IT GOES (ALMOST) WITHOUT SAYING: EUROPE IN THE BELGIAN PARTIES Kris DESCHOUWER Martine VAN ASSCHE Vrije Universiteit Brussel Vakgroep Politieke Wetenschappen Pleinlaan 2 1050 Brussel Kris.Deschouwer@vub.ac.be Martine.Van.Asche@vub.ac.be Paper prepared for presentation at the European Union Studies Association Ninth Biennial International Conference Austin, Texas March 31 - April 2, 2005 In this paper we try to show to what extent the process of Europeanization has affected party politics in Belgium. First we make a few methodological remarks, mainly defending the assumption that Europeanization must be broken down and contextualized. The effects of Europe on a national polity depend very much on the specific nature of that national polity. We then proceed to the presentation of the Belgian case, making the point that Belgium is a country in which the European issue has an extremely low salience. This means that there is very little direct effect of Europeanization to be seen on the party life. Europe is rather something that can be used by the parties whenever they need it. Then we look at the way in which Europe might have affected the party competition, by focussing on the evolution of the political cleavages. We defend the idea that especially the ethno-linguistic tensions have been thoroughly redefined and reframed by the European context. When looking for Europe in the party statutes and in the party’s internal life we do indeed find some evidence that the Belgian parties function in a European environment. Yet this evidence does not show a really devastating effect of Europe on the Belgian parties. Interviews with Belgian MEPs, MPs and party staff do confirm us though that Europe is increasingly there. 1. EUROPEANIZATION: OBVIOUS BUT TRICKY CONCEPT Party politics has mainly been studied within the context of national states. That is very normal. Parties – at least as we commonly define them – are closely and explicitly associated with the process of boundary closing that created the modern state. The state level is the context within which political representation in the modern sense was developed. The analysis of the origins of parties, of their ideological background and of their organizational forms has been done with reference to theories of modernization (e.g. Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Lapalombara & Weiner, 1966; Duverger, 1951). The notion of party system itself refers explicitly to the interconnectedness of one set of parties within the territorial boundaries of a political system. The process of European integration affects the existing forms and mechanics of political representation. We do expect this influence because the once relatively closed boundaries of the nation state – at least in terms of opportunities for the voicing and organizing of interest and thus for the organization of the linkage between politics and society – are being eroded (Bartolini, 1998; 1999; 2002). The process of Europeanization reshuffles and redefines the territorial boundaries of the states because it changes the realm of their political and administrative control. ‘Europeanization’ has received a variety of meanings and definitions, because it is a very complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. We will not go deeper into this discussion and simply use a very general and broad definition of Europeanization: ‘the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social institutions that formalize and routinize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules. Europeanization involves the evolution of a new layer of politics which interacts with older ones in ways to be examined” (Bartolini, Risse & Stråth, 1999: 1). One of the aspects to be examined is the impact of the Europeanization process on party politics at the national level. The contextual changes we are witnessing are not marginal. They involve a thorough and deep rethinking of the political space, probably of the same relevance for politics as the creation of the nation-state. We might even think of the process of European integration as a new ‘critical juncture’ in the development of the political institutions of Europe. Like the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the consolidation of national states, the industrial revolution and the development of the modern welfare state, this critical juncture will affect political contention, mobilization and decision-making. If we follow this ‘Rokkanian’ logic the assessment of the impact of the new developments should take into consideration the exact nature of the critical juncture, but also – very important – the nature and previous history of the state. The National revolution, to take just this illustrative example, did not have exactly the same impact on each of the national polities. Variation was due to the preconditions, to the way in which earlier critical junctures had already shaped and organized politics and society. This will also be the case for Europeanization. Although this seems to be a very obvious point, it deserves to be stressed: the European integration must be conceived of as having a differentiated impact on national political representation, depending on varying pre-existing characteristics of the national states and societies (Lindberg, 1971; Caporaso, Cowles & Risse, 2001; Radaelli, 2003). If the history so far has been a history of domestic differentiation (Bartolini, 1998), then one should not expect a non-differentiated impact of Europeanization, even if the overall process itself can be identified as one single type of change in European society. The dependent variable of our research can be broadly defined as the impact of Europeanization on parties and party systems. This is a very familiar approach. Political parties have always been staged in a changing environment, and have therefore always been presented as going through processes of change themselves. The origins and early development of political parties, their transformation from cadre to mass parties, their subsequent adaptation to catch-all and cartel parties, the rise and success of new-politics parties and of right-wing populist parties are all stories of adaptation and change. The societal, economic, cultural or politico-institutional environment changes and thus the parties follow. They adapt and they look for new opportunities. To this story we have now to add the analysis of change and adaptation that comes as a result of Europeanization. Even if we avoid a too deterministic flavor, and assert that the changing institutions also offer new constraints and opportunities for deliberate party actions, we still assume basically a causal arrow going from institutional change to party adaptation and change . This leads to serious problems of multicausality. Parties have always been changing. Especially during the last few decades a huge amount of theories and research evidence on changing parties has been produced. Even if one adopts the more skeptical view that many basic things are still very much the same, it is difficult to ignore the processes that have been labeled as value change, dealignment, increasing volatility, the transformation of social democracy, the rise of greens and right-wing populist parties or party decline. And these are then only the evolutions referring most directly to parties and party systems. To that list we have to add – at least – the legitimacy crises of traditional organizations like trade unions and churches, and more generally the processes of privatization, liberalization, rationalization and globalization, each hiding in turn a complex story. All these general changes are related to party change. Is Europeanization then to be considered as a new and separate change, or is it part of it? Are these changes already part of the Europeanization, of the erosion of boundaries, of the redefinition of identities and interests that come with it? These questions can probably not be fully answered. Multicausality is certainly not a problem solely related to the analysis of Europeanization. We should however be aware of the problem, and try to pin down the eventual specific effects of the European integration process that would then probably have to be broken down into more concrete and specific variables. Furthermore the exact nature of the relation should also be kept in mind (see also Knill & Lehmkuhl, 2002). The institutional changes produced by Europe can be a direct causal factor. The direct election of the European Parliament for instance can be seen as the direct cause of the creation and consolidation of transnational party federations. Europeanization can also be a reinforcing factor. Right-wing populist parties might eventually use the extra European context to mobilize even more against opaque decision-making structures in which there is no room for a direct