GERMANY’S PREFERENCES ON THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE ANKARA AGREEMENT: THE WIRTSCHAFTSWUNDER AND OPPORTUNITY AND EFFORTS OF TURKISH DIPLOMACY

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Abstract

Why did Germany support provisions on freedom of movement for Turkish workers in the Association Agreement between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey, which was concluded in 1963? This is puzzling given that Germany was fervently opposed to other common EU measures on legal economic migration since immigration policy was communitarized by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. The papers test two hypotheses. First, that a positive economic situation induces the German government to support common EU measures as in periods of strong growth Germany has more open immigration policies and there is a positive relationship between open national immigration policies and support for common EU measures. Second, a sending country (or a group of sending countries) needs to exert diplomatic pressure on the German government in order for it to support common EU measures on legal economic migration. For this to be successful there need to be two conditions in place, the sending country must have the opportunity to exert influence, due to strong historical ties with Germany or being important for geo-political reasons, and frame the need for common EU measures on legal migration in an effective manner. The hypotheses are confirmed for the case of Turkey and the Ankara Agreement and are used to assemble a theoretically eclectic and generally applicable framework able to explain Germany’s support for common EU measures on legal economic migration.

Keywords: European Integration, Preference Formation, Germany, European Economic Community, Ankara Agreement, Freedom of Movement

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Introduction

On 12 September 1963, the European Economic Community concluded an association agreement with Turkey (Ankara Agreement). The Agreement entered into force 1 December 1964. It was supposed to establish a customs union between the two parties in three steps and possibly to prepare Turkey for EEC membership. The Agreement contained provisions on the establishment of the freedom of movement for workers between Turkey and the EEC and thus constituted the first instance when EEC Member States agreed on common European policy measures on legal economic migration.

This is puzzling for a number of reasons. EEC Member States could agree on common European action for provisions on freedom of movement between the EEC and Turkey. However, around 40 years later, efforts to create common EU measures on legal economic migration from outside the Union into the Union failed because pronounced opposition and disagreement about the nature of such measures, and Germany had become to be one of the fiercest opponents of common EU measures on economic migration. Moreover, the federal government of Germany concluded a bilateral labour recruitment with Turkey on 30 October 1961 (Vereinbarung zur “Regelung der Vermittlung türkischer Arbeitnehmer nach der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”), before the Association Agreement with Turkey was brought to a successful conclusion. These developments pose an array of important questions. First, why did the federal government of Germany see the need for EEC involvement in this domain when everything was already regulated on the bilateral level? Second, why did the EEC only put in place provisions on freedom of movement with Turkey (and Greece) and not with other countries, such as Spain, Portugal, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, which have been used as a source of labour migrants by EEC Member States? Third, why do the freedom of movement provisions feature at all in an agreement which had the establishment of a custom union as its main objective? Finally, was the commitment for establishing the freedom of movement provisions lacking from the very beginning, thus leaving ultimate power to implement the freedom of movement provision to the

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2 Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities, COM(2001) 386 final, which was proposed by the European Commission in July 2001 had to be withdrawn formally in 2006, as Member States could not reach agreement on the Directive.
Ankara Agreement  Matthias M. Mayer

Association Council, where every Member State has the right to veto? While all these questions need to be – and will be - answered, the main and overarching question that concerns this paper is: why did Germany support the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement?

The paper focuses on the period between the points in time when Turkey applied for European Economic Community (EEC) associate membership in 1959 and the Ankara Agreement entered into force in 1964. The analysis is concerned with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), i.e. what was then West Germany.\(^3\) The argument of the paper is based on two hypotheses. The first one relates to the importance of a healthy economy in mobilising German support for the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement. The second hypothesis is based on the importance of the sending country Turkey in influencing Germany to support the provisions. Hypothesis two consists of two parts, the opportunity of Turkey to wield some power to push for its goals, and the utilisation of that power by effective diplomatic efforts. The paper thus presents a more nuanced analysis to explain Germany’s support for the freedom of movement provisions than existing treatments of the topic. The paper uses archival primary data from three different archives which has been looked through for the first time with a particular focus on the freedom of movement provisions.\(^4\) Most of the materials are governmental documents that are now accessible. While, by and large, they are well archived sometimes the context in which they are written is not clearly established. Secondary literature plus two interviews with experts in the field are used to triangulate the information obtained in the archives.\(^5\)

The paper is structured as follows. It begins with a brief overview of the Ankara Agreement, its freedom of movement provisions and an outline of Germany’s preferences on the Agreement and the provisions. This is followed by a conceptual section that derives two multi-layered hypotheses to explain Germany’s preferences. The paper then moves on to the empirical analysis that puts the two hypotheses to the test. The paper ends with a concluding section.

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\(^3\) The focus of this paper is on the Ankara Agreement itself and not the decisions of the Association Council because the Articles of the Agreement contain the most far-reaching provisions with regard to the freedom of movement for Turkish workers. Although its implementation is not tied to a particular deadline, Article 12 contains a binding obligation for Member States to establish the freedom of movement.

\(^4\) The German Federal Archiv (Bundesarchiv) in Koblenz, the Historical Archives of the European Union in Florence, and the Political Archives of the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt)

I. The Ankara Agreement and Germany’s preferences on the freedom of movement provisions

Background

The first steps towards the association agreement were undertaken by Turkey and not the EEC. Accordingly, Turkey applied to be an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC) on 31 July 1959. This was shortly after Greece put forward its application. An association agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the EEC (Ankara Agreement) was signed on 12 September 1963 and entered into force on 1 December 1964 (Bridge 1976: 161). The association agreement between Greece and the EEC was concluded two years earlier on 9 July 1961, after negotiations that were less lengthy than the ones on the Ankara Agreement. The former entered into force November 1962 (Rey 1963: 54; Wülker 1971: 63; Önis 2001: 108). The Ankara agreement was concluded to make Turkey an associate member of the EEC, to establish a customs union and to possibly pave the way for a Turkish membership to the EEC (Deutscher Bundestag 1964b; Joseph 2006: 3). 

