

READINGS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

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VOLUME I

WORKING PAPERS OF THE CEPS-IISS

EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM

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FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG, CHAIRMAN

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PREFACE

The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) joined forces in 2000 to launch a new forum on European security and defence policy in Brussels. The objective of the European Security Forum was to bring together senior officials and experts from EU and Euro-Atlantic Partnership countries to discuss security issues of strategic importance to Europe, treating both their European and transatlantic implications.

This volume brings together the discussion papers commissioned from experts in Europe, Russia and the United States on the first nine topics tackled by the European Security Forum since its inception. Each set of papers is prefaced by an Introduction by the Chairman, summing up the main points in the discussion and highlighting unresolved questions. This collection of papers offers the reader a highly diverse and rich menu of urgent and important topics of direct relevance to the European interest in the short and longer term. It is hoped that these papers and the debate they have helped to stimulate will contribute to policy initiatives that mitigate the potential negative impacts of the issues discussed, while exploiting whatever good can be secured from them.

The papers presented in this book have been written over a span of 18 months, from February 2001 to July 2002 – a period characterised by great strategic turbulence, if not epochal change. We not only witnessed the September 11th attacks but also the rapprochement of Russia and NATO leading to the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council at the Rome Summit in May 2002. Moreover, both the NATO and EU enlargement processes have built up a strong momentum and taken a well defined shape. The eight topics discussed here have had a special political relevance during this period.

Missile Defence and European Security. Early in 2001, national missile defence was a particularly urgent and important topic in view of the advent of the new US administration. When President Bush placed missile defences at the centre of his security and defence platform, Europeans had reason to assume that this new technology would, in one form or the other, become an actual, rather than a virtual, facet of the US military posture. Since the Bush administration has not put forward a specific systems architecture, the challenge for America's allies and partners – notably its fellow members in NATO, the EU and Russia – is to define what they believe can be the least damaging or most preferable outcome, and to seek policies leading to such an outcome. This challenge

was taken up at the first meeting of the Forum in February 2001, with contributions by Ivo H. Daalder, Alexander Pikayev and Klaus Becher.

The Macedonian Crisis and Balkan Security. In the second meeting of the Forum in May 2001, attention turned to the Kosovar/Albanian insurgency and Balkan security. With contributions by Dana H. Allin, Nicholas Whyte and Nadia Arbatova, the debate revolved around issues of the utility and desirability of a direct and forceful military intervention, the role of transnational crime in the current situation and the question whether the international community had become part of the problem, rather than part of the solution.

NATO Enlargement. In its third meeting in July 2001, the Forum addressed the decisiveness of NATO at 26 or 27, the possibility of Russian membership of NATO and the interaction between EU and NATO enlargements. Contributions were made by Tomas Ries, Vladimir Baranovsky and F. Stephen Larrabee. The debate revolved around the Russia position vis-à-vis NATO expansion to the Baltics. It was observed that the technical preparation of the accession countries was better due to the Membership Action Plan and that there were reasons to suspect that the new enlargement would be politically easier to handle than the first, precisely because of what did not happen after the initial round: no new “Cold War”, no “new fault line” and no “bankrupting” of NATO.

The EU's Rapid Reaction Capability. The ambitions of the European Union in the security and defence field are global. In its fourth meeting in September 2001, the Forum focused its attention on three questions: “What are the EU's rapid reaction capabilities for?” “What budget efforts are required to give this capability substance, as well to keep under manageable proportions the ‘gap’ with the US?” and “How serious is the Turkish issue?”. With contributions by Charles Grant, Kori Schake and Dmitry Danilov, an interesting debate took place on the emerging division of labour between the US and Europe, access to NATO assets and the required capabilities to match the EU's global ambitions.

The War against Terrorism and the Transformation of the World Order. The unprecedented attacks in the United States on September 11th changed the international security agenda in many respects. It was therefore essential for the European Security Forum to address the issue at its first meeting after these events, in November 2001. Contributions were by François Heisbourg, David Gompert and Alexei Arbatov, who discussed the form, nature and substance of the war against terrorism but also the way international relations were impacted by these events.

Russia's Security Policy and EU-Russian Relations. In the sixth meeting, contributions were made by Dmitri Trenin, Angela Stent and Stephan de Spiegeleire. The debate revolved around the durability of President Putin's policy of modernisation "within the West", the extent of potential EU-Russian relations, notably in security terms, to what extent Kaliningrad would be a test case for EU-Russian relations and a division of labour that might be worked out between the US, the EU and Russia in managing the security in "post-Soviet space".

The Role of Europe in the Greater Middle East. The seventh meeting of the Forum examined the question of what the EU should do in the Middle East, notably in relation to US policies, and to what extent the effectiveness of EU institutions could be improved in working in this region. The Forum had the benefit of three essentially complementary papers with Alain Dieckhoff's focus on Europe's positioning vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian nexus, Anthony Cordesman's broad-spectrum view of the region, and Vitaly Naumkin's Russian view of the EU's role.

European Security and Defence Policy: Taking Stock. In mid-2002, most commentators tended to believe that the momentum for ESDP had been lost due to the combined impact of September 11th and the limited willingness of EU members to commit additional resources. In addition, the prospect of EU enlargement and the emerging work of the Convention on the future of the EU raised additional questions for the future of ESDP. Drawing from contributions by Nicole Gnesotto, Robert Kagan and Victor Kremenyuk, an assessment was made as to just how far political rhetoric could be matched by reality.

Iraq. If or when. The European Security Forum addressed the prospective war with Iraq three days before President Bush's speech at the UN General Assembly. The topic was introduced by Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian, Andrei Zagorski and Marta Dassù. In the debate the following issues were considered extensively: the role of the UN Security Council; the form and substance of a Security Council resolution, the terms and modalities of a possible war and post-war issues.

It has been both a pleasure and a privilege to organise and host the European Security Forum for the last eighteen months. We take the opportunity to express our thanks to the participants (from 21 countries) for sharing their thoughts and ideas with us in the debates and thank the authors for their fine scholarship and the work and thought that they have put into their papers.

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**MISSILE DEFENCE
AND
EUROPEAN SECURITY**

**CEPS-IISS EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM
WORKING PAPER NO. 1**

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY

**KLAUS BECHER
ALEXANDER PIKAYEV
IVO H. DAALDER**

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INTRODUCTION

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

The first meeting of the European Security Forum was held on 2 April 2001. The session was devoted to the issue of missile defences, with the discussion drawing on three papers written respectively from a European, an American and a Russian perspective.

Missile defence is a particularly urgent and important topic in Europe, in view of the advent of the new American administration. Whereas the Clinton administration forwarded its National Missile Defence (NPD) plan under congressional pressure rather than as a priority of its own choosing, President Bush has put missile defences at the centre of his security and defence platform. Europeans therefore have reason to assume that missile defences, in one form or another, will become an actual, rather than a virtual, facet of the US military posture. No less importantly, the Bush administration has not yet put forward a specific systems architecture in terms of missile defences: in other words, the Europeans are faced with a general intention, not a specific policy. The opponents of missile defences therefore do not have a sitting target at which to aim their own suggestions, so as to help orient American policy in the least damaging direction. This temptation is fuelled not only by Bush administration statements taking the interests of allies and partners into account; but there is also ample evidence that a number of competing missile defence visions co-exist for the moment within the Bush team. No clear choice has yet been made as to the scope of missile defences – global, regional or homeland defence? – their scale – defences against limited strikes only or broader strategic ambitions? – their pace (a piece-by-piece or a “big bang” approach?) – their objective (intercepting ICBMs only directed at the US and/or dealing also with shorter-range missiles threatening Europe and East Asia) or their technological emphasis (boost phase taking precedence or not vis-à-vis subsequent phase intercept?).

In this lies a substantial difference vis-à-vis the Clinton Alaska- and ground-based re-entry phase project against limited attacks by “rogue state” intercontinental missiles.

From a European perspective, this had every apparent defect: it would have provided no positive contribution to the security of America’s allies while entailing the risk of upsetting the ABM Treaty and generating tension with Russia and China, while at the same time what was

presented as a *fait accompli* was put forward in a half-hearted manner. Under those circumstances, it isn't surprising that NMD received high levels of flak. Even the United Kingdom took its distance.

Since then, the Europeans have moved in a cautious manner now that NMD has been superseded by a less clearly defined missile defence. For America's allies – notably the European members of NATO and the EU – and partners (not least Russia), the challenge is now to define the least damaging possible outcome, and to seek policies leading to such an outcome. And for the Americans, the symmetrical task is to establish the least counterproductive balance between alliance commitments – and more broadly security relations with other partners e.g. China and Russia – on the one hand, and the pursuit of missile defences on the other.

This *problématique* – to use a typical piece of Brussels Euro-speak – colours the three papers presented to the European Security Forum. Thus Ivo Daalder, a former NSC staffer, makes specific suggestions as to the manner in which the US should reconcile missile defences and broader strategic objectives. Klaus Becher, the Senior Fellow for European security at the IISS, puts forward proposals flowing from the specific interests of the European allies, while Alexander Pikayev, like a number of other Russian analysts – and indeed decision-makers – seeks to promote cooperative missile defences against the threat of non-strategic ballistic missiles.

The members of the European Union have every interest in defining their interests vis-à-vis the European decision-shaping process in the short term: the window of indecision as to the specific content of the Bush administration's missile defence policy will not remain open much longer. The time to influence policy is now.

It will not have escaped the reader that this Introduction has been set in a damage-limitation mode, rather than in a strongly positive light. This is a deliberate choice, for the Europeans are faced with strategic priorities (notably the emphasis on investment for force projection) that conflict with the budgetary demands of missile defences: and the Europeans don't always share the US vision as to what the appropriate policy mix should be towards the risks linked to missile proliferation. Therefore, it is likely, to use Henry Kissinger's recent analogy, that America's partners are going to look at American missile defences policy as the equivalent of a visit to the dentist: enthusiasm is not a foreseeable part of that prospect.

MISSILE DEFENCE: EUROPEAN APPROACHES AND INTERESTS

KLAUS BECHER

European NATO countries have been spectators to the debate about defending the US against ballistic missile attacks. While there have been national differences in Europe's reactions to the national missile defence (NMD) programme, it is obvious that most Europeans don't like it. The French seem somewhat more convinced than others that missile defence is inherently foolish and unworkable. Some British experts seem to insist more than others that any programme that might undermine NATO's nuclear deterrence and strategic unity should be avoided. And perhaps Germans, more than others, worry about perceived dangers to the ABM and other arms control treaties, and generally about relations with Russia. Most Europeans at present believe that US defence against long-range ballistic missiles is a slap in the face for Russia, a dangerous provocation for China and an inadequate response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile technology.

In spite of the widely shared assessment that the US is nevertheless determined, across party lines, to go ahead with missile defence, European allies have continued to offer only lukewarm diplomatic support. At the same time, the issue was not high on the agenda of European leaders, and little effort was made to base public pronouncements on a thorough understanding of the facts concerning technology, costs and goals of actual US missile defence efforts. NMD was allowed to become a bogey in the European debate: Nothing good could come from it.

