Images of Europeans: In-Group Trust and Support for European Integration

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Abstract

Prior research on citizen support for European integration does not consider how individuals’ evaluations of European nationalities are associated with support. This paper fills this gap by developing a political cohesion model based on social identity theory. I claim that the probability of supporting integration increases with greater levels of trust in fellow Europeans, which assumes to reflect their positive images. Also, trust in northern EU nationalities improves the probability for support, more so than trust in the southern nationalities due to the latters’ lower economic development. Controlling for various factors, the ordered logistic regression analysis of five Eurobarometer surveys data from 1980-1994 among the first 12 EU members support these claims.

Early thoughts regarding European integration promoted an idealism of uniting a people by establishing a community of Europeans. However, this goal is more pragmatic than idealistic in facilitating positive-sum transactions. This paper demonstrates, both theoretically and empirically, the connection between the level of cohesion in the trans-European political community and support for integration. The model proposed here will also detail how identity cleavage (along a north-south dimension) in the political community is associated with support for integration. Without a political community, it may be difficult to see any significant degree of support for components of the political system, such as institutions or politicians (Easton 1965: 189). Deutsch refers to a political community as a “people who have learned to communicate with each other and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of goods and service” (1953: 61). This definition captures the notion of a political community as the amount of cohesion among individual citizens; individuals are part of a defined community because they have developed a social-psychological attachment with one another through greater communication and understanding. What has often been referred to as a “we feeling” (Deutsch et al 1957: 36) has also been captured in other, more general, renditions of community (Taylor 1972; Harrison 1974). In sum, a political community is “that aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor” (Easton 1965: 177). The emphasis is in individuals drawn together for the purpose of operating within a common structure.

The ideas and practice of European unification is an example of political community building. Jean Monnet and others in the pan-European movement held a vision that is reflected in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome: integration is a project establishing a polity with a common political structure. My central argument is that support for integration is associated with the
formation of a European political community. The foundation of this community is the development of positive images among fellow Europeans because such images broaden in-group membership. However images of individuals marked by a north-south identity will have different effects on support for European unification. The remaining sections will detail the importance of in-group membership for an individual’s motivation to support integration. I test the hypotheses using ordered logistic regression analysis using data from five Eurobarometer surveys conducted from 1980-1994 among the first 12 members.

Self-interest, trust, and cooperation

Easton’s (1965; 1975) theoretical work views public support as being either specific (also known as utilitarian support) or diffuse. This section differentiates the motivations of both types and concludes that given differing motivations, variables that explain one type of support may not be as powerful in explaining the other type. Specifically, motivations for utilitarian support are primarily self-interest in nature while diffuse stems from a common interest motivation. Individuals provide utilitarian support when the state provides acceptable outputs (which can be economic or non-economic gains for the individual); in so doing, the state maintains the system through citizen support (Easton 1965: 157). Utilitarian support is especially popular among researchers in the context of European integration. They build upon the conceptualization of self-interest, which has long been the cornerstone of understanding political decisions (Olson 1965). Researchers point out that motivations for utilitarian support arise from evaluations of the EU’s ability to provide benefits and minimize any negative effects, including the changing role of the EU as integration evolves (Anderson and Reichert 1996). Feld and Wildgen’s (1976) work shows a connection between support levels in the four core countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) to that of welfare increases in the early years of integration. The attempt at
explaining support continued with Handley (1981) who descriptively notes that the economic downturns of the 1970s dramatically lowered support levels for the EEC. Eichenberg and Dalton’s (1993) refined the testing of this argument by looking at the various levels of influence on support levels with similar results. Others have also built upon this method of analysis with analogous findings (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Duch and Taylor 1997). Moreover, others have taken a more direct approach and predicted the probability of their support given the individual’s socio-economic position in the economy and the expected effects of market integration (Anderson 1991; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998).

