy-seeking movement (Hendriks 2001; Hooghe 1995; Laible 2001; Lynch 1996). In Denmark, the largely German-speaking region South Denmark was selected (Cordell and Wolff 2004). In Finland, the largely Swedish-speaking region South Finland was selected (Cordell and Wolff 2004). In France, the largely German-speaking Alsace and the autonomy-seeking Bretagne were selected (Cordell and Wolff 2004; Lynch 1996). In Germany, the autonomy-seeking Bavaria, in which a number of regionalist parties exist, was selected (Anderson 1999; Bullman 2001; Day 1988; Gerstenlauer 1995). In Italy, the northern regions Piemonte/Valle d'Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia/Giulia, and Emilia-Romagna were selected, motivated by their inclusion in the autonomy-seeking larger region Padania (Desideri 1995; Loughlin 2001). Furthermore in Italy, the largely German-speaking region Trentino was included, as well as the autonomy-seeking region Sardegna (Cordell and Wolff 2004). In Spain, the linguistically distinct regions Cataluña, Galicia, and Pais Vasco (the Basque country) were selected (Folch-Serra and Nogue-Font 2001; Keating 1996; Keating, Loughlin, and Deschouwer 2003; Morata 1995). In addition, all Spanish regions in which a regionalist political party was present—Andalucia, Aragon, Asturias, Baleares, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla Leon, Valencia, Extremadura, Navarra, and Rioja—were selected (Day 1988). Finally, in the United Kingdom, Scotland and Wales were selected, motivated by linguistic distinction and autonomy-seeking, and Northern Ireland was selected based on its characteristic as the only large-scale religious minority nationalist region in the EU (Cordell and Wolff 2004; Keating 1996; Keating and Jones 1995; Loughlin 2001; Lynch 1996; Newman 1996; McGarry 2001; Newman 1996).

¹⁴ The descriptive statistics of the analysis sample can be found in Appendix B.

for European integration. All key independent variables were statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level in at least two of the models, and all control variables at least at the 1 percent level in at least two of the models.¹⁵ Looking at the individual coefficients of the independent variables across the models, however, the results are mixed.

First, the results suggest that respondents interviewed in member states and regions with higher levels of federalism were—as expected—more likely to be satisfied with their country’s EU membership, more likely to have a positive EU image, and more likely to be relatively more satisfied with EU democracy than with democracy in their home country. The practical significance of this result is minute, however, since the magnitude of the positive relationship is very small. Second, against expectation, respondents whose regional identity is stronger than the identity with their home country are *less* likely than others to be satisfied with their country’s EU membership, are *less* likely to have a positive EU image, while at the same time being relatively *more* satisfied with EU democracy than with democracy in their home country. These contradictory findings may be a result of varying reasons for feeling affinity towards one’s region. Some of the contradiction may be explained by the fact that not everyone expressing a strong regional identity lives in a minority region, while not everyone living in a minority region has a strong regional identity. The interaction term, which captures the effects on the dependent variables by respondents that both have a strong regional identity and live in a minority region, confirms this suggestion. The findings indicate that respondents with these traits tend to be more satisfied with their country’s EU membership than others, and the relationship has a relatively large magnitude, while being significant at the .1 percent level.

¹⁵ The regressions were estimated using robust standard-errors, since several of the variables showed signs of heteroskedasticity in the Breusch-Pagan test.

[Table 1 about here]

Whereas the results in Table 1 are useful for assessing the statistical significance and the positive or negative direction of the various effects, the magnitudes of the coefficients estimated with logistic models are due to the nonlinearity of the models not easily interpreted. A commonly suggested more direct approach for interpretation is to examine the predicted probabilities of an event for different values of an independent variable while holding all other variables at their means (Long 1997). First, Table 2 displays the predicted probabilities of different levels of satisfaction with one's EU membership, of different EU images, and of different levels of the relative satisfaction with EU and member state democracy, for each of the groups of respondents living in states/regions with different levels of federalism.