While this attitude did not cause harm during the indecisive Clinton years, it clearly won't suffice in conversations with the Bush administration. It was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's 1998 Commission report on the accelerating threat of missile attacks with biological, chemical and nuclear weapons that brought missile defence back on the political agenda. Europeans must learn to deal with US missile defence on its merits. Some basic insights must be taken on board:

- Current US plans are not a carry-over from the cold war; on the contrary, they are a consequence of its end and the resulting strategic pluralism and military uncertainty, amplified by the diffusion of

advanced technology. It is not the goal of these plans to render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, as President Ronald Reagan had advertised the strategic defence initiative (SDI), and specifications do not include a quest for near-100% protection.

- The assessment that there is a growing missile and WMD threat, in spite of differences of opinion on certain specific countries, is shared within NATO and also with other allies such as Israel and Japan, as well as Russia.
- The required technology is not a matter of science fiction, and an operational missile defence system is not unaffordable for the US. Even if total costs accumulate beyond \$60 billion over 20 years, this would still be within the cost range of other large US procurement programmes and consume just about 1% of the Pentagon's budget.
- The West European cold-war concern that the US would cease to be a reliable ally if it weren't exposed to assured nuclear destruction, sometimes still quoted to explain fears of "decoupling", is today so far removed from actual definitions of US interests and the functioning of US defence policy that it has become entirely incomprehensible. Acquiring defences against missile attacks reduces the risk of strategic blackmail and thus helps to preserve the ability to act politically and militarily in crisis situations. Protecting this ability to act has always been one of the central goals of the Atlantic Alliance.
- US missile defence efforts are not only about safeguarding US territory. The US is spending 50% more on theatre missile defence (TMD) than on NMD, and is very clear about the military priority of theatre missile defence. Moreover, the Bush administration has rightly stressed that Europeans are also likely to be threatened by missiles and WMD. Aggressors will not fail to note that the US is politically and economically so intertwined with its allies that blackmailing them would affect the US nearly as much as direct threats.

Based on the Bush administration's approach to the ongoing nuclear review process, there appears to be a good chance now that further reductions of US strategic nuclear weapons will become possible in conjunction with a move into strategic defences. Such a build-down would be very much in the interest of most European countries, as it would strengthen international non-proliferation and risk-reduction efforts and could increase the prospects for successful regional arms

control and disarmament efforts in various strategically exposed parts of the world, including Europe's periphery.

Looking at Russia and the ABM Treaty, Europeans will continue to consider it decisive that the transition is achieved not unilaterally but in cooperation. The continuous record of US-Russian cooperative threat reduction measures and additional achievements such as the new joint early warning centre should be recognised as reassuring demonstrations of the fact that common security has indeed replaced bipolar antagonism, in spite of recurring political obstacles and complications.

Most likely, Moscow will in the end cooperate with the West on missile defence. However, Russian leaders and negotiators will try to extract as high a price as they can. The inclusion of Russian technology, research and industrial capacities in future missile defence systems may well be one central and to a certain extent even attractive component. European defence and aerospace companies would be well advised to fight for their share in the eventual deal not just by seeking a transatlantic foothold in the US defence market but also by engaging Russian capacities now, presumably against massive US resistance.

While it is not necessarily obvious that the US and NATO must urgently build extensive missile defences at this point in time, there is no convincing reason why the US should not go ahead in that direction. This is a matter of strategic choice, and certainly legitimate for the purpose of controlling the right mix of instruments for defence in potential future conflicts while exploiting technological advantages intelligently. European countries may want to actively help shape the ongoing process of strategic change of which missile defence is just one element, and support the emergence of increased stability and cooperation.

The main reason why the US believes in the need for missile defence is that its forces are likely to be fighting wars against aggressors who possess such missiles and are prepared to use them. As Europeans pledge to upgrade their own defence capabilities within NATO and also on their own in ESDP to be better able to share the burdens of maintaining international peace and security, it is more likely than not that European forces will be fighting such wars too. As one of the consequences of Europe's intensified security and defence ambitions, it should begin to be more concerned about protecting its own troops and installations in theatre as well as at home against the full range of ballistic threats to be expected.

NATO as a whole has been operating under the sound assumption for a number of years that by 2010 all of Europe will be within reach of

missiles from outside Europe. European politicians, however, have so far not been willing to acknowledge this assessment publicly, presumably also out of fear that this would impose additional demands on limited defence budgets. If this attitude were ever to change, there would probably be substantial synergies to be found in pursuing the intended upgrade of European C3 (command, control and communications) capabilities in conjunction with a highly integrated systems approach such as integrated extended air defence that has immediate practical application and is multinationally networked by necessity.

The Bush administration's apparent new focus on sea- or air-based boost-phase defence is unlikely to make a big difference from a European viewpoint. The new US eagerness to include forward-based elements and reflect the requirement to protect allies and US troops abroad might be seen by Europeans as an interesting opening to pursue the integrated extended air defence and ballistic missile defence approaches developed jointly in NATO working groups, with French participation, during the 1990s. However, one needs to distinguish between forward-based boost-phase defence and the kind of integrated European TBMD (theatre ballistic missile defence) architecture that might include US sea-based radar and upper-tier interceptor capabilities in the Mediterranean. While these capabilities would help to protect European countries and US troops in Europe by targeting incoming missiles on their re-entry, they would add nothing to US national missile defence against ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East.

For boost-phase intercepts during the burn phase of the missile's engine, interceptors need to be deployed within a few hundred kilometres of the attacking missile's launch site. For threats from the Middle East, this would in practice require land-based forward interceptor sites that are strategically much less attractive than the more flexible sea-based ones. It is unlikely that any future US national missile defence architecture would at the same time provide protection to Europe through boost-phase intercepts. If Europeans want to be protected against missile attacks, they will have to build their own defences, and pay for them.

Politically, missile defence is likely to be seen by European governments mainly as an additional source of potential irritation in the transatlantic relationship at a time of accumulating, partially value-based conflicts over trade and a widespread desire among European politicians to assert Europe's own identity vis-à-vis Washington, New York and Hollywood as a matter of principle. Europeans are unlikely to risk causing further aggravation over missile defence. They should not miss the opportunity, however, as they come out in support of the US on this issue, to win

active US support for the EU's own ongoing defence-capabilities efforts. This involves, above all, the establishment of satisfactory conditions for transatlantic defence-industrial interaction.

The institutionalised political, diplomatic and defence-technological cooperation in NATO offers good opportunities to Europeans to make the most of Washington's declared willingness to consult before taking decisions on missile defence. Beyond that, European foreign, security and defence policy should certainly also aspire to influence other actors such as Russia and China, and to provide guidance to European public opinion. The price for failing to play a constructive, determined role might be a popular relapse into the obsolete East-West mindset when European security matters were decided in Washington and Moscow over European heads. The US-Russian joint statement on strategic stability of 4 June 2000, while listing the strategic commonalities shared by these two powers, makes no mention of the European allies and the need to consult them or others.

European governments would be well advised to make sure they become, or remain, serious and respected actors in the missile defence arena. If Europe wants its voice heard, it must speak up and help to shape developments in pursuit of European interests. There is quite a long list of issues and interests worth pushing from a European viewpoint that are unlikely to be at centre stage if the matter is left to the US, Russia and China alone. On the other hand, Europeans are not really needed, for example, for placing the issue of continued respect for the ABM Treaty on the agenda because Russia, as a party to this treaty, will take care of this point in its own right.

In addition to the interest in developing the transatlantic relationship and maintaining cooperation with Russia, specific European fields of interest that need intensified attention and discussion in the context of the transition towards US deployment of operational ballistic missile defences include:

- *Access to missile defence technology and components.* Future efforts to develop European extended air defence against ballistic missiles will require sharing some elements of US missile defences, also including assured direct access to space-based early warning and tracking data. As far as Article IX of the ABM Treaty stands against such shared use of non-nuclear ballistic missile defence (BMD) components, it should be in Europe's interest to support an understanding among ABM Treaty parties to change this situation.

US negotiators raised this point with their Russian counterparts in Geneva in January 2000.

- *Abolition of nuclear ABM.* The 1972 ABM Treaty legitimises the possession and use of nuclear weapons for ballistic missile defence and merely limits their deployed numbers. To this day, Moscow is defended with such crude nuclear interceptors against potential missile attacks. Nuclear safety concerns and the devastating consequences of any accidental or intentional use of this neglected class of nuclear weapons in Russia's stockpile demand a revision of the ABM Treaty to ban and dismantle all nuclear-tipped ABMs.
- *Deep cuts.* On strategic nuclear arsenals, Europeans should remind the US and Russia of their obligation under Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue nuclear disarmament. This also includes US adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
- *Addressing theatre nuclear forces (TNF) arsenals.* Russia still holds about 10,000 nuclear charges for non-strategic nuclear weapons at approximately 40 storage sites, which give reason for concern about safety and proliferation. Europeans have a strong interest in pushing for more transparency, confidence-building measures and cooperative risk reduction in this field, not just bilaterally between the US and Russia, but also with involvement of NATO and the EU.
- *Controls on (anti-satellite) ASAT.* As missile defence technology overlaps substantially with the capacity to attack satellites in orbit, both the proliferation of such technology and its potentially destabilising application for targeting space platforms need to be addressed. A world-wide ban on testing interceptors in an ASAT mode could help to avoid an arms race in space and prevent a situation where pre-emption against missile defence sites may become necessary to protect essential space-based C4I assets (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence).
- *Banning interceptors in space.* While boost-phase and mid-course missile defence from space may look like a technologically attractive option in the long term for the US, its pursuit would open the gates to a broad militarisation of space that could only result in much-increased vulnerability for all nations. The post-ABM regime should include a ban on developing, testing and deploying space-based intercept devices, as a step towards banning all other weapons in full or partial orbit.

Such accompanying measures of common security geared at strengthening international confidence in the willingness of the US not to exploit its economic and technological advantage in destabilising ways would not only broaden the common ground with Russia and might attract China to a dialogue on arms control, but would also demonstrate the coherence of NATO's conceptual approach to security and cooperation. They would thus also help to keep Europe's own defence identity firmly anchored in the transatlantic alliance.

RUSSIA AND ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCES

ALEXANDER PIKAYEV

The International Context

Anti-missile debates have been regularly surfacing for more than three decades, starting at least from the US great anti-ballistic missile (ABM) debates of the late 1960s. More recently, the discussions about strategic anti-missile deployments have coincided with fundamental changes in European and global security, triggered by developments of the first decade after the end of the cold war. The circumstances were characterised by further consolidation of the US position as a leading global nation, whose position was enhanced even inside the Western alliance. European integration crossed some important qualitative lines, constituting the basis for more rapid economic development of the European Union in coming decades, and its gradual transformation from a mainly geo-economic into a geo-political entity. This might lead to a reassessment of transatlantic relations, including future roles of NATO and its further enlargement, as well as its interaction with emerging security institutions in Europe.