Free movement of workers (Articles 12, 13 and 14)

Article 12:

The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of progressively securing freedom of movement for workers between them.

Article 13:

The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 52 to 56 and Article 58 of the Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of abolishing restrictions on freedom of establishment between them.

Article 14:

6 Officially, the Ankara Agreement was supposed to lead to full Turkish membership in the EEC. However, given the development of the negotiations about Turkish membership to the EU, it comes to mind that references to Turkey’s full membership in the Ankara Agreement might have been opportunistic rhetoric.
The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 55, 56 and 58 to 65 of the Treaty establishing the Community for the purpose of abolishing restrictions on freedom to provide services between them.

Article 12, 13 and 14 of the Agreement comprise provisions of economic migration, i.e. the freedom of movement of workers. Ceylanoglu (2004: 18) suggests that these provisions were taken from the Treaty of Rome which together with its four freedoms served as a model for the association agreement and that there was no disagreement about the freedom of movement provisions in the negotiations. The paper shows that this is only partially true, as there was some disagreement and the wording and content of the freedom of movement provisions in the Ankara Agreement differs from both the Treaty of Rome and the Association Agreement with Greece.

Article 12 refers to the establishment of the freedom of movement between the EEC and Turkey. This provision is based on Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the EEC Treaty. Article 13 is to establish the abolishment of restrictions on the freedom of establishment between the EEC and Turkey. It is based on Articles 52 to 56 and Article 58 of the EEC Treaty. Article 14 obligates the contracting parties to do away with any restrictions on freedom to provide services between them (Council of the European Union 1992). The Agreement also contains a number of further economic provisions for economic union regarding for instance, transport, competition, taxation, balance of payment, movement of capital. The Articles, including the ones on the freedom of movement, are only brief and rather vague in their wording. They are supposed to be supplemented with additional protocols by the end of the preparatory stage (Wülker 1971: 65). Article 36 of the Additional Protocol provides for the gradual establishment of free movement by 1986, with the process managed by the Association Council (Ugur 1999: 143). As Member States do have veto points in the Council, freedom of movement was never established.

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7 The four freedoms include the freedom to move (I) people, (II) goods, (III) services and (IV) money freely around the EEC (and later the EU).
8 Supplemented by personal communication with author, 28 April 2008.
9 Articles 48-50 of the EEC Treaty lay down the provisions on freedom of movement for workers within the Community.
10 Articles 52-56 and 58 of the EEC Treaty refer to the freedom of establishment within the EEC.
Preferences of the federal government of Germany

The German government supported including provisions on the freedom of movement and the right of establishment, and the freedom to provide services, in the Ankara Agreement. In the course of the pre-negotiation talks, Germany lobbied for the inclusion of these provisions in the Agreement (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1963a). The only condition was that these provisions should apply to both EEC and Turkish nationals (Council of the European Economic Community 1959a). Officially, the Ankara Agreement was supposed to lead to eventual EU membership. Hence, the German government thought the Agreement should be modelled as closely as possible to the Treaty of Rome, including its provisions on freedom of movement, right of establishment, and the provision of services. The next section will explore what the existing literature can contribute theoretically to answer the question why Germany supported the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement and distil two hypotheses.

II. Conceptual framework

The Ankara Agreement has been researched by scholars from different disciplines, including, law, history, economics and political science. However, the political dynamics, in particular with regard to the provisions on the freedom of movement for workers have not been explored in detail. Thus the paper filters relevant propositions of existing works and uses them to assemble an analytical framework consisting of two multi-dimensional hypotheses which will then be used to explore the empirical jungle of mountains of archival material to extract the causal mechanisms that led the particular position of the federal government of Germany. Theoretically, the paper is on the nexus between European integration and immigration policy making. Hence, both streams of literature have to been consulted.

Hypothesis One: Economic Situation in Germany

a) Strong economic growth in Germany makes it easier for the government to support common EU measures on legal economic migration.
b) In periods of strong economic growth Germany has more open immigration policies.

c) There is a positive relationship between more open national immigration policies and the willingness to agree to common policy measures on the EU level.

Economic considerations play an important role in the formulation of immigration policies. Economic prosperity instigates states to accept more immigrants. Conversely, during recessions states are more reluctant to admit migrants which can damage bilateral ties between sending and receiving countries (Miller 2000: 36). Meyers (2004: 12) suggests that the economic situation impacts immigration policy through the interest group channel, and, mostly in times of economic crisis, also through the partisan channel. During periods of strong economic growth, employers are eager to hire additional workers and they employ their resources to lobby for liberal immigration policies. Domestic workers are happy over immigration inflows as long as they take low-paid jobs, allowing the domestic workers to improve their social position (Meyers 2004: 12). This can be underpinned by a liberal economic model: continued supply of labour keeps firms’ wage bills low and profits up, hence making sure there is a favourable climate for investment, improved productivity, low inflation, and increased consumption. This model predicts – rather optimistically – strong economic growth and increasing wages as long as labour supplies are unlimited and demand is increasing (Lewis 1954; Kindleberger 1967; Hollifield 1992: 104). In times of recession, the model breaks down because of decreasing demand and the augmented importance of political reasons, first because of realist considerations that immigration is no longer necessary to sustain economic growth and second due to domestic interest group and partisan politics pulling the government towards a more nationalist stance (Hollifield 1992: 109).

