

**BUILDING CONFIDENCE  
IN PEACE  
PUBLIC OPINION  
AND THE CYPRUS PEACE PROCESS**



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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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*Building Confidence in Peace* reports and analyses the results of the first in a series of public opinion surveys in Cyprus carried out by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in collaboration with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot partners. The project, which began in late 2007, gained momentum and significance with the 21 March 2008 peace process launched by the Greek Cypriot President Demetris Christofias and his Turkish Cypriot counterpart Mehmet Ali Talat. Indeed direct negotiations on the island, stalled since 2004, were restarted on 3 September 2008 – a new process that both communities and the international community alike appear to acknowledge as possibly the final chance for reunification of the island, in view of the changing dynamics both within Cyprus, the eastern Mediterranean and the wider international community. In this renewed political context, the lessons of the recent past are vivid in the minds of both the local leaders and external actors. First, lest a new agreement be subject to unjustified accusations of ‘foreign meddling’ it is crucial for the peace process to be ‘Cypriot-owned’. This does not imply that Cypriots should be left alone. Yet the role of external parties – first and foremost the EU – should be that of supporting and offering incentives in the peace process as well as acting alongside negotiations in order to increase confidence between the two communities, both in the peace process and in the EU itself. The second lesson drawn from the Annan Plan and the referenda (see Introduction) is the need to engage the public in the peace process. Debate and communication need to be established between local leaders and the public so that the peace process is as open and participatory as possible.

It is in this context that CEPS has launched a project investigating, through successive opinion polls, what Cypriots think of each other, of the peace process and of possible solutions to the conflict. The aim of the project and of this book is to act in support of the peace process; exploring avenues to increase public confidence in the process and testing ideas for a solution that would meet the consent of both communities. The results of

our first survey are presented here, conducted simultaneously in the northern and southern parts of the island in April-May 2008. We suggest ways in which the leaders in Cyprus and the EU could increase public confidence in and offer incentives for peace on the island.

We begin our study by exploring who the Cypriots are and what their political values and attitudes are. How do Cypriots view themselves? What are their aspirations, their fears and their perceptions of each other, and of the prospects for peace on the island? The picture that emerges is a mixed one. On the one hand, Cypriots share, as citizens, many important similarities in terms of their political values and aspirations, with differences between them appearing to be rooted more in their different contexts and historical trajectories than in fundamental divergences in values and ideologies. Moreover, while some reasons for concern do emerge, Cypriots are open to compromise, are ready to revisit their official historical narratives and abhor a resort to violence. This sets Cyprus apart from other conflicts in the European neighbourhood, as the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia tragically reminds us. On the other hand, Cypriots are fundamentally distrustful. Turkish Cypriots distrust Greek Cypriots, the EU and the international community, whereas Greek Cypriots distrust Turkey. Mistrust is also intra-communal, with general and diffuse mistrust of fellow citizens and institutions. Moreover, both communities lack confidence in the peace process; after decades of failed negotiations, Cypriots view renewed efforts to reach an agreement with caution.

Turning to views on a comprehensive settlement, we note that whereas divergence exists in terms of 'ideal' solutions, the second-best area of convergence between the two communities remains that of a bi-communal bi-zonal federation based on the principle of political equality. Delving deeper into the substance of a final settlement, we found interesting areas of convergence on issues such as Cyprus' economic and international outlook. As expected, divergence is prominent over other items on the conflict settlement agenda, yet we also note that agreement exists on the procedures and principles to tackle contested issues such as governance, rights and freedoms, security and territory.

On the basis of these results a double need emerges starkly. First, it is essential to act, in parallel to the negotiating process, to engender public confidence in the peace process, in order to ensure that as and when an agreement is reached, the Cypriot people will go along with it and make its ratification and implementation a success. Second, precisely because of persistent areas of divergence, a set of confidence-building steps could be

envisaged to help narrow the gaps separating the two communities. This does not entail shifting attention from negotiations to confidence-building measures (CBMs), a strategy that has often either had the intent or the effect of sinking negotiations over a comprehensive settlement. In contrast, unilateral CBMs or non-controversial CBMs oriented towards inter-societal reconciliation may have a very positive impact and may add momentum to the peace process within a strategic context of renewed negotiations. It is precisely in this spirit that we note the ongoing efforts to build confidence in parallel to negotiations, first and foremost with the opening of the Ledra Street crossing/Lokmacı on 3 April 2008.

Our survey revealed a first set of CBMs that could be easily agreed and implemented in so far as they meet wide support and little resistance from both communities. As such these ‘easily-agreed measures’ could be pursued alongside negotiations over a comprehensive settlement. More specifically, steps could be taken in the areas of:

- Jointly fighting organised crime on the island
- Joint participation of the two communities in international sporting events, drawing upon the formulas devised by other countries bedevilled by problems of contested sovereignty and recognition
- Joint protection of each community’s cultural heritage
- Establishing a social reconciliation committee, which will be future-oriented and tasked with the building of trust between the two communities
- Supporting Turkish-Cypriot-EU harmonisation
- Renovating and making joint use of buildings in the buffer zone near the Ledra Street crossing.

Alongside this, other confidence-building steps could be taken to facilitate negotiations on the more contested issues in the comprehensive settlement agenda. In our survey we noted strong convergence on the theme that the negotiations should be supplemented by various fact-finding activities, many of which could be encouraged, supported by or organised by the EU in its efforts to support the negotiating process. These fact-finding activities include:

- Conducting an analysis of threats and threat perceptions, from the viewpoint of all actors involved, to serve as a foundation for further negotiations around the security issue

- Producing an economic development plan for post-settlement Cyprus that will instil confidence in the public that a solution will bring prosperity to both communities
- Conducting an internationally monitored Cyprus-wide census of all properties – Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot – affected by the conflict in order to assess their current use and condition, as a foundation for further negotiations around the property issue
- Engaging in consultations with individuals affected by the property issue, to identify their preferences and priorities regarding the resolution of their property claims
- Conducting an internationally-monitored population census, on both sides of the Green Line, as a foundation for further negotiations around the issues of citizenship and immigration.

These fact-finding activities would both increase public confidence in the peace process – which will be viewed as a result of such efforts as more participatory, inclusive and grounded on the needs of the people – and at the same time may help bridge the gaps dividing the two communities on some of the most contested dossiers of the conflict settlement agenda.

A second category of CBMs, which we define as more challenging, would be those that enjoy narrow majority support in both communities, while also meeting resistance from sizeable minorities in either one or both, and which would thus require careful packaging and negotiation between the two leaders. Yet as in the case of the first set of CBMs, these measures could also be pursued alongside the peace process aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement, and would in fact serve to boost this process and ease agreement on several items on the conflict settlement agenda. Among these measures would be:

- Including northern Cyprus in the EU customs union
- Including Turkish Cypriot higher education institutions in the European higher education system (Bologna, Erasmus etc.), while at the same time creating joint academic institutions where Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot academics and students can work together
- Exploring forms of transitional justice.

Finally, there are other important yet far more contested CBMs to be considered and worked upon. Given the divisive nature of these issues, we suggest that they be discussed within both communities in order to prepare the ground for future agreement. However, in the current political context,

they should probably not be the subject of negotiations between the leaders. In fact, within a comprehensive agreement, all these issues would automatically be resolved. Nevertheless, given their critical importance and the uncertainty of any future comprehensive deal, we raise these questions here, recommending that at this stage, official, political and civil society actors discuss them within each community, before tackling them in inter-communal discussions at leadership level. These issues include:

- Direct trade and direct flights
- Resolution of Varosha.

Our survey revealed that once proposals are re-conceptualised so that both communities stand to gain from each measure, then the polarisation around these issues that emerges on the surface begins to dissipate. Potentially promising approaches to tackle these issues include:

- Converting Varosha into a special zone of inter-communal cooperation, under the supervision of the UN and the EU, as an area where the challenges of power-sharing will be tested in advance of a comprehensive settlement
- Making an airport available for common use, both by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to travel to the rest of the world.

These two proposals could at some point be merged into one integrated package, if the proposed common airport is located at, or is very close to, the proposed inter-communal zone of Varosha.

While these issues ought not to be negotiated now, lest they detract attention from and contaminate the ongoing peace talks, we felt it important to raise them for the sake of 'contingency-planning' and to increase the stakes and incentives of the current peace talks.



## 1. Introduction

The 21 March 2008 process launched by the newly elected Greek Cypriot President Demetris Christofias and his Turkish Cypriot counterpart Mehmet Ali Talat has injected new hope into the Cyprus peace process. On July 25<sup>th</sup> the leaders produced a joint statement in which they pledged that ultimately “[t]he agreed solution will be put to separate simultaneous referenda”.<sup>1</sup> Fully-fledged negotiations commenced with a formal ceremony on 3 September 2008. Hence, whereas external mediators may well have to inject ideas and bridge proposals in this renewed peace effort, what is clear is that the people of Cyprus and their leaders must be in charge of the process for it to have any chance of success.

With the failed referenda of April 2004, in which the Greek Cypriot community rejected and the Turkish Cypriot community accepted the UN-brokered Annan Plan<sup>2</sup> coupled with numerous domestic setbacks, particularly in the south, to an effective post-Annan Plan re-engagement, Cyprus lived through four years of stalemate. But every cloud has a silver lining, and over the course of the last four years several important lessons have been learnt by Cypriots and the international community alike.

The first critical lesson was the need for a Cyprus peace process to be Cypriot-owned. True, the Annan Plan had been largely drawn-up by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders and their negotiating teams, building upon talks carried out between both sides over decades. The UN team had made bridge proposals, suggested new ideas and fixed time frames only when compromise eluded the leaders. Yet the mainstream narrative within the Greek Cypriot community, which was driven by the ‘No’ camp, was that the Plan had been imposed upon Cypriots by foreign agents. In turn the public perception among Greek Cypriots of the Annan Plan process was of excessive external meddling, which reawakened deep-

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<sup>1</sup> UN News Centre (2008), “Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders announce ‘full-fledged’ negotiations” ([http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID\\_27489&Cr=Cyprus&Cr1](http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID_27489&Cr=Cyprus&Cr1)).

<sup>2</sup> The Annan Plan proposed a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus conflict foreseeing the establishment of the United Cyprus Republic with its two constituent states in the northern and southern parts of the island. Several iterations of the Plan were published between November 2002 and April 2004, when the Plan was put to two separate and simultaneous referenda.

seated anti-colonial sentiments and fears. In other words, regardless of the actual truthfulness of this narrative, the fact that it took hold within the Greek Cypriot community created a new reality that had to be reckoned with. Without necessarily setting aside their first instinctive reaction that questioned the Greek Cypriot commitment to any kind of federal solution, the international community gradually appreciated this reality and thus recognised the need for any future effort to be unambiguously Cypriot-owned. This would not necessarily provide a guarantee of success, of course, but it would hedge against some of the criticisms that had dogged the Annan Plan. Hence, in December 2006, the Greek Ambassador to the UN Adamantios Th. Vassilakis, argued at the Security Council in favour of a “Cypriot-owned solution through a Cypriot-owned process”.<sup>3</sup> Echoing this line, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in his end-of-office report stated that “the responsibility [for the peace process] lies primarily with the Cypriots themselves”.<sup>4</sup> Following the election of Christofias in 2008, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown pledged full support for a “Cypriot-owned solution”.<sup>5</sup> The view gradually consolidated both within and beyond Cyprus that a new process had to see Cypriots themselves squarely in the driver’s seat, determining the substance, procedures and timeframes of negotiations. The international community and the UN in particular would keep to a good offices role. This does not imply that Cypriots should or would be left alone in the process. Particularly in view of the asymmetries in power, incentives and contexts in the conflict, but also in view of the responsibility shared by external actors for the 2004-2008 impasse, the EU ought to play an important role here. Yet the role of the EU would be that of acting in support of and generating incentives within a Cypriot peace process as well as acting alongside the negotiation process in order to raise confidence between the two communities, in the peace process and in the EU itself, which is the very subject of this report.

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<sup>3</sup> UN Security Council (2006), “Security Council Extends Mandate in Cyprus Force until 15 June 2007, unanimously adopting Resolution 1728(2006)”, Security Council Meeting 5593, 15 December (<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8905.doc.htm>).

<sup>4</sup> UN News Centre (2006), “Without a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus, Annan recommends extending mission” (<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20853&Cr=cyprus&Cr1=>).

<sup>5</sup> S. Evripidou (2008), “A new era in relations with Britain”, *Cyprus Mail*, 9 June.

The second lesson drawn from the Annan Plan and the referenda is the need to engage public opinion in the peace process. In the years since the referenda, public opinion polls and studies have shown that, while Cypriots certainly do heed the calls of their leaders, they are actors in the peace process in and of themselves, with views – more or less informed – on what kind of solution they would like to see and accept on the island.<sup>6</sup> Naturally it is far easier for leaders to discuss these matters in secret behind closed doors. In some respects secrecy also allows for greater flexibility and openness to compromise. Yet the Annan Plan precedent points to the boomerang effect of an elite-driven and non-transparent process. Once the Plan was disclosed and because its content and philosophy had not been discussed in public over time, it became far easier for the ‘No’ camp in the south – where the Annan Plan process did not overlap with a period of effective regime change, as in the north – to make its case. The need to engage public opinion and thus listen, inform and discuss the peace process publicly and transparently is thus key to achieving, first, positive referenda results, and second, the actual implementation of a peace agreement on the ground. It is essential that debate and communication be established between local leaders and the public and for the peace process to be as open and participatory as possible in order to maximize its chances of success. While not being a sufficient condition of success, an open and transparent process appears to have become a necessary element of a successful process in Cyprus.