On the other side of Eurasia, the rapid growth of China is increasingly challenging the credibility of the US-led alliances in the Western Pacific. Together with volatility across the Taiwan Strait and likely Korean reunification, this could force Japan to reconsider its recent military self-restraint and promote its re-militarisation, if not nuclearisation. The southern part of the Eurasian continent – from the Mediterranean to Myanmar – is increasingly becoming an area of traditional geopolitical competition between growing local and outside powers. It witnesses the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and the fragmentation and radicalisation of the Islamic world.

Russia and other post-Soviet states emerged in the middle of these profound changes. In the 1990s, they survived unprecedented economic, political and military decline, which left them without any serious chance to re-establish the significance they enjoyed a decade ago. Moreover, at least some newly independent states have not finished their downturn, and face the real probability of further degradation. A further weakening of that part of the world might turn it into arena of geopolitical competition between neighbours with unpredictable consequences in terms of uncontrollable spread of remnants of the Soviet nuclear legacy, conventional arms, migration and crime. As a result, neighbouring

entities could be forced to conduct hardly bearable burdens of peace-making amidst endless Eurasian steppes and forests.

Anti-Missile Defence and the International Order

Anti-missile defences might accelerate or even promote undesirable geopolitical trends. Well before actual deployments, the anti-missile debates have already complicated transatlantic relations in recent delicate times of redefining balances between the two sides of the ocean. Commitment to large-scale missile defences might reflect shifts occurring in the United States towards unilateralism – with an explosive combination of isolationist trends and a preoccupation with relations with the Americas, on the one hand, and unilateralist spasmodic interventionism overseas, on the other. This would destabilise the international arena, since the US involvement, when needed, would not be forthcoming, but might unexpectedly take place in other areas. If anti-missile defences were deployed, it could create a wrong perception of invulnerability from potential retaliation and thus take the pressure off decisions to intervene.

The unilateralism could target international legal regimes, particularly those dealing with non-proliferation and arms control. The ABM Treaty is a good example. Unsuccessful tests of missile interceptors during the Clinton administration demonstrated that the United States, very likely, possesses no available technology for anti-missile deployments on a scale justifying withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The treaty does not prohibit anti-missiles; it only restricts tests and deployments of strategic anti-ballistic missile defence systems. Within a decade, development and testing of new systems could probably be made inside the treaty restrictions, or under the umbrella of non-strategic missile defences. Nevertheless, attacks on the ABM Treaty – well before its military substitute is ready – create concerns that the real aim of the debate is not to give up an obsolete agreement which complicates responding to urgent national security challenges, but to withdraw from the regime, which is hated for ideological reasons of near-religious character.

Together with the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and compliance problems with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), attacks on the ABM Treaty might reflect a broader desire to follow unilateralist actions internationally without taking into account existing international regimes and norms. This establishes precedents for other nations, which in their turn might decide to withdraw from regimes that limit their freedom of action. As a result, the world would become a much more dangerous place, where relations between

the states would be determined not by international law, but by national interests and great powers games.

The weakening of the US alliances in the Western Pacific is sometimes mentioned as one of the primary reasons for the US anti-missiles deployments. Indeed, if protected, the United States would more willingly participate in defending their regional allies. However, there is uncertainty on how the leading East Asian nation would react to the US deployments. In recent years, China has possessed two or three dozen missiles capable hitting targets in North America. These numbers might be successfully intercepted by even an initially modest US anti-missile system with the necessary architecture. As a result, Beijing would be deprived of its minimum deterrence option, which it obtained in the early 1980s.

The Chinese could avoid that development if they slowly build-up their strategic nuclear forces to a level where they could saturate the American defences. That build-up might be quite significant. In order to maintain assured penetration even through limited defences with 100 interceptors, China would need up to 200 strategic warheads deliverable to North American targets. In other words, Beijing may have to increase its minimum strategic forces ten-fold.

The Chinese nuclear build-up might trigger a nuclear chain reaction in Asia. India clearly links its nuclear ambitions with China, and would be tempted to follow Beijing's suit. Pakistan could hardly stay away from that arms race either. A Pakistani build-up might increase pressure on Iran, which has a difficult relationship with Islamabad. In the Western Pacific, facing a nuclear arms race between continental Asian powers, both Taiwan and Japan could feel themselves increasingly insecure and could be sorely tempted to change their non-nuclear status. Under certain circumstances, South Korea could even pre-empt them.

Russia's Dilemmas

For Russia, an increasingly unilateralist United States, erosion of existing international law, a nuclear build-up and proliferation in Asia represent considerable mid-term challenges. In that security environment, Moscow could hardly permit itself to maintain its recent modest rate of nuclear modernisation programme: in 1998-2000, only 26 new Topol M SS-27 ICBMs were delivered to their bases. Russia would have to keep sizeable deterrent force levels in order to feel secure in more nuclearised world.

Some existing arms control regimes significantly restrain Moscow's ability to maintain higher force levels. In particular, the START II

prohibits ICBMs with multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Producing large numbers of single warhead missiles would be much more expensive than producing MIRVed ICBMs. This may stimulate Moscow to abandon those restrictions by both cooperative and unilateral measures. As another example, the INF Treaty prevents Russia from establishing an equal footing in an arms race with China, if the latter decided to initiate a build-up of its medium-range nuclear forces. China, as well as other emerging nuclear powers, are not party to that treaty, and – unlike Russia and the United States – are not limited by its restrictions. This complicates Russia's task to maintain balances in those classes of nuclear weapons, and gives a motivation to withdraw from that agreement. The US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would provide a comfortable pretext for Moscow's reciprocal withdrawals from those and, probably, some other regimes.

Therefore, Russia – together with many other members of the international community – has every reason to be concerned by developments driving the US anti-missile commitments. At the same time, the Kremlin is not interested in confrontation and a nuclear arms race, and still needs to gain access to Western investment, markets and technology. That dualism led to disagreements inside Russia's establishment on how to react to the US anti-missile plans. The disagreements could be found in two important doctrinal documents adopted in 2000 – the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine, signed by President Putin, respectively, on January 6 and April 21. While the National Security Concept stated that Russia would adopt arms control agreements in response to the changing international environment, the Military Doctrine, on the contrary, declared that Russia would fulfil existing arms control agreements. Abrogation of the ABM Treaty was especially mentioned in this context as a national security risk.

The hard-liners think that Russia's resistance to changing the ABM Treaty could deliver a message to the United States that they cannot expect Moscow to compliantly follow Washington's zigzags, as it did under the Yeltsin administration. They argue that the tactic to agree to US demands in the area of the ABM/START could only force Russia to accept almost all of Washington's requirements during the negotiations, while Moscow would find itself trapped with uncomfortable restrictions. That school also likely perceives that the US unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would facilitate Russia's withdrawal from other agreements that limit its freedom of manoeuvre.

Supporters of a more conciliatory approach believe that, if Washington suggests an attractive deal in the strategic arms reduction area – negotiated or unilateral – Moscow should agree to discuss new approaches to the ABM Treaty. Russia is interested in deep US strategic nuclear cuts below the level of 2,000 warheads. That would permit the Kremlin to maintain approximate numerical parity with the United States. Besides its psychological importance, that might be important diplomatically for gaining better deals in other areas. Moscow also wants to establish industrial cooperation with the US and EU defence industries and obtain contracts for its cash-starved enterprises.

Advocates of a more cooperative line promote the idea of joint anti-missile defence (AMD) against non-strategic ballistic missiles (NSBMs). A provision for cooperating in tactical missile defences was included in the Russia-NATO Founding Act, signed in Paris in May 1997. Reportedly in late 1998, the Russian Defence Minister was on his way to Brussels with a proposal for cooperative Russian-NATO activities in the anti-missile area, but due to disagreements over Anglo-American air raids against Baghdad in December 1998, and the Kosovo operation which took place in March-June 1999, the plan was not tabled. It was during his visit to Italy in June 2000 that President Putin proposed for the first time joint anti-missile defence, but he did not specify details.

Finally, in February 2001 during the visit of Lord Robertson, Secretary-General of NATO, to Moscow, Russia delivered a more detailed proposal on European AMD against NSBMs. The fact that it was handed to NATO reflected the Kremlin's desire to alleviate possible US concerns that the proposal was purely aimed at widening cracks in transatlantic relations. The proposal was understandably limited to the non-strategic level, because the ABM/START limbo was yet to be resolved through the US-Russian bilateral dialogue. Indirectly, the abbreviation AMD against NSBMs – but not NSMD (non-strategic missile defence) hinted that Moscow was ready to give up NSBMs and proceed forward with AMD only.

The proposal contained a phased approach. Initially, the interested parties should define common missile threats. Then they would need to discuss how better to meet existing and emerging challenges, including an evaluation of non-military instruments for neutralising them. Only if it was decided that military tools were essential could the sides start discussing potential architecture of the AMD and its armaments. For developing potential European AMD, Russia offered its research, development and testing facilities, as well as existing surface-to-air missiles such as the S-300 and S-400. As an option, mobile anti-missile

launchers were mentioned in particular. Such weapons are needed for protecting rapid reaction troops to be deployed in regions of nuclear and missile proliferation.

Given the lack of perceived threat of direct missile and nuclear attack, the Western European nations were probably not the best audience for promoting anti-missile defence cooperation. However, that proposal could help to address some unsettled issues in Russian-Western relations that lay outside the anti-missile framework. They include a lack of substance, positive agenda and institutions. The AMD dialogue might open doors to broader benefits. Western European industries could be interested in gaining access to Russian defence technology. And discussing mutual threat perceptions would help to add substance for those institutions where the AMD discussions will take place.

MISSILE DEFENCES: THE CASE FOR A LIMITED INSURANCE DEFENCE

IVO H. DAALDER

President George Bush's inauguration last January settled the issue of whether the United States will proceed with developing and deploying a missile defence system. It will. The only questions that remain are what kind of system will be deployed, when and with what consequences for international stability and security. Those, indeed, are large and important questions with, as yet, uncertain answers.

The decision to proceed with missile defences results from three factors. First, there is virtual agreement in Washington that the threat posed by the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction is growing. More countries are believed to be acquiring these technologies, including some countries whose foreign policy behaviour is seen to be both unpredictable and inimical to American interests. Second, four decades of research, including spending some \$60 billion on ballistic missile defence research over the past 20 years alone, has begun to pay off in new technologies that promise to provide some protection against small-scale missile attacks. Sensor technologies have advanced to enable adequate discrimination and exceptional tracking and guidance capabilities, so that it is now possible for the proverbial bullet to hit a bullet. Third, with the end of the cold war, long-standing strategic objections to missile defence (including the strict limits on defence incorporated in the ABM Treaty) are no longer applicable. New threats within this new strategic environment call for new responses. Thus, missile defences are necessary to counter the ability of countries that are once again known as "rogue states" to blackmail or coerce the United States and its allies in ways contrary to their interests. Defences, in this view, are seen as the best way to extend and protect America's global reach in a world of proliferating weapon systems.

Each of these reasons has merit. More countries may acquire weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them over great ranges – if not now, then possibly in the future. Vast sums of research money are paying off in fielding better technologies. And defences can add a degree of uncertainty in the minds of actual or potential adversaries that complete vulnerability erases. There is, therefore, good reason to pursue missile defences – and even to deploy systems if and when they become available.