Other individual motivations, while being self-interest in nature, are not necessary economic. The founders of European integration were driven by the memories of catastrophic wars and hoped that regional integration would be a vehicle for a permanent peace (Deutsch et al 1957; Haas 1958; Etzioni 1965; Mitrany 1966). Europeans also supported integration, in its early years, in part for its promise to prevent war (Hewstone 1986). However, with the passing memory of war and the end of the Cold War, physical security is not as strong a factor in supporting integration as it once was (Gabel 1998). Other benefits include a more effective form of governance that is lacking at the national level due to underdeveloped welfare benefits and high levels of corruption (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).

These studies provide insights into utilitarian support levels, but answer only a narrow range of questions and provide, at best, short-term explanations. Business cycles and other factors that influence self-interest motivations help to explain utilitarian support, but these variables do not explain how psychological factors, such as in-group/out-group dynamics, would also influence support. Such dynamics would explain how Europeans’ views on fellow
nationalities in the EU relate to utilitarian support and can serve as a more stable explanation because it relies on deep-seated perceptions.

Diffuse support is a “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants” (Easton 1965: 273; 1975: 444). Easton goes on to say that such support “is an attachment to a political object for its own sake, it constitutes a store of political good will. As such, it taps deep political sentiments and is not easily depleted through disappointment with outputs” (Easton 1965: 274). What “an attachment” refers to is not quite clear. Easton does mention that it is associated to a “sense of community” (1965: 325) but this concept also lacks specificity by leaving its definition as “the degree of solidarity” (1965: 184). In the simplest formulation, diffuse support occurs after a period of time when specific support is present (Easton 1965).² Diffuse support enters the picture when the political system has a “communal ideology” that promotes a common interest (Easton 1965: 333). However, common interest is not entirely separate from self-interest. It is possible for a collection of individuals to have similar interests; however the summation of these interests does not necessarily define a common interest. Common interests arise from a coordination of similar self-interests. This coordination is more likely at higher rates of political cohesion, as measured by trust in others. Common interest develops because there is a “sense of community” where individuals strongly identify with one another (Easton 1965: 326).

Developing explanations for supporting integration by understanding the role of common interests are not new. One of the more cited sets of work in this area is the postmaterialist argument. Inglehart (1971; 1977a; 1977b) states that Europeans were socialized in an environment of high rates of economic growth. As a result individuals in the post-war era
developed a different set of values (different from prior generations) that are amiable toward the prospects of regional integration. These individuals personally identify with supranational institutions and thereby give the process their support. However, Janssen (1991) and Gabel (1998) dispute this claim with empirical evidence. Their research finds little evidence for the relationship between postmaterialism and support for integration. In fact, the little evidence that does exist indicates that postmaterialists are less likely to support integration. However, the problem is not in the value of the postmaterialist explanation, but what it was trying to explain. Researchers used the postmaterialist variable in order to explain utilitarian support. However, the postmaterialist argument is not suited to explain such a variable. Postmaterialism cannot tell us how postmaterialists or materialists reach their opinions (Rochon 1998). In fact, it may be possible for both value sets to favor regional integration but for different reasons. It is easy to see that materialists would be in favor if they believe that regional integration will provide material and physical security. One can assume that postmaterialists would be in favor if they believe that it is a means to solve trans-national problems (e.g. clean air, water, etc.). This tells us that we need to understand the dependent variable (the type of support) in order to develop explanations.

**A political cohesion model for EU support**

Research that looks at common interest motivations for individual support for integration has mainly focused on the factors that would impede the formation of the political community. They echo the claim by Dahl (1989) that an attachment allows for easier rule because it adds legitimacy to those that govern by the governed. McLaren (2002) demonstrates that hostility towards other cultures effects attitudes towards the European Union. Carey (2002) also demonstrates that a strong national attachment lowers the probability that an individual will support regional integration. In addition, Van Kersbergen (2000) explains support for the EU by
examining the role integration has in forming primary national allegiances. These researchers demonstrate that these attitudes pose a problem in developing a European identity and thereby lower the chances of supporting the EU. In developing a political cohesion model, I focus attention on individuals’ direct evaluations of members of the trans-European society.