**Hypothesis Two: Pressure of Third Country**

a) A country that has the opportunity to influence the German position on immigration policies if

   i) the geopolitical security situation makes it an important partner for Germany.

   ii) it has strong historical ties with Germany.

b) A country that makes use of this opportunity by cleverly farming the issues at stake and exerting effective diplomatic pressure has a significant impact on the German government’s position on a particular migration issue.
Third countries or sending countries can have an impact on immigration policies of receiving countries. However, such considerations do not feature very prominently in the literature on national immigration outcomes. Emigration countries generally advocate open policies because of the prospects of curbing illegal migration and securing the sending of remittances (Miller 2000: 36). For sending countries to have an influence on receiving countries’ preferences, policies, or agreements, two conditions need to be in place. First, they need to have the opportunity and second they need to make use of the opportunity, i.e. frame a particular policy issues in a way that allows them to influence immigration policies of receiving countries. Lavenex (2001: 25) defines policy frames as “the ideational core of a particular policy field, which contains the dominant interpretation of the underlying social problem and expresses guideposts for action.” Once created, policy frames structure actors’ perceptions and interpretations and influence the political decision-making process.

First, the opportunity of a sending country (or a group of sending countries) to influence the German government’s preferences on immigration policies can be a result of the general geo-political security situation. The link between immigration policy and security or military motivated consideration has been used in the literature to explain national immigration policies. This is in accord with realist (see, for instance, Morgenthau 1978) and neo-realist writings (see, for instance, Waltz 1979) on International Relations, putting forward a simplified model of the state as a unitary actor behaving rationally in the pursuit of maximising its power and attributing the highest importance to security issues on the foreign policy agenda (Meyers 2000: 1263; Hollifield 2004a). While realist approaches are seen has only having a marginal value in explaining international migration policies apart from refugee polices (Meyers 2000: 1265), this paper argues that security political considerations play an important role in explaining why Germany supported the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement. Rudolph offers a theoretical model explaining different outcomes of migration policy by the primary independent variable “structural threat environment” (Rudolph 2006: 29-40). The author puts forward that immigration policies that served foreign policy and economic interests enabled

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decision-makers in Germany to successfully fight the Communist threat during the beginning of the Cold War, i.e. accepting foreign workers kept the German economy growing and healthy to prevent potential Soviet expansion (Rudolph 2006: 102). Other scholars argue that countries are generally willing to accept immigrants from particular countries for the sake of foreign policy goals, such as fostering relations with allies or sustaining political links that have been established in the past (Meyers 2004: 15). The US, for instance, has employed immigration policy as a tool to achieve certain foreign policy objectives. Generally this took place in revising restrictive national immigration laws in order not to endanger deterioration or to improve relations with a country of particular foreign policy interest. Examples are the annulling of immigration laws excluding Chinese workers to move to the US, after the US had an interest in fostering friendly relations with an ally during the Second World War in 1943, and the favourable treatment of the Western World in maintaining “good neighbour” relations (Díaz-Briquets 1995: 161; Stanton Russel 1995: 61-70; Zolberg 1995: 120-121). The 1968 recruitment treaty between Germany and Yugoslavia is also attributed to the restoration of diplomatic relations as part of the beginning Ostpolitik (Thränhardt 1996; Meyers 2004: 165). Also the recruitment quota that the German government attributed to Tunisia is said to have served foreign policy considerations (Schönwälder 2004: 254). The paper argues that in order for security concerns to influence a receiving country’s immigration policies, diplomatic pressures of the sending country (or a number of sending countries) need to be exerted.\footnote{The importance of foreign policy factors has been analysed also in the context of EU immigration policies and have been argued to be an important factor for formulating such policies. Gatev (2008), for instance, shows that the EU cooperates with third-countries on a wide range of possible immigration measures – be it accepting migrants to EU territory or borderline cooperation – in order to achieve a different set of immigration unrelated foreign policy considerations, such as energy security or knowledge of a strategically important region on the frontier between East and West.}

Second, countries that have the opportunity to have an impact on a particular sending country tend to be countries with special ties to that country. Generally, post-colonies of European countries are given as examples. For instance during the period of decolonialisation after World War II, Algerians were considered French, Caribbean and Indian migrants were subjects of the British crown and later British citizens, and Molukkans were Dutch citizens (Thränhardt 1992: 21-23; Cornelius, Martin et al. 1994: 15-22; Joppke 2005: 95-96). Although treatment of nationals from those countries was far from perfect and also at times was strained by the shadows of colonial history, such as entrenched social,
economic, and racial hierarchy, it was much easier for them to be accepted as a migrant in their respective former colonial power (Chin 2007: 27). With regard to Germany, historical links (together with foreign policy relations) to Yugoslavia contributed to conclusion of the labour recruitment agreements (Meyers 2004: 165). Also, the fact that the idea of foreign labour recruitment entered German economic discourse in late 1952 is partly due to Italian requests to Germany policy makers to accept seasonal workers from Italy (Rudolph 2006: 2006). That Tunisia was granted an immigration quota to Germany in 1965 was chiefly due to Tunisia’s president Bourgiba reminding the German government of Tunisia’s support when other Arab countries turned their back to West Germany due to weapon deliveries to Israel (Schönwälder 2004: 254).

Sending countries’ decision to influence a receiving country, such as Germany, can be motivated by a number of factors, most notably, developmental economic benefits, geopolitical security benefits, and historical rivalries with neighbouring countries. Regarding economic benefits, prospects of remittances, easing the tense domestic labour market situation, and transferring skills from the receiving to the sending country are important considerations. Poland’s efforts to conclude agreements with Western European countries that would enable Polish workers to attain employment abroad, for instance, was part of a conscious emigration policy aimed at easing the country’s difficult economic situation resulting from the transition to a market economy (Kicinger 2009: 90). This was the only way to decrease unemployment (Zientara 2008: 422). Similar developments can also be observed for other cases, such as Mexico (Fitzgerald 2006). Thus, the gist of hypothesis two is, that by making use of the traditionally cordial relationship between the two countries while framing the Soviet threat as a significant danger to Turkey, and articulating this vis-à-vis the German government in an effective way and according to its interests, the Turkish government influenced the position of the German government it is favour.