[Table 2 about here]

These results confirm the patterns from Table 1, suggesting that as the level of federalism increases, the probability of considering one's country's EU membership a good thing increases, while the probability of considering one's country's EU membership a bad thing decreases. Despite the steadiness of this trend, however, the differences between the two extremes of perfect centralism and perfect federalism are a mere 4.3 and 1.9 percentage points. Similarly, the results suggest that an increase in the level of federalism is resulting in a linear increase in the probability of having a more positive EU image, however with an even smaller actual difference of 3.2 and 1.7 percentage points between the lowest and highest levels of federalism. Finally, this pattern is repeated in the predicted probabilities of being relatively more satisfied with EU

democracy than with member state democracy, with a very small actual difference of 2.1 percentage points between the lowest and the highest levels of federalism.

The predicted probabilities of the dependent variables for respondents with different levels of regional identity, and living in minority versus non-minority regions, displayed in Table 3, also confirm the contradictory findings from Table 1, while the differences between the categories are greater than in Table 2. Most significantly, the probability of thinking that one's country's EU membership is a generally good thing is more than 10 percentage points greater among respondents from minority regions whose regional attachment is stronger than the attachment to their country, than among other respondents. This corresponds to the large magnitude of the only statistically significant positive coefficient on a variable related to regional identity within this model, and suggests that this measure may in fact be the best proxy for the purpose of capturing the characteristics that the literature on pro-European minority nationalist regions is referring to.

[Table 3 about here]

Beside the effects of the key independent variables on EU attitudes, an interesting conclusion can be drawn about one of the control variables. All three models suggest a strong positive relationship between respondents' perceptions about their voice being heard in the EU (here referred to as representation), and satisfaction with their country's EU membership, a positive image of the EU, and a relatively greater satisfaction with EU democracy than with democracy in their home country, all else being equal. The predicted probability of considering one's country's EU membership a good thing is 77.1% among respondents who think that they

have a voice in the EU, as compared to only 42.4% of respondents who do not feel that they have a voice in the EU. Similarly, the probability of having a very positive or fairly positive image of the EU is 67.4% among respondents who feel well represented, while only being 33.1% among those who do not feel well represented in Brussels. Even if these findings do not relate directly to the hypotheses tested in this paper, they are of great significance as evidence for the fact that there is indeed a strong relationship between citizens' sense of being well represented in the EU and their relative support for European integration. Simply put, representation in Brussels matters for EU citizens, and the quality of this representation, in particular of the representation of regional interests, will be examined in the next part of this paper.

Results II: The Quality of Regional Representation as a Cause of Variation in Euroscepticism

This part of the paper will present some initial findings from the collection of data through forty interviews with the directors of regional representation offices in Brussels in May and June 2008. The interview data is very rich but the scope of this paper does not allow for more elaborate analysis at this time. As mentioned in the data section cases from three EU member states were selected along two dimensions—one one hand to control for institutional factors, by choosing one federal, one semi-federal, and one unitary member state, and on the other hand to control for cultural factors, by choosing member states two out of three of which harbor strong identity regions. In the following, some of the patterns that have been identified so far will be presented briefly.

Three general trends were identified, with similarities across virtually all forty regions that were part of the study. First, regarding the question of whether the regions actually have any influence over EU legislation, the interviewees overwhelmingly feel that this is the case, and

many provided concrete examples of this. With the exception of some of the largest and most influential regions, however, most interviewees added that you cannot achieve anything alone, and that one of the most important strategies to achieve influence over legislation is to team up with other regions. In fact, one of the most surprising overall findings of the interviews was the density of the system of cross-regional co-operation and networks that have developed in Brussels over the past decade. Another interesting finding was that virtually all interviewees feel that their region's presence in Brussels can contribute to the representation of interests unique to their region in ways that the Permanent Representations (representing the member state governments in the Council) from their countries cannot. A slightly different pattern characterized the German *Länder*, however, as all of the interviewees pointed out that they had a complementary representative role rather than a competitive one in relation to the Permanent Representation. Likewise, some of the regions with a stronger regional identity deviated from the general pattern by expressing a more independent representational role beside their Permanent Representations. These patterns were supported by different levels and frequencies of cooperation between the regional offices and the Permanent Representations. Finally, virtually all the regions focus their lobbying—some of the interviewees were resistant to using this term, although the description of what they do clearly indicated that it is lobbying—on the same two EU institutions: the Commission and the Parliament. The only exceptions were, once again, some strong identity regions from Germany and the UK, which included the Council in either first or second place. Interestingly, but maybe not surprisingly, only one single interviewee mentioned the Committee of the Regions, and when asked about it, others stated quite blatantly that it is not important, because it does not have any real decision-making power.