At the same time, it is easy to overstate the threat, the technological advances and the strategic impact of deploying defences. Political change in countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq may fundamentally alter the character or foreign policy goals of the regime. Developing even near-perfect defences capable of defeating a dedicated and technologically determined foe may never be possible. And it is unlikely that any president will rely on the uncertainties of defences (including the knowledge that they may fail with catastrophic consequences) for pursuing policies she or he would otherwise shun.

That leaves a limited, but still important rationale for deploying missile defences: basic insurance in case things go wrong. If a missile were ever to be launched against one's territory, it is better to possess imperfect defences than none at all. And while such defences may not alter the strategic calculations of the defender, they are bound to affect the calculus of the attacker. Therefore, the United States should work with its allies in Europe and, if possible, with Russia to devise a strategy for deploying defences against small-scale missile attacks from third countries. Such a strategy will require that Europeans (and Russia) accept the contributions active defence can make to their security, and the United States to accept that deployment can proceed only if it is embedded within both a broader effort to curb and reverse weapons and missile proliferation and a vigorous attempt to reach agreement with Russia on modifying and updating the existing arms control regime to accommodate such a limited defence.

An Evolving Threat

In some important respects, the ballistic missile threat confronting the United States and Europe today is less than it was at the end of the cold war. Russia deploys thousands of missiles less than the Soviet Union did, and countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt and South Africa abandoned space launch and missile programme in the early 1990s (Cirincione, 2000). Moreover, the oft-repeated belief that ballistic missile proliferation is increasing – even accelerating – is not substantiated by the available evidence. Thus, while CIA Director George Tenet referred in his testimony in February 2001 (see Tenet, 2001) to “the continuing and growing threat posed to us by ICBMs”, he presented no real evidence to substantiate that conclusion. There, as elsewhere, the focus was on just three countries: North Korea, Iran and Iraq.

What has changed is less the evolving threat than the standard by which the US intelligence community assesses that threat. Whereas in the early and mid-1990s, National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) of future long-

range missile threats maintained that the probability of countries developing such capabilities within the next 15 years was low, the latest NIE (released in 1999) argued that North Korea, Iran and Iraq could deploy such systems much earlier (see National Intelligence Council, 1999 and National Intelligence Council, 1995). This change followed publication of the Rumsfeld Commission Report in July 1998, which concluded that the intelligence community might have underestimated the ballistic missile threat to the United States. Indeed, the Commission argued that countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq could plausibly deploy ICBM-range missiles “with little or no warning” (Rumsfeld Commission, 1998). As if to prove the Commission right, six weeks after the publication of its report, North Korea tested a three-staged Taepo Dong-I missile, which it could theoretically convert into an ICBM. Suitably chastened, the intelligence community decided in 1999 to substitute its best assessment of what was *likely* to happen with a worst-case judgement of what *could* theoretically come to pass. In addition, the 1999 NIE substantially reduced the range of the assessed long-range missile threat by shifting from a focus on threats to the 48 continental states to the threat posed to all of US territory (including the outer islands of Alaska and Hawaii) and shortening the timeline from a focus on when a missile would first be deployed to a concern with when it would first be tested (see Cirincione, 2000).

Lost in all the machinations, politically and otherwise, of assessing the long-range missile threat to the United States was the political context in which such threats might appear. Yet, politics provide a crucial input for threat assessments – ultimately, what matters are intentions as well as capabilities. Thus, while the United States is within the reach of French or British long-range missiles – and may soon also be reachable by missiles fired from Israel or India – no one is particularly concerned or focused on the possibilities. Politics, in other words, are important. And politics at the turn of the century may be changing the character or capabilities of “rogue regimes”. North Korea has entered a *détente* of sorts with the South – and it has coupled this with a freeze on missile tests and a far-reaching offer both to abandon the export of missile technology as well as to end its indigenous medium- and long-range missile programme (for details on this offer, see Gordon, 2001). Iran is in the midst of possibly far-reaching political change – with reformist politicians who dominate the parliament and presidency competing for the power to set the country’s future political course with the orthodox and revolutionary forces that still hold most of the reins of power. And Iraq, though emerging from years of self-inflicted isolation, remains

effectively contained by a combination of economic sanctions and a large American military presence in the region.

None of this is to suggest that these countries are about to join Israel or India – let alone our allies – as states that might be capable of threatening the United States, its forces or friends but clearly have no intention of doing so. But it does suggest that hyping the threat, and basing all analysis on worst-case assumptions about what could happen rather than what is most likely to happen, has its costs – not least to encourage these very same countries to believe that an improvement in political relations with Washington is not possible. That, in itself, can make their decisions to acquire long-range missiles that can threaten to attack the United States more, rather than less, likely.

This does not mean that the United States should not take the proliferation threat seriously. While politics can change things for the better, it can also change them for the worse – and quickly. It does mean, however, that the more appropriate response to the missile proliferation is a more variegated strategy that combines a proactive non-proliferation strategy with efforts that address the consequences of proliferation. Thus, the best response to missile proliferation involves a combination of efforts designed to prevent countries from acquiring missiles (through export controls, arms control agreements and security alliances), to roll back missile programmes that already exist (through diplomatic persuasion, by offering economic or other incentives and/or imposing sanctions), and to manage the consequences of missile proliferation (including by deploying defensive systems and possibly through pre-emption). If the Bush administration demonstrates as much commitment to the first two strategies as it does to the third, Europe and Russia are much more likely to support missile defence deployments.

It is within this broader non-proliferation effort that investment in a limited insurance defence makes sense. We live in an uncertain world, in which it would be folly to exclude the possibility that our best non-proliferation efforts might fail. It is possible – perhaps even likely – that the United States and its allies will have to confront a long-range missile threat to their Territories within the next decade. And given the long lead times for research, developing, testing and deploying the highly complex and technologically sophisticated defences that may be needed to counter these threats, deciding now to proceed along this path is the right way to go.

Improving Technologies

Although much of the US debate about missile defences is conducted on the presumption that there is something to deploy in the very near future, the fact of the matter is that even if President Bush were to decide today that he wanted to move forward with deployment, any real defensive capability would not be available until the time he leaves office – assuming, of course, that he will be re-elected in 2004. This is true even for those technologies that are in the most advanced state of development – the mid-course defence system that the Clinton administration contemplated deploying initially in Alaska. A multi-layered system of the kind Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has talked about – presumably including boost-phase and mid-course defences based on land, at sea and in the air and space – will take a decade and more to see the light of day (see Lindsay and O’Hanlon, 2001, pp. 82-115).

Therefore, the day that the United States can deploy a perfect, or even a near-perfect, defence against a small-scale ballistic missile attack is still far off. The mid-course defence favoured by the previous administration still has to undergo nearly its entire testing programme to ensure that the hit-to-kill technology on which it is based will in fact work. Indeed, the failure of two out of the three initial tests of the interceptor rocket and kill vehicle indicates that this may still take some time. Moreover, there are plausible countermeasures to defeat this defence, and these are likely to be available to any country that possesses the technological know-how to build a long-range missile capable of delivering a nuclear or other warhead somewhere in the vicinity of where it is aiming. Boost-phase technologies that attack missiles as they ascend into space are less susceptible to countermeasures, but with the exception of the airborne laser and research conducted on space-based interceptors (the “brilliant pebbles”) a decade ago, no such systems are currently on the drawing board. It will likely take a good half a dozen years for the basic research and development on such a defence to be completed.

At the same time, a dedicated effort to develop missile defences is bound to succeed sooner or later. In the years ahead, technology will be available to intercept missiles and warheads in flight – not every time nor always perfectly, but with a sufficient probability of success to make proceeding with deployment worthwhile. This point is important, though often forgotten. Because the consequences of a nuclear warhead actually exploding on one’s territory are so catastrophic, much of the missile defence debate presumes that the only defences worth deploying are those that have a very high probability of success – on the order of 90% or more. And because it is not too difficult to think of reasons why even

very able defences might fail more than 10% of the time, opponents of missile defences have long had the better of the argument.

But the world has changed – and so are the terms of debate about the utility of deploying missile defences. If there is even a small chance that a country will launch a missile topped with a nuclear, chemical or biological warhead, then is not some defence, however imperfect, better than none? Just because it was clearly impossible to defend the United States against a Soviet Union capable of launching thousands of warheads against US territory, that does not mean that the United States should not attempt to defend itself against far smaller and more circumscribed missile threats. Particularly if the goal of deploying missile defences is to provide some form of insurance, then clearly something is better than nothing. Nor do defences need to be perfect on the first day they become operational – it is possible to improve and upgrade these systems over time, as additional research and testing is done.

Of course, one should only deploy a defence that works. But the definition of what “works” is no longer as clear-cut as it once was presumed to be. Even imperfect defences that give the defender no more than one-in-two or even a one-in-three chance to intercept an incoming missile may well be preferable to having no defence at all. The question is not whether defences can work perfectly, but whether they can work sufficiently well – and at an acceptable cost – to make a difference. By that standard, there can be little doubt that the technology has advanced sufficiently for a workable missile defence system to be deployed by the end of this decade.

If that is the case, what kind of system should the United States aim to deploy? Given the limited aim of defences, the most appropriate system to develop would be a two-tiered system that relied mainly on boost-phase defences deployed on land and possibly at sea and might also include a small, mid-course defence based in the United States (and should Europe want to deploy this second tier, perhaps in Europe as well) (see Lindsay and O’Hanlon, 2001, Chapter 6). The advantage of boost-phase defences is that these systems provide global protection against specific missile threats. Thus, a boost-phase defence capable of intercepting a missile fired from, say, Iran could do so no matter whether it was aimed at Moscow, Munich or Miami. Equally important, land- or sea-based boost-phase systems pose no threat to the nuclear missile forces of Russia or China, since these can be launched from positions far removed from where the defences would be deployed.

Finally, boost-phase defences offer the advantage – the need actually – of promoting cooperation between the United States and other countries, including possibly Russia, on developing and deploying defensive systems. Since sea-based systems will be unable to defend against missiles that are launched from Iran or Iraq on a northward trajectory, a boost-phase defence must be deployed north of these countries – in Russia, the Caucasus and/or Turkey. Thus, aside from a space-based system, an effective boost-phase defence will require the United States to cooperate with other countries to ensure adequate coverage.