It is in this context that CEPS has launched a project to investigate what Cypriots think of each other, of the peace process and of possible solutions to the conflict, carried out through successive public opinion polls. Within the context of a renewed ‘Cypriot-owned’ peace process at elite levels, the relevance of this project has soared. Its aim is to act in support of this process, exploring avenues to increase public confidence in it and testing ideas for a solution that would meet both communities’ consent. In what follows we present the results of our first survey, conducted simultaneously in the northern and southern parts of the island in April-May 2008, and suggest ways in which the leadership in Cyprus as

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<sup>6</sup> See A. Lordos (2008), “Rational Agent or Unthinking Follower? A Survey-Based Profile Analysis of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Referendum Voters”, in T. Diez and N. Tocci (eds), *Cyprus: A Conflict at the Crossroads*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

well as in the EU could engage in measures to raise public confidence in as well as incentives for peace on the island.<sup>7</sup>

The objective of this book is not to delve into the substantive and detailed elements of a peace agreement, although preliminary results will be presented. This will be the subject of the next phase of the project, the results of which will be presented in forthcoming publications. The aim here is rather to focus on measures to build confidence both between the parties in conflict and, above all, in the peace process itself in view of its relaunch in 2008. Building public confidence in the process is indeed a fundamental precondition for its ultimate success.

## **2. Inter-communal Values and Attitudes**

We began our study by exploring who the Cypriots are and what their political values and attitudes are. How do Cypriots view themselves? What are their aspirations, their fears and their perceptions of each other, and the prospects for peace on the island? Our initial focus on values and attitudes reflects an acknowledgement that a solution in Cyprus must not only focus on constitutional and technical matters, but also on sociological factors. Efforts to build a viable polity will require an appreciation of the political sociology of the respective communities, their points of convergence and of divergence.

The picture that emerges is a mixed one. On the one hand, Cypriots share, as citizens, many important similarities in terms of their political values and aspirations, with differences between them appearing to be rooted more in their different contexts and historical trajectories than to fundamental differences in values and ideologies. Moreover, while some differences and reasons for concern do emerge, Cypriots are open to compromise, ready to revisit their official historical narratives and abhor a resort to violence. This sets Cyprus apart from other conflicts in the European neighbourhood, as the August 2008 war between Russia and

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<sup>7</sup> Two identical polls were conducted, in the north and south, by Prologue Consulting Ltd. and CYMAR, respectively. For each poll, 1000 interviews were conducted. Respondents were selected initially through stratification of urban and rural populations based on census data. Details of the sampling process can be found in Annex 1. The questionnaire was produced by CEPS in collaboration with a research team comprised of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and has been reproduced here in Annex 2.

Georgia tragically reminds us.<sup>8</sup> This very point was made in a recent report published by the Cyprus Centre of the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) that finds that Cyprus is unique in that, despite inter-ethnic warfare, levels of ethnic cleansing and inter-communal hatred are lower than might be expected.<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, Cypriots are fundamentally distrustful. Turkish Cypriots mistrust Greek Cypriots, the EU and the international community, whereas Greek Cypriots mistrust Turkey, bringing to the fore the double-minority characterisation of the conflict.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, other recent polls conducted point to high levels of inter-communal mistrust.<sup>11</sup> It has been suggested elsewhere that inter-communal trust can be enhanced through greater contact between the communities. Unfortunately, in Cyprus, crossings have been limited and even declined after an initial peak in 2003, due to a number of factors.<sup>12</sup> Mistrust is also intra-communal, with general and diffuse mistrust of fellow citizens and institutions. These findings are not unique to this study. The relative weakness of civil society in both communities has been documented.<sup>13</sup> In response to this reality the

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<sup>8</sup> There are also groups in Armenia and Azerbaijan that support the resort to military means if necessary in order to reach a 'solution' to the conflict. On this point, see the International Crisis Group (2005), *Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground*, Europe report No. 166, 14 September.

<sup>9</sup> A. Sitas et al. (2007), *Prospects of Reconciliation, Co-Existence and Forgiveness in Cyprus in the Post-Referendum Period*, PRIO Report, Cyprus Centre of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, ([http://www.prio.no/files/manual-import/cyprus/1740\\_Report\\_4\\_07.pdf](http://www.prio.no/files/manual-import/cyprus/1740_Report_4_07.pdf))

<sup>10</sup> This refers to the 'balance' created by the fact that Turkish Cypriots are in a minority position vis-à-vis Greek Cypriots on the island, whereas Greek Cypriots and Greeks are in a minority position vis-à-vis Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean.

<sup>11</sup> J. Christou (2008), "Questions raised over poll of Turkish Cypriot attitudes", *Cyprus Mail*, 12 August.

<sup>12</sup> C. Psaltis (2008), "Trust, contact and identities in the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot community", paper presented at the conference on Rethinking Reconciliation and Cooperation with View to Reunification in Cyprus: Challenges for Citizens, Political and Social Actors, 20-21 June, University of Nicosia.

<sup>13</sup> CIVICUS (2005), "An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future", *CIVICUS: Civil Society Index Report*.

European Union has launched its Cypriot Civil Society in Action programme.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, both communities lack confidence in the peace process; after decades of failed negotiations and the ultimate failure of the Annan Plan, Cypriots view renewed efforts to reach an agreement with some caution.

## 2.1 Shared values and aspirations

In this section we investigate the degree to which the communities in Cyprus share certain values and aspirations that might make a settlement feasible or otherwise. As we see below, people from both communities tend to exhibit pragmatism, putting a premium on economic and social progress while abhorring the use of violence. Alongside this both communities also share the view that the status quo is neither preferable to a solution nor ideal. Yet at the same time, a high degree of risk aversion within both communities, coupled with the significant percentage of Cypriots – higher in the Greek Cypriot community – who are satisfied with or have mixed feelings about the political status quo, could constitute an obstacle to peaceful resolution.

Beginning with shared values, Cypriots share some important similarities regarding their perceived identities and political values. Large majorities of each community view themselves as being both Greek/Turkish and Cypriot (96% GC and 76% TC), even if both consider Greece and Turkey respectively as being their cultural and/or political kin-states. In other words, Greek and Turkish Cypriots tend not to identify themselves as Greeks or Turks exclusively, and both communities share an affinity to Cyprus (see Figures 1 & 2).

Both communities also have an open international outlook, with 63% of Greek Cypriots and 66% of Turkish Cypriots identifying with the description ‘citizen of the world’. Furthermore, neither community manifests an ingrained sense of euroscepticism, with only small minorities viewing EU membership as a threat to national identity (19% GC and 22% TC). However, whereas 88% of Greek Cypriots view themselves as EU citizens, only 41% of Turkish Cypriots do so (see Figure 3).

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<sup>14</sup> This programme is funded as part of the European Commission’s financial instrument to support the development of the Turkish Cypriot community through budget-line 22020703 (see EuropeAid/127215/L/ACT/CY at <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/cgi/frame12.pl>).




Figure 1a. Greek Cypriot sense of identity




Figure 1b. Turkish Cypriot sense of identity




Figure 2a. Greek Cypriot sense of cultural affinity




Figure 2b. Turkish Cypriot sense of cultural affinity




Figure 3a. Greek Cypriot sense of citizenship




Figure 3b. Turkish Cypriot sense of citizenship

This divergence is a clear reflection of the Turkish Cypriots’ exclusion from many of the benefits of EU membership, rather than a fundamental rejection of the EU. Today’s feeling of exclusion from the EU may well, in time, translate into Turkish Cypriot euroscepticism, especially in a situation of continued turbulence in EU-Turkey relations. Such euroscepticism may in turn translate into a more rigid negotiating position vis-à-vis the conflict. This could be true especially of those aspects of a settlement in which the Greek Cypriots seek a fuller implementation of the EU *acquis*, resisting temporary or permanent derogations from it. This situation highlights the counterproductive effects of Greek Cypriot fears and conservatism when it comes to any proposal that would integrate the Turkish Cypriot community more closely into the EU.

Second, Cypriots are not fundamentally hostile towards each other and both communities have reached a level of political maturity necessary to re-evaluate their conflict-ridden pasts. Both acknowledge the mistakes committed by their own community in the conflict (85% GC and 50% TC), both recognise that a solution needs to be based on mutually acceptable compromises (81% GC and 69% TC) and both are absolutely opposed to the idea of ‘solving’ the conflict through armed struggle (89% GC and 92% TC) (see Figure 4).




Figure 4a. Greek Cypriot underlying attitudes regarding the Cyprus problem






Figure 4b. Turkish Cypriot underlying attitudes regarding the Cyprus problem

Third and alongside this, neither community is satisfied with the status quo, which also points to an underlying desire to move the peace process forward. This is especially evident for the Turkish Cypriots who, disillusioned with the Greek Cypriots and the international community for having rejected the Annan Plan and for not having found a way to lift their state of international isolation, declare themselves fundamentally dissatisfied with the status quo (46%) or as having mixed feelings towards it (38%). Yet also for the Greek Cypriots, only a minority declares itself satisfied with the status quo (15%), while the rest, not least in view of the inherent sense of insecurity vis-à-vis Turkey, are either fundamentally dissatisfied with the status quo (30%) or have mixed feelings about it (45%) (see Figure 5). A possible explanation of these differences may be that whereas Greek Cypriots are on the whole satisfied with their personal lives (51%), only 29% of the Turkish Cypriots are, not least because they are more directly affected by the consequences of the conflict (see Figure 6). It should be noted that the higher level of personal dissatisfaction among Turkish Cypriots is linked, as we shall see in a moment, with an equally strong sentiment that the Greek Cypriots, the European Union and the international community at large share a part of the blame for their current

situation. Hence, the pressing need to improve the living conditions of the Turkish Cypriots, not just on humanitarian grounds but also to increase the level of trust of Turkish Cypriots towards the aforementioned actors. Such efforts will be most effective, and most supportive of efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement, if the Greek Cypriots wholeheartedly participate in the endeavour in whichever way is appropriate. This would help to dilute current narratives within the Turkish Cypriot community that Greek Cypriots “are taking pleasure in the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots”, or even that “they wish to maintain the Turkish Cypriots in an inferior social and economic level so that they remain the undisputed masters of the island”. At the same time, the fact that sizeable minorities in each community are satisfied with the status quo or have mixed feelings about it should serve as a warning sign to those charged with negotiating and then drafting a comprehensive settlement plan. Only if the end product of their deliberations is perceived, in both communities, as being significantly better than the status quo, can it be guaranteed that the large majority of the public will fall behind its leaders in support of a new settlement plan.



*Figure 5. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot levels of satisfaction regarding the current political situation*



*Figure 6. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot levels of satisfaction regarding their personal lives*

Fourth, the two communities share important similarities in terms of their personal values. Both value independence highly (40% GC and 53% TC) and a feeling of responsibility (63% GC and 59% TC), while attributing less importance to imagination and creativity (21% GC and 21% TC), and altruism (23% GC and 24% TC) (see Figure 7). Both appear to be religious, with 94% of Greek Cypriots and 88% of Turkish Cypriots viewing themselves as either practising or non-practising Orthodox Christians/Muslims respectively (see Figure 8).<sup>15</sup> Both communities attach prime importance to their sense of security (86% GC and 85% TC), to kindness towards the other (85% GC and 90% TC) and to tradition (76% GC and 71% TC), while attributing less importance to wealth (17% GC and 28% TC), to spoiling oneself (28% GC and 52% TC) and to adventure (39% GC and 34% TC) (see Figure 9). The shared reluctance to embrace adventure may also indicate an underlying tendency in both communities towards risk aversion, creating a potential impediment to reaching a solution, which inevitably calls for a considerable leap of faith. In addition, the

<sup>15</sup> Particularly as far as the Turkish Cypriots are concerned, this finding is particularly interesting in view of the widespread view that Turkish Cypriots are generally quite agnostic.

comparatively low importance that both communities ascribe to imagination and creativity may act as a further impediment, insofar as achieving mutually acceptable solutions to complex problems normally requires a healthy dose of creativity.




Figure 7. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot responses to the question: "Which values would you encourage your children to learn?" Respondents choose up to five options




Figure 8a. Greek Cypriots and religious beliefs




Figure 8b. Turkish Cypriots and religious beliefs




Figure 9a. Greek Cypriot self-identification with alternative personal value sets




Figure 9b. Turkish Cypriot self-identification with alternative personal value sets

Impressively, both communities mirror each other in terms of value preferences regarding conditions in society and public policy priorities. Both value economic growth highly (75% GC and 70% TC) and a stable economy (70% GC and 68% TC), but less so strong defence forces (37% GC and 40% TC), empowerment (46% GC and 45% TC) and the environment (38% GC and 42% TC) (see Figure 10). The two communities also mirror each other in terms of their ideological preferences, with the distribution of political preferences across the far left-far right spectrum following a similar curve (see Figure 11), whereby both communities are relatively centrist and non-polarised politically. This finding bodes well for the future of a sister political party or common political parties within a reunified island.




Figure 10. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot preferences regarding public policy priorities (primary option set). Respondents choose up to two options




Figure 11. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot self-identification along the political spectrum

## 2.2 Differences, mistrust and lack of confidence

In other aspects instead, the two communities differ in terms of personal values and values attributed to conditions in society. When asked to rank different values, Greek Cypriots prioritise tolerance and religious faith (58% and 44% respectively), while Turkish Cypriots put a premium on determination and obedience (41% and 33% respectively) (see Figure 7). The value attributed to obedience might also be related to the more ambivalent attitude that Turkish Cypriots have towards non-democratic forms of governance, whereby 68% would approve of a technocratic government and 51% are open to forms of authoritarian rule (see Figure 12). As a visible effect of different contextual circumstances, Turkish Cypriots appear to be more transformationist, i.e. willing to change a diverse set of features within their society, valuing almost equally order (59%), democracy (51%), fighting inflation (41%) and freedom of speech (45%).





Figure 12a. Greek Cypriot evaluation of alternative political systems



*Figure 12b. Turkish Cypriot evaluation of alternative political systems*

By contrast, Greek Cypriots appear to care more for current problem areas within their society such as maintaining order (71%), fighting crime (62%) and fighting inflation (59%), as opposed to areas they feel relatively content with (e.g. democracy 33% and freedom of speech 34%) (see Figures 13 & 14). This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that both communities consider democracy as the most desirable political system (97% GC and 96% TC) (see Figure 12), the difference thus seeming to be that Greek Cypriots believe they live in an acceptable democracy and therefore see less need for action in this area. The Turkish Cypriots, while wanting more democracy, seem to be also open to forms of non-democratic yet effective and efficient government in so far as they may feel that they lack a fully democratic, effective and efficient government, so are therefore open to all experimentations of alternative forms of governance.