In addition to these general trends of relative similarities across regions, a few patterns of striking differences among regions were identified. Relevant for the research questions asked in this paper, although regions feel that they represent their constituents, this cannot be expected to automatically lead to greater citizen satisfaction with European integration. Rather, to contribute to more positive attitudes towards European integration, the regional goals achieved in Brussels must be communicated to the constituents at home. There is in fact great variation in the extent to which the regional offices do this, or even think that it is their task to do this. Some regions go as far as putting up signs at public places that were built with the help of EU funds, while others admit that the regional elites back home like to take the credit for these achievements without necessarily mentioning that they were made possible thanks to the EU. Although most interviewees agree that it is an important task of theirs to bring Europe closer to the elites at home (often by bringing these elites to Brussels), some believe that it is then the elites' choice whether or not to "market" the EU at home, while others actively pursue this goal on their own.

Conclusion

Considering the failed ratification process of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, the currently hibernating ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, as well as the consistently declining turnout rates in European Parliament elections, citizen support for the EU is of utmost importance to its legitimacy. These circumstances thus indicate a large practical value for future analyses of questions like the ones posed in this paper. The evidence of variation in Euroscepticism at the regional level provided in this paper, along with the indications of the increasing importance of regional actors in Brussels provided by the interviews and other data, should also be seen as a prompt to conduct further analysis of the connection between regional

representation and Euroscepticism. Analyses using further regional level socio-economic data, and more elaborate data on regional involvement at all stages of the policy-process in Brussels, from agenda-setting to policy implementation, could shed further light on this relationship. Yet another suggestion for future research is to compare the relationship between sub-state and support for European integration over time, adding a time-series component to the analysis. Although such an analysis could provide additional knowledge of the change in this relationship, and thus enhance the possibility of finding causal relationships, the largest problem with such an analysis would yet again be the limited availability of data, since the consecutive survey results are not based on panel surveys and since some of the survey questions are not repeatedly asked.

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Figures and Tables

Table 1: Results of Regression Analyses (Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
	<i>Satisfaction with EU Membership</i>	<i>EU image</i>	<i>Relative Satisfaction with EU Democracy</i>
Federalism	0.018 (0.005)**	0.013 (0.005)**	0.026 (0.009)**
Regional Identity	-0.319 (0.065)***	-0.300 (0.060)***	0.326 (0.107)**
Minority Region	0.013 (0.048)	0.053 (0.042)	-0.117 (0.087)
Regional ID x Minority Region	0.435 (0.120)***	0.108 (0.102)	0.019 (0.196)
Representation	0.759 (0.020)***	0.714 (0.018)***	0.166 (0.034)***
Frequently Discusses Politics	0.156 (0.053)**	0.149 (0.050)**	0.388 (0.081)***
Never Discusses Politics	-0.079 (0.041)	-0.006 (0.037)	-0.113 (0.080)
Financial Situation	0.379 (0.025)***	0.328 (0.025)***	-0.442 (0.045)***
Male	0.189 (0.036)***	0.085 (0.032)**	0.033 (0.063)
Age	-0.011 (0.001)***	-0.013 (0.001)***	-0.006 (0.002)**
Education	0.018 (0.004)***	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.027 (0.007)***
Constant			-1.063 (0.197)***
Log (Pseudo-)Likelihood	-12,315.54	-17,848.26	-3,752.32
χ^2 /Wald χ^2	2,194.46	2,256.98	212.48
Pseudo R ²	0.0902	0.0628	0.0280
Percent Correctly Predicted	59.0%	45.7%	90.8%
N	14,014	14,147	12,577

Notes: * Significant at the 0.05 level; ** Significant at the 0.01 level; ***Significant at the 0.001 level.