I link support for integration to individuals’ perceptions that integration is a group effort. This perception can have a positive effect on support and tied to the usual collective action problems. Support improves with higher levels of cohesion among individuals in a political community. Greater cohesion lowers the barriers to collective action that are needed to solve problems facing Europeans. Of course, the actual problems are specific to the year or decade.

Political cohesion is closely associated with establishment of a common identity. Through a common identity, individuals can rationalize that individual problems are actually collective problems and that societies need to forge links, by way of integration, if they are to be solved. A common European identity is not necessarily associated with a foundational mythos, ethnic affiliation (Obradovic 1996), common language, or shared customs (Smith 1992), or any characteristic that we usually associate with national identities (Zetterholm 1994; Cederman 1996; McKay 1996). However, it does have a similarity with national identities in that it is “imagined” and develops through the construction of a society (Anderson 1991). This notion of “imagined” speaks to the malleable nature of identity and is therefore a construction or adaptation to new political and/or economic realities rather than from biological or common blood rationalities. In its construction, individuals make choices as to who can and cannot belong to a specific identity. In fact, individuals may also choose to belong or not to belong given the characteristics of those who already claim the identity. This concept of in-group/out-group
identity (who is and is not a member of group) will be shown as being important in the social-psychological dynamics within and among such groups in a political community.

The construction of a European identity has been associated with a common belief in liberal-democratic values (Moravcsik 1993; Beetham and Lord 1998), which have been codified in the legal formation of European citizenship. However, the average EU citizen may not have this level of sophisticated understanding of identity given that they are not well informed (Anderson 1998). The more reasonable approach in explaining support for integration is through the psychology of common interest evaluations.

Piaget (1965) stated that building attachments to groups is part of normal human behavior. These attachments promote cohesion among group members and are associated with the social-psychological phenomena of in-group bias and subjective images. Individuals become members of the in-group because the group fulfills some need (Terhune 1964; Winter 1973; Stogdill 1974; McClelland 1975; Bass 1981). At the level of national identity, individuals attach themselves because they see the nation as the embodiment of what is important (DeLamater et al. 1969). Also individuals will interact with individuals who are members of another group if the other group’s members share some commonality with in-group members (Brewer 1968). The members of both groups are more trusting of each other and thereby facilitating cooperation among members. One often cited definition of trust is “the probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing anything to bring them about” (Gamson 1968: 54). That is, group members will not need to monitor each other because there is confidence that interests are aligned. Putnam (1993) shows, in the Italian cases, that the level of trust one has for others produces effective institutional performance because of the higher probability of obtaining cooperation. It lowers the costs of association because of the perception that individuals will not
cheat or defect. In paraphrasing Wintrobe (1995: 46), trust yields a stream of future returns on exchanges that would not otherwise take place because trust makes behavior predictable and stable. Therefore, individuals may develop overlapping group memberships or an integrated identity when trust is present. When trust is not present, overlapping memberships do not occur and group status becomes exclusive.

How is political cohesion, as measured by trust levels, associated with support for European unification? Why would the north-south cleavage partially explain the variation of these two types of support? Social identity theory provides a good framework in getting answers to these questions, namely the two phenomena of in-group bias and out-group bias. In-group bias is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of their in-group versus others who are not members (the out-group members) (Tajfel 1978). In early psychological experiments individuals tended to give more rewards and side with other members of their group because of their affiliation. These biases occurred even when test subjects were only recently informed that they belong to a particular group and had never met nor interacted with other in-group members (Tajfel 1978; Turner 1978; Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1982; Brewer and Kramer 1985; Messick and Mackie 1989).

The cause of this bias, as put forth by Tajfel (1981; 1982), is due to positive evaluations individuals have for members of their group. They join and are identified by such groups because, as stated above, the group symbolizes a set of values. By associating with similar-valued individuals, self-esteem improves because values are reinforced. This self-esteem further improves when individuals make favorable comparisons between the in-group and out-group. Not only are they part of a subjectively valued group, the in-group is also subjectively judged as better than the other out-groups. Therefore, by tying an individual’s social identity to the importance of the in-
group, group maintenance or cooperation for group survival becomes important. To this end, individuals will tend to give favorable biases to fellow group members.