III. Explaining Germany’s preferences on the freedom of movement provisions

The empirical analysis tests the two hypotheses developed in the preceding section. Germany’s preferences were formulated by the government and relevant ministries (Haftendorn 1983: 51;
Ceylanoglu 2004: 21). At the time when the Ankara Agreement was debated, European Integration was a process that happened almost unnoticed by the general public (Görtenaker 2002: 145-146). There was very little newspaper coverage on the Ankara Agreement, not even to mention the provisions on the freedom of movement. Hence, public opinion and the media did not play an important role in the preference formation on the Ankara Agreement and the freedom of movement provisions. Neither is there any indication that the employer associations held active positions with regard to the Agreement. Also the Länder governments were not involved in the preference formation of the German government. Even if they had been, they probably would have been in-line with the federal government as it did not face any significant opposition in the Bundesrat between 1959 and 1964.\(^\text{13}\) The position of the German government concerning associating Turkey with the EEC has been shared in trade union circles (cf. Donner 1959; Schröder-Brzosniowsky 1959; Donner 1961; Donner 1963).\(^\text{14}\) However, there are no separate statements on the provision on freedom of movement, right of establishment, and the provisions of services.

However, interest groups or private actors came in through “the back door” as they contributed their part in making the German government to sign the bilateral recruitment agreement with Turkey which in turn had an important impact on the German government’s preferences on the freedom of movement provisions. This will be analysed in detail in section III. Competency on formulating the preferences on the Ankara Agreement was largely a bureaucratic matter and happened between the relevant German Ministries. As the EEC was still in its infancy, competences on formulating Germany’s position on European integration were not yet clear cut. Both the Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Economics shared responsibility on European Integration and thus also with regard to the Association Agreements. The Foreign Office was masterminding the general process with the Ministry of Economics having the final say on economic matters. In practice, general and economic matters were sometimes difficult to disentangle which produced fertile ground for competency struggles between the two ministries (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1959a). Thus Germany’s preferences on

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\(^\text{13}\) The Bundesrat is the upper house of the German parliament and represents the Länder.

\(^\text{14}\) In the Journal Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, which is supposed to be the theoretical centre for debate in the German trade unions, it has been repeatedly argued that concluding an association agreement with Turkey would be beneficial for the EEC on political and economic grounds. Nonetheless, the problems an association agreement with Turkey posed were also discussed.
the Ankara Agreement were by and large formulated between the Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Economics, with other Ministries, such as Justice, Employment and Social Affairs, and Interior only playing a marginal role. With regard to macro decisions, the final say was with Chancellor Adenauer (cf.: Müller-Rommel 1994: 162; Rudzio 2003: 289-290).

**Germany’s economic situation**

The first causal factor is the general economic situation Germany was in. It was very positive and made the government confident to agree to provisions of freedom of movement with Turkey, even though they were not directly needed to fill Germany’s labour shortages. Thus, in line with hypothesis one, Germany’s healthy economic situation was a necessary condition for its support for the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement.

*Figure 1* indicates the healthy shape of the German economy in the late 1950s and early 1960s. *Figure 2* shows the number of employees in Germany that were foreign nationals. There is a sharp increase in foreign nationals working in Germany from 1959. In addition to the strong economic expansion, the age structure of the German population, the built-up of the *Bundeswehr*, the prolonged schooling time and the cut-off of the migration flow from Eastern Germany due to the erecting of the Berlin wall in 1961 increased the demand for foreign workers in Germany (Schönwälder 2001: 159). The decrease in German labour force is illustrated by *Figure 4*. The figure also demonstrates that the overall labour force is slightly increasing up until 1965, due to labour immigration. This is made even clearer when also taking into account *Figure 5* that displays the increased labour migration to Germany. *Figure 5* also shows that the number of vacancies is more or less constant between 1960 and 1965 – despite the grown overall work force, suggesting that new jobs kept being created. *Figure 3* splits up the number of foreign workers according to nationality. It indicates a significant increase in Turkish workers once the bilateral recruitment agreement between Germany and Turkey was put in place in 1961 (and when its revised version entered into force in 1964).
The positive economic climate enabled Germany to give substantial financial assistance for Turkey within the framework of the Association Agreement. Germany could afford to make sure that the negotiations would not collapse or be postponed even longer due to the EEC’s unwillingness to provide support to the Turkish economy and without which no realistic plans for a customs union not even to mention EEC membership for Turkey could be made. For instance, Germany took the biggest share of the burden to provide financial assistance to Turkey. Of the 175 Mio US Dollar of pre-association aid, Germany provided 58.5 Mio US Dollar (around one third) (Özren 1999: 244).

Figure 1: Real GDP Growth Rate West Germany, 1959-1965

Sources: Eurostat New Cronos (France), Herbert 1986, 2001 (Germany)
Figure 2: Foreign Workers in Germany (in thousands)

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt

Figure 3: Foreign Workers in Germany, by country of origin (in thousands)

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt
Figure 4: Labour Force in Germany (in thousands)

Source: Herbert (2001: 207)

Figure 5: Foreign labour force and job vacancies in Germany (in thousands)

Source: Herbert (2001: 207)
Germany was suffering labour shortages by the time the Ankara Agreement was negotiated and there was no sign that the situation would change in the near future (Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaft Zeitung 1959; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1959e; Düsseldorfer Nachrichten 1961; Kölner Stadt Anzeiger 1963). That Germany actually needed foreign labour contributed to the fact that immigration was a topic that was not controversial in domestic politics and decisions could be taken within the government ministries, largely shielded from the general public. In addition, labour shortages were hampering economic growth and thus standards of living, so no major interest group, e.g. employer associations and unions, or party was opposed to labour migration to Germany (Chin 2007: 37-38). Furthermore, despite the high immigrant inflow during the 1950s and 60s, there was no significant opposition in the German public (Hollifield 1992; Brochmann 1996). The first scattered critical voices began to emerge in the mid-1960s in form of newspaper articles and references in parliamentary debates (Schönwälder 2001: 179-1982). The importance of the economy and hence support for hypothesis one is also provided by the fact that recruitment of foreign labour to Germany decreased temporarily during the recession between 1966 and 1967 and came to an standstill – with the exception of family reunification, asylum, and migration of the highly skilled – after the first oil shock hit the German economy in 1973 (Geddes 2000: 2; Geddes 2003:81-82). Thus hypothesis one can be confirmed.