Table 2: Predicted Probabilities by Federalism Status for the Ordered Logit and Logistic Models

Satisfaction with EU membership	Generally good	Neither good nor bad	Generally bad
Federal score = 0 (least federal) (N=4,110)	56.7%	30.1%	13.2%
Federal score = 1 (N=2,617)	57.1%	29.9%	13.0%
Federal score = 3 (N=975)	58.0%	29.4%	12.6%
Federal score = 4 (N=954)	58.4%	29.2%	12.4%
Federal score = 5 (N=342)	58.8%	29.0%	12.2%
Federal score = 6 (N=1,530)	59.3%	28.7%	12.0%
Federal score = 7 (N=206)	59.7%	28.5%	11.8%
Federal score = 8 (N=1,836)	60.2%	28.2%	11.6%
Federal score = 10 (most federal) (N=1,444)	61.0%	27.7%	11.3%

EU image	Very or fairly positive	Neutral	Fairly or very negative
Federal score = 0 (least federal) (N=4,097)	46.3%	37.4%	16.3%
Federal score = 1 (N=2,632)	46.6%	37.3%	16.1%
Federal score = 3 (N=977)	47.3%	37.0%	15.7%
Federal score = 4 (N=967)	47.6%	36.8%	15.6%
Federal score = 5 (N=349)	47.9%	36.7%	15.4%
Federal score = 6 (N=1,571)	48.2%	36.5%	15.3%
Federal score = 7 (N=206)	48.5%	36.4%	15.1%
Federal score = 8 (N=1,882)	48.9%	36.2%	14.9%
Federal score = 10 (most federal) (N=1,466)	49.5%	35.9%	14.6%

Relative satisfaction with EU democracy	More satisfied	Not more satisfied
Federal score = 0 (least federal) (N=3,675)	7.8%	92.2%
Federal score = 1 (N=2,264)	8.0%	92.0%
Federal score = 3 (N=886)	8.4%	91.6%
Federal score = 4 (N=835)	8.6%	91.4%
Federal score = 5 (N=247)	8.8%	91.2%
Federal score = 6 (N=1,378)	9.0%	91.0%
Federal score = 7 (N=171)	9.2%	90.8%
Federal score = 8 (N=1,804)	9.4%	90.6%
Federal score = 10 (most federal) (N=1,317)	9.9%	90.1%

Table 3: Predicted Probabilities by Regional Identity and Minority Region Status for the Ordered Logit and Logistic Models

Satisfaction with EU membership	Generally good	Neither good nor bad	Generally bad
Strong regional identity (N=1,630)	51.3%	32.8%	15.9%
Weak regional identity (N=12,384)	59.2%	28.8%	12.0%
Minority region + strong regional ID (N=563)	68.0%	23.5%	8.5%
Other Respondents (N=13,451)	57.9%	29.5%	12.6%
EU image	Very or fairly positive	Neutral	Fairly or very negative
Strong regional identity (N=1,644)	40.9%	39.6%	19.5%
Weak regional identity (N=12,503)	48.4%	36.4%	15.2%
Relative satisfaction with EU democracy	More satisfied	Not more satisfied	
Strong regional identity (N=1,453)	11.1%	88.9%	
Weak regional identity (N=11,124)	8.2%	91.8%	

Appendix A

The Cleaning of the Survey Analysis Sample from Eurobarometer 65.2 (2006)

Cleaning step	N
Original Sample Size	29,170
Not EU15	-13,722
EU15 Sample Size	15,448
Not EU15-Citizen	-66
EU15-Citizen Interviewed in Another EU15 State	-381
No Region Stated	-44
Missing Values on Other Independent Variables	-501
Missing Values on DV SatEUMem	-442
Analysis Sample Size DV SatEUMem (Model 1)	14,014
Missing Values on DV EUimage	-309
Analysis Sample Size DV EUimage (Model 2)	14,147
Missing Values on DV SatEUDem	-1,879
Analysis Sample Size DV SatEUDem (Model 3)	12,577

Appendix B

Descriptive Statistics of the Analysis Sample

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Satisfaction with EU Membership	14,014	1.4128	0.7433	0	2
EU Image	14,147	2.3430	0.9546	0	4
Relative Satisfaction with EU Democracy	12,577	0.0919	0.2889	0	1
Federalism	14,957	3.6430	3.5483	0	10
Regional Identity	14,957	0.1147	0.3187	0	1
Representation	14,957	0.8361	0.9433	0	2
Minority Region	14,957	0.2233	0.4165	0	1
Frequently Discusses Politics	14,918	0.1565	0.3634	0	1
Never Discusses Politics	14,918	0.2835	0.4507	0	1
Financial Situation	14,676	1.7950	0.7154	0	1
Sex	14,957	0.4542	0.4979	0	1
Age	14,957	48.1865	18.1875	15	95
Education	14,763	18.4656	5.7781	0	70