A second, mid-course tier could be added to provide further protection. By the logic of compound probabilities, having two shots at an incoming missile – even with defences that are known to be far from perfect – significantly enhances the likelihood of a successful intercept. Also, since the two tiers are based on different technologies, the attacker faces a more complicated task of trying to defeat the defence by deploying different countermeasures. Finally, a mid-course defence of this kind could possibly be deployed more rapidly than a boost-phase defence that still requires much research, especially if the interceptors and associated radar were to be deployed in North Dakota rather than Alaska, as originally planned. And if Europeans were interested in deploying a similar system, a single interceptor and radar site in central Europe (e.g. the Czech Republic) would provide Europe with some protection against missile threats from the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

A Changing Strategic Environment

The end of the cold war has significantly changed the strategic calculus of missile defences. At a time when the US-Soviet nuclear rivalry still dominated the strategic environment, there was general (though by no means complete) agreement that efforts to defend national territory against ballistic missile attacks were both futile and destabilising. In the current environment, one that is no longer marked by the previous nuclear competition, the offence-defence equation has shifted. There is widespread agreement that we no longer need the large, diverse and sophisticated nuclear arsenals capable of delivering thousands of warheads with precision against an array of military and strategic targets that were deemed necessary to deter the Soviet Union many years ago. As a result, the requirements of US-Russian mutual deterrence have either disappeared altogether or, at the very least, eased significantly. So long as Moscow and Washington retain the ability to deliver hundreds of nuclear weapons under any and all circumstances, the fundamental stability of

their nuclear relationship in the current environment will remain unaffected.

This changing strategic reality has implications for the deployment of missile defences. It is no longer obvious that limited defences, deployed to address new strategic threats, would have the destabilising consequences that many feared would be the case during the cold war. Today, the perceived missile threat does not stem from Russia, but from countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq that may prove able to acquire long-range missiles capable of threatening US or European territory. Limited defences, with interceptors numbered in the low one hundreds at most, should have no impact on Russia's perceived ability to deter a US attack or otherwise affect Washington's calculation. But such a defence could, or so advocates argue, have a major impact on the small missile inventories that a Pyongyang or Teheran may be able to amass in the next decade or so.

Some would argue that defences may also be necessary to address the actual or potential threat posed by China. Over the next decade or two, Beijing may well expand its long-range missile arsenal by a factor of five or ten – whether or not the United States deploys a missile defence system. Some have argued that such an expansion would offer positive proof of China's expansionist pretensions (e.g. towards Taiwan), thus necessitating a similar expansion in US defensive capacity (see Hadley, 2000, p. 106). But there are two problems with this perspective. First, so long as the United States has the capacity to destroy China as a functioning society, why should an expansion in Beijing's capacity to do the United States harm be of more concern than it is today (unless, of course, one assumes that China's 18 liquid-fuelled ICBMs do not constitute a viable force)? Second, to build a defence able to thwart a dedicated Chinese missile attack once China has expanded its arsenal to 100-200 long-range missiles would require a system vastly larger in scope and capability than anyone is now contemplating. And that, in turn, would invariably bring Russia into the equation, thus raising all the questions about strategic stability that the advocates of missile defences now claim are beyond us.

It follows that the purpose – the sole strategic purpose – of missile defences can only be to deal with the threat of small-scale missile attack. That being the case, the question is whether, in a world where countries like North Korea, Iran and Iraq have acquired long-range missiles capable of attacking the United States and European countries, the deployment of ballistic missile defences will have a fundamental strategic impact? Advocates of defences, including the Bush administration, answer with

an emphatic “yes”. According to this view, the main reason why these countries seek to acquire long-range missiles capable of threatening the United States is to deter American intervention in their region. From that perspective, defences are a means to neutralise that deterrent, thus enabling America’s global reach. As one advocate put it (see Kaplan, 2001), “missile defence is about preserving America’s ability to wield power abroad. It’s not about defence. It’s about offence.”

This argument has intuitive appeal. Would the United States have tried to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait if Baghdad was known to possess long-range missiles armed with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads capable of reaching US territory? Perhaps not. Would Washington have been able to pull together the Gulf War coalition if Iraq could similarly threaten far-away coalition members, including in Europe? Most unlikely. Long-range missiles in the hands of Saddam Hussein might have made a major difference.

But if Saddam had this capability and the United States had deployed defences able to provide some protection to US and allied territory, would that have fundamentally altered US and allied calculations? I have my doubts. If there was a 50 or 25 or even a 10% chance that a missile launched at their territory would penetrate the defences, presidents and prime ministers would likely weigh that probability as heavily as if the chance was 100%. Of course, even with these risk calculations, leaders might still decide to go to war if the stakes were judged sufficiently high. Even without defences, US and some allied leaders can rely on their ability to inflict unacceptable damage (by conventional or other means) to deter an attack on their territory. After all, although he had demonstrated the capability and will before, Saddam did *not* use chemical or biological weapons against US or allied forces, having apparently been deterred by the knowledge of what the United States could do in response (see Bundy, 1991).

The mere deployment of defences is therefore unlikely to have a major, let alone a fundamental, impact on the strategic calculus of the United States and its allies. Risks will continue to be weighed against the interests affected – and those interests will themselves tend to dominate. Thus, whether or not the United States would have acted similarly as it did in 1990-91 if Baghdad had been able to threaten US territory directly is a decision that was likely to have remained unaffected by whether defences had been deployed. The chance of a defence’s failure would have to weigh heavily in any president’s mind, as it would in the public’s. But if the interests were judged to be sufficiently great, then intervention

could be a reasonable judgement even if the defences were far from perfect, or absent altogether.

However, while US or allied strategic calculations may be little affected by the deployment of defences, the same would not of course be the case for the countries against which such defences would be deployed. A North Korea that possessed a handful of missiles, and perhaps as few as two or three nuclear warheads, would have to be deeply concerned that its one, two or three-shot chance might be successfully deflected by a limited defence. That, coupled with the near-certainty of devastating retaliation, might well dissuade a leader in Pyongyang from using or even seriously threatening to use a nuclear-armed missile against the United States. And in that sense, the deployment of a limited insurance defence could have important strategic benefit.

The Way Forward

The United States should proceed with the deployment of a limited insurance defence – a “LID” – designed explicitly to defend its territory and that of its allies against a possible small-scale missile attack from countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. Such a defence would likely consist of boost-phase interceptors based at sea and on land. These systems would preferably be developed in cooperation with any country concerned about a possible missile threat, including NATO members and, if agreeable, Russia. In addition, the United States might also consider deployment of a mid-course defence, based in North Dakota, and consisting of a small number (25-50) of interceptors. This defence could be built rapidly, should the need arise, and its initial deployment (notably the construction of a new battle management radar in North Dakota) could proceed within the restrictions imposed by the ABM Treaty. This two-layered defence would provide adequate protection against a small-scale missile attack without creating the perception in Beijing or Moscow that its deployment was aimed at undermining their nuclear deterrent forces.

But the United States must do more to reassure Europeans and others about the reasons for moving forward in this direction (these ideas are further elaborated in Daalder et al. (2000), Daalder and Goldgeier (forthcoming 2001), Daalder and Gordon (2000) and Daalder et al. (2001)). First, Washington should make clear that it views the pursuit of missile defences as an inextricable part of a broader non-proliferation effort. That effort is geared to preventing countries from acquiring missiles, rolling back missile programmes that already exist and managing the consequences of any proliferation that does occur. To put

substance behind this effort, it is important that the Bush administration reverse course on a number of policy stances that point in the opposite direction by encouraging early Senate approval of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, redoubling efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention and immediately engaging North Korea in negotiations on terminating its missile programme. Europe cannot be asked to support missile defences if the United States is not ready to support the many multilateral efforts designed to stem proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

Second, Washington should reassure its allies, Russia and other countries that it is fully committed to continuing the international regulation of defensive deployments. In practice, this means a recognition by the Bush administration that it must work with Russia towards an agreement on updating and modifying the ABM Treaty. While the sentiment expressed by many senior Bush administration officials – that the ABM Treaty is a “relic” and belongs to a different era – may have some merit, the onus is on the Bush administration to devise ways in which its key principles can be upheld while deployment of limited defences proceeds. In particular, although the specifics of such an agreement have to be left to further negotiations, it is critical that any revision in the treaty – or even a replacement – upholds and strengthens three fundamental principles that were accepted by Washington and Moscow in 1972:

- *A ban on strategically significant missile defences.* The ABM Treaty did not bar the deployment of ballistic missile defences – only the deployment of a nation-wide defence. In fact, the treaty specifically allowed for up to 100 interceptor missiles to be deployed at two different sites (reduced to one site in 1974). Any modified treaty must continue to bar the deployment of defences capable of posing a threat to the Russian or American nuclear deterrent.
- *Guard against the rapid breakout of limits on defensive systems.* The ban on strategically significant defences is useful only if it is difficult for either side to break out from limits imposed on the deployment of defences. That is why the 1972 treaty barred deployment of all but fixed, land-based interceptors and placed severe limits on the type, location and orientation of radar installations. An updated treaty might be able to relax some of these limits (for example, allowing for the deployment of mobile boost-phase interceptor missiles on land and at sea), while confirming others (notably a ban on space-based weapons and tracking sensors).

- *Prevent the circumvention of treaty restrictions.* At the time of the ABM Treaty's negotiation in the early 1970s, and ever since, the United States and Russia have been concerned about the possible adaptation of non-ABM systems, such as surface-to-air missiles, anti-tactical missile systems and anti-satellite weapons, to ABM systems. Indeed, as late as 1997, Moscow and Washington agreed on how to differentiate between so-called theatre missile defences (which are not constrained by the treaty) and ABM interceptors (which are). An updated treaty must take account of this principle, notably by restricting battle management/command, control, and communication systems and by placing strict limits on the type and location of sensors.

It will not prove easy to forge a cooperative path on missile defences between Russia and the United States. But it is important for both sides to try. The question of whether missile defences will be deployed may have been settled. But given the possibility that their deployment can have highly destabilising consequences for US, European and international security, it is important to consider carefully how that is to be done.

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**THE MACEDONIAN CRISIS
AND
BALKAN SECURITY**

**CEPS-IISS EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM
WORKING PAPER NO. 2**

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY

**NICHOLAS WHYTE
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DANA H. ALLIN**

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INTRODUCTION

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

On May 28th, 2001, the second meeting of the CEPS-IISS European Security Forum turned its attention to the Kosovar/Albanian insurgency and Balkan security. In other words, the current Macedonian crisis was at the heart of the discussion, which greatly benefited from three well focused papers, speaking from clearly distinct geopolitical perspectives.

Thus, Nicholas Whyte suggested tongue-in-cheek that this time, Europe's hour had finally struck, that Europe's broad-spectrum systemic approach gave the EU pride of place in dealing with the Balkans. For the short run, he mentioned the risk of Kosovar guerrilla activity against KFOR, if the latter's presence were seen as the main obstacle to independence – an “Irgun scenario”, as it was dubbed by the chairman.

Dana Allin's American viewpoint emphasised the exemplary quality of US-European cooperation vis-à-vis the Macedonian crisis, while emphasising the need to discuss the insertion of a NATO force in that country.

Nadia Alexandrova Arbatova's presentation contained an element of Russian *Schadenfreude* at the spectacle of NATO being hoisted with its Kosovar petard in Macedonia. She suggested inter alia extending KFOR's mandate into Macedonia. She also considered that the need to exclude the prospect of independence for Kosovo was the basis of stability in the region. This was hotly disputed in a discussion enriched by the substantive participation of analysts and representatives from Macedonia and Albania. A number of salient points can be drawn from the proceedings.