Opportunity and Framing

The second hypothesis consists of two different parts. First, Turkey was given the opportunity to influence Germany by the particular security situation of the cold war and the good state of its historically devolved relationship with Germany. Second, Turkey used this opportunity by lobbying Germany effectively to adopt a position favourable to Turkey. The following sections discuss each part of hypothesis two.

Opportunity One: Cold War geopolitical security concerns

The Cold War geopolitical security concerns contributed a great part to Turkey having the opportunity to influence the German position on the freedom of movement provisions. The rather general term “security concern” covers a couple factors. First, military security considerations related to the security
threat emanating from the Soviet Union, and second Germany's limited foreign political room for manoeuvre due to its dependence on US military support. At the turn from the 1950s to the 1960s, the Cold War was raging. The Soviet Union with its expanding nuclear programme was perceived as a very important threat in the West. This was particularly the case for Western Germany, which was the epicentre of the Cold War and as a defeated power of World War II not in the possession of nuclear arms and in the position to defy the Soviet Union with its own military capacities. The threat of war was most immediate during the Berlin Crisis when the Soviet Union annulled the four power status of Berlin and which climaxed with the building of the Berlin wall in 1961 (Hacke 2003: 86-87). It was crucial for Germany to have very close ties with the Western powers and to intertwine as deeply and quickly as possible with the member countries of organisations, such as the EEC and the NATO. Being integrated into the EEC gave Germany, which then still was a defeated nation without any foreign political influence, a voice on the European level (Lappenküper 1992: 89). Integrating with its Western European neighbours was then seen as the prime route to re-establish some of Germany's geopolitical power. It also made Germany, at least *de jure*, an equal partner in the European project. German Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard mentioned the importance to find a quick solution for the Greek and Turkish bids in order not to upset the governments and publics of those two countries that constituted a cornerstones of NATO (Council of the European Economic Community 1959b). A German *aide-mémoire* indicates the importance of Turkey's geographic location and military considerations for the conclusion of the Agreement (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1963b). In a meeting held in the Council of the EEC at 3 April 1962, the German delegation reminded the other Member States that it is important not to offend Turkey for security political reasons (Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1962).

Germany was dependent on US goodwill and support in order to have a comfortable position in terms of geopolitical security and avoid the outbreak of a war on its territory. Germany was no nuclear power and needed support of the Western powers, in particular the US to deter the Soviet Union whose influence began immediately after the Federal Republic of Germany's eastern borders (Adenauer 1959-250; Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1962; Rudzio 2003: 17). This “fundamental dependence” (Johnson 1973: ix)
made Germany subordinate to the US and meant that German politicians had to take into account US interests when making foreign policy (Besson 1970: 185). Negotiations of the Ankara Agreement show that US pressure was an important factor in the EEC’s efforts to integrate Turkey into Europe. This is particularly the case for Germany (Commission of the European Economic Community 1963; Özren 1999: 243; Krieger 2006: 189). The US also exercised diplomatic pressure in support of the Athens Agreement, including a visit to the Auswärtige Amt in 1960 (Ceylanoglu 2004: 217-218). The US influence impacted on Germany also through another channel, namely direct US diplomatic pressure with regard to the EEC association agreement with Greece. Head of the Unit dealing with European Affairs in the Federal Ministry of Economics, Mr. Jentsch, was called by the US embassy inquiring about the validity of rumours that Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard, did not support the EEC Association Agreement with Greece (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1959b). With regard to the Ankara Agreement, such a direct pressure cannot be found (Ceylanoglu 2004: 217-218). Nonetheless, the US was favourable towards Turkey becoming an associate member of the EEC.

The containment policy of the US inaugurated by the Truman Doctrine in 1947 made it an important US foreign policy goal to support states endangered by Communism and Soviet rule, such as Turkey, and to anchor them in the West (Rudzio 2003: 14-15; Krieger 2006: 171-172). Turkey was particularly important as on 30 October 1959, it had agreed to station US missiles on its ground that could reach the Soviet Union. This made Turkey extremely important to the US, as only two further countries (the UK and Italy) had agreed to station such missiles on their ground (Jamin 1998: 70-71). Consequently, the US supported the Ankara Agreement, largely on political grounds (Ceylanoglu 2004: 213-218). The US was even prepared to put up with exposing its products, most notably tobacco, to increased competition with Turkish (and Greek) products within the EEC’s markets, in order to tie Turkey closer to the West (Council of the European Economic Community 1963). Regarding economic relations, increasing financial aid from the EEC to Turkey meant a relief for US finances (Gürbey 1990: 175; Özren 1999: 293; Krieger 2006: 37). In particular with regard to Germany and its increasing economic prosperity and capacity, the US expected a return service for the Marshall Plan (Krieger 2006: 178). In addition, the US held particularly close ties with Germany as preventing Germany to become a negative force in Europe again was the foundation of legitimacy for US hegemony in Europe (Krieger
The US supported closer and institutionalised ties between the EEC and Turkey also on budgetary grounds. Nonetheless, it has to be noted that financial aid to Turkey was politically motivated and sought to increase the West’s influence in the region. The US expected the German government to take “the leading role” in providing financial assistance to Turkey. The German government did not have much latitude in that respect and met the demands. Thus, Germany supported Turkey’s fast integration in the West by means of the Ankara Agreement. It sought to avoid any weakening of Turkey which was seen as an important pillar for the West and NATO partner vis-à-vis the Soviet threat (Erhard 1959; Krieger 2006: 178). Generally, security political concerns, reflecting a logic of Realpolitik on the side of the German government, provide a convincing explanation for why Germany supported the Ankara Agreement as a whole. However, they do not give an indication of why the freedom of movement provisions feature in the Agreement. In order to explain this why need to include further causal factors in the analysis.