link with the people. Europeanization can eventually also stop or slow down a number of processes. It is then a counteracting factor. One possible example could be the softening of the demands of regionalist movements and parties, leaving their clear separatist positions. These were linked with and oriented at a national state, that is now being weakened by the Europeanization process, while this process also allows regions to bypass the state and to define themselves as part of a broader, non-national polity. The multicausality is related to a problem of timing. Europeanization does not come alone, and it does not come at once. When does ‘Europe’ appear on the scene and from when is it likely to produce effects? It is generally accepted that the Single European Act and especially the Treaty of Maastricht relaunched European integration and especially politicized it in the domestic political arenas. But of course economic and monetary integration was already on its way. And the direct election of the European Parliament, a quite crucial feature for the political parties, goes back to 1979. The independent variable ‘Europe’ thus needs to be unpacked and differentiated. Depending on the aspect that is being studied, the timing of relevant changes will be different. If we focus on parties and party systems, 1979 is a crucial date indeed. The ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, and especially the close referendums in some member-states is another crucial moment. But things are more complex than just this general timing of relevant events. The timing of events is a varying feature itself, having a different meaning depending on the member-states in which they occur or on which we want to assess the impact. For the six founding member- states, Europe installed itself incrementally into the national and local political institutions. For countries joining the EU later, the process of ‘meeting’ Europe and thus the impact of it has been different. That is a matter of mere timing, but might also have a cultural dimension. Britain, the southern countries like Greece, Spain and Portugal, the northern enlargement towards Finland and Sweden and more recently the enlargement towards the east has added countries with different cultural and bureaucratic traditions, having themselves a different perception of the meaning of Europe and of their place in it (Marcussen et.al. 1999). And every enlargement changes the meaning and definition of Europe for the member-states already belonging to it. The problem of timing becomes then extremely difficult to handle, but is too important to be discarded. The timing is thus in the first place a matter of the type of institution and its impact being studied, and in the second place a matter of where the impact is being studied. We have already mentioned and have to repeat here the importance of the differentiation of any impact of Europe. No general answers can be given. The only correct answer is ‘it depends’. It depends on what we look at, on when we look at it and on where we look at it. Any analysis of the possible effects of Europe not taking these methodological qualifications into account is likely to produce too general and hence wrong answers. In this paper we want to describe how Europeanization affects party politics in Belgium. We will therefore in the first place sketch the Belgian context as the crucial background against which the effects of Europe can be analysed. It is a context in which the issue of European integration has a very low salience, with all political actors basically defending in a pragmatic way a further supranational integration. The main challengers on the national level are also the main challengers when it comes to Europe: the right-wing extremist parties Vlaams Belang (formerly Vlaams Blok) in the north of the country and Front National in the south (see also Taggart, 1998). Given the electoral strength of the first in Flanders (24% of the votes in 2004), its Eurosceptical points of view could potentially alter the existing permissive consensus in the country. But so far, the party did not mobilize on the issue either (Deschouwer & Van Assche, 2005). This context makes it difficult to find explicit proofs of ‘impact’ of European integration on Belgian party politics 2. THE BELGIAN CONTEXT 2.1. The obvious Europe Belgium belongs to the six original members of what has gradually become the European Union. Europe has basically always been there and is therefore a matter of fact. Whether Belgium should be part of Europe or not, has never been an issue. In the 1950s however there was some reluctance. The idea of linking the Belgian economy into a larger market was easily accepted, but the giving away of political sovereignty lead to some discussion. The King and the Prime Minister (exceptionally a Socialist from 1954 to 1958) were not terribly enthusiastic about the whole European project. Yet when the Treaty of Rome had to be ratified in the Parliament, the Prime Minister (a Christian Democrat again in 1958) complained that only a very small number of MPs had participated in the discussion. And that was indeed the image to be seen later: Europe is simply there. Europe goes without saying. And while the political elite agrees on the European issue, the population at large is not mobilized. Until very recently, Europe was considered to be ‘foreign policy’ and ‘external representation’, and these were domains traditionally reserved to the government. Actually there is more than just this silent goodwill towards the EU. Belgium has become – especially since the 1990s (Bursens, 2002) a very active defender of the communitarian method, of the further supranational and federal integration of the Union. When Prime Minister Dehaene failed to become the President of the Commission in 1994 (because of a veto by John Major), one of the reasons for that was his far too obvious pro integration position. This might have been visible on the international scene, but in Belgium he was never seen as having any surprising views on this matter. He was and is a defender of the further integration of the Union, and this is considered to be the normal position. A Belgian Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs can only be blamed at home for not having been European enough. When Belgium takes over the presidency of the Union, this is seen as a major opportunity to try to make Europe move towards more integration. During the last presidency, Prime Minister Verhofstadt succeeded in having the so-called ‘Declaration of Laeken’ accepted and thus the organization of a Convention that should lead to a new a preferably ‘constitutional’ treaty for the Union. Former Prime Minister Dehaene was appointed as vice-president of the Convention and tried hard indeed to make the Union a more supranational organization. This elitist consensus on Europe is doubled by a very high acceptance of the European Union among the Belgian population. Europe is a good thing. That is what the Belgians believe. According to the Eurobarometer surveys, the percentage of the Belgians thinking that the European membership is a ‘bad thing’ for the country is usually below 10%. The highest point ever was 19% in 1996 (see figure 1 below). Yet one cannot say that Europe has had no visible effect on Belgian politics and policies. Especially the convergence criteria for the participation in the single currency have put an extremely high pressure on the Belgian decision-makers. When the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the budgetary deficit was 7% of GDP, while the public debt was at a peak of 135%. When the decision about the participation in the EMU had to be taken, the yearly deficit had been brought down to less than 3%, and the reduction of the public dept to 118% of GDP (it went further down to just under 100% in 2004). One would expect that such a harsh reduction of public spending would lead to heated debates, and that one or more parties would blame the source of that policy. But hardly anything of that kind was heard. Belgium was brought into the EMU by a centre-left government, and the Liberal opposition only blamed the government for being too slow, or for presenting figures that made the situation look better (i.e. closer to the convergence criteria) than it was. Figure 1: Support for European Union Membership in Belgium, 1981-2004 (Source: Eurobarometer 61) Europe is thus clearly not a crucial matter of discussion in Belgian politics. Europe is there and its effects on national policy making are not perceived as disturbing. Even Vlaams Belang, the main mobilizer of protest votes in the country, considers the risk of mobilizing against the EU in a context that is so much pro EU (interview with party president Van Hecke). This absence of a debate is to some extent the consequence of the early