First, there was little support for a direct, and forceful foreign military intervention. From a Macedonian perspective, the insertion of a NATO force (whether new, or as a UN-authorized extension of KFOR) would have substantial drawbacks: as in Bosnia and in Kosovo, it could lead to, or entrench, territorial partition; and by establishing a *de facto* protectorate, it would produce the same political, economic and social distortions as in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. In other words, everything should be done by the EU and NATO and by the international community more generally to help Macedonia deal with the crisis. Naturally, such assistance has to be accompanied by the sort of political initiatives and military conduct that would help avoid further alienation

of the Albanian-speaking population. This “finding” against forceful foreign intervention – at least as long as there is a prospect for an internal solution – was possibly the most important result of the meeting. Nevertheless, the case against the insertion of foreign troops in Macedonia should not be overstated. After all, a UN Peacekeeping Force – including US forces – successfully played a crisis prevention role in Macedonia for close to ten years. Trouble from the UCK began only after these forces had left Macedonia as a result of China's refusal to review the Security Council's mandate, subsequent to Macedonia's recognition of Taiwan in 1999.¹

Secondly, the role of transnational crime in the current situation was underlined, given the close interests that exist between local or regional mafias (which incidentally bridge inter-ethnic gaps when it is in their "bizness" interest to do so) and the failing states in which they operate.

International cooperation against money laundering was key in fighting these phenomena. But it is no less necessary for law-and-order to be more fully implemented locally at least in Kosovo, even if this could run against the “force protection” imperative. Indeed, while it is well understood that KFOR could hardly control the roughest stretches of the border between Kosovo and Macedonia, it is more difficult to explain why mafia infrastructure and UCK arms depots in Kosovo weren't being more systematically dismantled. It was time to give the lie to the joke: “Welcome to Kosovo: your Mercedes is waiting for you!” In this respect, it was noted that criminal groups prosper in so-called “gray zones” of indeterminate legal status and uncertain political provenance, of which Kosovo is a vivid example.

Thirdly, the point was made that the international community in general and NATO in particular needed to ponder the proposition that it may have become part of the problem rather than part of the solution. In a sense, we “invited” the UCK to destabilise Macedonia by stating that independence for Kosovo had to be avoided since it would provoke the destabilisation of Macedonia; not surprisingly, the UCK has been doing its utmost to destabilise Macedonia, thus voiding the syllogism of its logic.

The discussion was not conclusive on this issue of Kosovo's “final status”. As one participant emphasised, the international community may have displayed an excessive attachment to the status quo: independence is habitually rejected for Kosovo in the name of Chechen or Basque

¹ Macedonia's recognition of Beijing in June 2001 may help re-establish a UN-based option.

precedents – but then, why do we assume that this has to be the case (other than as a self-fulfilling prophecy)? Here mention was made of Slovakia, a country that had no constitutional right to secession nor any prior internationally accepted record of independence – yet Slovakia's independence has not been contested; nor did it create a precedent.

It was noted that democratic Serbia may well be moving away from the traditional claim on Kosovo (why would Belgrade want to lay claim on two million disaffected Kosovars?), eventually opening the way to independence. *En attendant*, it was suggested that the international community should establish formal guidelines when setting up protectorates such as Bosnia, Kosovo or East Timor, possibly reviving the UN's Trusteeship Council.

Finally, the view was widely expressed that the US would most probably not quit the Balkans in the near future. A unilateral US departure could prompt a European departure, thus leading to a particularly unwelcome implementation of the principle “in together, out together”.

It was also noted that, however destabilising the Albanian guerrilla operations may be in Macedonia, this was not a movement that was supported by the Albanian state. Indeed, the UCK's demand for Greater Albania is distinctive in that it does not enjoy the backing of the country in whose name it is being voiced. This makes for a situation that is intrinsically different from the one that characterised the “Greater Serbia” of Milosevic, which deliberately undermined the neighbouring countries where significant numbers of Serbs lived.

L'HEURE DE L'EUROPE – ENFIN ARRIVÉE?

NICHOLAS WHYTE

For most of the last ten years, Europeans have been embarrassed by Jacques Poos' rash promise of 1991; during the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia from 1991 to 1995, the phrase seemed only to sum up the ineffectiveness and the pomposity of the European Union's pretensions to be an actor of importance in its own backyard. The Dayton Agreement of 1995 was achieved only when Richard Holbrooke threatened to pull the US out of the process and "leave it to the Europeans". Terrified by this awful prospect (at least, according to Holbrooke's version), the warring parties agreed to the deal.

From the latest Macedonia crisis, however, it is apparent that *l'heure de l'Europe*, at least in the South-Eastern part of the continent, actually has arrived. Rather than pompous and ineffective statements from the Council of Ministers, Europe is now sending in Javier Solana, a figure with almost the authority of an American Secretary of State. Furthermore, Europe provides a credible prospect for future co-existence with and between the Balkan states. The latest confusion surrounding the activities of Robert Frowick may indicate that the time for personal missions brokering deals between tribal leaders may be over, and that the more systemic approach of European integration has become the dominant paradigm for a successful approach to the problems of the region. This paper examines why and how this has come about.

This year's fighting in Macedonia has both indigenous and external causes. Internally, the problems of building a viable state have been huge. The costs of the economic transition for Macedonia will include a massive slimming down of the public service, and the privatisation of formerly state-owned factories. As a result of the legacy of past discrimination, this will mean that many ethnic Macedonians will lose their jobs. The ethnic Macedonians resent the apparent relative prosperity of their ethnic Albanian neighbours, fuelled by what is called the "informal economy", and apparently not very vigorously taxed (though of course tax evasion is endemic on all sides).

Ethnic Albanians feel that historical forces have yet again incorporated them into a state against their will, where they cannot use their own language for official purposes, where the security forces are dedicated not to keeping the peace but to keeping them down, and where the existence of a few token ministers and ambassadors from their community has done

little to address the underlying problems of the “national state of the Macedonian people” (as it is described in the Preamble to the Constitution). Ten years of playing by the democratic rules have brought little reward.

The external situation has been shaped by the protracted disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. Macedonia’s historical experience of constitutional change since 1878 has been entirely imposed by outside forces. In particular, the present continuing uncertainty over the status of Kosovo has encouraged wishful thinking by militants who remember the days – not very long ago – when the ethnic Albanian population in Western Macedonia, and also in the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia, formed a single social and economic space with Kosovo. In their view the fact that UN Security Council Resolution 1244 extends only to the territory of the former autonomous Yugoslav province of Kosovo is an unfortunate mistake, which should be corrected. It is surely no coincidence that the outbreak of violence in Macedonia at the end of February came the day after the border between Kosovo and Macedonia had been fixed (after negotiations which did not involve anyone from Kosovo), and that the village of Tanusevac, where it all began, is literally divided in two by the frontier.

To this, we add the perception on both sides that the international community recognised Slovenian and Croatian independence in 1991 after they began to fight the Serbs; that the Bosnian Croats and Serbs defended themselves against the threat of a Muslim state in Bosnia by fighting a war; and that the Albanians in Kosovo gained the support of the international community only through fighting a guerrilla war, after years of ineffective passive and pacifist opposition. We may respond that the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and for that matter Bosnia and Macedonia, was the result not of violence but of the recommendations of the Badinter Commission coupled with the collapse of the institutions of the Yugoslav state; we may point out that any political gains made by Bosnian Serbs and Croats came at a truly horrible cost; we may point out that the Western intervention in Kosovo came about only after the Milosevic regime adopted genocide as a state policy; but it is still very difficult to construct an argument that violence is counterproductive.

Of course, that should not stop us from trying. And the record of the last few months is in fact rather encouraging. The insurgency in the Presevo valley has now been resolved, partly through the external mediation of NATO and the European Union – Javier Solana appointed a Personal Representative to be the EU’s “point man” on the ground, the first time

this post has ever existed – and partly because there was genuine good will from both the government of Serbia (in the person of Nebojsa Covic) and from moderate Albanian politicians, who actually consented to the return of Yugoslav troops to the “buffer zone” along the Kosovo border.

Likewise, it seems that both sides in Macedonia are groping towards a similar accommodation. All the major political parties of both main ethnic groups are now included in the government; unlike any of the factions in previous Balkan conflicts, the Macedonian army has not engaged in wholesale slaughter of civilians; violence from ethnic Macedonians in the cities directed against their Albanian neighbours has been very localised (though none the less regrettable); and ethnic Albanians in the cities have remained remarkably quiet – almost all of the actual fighting has been in villages in the mountainous Kosovo border.

However there is still potential for disaster. Last week’s news of an agreement brokered by Robert Frowick, an American diplomat with much Balkan experience on secondment to the OSCE, which tied the National Liberation Army to the political agenda of the ethnic Albanian political parties, produced chaos in the Macedonian government. Ethnic Macedonian leaders are terrified of being seen by their constituents as having surrendered to terrorism, and the perceived effect of the “Frowick agreement” was to tie the ethnic Albanian negotiating agenda to the threat of violence.

This must have come as an unwelcome surprise to Frowick, who presumably thought he had managed to get the NLA to agree to a cease-fire on terms that were identical to what was on offer anyway. The text of the Frowick agreement is annexed to this paper; the substantive proposals are ambitious but would be perfectly acceptable in a peacetime situation. (The whole affair is reminiscent of the 1994-97 period in Ireland, when John Hume of the moderate SDLP used to present John Major with the latest text which would be acceptable to the IRA in order to bring peace, and Major would then reject it on the grounds that he was not going to cave in to terrorist demands.)

This diplomatic row is probably resolvable. More serious is the possibility that the intensified military activities of the Macedonian army might result in extensive civilian casualties among ethnic Albanians, which certainly would inflame the situation; or, as Saso Ordanoski has warned, that extremists among the ethnic Macedonians, whose faith in their political leaders is already low, take the law into their own hands and begin a campaign of sectarian violence. Equally serious is the likelihood that the grand coalition government, once it has got over the

Frowick affair, fails to deliver on any sort of reform agenda. This is where the international community has a real role to play.

The European Interest

James Baker's 1992 quip that "we don't have a dog in that fight" has become almost as notorious as Jacques Poos' *l'heure de l'Europe*. The European perspective is different; Europeans no longer support one dog or another, but are interested in the entire pack. One could begin by listing obvious factors, such as the geographical location of the Balkans across major transport routes, the proximity to EU member states such as Greece, Italy and Austria, and the interest of European states in both humanitarian aid and peacekeeping activities in their immediate neighbourhood. But that is merely to state the obvious. The extent of European interest in the Balkans may have fluctuated in the last ten years, but the fundamentals remain the same.

What has changed is the ability of the European Union to take effective action as an actor. The ineffectiveness of the 1990s reflected the priority of transforming the Central and Eastern European countries into credible applicants for EU membership, the momentous project of the single currency, and most of all the lack of institutional support for the CFSP. Two policy instruments are important here, one of which developed gradually in the 1990s, the other arriving suddenly in 1999 as a result of the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty. Together, the enlargement process and the institutional strengthening of the CFSP have made the EU a more visible player in the security of the Balkans.