Figure 13. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot preferences regarding public policy priorities (1<sup>st</sup> complementary option set). Respondents choose up to two options




Figure 14. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot preferences regarding public policy priorities (2<sup>nd</sup> complementary option set). Respondents choose up to two options

Moreover, important elements of mistrust and scepticism persist. Both communities tend to be generally mistrustful of others, with only 5% of Greek Cypriots and 11% of Turkish Cypriots agreeing that “others generally try to be fair” (see Figure 15). Both communities tend to trust only their immediate surroundings including the family (98% GC and 96% TC), people they know personally (85% GC and 76% TC) and their neighbourhood (67% GC and 68% TC), while both are distrustful of strangers and people of other nationalities and faiths (see Figure 16). Greek Cypriots in particular also appear to be fomenting the potential for ethnic intolerance and xenophobia (probably not only towards Turkish Cypriots but also towards immigrants of other European countries), with only 8% of Greek Cypriots (as opposed to 37% TC) believing that ethnic diversity enriches life (see Figure 17).

It is interesting to note that Greek Cypriots live in a comparatively multi-ethnic society whereas Turkish Cypriots live in a comparatively mono-ethnic society; at the same time, it is Turkish Cypriots who tend to espouse ethnic diversity and not the Greek Cypriots. Perhaps the responses of each community represent a form of over-compensation for their actual life experiences: the Greek Cypriots are becoming worried about the social consequences of an increasing influx of immigrants, while the Turkish Cypriots are becoming worried about their isolation from the other nations and nationalities of the world and acknowledge the need to achieve greater openness in society.

Whatever the explanation for this phenomenon, some conclusions are obvious. On the one hand, policy-makers need to place an increased emphasis on multi-cultural education, both now and in the context of a re-unified Cyprus; on the other hand, the increased levels of inter-ethnic openness that are now evidenced among Turkish Cypriots should be taken note of by those Greek Cypriots who currently worry that “in the context of a federal settlement conditions of ‘ethnic purity’ will prevail in the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State because this is what the Turkish Cypriot authorities will be working towards”. Clearly, the current findings constitute grounds for re-considering this position.




Figure 15. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot responses to the question: “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?”




Figure 16a. Greek Cypriot level of trust towards different social groups




Figure 16b. Turkish Cypriot level of trust towards different social groups




Figure 17. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot attitudes regarding ethnic diversity

Regarding levels of trust between the parties to the conflict, Greek Cypriots, possibly influenced by their long-standing political narrative that “our problem is not with the Turkish Cypriots but with Turkey”, say they trust Turkish Cypriots (61%); while Turkish Cypriots say that they mistrust Greek Cypriots (72%), their leader Christofias (74%) as well as Greek Cypriot parties and institutions (see Figure 18).<sup>16</sup> By contrast and as a reflection of the ‘double minority’ problem characterising the conflict, Greek Cypriots, while trusting their own institutions (RoC courts and army 76%, RoC government 75%) (see Figure 19) manifest outright mistrust for Turkey - its army (99%) and government (97%) - as well as those Turkish Cypriot actors, including political parties and the president, which are viewed as either weak or puppets in the hands of Ankara (see Figure 18). Yet the Turkish Cypriots, whose only protector is Ankara because of their persistent isolation, continue to place most trust in the army (93%), creating a significant context-driven divide with their Greek Cypriot counterparts (see Figure 19). This result also relates to and reflects back on the relative Turkish Cypriot openness towards the forms of non-democratic rule discussed above (see Figure 12). In addition, whereas Turkish Cypriots consider Greek Cypriots as being essentially in charge of their own affairs, Greek Cypriots perceive Turkey as being the unquestioned master of the beleaguered Turkish Cypriots (see Figure 20).




Figure 18a. Greek Cypriot level of trust towards different groups and power centres related with the Turkish Cypriot community

<sup>16</sup> Turkish Cypriot attitudes are probably conditioned by the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of the Annan Plan.




Figure 18b. Turkish Cypriot level of trust towards different groups and power centres related with the Greek Cypriot community




Figure 19a. Greek Cypriot level of trust towards international organisations and institutions in their own community




Figure 19b. Turkish Cypriot level of trust towards international organisations and institutions in their own community





Figure 20a. Greek Cypriot perceptions regarding the locus of political authority in the Turkish Cypriot Community. Respondents choose up to two options




*Figure 20b. Turkish Cypriot perceptions regarding the locus of political authority in the Greek Cypriot Community. Respondents choose up to two options*

These perceptions regarding the locus of political control within the other community drive a further wedge of grievance and mistrust between them; the Greek Cypriot notion that the Turkish Cypriots are mere puppets in the hands of Ankara is received by the Turkish Cypriots as hurtful and insulting, despite – or even because of – Greek Cypriot assurances that “our problem is not with you but with Ankara”. At the same time, the perception among Turkish Cypriots that the Orthodox Church in the Greek Cypriot Community is somehow an equal partner of the president and the National Council in the formulation of Cyprus problem policy betrays a narrative that has been frozen in time since the early days of the conflict.

Beyond their perceptions and (mis)trust of each other, both communities are also pessimistic regarding the peace process, with only 18% of Greek Cypriots and 13% of Turkish Cypriots expressing unambiguous hope about a positive outcome (see Figure 21). This pessimism is particularly acute amongst Turkish Cypriots, who following the Annan Plan precedent have little faith in the peace process and Greek Cypriot willingness to deliver a compromise solution, as opposed to Greek Cypriots, who, emboldened by their new president, appear somewhat

more hopeful of the ongoing negotiations. Finally, both communities seem to be experiencing a crisis of confidence in the United Nations and its mediation efforts; only 44% of Greek Cypriots and 39% of Turkish Cypriots declare that they have confidence in the UN, percentages that are only paralleled by those for the political parties, which also suffer low levels of confidence among the public in both communities (46% GC and 27% TC) (see Figure 19). Regarding the UN in particular, the UNFICYP survey of 2007<sup>17</sup> also identified this crisis of confidence; according to follow up questions within that survey, one major factor that contributed to the UN’s comparatively poor image among the Cypriots is the widespread sense that “little effort is being made to understand – and include in the peace process – the concerns and priorities of ordinary Cypriots”. Within that poll, several ways and means by which the UN could approach the public in both communities were tested, and all were found to be extremely popular.



*Figure 21. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot level of hope regarding the new process that began with the March 21<sup>st</sup> meeting between the two leaders*

<sup>17</sup> UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (2007), “The UN in Cyprus: An Inter-communal Survey of Public Opinion by UNFICYP”, February-June ([http://www.unficy.org/media/Survey\\_24\\_04\\_2007\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.unficy.org/media/Survey_24_04_2007_ENG.pdf)).

### 3. Prospects for a Comprehensive Settlement

The meeting on 21 March 2008 between the two Cypriot leaders led to a resumption of the peace process. This Cypriot-led process initially saw the establishment of six inter-communal working groups in April 2008 meeting twice a week and covering the principal items on the conflict settlement agenda: governance and power-sharing, EU matters, property, security and guarantees, economy, and territory. Seven technical committees were also set up to discuss crime, commerce, cultural heritage, crisis management, humanitarian issues, health and the environment. Moreover on 23 May 2008, Christofias and Talat declared that a solution would entail a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, with a single international personality and with a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot constituent state enjoying equal status. This was followed by the July 1<sup>st</sup> statement where the leaders agreed in principle that a solution would entail a single sovereignty and citizenship on the island. On July 25<sup>th</sup> a final review of the work of the working groups and technical committees was completed leading to agreement to commence fully-fledged negotiations as of 3 September 2008. Within this context, what do Cypriots think of the peace process, how should it be conducted and what kind of solution should it lead to?

#### 3.1 Convergence on process and principle

Here as well, encouraging aspects of convergence come to the fore. Both communities believe the process should be Cypriot-owned, with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot experts working together on the various items of the conflict settlement agenda, as opposed to third-party nationals being given this responsibility (GC 80% and TC 70%) (see Figure 22). Probably for very different reasons, either one or both communities are sceptical of previous initiatives or proposals as a basis of future talks, including the Annan Plan (60% GC and 43% TC against), the 1960 constitution (46% TC against) or a prior recognition of two states (64% GC against). Related to this, Greek Cypriots reject a confederation as the basis for a solution (50% against), both reject a land-for-recognition package (69% GCs and 53% TCs against) and Turkish Cypriots are sceptical of an evolutionary integration into a unified state (33% against) (see Figure 23). It is likely that both communities would accept a consensual evolutionary federation (e.g. through a Constitutional Convention), but an *a priori* specification that such an evolution would lead to a unified and centralised state is unsurprisingly resisted by the Turkish Cypriots.





Figure 22. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot responses to the question: “Who do you think should be primarily involved in the negotiations, on an expert level?”



Figure 23a. Greek Cypriot preferences for the constitutional framework of a comprehensive settlement



*Figure 23b. Turkish Cypriot preferences for the constitutional framework of a comprehensive settlement*

By contrast, both communities converge on the idea that the basis for negotiations should be the 1977-79 High Level Agreements, with 63% of Greek Cypriots and 77% of Turkish Cypriots viewing this basis as either tolerable, satisfactory or desirable, leading to a 'Bi-zonal Bi-communal Federation with Political Equality', with 75% of Greek Cypriots and 90% of Turkish Cypriots viewing this final outcome as either tolerable, satisfactory or desirable (see Figure 23). It is interesting to note the small divergence in levels of support for the 1977-79 High Level Agreements (slightly lower in both communities) compared to levels of support for a 'Bi-zonal Bi-communal Federation with Political Equality' or a 'BBF' (slightly higher in both communities). In the case of a comprehensive Cyprus settlement, it would seem that the rule applies whereby the less you specify in detail what lies behind a label the greater support you gather for the proposed solution in question. In the case of the High Level Agreements, while those texts specifically state that the solution will be federal, bi-zonal and bi-communal, they also make some additional statements of principle to clarify what that federal solution would imply (e.g. the 1977 agreement, states that account will be taken of the special needs of the Turkish Cypriot community when resolving the property issue, or in the 1979 agreement,

that human rights and basic freedoms will apply). The more such clarifications are made, the greater the potential for supporters of a federal settlement, in either community, to fall away and join the sceptic camp.

The Annan Plan is another very interesting example, which while representing one possible specification of a BBF, exhibits dramatic differences in the levels of support for a generic BBF and for the specific plan. There may be several explanations for this divergence. One explanation often heard in the south is that the 'devil is in the detail' and that while a BBF is intrinsically acceptable, the Annan Plan's specific interpretation of it was not. An alternative reading, which enjoys more resonance in the north and in Turkey, is that the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan was a litmus test of a broader rejection of a BBF, which can be easily concealed when only the general and unspecified proposition of a BBF is on the table. Another explanation may be that the label more than the substance of the Plan has been tarnished in the south.

All these readings may hold some truth. The discrepancy in the figures also suggests that while prospects for an agreement on the basis of a BBF appear promising, the room for different interpretations of what this would entail necessitates further in-depth research that goes beyond the labels and into the specifics of what a settlement model would look like in practice. This should take place before final conclusions regarding the level of convergence of the two communities can be reached. We begin to do this in the pages that follow, but a more in-depth analysis of the various options – which the two communities may choose from in drafting a comprehensive settlement plan – will be conducted in the next poll planned within this project.

Linked to this discussion, other polls conducted in 2008 among Turkish Cypriots suggest that support for federalism is waning in northern Cyprus as well. In fact, support for an 'ideal' two-state solution has increased since the failed referendum of 2004. Polls conducted in 2007 demonstrate that the 2008 results are not unique.<sup>18</sup> However, there is a limit to arguments surrounding the 'ideal' solution for both communities. It should also be appreciated that when polled in the context of the recent

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<sup>18</sup> The results of a KADEM poll released in January 2007 demonstrated that 65% of Turkish Cypriots favoured a two-state solution (<http://acturca.wordpress.com/2007/02/02/turkish-cypriots-in-favour-of-coexistence-of-two-separate-states-on-cyprus/>).

stalemate, respondents of both communities were likely to hold an underlying belief that a comprehensive and negotiated settlement is not in the offing – a perception that tended to influence poll responses, especially when solution types are directly compared, such as in a question of the type: “What do you prefer, a two-state solution or a federation? (Choose one)”. According to a UN poll conducted in 2007, overwhelming majorities of respondents from both communities considered that the Cyprus problem “will not be solved in the foreseeable future”.<sup>19</sup> The same poll demonstrated that 59% of Turkish Cypriots considered a two-state solution satisfactory, with an additional 21% considering it tolerable. On the other side, a full 71% of Greek Cypriots considered a unitary state solution satisfactory. This notwithstanding, that poll, as well as the current one, treats each alternative separately, and does not force a comparison of ‘ideal’ types. Thus, when asked whether they would countenance federalism, majorities in both communities remain open to this alternative.

Indeed in our poll, we find that over 75% of Turkish Cypriots polled consider mutual recognition of two states as a preferable precondition to negotiations. However, when asked whether the solution should be based on the principles of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation with political equality, we see that less than 20% of Turkish Cypriots oppose this. In other words, the ideal option of two-states would not appear to be mutually exclusive with the alternative of a BBF, the former being an ideal first best and the latter an achievable second best. Likewise, Greek Cypriots would also prefer a gradual full integration into a unitary state, but are open to a second best federal settlement. In fact, the percentage of those absolutely hostile to a federal settlement is similar in both communities, hovering between 10% and 20%. This implies that whereas a federal settlement is a compromise for both it would rally majority acceptance on both sides of the island. Whereas the two communities have polarised views on ‘ideal’ solutions, they share an identifiable area of second-best overlap (see Figure 23).