membership, although this cannot be the sole explanation. France is also an early member and has had much more heated debates about Europe and the place of France in Europe. The small size of Belgium – certainly compared to France – also explains why themes like the loss of national sovereignty or the loss of power in the international context are not part of the daily political vocabulary. But there are still some other explanations for the striking europhilic consensus in Belgium. The first and most general is the fact that Belgium has spent and still spends a lot of its political energy to its own national institutions and not to its place or role in the world. That is related to the fact that it is a small country, but also to its ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and the long lasting search for a proper institutional answer to the ongoing tensions between the Dutch-speaking north of the country and the French-speaking south. This is not the place to describe in detail the way in which it was done. The point we want to make however is that Belgian politics is extremely inward looking, paying much attention to the way in which the state functions or should function. Since the 1960s these matters have always been very high on the agenda, even (and especially) during the oil crises of the 1970s. One of the consequences of this ‘over investing’ in the internal institutional debates has been the extremely high public debt, since hardly anybody was really being concerned about the proper financial policy needed at that time. An interesting anecdote is that the government that signed the Maastricht Treaty was actually a caretaker government, that had collapsed a few weeks earlier on a disagreement between the north and the south about exportation of weapons (produced in the south). The fact that this caretaker government signed Maastricht has never been seen as a problem. Europe is OK and Europe can always go on. In the meantime, Belgium is dealing with its own problems. And finally we should mention the fact that Belgium has so far never organized a referendum on the European issue. Countries that did organize a referendum have witnessed much more debate about Europe and often a surprising high level of Euroscepticism. Whether this would happen in Belgium is of course difficult to say, but the absence of a referendum might eventually explain why nobody ever felt the need to put the European issues more explicitly on the agenda. Organizing a referendum is not easy in Belgium. The Constitution does not allow for a binding referendum. There has been one consultative referendum in 1950, and that was a rather bad experience. The question was whether King Leopold III, who had been negotiating with the German occupiers in 1940 and who was temporary replaced by his brother, could come back to be King. The population said yes (57%), but there was a clear ‘yes’ among the Dutch-speakers and a clear ‘no’ among the French-speakers. The result of the referendum was thus not respected and a typically consociational and negotiated compromise was reached to get out of this so-called King’s Question. Current Prime Minister Verhofstadt – generally a defender of more direct forms of democracy – has tried to launch the idea that a referendum should be organized about the Constitutional Treaty that was recently accepted. Both Liberal parties and the right-wing extremist Vlaams Belang supported the idea. The other parties (and especially one of the architects of the Treaty Jean-Luc Dehaene) rejected it, among others because they feared that the right-wing extremists would seize the opportunity to put the potential membership of Turkey on the agenda rather than the content of the Constitutional Treaty. 2.2. The European elections and the European offices Belgium has 25 seats (24 since 2004) in the European Parliament. That is a relatively small number. One seat is reserved for the German-speaking community of the country, while the others are divided between the Dutch-speaking (14) and the French-speaking (10 or 9) communities. In 2004 10 parties managed to capture a seat, which means that each of them holds 2.4 seats on the average. The highest number is four seats for the Dutch-speaking Christian Democrats and for the Francophone Socialists. Three parties have only one single seat. These numbers are small indeed, and that is important to mention. It means that the weight of the MEPs in the party organization can never be really important. A European seat is just a little extra, one more position that can be filled in, but that will not influence the balance of power in the party. It does however enlarge the pool of positions available for a party and offers therefore some possibilities for an easier personnel policy. Contrary to the position of MEP, the position of member of the European Commission is very important. Belgium has one commissioner and it counts as the equivalent of one very heavy portfolio in the federal government. The choice of the Belgian commissioner is therefore always part of tough negotiations between the governing parties. Giving the job to an opposition party is out of the question. Actually being the European commissioner is close to being Prime Minister. Coming back to Belgian politics is therefore not an easy thing to do. Former members of the Commission never came back ‘down’ to Belgian politics, but went either sideways (i.e. to the private sector) or stayed at the European level as MEP. Before explaining how these European resources are being used by the parties, we need some more information about the organization of the European elections in Belgium. As said above, the Belgian seats are distributed per language community. They each form one electoral district (in Brussels the voters can choose for which language group they cast a vote). The seats are being distributed proportionally (D’Hondt divisors) with a threshold of 5% per constituency. This is a system that differs from federal or regional elections. For federal elections provincial constituencies are being used. For regional elections in Flanders this is also the case. Regional elections in Wallonia have a larger number of smaller constituencies, with a second tier distribution of the seats at the provincial level. What makes the European election different is thus this single list per language community. It offers the unique possibility to test one’s popularity in the population as a whole (the country being divided in two language groups this also means that there is one public opinion per language group). Popular politicians will try to get on top of the lists and the lists are drafted at the highest level of the parties. There is no need to involve provincial or even lower party levels into the drafting of the lists. European elections are a very centralized affair, offering possibilities for high level personnel reshuffle. This is being reinforced by the way in which elected candidates can be replaced when needed. Every party not only presents a list of ‘effective candidates’, but also a list of ‘successors’. If one of the elected effective candidates needs to be replaced, it is not the next elected effective candidate but the first on the successors list who enters the MEP (actually that system works on all levels except for the local elections). European elections are generally seen as second-order national elections. That does not make them unimportant though. The fall-out of the last European elections on the national governments of France or Italy is a very nice illustration of that. In the case of Belgium, the interaction between European and other elections is slightly different. European elections are held simultaneously with the regional elections since 1999. The European elections of 1999 were also federal elections. And that is another element that gives the European elections the meaning of ‘something extra that can be used’, rather than a meaning that refers directly to the European issues. On the other hand, the potential of European elections to serve as a test case for the national breakthrough of new parties should not be neglected. The francophone Front National was put on the map when in 1989 its party leader was elected in the European parliament. The public recognition of Vlaams Belang (Vlaams Blok at that time) as a truly national phenomenon (until then only successful in the city of Antwerp) took off also in 1989 when its part leader was elected MEP. European mandates can also be quite rewarding for a party, if only because of the extra means it brings in terms of information, personnel and money for publicity. For parties having a hard time at the national level, an elected MEP can make a crucial difference. The re-election of the Flemish Green party’s MEP in 2004 was extremely important, after the party had lost all its national MPs in 2003. Having an MEP can also be a matter of prestige. The Flemish nationalist Volksunie fell apart in 2002, and the two successor parties really wanted to be represented in Europe (to continue the battle for a Europe of the regions) Only one of them succeeded (the more nationalist N-VA), but the other (the more moderate and leftist Spirit) was able to block her membership of the European Regionalist Party. All this illustrates nicely how the European elections mainly offer the Belgian parties a small but significant extra number of seats to be filled. They are added to the existing pool (national and regional mandates) and distributed by the party leadership. The MEP is then not necessarily the person wanting to do the European job, but often a person that has not been able to secure at seat at one of the other levels. 