Out-group bias, however, is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of out-groups instead of members of their own in-group. Out-group bias occurs when the two groups under observation are self-determined to be of differing social status (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1986). Individuals from the lower status group have negative evaluations of members of their group when compared to the higher status out-group. The negative evaluations stem simply from their lower status position and are tied to their self-esteem. The relative evaluations lead members of the lower status group to have positive evaluations of higher status members and thereby extend favoritism to them. This phenomenon occurs when the lower status group feels that the higher status group is legitimately in their position and that the status hierarchy is stable (neither group will change their status) (Turner 1978). However, the members of the higher status group will continue to exhibit in-group biases because they have positive evaluations of their members and negative evaluations of the members from the out-group. Again this stems simply from the differing social status of the groups (Turner 1978).

Since cohesiveness is a function of in-group evaluations associated with identity, it is important to revisit the possible phenomenon of overlapping in-groups. This is important in the context of integration because the formation of a European identity is not theorized to replace national identities but to coexist with them (Deutsch et al. 1957). This is where the concept of image becomes important. Kelman (1965: 24) states that image

…refers to the organized representation of an object in an individual’s cognitive system.

The core of an image is the perceived character of the object to which it refers – the
individual’s conception of what this object is like. Image is an inferred construct, however, rather than a mere designation of the way the object is phenomenally experienced.

Scott, more succinctly, defines “…an image of a nation (or of any other object) constitutes the totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation” (1965: 72). In addition, such images are subjective (Kelman 1965: 27). Individuals can use images of other groups to formulate likes and dislikes for and positive or negative stereotypes of out-groups (Druckman et al. 1974; Hewstone 1986; Druckman 1994). A positive image therefore develops the likelihood that multiple identities form as members of in-groups view the values of out-group members as similar and therefore compatible. Groups can, by this mechanism, tie themselves together in a unifying identity, in one extreme, much like individuals do with one another in forming group attachments. Recall that individuals tend to form groups, in part, because of emotional importance to the group’s symbolic values. If a subset of such values is present in other groups, then a broader identity will form without necessarily dissolving prior identities. The individuals in the broader group (one that includes two or more in-groups) can now operate with similar cohesiveness as the individual in-groups. However if such values are not present then the in-group and out-group biases will manifest leading to a lack of cohesiveness.

In the context of Europe, individuals may support integration when they have a positive image of other EU nationalities. This positive image may result from evaluations of similarity on a number of issues and thus an individual will tend to view other nationalities as more in line with the in-group versus an exclusive out-group identity. While Europeans may see some difference in tastes, such as food, music, art, etc., such differences would only limit the possibility of replacing the national identities with a European one. Where there are similarities, a cohesive political
community can develop. Subjectively perceived dissimilar values would produce less trust and lowers the probability of supporting integration.

Among the first 12 members of the EU, individuals can subjectively perceive differences along a north-south divide. Images of southern nationalities as lesser developed economically due to holding dissimilar values are prevalent in the minds of some. The resulting image of a more economically developed north can point to significant differences among the peoples of Europe. The issue of development is an important aspect because the level of economic development is perceived as an outcome of commonalities specific to the northern and southern sub-regions. The cultural factor that influences social-psychological perceptions may well have its roots in the Protestant reformation. This, along with the 30 Years War and the resulting Treaty of Westphalia, established national cultures along a Catholic-Protestant divide. While the religious roots of development can be debated and refuted, the idea of a cultural explanation for development may linger in the mind of the average European. Niedermayer (1995) has already observed that there is a variation in trust among the first twelve EU nationalities. On average, northern nationalities were given more trust than southerners. But what is not clear from his research is the distribution of trust level across northern and southern respondents. Also, this research does not link trust levels to support, but does make a case for looking at trust in community building.