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<sup>19</sup> UNIFCYP (2007), *op. cit.*

### **3.2 Areas of convergence and divergence on settlement details**

Moving into the detail of a comprehensive agreement, there is some scope for optimism and convergence, particularly on issues such as the economy and Cyprus' international perspectives. On Cyprus' future economic outlook, both agree on the principle that all efforts should be made to equalise the two communities' living standards, preferably with a significant input by the international community and the EU (79% GC and 62% TC viewing this as either satisfactory, desirable or essential). Both agree that achieving this goal – and, beyond it, ensuring long term economic growth for the benefit of all Cypriots – would require a carefully planned economic development strategy (82% GC and 83% TC), with the financial and economic ramifications of a settlement being evaluated carefully prior to an agreement (75% GC and 85% TC), and that economic integration ought to be carried out gradually, with temporary restrictions to protect vulnerable groups (79% GC and 79% TC) and by encouraging joint business ventures between the two communities (77% GC and 65% TC) (see Table 1). The question of inserting temporary restrictions to the economic reunification of the island links to the critical policy question facing the leaderships in Cyprus and the EU: whether and how to include temporary restrictions on the implementation of the EU *acquis* following the reunification of the island.

Likewise, both communities share similar aspirations regarding Cyprus' future international outlook, which would see Cyprus within the eastern Mediterranean and the EU, projecting peace, stability and prosperity to its wider neighbourhood. Both agree that Cyprus should enjoy sovereign equality in its international relations with Greece and Turkey (87% GC and 69% TC). Both agree that post-settlement Cyprus should support Turkey's EU membership bid (53% GC and 80% TC), and that Cyprus should participate fully in EU foreign policy (79% GC and 56% TC). Both concur that Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, as strategic partners, should promote stability and development in the wider eastern Mediterranean region including the Balkans and the Middle East (62% GC and 68% TC) (see Table 2).

PROPOSAL	GREEK CYPRIOTS			TURKISH CYPRIOTS			DOSSIER
	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent - Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent - Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	
The financial and economic ramifications of the settlement must be carefully evaluated by experts in advance of the agreement, to ensure that there will not be any unexpected negative consequences.	7%	18%	75%	10%	5%	85%	Economics
The settlement should include a complete economic development plan, to outline the strategy for economic progress and growth in the first few years after a settlement for the benefit of all economic groups in society.	9%	9%	82%	12%	5%	83%	Economics
Economic integration needs to take place at a moderate pace, with some temporary restrictions, in order to protect potentially vulnerable economic groups (low skilled workers, small businesses etc.) from competition they are not ready to face.	11%	9%	79%	15%	7%	79%	Economics
In the settlement, joint business ventures between Greek and Turkish Cypriots should be encouraged through appropriate incentive schemes as a way to improve the relations between the two communities and encourage economic growth.	14%	9%	77%	29%	7%	65%	Economics
Immediately after the settlement, every effort must be made to bring the standard of living of the Turkish Cypriots on a par with the standard of living of Greek Cypriots, but financed in such a way as not to burden the Greek Cypriots.	14%	7%	79%	31%	7%	62%	Economics

*Table 1. Areas of convergence in the economics dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda*

PROPOSAL	GREEK CYPRIOTS			TURKISH CYPRIOTS			DOSSIER
	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent- Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent- Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	
Greece, Turkey and unified Cyprus should become strategic partners after a settlement, working together to promote the stability and development of other countries in the Balkans and the Middle East.	20%	18%	62%	25%	8%	68%	International Outlook
After a settlement, unified Cyprus must enjoy relations of sovereign equality with Greece and Turkey, and not be seen in any way as inferior or subordinate to them.	7%	6%	87%	22%	9%	69%	International Outlook
After a settlement, unified Cyprus should participate fully in the development and execution of the EU's common foreign policy.	10%	11%	79%	34%	10%	56%	International Outlook
Once a settlement is reached, and given that all parties - Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Turkey and Greece - honour their part of the agreement, unified Cyprus should support Turkey's bid for EU membership.	34%	13%	53%	13%	7%	80%	International Outlook

*Table 2. Areas of convergence in the international outlook dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda*

As for other dossiers on the conflict settlement agenda, there is significant distance and polarisation between the two communities. This especially concerns questions of governance, property, residence, 'settlers' and security. On governance, there is divergence on issues related to veto rights in the decision-making process. On property, there is divergence regarding whether a solution should primarily take the form of restitution or compensation. Regarding 'settlers', Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have contrasting views on the repatriation of Turkish immigrants. On security, we found some polarisation, especially in matters related to the prospect of demilitarisation. On residence rights, there are clear differences in the interpretation of bi-zonality, with Greek Cypriots strongly opposing and Turkish Cypriots preferring that members of each community should live primarily within the boundaries of their own constituent state (see Table 3).

Despite divergences, there is scope to move these dossiers forward, both through the convergence of views regarding principle and procedure. Across all dossiers, generally we found relatively high levels of support for measures that would help provide more accurate information about daily reality, which is necessary to elaborate more realistic and appealing proposals. As we shall consider below, these fact-finding exercises, be they a census on population, on property or on security threat perceptions, could also represent important confidence-building steps between the communities, possibly contributing to a process of depolarisation on more detailed substantive matters.

On governance and power sharing issues, both communities agree on the principle that a future bi-communal government should be functional (84% GC and 77% TC viewing this as either satisfactory, desirable or essential) and ensure effective participation of both communities in decision-making (76% GC and 74% TC) (see Table 4).

PROPOSAL	GREEK CYPRIOTS			TURKISH CYPRIOTS			DOSSIER
	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent - Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent - Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	
Each community should have the right to unilaterally block any decision or legislation of the federal government that it considers to be incompatible with its own communal interests.	38%	21%	41%	21%	7%	72%	Governance & power-sharing
The property issue should be solved primarily through restitution, so that affected individuals will regain control of their properties as they had them before the events of the Cyprus problem.	6%	3%	91%	52%	6%	42%	Property
All people who came from Turkey after 1974, including their descendents, should return to Turkey after a settlement. The only possible exception is the case of those who have married Turkish Cypriots and the children of such mixed marriages.	29%	6%	65%	72%	5%	23%	Citizenship
After the settlement, Cyprus should be fully demilitarised. All foreign troops should withdraw and all Cypriot armies should be disbanded.	23%	11%	66%	75%	8%	17%	Security & guarantees
In the context of a settlement, all, or almost all of the Greek Cypriots should live in the Greek Cypriot state, while all, or almost all of the Turkish Cypriots should live in the Turkish Cypriot state.	63%	10%	27%	29%	5%	66%	Residence rights

*Table 3. Areas of divergence and intensely contested issues in the various dossiers of the comprehensive settlement agenda*

PROPOSAL	GREEK CYPRIOTS			TURKISH CYPRIOTS			ASPECT
	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent- Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent- Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	
Effective participation both of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the decision-making process should be included in the administrative provisions of the settlement.	14%	10%	76%	18%	8%	74%	Governance & power-sharing
The administrative provisions of the settlement must be such as to ensure the functionality of government, and specifically to ensure that the government will be able to make swift and correct decisions.	7%	9%	84%	13%	10%	77%	Governance & power-sharing

*Table 4. Areas of convergence in the governance and power-sharing dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda*

Both communities converge on the idea that prior to an agreement on property and precisely in order to ensure that such a deal is satisfactory, there should be a process of consultation with all affected persons, with 86% Greek Cypriots and 77% Turkish Cypriots believing this to be satisfactory, desirable or essential. Both communities also accept the idea that the international community, including Greece and Turkey, should contribute financially to the settlement of the property issue (80% GC and 76% TC). There is also agreement on the idea that prior to an agreement on property, there ought to be a full census of all affected properties examining their current use and conditions (78% GC and 62% TC) (see Table 5). It is worth noting that most of these points of convergence on the property dossier are related, as we have mentioned above, to fact-finding activities. On the one hand through consultations with affected individuals, and on the other hand by conducting a census of properties.

While such proposals make sense on an intuitive level – insofar as it appears paradoxical for leaders to be representing individuals regarding their property rights without consulting them, or for detailed negotiations to be taking place without having a clear picture of the financial costs and other parameters of the property issue – they have nonetheless not been a component of the negotiation process so far. By discussing the property issue on an abstract level, however, it becomes extremely difficult to reach a compromise between the competing principles of the two sides (restitution vs. compensation) and even when a compromise is reached it becomes very difficult to legitimise it to the wider public and to the affected individuals in particular.

Turning to residence, despite divergence on detail, both communities accept the principle that a balanced compromise is needed between the Greek Cypriot desire for freedom of settlement and Turkish Cypriot concerns for bi-zonality (52% GC and 57% TC viewing this as either satisfactory, desirable or essential) (see Table 6).

PROPOSAL	GREEK CYPRIOTS			TURKISH CYPRIOTS			DOSSIER
	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent- Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent- Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	
The international community – including Turkey and Greece – should contribute generously to the financial cost involved in the resolution of the property issue.	8%	12%	80%	18%	6%	76%	Property
In order to reach a satisfactory solution to the property issue, the affected individuals themselves – the ordinary Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot refugees – need to be consulted so that the solution will be tailor-made to their real requirements.	10%	5%	86%	19%	4%	77%	Property
Before the property issue can be resolved, a full census of all affected properties should take place, in both communities, examining their current use and condition. This property census would then be used by the negotiators of the two communities in their deliberations.	15%	7%	78%	30%	8%	62%	Property

*Table 5. Areas of convergence in the property dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda*

PROPOSAL	GREEK CYPRIOTS			TURKISH CYPRIOTS			DOSSIER
	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent- - Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent- Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	
A balanced compromise will need to be struck between the desire of Greek Cypriots to be able to live freely anywhere in post-settlement Cyprus, and the desire of Turkish Cypriots to ensure that they will remain the effective majority in the region that they will control.	35%	13%	52%	33%	10%	57%	Residence rights

*Table 6. Areas of convergence in the residence rights dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda*

PROPOSAL	GREEK CYPRIOTS			TURKISH CYPRIOTS			DOSSIER
	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent- Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent- Unsure	Satisfactory Essential	
In order to properly resolve the issue of the people from Turkey, a complete and internationally monitored population census must first take place, in both communities, so that the negotiators have a clear picture of the extent and parameters of the problem which they are trying to solve.	12%	7%	81%	29%	8%	63%	Citizenship

*Table 7. Areas of convergence in the citizenship dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda*

PROPOSAL	GREEK CYPRIOTS			TURKISH CYPRIOTS			DOSSIER
	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent - Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	Unacceptable - Tolerable	Ambivalent - Unsure	Satisfactory - Essential	
In order to reach a satisfactory solution to the security aspect, the security concerns and fears of both communities need to be taken into account as well as the objective threats that Cyprus might face in the future.	6%	5%	89%	14%	7%	79%	Security & guarantees
Post-settlement Cyprus will need to maintain a moderately-sized professional security force, bi-communal in composition, which would be responsible to defend the island from any internal and external threats.	17%	11%	72%	27%	6%	67%	Security & guarantees

*Table 8. Areas of convergence in the security and guarantees dossier of the comprehensive settlement agenda*

Regarding 'settlers', both communities agree that an adequate solution would necessitate a complete and internationally-monitored population census (81% GC and 63% TC viewing this as either satisfactory, desirable or essential) (see Table 7). In 2006 the Turkish Cypriot authorities conducted a census in northern Cyprus that revealed there was a total of 256,644 permanent residents at the time of the census.<sup>20</sup> Of these 178,031 held TRNC citizenship. The remaining 78,613 were of foreign origin with work or residency permits - the vast majority (70,525) hailing from Turkey. However, the statistics are complicated by the fact that many 'settlers' now hold TRNC citizenship. Indeed, nearly 43,000 (or approximately 25%) TRNC citizens are dual nationals. It was reported, for instance, that among TRNC citizens, nearly 45,000 indicated that their parents were born in Turkey. We find no reason to dispute the methodology and results of this census; however, conducting a new internationally-monitored population census on both sides of the island would seem appropriate and would certainly increase the confidence of both parties in each other and in its results. Only in this way might it be possible to put a halt to the war of words, distortions and manipulations that have long surrounded the 'settlers' issue in Cyprus.

On security, we found wide consensus on the principle that the security needs of both communities ought to be satisfactorily met through a process in which the fears and concerns of each community will be carefully examined (89% GC and 79% TC viewing this as either satisfactory, desirable or essential) (see Table 8). It should be noted at this point that while discussions and negotiations on security have always been one of the most polarising issues of the Cyprus conflict, at no stage has there been a concerted effort between the various sides to agree in principle what the underlying security challenges - on which a security architecture should be built - actually are. Instead, negotiations are typically limited only to a discussion of security structures as such, for instance how many troops should remain, whether Greece and Turkey should or should not have intervention rights etc. Given that so far there has been no effort to commonly identify the underlying *problem* that such security structures are meant to *solve*, the ongoing deadlock in the security dossier does not come

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<sup>20</sup> The TRNC State Planning Organization provides statistics over the internet. See [http://nufussayimi.devplan.org/Kesin-sonuc-index\\_en.html](http://nufussayimi.devplan.org/Kesin-sonuc-index_en.html).

as a surprise. An analysis of threats and threat perceptions would be more complete if it included the viewpoints of all sides of the conflict, including Greece and Turkey as well as the Cypriots, in the hope that such a dialogue will provide the basis for convergence between all actors, in the context of a security architecture that simultaneously responds to the concerns of everyone involved.

Another element of convergence between the two communities as regarding the Security dossier is their agreement on the need for Cyprus to establish a professional bi-communal security force (72% GC and 67%) (see Table 8). This is a particularly interesting finding given that negotiations on the security architecture on the island have often been trapped between the Greek Cypriot insistence on demilitarisation and Turkish Cypriot insistence on Turkish troop presence. Adding a third option to this discussion may inject a new lease of life into the security negotiations.

#### **4. Building Confidence in Each Other and in the Peace Process**

Throughout the decades of Cyprus' partition, Cypriots and international mediators alike have discussed the relative virtues of confidence-building measures (CBMs) versus negotiations over a comprehensive settlement. In key instances such as 1992-93, following the failure of negotiations over the UN "Set of Ideas", the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali proposed to turn negotiation efforts to CBMs in view of the "deep crisis of confidence" between the parties.<sup>21</sup> The proposed CBM package foresaw the Greek Cypriot resettlement in the ghost town of Varosha under a UN administration and the establishment of an inter-communal tax-free trade area there, together with the reopening of Nicosia international airport. Discussions over the package took place in May-June 1993. Negotiations ultimately failed, as they became entangled over details of principle and implementation. In other instances, it was either one or the other Cypriot leader who turned to CBMs. Yet the track record here too has been poor. Whenever the leaderships shifted their attention to CBMs, their principal objective and ensuing effect appeared to be that of distracting attention

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<sup>21</sup> S. Bölükbaşı (1995), *Boutros-Ghali's Cyprus Initiative in 1992: Why did it fail?* Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 460-482.

from a comprehensive deal.<sup>22</sup> In the recent past for example, the Greek Cypriot leadership pursued this route, proposing in 2006 that the Turkish Cypriots could return Varosha to Greek Cypriot rule and 'gain' the joint Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot management of Famagusta port so as to allow direct trade with the EU. Negotiations on this mini-package stalled with intransigent positions and mutual recriminations. By contrast, by far the most significant CBM has been the opening of the Green Line in April 2003. This step was entirely unilateral, not the result of negotiation and agreement.