3. EUROPE AND THE PARTY PROGRAMS 3.1. Being the best in Europe As we have already said above, the issue of European integration has a very low salience in Belgium. There is a quasi consensus on the need for further supranational integration of the Union. Thus Europeanization does not have a visible impact here on the party competition (Van Assche, 2003; 2004). One good way to illustrate this is looking at the way in which the European treaties are ratified by the Belgian Parliament. This is always done without any significant debate. The voting behaviour of the different party groups is also interesting. Not all of them vote in favour, but those voting against use more or less the same arguments as those voting in favour. The Maastricht Treaty, originally signed by a caretaker government, could have been criticized for this lack of legitimacy. Yet it was not. The Parliament approved it after a short discussion, scheduled a few days before the Summer holidays. The governing parties (Christian Democrats and Socialists) and the major opposition parties (Liberals) approved the Treaty. Yet they all voiced some criticism. They accepted the treaty as a good compromise, but would have liked to see more matters put into the first pillar. The Greens voted against Maastricht, because they thought the treaty was not going far enough in terms of integration of the Union. That was exactly the same argument as the one used by the parties approving the treaty. The Flemish regionalists voted against it, because they would have liked to see more powers given to the Committee of the Regions, but not because they did not want a further integration of the Union. The right wing populist Vlaams Blok also voted against, also because it rather wanted to see a Europe of the ‘peoples’ than a Europe of the states. It also feared that the granting of local voting rights to European citizens might disturb the linguistic balance in Brussels. And it thought – and this is a more substantial point of criticism – that Maastricht was going too far by letting the EU enter policy domains like culture, education and citizenship. When the Amsterdam Treaty had to be ratified, more or less the same picture emerged. The major opposition parties (Liberals) voted with the government in favour of a treaty. This was however a yes without enthusiasm, because much more could have been done. For the same reason the Greens did not accept the Amsterdam Treaty. The Flemish regionalists voiced the same concerns, and added again that the regions should receive more power in the EU. The Vlaams Blok followed on that point, and added that the EU should be much more integrated in matters of border control and asylum policy. The Nice Treaty received basically the same reaction. There was a general disappointment about the missed chances, but again the willingness to accept the compromise. The Greens, now in government, approved the Treaty. The Flemish regionalists abstained and the Vlaams Blok voted against. It asked for a referendum to be organized. There was only one surprise: the Francophone Christian Democrats – now in the opposition – also voted against the Nice Treaty. All these debates were short, were held among a few EU-specialists in the parties and did not receive any media attention at all. It goes without saying that Belgium approves the treaties. Europe is there and Europe is good (although it could be better). If one looks at the national party manifestos, quite some evidence is to be found of the fact that Europe is there indeed (Van Assche, 2005). Europe has become a ‘natural’ frame of reference for the government-opposition dynamic on the national level and it provides it with an extra European layer. Parties agree that government should increase its efforts to make the country belong to the European top. This certainly goes for the main issue in Belgian election campaigns: the socio- economic conditions of the country. The way to accomplish this is however contested and on several occasions parties refer to better performances in other EU member states to document their claims. Government parties, more in Flanders than in the south of the country, refer to Europe to put their previous accomplishments in the spotlights. It is thus on the opposition side that we can detect some particular concerns of parties: high tax level, interest rates, labour costs, bad employment figures are rewarding themes to criticize government. All parties voice their opinion on the desired institutional set-up and future of the EU. There is a general agreement on the need for strong institutions and the goal of a federal Europe (although Flemish parties make more outspoken use of the latter term). Party manifestos elaborate to a greater or lesser extent on a strong EP, a strong European government, an extended application of QMV and so on. In both parts of the country parties urge for a stronger role of the regions in European institutions. The main exception is indeed Vlaams Belang. The party combines its call for a restoration of the powers of the nations (read: Flanders) with a confederal form of cooperation on the European level. Front National also wants the power to the given back to the national level but it is the only one to criticize the “anachronism of nationalist discourses and the project of further integration on the European level” A growing concern within all the party manifestos is the so-called democratic deficit of the EU. The reasons mentioned for this deficit and thus also the solutions for the problem are very diverse. But again, the right-wing extremist parties distinguish themselves in the discussion. For them, European ‘bureaucracy and ‘centralism’ are reasons to put a stop to Europe while this is certainly not the aim of the others: they only want another Europe and ‘more Europe’. Several proposals in the party programmes to ‘close the gap’ between Europe and its member states suggest a better communication of information from Europe to the national parliament and the organization of systematic scrutiny of EU policy. To make this link with the European policy level, Belgium set up a specialized parliamentary committee, the Federal Advisory Committee of European Affairs. Its composition – a mix of national and European parliamentarians, and chaired by the presidents of the federal chambers – gave this committee a very promising start. It allows European specialists (the MEPs) to question national ministers about their European activities, which is very unique in Europe. From our interviews we learned that the MEPs are not very eager to join the meetings. The activities of the committee are limited to briefings by the Prime Minister and/or Minister of Foreign Affairs about the European top summits. These briefings are organized more systematically since the Liberal-Socialist-Green federal government took over in 1999. Very often though, MEPs receive this information long before the committee session are organized. Other ministers than the PM or the Minister of Foreign Affairs do not feel obliged to appear and answer questions. Several attempts have been made to upgrade the work in the committee but it is clear: nobody is interested. Belgian politicians generally agree on the fact that democratic control of the EU policies is the role of the EP rather than the Belgian Parliament. Another major reason for the lack of interest among the national MPs is the low electoral pay-off of specializing in European policy. The gradual enlargement of the EU gave cause to statements about the borders of Europe. This issue is, not unexpectedly, used by Vlaams Belang and Front National to point to the specificity of the European culture and to discriminate between ‘us, Europeans’ and ‘them, non-Europeans’. Also the Flemish Christian-Democrats have some doubts about Turkey’s entrance in the EU but as we mentioned above, the national context made parties decide to carefully avoid the discussion. And the conclusion is again: Europe is basically a good thing, so let us go on with it. Belgian parties, in