*Opportunity Two: close historical relationship*

The relationship between Germany and Turkey has been a special and cordial one, making the German administration rather receptive to Turkish demands. Germany was an important trade partner and ally for Turkey and in addition, the two countries were united by the long-established “German-Turkish friendship” and the alliance in the First World War. Unlike a few years later, in the 1950s and early 1960s this “friendship” was still an appropriate characterisation of the German-Turkish relations (Gürbey 1990: 9-10). The German Foreign Office praised this alliance and friendship strongly in 1963 and attributed great significance to it. Hunn describes the reciprocity of these appreciations with reference to archival material (Hunn 2005: 34-35). A internal document of the Foreign Office indicates that the traditional bond with Turkey and the experience of Turkey as a reliable ally were still important considerations for Germany when the Ankara Agreement was discussed (Auswärtiges Amt 1959). In July 1962, the Turkish government thanked the German government in a *aide- mémoire* for its continued support of the Turkish bid (Turkish Embassy to the Federal Republic of Germany 1962). This special relationship gave Turkey the opportunity to voice its interest to the German government with a good chance of being taken seriously. The active desire of Turkey to join the EEC, which

15 Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin.
manifested itself for the first time in its application for EEC associate membership in 1959, built on this opportunity.

Turkish Diplomatic Efforts

The provisions of the freedom of movement for workers were important for Turkey. In the late 1950s, Turkey was in an economic and political crisis with inflation increasing by 60% between 1954 and 1958 (Gitmez 1989: 4). The Turkish government anticipated that freedom of movement provisions promised several immediate benefits to Turkey that would change the status quo to the better (Escobar, Hailbronner et al. 2006: 716). First, Turkey’s economy was suffering of sustained underemployment (Hunn 2005: 33). This was because its high birth rate, mechanisation of agriculture, and rapid industrialisation left many workers without a job. The possibility to export workers to the EEC promised relief for the domestic labour market. A further benefit was that Turkish workers could obtain professional qualifications in the EEC that would benefit Turkey’s economic development after return of the workers. Remittances from workers abroad could improve Turkey’s balance of payments (Wülker 1971: 69). Figure 6 indicates the increasing number of Turkish labour emigrants from 1961 to 1973. Interestingly, the Turkish delegation initially was more interested in receiving qualified workers from the EEC to provide technical assistance rather than sending Turkish workers to the EEC (Commission of the European Economic Community 1959b; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1959c; Council of the European Economic Community 1959c). In addition, the long-lasting rivalry with Greece which applied for EEC associate membership a few months before Turkey was important for Turkey’s motivations. This point will be discussed in more detail below.

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16 At the time when the freedom of movement provisions were negotiated, it was not clear that their date of implementation would be kept extremely vague.
It is argued here that Germany supported them to not endanger the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement. In order to advance its goals, Turkey used two framing devices, first the Soviet threat and second being disadvantaged vis-à-vis Greece. Thus Turkey wielded some political power to assert its demands vis-à-vis the Community and Germany because the German government saw Turkey as a very important partner for the EEC in terms of security. The Turks were careful to also frame the issue like that. For instance in April 1962, the Turkish Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, stressed the fragility of its country despite it being an important pillar of NATO, and expressed his concern about the prolongation of the conclusion of the Agreement by the Community (Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1962). On a more general note, in August 1961, the Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Rauf Sarper conveyed an *aide-mémoire* to the German Embassy in Ankara expressing explicit Turkish expectations for German support of the Turkish bid for associate membership (Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Ankara 1961c).

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17 For the years 1961 and 1962, Keyder and Aksu-Koç (1988) list different figures than the ones from the Turkish Employment service used by Martin (1991) for official workers sent abroad (4041 and 8620 respectively). The estimates of unofficial migration assume that unofficial emigration is 25% of official migration rounded to the nearest 100.
However, most important is that Turkish motivations to join the EEC have to been seen in light of the developments that took place in the wake of Greece’s bid for EEC membership. Turkey did not want to fall behind its main rival Greece that had applied for EEC association membership in June 1959, two months before Turkey (Commission of the European Economic Community 1960b; Auswärtiges Amt 1961a). Thus, the Turkish government used the necessity of equal treatment with Greece as a second framing device to make its case vis-à-vis the EEC. A letter about the German position sent within the German Ministry of Economics states that also the Commission saw the Turkish desire for equal treatment with Greece as the main reason for its attempts to conclude the Association Agreement with the EEC. The letter further argues that sensitivity of both the Greeks and the Turks as well as their mutual jealousy blocked the way to an Association Agreement with Turkey that differed fundamentally from the one with Greece. The letter further put forward that although an Agreement with Turkey that was completely identical to the one with Greece was not desirable due to Turkey’s lack of economic development, there was not much latitude to take this into account (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1961). Also, a note on the federal government’s position with regard to the Association Agreement with Turkey shows that it was considered as politically impossible to refuse Turkey to become associate member of EEC such as for instance Greece (Council of the European Economic Community 1961). This argument is further corroborated by the fact that the Turkish delegation was at times badly prepared for the negotiations and predominantly tried to achieve the same provisions that have been agreed in the Athens Agreement (Commission of the European Economic Community 1959a; Commission of the European Economic Community 1960b). Turkey actively exerted pressure on Germany and the other EEC Member States, for instance orally by Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, also with reference to the importance of equal treatment with Greece (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1960b).