This track record reveals several important lessons. Now, at a moment in which a peace process aimed at a comprehensive settlement has been re-launched and hopes are cautiously high on its prospects of delivery, it would be unwise to divert attention to talks over complex and negotiated CBM packages. In contrast, unilateral CBMs or non-controversial CBMs oriented towards inter-societal reconciliation may have a very positive impact and may add momentum to the peace process within a strategic context of renewed negotiations. This is especially the case, as we have seen, in view of the significant lack of confidence that Cypriots have towards each other, and - particularly in the case of the Turkish Cypriots - towards the peace process, the EU and the international community.

It is precisely in this spirit that we note the ongoing efforts to build confidence in parallel to negotiations. Most notable is the opening of the Ledra Street crossing in April 2008 and more crossings, specifically at Limnitis/Yeşilirmak are on the table. Moreover, on 25 July 2008 a number of CBMs were announced through the aforementioned Christofias-Talat joint statement. These steps notwithstanding, there remains a dire need to build confidence, trust and social capital within and between the communities as well as between Cypriots, Turkey, Greece and the EU, calling for CBMs between and by all actors. Several recent events of tit-for-tat politics on the island further highlight the urgency of such measures.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> See also International Crisis Group (2008), *Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet*, Europe Report, No. 194, 23 June, p. 9.

<sup>23</sup> For example, although the opening of the Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing had been on the agenda of the leaders, the Turkish Cypriot side declined to permit the crossing of Greek Cypriot pilgrims to Morphou/Guzelyurt on 2 September 2008,

As such and precisely to act in support of the peace process, we now turn to a set of CBMs that could be pursued alongside negotiations over a comprehensive settlement.

#### **4.1 CBMs enjoying wide support by both communities**

We begin by discussing a set of CBMs that could arguably be agreed and implemented easily, in so far as they win the consent of significant majorities in both communities without strong opposition in either one. While seemingly representing minor steps within the overall context of the conflict, their implementation could boost the peace process by building confidence between Cypriots, of Cypriots vis-à-vis the negotiations, and of Turkish Cypriots vis-à-vis the EU and the international community.

To some extent this is already being done with Christofias and Talat having agreed on the opening of the Ledra Street crossing on 3 April 2008. Further progress has been made by the technical committees. In particular agreement has been reached on the crossing of ambulances across the Green Line, trilingual (Greek, Turkish and English) road signs across the island, cooperation on public health issues, and repair work on two churches in the north in June 2008.<sup>24</sup> More has been promised through the 25 July 2008 statement, although confidence can only be built once these measures are actually implemented.<sup>25</sup> In the area of environmental

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citing “technical” reasons, despite the fact that a few weeks prior to this Turkish Cypriots had travelled to Kokkina/Erenkoy through the same crossing point to mark the anniversary of the 1964 inter-communal clashes. Upon being notified of the Turkish Cypriot decision not to permit the crossing of Greek Cypriots, Mr. Christofias’ representative and presidential commissioner, George Iacovou walked out of his scheduled meeting with his Turkish Cypriot counterpart, Ozdil Nami. Another case in point is a recent event in the mixed village of Pyla/Pile where Turkish Cypriot-owned shop windows, a car, and an Atatürk bust were damaged. Although this was a relatively minor incident of vandalism and the respective Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot mukthars immediately produced a joint statement and press conference, opposition groups were quick to portray the events as symbolic of the fact that coexistence was problematic.

<sup>24</sup> See International Crisis Group (2008), *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>25</sup> Despite agreement on road signs, for instance, there is no indication that changes are being made. Despite a wildfire on the Kyrenia mountain range in August 2008, there was no cooperative effort to put out the fire.

protection, both sides agreed to prevent illegal dumping sites in the buffer zone, to exchange information between environmental experts and to cooperate on the prevention of wildfires. Further measures included cooperation in waste management, raising awareness for water conservation, dealing with quarrying, biodiversity protection, marine management, and the management of chemical, asbestos, and historical pollution. With respect to cultural heritage a list of immovable cultural heritage is to be compiled and additional restoration projects to be determined. Guidelines are to be produced for the development of an interactive educational computer programme. In the area of crisis management, mechanisms for cooperation are envisaged. Finally, cooperation in crime and criminal matters is to be enhanced through the exchange of information and intelligence.

In the sections that follow, we turn to some of the specific measures mentioned above as they relate to the poll. These are relatively easy areas for collaboration, reflecting functional needs and interdependencies. Moreover, as the poll results below reveal, there is much more that could be done, which would garner the consent of both communities and could thus be easily agreed.

#### **4.1.1 Fighting organised crime**

First, joint steps could be taken to fight organised crime, operating across the buffer zone. This would entail a tripartite cooperation between Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and the UN. As listed above, the July 25<sup>th</sup> package included the goal of fostering cooperation in this area. Interestingly, as discussed above, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots place a high value on living in secure surroundings, the maintenance of order and – the Greek Cypriots in particular – strongly prioritise the need to fight crime. Unsurprisingly therefore, both communities agree on the benefits of finding joint responses to the fight against organised crime, with 90% Greek Cypriots and 72% Turkish Cypriots being moderately or strongly in favour of such activities, thus making this a prime candidate for a win-win and easily agreed inter-communal CBM (see Figure 24). The need for such collaboration is self-evident, with the crossings serving as a focal point for smugglers and organised crime. Moreover, criminal investigations are hampered when

evidence is not shared by the respective authorities.<sup>26</sup> Meanwhile, given the growing problem of human trafficking across the green line, the EU also has a stake in cooperation.





Figure 24. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal that the two communities should find ways to jointly fight organised crime that operates across the buffer zone

#### 4.1.2 International sporting events

A second critical CBM would be the joint participation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in international sporting events, with 71% Greek Cypriots and 67% Turkish Cypriots being in favour (see Figure 25). Enacting such solutions would serve the double purpose of building confidence between the two communities as well as making the Turkish Cypriots feel part of the international community by lifting the international isolation on a critical aspect of social and cultural life. To date, attempts to include Turkish Cypriots in international sporting events have been built on existing Republic of Cyprus institutions and as such have

<sup>26</sup> Prominently, following the murder of Elmas Guzelyurtlu – a Turkish Cypriot businessman living in the south – and his family in 2005, an investigation in 2005 proved inconclusive when Turkish Cypriot authorities could not obtain DNA samples and other evidence from a crime scene in the southern part of the island. On this see S. Bahcheli (2006), “Haven for criminals”, *Cyprus Mail*, 24 September.

unsurprisingly met Turkish Cypriot resistance.<sup>27</sup> Searching for new avenues would thus entail finding creative solutions to a whole set of questions regarding representation and recognition, including which flag Cyprus would use and how the two communities would be represented.



*Figure 25. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to find ways so that the two communities can jointly participate in international sporting events*

Various precedents offer interesting lessons. In the case of Korea, while participating in the Olympics with separate teams, athletes from the two Koreas have since the 2000 Olympics marched together in the same uniform under the same ‘unification flag’ singing the same song “Arirang” instead of their separate anthems.<sup>28</sup> Another interesting case is that of Ireland, where despite being part of two separate states, the Ireland Rugby Union Team represents both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland,


<sup>27</sup> For instance, in the summer of 2008, the world football’s governing body FIFA and its European counterpart UEFA offered the Turkish Cypriot Football Association cooperation through the Cyprus Football Association. One upshot would be the ability to play international ‘friendlies’ at club level. However, unlike in the cases cited above, this would entail Turkish Cypriot recognition of the Republic of Cyprus association. As a result, at the time of writing, the Turkish Cypriot Football Association rejected this proposal, although it also wished to continue discussing the matter with FIFA officials.

<sup>28</sup> See <http://www.theolympian.com/sports/story/494760.html>.

with a flag designed especially for this purpose.<sup>29</sup> In the case of Cyprus, the UN has already hinted at the possibility of participating jointly in international sporting events under the UN flag. Alternatively, the first step of this CBM could be precisely that of organising a Cypriot flag competition.

### 4.1.3 Protecting cultural heritage

A third CBM that would meet the broad consensus of both communities (92% GC and 72% TC) would be that of finding joint ways to protect the cultural heritage of one community that is located within the territory under the control of the other (see Figure 26). Restoration projects are not new to Cyprus. A number have been sponsored through the UNDP. Crucially, what needs to be demonstrated here is the ability to cooperate bilaterally and instil a sense of mutual respect for each other's culture, tradition and history – an essential step on the way towards a unified and multicultural federal Cyprus.



*Figure 26. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to examine ways so that each community can protect that part of its cultural heritage that happens to be under the control of the other community*

<sup>29</sup> For an image of the All Ireland Rugby Union Team see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Ireland\\_rugby.png](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Ireland_rugby.png).

#### 4.1.4 Establishing a social reconciliation committee

A fourth CBM would be that of establishing a social reconciliation committee (85% GC and 71% TC) (see Figure 27). The task of such a committee would not be to revisit historical narratives, facts and events, a far thornier issue to which we return below, but rather to focus on the current state, causes and symptoms of inter-communal suspicion and mistrust, and ways to overcome these. As discussed above, Cypriots appear to be generally mistrustful of anyone beyond their personal acquaintances, as well as being especially suspicious of each other and, particularly in the case of the Turkish Cypriots, of the international community and the EU. Hence the importance of understanding both the conflict and non-conflict related causes of such suspicion and mistrust, in order to identify possible solutions.




Figure 27. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to form a Social Reconciliation Committee

This CBM would build confidence in two ways. First, the very act of forming such a joint initiative would help build inter-communal social capital on the island, which, as the literature on civil society and conflict

indicates, is critical to achieving reconciliation.<sup>30</sup> Second, by focusing this enterprise on the discussion and identification of solutions to joint and reciprocal suspicions, this measure would help tackle and potentially reduce mistrust, which is clearly a major cause of the lack of confidence between the parties.

Some steps in this area are already being taken. The European Union intends to fund projects to this end and to facilitate reconciliation in the interim. The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) is working with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot human rights associations to help pave the way for revision of the divisive historical narratives of each side, as well as promoting a shared understanding of the past.<sup>31</sup> Yet a far more generous and systematic effort in this direction would require a commitment to engage by the two leaders as well.

#### **4.1.5 Turkish Cypriot EU harmonisation**

A fifth CBM falling under this category would be that of cooperating together and with the EU to encourage Turkish Cypriot harmonisation with the *acquis communautaire*. Both communities (79% GC and 66% TC) in fact agree that measures should be sought to bring Turkish Cypriot society, institutions and norms closer to those of the EU, so as to allow Turkish Cypriots to become fully active participants in EU institutions and policies immediately, within the context of a comprehensive settlement (see Figure 28). Translated into EU jargon this would entail measures to allow and expedite Turkish Cypriot harmonisation with the *acquis*, a process that is currently ongoing but which has faced difficulties stemming from Greek Cypriot resistance to the use made of EU funds and assistance to northern Cyprus. As in the case of joint participation in international sporting events, this CBM would serve the dual purpose of building confidence between Cypriots as well as establishing Turkish Cypriot trust in the international community and in the EU in particular.

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<sup>30</sup> A. Varshney (2001), "Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society", *World Politics*, Vol. 53, pp. 362-98.

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.ictj.com>





Figure 28. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to bring Turkish Cypriots closer to EU norms in view of a settlement

#### 4.1.6 Renovating and making joint use of buildings on Ledra Street

As a first act of mutual trust, confidence and goodwill between the two Cypriot leaders, the Ledra Street crossing, an unnecessary bone of contention for a number of years, was reopened in April 2008. Yet the old buildings on this historic street crossing the Green Line, remain damaged and in dire need of renovation. Both communities broadly agree (88% GC and 65% TC) that these buildings on the buffer zone should be restored and used for joint activities (see Figure 29). These activities could include, for example, the social reconciliation committee, as well as more contentious civil society work such as the revisiting of historical narratives or joint discussions on the more challenging issues of the Cyprus conflict, alongside more ordinary day-to-day activities such as socialising or enjoying a meal together in a safe and neutral space.

In fact as discussed above, both as far as personal and societal values are concerned, as well as views and positions on the conflict settlement agenda, there remain wide areas of divergence and mistrust. Focusing joint civil society activities on discussions regarding issues such as multiculturalism (where especially the Greek Cypriots manifest a worrying level of intolerance) or on the most polarising aspects of the conflict (e.g. bizonality, property, demographics and settlers, as discussed above) could prepare the ground for a gradual convergence of views. Alongside this,

renovated buildings on Ledra Street could host meetings between the two communities, as well as wider events at both official and civil society levels, including meetings between political parties, unions, professional associations, academics and NGOs, and with representatives from Greece and Turkey too. Carrying out these meetings, activities and discussions within physical spaces symbolising inter-communal reconciliation and compromise would in and of itself boost confidence and goodwill in pursuing further conflict transformation activities. Furthermore, creating a neutral space where members of each community can meet the other without crossing into an area that is ‘dominated by the other’, may reduce levels of apprehension and thus facilitate genuine contact between individuals and small groups of the two communities, especially among those who – for reasons of fear or due to personally held convictions – have so far declined to make use of the option to cross over into the area controlled by the other community.