particularly Christian-Democrats and Liberals both in Flanders and Wallonia, also like to brag of with their performances in European institutions and fora. That is in the first place the case for the Belgian presidencies, the most visible expression of EU- leadership also for the electorate. All parties pay major attention to an excellent conduct of the event. All agree that cooperation is required here because the status of the country is at stake. When the country leads the Union, majority and opposition grow closer to each other. In marked contrast to this europhylic attitude, there is the bad implementation record of EU law in Belgium (Bursens & Helsen, 2003). This bad performance can mainly be attributed to the often confusing and incomplete transfer of power from the federal to the regional level. Again there is the same pattern of thought: all parties agree that European law is there to be respected. Government parties proudly refer to the reduction of the backlash in rule implementation during their government term, while opposition blames the outgoing coalition for not having obeyed enough to Europe. The most striking observation throughout the years is indeed the considerable increase of criticism from the side of Vlaams Belang, mainly starting from the Maastricht period. It is the only party to blame government for allowing too much Europe, while the others rather refer to Europe when blaming it for not having pursued certain measures. Front National is not really engaged in this discussion (yet?). Its references to Europe are rather limited. This could partly be explained by its absence from the European scene but in general, the programs and views of the party are not that elaborated. 3.2. Europeanization and the old cleavages Does the development of the European Union and all the institutional and societal changes that come along with it affect the old cleavages in Belgian politics? That is an extremely relevant question (see Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002), but extremely difficult to answer. This is exactly the place where the problem of multicausality disturbs the analytic picture. There is indeed quite some ideological change to be witnessed in Belgian politics (and in other national states), but it is not easy to see to what extent these changes would not have taken place if the European Union had not been there. The only cleavage for which the evidence might be convincing, is the regionalist issue. 3.2.1. Church and State The traditional Church-State cleavage, opposing the Christian-Democrats to Liberals and the Socialists has basically been pacified in 1958, when a major agreement on the school issue was reached. Since then, Catholic voters find their way to the other parties. Rapid secularisation has also lead to the fast decline of the Christian Democratic party. That is especially the case in Flanders – the northern region – where the Christian Democrats fell from 60% in the 1950s to a mere 20% in 2003. In Flanders the Christian Democratic party is now one of the mid size parties (20 to 25%) competing for the number one position in the region. In the south – where Christian Democracy was never that strong – the Christian Democrats have renamed themselves as a ‘humanist’ party. None of all these developments can be linked visibly to the Europeanization process. The two parties do remain strong defenders of the European integration and their MEPs (four Dutch speaking and one French speaking) belong to the EPP. 3.2.3. Labour and capital The Labour-Capital cleavage has not been very salient anymore since the Second World War. A system of permanent tripartite negotiations was set up, leading to a generally stable social climate. Exceptions are the early sixties with some major strikes, the early seventies with the oil crises and the early eighties when a Christian-Democratic and Liberal government imposed very harsh measures to reduce the public debt. Since the 1990s both Liberals and Socialists converged very much. The further reduction of the public debt in the early nineties – trying to reach to the Maastricht criteria – was done by a government of Christian Democrats and Socialists. The Liberals criticized it for going too slow, but Belgian was accepted in Euroland. When after 1999 Socialists and Liberals governed together, they continued in the same direction. The fact that these two party families were able to govern together is also a strong indicator of their convergence. The most striking element is indeed the moderation of the Socialists and their acceptance of the European rules. The Maastricht criteria, the single market and the liberalization policy were never really challenged by the Socialists. The mere acceptance of the European rules and readiness to apply them could recently been witnessed in the southern region, where the Parti Socialiste is very dominant. The region has invested a lot in the development of a regional airport in Charleroi (it is called Brussels south) and organized it – by offering very cheap landing rights – as one of the major airports for Ryanair. When the Commission decided that subsidies to Ryanair had to be paid back, this did not lead to fierce reactions against a too liberal Europe. The Socialist-led Walloon Government simply started the procedure to claim the money from Ryanair. The criticism of the green parties has always been and remains important. But when it comes to government participation, they are also prepared to support the Belgian consensus. 3.2.3. Etho-linguistic tensions The third major Belgian cleavage is the ethno-linguistic one. Here we can clearly see how the European context has reshaped the very meaning of it. Belgium has had three regionalist parties: one defending more autonomy for Flanders, one defending more autonomy for Wallonia and one defending a fully francophone Brussels region. These parties reached their highest scores in the 1970s. Since then the country has been thoroughly transformed into a (fairly complex) federal-type state, granting a very large degree of autonomy to language communities and to territorial regions. The Walloon regionalist party disappeared; the Brussels party formed an alliance with the Francophone Liberals and the Flemish party fell apart after the 1999 elections. Some individuals went to the Liberals, the more radical wing formed an electoral alliance with the Christian Democrats and the more moderate wing formed an alliance with the Socialists. Non of the regionalist parties plays a significant role today. There are two reasons for that. The first is of course the fact that most of their requests for more autonomy have been realized. The second is that all the other political parties – especially after the total split of the former Belgian parties in two unilingual parties between 1968 and 1978 – have become regional parties and have taken over the regionalist discourse. The European background is fairly obvious here. While the idea of differentiated regional policy making and of regional autonomy was close to a heresy in the 1970s, it has gradually become part of the mainstream thinking, actively endorsed by the European Union (see also Dewinter, 2001). The European structural policy, the incentives for active involvement of the regions into the claiming and spending of the funds and the formal recognition of the regions by the setting up of the Committee of the Regions has offered the regions and therefore also the regionalists a fertile ground for the further development of ideas of regional autonomy. Yet this autonomy is now explicitly framed within the general context of this ‘region friendly’ European Union. Regional autonomy – even if it tries to reduce the power of the national states – is one that is set within the multi-level governance of the Union (Marks & Hooghe, 2001; Keating, Loughlin & Deschouwer, 2003). The Belgian regions – clearly belonging to the strong so-called constitutional regions – very often refer to Europe. Europe is the place where they want to be. Europe is the scene on which they can form alliances and international associations with other active regions. A conflict that once was framed in terms of loyalty versus betrayal of the national state, has been rephrased into a reform of institutions within the safe environment of the European Union. The Union has deeply redefined the notion of sovereignty and autonomy, and has therefore given new (and less threatening) meanings to regionalism. The impact of this on Belgian politics is very obvious. Even the separatist Vlaams Blok stays within the European context. The party does not accept Flemish autonomy within Belgium, but wants a fully independent Flanders. This independent Flanders will obviously be a member of the European Union. And the fact that quite a number of member states are smaller than Flanders is an argument very often used to defend the idea that this independent Flanders can be viable indeed. 