Using the logic of social identity theory in the context of EU, I propose to test the following hypotheses. First, there is a positive association between the overall level of trust for fellow EU nationalities and support for integration. This trust is assumed to reflect the positive image of the European nationalities in the mind of the respondent. Positive images reflect group overlaps and the associated biases. Second, there would be a larger impact of trust in northern nationalities than in southern ones on support. Given the lower economic development of the southern nationalities,
southerners would comprise the lower status group. This lower status would promote biases against southerners and wishing to exclude them from the broader European in-group. Lastly, the larger impact of trust in northern nationalities would be present among both northern and southern respondents. This again is due to the lower economic status of southerners and the associated in-group bias among northerners and out-group bias among southerners. Given that the northerners would be in the higher status in-group, they would wish to exclude themselves from a community that requires inclusion of the lower status group.

**Data description and testing procedures**

The public opinion data come from multiple *Eurobarometer* surveys (1980, 1986, 1990, 1993, and 1994).\(^5\) As with most studies using secondary data, great efforts were taken to optimize the operationalization of the variables by following the suggestions made by Kiecolt and Nathan (1985). Special attention was given in selecting specific surveys so that the questions offered sound measures for the variables. Since all the relevant questions were not asked after 1994, the analysis includes only samples from the first twelve members of the EU. Some of the samples were collapsed while others were not included: The Northern Ireland sample was included in the British sample and the East German sample was omitted given its unique attributes.\(^6\) I use a weighted variable so that no national population will be over or under represented in the data (the European weight) because all tests are at the individual level.\(^7\) This variable also adjusts for any over or under representation of socio-economic groups.

OLS regression techniques are not permissible because the dependent variable is ordinal. Because it is not continuous, applying OLS techniques will produce inefficient coefficients that may lead to type one and two errors. The appropriate technique is to employ ordered regression models, specifically, an ordered logit model (Long 1997). Each model will be evaluated based
upon its significance of explanation. The evaluations of the coefficients will be solely based on their statistical significance and direction of signs. The independent variables will then be judged based upon their contribution to predicting the probabilities of the dependent variable’s values.

**Dependent variable**

The dependent variable is support for European unification. The question is a trend question and normally appears in every *Eurobarometer* survey:

*In General are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?*

1. For very much
2. For to some extent
3. Against to some extent
4. Against very much.

In the post 1990 surveys, the phrase “Western Europe” was replaced by “Europe.” The responses for this question were recoded so that larger values measure higher levels of support.

**Independent variables**

The following are the explanatory variables, each of which measures the respondent’s trust in fellow EU nationalities. The operationalization of the trust variable is through a series of questions asking the respondents to gauge their trust in EU nationalities:

*I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust, or no trust at all?*

1. Lot of Trust
2. Some Trust
3. Not Very Much Trust
4. No Trust at All.

The respondents go through and assign a level of trust to each nationality including their own. This variable therefore measures both trans-national trust levels as well as intra-national trust levels. Since trans-national trust is the variable of importance in this research (the trust one has for fellow Europeans that are not members of the respondents’ nationality), I coded intra-national trust as missing. The values were also recoded so that larger values correspond to higher levels
of trust. A confirmatory factor analysis will be performed to see if the 12 individual variables do in fact group along northern and southern dimensions.

Control variables

The analysis requires the use of control variables so that the results are understood in the light of some prevailing hypotheses.

Utilitarian support. Easton (1965) noted theoretically that individuals give diffuse support after they have given specific (utilitarian) support. Therefore utilitarian support partially explains diffuse support. Since the dependent variable captures can capture the concept of diffuse support, a variable measuring utilitarian support is therefore need. Gabel (1998) suggests the following question:

*Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of the European Community [European Union] is a good thing, bad thing, or neither good nor bad?*

1. Good Thing 2. Bad Thing 3. Neither Good nor Bad

The responses for this question were recoded so that “good thing” has a value of 3, “bad thing” has a value of 1, and “neither good nor bad” has a value of 2.

Education. To measure this variable, I use a standard question found in all *Eurobarometer* surveys since 1970: How old were you when you stopped full-time education? The responses are then collapsed into 9 groups: values from 1 to 8 begin with the age of 14 and end with the age of 21, with the value 9 assigned to those who finished after the age of 22. Individuals who are still studying are recoded into their appropriate age group based on their response to the question requesting their age. Although they have not completed their studies, this method captures the height of their educational status at the time survey.