*Figure 29. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to restore and make joint use of old buildings in the buffer zone near the Ledra Street crossing*


## 4.2 More challenging CBMs

A second category of CBMs includes measures that enjoy narrow majority support in both communities, while also meeting resistance from sizeable minorities in either one or both, and which would thus require careful packaging and negotiation between the leaders. Yet as in the case of the

first set of CBMs, these measures could be pursued alongside the peace process aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement, and would in fact serve to boost this process and ease agreement on several items on the conflict settlement agenda. Progress in negotiating such issues is likely to mirror the state of play in talks over a comprehensive settlement. In this respect, care should be taken to ensure that positive synergies are developed on both tracks of negotiations, as opposed to a scenario whereby obstacles in talks over more complex CBMs become a distraction that would contaminate negotiations over a comprehensive settlement. Before proceeding, and precisely on the question of packaging, one general observation is in order. In Cyprus, labels and packaging matter. Above we discussed how, whereas Greek Cypriots generally accept a BBF, they adamantly reject the Annan Plan, despite the latter being a detailed specification of what the former might look like. Also in the case of CBMs as we shall see below, whereas topics labelled “direct trade”, “direct flights” or the “return of Varosha” inspire instinctive negativity from one community or the other, Cypriots may not be against relabelled and conceptually reworked proposals on these very same issues.

#### **4.2.1 Including northern Cyprus in the EU customs union**

The question of direct trade, while continuing to require serious effort, pressure and creative proposals on the part of the EU in particular, has become highly polarised within Cyprus, being widely accepted by the Turkish Cypriots but strongly rejected by the Greek Cypriots (60% GC against, 85% TC in favour). Yet this does not imply that the two communities and the Greek Cypriots in particular oppose measures to encourage the economic development of the Turkish Cypriots. In fact both agree (58% GC and 67% TC) that economic ties between the two communities should be strengthened through trade and common enterprises (see Figure 30). This could include specific EU, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot funds to encourage joint business ventures.



*Figure 30. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to enhance the economic ties between the two communities through trade and common enterprises*

It could also entail a further modification of the EU Green Line regulation. Following the referenda and the ensuing entry of the divided Cyprus into the EU, a regulation was approved by the EU Council of Ministers on 28 April 2004, which was meant to ensure that the Green Line would not represent the EU's external borders and would encourage reunification. First, the regulation sought to secure EU citizenship rights for individual Turkish Cypriots by allowing their free movement across the island. Second, the regulation sought to promote intra-island trade, allowing Turkish Cypriots to send their indigenous goods to the south, to be sold there or exported to other EU markets via southern Cypriot ports. But the regulation has failed to kick-start substantial cross-border trade. Hence, in June 2008 the Green Line regulation was modified to allow for trade in agricultural goods, increase the maximum value in the personal luggage of persons crossing the line and, most importantly, allow for the temporary import of tools from Turkey necessary to produce Turkish Cypriot goods destined for export.

This last element in the deal, while seemingly marginal, could prove pivotal in ushering the way for a far more significant modification of the green line regulation. Such a modification would allow Turkish Cypriot-Turkish co-produced goods to be traded across the Green Line and

exported to the EU; this would significantly boost the Turkish Cypriot economy, as well as act as a critical CBM between the two communities, between Greek Cypriots and Turkey, and between the Turkish Cypriots and the EU. It would first require a Turkish Cypriot unilateral adoption of the EU's common external tariff, removing financial tariff barriers between northern Cyprus and the EU. This would come within the wider effort being undertaken by the Turkish Cypriot community to harmonise with the *acquis communautaire*. Second it would call for Greek Cypriot consent to an EU amendment of the Green Line regulation to allow Turkish (and other EU) originating products to cross the line in both directions. Third it would require EU acceptance to jointly manage Famagusta port with Turkish Cypriot authorities. Alongside Turkey's acceptance of Republic of Cyprus flagged vessels into Turkish ports, this modification of the Green Line regulation would mean that all of Cyprus as well as Turkey would be effective members of the EU customs union together. In the context of the debate on what kind of trade regime should govern Turkish Cypriot relations with the EU, prominent members in the Turkish Cypriot community, such as former president of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce Ali Erel, have long advocated the relative advantages of free trade over direct trade in Turkish-Cypriot-EU relations.


#### **4.2.2 Higher education**

Another controversial yet critical area to be worked on is that of higher education. Currently the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots is also felt in the domain of higher education, despite this being one of the most developed sectors in northern Cyprus. A strategic goal for universities in northern Cyprus is to join the emerging higher education area in the European Union and partake in ERASMUS, the European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students, as well as other ERASMUS-related programmes. Whereas mainland Turkish universities (hence students), and academic institutions in the Greek Cypriot community are part of the 'Bologna process' that aims to create a European Higher Education Area by 2010, Turkish Cypriot institutions remain excluded and face significant disadvantages.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> K. Rubin (2006), "Crossing the Green Line", *International Educator*, Vol. 15, pp. 28-35.

The leaders, to date, have failed to find creative solutions to this problem, hindered by a good dose of insufficient political will. Yet Cypriots do not fundamentally disagree on the way forward (see Figure 31). In fact, both communities accept that ways should be found to integrate Turkish Cypriot higher education institutions in the European Higher Education system. This would allow for Turkish Cypriot participation in the Bologna Process, Erasmus Mundus, Leonardo and the EU's Research Framework Programmes.<sup>33</sup> At the same time, the two communities should also explore ways to create joint universities whereby Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could work and study together.



*Figure 31. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to integrate Turkish Cypriot Higher Education Institutions into the European Higher Education System, while at the same time establishing common universities for the two communities in Cyprus*

Finding solutions to these issues is by no means impossible and need not get entangled in intractable issues of sovereignty and recognition. Under the 1960 framework issues such as culture and education were already foreseen as being separate communal competences. Implicit

<sup>33</sup> This would entail going beyond the existing Commission scholarships to individual Turkish Cypriot students to study in the EU (while excluding Turkish Cypriot universities).

reference to the 1960 Constitution was precisely the way in which trade across the Green Line was agreed by both communities, given the establishment and status of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce in 1960 which has, since 2004, been entitled by the EU to certify Turkish Cypriot products. Similar solutions could also be found in the field of higher education, adding to this the establishment of a joint university in order to make the deal more palatable to the Greek Cypriot community, who typically look more favourably on proposals that emphasise integration.

By breaking the currently existing barriers to co-operation between academics of the two communities, and instead creating common institutions where advanced teaching and research can take place, an opportunity for significant societal transformation would be created; universities are the places where new polities, new norms and new attitudes are shaped. Thus, a higher education system that is at peace with the other community is an important precursor to a society and political system that is at peace with the other community. Additionally, it should be noted that currently in Cyprus almost all professional and even political groups (from businesses to the media, from trade unions to political parties) are legitimised to engage in contact with their counterparts in the other community, but academic institutions are excluded from this possibility – a situation that has more to do with the historical peculiarities of the Cyprus problem and less to do with any discernible policy of actual significance to any of the actors involved.

### **4.2.3 Transitional justice**

Finally, within the context of negotiations over a comprehensive settlement, the two communities could also move forward on issues pertaining to transitional justice. One example that could obtain the consent of both communities, though admittedly by a narrow majority at this stage (52% GC and 58% TC), would be the establishment of an investigative committee to discover individuals who were responsible for acts of violence in the 1963-74 period, offering immunity to those willing to cooperate with the authorities and genuinely willing to repent, while prosecuting others (see Figure 32).




Figure 32. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to establish a truth commission

This would be essentially similar to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission model.<sup>34</sup> Moving forward on this dossier would probably only be possible in the framework of a comprehensive settlement in so far as it would require - far more than in the case of the joint fight against organised crime - an extremely deep level of police, intelligence and judicial cooperation between the parties. Yet within the process leading to a comprehensive settlement, joint work relating to information and intelligence-sharing could be carried out in preparation for the establishment of a just, accepted and effective system of transitional justice.<sup>35</sup>

### 4.3 Preparing the ground for the most complex CBMs

Finally, there are other important yet far more complex CBMs to be considered and worked upon. Given the contested nature of these issues, we would suggest that they be discussed within both communities in order to prepare the ground, in case these measures need to be revisited later on.

<sup>34</sup> See E. Kaymak (2007), "Does Cyprus Need a Truth and Reconciliation Commission?", *Cyprus Review*, Vol. 19, No. 1, spring, pp. 71-89.

<sup>35</sup> On this see also ICG (2008), *op. cit.*, p. 8.

However, in the current political context, these measures should probably not be the subject of formal negotiations between the leaders. Talks and efforts in these areas should by no means detract attention from the fundamental and within-reach goal of yielding a comprehensive agreement. In fact, within a comprehensive agreement, all these questions would automatically be resolved. Nonetheless given the critical importance of these issues and the uncertainty of a future comprehensive deal, we raise them here, recommending that at this stage, official, political and civil society actors engage in public discussion on these issues within each community, before tackling them in delicate and complex inter-communal discussion at leadership level.

### **4.3.1 Direct trade and direct flights**

The first issue, of fundamental importance to Turkish Cypriots and by far the most acute symbol of their international isolation, is the question of direct trade and direct flights. The two issues are distinct and raise different problems.

Turkish Cypriots can trade their goods directly to and from the EU and there are no legal impediments to them doing so. However, since the 1994 European Court of Justice ruling on the Anastasiou case, the EU no longer allows preferential treatment of Turkish Cypriot certified products, and Turkish Cypriot exports to the EU have to pay standard import duties, making such exports highly uncompetitive.<sup>36</sup> Following the Annan Plan debacle and UN General Secretary Kofi Annan's call to lift the international isolation on Turkish Cypriots, the EU, one week before the RoC's entry, proposed, alongside the 'green line' and the 'financial aid' regulation, a 'direct trade' regulation. The proposed direct trade regulation would have allowed duty free import of EU goods into northern Cyprus and the duty free export of goods wholly obtained or substantially produced in the north. To overcome the problem of Turkish Cypriot origin certificates, the Commission proposed that certificates issued by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce be accepted. The argument advanced by the Commission was that the Chamber, an institution established under the

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<sup>36</sup> In 1994, the European Court of Justice judgement on the Anastasiou case prohibited preferential treatment for Cyprus exports that did not bear Republic of Cyprus certificates of origin.

1960 framework that predates the division of Cyprus, enjoys international standing. The Commission's proposal included a tariff quota system, i.e., a system whereby only a specified quota of products could benefit from preferential trade. The quota was introduced to ensure that only Turkish Cypriot (rather than Turkish) products would benefit from the arrangement. Finally the Commission argued that the regime could be implemented under Article 133 of the EU Treaty, which regulates trade between the Community and third countries or territories that are part of a member state but not included in EU customs territory.

The obstacles to implementation, both legal and political, have proved formidable, exemplifying the difficulties the EU has in acting decisively on Cyprus now that one party to the conflict is a member state. The Greek Cypriots, supported by the Council's legal service, successfully argued that the directive required unanimity under Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty rather than majority vote under Article 133.<sup>37</sup> Having established its right to veto, the Greek Cypriot government has blocked all initiatives to approve and implement the regulation, insisting on its sole right to certify and verify origin of Cypriot exports, objecting to the use of Turkish Cypriot ports, and arguing that the regulation would lead to a creeping recognition of the TRNC. Despite successive efforts by the Luxembourg Presidency in the first half of 2005, the British presidency in the second half of 2005, and the Finnish Presidency in the second half of 2006, the direct trade regulation, to date, has been left pending.

Direct air links are also of fundamental importance to Turkish Cypriots, representing a critical asset for the development of the tourist industry. As in the case of direct trade, the absence of direct air links is a principal feature of the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation acknowledges each state's "complete and exclusive sovereignty over airspace above its territory" (Article 1). The RoC government, recognised by the UN as the sole legitimate state on the island, claims exclusive rights to designate which airports may be used. Unsurprisingly in the prevailing atmosphere,

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<sup>37</sup> They argued that the directive falls under Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty, which stipulates that a partial lifting of the suspension of the *acquis* to the north requires unanimity. The Commission has conceded the Greek Cypriot call for unanimity in principle, though it argues that the legal basis should be different.

it has not recognised northern airports and argues that operating direct flights to the north would be in breach of the Chicago Convention. The European Commission has indicated that it would not advance proposals on this issue. Interested member states like the UK have also been cautious in advancing ideas, arguing that the simplest solution would be for the Greek Cypriots to allow direct flights to Ercan airport in northern Cyprus.<sup>38</sup> However, also in this case, there appears to be little prospect for further movement on this front, despite its importance for the development of the north.

As in the case of direct trade, direct air links are also related to the use of ports more generally. A case in point is the contested ferry line between Famagusta and Latakia. The Republic of Cyprus has maintained that the seaport is prohibited and closed to all vessels. The European Commission, on the other hand, has declared that “there is no prohibition under general international law to enter and leave seaports in the northern part of Cyprus”.<sup>39</sup> The issue, however, remains unresolved and is the basis for mutual mistrust between the two sides on the island.

Whereas Turkish Cypriots overwhelmingly support movement on direct trade and direct flights, Greek Cypriots remain fundamentally opposed (64% GC against, 77% TC in favour). Yet given the critical importance of these issues for the development of the Turkish Cypriot economy, which the Greek Cypriots largely favour, it is of paramount importance for these issues to be debated openly and creatively in the south and for political and official actors to diffuse and repackage the divisive and polarising language used to discuss these issues in recent years. Naturally the question of trade and flights would be automatically resolved within the context of a comprehensive settlement currently being negotiated and as such engaging in direct negotiations on these issues now would be useless at best and counterproductive at worst. Yet lessons of the

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
<sup>38</sup> See the “Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on the Second Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2004-05 on Cyprus”, London, April 2005, p. 4.

See “Commission legally endorses Famagusta-Latakia route”, *Cyprus Observer*, 19 October 2007.

<sup>39</sup> See “Commission legally endorses Famagusta-Latakia route”, *Cyprus Observer*, 19 October 2007 (<http://www.observercyprus.com/observer/NewsDetails.aspx?id=2393>).

past also suggest that contingency planning is of the essence. In other words intra-societal debate, above all within the Greek Cypriot community on issues such as these are critical to provide a safety-net, not simply for the Turkish Cypriots but more broadly for the peace process and the future of EU-Turkey relations, should the current negotiating effort stall.