For the first time in centuries, all of the political elites in South-eastern Europe are looking in the same direction – towards the West. This is matched by the emotional commitment of Western European political leaders to reuniting the continent. The prospect of EU membership, worryingly distant even for Romania and Bulgaria, may be distinctly long-term for the countries of the Western Balkans, but the fact that it is definitely on offer has already had a stabilising effect.

Consider the case of Albania, whose government has taken a strong line against the violence in Macedonia, and appears much more interested in the 21st century game of integration rather than the 19th century game of territorial aggrandisement. For the first time in the history of the Balkans, an ethnic rebellion has failed to get support from the "mother country" and this is largely because of the policy alternatives given to the Albanian government by the Euro-Atlantic integration process. Likewise, the fact that Macedonia has actually signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU denies credibility to the suspicion that the

international community would countenance a division of the country. And the forces of nationalism in Croatia remain in disarray in the face of the integration process – their performance in the recent local elections was only a slight improvement on their disastrous results in January 2000.

In addition, to adapt Henry Kissinger's famous question, Europe now has a phone number. (It is +32 2 285 6111.) The personification of the CFSP in the shape of Javier Solana could perhaps have led to a series of Holbrooke-style (or perhaps Frowick-style) confrontations with the local tough guys, intended to browbeat them into a settlement which they then would have to be continually reminded of. Instead we have seen a more systematic approach, where Europe's political support for the Macedonian government's security actions is heavily conditioned on progress on other fronts, and where Javier Solana found himself facilitating the formation of the new government in Skopje – surely the first time an EU official has played such a role. We have also seen institutional innovation from the EU, where Personal Representatives of Solana have been appointed for the Presevo Valley and Macedonia – both of them professional diplomats with other responsibilities, who are part of the arsenal of institutional resources available to the EU's Mr PESC.

Strategic problems remain. In order for a state to integrate into the EU, it is first necessary to have credible structures in place; Croatia and Albania are obvious examples. Macedonia quite possibly could have met this criterion, before the current violence began. Bosnia, where the word of the international community's High Representative is law, does not. It is impossible to see a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under its current constitutional mess, simply because it is not clear which competences can be expected to be exercised by the governments of Serbia and Montenegro, and which competences (if any) belong to the internationally recognised state. And the unresolved future status of Kosovo leaves open not only the issue of "sovereignty" but also the question of how a sub-national protectorate can have a credible prospect of European integration. (The same question is also faced by the component parts of Bosnia, but at least there the answer – that they must learn to work the institutions of the Dayton state more effectively – is more obvious.)

The other huge strategic issue raised here is the effectiveness of EU-NATO cooperation. The United States cannot offer an integration process to the Balkans. Only Europe can propose inserting the region, bit by bit, into a trajectory that leads, through regional cooperation and external

assistance, ultimately to full participation in the EU. Therefore, there will always be a tension between the US instinct to keep things quiet, even if that means creating “democracies” that leave the local thugs in control (a “stabilising” technique also used historically by European colonial powers), and the European agenda of civilising the region in preparation for its integration.

Already we see a divergence of interests both at the macro level, with US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld muttering once more about withdrawing US troops from the Balkans, and also at the micro level, with US troops too wary of putting themselves in harm’s way on the Kosovo/Macedonian border to effectively keep the peace. The frequent presence of Lord Robertson at Javier Solana’s side in the region is comforting, but it is also a reminder that the responsibility of maintaining a secure environment for the European integration of the Balkans lies in the hands of a completely separate institution.

A final note. If disaster can be averted in Macedonia, and if (as seems more likely) the relationship between Montenegro and Serbia is resolved reasonably peacefully, the challenge of maintaining order in Kosovo will remain. At present, the majority population of the protectorate passively assents to international peacekeeping because many are personally profiting from the situation and because they believe that the international community will some day deliver independence. What François Heisbourg has dubbed a “Irgun scenario” is all too plausible, in which Kosovars perceive an international intention to restore Yugoslav sovereignty, and again take up arms, but this time against KFOR; this could provoke a rapid NATO withdrawal. The only way to avoid this scenario is to begin serious talks between the political representatives of Pristina and Belgrade on Kosovo’s future status sooner rather than later, facilitated by the international community led by the EU. Conflict prevention is far preferable to crisis management.

ANNEX

Process of Ending Armed Conflict in Macedonia*

At noon local time on Wednesday, 23 May 2001, the following actions will take place:

1. Announcement by the UÇK and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia of the cessation of hostilities.
2. Announcement of amnesty and rehabilitation by the government for UÇK personnel who are Macedonian citizens in the whole area of Macedonia, except for those who are ICTY suspects [and persons with criminal records preceding the conflict]. Any persons found with illegal weapons after Friday, 22 June 2001, will no longer be eligible for the amnesty.
3. All detainees and prisoners convicted of political crimes will be released by noon local time on Wednesday, 30 May 2001.
4. OSCE unarmed observers, together with other international monitors under the coordination of the OSCE, will enter the Kumanovo area.
5. A Commission composed of the OSCE and the Mayor of Lipkovo will begin collecting UÇK arms under seal, which will be delivered to the Macedonian security forces.
6. Macedonian security forces will not enter the Kumanovo area. However, an unarmed institutional establishment of the Macedonian State (the President of Lipkovo Municipality, health institutions, post office, etc.) will be established there.
7. Uniformed UÇK forces will no longer be visible in any of the areas of conflict, either armed or unarmed.

* *Author's Note:* This is the text of the agreement between the political leaders of the two main ethnic Albanian political parties in Macedonia, and the leadership of the "National Liberation Army", with the mediation of US Ambassador Robert Frowick, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office's Personal Representative for the situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. News of the agreement caused a major crisis in the Macedonian government and evoked denunciations from the international community, though Arben Xhaferi and Ymer Ymeri maintained that they were only responding to requests from the Macedonian government and others; a European official commented to me that on this occasion the international community's "co-ordination was sub-optimal". This version of the document was obtained from one of the ethnic Albanian negotiators.

8. The Government of the Republic of Macedonia will expedite substantial efforts towards reconstruction in the Kumanovo area.
9. Announcement of a joint statement by Albanian political leaders as soon as possible about the common goals to be reached in the process of reform.
10. The Albanian leaders will send a letter of intent concerning the process of political dialogue to Ambassador Frowick setting out the issues they expect to be resolved. Ambassador Frowick will respond with a letter noting his support for the inclusion of these issues in the dialogue.
11. President Trajkovski announces the next meeting of the President's All-Party Commission to intensify the political dialogue aimed at reforms will take place on Friday, 8 June 2001.
12. At noon local time on 22 June 2001, armed Macedonian security forces, with unrestricted OSCE monitoring, will resume control over the Kumanovo area. Macedonian security forces will show maximum restraint in re-establishing and maintaining order in the area not currently under their control.
13. If one side fails to implement this entire understanding, then the other side will consider the understanding null and void.

**Statement of the Albanian Leaders of Macedonia
concerning the Peace and Reform Process
in the Republic of Macedonia**

The Albanian leaders of Macedonia, conscious of the historic moment for the Republic of Macedonia and its peoples, have agreed on a joint action based on a national consensus which should reform the Republic of Macedonia so it can be a democratic state of all of its citizens and all of the ethnic communities.

The consensus of the Albanian leaders is based on these principles:

- recognition that the aimed reforms preserve the integrity and multi-ethnic character of Macedonia;
- recognition that there are no “ethnic territorial” solutions to the problems envisaged and that any attempt to “ethnically break” territories will bring harm to the citizens of Macedonia and peace in the region, and
- recognition that there is no military solution for the problems in the Republic of Macedonia;

- recognition that the transformation of RM should lead the country into Euro-Atlantic integration; and
- recognition that the solution will be found within a domestic political process with the facilitation of the US and the EU.

Based on these principles, the Albanian leaders of Macedonia are fully intended to participate in the process of reformist dialogue, dealing with these issues:

- the amendment of the preamble of the Constitution
- the unrestricted use of the Albanian language as an official language in Macedonia
- the ethnic proportionality in institutions of the state
- the enlargement of the powers of the municipalities
- the full secularisation of the Constitution/i.e. state and
- the introduction of consensual democracy in areas concerning ethnic rights /i.e. the limitation of majority over-voting in areas that directly concern ethnic rights.

Also pertaining to the negotiations are measures for the transformation of the NLA members into various forms of civilian life occupation/duties, including those within the state institutions.

Within this debate, a special focus will be on:

- full rehabilitation of all of the members of the NLA
- reconstruction of villages and family economy destroyed during the fighting as well as care for the victims of war (war invalids, family of the killed) and
- ARM military duty within the municipality of birth.

In the dialogue that will be conducted within the roundtable of leaders of the political parties making up the present Government coalition, headed by the president of the Republic, and through the facilitation of the US and OSCE, a consensual form of presentation of the Albanian factor will be created.

Arben Xhaferi, President, PDSH
Ali Ahmeti, Political and Military Leader, Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare
Ymer Ymeri, President, PPD

MACEDONIA AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

NADIA ALEXandroVA ARBATOVA

The problem of Macedonia can be seen and analysed from different angles. It is part of the so-called Albanian question, it is closely related to the situation in the post-Milosevic Yugoslavia, and consequently to the problems of stability and security in the Balkans, which, in their turn, are part of a broader picture of European security and Russian-Western relations. But the very core of what is going on in Macedonia now, as seen from Moscow, is a logical continuation of the Kosovo problem, which has not been resolved by NATO's military intervention. As for the latter, the Macedonian problem can be also seen as a product of miscalculations and ill-conceived decisions of the international community, and, particularly, NATO and the United States. With the Yugoslav experience of the past decade as background, the recent developments in Macedonia are just new evidence in support of the thesis that the immediate risk to Balkan peace is not so much aggression but secession by minorities big enough to contemplate statehood which in turn could trigger war ("The Balkans Survey" in *The Economist*, 14 January 1998, p. 5). Like Kosovo, the Macedonian problem has three aspects – internal, regional and international.

Macedonia is part of a broad Albanian space in former Yugoslavia, which includes Kosovo, Albanian enclaves in southern Serbia (Medvedja, Presevo and Bujanovic) and those in Montenegro (Gusine and Plav). The collapse of the Yugoslav empire divided this space into two main Albanian-populated areas – the Kosovo province and Macedonia. But Albanians could never reconcile themselves with this reality, and, in spite of all efforts of Belgrade and Skopje, succeeded in preserving close ties between the Albanian communities in this space. The Kosovo province, where the Albanian community had enjoyed broad political and economic rights in Tito's time and where the Pristina University had been the main educational institution for the Albanian political elite in FY, became a real centre of gravitation for all Albanian communities after the demise of Yugoslavia. The so-called Albanian question acquired a new dimension with the collapse of Yugoslavism as a ruling ideology, which encouraged the Albanian struggle for independence. In the mid-1990s, there emerged a network of extremist Albanian structures under the name of national liberation armies with the leading role played by the Kosovo Liberation Army. The Kosovo Albanians ceased to support non-violent actions against the Milosevic Yugoslavia and Serb nationalism and resorted to

the Intifada-like strategy along the Palestinian pattern. This struggle was supported by nationalist forces in neighbouring Albania who showed their propensity to expand it to all Albanian minorities living in the Balkan countries.