Democratic Deficit. The democratic deficit is a widely talked about problem in EU politics (McCormick 1999; Schmitter 2000). The magnitude of the problem can be seen in the large
public protests outside Council and IGC meetings. Rohrschneider’s (2002) analysis indicates that there is a positive relationship between being satisfied with EU level democracy and support for integration. Unfortunately, the question measuring satisfaction with EU level democracy was asked in only two of the five surveys used in this analysis (1993 and 1994). To include this variable would therefore drop the number of observation years and potentially including a bias in the results. Instead I employ the following question which captures the degree to which individuals are satisfied with democracy in their country:

*On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?*  
1. Very satisfied  
2. Fairly satisfied  
3. Not very satisfied  
4. Not at all satisfied.

I justify using this variable as a proxy for satisfaction with EU level democracy due to the high correlation (gamma=0.46). This indicates that the two variables are actually measuring overall satisfaction with democracy. The variable was recoded so that larger numbers represent satisfaction with democracy.

**Income.** Respondents were asked to choose an income range that would include their annual household income (13 standardized levels). No specific hypothesis is developed here with regard to this variable’s contribution to explaining support for integration.

**Ideology.** Prior research demonstrates the negative association nationalism has on both identity formation and support (McLaren 2002; Carey 2003). One method to measure this possible effect is through left-right self-evaluations. The respondents were asked to place themselves on a left-right continuum. The range is one to ten with ten being the most extreme rightist ideology. I hypothesize that the higher values of this variable will be negatively associated with support for integration for reasons given in McLaren (2002) and Carey (2003).
Country and year effects. Country and year dummies are included in each of the models but the results are not reported due to space constraints. These dummy variables control for effects that are specific to either the countries in the analysis or the year of the surveys. In each regression one country dummy variable is omitted and the base year is 1980.

Explaining support for the EU

The overall results of the analysis show that political cohesion is an important factor in explaining support for the EU. The first step was to determine if the trust variables measured the latent dimensions described in the theoretical section. I hypothesized that trust in the EU-12 nationalities measures political cohesiveness. However, this trust is thought to be divided along a north-south dimension. The confirmatory factor analysis using the maximum likelihood method (varimax rotation) presented in table one indicates that two factors do indeed underlie the trust variables. Trust in the northern nationalities group together in one factor loading while trust in the southern nationalities fall into another. This indicates that evaluations of these two groups take on different dimensions. The variables that measure trust in the northern nationalities were summed together and divided by seven or six to produce one variable. The variables that measure trust in the southern nationalities were summed together and divided by five or four to produce a second variable. By dividing the additive term by the appropriate number, the range of the variable is restricted to between one and four, thereby allowing comparability when interpreting results. The reliability coefficients for both indexed variables are quite high (\( \alpha = 0.85 \) for the northern trust variable and \( \alpha = 0.79 \) for the southern trust variable), indicating a very good fit among the variable components (DeVellis 1991).

Table two presents the first results of the ordered logit regression with support as the dependent variable. Each of the two models is significant as shown by their respective chi-
squares. Model one tests the relationship between trust for all EU-12 nationalities and support. The sign of the coefficient is positive and significant, indicating that the more an individual trusts members of other EU nationalities, the higher levels of support. This result holds even while controlling for the other variables. The second column in table two shows the marginal changes in the predicted probabilities of respondents stating that they are “very much for” European unification. Each value indicates the marginal change in this probability associated with the independent variable as it moves from its minimum to its maximum value while holding the other variables constant at their means. Respondents are about 27.4 percentage points more likely to strongly support unification as we move from the lowest to the highest level of trust in fellow EU nationalities. The EU-12 trust variable has a larger marginal change than any of the control variables save utilitarian support.