Beyond the modification of the Green Line regulation allowing northern Cyprus to enter the EU customs union, which would de facto prove far more important for Turkish Cypriot trade than direct trade, movement is also necessary on the issue of direct flights. One suggestion that garners the consent of both communities (63% GC and 60% TC) would be the establishment of an airport to be made available for common use by Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and foreigners to travel to and from the rest of the world (see Figure 33). In other words, once the issue of flights is repackaged into the concept of ‘solving the flights issue in a manner that will at the same time put the two communities on a path of convergence’, the response of Greek Cypriots changes dramatically.



*Figure 33. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to make an airport available for common use by both communities*

While attractive in principle, the notion of a common airport begs the question of which airport could serve this purpose? Several options could be discussed. The oldest alternative is that of restoring the Nicosia international airport, an idea that was flagged back in the days of the 1993

CBM package proposal by the UN. A second option would be some type of co-administration scheme for Ercan airport, including EU and/or UN administrative oversight, which would then be recognised by the RoC. A third alternative, which draws upon the UK's readiness in 2004 to return part of the Dhekelia sovereign base area (SBA) to Cyprus as part of the Annan Plan, would be that of restoring and transforming the Dhekelia SBA into a civil international airport.


### **4.3.2 Varosha**

The proposal of converting the Dhekelia SBA into an international airport for common use ties in with another critical element on both the CBM and the comprehensive settlement agenda: Varosha, the uninhabited and formerly developed tourist resort area bordering the town of Famagusta. Since the 1979 High Level agreement, the parties have accepted in principle the resettlement of the abandoned tourist resort area by Greek Cypriot displaced persons as an interim CBM. Since then, Varosha has been a permanent item on the CBM agenda, including in 1993 and again since the failed referenda in 2004. In 2005, the Turkish Cypriots made the surprising offer to return Varosha to the Greek Cypriots in exchange for the opening of the northern ports and Ercan airport. The Greek Cypriots rejected this out of hand, and negotiations collapsed. In 2006, the Greek Cypriots also pursued this route, proposing that the Turkish Cypriots returned Varosha to Greek Cypriot rule in return for the joint Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot management of Famagusta port. The Turkish Cypriots rejected the offer.

The question of Varosha has also been complicated further by the fact that its status is governed by UNSC resolutions 550/1984 and 789/1992, requiring the consent of UNSC members in order to legalise a change in its status. Furthermore, our poll has shown that Varosha is another highly polarising issue between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, with the idea to return Varosha to Greek Cypriots under RoC administration with UN security winning the overwhelming consent of the Greek Cypriots and the overwhelming opposition of the Turkish Cypriots (90% GC in favour, 75% TC against).

An alternative to these proposals, which, if approved would no doubt be accepted by the UNSC, would be that of transforming Varosha into a joint free trade area, a microcosm in which to experiment joint business ventures and the future of power-sharing on the island. This proposal, while challenging, could potentially fly with the two communities. When

asked whether they would accept the conversion of Varosha into a special zone of inter-communal cooperation under the supervision of the EU and the UN in which the challenges of power-sharing would be tried out in advance of a comprehensive solution, 62% of Greek Cypriots and 53% of Turkish Cypriots agreed (see Figure 34). Moving in this direction would also raise the appeal of transforming Dhekelia into an international airport serving the inter-communal zone of Varosha and northern Cyprus, while leaving Larnaca, in the south, to serve its current destinations.



*Figure 34. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot evaluation of a proposal to convert Varosha into a special zone of inter-communal co-operation*

The appeal of such an integrated proposal is to be found not so much in the current context of intensive negotiations for a comprehensive settlement (which after all, if successful would solve both the problem of Varosha and all matters related to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots), but rather as a complete 'Plan B' in case negotiations temporarily stall or prove to be more lengthy than anticipated. In such a scenario, this proposal could mitigate many of the negative side-effects that such a delay in reaching a Comprehensive Settlement would entail. For the two communities in Cyprus, it would provide a path of gradual convergence, especially on an everyday societal level, quietly leading to the building up of the required social capital for an eventual Comprehensive Settlement. For the Turkish Cypriots specifically, this would go a long way towards lifting their international isolation and by extension increasing their trust

towards the Greek Cypriots, the EU and the international community; while for Turkey, and for the EU, the resolution of the Varosha and flights issues will remove the political impediments that currently prevent Turkey from fully implementing the Additional Protocol to the Customs Union that it signed after the 2004 accession of the 10 new member states. As a result, new life will be breathed into Turkey's EU accession negotiations, which are currently moving at a very slow pace not least due to the impediments generated by the Cyprus impasse. In contrast, a total freezing of Turkey's EU accession negotiations will benefit no one, least of all the Cypriots who are placing their hopes on an EU-oriented - and therefore solution oriented - Turkey.

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## **Annex 1. Methodology**

The survey questionnaire (see Annex II) was designed by CEPS in collaboration with its Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot project partners. The questionnaire was subsequently translated into Greek and Turkish, and the field work was administered by CYMAR Market Research<sup>40</sup> in the Greek Cypriot Community and Prologue Consulting<sup>41</sup> in the Turkish Cypriot Community. The field-work was conducted within a period of four weeks, from late April to late May 2008.

### **For the Greek Cypriot Community: Methodology Report by CYMAR Market Research**

#### **A. General public**

##### 1. Coverage

The survey was national and covered urban and rural populations. Greek-Cypriot males and females 18 years and over were eligible to participate in the study.

##### 2. Conduct method

Interviews using a questionnaire (see Annex 2) were carried out face to face at the residence of respondents.

##### 3. Sample selection

The sample was selected using a combination of random multistage area probability sampling and quotas sampling: the sample was selected in various stages as follows:

*Stage one:* Stratification of the areas

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<sup>40</sup> CYMAR Market Research Ltd, established in 1994, is a Cyprus-based company specialising in market research. It operates primarily within the Greek Cypriot community. Cymar is a member of ESOMAR (European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research) and SEDEAK (Cyprus Association of Opinion Poll and Market Research Enterprises) (see <http://www.cymar.com.cy>).

<sup>41</sup> Established in 2002, Prologue Consulting Ltd is a market research and consulting company based in the northern part of Cyprus. Prologue is a member of ESOMAR (European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research) (for more information, see <http://prologueconsulting.com>).

Areas of the island covered by the study were stratified into urban and rural on the basis of the latest *2001 Population Census*, carried out by the Department of Statistical Services of the Republic of Cyprus.

*Stage two: Selection of PSUS (Primary Sampling Units)*

For the purposes of sample selection, urban areas in each district were divided into a number of enumeration areas of approximately the same size (~1000 persons each).

The greater urban area of Nicosia was divided into 209 enumeration areas, of Limassol into 161, Larnaka into 72 and Pafos into 45.

For the sample selection, the enumeration areas in urban districts and the villages in rural areas were treated as primary sampling units.

In each district, urban enumeration areas had an equal probability of being chosen as primary sampling units. By contrast, rural enumeration areas (villages) had a probability of being selected that was proportionate to their size.

In total, 68 enumeration areas in urban areas and 32 villages in rural areas were randomly selected.

Each area selected was allocated an equal number of interviews.

The distribution of the primary sampling units selected among the five districts and among urban and rural areas within each district was representative of the actual population.

*Stage three: Selection of households*

Within each Primary Sampling Unit selected at stage two an equal number of households was selected in such a way that each household was given, as far as possible, an equal probability of selection.

In the selected area the interviewer was allocated a random starting point,<sup>42</sup> from which he/she commenced calling on every  $n^{\text{th}}$  household encountered.

*Stage four: Selection of individuals*

In each household selected at stage three, one person was selected based on predefined quotas. Quotas were set with respect to sex and age in order to ensure that the selected sample was representative of the target population of the survey.

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<sup>42</sup> Both enumeration areas and starting points were randomly selected with the aid of purpose-built computer software.

#### 4. Sample size

In total 1000 interviews were carried out.

#### 5. Questionnaire

The questionnaire of the survey was submitted by CEPS.

#### 6. Training and control of the interviewers

All interviewers who participated in the study have previous experience with social research, and have all completed their education, at least to secondary level.

Regardless of the experience of the interviewers, all interviewers went through a 3-day training stage before fieldwork commenced.

During the training, the questionnaires and the conduct method were fully explained and interviewers participated in pilot studies. Written instructions were given to interviewers explaining the method of sample selection, how to approach people and the point of the questionnaire.

#### **In total, 30 interviewers and 4 supervisors worked on the study.**

The interviewers delivered their work to the supervisors on a daily basis and the supervisors were responsible for the daily checking of the completed questionnaires. There was a 15% recall of the work of each interviewer to make sure of the authenticity of the responses, the time the interview took and the behaviour of the interviewers. The whole study was supervised by the manager in charge of the project.

### **B. Decision-makers**

The second target population of the survey was decision-makers (current and former members of parliament, ministers, mayors, elected officials, political party members, etc).

For the purpose of sample selection a list of 139 decision-makers was compiled by CYMAR from various sources.

All individuals on the list were initially contacted by telephone. During this initial contact the purpose of the study was explained to potential interviewees and their level of interest and willingness to participate in the study was assessed.

A meeting was arranged with all individuals who agreed to participate in the survey in order to conduct the interview. In total, 76 successful interviews were conducted with decision-makers.

## **For the Turkish Cypriot Community: Methodology Report by Prologue Consulting**

### **A. General public**

#### 1. Coverage

The survey in the Turkish Cypriot Community was national and covered urban and rural areas. Turkish-Cypriots males and females of 18 years and over were eligible to participate in the study.

#### 2. Conduct method

Interviews were carried out face-to-face at the residence of respondents.

#### 3. Sample selection

The sample was selected using a combination of random multistage area probability sampling and quotas sampling: The sample was selected in various stages as follows:

##### *Stage one:* Stratification of the areas

Areas of the island covered by the study were stratified into urban and rural on the basis of the latest *Census*, carried out by the Department of Statistical Services and the 5 districts were allocated quotas according to the natural distribution of the population.

##### *Stage two:* Selection of individuals

The individuals to be surveyed have been selected using a specifically designed computer programme using preselected quotas. Quotas were set with respect to sex and age in order to ensure that the selected sample was representative of the target population of the survey.

#### 4. Sample size

In total 1000 interviews were carried out.

#### 5. Questionnaire

The questionnaire of the survey was submitted by CEPS.

#### 6. Training and control of the interviewers

All interviewers who participated in the study had previous experience with social research, and have all completed their education, at least to secondary level.

Regardless of the experience of the interviewers, all interviewers went through a 3-day training stage before fieldwork commenced.

During the training, the questionnaires and the conduct method were fully explained and interviewers participated in pilot studies. Written instructions were given to interviewers explaining the method of sample selection, how to approach people and the point of the questionnaire.

**For the purposes of study, 40 interviewers were used.**

There was a recall of 25% of the work selected at random in order to make certain of the authenticity of the responses, the time the interview took and the behaviour of the interviewers. The whole study was supervised by the manager in charge of the project.

**B. Decision-makers**

The second target population of the survey was decision-makers (current and former members of parliament, ministers, mayors, elected officials, political party members, etc).

For the purpose of sample selection a list of 100 decision-makers was compiled from various sources by Prologue Consulting Ltd.

All individuals on the list were initially contacted by telephone. During this initial contact the purpose of the study was explained to potential interviewees and their level of interest and willingness to participate in the study was assessed.

A meeting was arranged with all individuals who agreed to participate in the survey in order to conduct the interview. In total, 25 successful interviews were conducted with decision-makers.

## **Annex 2. CEPS Survey No. 1, pre-translation template questionnaire**

The following questionnaire was devised as a template within CEPS, Brussels, before being translated into Greek and Turkish and used for the survey interviews in both communities. In designing the substantive questions (see Section A and Section B below), every effort was made to include the viewpoints of both communities, and of other involved actors, as these have been made public at various times through the media, published documents related to the Cyprus negotiations and prior policy research publications. In designing the values questions (see Section C and Section D below), material was utilised from the World Values Survey<sup>43</sup> in order to allow for future comparisons of our findings with World Values Survey results for Turkey, Greece, and other European countries or countries in conflict. Regarding the more Cyprus-specific aspects of the values section, additional material was utilised from a recent survey concerning inter-group contact in Cyprus, conducted by the Oxford Centre for the Study of Intergroup Conflict.<sup>44</sup>

### **Section A – The way towards a Cyprus Settlement**

A1. On 21 March this year, the leaders of the two communities Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, agreed to set up technical committees and working groups as a first stage towards negotiating a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus Problem. To what extent are you hopeful that this agreement will produce results? *(0 to 10 scale, from “no hope at all” to “great hope”)*

A2. More specifically, the technical committees will consider possible confidence-building measures and other matters that affect the daily lives of the two communities, to be implemented even before a settlement is reached. To what extent would you agree or disagree, if these technical committees were to explore the following issues? *(5 point scale)*

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<sup>43</sup> See <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

<sup>44</sup> C. Psaltis and M. Hewstone (2008), *Intergroup contact between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots*, Final Report of the New Career Development Scheme Fellowship, of Nuffield Foundation at the Oxford Centre for the Study of Intergroup Conflict, Oxford.

1. Find ways so that the organised crime that is operating across the buffer zone is stopped, in a three-way co-operation between the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots and the United Nations.
2. Find ways so that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots participate together, in upcoming international sporting events such as the Olympic Games.
3. Examine ways for the Turkish Cypriots to also adopt the euro (common European currency), as the Greek Cypriots already did in January 2008.
4. Examine ways in which each community can protect that part of its cultural heritage that happens to be under the control of the other side, through the mediation of the United Nations and the International Community.
5. Find ways to enhance the economic ties between the two communities even before a solution, such as through trade and common enterprises.
6. Find ways to integrate Turkish Cypriot higher education institutions into the European Higher Education system, while at the same time exploring the possibility of establishing common universities where Turkish and Greek Cypriot academics will work together on various issues.
7. Find ways to impose a moratorium on any further building over Turkish Cypriot properties in the south and Greek Cypriot properties in the north, while a comprehensive solution is negotiated.
8. Find mutually acceptable ways for goods produced by the Turkish Cypriots to be exported to all EU countries without paying third-country import levies.
9. Find ways to allow direct trade and direct flights, from ports and airports in the north of Cyprus to the rest of the world.
10. Find mutually acceptable ways for Varosha to be converted to a special zone of inter-communal cooperation, under the supervision of the UN and the EU, as an area where the challenges of power-sharing will be tested in advance of a comprehensive settlement.
11. Find a mutually acceptable way for an airport to be made available for common use, both by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, to travel to the rest of the world.