This Turkish behaviour induced by its relative position to Greece is also the key for the freedom of movement provisions in the Ankara Agreement. Before the Athens Agreement was concluded, Turkey did not have any particular demands with regard to freedom of movement, apart from technical assistance from the EEC (Council of the European Economic Community 1959d). At a later stage of the negotiations and after the Athens Agreement was successfully signed, the Turkish delegation’s
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Proposal on the content of the freedom of movement provisions consisted of a copy of the text of the relevant provisions of the Athens Agreement (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1963c). It is important to note that Turkey made explicit demands for the freedom of movement provisions, i.e. they needed to be similar to the ones in the Athens Agreement. Ceylanoglu (2004: 18), for instance, misses this point. However, after Turkey articulated this demands, the Community did object to have the same provision in the Ankara Agreement and pushed for formulations that were less encompassing (Auswärtiges Amt 1963). Title III of the Ankara Agreement does not include articles on the exchange of young workers and the provision of technical assistance by the Community from the like of the ones in the Athens Agreement. In addition, the wording of the freedom of movement provisions in the Athens Agreement is stronger than in the Ankara Agreement. Thus, Title III of the Ankara Agreement was neither completely uncontested, nor is just a copy of Title III of the Athens Agreement. The next section discusses the bilateral labour recruitment agreement between Germany and Turkey and its importance for Germany’s position on the freedom of movement provisions.

Bilateral Agreement

Germany and Turkey concluded a bilateral labour recruitment agreement on 30 October 1961 after around one year of exploratory talks and negotiations (Hunn 2005: 29). Figures 3 and 6 indicate the increase in the Turkish workforce in Germany after the agreement was concluded. This agreement was a necessary condition for German support of the freedom of movement provisions. When the Athens Agreement was negotiated, Germany agreed to support the freedom of movement provisions as it had concluded already a bilateral agreement with Greece in 1961 to recruit workers which was more concrete and comprehensive. Hence, German policy-makers were the opinion that the freedom of movement provisions of the Athens Agreement could well be included as they would not have any practical significance (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 1960; Commission of the European Economic Community 1960a). Also with regard to Turkey, Germany was attributing greater importance to the bilateral agreement than to the regulations in the Association Agreement. As the federal government had already concluded a bilateral agreement with Turkey on 30 October 1961 (Vereinbarung zur “Regelung der Vermittlung türkischer Arbeitnehmer nach der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”), it had no problems to support the provisions on the European level, as it thought that the actual regulation of the
movement of Turkish workers would be regulated by the bilateral agreement. The bilateral agreement had entered into force retroactively on 1 September 1961 (Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1962; Hunn 2005: 46). It specified the selection procedure and a model work contract. The agreement was less generous than the ones with the other European countries, such as Italy, Spain, and Greece as it contained no provisions on family reunification and requesting specific Turkish workers by name. Moreover, it restricted the stay in Germany to two years (Bundesminister für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1962; Steinert 1995: 308; Hunn 2005: 55-56). This reflects that the German government was initially not very keen on concluding such an agreement with Turkey (Generalkonsulat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Istanbul 1960). In September 1960, the Federal Agency for Labour and the Auswärtige Amt in November 1960 did not see any need to conclude a recruitment agreement with Turkey as the ones already in place would cover the German need for workers more than enough (Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung 1960; Auswärtiges Amt 1960b; Hunn 2005: 46).

The bilateral agreement – as the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement – can be explained by hypothesis one and two. The following section puts this claim to the test. In accordance with hypothesis one, the fast growing German post war economy with its hunger for foreign workers was a necessary condition for the German government to support the agreement. Also the run of Turkish workers interested in working in Germany to the German representations in Turkey was very high and contributed to German politicians recognising the necessity to conclude a bilateral agreement with Turkey (Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Ankara 1961a). German firms were enthusiastic about employing Turkish workers and, in spring 1961, an increasing number of company and human resources directors undertook independent recruitment efforts in Turkey (Generalkonsulat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Istanbul 1961). For instance, Tarik Kadam, a Turkish Civil Engineer working for Stuttgart-based construction company Karl Kübler, travelled to Istanbul to recruit in total 105 Turkish workers. In March 1961, The German general consulate in Istanbul had such a massive amount of recruitment demands by German firms that it decided to ask the Foreign Office for

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18 A revised version of the agreement came into force on 30 October 1964, which made its provisions very similar to the other bilateral labour recruitment agreements.
advice. These developments contributed their share to the Federal Ministry for Labour deciding to be in favour of meeting Turkish demands to produce an official bilateral agreement (Bundesarbeitsministerium) (Hunn 2005: 49). The Federal Ministry of the Interior was still reluctant to support a bilateral agreement. The Foreign Office proposed to send a recruitment commission to Turkey that together with the Turkish government was supposed to manage German labour recruitment. In July 1961, the ministries concluded that it was necessary to successfully negotiate an agreement. The Federal Ministry of the Interior managed to keep the final version of the agreement less generous than the agreements with Italy, Spain and Greece but could not avoid its conclusion as other influential ministries such as the Federal Ministry of Employment and the Foreign Office plus a number of important interest groups, such as the business lobby, favoured the agreement (Hunn 2005: 52-59). Generally, the German immigration policy at that time was rather intransparent and was made shielded from the public (Schönwälder 2001: 197)