3.3. European policy: new cloths for the old cleavages? 3.3.1. Church versus State European politics are said, in general, to be decided on through ‘national prisms’. Not only their general national context as such, but also their own ideological points of view colour they way they make choices for the European level. The recent discussion on the inclusion of the reference to the Christian roots of European culture in the EU Constitutional Treaty did not provoke a discussion in Belgium. Statements of the (governing) Liberals that they would not support this proposal, in general met with indifference. Religion indeed is a non-issue. 3.3.2. Labour versus capital On the Labour-capital cleavage, parties say what we expect them to say: more Europe is good, but Europe is expected not only to create a free market but also to correct it. The greens are requesting of environmental measures and corrections, the socialists focus on social corrections and for the liberals regulation should disturb the market. But it is indeed the socio- economic debate that has the biggest potential to politicises Europe in Belgium. Recently, both the Flemish and the Francophone socialists started to denounce more explicitly the liberal turn of the EU and they ask for a ‘different Europe’. Statements have been made by prominent politicians in this sense but they have so far not lead to a real debate, even within their own party. It is still ‘not done’ to criticize the EU. Critical remarks about the nature of the process and about policy are still perceived as a withdrawal of support for the EU in general. Yet now that Europe touches upon important achievements, the tide seems to turn. The politicisation of the struggle on the port directive (which aims to liberalize the port services in the EU) showed us that parties are prepared to enter the political struggle about European policies. The growing mobilisation on the Bolkestein directive (for the liberalisation of services in general in the EU) promises to become another important political issue in the country. According to the Eurobarometers, Belgian citizens want Europe to solve the problem of unemployment, the threat they fear the most in the enlarged Union. The Belgian trade unions and dockworkers showed that they are prepared to travel to Strasbourg (?) to remind the EU of their right to work. 3.3.3. Etho-linguistic tensions The move towards more autonomy for the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking communities in the country was motivated differently in both parts of the country. The Flemish region’s struggle was a struggle for the defence of its language and culture. The protection of languages and culture indeed gets also an important place in the Flemish parties’ proposals on the European level. On the Francophone side, the protection and enhancement of the ‘francophonie’ is mainly an issue in the programs of the Liberal MR. This particular attention could also be attributed to the party’s electoral alliance with the Brussels regionalist FDF. The regionalist concerns of the Francophone parties are rather, and much more than in Flanders, economic concerns. Europe is expected to revitalize and enhance the economical conditions of the region. The Walloon region is indeed economically not in a very good shape, at least when compared with Flanders. It has therefore also been more dependent on the European structural funds, which obviously sharpens the attention for the European plans in this respect Flanders on the other hand presents itself very much as a cultural region, and tries to find partners of the same kind in Europe. Both Belgian regions are in general very active on the European scene, among others in the networks and associations of so-called ‘constitutional regions’. Europe gives both of them an opportunity to reach beyond the Belgian level, where the definition of what they are and can be is fully determined by the (always potentially confliction) relations between them (Keating, Loughlin & Deschouwer, 2003). 4. PARTY ORGANIZATION 4.1. The party statutes We have already seen above that the way in which the European elections are organized – lists per language groups and simultaneity with regional elections – has had a clear centralizing effect on the party organization. Deciding on the European mandates is done at the top. In this final paragraph we will also present some evidence from the party statutes. We have looked for Europe in three places: the general mission statement of the parties, the organization of elections, and the composition of the party organs. This shows without any doubt that the Belgian parties are active in a European country. The presence of Europe is explicitly taken into account (Van Assche & Deschouwer, 2003). Already in the 1960s the Christian Democratic Party (at that time still a bilingual party) mentioned explicitly its devotion to the European cause in the first paragraphs of its statutes. When the party split, the two new parties kept this reference to Europe in their newly written party rules. It is interesting to note that this becomes vaguer and shorter after every revision of the rules. In the current statutes of the Flemish Christian Democrats Europe is not mentioned anymore, and the Francophone Christian Democrats only say that they have “a mission to fulfil” in the European institutions. This probably does not mean that Europe has become less important. It has simply become more evident. The belief in Europe goes without saying. In the older (1960s) statutes of the Socialist Party there is only a reference to contacts with other Socialist parties in the world, but no specific reference to Europe. It is only in the 1990s that reference is made to the incorporation of the (now two separate) Socialist parties in the European Federation of Socialists. The Francophone PS gives today a very special place to the members of other European Socialist parties residing in Belgium. They actually form a distinct party organ that can send representatives to a “Conseil des représentants des Socialistes européens”. They are also represented (without voting right) in the party bureau (the executive body). For the Liberal Parties we also see a very early (1970s) reference to Europe in the party rules. Today the Flemish Liberals have dropped this reference form the statutes, but in the constitutional charter of the party (Beginselverklaring) the party explicitly opts for a federal Europe. The Flemish regionalist Volksunie declares that it goes for more Flemish autonomy in a European context. One of its successors (the party fell apart in 2001), the more radical and centre-right N-VA would like to see an independent republic Flanders, member state of a democratic Europe. The other successor of the Volksunie, the more moderate and centre-left SPIRIT, defends the principle of federalism (except for Belgium where it prefers a confederal logic). Federalism is seen as a way in which cooperation can be achieved between units keeping their own identity. Europe is seen as the first answer major problems like globalisation and democracy. It goes without saying that Europe has to be a Europe of the regions. The Greens do not refer to a European project, but they make their link with other European Green parties very explicit. A members of one of the Belgian Green parties cannot be a member of another party, except for one of these other Green parties. And members of the sister parties can join one of the Belgian Green parties. The right-wing extremist Vlaams Blok did not make any reference to Europe at all. In 2004 the party changed its name, after some organizations closely linked to the party had been condemned for the distribution of racist propaganda. Its name is now Vlaams Belang and the party tries to adopt a softer image. The only major change in the party statutes is the reference to Europe in the general mission statement. Europe, i.e. the cooperation between European peoples in a community of cultures and civilization, is seen as a historic chance for peace, stability and welfare. Yet the party does not like the bureaucratic Europe with its infringements on domains that should remain under the control of the sovereign people. And Europe should stay inside the European borders, meaning that Turkey should not become a member. Most parties say something (fairly vague and general) about the European elections: drafting of the list, organizing the campaign, and writing the manifesto. Here it is very clear that the party rules do not tell us the real story. In general parties have rules that involve congresses, militants or members into the decision-making. If lower levels are involved however, they only act as rubber-stamping actors. It is the party leadership that decides. Only the Greens