Model two in table two substitutes the EU-12 trust variable with those that measure trust in the northern and southern nationalities. The results fall along expected lines. Both variables are positive but trust in northern nationalities has a higher level of statistical significance. The coefficient for the northern trust variable is larger than the southern variable. The difference is statistically significant (p = .0000). As individuals’ trust in northern nationalities moves from the minimum value to the maximum value, we see a 24.4 percentage point increase in the probability that they will be very much for unification. The same change in the values for trust in southern nationalities produces an approximate 3.1 percentage point increase. In total, the results indicate the greater importance of trusting northern nationalities vis-à-vis southern nationalities in predicting the probabilities that individuals will say that they are for unification.

For the final steps of the analysis, I break the data down into northern and southern respondents and reexamine model two of table two. In this analysis the nation weight was
employed instead of the European weight because the analysis examines individuals from specific member countries. Table three displays the results of the reexamination. The values represent the probability that respondents would state that they are “against very much,” “against to some extent,” “for to some extent,” or “for very much.” The rows labeled “Trust in northern nationalities” have the northern trust variable set at the highest level, the southern trust variable set at the lowest level, and the remaining variables set at their means. The opposite is true for the row labeled “Trust in southern nationalities.”

The first entries in table three are for the southern respondents. The results indicate that trust in northerners and southerners are of unequal value among the southern respondents when trying to predict the varying levels of support for unification. Southern respondents who highly trust northerners are 52.8 percent likely to be strongly supportive of unification. These same respondents are 19.7 percent likely to make the same statement at the highest level of trust for southerners. The second sets of entries are for northern respondents and tell a similar story. Those that highly trust southerners have a 13.8 percent likelihood of strongly favoring European unification, but those that highly trust northerners have a 30.3 percent likelihood. Trusting people of northern nationalities has a larger impact on supporting unification than trusting southerners.

**Conclusion**

The political cohesion model can be an aid in explaining the probabilities for supporting the EU. Greater levels of trust among individuals are significantly associated with higher probabilities of supporting integration. Given the lower level of economic development among the southern countries, individuals that trust these nationalities are less likely to see the common interests involved in building an untied Europe. In short, the north-south demarcation is significant for Europeans when supporting integration.
Two important items must be considered with regard to these results. Neither of these items would necessarily put into question the results found in this paper, but are important enough to consider. First, given that the surveys used in this analysis are old, we would need to obtain up-to-date data that indicates that the association between trust among Europeans support has not changed. However, there is nothing in the model’s logic that makes the arguments any less salient today. Also, year dummy variables were not significantly different from the base year, which indicates that there is a lack of temporal influence. However, more current data is an important way to determine if the findings of the 1980s and 1990s hold today.

Second, Europe has expanded further eastward. This fact may not necessarily add complexity to model. Since trust in northern nationalities proved to be more important than trust in southern nationalities, it may be true that trust for the eastern nationalities may prove to be less important as well. If economic development is the key factor in understanding why trust in northern nationalities is more important, then trusting eastern nationalities may prove to be an even less important factor due to their lesser developed economic status vis-à-vis the southern periphery.
Table 1

Maximum likelihood factor analysis for trust in EU nationalities (varimax rotation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trust in:</th>
<th>Factor loading</th>
<th>Factor loading</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourgers</td>
<td>.799</td>
<td>.214</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>.791</td>
<td>.206</td>
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<tr>
<td>Danes</td>
<td>.776</td>
<td>.205</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgians</td>
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<td>French</td>
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<td>.458</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 10362.02; \text{df} = 43; p < .000$

Trust in northern nationalities reliability $\alpha = .85$
Trust in southern nationalities reliability $\alpha = .79$
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Marginal Changes in Probabilities$^1$</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Marginal Changes in Probabilities$^1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in all EU-12</td>
<td>.503***</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationalities</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in northern</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.450***</td>
<td>.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationalities</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in southern</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.053*</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationalities</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control variables</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with</td>
<td>.176***</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td>.169***</td>
<td>.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy</td>
<td>(.018)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left/Right self</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>placement</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe good/bad</td>
<td>1.48***</td>
<td>.378</td>
<td>1.50***</td>
<td>.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.023)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic variables</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.027***</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.026***</td>
<td>.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.021***</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.020***</td>
<td>.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^1$</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.01</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^2$</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.74</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau^3$</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$ (degrees of freedom)</td>
<td>7492.5(20)***</td>
<td></td>
<td>7787.0(22)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log likelihood</td>
<td>-21169.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>-21710.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>22,936</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,936</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses; $***p \leq .000; **p \leq .010; *p \leq .050$;
$^1$Ordinal value of “For very much”
Table 3