As put forward by hypothesis two, it is important to note that the Turkish government had to exert serious diplomatic pressure in order to convince the German government to sign a bilateral recruitment agreement. The opportunity structure to influence the Germany position was the same as for the Ankara Agreement. Germany influenced the Germany government by framing the issue in a way that Germany might be in the process of offending an important NATO partner and with reference to the good relations it had with Germany (Steinert 1995: 306-307; Schönwälder 2001: 252). The Turkish embassy in Bonn conveyed a verbal note in which Turkey argues that as an important NATO partner, the Turkish government would need to see itself necessitated to regard a German “no” to the bilateral agreement as a dispraise vis-à-vis countries with similar geographic distance to Germany, such as Greece (Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung 1960; Auswärtiges Amt 1960a; Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Ankara 1961b). In addition, the Turkish government loosened travel restrictions for Turkish nationals to make the case for a bilateral agreement due to the expected increase of labour migration from Turkey to Germany. The bilateral agreement put emigration of Turkish workers to Germany under governmental control which was an important consideration for the Turkish government (Keyder and Aksu-Koç 1988: 14). Other sources show that the Turkish government also made the case for the bilateral agreement on economic grounds (labour shortages in
The above arguments made it impossible for the German government to resist the bilateral agreement with Turkey (regarding the foreign policy argument, see, Steinert 1995: 307; Jamin 1998: 70-71; regarding migration control dimension, see, Schönwälder 2001: 252). The Auswärtige Amt was the first ministry to support the conclusion of a bilateral agreement because of the strong diplomatic pressure of Turkey (Hunn 2005: 48), and tried to persuade the still reluctant ministries, such as the Federal Ministry for the Interior, to do the same (Auswärtiges Amt 1961b). However, this resulted in some concession to the demands of the Federal Ministry of the Interior which meant that the bilateral agreement was less far-reaching than the ones with Italy, Spain and Greece. The position of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern) was that there should be no permanent employment for Turkish nationals in Germany and that there should be health checks, and strict control over recruitment (Steinert 1995: 308). To ensure that the Federal Ministry for the Interior pushed for an agreement rather than an exchange of notes as initially envisaged by the Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales) (Schönwälder 2001: 252). The agreement was concluded without decision in the German cabinet (Schönwälder 2001: 307). The Federal Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs accepted the arguments put forward by the Foreign Office. The President of the Federal Employment Agency (Bundeanstalt für Arbeit), Anton Sabel, negotiated the first draft of the agreement in Turkey in summer 1961. The agency, which is subordinate to the Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs, thus had a great impact on the content of the agreement. The Federal Ministry for the Economy did not have any significant influence on the bilateral agreement as it only received the draft agreement for information purposes without having the opportunity to suggest amendments (Jamin 1998: 72). However, the ministry had more impact in the negotiations of the revision of the agreement which entered into force in September 1964.

The employer associations and trade unions did not take significant influence in the negotiations on the 1961 bilateral agreement (Schönwälder 2001: 308-309). The Bundestag did not discuss the
bilateral agreement either (Schönwälder 2001: 347-348). The German government was keen to keep the conclusion of the agreement as secret as possible to prevent other states from making claims for similar agreements with Germany. The Federal Ministry for Employment asserted the decision-making on issues of labour migration against the Federal Ministry of Economics in 1955 which was confirmed again in 1965 (Schönwälder 2001: 305).

Turkish efforts to include the Title III were necessary for the German government to support the provisions. However, arguably more due to seeking equal treatment with regard to Greece than due to economic considerations. In addition, the bilateral agreement Germany had concluded with Turkey shortly before the negotiations on the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement took place, was important to secure the German government’s support. This confirms hypothesis two and shows that Turkey firstly, had the opportunity to yield influence over Germany due to the close historic bond of the two countries and secondly, used it by exerting diplomatic pressure on Germany and framing of both the bilateral agreement and the Ankara Agreement as issues that might offend Turkey as an important NATO partner which would be very detrimental for the West due to the tense Cold War security situation.

IV. Conclusion

The paper has derived two multilayered hypotheses to explain why the federal government of Germany supported the freedom of movement provisions of the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement. Hypotheses one sheds light on the economic side of the argument. It shows the important role the Germany economy played in the preference formation of the German government. There is a positive relation between strong economic growth and the willingness of a government to support common EU measures on legal economic migration. Also, the hypothesis suggests that strong economic growth makes a government more inclined to have relatively open immigration policies on the national level and that such policies make it easier for the government to agree on common EU measures in that domain. The analysis of the bilateral recruitment agreement between Germany and Turkey shows the importance of the agreement for the German position on the freedom of movement provisions of the
Ankara Agreement. In so doing, it also confirms the link between national immigration policies and European level measures.

Hypotheses two complements the findings highlighted by hypotheses one in focusing on the role Turkey played in influencing the German position. The hypothesis consists of two main elements: first, the opportunity structure for Turkey to have an influence and second targeted Turkish diplomatic effort to use the opportunity by framing the relevant issues in an effective way. The opportunity is bestowed to Turkey by its important geo-political role in the security situation of the Cold War and its long-established friendly relationship with Germany. These opportunities are used by the Turkish government in a shrewd and successful way. Turkish motivation can be explained by the desire of equal treatment with Greece that concluded an association agreement with the EEC and a bilateral agreement with Germany shortly before Turkey did, and developmental economic considerations. This applies both for influencing Germany’s support for the freedom of movement provisions of the Ankara Agreement and its willingness to conclude the bilateral labour recruitment agreement. The bilateral agreement plays a central part in the argument because the German government attributed greater importance to the regulations on the bilateral level that were more explicit and far-reaching than what was agreed on in the Ankara Agreement and were seen as to regulate Turkish labour migration flows to Germany. Hence, it was a necessary condition for the German government to support the freedom of movement provisions. The developments regarding the bilateral agreement and Germany’s support of the agreement can also be explained by hypotheses one and two.

The existing literature on the Ankara Agreement (see, for instance, Gürbey 1990; Özren 1999; Ceylanoglu 2004; Krieger 2006) does not provide a satisfactory explanation of why the freedom of movement provisions are included in the Agreement and focuses too much on security political factors and as a result misses the complex interplay of political and economic factors that led to Germany’s support of the freedom of movement provisions. The paper has shown that the freedom of movement provisions were not just taken from the Treaty of Rome, as put forward by the literature, but are modified versions of the provisions in the Athens Agreement.
The two hypotheses developed and tested in this paper are part of a conceptual framework able to explain Member States' support for common EU measures in a general way. The ability of the two hypotheses of not just explaining Germany's preferences on the freedom of movement provisions but also on the bilateral agreement with Turkey underpins such claims of generalisability. The paper highlighted that in order to explain the preferences of Germany on common EU measures on legal economic migration, a complex array of different causal factors need to be included in the analysis. While economic factors lately have been prominent in attempts to explain such developments, the importance of sending countries' effort has not featured in many analyses. But potentially, it is exactly this factor that has been missing in recent years. This will be explored in the following papers of the dissertation.
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