12. Find a way to return Varosha to its pre-1974 Greek Cypriot owners, under the administrative control of the Republic of Cyprus but with the UN being temporarily responsible for the town's security.
13. Form an investigative committee to discover which individuals were responsible for acts of violence against the other community in events from 1963 to 1974, offering immunity from prosecution if they are willing to co-operate and admit what they did, but prosecuting them if they are unrepentant and unwilling to co-operate.
14. Form a Social Reconciliation Committee that will focus on examining the current state of suspicion and mistrust between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, discover what causes it, and suggest ways in which it can be overcome.
15. Examine ways to renovate the old buildings in the buffer zone, near the Ledra Street crossing in Nicosia, so that the area can then be used by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots together, to meet and engage in various shared activities.
16. Find mutually acceptable ways to bring Turkish Cypriot society, institutions and norms closer to the European Union's norms and regulations, so that Turkish Cypriots will be ready to become an active part of the EU as soon as the Cyprus problem is solved.

A3. Now, regarding the search for an actual Comprehensive Settlement, if negotiations commence again what do you think should be their basis? ***(Unacceptable, Tolerable if we do not have better options, Satisfactory on the whole, Highly desirable)***

1. The basis should be allowed to develop through a fresh and creative discussion and negotiation of the various substantive issues, with reference to what the people of both communities might be willing to accept.
2. The Annan Plan should be used as the basis of all further discussion and negotiations.
3. The basis of negotiations should be the 1960 constitution.
4. The two sides should first recognise each other as legal states, and this should be a basis and precondition for any further negotiations.
5. The basis for negotiations should be the principles of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation as agreed in 1977-79.

A4. And when negotiations commence again, who do you believe should be primarily involved, on an expert level, in drafting its legal and administrative provisions? (*Choose only one*)

1. Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot experts working together
2. UN-appointed experts from third countries
3. It doesn't really matter where the experts come from.

## **Section B – Substantive aspects of a Comprehensive Settlement**

*The basic response range for each question is as follows:*

- 1 – This is **entirely unacceptable**
- 2 – This is **tolerable** if necessary
- 3 – This is **satisfactory** on the whole
- 4 – This is **highly desirable**
- 5 – This is **absolutely essential**

*Additional response options are as follows:*

- 77 – *I am not sure where I stand regarding this proposal*
- 88 – *I do not understand the implications of this proposal*
- 99 – *I do not wish to respond (Unprompted)*

B1. Overall Shape of the deal

1. The overall deal could be described as a “**bi-zonal bi-communal federation with political equality**”. This would mean that there would be one central federal government, but also two regional administrations. In the federal government, the two communities would work together to manage matters of common concern, while through the regional administrations each community would look after its own affairs.
2. The overall deal could be described as a “**confederation of two sovereign states**”. The fundamental right of self determination would first be acknowledged to each of the two sides, who would then come together in a loose partnership, giving over some of their authorities to a central and common administration.

3. The overall deal could be described as a “**land for recognition**” package. The Turkish Cypriots will give over land to the Greek Cypriots, somewhat more than they would give under a federal or confederal solution, and in return the Greek Cypriots will recognise the TRNC, which will become a sovereign and internationally-recognised state with a seat at the UN and the right to apply for EU membership.
4. The overall deal could be described as an “**evolutionary integration into a unified state**”. Initially, the agreed settlement will involve the setting up of a bi-zonal bi-communal federation, with each community mostly living in its own region and managing its own affairs, but gradually the various restrictions will be lifted allowing for a total mixing of the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot population, with the ultimate aim of removing ethnic distinctions from politics and creating a state where all citizens are equal before the law.

## B2. Property

1. In order to reach a satisfactory solution to the property issue, the affected individuals themselves - the ordinary Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot refugees - need to be consulted so that the solution will be tailor-made to their real requirements.
2. The property issue should be solved primarily through restitution, so that affected individuals will regain control of their properties as they had them before the events of the Cyprus Problem.
3. The international community - including Turkey and Greece - should contribute generously to the financial cost involved in the resolution of the property issue.
4. The property issue should be solved primarily through compensation, rather than through restitution, and with the absolute minimum relocation and resettlement of individuals from their post-1974 residences.
5. Before the property issue can be resolved, a full census of all affected properties should take place, in both communities, examining their current use and condition. This property census would then be used by the negotiators of the two communities in their deliberations.

### B3. Security – Guarantees

1. In order to reach a satisfactory solution to the security aspect, the security concerns and fears of both communities need to be taken into account as well as the objective threats that Cyprus might face in the future.
2. Post-settlement Cyprus will need to maintain a moderately-sized professional security force, bi-communal in composition, which would be responsible for defending the island from any internal and external threats.
3. After the settlement, Cyprus should be fully demilitarised. All foreign troops should withdraw and all Cypriot armies should be disbanded.
4. After the settlement, the constitutional order and territorial integrity of Cyprus should be guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

### B4. Governance – Power-sharing

1. The administrative provisions of the settlement must be such as to ensure the functionality of government, and specifically to ensure that the government will be able to make swift and correct decisions.
2. Effective participation both of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the decision-making process should be included in the administrative provisions of the settlement.
3. Each community should have the right to unilaterally block any decision or legislation of the federal government which it considers to be incompatible with its own communal interests.
4. The electoral system must be such as to ensure that politicians – whether Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot – will need to solicit the votes of people from both communities, and in this way consider themselves accountable to both communities.

### B5. Human Rights – Bi-zonality

1. A balanced compromise will need to be struck between the desire of Greek Cypriots to be able to live freely anywhere in post-settlement Cyprus, and the desire of Turkish Cypriots to ensure that they will remain the effective majority in the region that they will control.

2. In the context of a settlement, all, or almost all of the Greek Cypriots should live in the Greek Cypriot state, while all or almost all of the Turkish Cypriots should live in the Turkish Cypriot state.
3. In the context of a settlement, all citizens of Cyprus should have the right to live, work, and claim their rights as citizens, anywhere within the territory of Cyprus.
4. Even within the wider framework of a bi-zonal settlement, it will be important to ensure that mixed local communities develop again, as they existed prior to 1974, in order to bring the two communities closer to each other on a day-to-day level after all these years of separation.

#### B6. Citizenship

1. People from Turkey who have already lived in Cyprus for many decades with their families should, after a settlement, be allowed to stay, but those who came more recently should return to Turkey.
2. Some people from Turkey could be allowed to stay after a settlement, but only with a residence permit and work permit – not with citizenship and voting rights.
3. All people who came from Turkey after 1974, including their descendents, should return to Turkey after a settlement. The only possible exception is the case of those who have married Turkish Cypriots and the children of such mixed marriages.
4. In order to properly resolve the issue of the people from Turkey, a complete and internationally monitored population census must first take place, in both communities, so that the negotiators have a clear picture of the extent and parameters of the problem they are trying to solve.

#### B7. Economics

1. Immediately after the settlement, every effort must be made to bring the standard of living of the Turkish Cypriots on a par with the standard of living of Greek Cypriots, but financed in such a way as not to burden the Greek Cypriots.
2. Economic integration needs to take place at a moderate pace, with some temporary restrictions, in order to protect potentially

vulnerable economic groups (low-skilled workers, small businesses etc.) from competition they are not ready to face.

3. The settlement should include a complete *economic development plan*, which will outline the strategy for economic progress and growth in the first few years after a settlement for the benefit of all economic groups in society.
4. In the settlement, joint business ventures between Greek and Turkish Cypriots should be encouraged through appropriate incentive schemes as a way to improve the relations between the two communities and encourage economic growth.
5. The financial and economic ramifications of the settlement must be evaluated very carefully by experts in advance of the agreement, in order to ensure that there will not be any unexpected negative consequences.

#### B8. International Outlook

1. After a settlement, unified Cyprus must enjoy relations of sovereign equality with Greece and Turkey, and not be seen as in any way inferior or subordinate to them.
2. Once a settlement is reached, and given that all parties - Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Turkey and Greece - are honouring their part of the agreement, unified Cyprus should support Turkey's bid for EU membership.
3. Greece, Turkey and unified Cyprus should become strategic partners after a settlement, working together to promote the stability and development of other countries in the Balkans and the Middle East.
4. After a settlement, regional headquarters of the UN, the EU and other international organisations should be located in unified Cyprus, making use of the island's 'between three continents' strategic location.
5. After a settlement, unified Cyprus should participate fully in the development and execution of the European Union's common foreign policy.

### **Section C – Attitudes regarding inter-communal relations in Cyprus**

C1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding the other community in Cyprus and prospects for a solution? *(5 point Scale)*

1. We have much in common with the Turkish Cypriots (Greek Cypriots).
2. I would not mind having Turkish Cypriot (Greek Cypriot) neighbours.
3. The Cyprus Problem must be solved on the basis of a mutually acceptable compromise.
4. The Cyprus Problem must be solved through an armed struggle.
5. I do not waste my time listening to the arguments of Turkish Cypriots (Greek Cypriots).
6. I recognise that both communities of Cyprus have made mistakes in the past.
7. I try to look at the Cyprus problem, both from the point of view of Greek Cypriots (Turkish Cypriots) and from the point of view of Turkish Cypriots (Greek Cypriots).

C2. For each of the persons and groups below, to what extent would you say you trust their intentions? *(Strongly mistrust, somewhat mistrust, somewhat trust, strongly trust)*

1. The Turkish Cypriot Leader, Mr. Talat/The Greek Cypriot Leader, Mr. Christofias
2. The Turkish Government/The Greek Cypriot National Council
3. The Turkish Army/The Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus
4. Turkish Cypriot Left-Wing Parties/AKEL Party
5. Turkish Cypriot Right-Wing Parties/DISY Party (Clerides Party)
6. Ordinary Turkish Cypriots/Ordinary Greek Cypriots.

C3. And of the above, who do you think will be primarily involved in making the important decisions related to the Cyprus Problem? *(Up to two answers only)*

C4. Do you consider yourself to be ... *(One answer only)*

1. Only a Greek (Turk) and not at all a Cypriot?
2. Mostly a Greek (Turk) but also somewhat a Cypriot?
3. A Greek (Turk) and a Cypriot to the same degree?
4. Mostly a Cypriot but also somewhat a Greek (Turk)?
5. Only a Cypriot and not at all a Greek (Turk)?

C5. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding national and cultural identity? *(5 point scale)*

1. I consider myself to have Greek (Turkish) cultural roots.
2. Cyprus historically is Hellenic (Turkish).
3. Entrance into the European Union constitutes a threat to our national identity.
4. I consider Greece (Turkey) to be my mother country.

C6. How satisfied are you with the political situation related to the Cyprus Problem, as it stands today? *(Scale 0 to 10)*

### **Section D – Personal, Social and Political Values**

D1. Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five!

1. Independence
2. Feeling of responsibility
3. Imagination and Creativity
4. Tolerance and respect for other people
5. Determination, perseverance
6. Religious faith
7. Not being selfish
8. Obedience.

D2. Now I will briefly describe some people. Would you please indicate for each description whether that person is much like you, somewhat like you,

a little like you, or not at all like you? (*Code one answer for each description*)

1. It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things one's own way.
2. It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things.
3. Living in secure surroundings is important to this person to avoid anything that might be dangerous.
4. It is important to this person to have a good time; to 'spoil' oneself.
5. It is important to this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being.
6. Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life.
7. Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs handed down by the previous generation.

D3. People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which people would give top priority. Would you please say which two of these you, yourself, consider the most important? (*Code two choices*)

1. A high level of economic growth
2. Making sure this country has strong defence forces
3. Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities
4. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.

D4. If you had to choose, which two of the things on this card would you say is most important? (*Code two choices*)

1. Maintaining order in the nation
2. Giving people more say in important government decisions
3. Fighting rising prices
4. Protecting freedom of speech.

D5. Here is another list. In your opinion, which two of these are most important? (*Code two choices*)

1. A stable economy
2. Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society
3. Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money
4. The fight against crime.

D6. I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? (*Read out and code one answer for each*)

1. Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections
2. Having experts, not politicians, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country
3. Having the army take over when government is incompetent
4. Having a democratic political system.

D7. In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right.' How would you locate yourself on a left-right spectrum as below?

1. Far left
2. Left
3. Centre left
4. Centrist
5. Centre right
6. Right
7. Far right.

D8. And how would you describe yourself in terms of religion?

1. I don't believe in God.
2. I believe in God generally and I try to be a good person, but without believing in any particular religion.
3. I consider myself an Orthodox Christian (Muslim) but I don't follow the rituals of religion very much.
4. I consider myself a practising Orthodox Christian (Muslim) and try to follow the dictates of religion as best I can.

D9. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? Please show your response on this card, where 0 means that “people would try to take advantage of you,” and 10 means that “people would try to be fair” (**Code one number**).

D10. I’d like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? (**Read out and code one answer for each**)

1. Your family
2. Your neighbourhood
3. People you know personally
4. People you meet for the first time
5. People of another religion
6. People of another nationality.

D11. I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (**Code one answer for each**)

1. The church/religious authorities
2. The armed forces
3. The police
4. The courts
5. The government
6. Political parties
7. Parliament
8. The European Union
9. The United Nations.

D12. People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you see yourself? (**5 point scale**)

1. I see myself as a world citizen
2. I see myself as a citizen of my country
3. I see myself as a citizen of the European Union.

D13. Turning to the question of ethnic diversity, with which of the following views do you agree? Please use a 0 to 10 scale to indicate your position (**Code one number**):

- Ethnic diversity erodes a country's unity
- Ethnic diversity enriches life.

D14. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on which 1 means you are "completely dissatisfied" and 10 means you are "completely satisfied" where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole? (**Code one number**).

### **E. Demographics**

E1. Year of birth

E2. Age group

E3. Gender

E4. Place of residence

E5. District

E6. Urban/rural

E7. Level of education

E8. Family income

E9. Refugee status

E10. Ethnic origin

E11. Profession

E12. Newspaper readership

E13. Vote in 2004 referendum

E14. Vote in most recent parliamentary elections

E15. Interviewee attention span/quality of interview.

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