Ordered logit model: Predicted probabilities for support for European unification on trust for Europeans among southern and northern respondents¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Southern respondents</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Against to some extent</th>
<th>For some extent</th>
<th>For</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in northern nationalities</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.434</td>
<td>.528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in southern nationalities</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>.650</td>
<td>.197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Northern respondents</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Against to some extent</th>
<th>For some extent</th>
<th>For</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in northern nationalities</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.579</td>
<td>.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in southern nationalities</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.202</td>
<td>.595</td>
<td>.138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Southern respondents = French, Italian, Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese
Northern respondents = Belgium, Dutch, German, Luxembourgers, Danes, Irish, and British
References


Endnotes

The utilitarian support approach also stems from the endogenous political economy literature, which approaches the study of integration through a rational framework. It is closely related to other works that explain the behavior of domestic forces by looking at group motivations and their impact on national government decision (Downs 1957; Gamson 1961; Ames 1987; Levi 1988; Geddes 1994; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). The primary motivation of the political elite is either to remain in power or to allow a particular political party to remain in power. Therefore the politician will form coalitions among societal groups for this end. The wishes of the domestic forces need to be satisfied before the next turn in the election cycle occurs. Endogenous economic theory applies this logic to nation-state policy formulation regarding the global economy. Individuals form coalitions depending on their role in the economy (Stopler and Samuelson 1941). Such roles are economic factors (Rogowski 1989), economic sectors (Gourevitch 1986), or sectors that have specific assets (Frieden 1991). Each group will make their economic cost-benefit calculations and support foreign economic policies on this basis.

2 See Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt (1981) for the evidence of this process in the case of post-war Germany.

3 Due to data limitations, the hypotheses will only focus on the first twelve members of the EU.

4 While Greece is neither Catholic nor Protestant, it will be grouped together with the former.

5 The survey responses fall under the category of a repeated cross-sectional data set. Given the fact that no panel data are present (because different individuals are surveyed over the time frame) it would be inappropriate to consider the data as time series cross-sectional (Beck and Katz 1995). Therefore time series techniques and diagnostics would be inappropriate.
The East German sample may exhibit questionable results given its early phase of democratic transition and its recent membership, which may distort findings. One such fear is an inaccuracy of questionnaire responses due to the public’s long legacy of authoritarianism.

The nature of the hypotheses requires an individual level analysis. While some researchers believe that aggregation of individual level responses to opinion surveys remove random “noise” from the measurements (Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), research shows that the error associated with individual level variation may be systemic (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000). Therefore aggregating the data would not remove any associated “noise,” but instead may harm the robustness of potential results due to a lower number of observations.

This is contrary to what is stated in the Eurobarometer codebooks. The codebooks state that individuals are not asked to rate trust for their fellow nationals. However a look at the data clearly shows that this is not the case. Researchers should pay close attention before using this variable.

Every attempt was made to include controls for alternative explanations. However since this analysis includes five time points, some questions that may prove interesting were not included in all the questionnaires. This included the battery of questions that tapped into postmaterialist values and cognitive mobilization (Inglehart 1977b; 1990). Since no reliable proxy is available, these variables were omitted. Finally, age was omitted since it is associated with the education control variable.

McLaren (2002) and Carey (2003) used survey questions that directly measured nationalism. I use the left-right self-evaluations as a proxy given that the surveys used in this paper did not have direct measures.
11 Unrotated confirmatory factor analysis and exploratory factor analysis produced similar results.

12 Recall that the respondent will only evaluate the trustworthiness of nationalities excluding her or his own. Therefore the scale is divided by (n-1) when that respondent’s nationality is in the scale.