have a real open procedure. There is one single party – the Francophone Socialists – that mentions a procedure to be followed if the party is allowed to choose the Belgian member of the European Commission. In 1997 the PS writes down in its statutes that the party president can suggest a candidate during the negotiations. At the first occasion, in 1999, party president Philippe Busquin suggested himself and went to the Commission indeed. This is a rule that has been strictly adhered to. Today most parties give all their members the possibilities to participate in the party congresses. That means that also the MEPs can be present. Before the congresses were opened up, the MEPs were also allowed to participate. Presence or representation of the MEPs in the national executives comes more gradually. After the first direct election of the European Parliament, the MEPs were allowed to sit in the executive of the Liberal Parties, the Socialist Parties and the Francophone Christian Democrats. After the second election they also enter the party bureaus of the Flemish Christian Democrats, the Francophone Greens and the Flemish Nationalists. The Flemish Greens only allow them since 1996. Only the Vlaams Belang remains silent. Yet there has always been an MEP in the party executive. The newly created SPIRIT does not refer at all to the MEPs or other EU experts in its statutes. N-VA mentions that the leader of the group in the EP (actually one single person) is a voting member of the party executive. Looking at the party rules does indeed show that the Belgian parties take the European level into account. Yet this is really all that can be said. The European level is not important and does certainly not dominate the party (and its programmatic and strategic choices). Europe is there. It can be mentioned if needed. And it can be used by the party leadership if needed. 4.2. European politics in the party life . Interviews with politicians indeed confirm what the statutes suggested: Europe is present, but sometimes hidden in some attention for international politics and general, and often in a rather erratic way, not consciously organised. The MEPs participate in the meetings of the national party executive of all the Belgian parties. Their presence there is however not always dependent on the European mandate. The party president or vice president or national secretary in some cases happens to be an MEP. Yet it does mean that Europe is there and that it has the potential to be put on the national executive’s agenda. Some parties have the EU as a fixed agenda item, but in general the presence of Europe in the discussions depends on current events. One should also not forget that the number of MEPs per political party is low (ranging from 1 to 4), which automatically reduces their possible impact on the internal party debates. It makes the impact also very dependent on who exactly is the MEP. If it is somebody who chose explicitly to be active at that level, the impact will be more important than in the case where the European mandate is used as a waiting room for ‘coming down’ to the real thing of national or regional politics, or in the case where the mandate is only used to receive some money and some possibilities to hire personnel working for the party. Furthermore we have the strong impression that the way in which Europe enters the parties is quite dependent on the overall party culture. In the green parties, with a tradition of frequent meetings with clear agendas at all levels, Europe has received a formal place in these meetings. In the Christian-democratic and Socialist parties, with a tradition of strong (and for the Socialists also top-down) organisation, Europe is also more formally present. In the Liberal parties, with their more ‘anarchist’ tradition of letting individuals do their own thing, the impact of Europe depends much more on who wants to make sure that it is put on the internal party agenda. All parties, except the Francophone Liberals, Spirit and the right-wing extremist parties, established a European working group or committee. These groups meet in general monthly and bring together the MEPs, MPs, the party top, members of cabinets (advisors to the ministers) and internal and external experts. The latter include permanent representatives or academics. There seems to be a general need to organize some kind of ‘think tank’ and coordination on Europe policy. There are however interesting exceptions to this general tendency. In the Vlaams Belang – where traditionally the party leadership decides on everything – there is no such think tank. The same goes for the Front National, a party not having an MEP (any more). And Spirit is a very small party, also not having an MEP. The Francophone liberals are the only major party seemingly not organizing the link between the national and the European level. It is however a party relying on the strong leadership of one person – Louis Michel – who used to be the Minister of Foreign Affairs (i.e. deeply involved and in control of the European affairs) and who is now the Belgian member of the European Commission (i.e. still mister Europe in the party). Yet one should not overestimate the meaning of these workings groups or committees in the parties. Most of our interviewees – except for the Flemish greens – complain that there is a real lack of coordination between the European level and the other levels in the parties. The MEPs blame the national politicians for not having a ‘European reflex’. The Socialist parties, the Flemish Christian-Democrats and the Flemish greens have an international secretariat. This (limited) staff is involved in EU politics and thus seen as the organ where the EU experts of the party are to be found. All parties have (some) relations with their sister parties in other EU members states and/or with the European party federations. It is interesting to note however that within Belgium there is hardly any coordination between the parties of the same family belonging to the same European party federation. Cooperation depends very much on personal contacts, and it is traditionally better between both green and socialist parties. These are also the most integrated European party federations. The European expertise is mainly concentrated in two places: the MEPs and their staff and the national and regional ministers and their staff. The involvement of the party presidents in EU policy depends very much on their personal interest. The low salience of the European debate in Belgian makes the European issue electorally not very rewarding. Party presidents are the constant and very visible spokespersons of their party, but the debates in which they are engaging are to a very large extent internal (national and regional) debates. Events that bring Europe more to the front stage, can however be important triggers. The Belgian presidency of the Union is such an event, that makes parties aware of the fact that Europe not always goes without saying. For the Liberal Parties, having been in opposition from 1987 to 1999, the Belgian presidency of 2000 – with liberals in the position of Prime Minister and of Minister of Foreign Affairs – was a major happening. One final finding of our interviews needs to be mentioned. To perform their role in the European executive arena properly, politicians also depend very much on the administration and on the Permanent Representation of the country in the EU. All the Belgian MEPs have told us that is extremely important to have good relations and good contacts with the members of the Permanent Representation. Apparently a number of them do participate in the internal party meetings, although they rather not talk about it. The extent to which these links between parties and the Permanent Representation are truly party-political links, or simply a way to keep an important line of information open between the decision-making in the Council and the political parties, is an interesting and intriguing question. It does reflect however the way in which Europe can find its place in the political parties. European decision-making is to a large extent decision-making in which party people are involved, but not necessarily decision- making in which the usual (i.e. national) logic of party competition is the most dominant. Going to parties and expecting to find evidence of the European Union among the usual suspects like party executives or party presidents, might simply not be the most appropriate strategy. The European Union is a strange species, and it might force political parties to mutations in ways we do not expect. Conclusion In this paper we have been searching for evidence of some impact of Europe on the Belgian party life. We did found some, but cannot say that the parties have been deeply influenced by the fact that Belgium belongs since the very beginning to