Appendix C

Eurobarometer 65.2: Variables and questions

- QA1** When you get together with friends, would you say that you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?
- QA11a** Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?
- QA13** In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative, or very negative image?
- QA15a_4** Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree: "My voice counts in the European Union."
- QA34a** On the whole are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?
- QA34b** And how about the way democracy works in the European Union?
- QA35_2** People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to... your region.
- QA35_3** People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to... (OUR COUNTRY).
- QC1** How would you judge the current situation in each of the following? ... (7) Your financial situation.
- D8** How old were you when you stopped full-time education?
- D10** [Gender]
- D11** How old are you?
- P7** [Region]

Appendix D

Interviews with directors of regional offices in Brussels: Interview questions

A. General questions

1. When did [this region] open an office here in Brussels?
2. Why was this office established at that particular time?
3. At that time, to what extent do you think that institutional developments within the EC/EU affected the incentives for your region to open an office in Brussels?
4. Can you provide some basic information about the resources of the office:
 - a. What is the number of staff?
 - b. What is currently the size of the annual budget?
 - c. Beside staff and budget resources, what types of resources are important for the operations of this office?

B. Purpose/policy orientation

5. What do you perceive as being the main purpose of [this region's] presence in Brussels? What are some secondary purposes?
6. What influence do you perceive that you have on EU legislation through the activities of this office?
7. What influence do you perceive that this office has on the allocation of funds to the regions through the Cohesion Policy?
8. What kinds of strategies do you employ to achieve this influence?
9. [Ask only NUTS2-level regions!] Considering that [this region] is part of a NUTS1-region, which also has an office here in Brussels, do you think that [this office] performs any functions that the higher level office does not? Please elaborate.
10. Similarly, do you think that this office performs any functions that the UK Permanent Representation and the UK government do not perform? Please elaborate.
11. Has your office focused on any particular policy areas in the past six months? If so, what policy areas?

12. How about in the past five years?

13. How and by whom is this office instructed on what policy issues to focus on?

C. Effects of enlargement / the Lisbon Agenda

14. How did the 2004 enlargement affect your goals and your strategies to achieve these goals?

15. How has the Lisbon Agenda, with its focus on competitiveness, growth, and job creation, affected your region, and in particular the allocation of funds to your region?

16. How have your priorities changed as a result of the Lisbon Agenda?

D. Interaction with EU institutions and other regional offices and organizations

17. Which EU institutions does this office interact with most frequently? With what purposes?

[If not volunteered, ask about the interaction with:]

- Commission (specific DGs?)
- EP (specific Committees?)
- MEPs from [this region]
- Council (and COREPER)
- CoR

18. To what extent does this office cooperate with other regional offices to achieve its goals? What is the type and depth of this cooperation? Does it focus on specific issues?

19. Do you see this region as competing with other regions for regional funds? If so, is it competing primarily with other British regions, or with other regions within the EU overall?

20. To what extent does this office participate in the activities of trans-regional organizations to achieve its goals?

21. To what extent does this office cooperate with the UK Permanent Representation to achieve its goals?

22. To what extent does this office cooperate with nongovernmental organizations from your region to achieve its goals?

E. Constituency linkage/representation

23. If you consider this office to have a representative role, whose interests does it represent?
24. To what extent and by what means does this office communicate directly with its constituents in [this region]? (for example through direct mail or rallies)
25. To what extent and by what means does this office communicate indirectly with its constituents in [this region]? (for example through the media)
26. To what extent does this office attempt to communicate its policy achievements to the constituents in [this region]?
27. To what extent does this office attempt to increase the awareness of EU politics in [this region]?
28. Has the institutional development of the EU contributed to better representation of citizens from [this region] today? What could be better?
29. Does this office contribute significantly to better representation of citizens from [this region]? How?

F. Concluding questions

30. Do you generally feel that [your region] has benefitted from the UK's EU membership? If no, why not? If yes, in what ways?
31. Do you generally feel that [your region] has become a more powerful political actor vis-à-vis the UK within the EU governance system? How so?