the European union. The main reason for that is the very specific Belgian context: an original member of the EU in which the membership has never become a issue for public debate. Europeanization has no direct and visible effects on party strategies or party organization. For party ideology the picture is a bit more nuanced. Belgian parties have changed. Old cleavages have eroded. Some of these processes obviously occurred within the European context and might be explained – at least partly – as an effect of Europeanization. We have claimed that this is especially visible for the ethno-linguistic cleavage. The transformation of the meaning of autonomy and sovereignty by the European context, and the explicit recognition of regions by the European institutions, have reoriented the regionalist debates in Belgium. Regions are now regions in Europe. Regionalism is a mainstream ideology. The radicals have to be separatists. And even the separatists want to be independent in Europe. Looking at the party organisation, we do find evidence of the fact that parties have to say something or – if they govern – do something in Europe. Yet the picture we get form our research is very much one of coincidence and personal influence. The number of MEPs in each Belgian party is low, and one or two of them can make a difference in a party. Bibliography Bartolini, S. (1998), Exit options, boundary building, political structuring. Sketches of a theory of large-scale territorial and membership 'retrenchment/differentiation' versus 'expansion/integration' (with reference to the European Union), EUI Florence, SPS Working paper no 98/1 Bartolini, S. (1999), Political representation in loosely bounded territories. Between Europe and the nation- state, paper presented at the conference ‘Multi-level party systems: Europeanisation and the reshaping of national political representation’, European University Institute Firenze, December 1999 Bartolini, S., Risse, T. and Stråth, B (1999)., Between Europe and the nation-state: introduction into the Forum themes, European Forum 1999-2000 project, EUI, Florence Bartolini, S. (2002) “Institutionalisation and political structuring in the EU. Lessons from nation-state development”, in: Cavanna, H. (ed.), Governance, Globalization and the European Union. Which Europe for Tomorrow?, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 129-158 Bursens P. (2002), Belgium’s adaptation to the EU. Does federalism constrain Europeanisation ?, Res Publica, vol 44, no 4, p. 575-598 Burssens, P. and Helsen, S. (2003) Multi-level governance in de praktijk. Naar een efficiënte aanpak van het Belgische Europa-beleid, PSW-paper 2003/1, Universiteit Antwerpen Caporaso, J., Cowles, M.G. and Risse, T. (2001) Transforming Europe: Europeanisation and domestic change, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London Deschouwer, K. and Van Assche, M. (2005), “Hard but hardly relevant: party based euroscepticism in Belgium”, in: Tagart, P. and Sczerbiak, A. (forthcoming 2005) Dewinter, L. (2001) The impact of European Integration on Ethnoregionalist parties, Working Paper ICPS no 195, Barcelona Duverger, M. (1976) Les partis politiques. Paris, Armand Colin Hooghe L. & Marks G. (2001), Multi-level governance and European integration, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham Keating M., Loughlin J. & Deschouwer K. (2003) Culture, Institutions and economic development. A study of eight European regions, Edward Elgar, London Knill, C. and Lehmkuhl, D. (1999) The national impact of European Union regulatory policy: three Europeanization mechanisms, European Journal of Political Research, (41), p. 255-280 Lindberg, L. (1971) “Political integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement”, in: Lindberg, L& Scheingold, S. (eds), Regional Integration: theory and research, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Lapalombara, J. and M. Weiner, (eds) (1966) Political parties and political development, Princeton, Princeton University Press Lipset, S. M. and S. Rokkan, (eds) (1967) Party systems and voter alignments, New York, The Free Press Marcussen, M., T. Risse, et al. (1999). “Constructing Europe? The evolution of French, British and German nation state identities.” Journal of European Public Policy, 6, 4, 614-633. Marks, G., Wilson, C.J. and Ray, L. (2002) “National Political Parties and European Integration”, American Journal of Political Science, 46, 3, 585-594 Marks, G. and Hooghe, L. (2001) Multi-Level Governance and European Integration, Rowman & Littlefield, Boulder Radaelli, C.M. (2003) “The Europeanization of Public Policy”, in: Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C.M. (eds), The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 27-57 Reif, K.-H. (1980) “Nine second order national elections. A conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results”, European Journal of Political Research, 8, 3-44 Reif, K.-H. (1984) “National electoral cycles and European elections”, Electoral Studies, 3, 3, 244-255 Taggart, P. (1998) “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary European party systems”, European Journal of Political research, 33, 363-388 Van Assche M. & Deschouwer, K. (2003), Europeanisering en centralisering. Een verkennend onderzoek naar de plaats van de Europese Unie in de organisatie van de Belgische politieke partijen, Res Publica, vol 45, no 1, p. 121-142 Van Assche, M. (2003) Election briefing no 13. The Belgian federal elections of May 18 2003, Opposing Europe Reserch network,http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/oernbelgiumbp13.pdf Van Assche, M. (2004) 2004 European Parliament Elections briefing no 15. The European Election in Belgium June 13 2004, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/epern-ep2004-belgium.pdf Van Assche, M. (2005) “The integration of Europe in party ideologies: the case of the Flemish political parties”, in Kulachi, E. (forthcoming 2005) Interviews with politicians: Croux, B., member of Christen-Democraten en Vlaams (former MEP), party secretariat, 24/11/2004 De Vriendt, W., member of staff Groen!, party secretariat, 30/01/2004 Dhaene, J., member of European Parliament (former) Groen!, EP, July 2003 D’Hollander, H., administrative secretariat Federaal Adviescomité voor Europese Aangelegenheden, federal parliament- Kamer, 17/02/2004 Deseyne, R., member of federal parliament – Kamer, federal parliament – Kamer, 18/11/2004 De Zaeger, P., member of staff Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, party secretariat, 23/10/2003 XX International secretariat Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams, 19/10/2004 Legroe, P., member of staff responsible for External trade, Development Aid, External policy and European Affairs, federal parliament – Kamer, study center Vlaams Liberale Democraten, 04/02/2005 Loete, K., member of staff secretariat Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams, 19/10/2004 Mertens, J., member of staff and specialist European Affairs, party secretariat, 23/01/2004 Smet, M., member of regional parliament Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (former minister, former member EP, former member federal parliament), Flemish Parliament, 27/01/2005 Staes, B., member of European Parliament Groen!, EP, 17/02/2003 Sterckx, D., member of European Parliament Vlaams Liberale Democraten, by telephone, 07/04/ 2003 Thyssen, M., member of European Parliament Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams, EP, 03/04/2003 Van Brempt, K., member of European Parliament Socialistische Partij.Anders, EP, 01/04/2003 Van der Maelen, D., member of federal Kamer and group leader Socialistische Partij.Anders, 29/01/2004 Vanhecke, F., party president and member of European Parliament, party secretariat, 04/04/2003 Van Hoof, P., secretary Spirit, party secretariat, 26/01/2004 Van Lancker, A., member of European Parliament Socialistische Partij.Anders, home office Gent, 15/07/2003 Vanneste, L., director study center Socialistische Partij. Anders, party secretariat, 14/11/2003 Verwissen, A., member of staff responsible for European affairs study center Parti Socialiste (IEV), party secretariat, 07/02/2005 Party manifestos All party manifestos from 1985 to 2004 Party statutes All party statutes from 1985 to 2004 . One can of course also say that political parties have themselves deliberately produced the European construction, eventually even as a way to secure their domestic power positions. In that case the causal arrow goes form parties to the institutions. We will however not pursue that line of thought here. . Our data of Ecolo, the Francophone green party, are still too limited to draw any conclusions. We will not treat the party in this chapter. Actually most of the conclusions in this paragraph are preliminary, reflecting the first results of ongoing research? 27