From the very beginning, the internal aspect of the Kosovo problem was being seen by Russia and the West from different angles. For the West it was mostly the problem of securing the rights of ethnic Albanians, which had been severely violated by nationalistic Serbian authorities. To Russia, by contrast, the Kosovo case looked like a Serbian Chechnya and the core of the Kosovo problem was being regarded by Moscow in a broader context of several interrelated issues – territorial integrity and secession, national minorities' rights and terrorism. Being a multinational state and being faced with the problem of its territorial integrity (in Chechnya and in other crisis-prone areas inside the Russian Federation), Russian leadership has always been more sensitive than other members of the Contact Group to this challenge, and understood better the vulnerabilities of the Yugoslav Republic.

Although Moscow recognised that it was a big mistake and disservice to the Yugoslav national interests to deprive Kosovo of the status it had in former Yugoslavia, it proceeded from the understanding that state sovereignty and the continued existence of international borders should be given priority over the right to self-determination. There is no contradiction between the principle of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination, if the latter can be achieved by peaceful means. Apart from this there may be one exception of this rule – a policy of genocide against a national minority that is proved as such by independent international observers and institutions. This is essential for understanding Russia's position on the Kosovo crisis and on the renewed attacks of Albanian extremists in Macedonia, although there exists a very strong temptation in the West to explain it by Slavic solidarity and the Orthodox factor in line with Samuel Huntington's paradigm.

To put it simply, the Kosovo conflict had two key problems to be resolved – the Milosevic nationalist policy vis-à-vis ethnic Albanians and Albanian extremism directed at reuniting the minorities living in Kosovo, Macedonia and Greece with their mother country. NATO's military campaign against Slobodan Milosevic's Yugoslavia justified by humanitarian intervention has resolved only the first problem, but it has not eliminated the threat of a new conflict in the Balkans, having left Albanian extremism without any adequate response. Moreover the war against the Milosevic regime justified NATO's alliance with Albanian

extremists who are trying now to do in Macedonia what they did to Serbian authority in Kosovo.

After the war against Yugoslavia, NATO and Washington closed their eyes to the fact that the remnants of KLA and their supporters who had not been fully disarmed were taking advantage. They were forcing non-Albanians from the province, murdering moderate Albanian politicians, intimidating witnesses and judges and rebuilding and dominating activities like drug-running, arms smuggling and people trafficking. Ironically, the recent democratic election of President Vojislav Kostunica has encouraged Albanian militants to step up their request for a permanent separation of Kosovo and adjoining Albanian enclaves, since they are fearful that the West, and namely NATO, will cut a deal with the new Yugoslav leadership and reinstate military control of Serbia.

On many occasions, KFOR has showed its impotence to rein in Albanian militants in Kosovo and to guarantee provisions of the Military Technical Agreement signed in June 1999. Some of the fiercest clashes between the remnants of KLA and Serb forces have occurred in a 3-mile-wide demilitarised zone established by the Military Technical Agreement. The Albanians have turned the zone into a hotbed of resistance, founding the grandly named Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovic (three of the towns they wish to free in southern Serbia). (See Michael R. Gordon, "NATO Patrols Edgy Border, This Time Protecting Serb" in *New York Times*, 25 January 2001.)

If Albanian extremists continue to target Serb forces and KFOR does little to stop them, President Kostunica will be faced with a very difficult dilemma: to step back, which would reinforce Serb nationalists, or to use force against Albanian secessionists, which in its turn would confront NATO with a difficult choice of siding with one of the warring parties. If the present conflict in southern Serbia continues to spread allowing ethnic Albanian militants to take their fight to Macedonia, while NATO is not ready to take on new responsibilities on the ground, it might result in a military union between Macedonia and Yugoslavia. Despite positive changes in Belgrade, the predominant opinion in the West is that the Milosevic old guard still holds powerful positions in the security and army apparatus. Thus, there is a risk that KFOR will be drawn into unwanted hostilities that threatens to undermine the KFOR solidarity and provoke a new conflict in Russian-Western relations.

In a way, the US and NATO are reaping in Macedonia what they sowed in Kosovo. "The militants' goal supported by ordinary people, victims of Slav discrimination is to consolidate ethnic Albanians, be it in

Kosovo or in Macedonia, under Albanian rule.” (See Steven Erlanger, “The Balkans: A One-Time Ally Becomes the Problem”, *New York Times*, 25 March 2001.) Albanian militant groups have misread Western support in Kosovo as a carte-blanche to encroach further on the FRY territory. This issue is crucial for peace in the region. (Ljubomir Frckoski, “Macedonia and The Region”, in *The Southern Balkans: Perspectives from the Region*, Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers 46, April 2001, p. 42.)

Ironically, Macedonia, which recently was being singled out as the only case of preventive diplomacy in the Balkans and which demonstrated its full loyalty to NATO in the Kosovo crisis and hosted Albanian refugees, has been left by NATO on its own. Russia's proposal to deploy peacekeeping forces in Macedonia along the border with Kosovo didn't evoke any serious response from the West, which is not ready to take new risks on the ground and to recognise that it has made a serious mistake in Kosovo and created a kind of Frankenstein. Russia's position on the regional aspect of security in the Balkans has been formulated during the Kosovo crisis. It stemmed from Moscow's concerns that Kosovo's secession might reinforce the Macedonian Albanians' demand for autonomy, which would destroy the Macedonian state and trigger a chain reaction in the southern Balkans involving all regional states, Bosnia included. The recent developments in Macedonia are the best evidence in support of the assertion that such a threat still exists, and it would be wrong to reduce this problem to that of a Greater Albania. The establishment of a broad Albanian secessionist movement can become a catalyst for demands of other ethnic minorities in the neighbouring states as well as for latent inter-state disputes. (See “Potential conflicts in the southern Balkans”, in *A New Ostpolitik □ Strategies for a United Europe*, edited by Werner Weidenfeld, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Gutersloch, 1997, pp. 51-53.)

Although Bulgaria and Greece have settled their quarrels with Macedonia about what to call the Macedonian nation and the name “Macedonia”, they continue to perceive them as an irredentist threat. The respective minorities may be encouraged to cause problems between Greece and Albania. In addition, as a reaction to a broad Albanian secessionist movement, an Islamist movement could develop to form a coalition between the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sandzak and Albania. It is no riddle why the Albanian extremists are being supported by Osama bin Laden's organisation.

It is promising that the last meeting of the Contact Group in Paris (April 2001) agreed on its approach to the situation in the Former Yugoslavia

after the renewed attacks of Albanian militants in Macedonia having condemned extremism and confirmed the principle of territorial integrity of Macedonia and Yugoslavia. But we remember that the same Contact Group stressed “its condemnation of violence and acts of terrorism in pursuit of political goals, from whatever quarter” (Contact Group Statement, 8 July 1998, Bonn). Nevertheless, it did not prevent the Kosovo crisis, which became a turning point in post-bipolar international relations and drastically changed Europe's security landscape.

The Kosovo crisis dealt a heavy blow to Russia's relations with the West, and particularly with NATO. This crisis, which had entailed dramatic consequences for Russia's domestic development, can also be viewed as a culmination and a logical conclusion of the over-ripe Russian-Western contradictions, and in the first place the growing gap between Russian and Western threat perceptions. Apart from that, the Kosovo crisis had virtually proven that the West didn't view Russia as a full-fledged partner. This was proved rather vividly by the fact that Russia was deprived of its own sector in KFOR operation.

As Yeltsin's successor, President Putin has proclaimed himself a devoted partisan of Russian-Western cooperation having supported ratification of the START II Treaty, post-Kosovo dialogue between Russia and NATO and a strategic partnership with EU. Russian leaders and those of leading Western countries continue to negotiate with each other, voicing all kinds of good wishes and important initiatives. However, this process tends to conceal a new trend in Russia's relations with the West. These relations had quickly passed through a romantic period in the early 1990s, with the concerned parties expressing mutual disappointment and failing to understand each other in the late 1990s. As of today, such relations have confidently entered the pragmatic-minimalist phase, which tends to resemble the East-West peaceful co-existence to an ever-greater extent. This was eventually reflected in the Russian military doctrine and NATO's new strategy. This is also proved by the fact that Putin's extremely important initiative stipulating the deployment of a tactical ABM system together with NATO hasn't evoked any serious response in Europe, Canada nor the United States.

The Kosovo crisis affected not only Russian-Western relations, but the Euro-Atlantic partnership as well. The EU failure to take a lead in the Kosovo crisis dented the image of the Union as a new concept of power that attempted to enhance the process of European integration in the field of CFSP and ESDI. The latter in its turn brought about new problems in the EU-NATO relationship. Any attempt by the EU to build a European military alliance is being seen across the Atlantic as a move to undermine

NATO and to marginalise the US in European security. At the same time, NATO insiders say that the US is going to pull out anyway over the next 10 years, and the new EU military partnership will accelerate this process. They could be out in all but a token presence by 2003.

Thus, a new conflict in the Balkans can erupt at a time when Russian-Western relations are far from perfect, when the new US administration views the Balkans as peripheral to American national interests and when Europeans cannot cope with this problems on their own. The post-Kosovo challenges to European security can be exacerbated by new trends in Russian and American foreign policies. What should be done to prevent unlimited conflict? The solution of the Macedonian problem lies in Kosovo. It is not enough to only recognise that territorial integrity of Yugoslavia is a key to stability in the Balkans. Territorial integrity of Yugoslavia must be a primary goal of KFOR, which means that NATO should decide how to respond to Albanian extremism. It is of the utmost importance for NATO itself not to reduce its role in the region that threatens to destroy its credibility as a guarantor of regional stability. American leadership should help to re-think NATO's strategy in the Balkans to turn the KFOR mission into a real success story. Some suggestions towards this end:

1. The remnants of KLA should be disarmed in full. The United States, which is the only country with tangible leverage over moderate and militant Albanians, should use this leverage.
2. The border between Kosovo and Macedonia, which is transparent, should be closed to prevent any penetration of Albanian extremists from Kosovo to Macedonia.
3. The KFOR mission should be expanded to Macedonia with Russia's participation on an equal footing.
4. Consequently, it would be extremely important to revise the terms of Russia's participation in KFOR and to involve it as a real partner.
5. The European countries and the United States should press the Albanian diaspora to stop military and financial support of Albanian militants in FY.
6. The European Union should enhance implementation of social and economic reconstruction for the region giving its full support to re-integration of Yugoslavia and Macedonia into Europe. Hopefully, all these efforts will help not only to avoid the repetition of the Kosovo scenario but also to pull Russian-Western relations out of the blind alley.

SOUTH BALKANS CONFLICT, NATO'S MISSION AND THE AMERICAN INTEREST

DANA H. ALLIN

From the early 1990s, as Yugoslavia suffered its wars of ethnic cleansing, there was much dreadful speculation about the consequences of Macedonia succumbing to the same fate. Some of the more lurid scenarios – such as a general south Balkans war drawing in Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey – never seemed very logical. The real challenges to Macedonian identity and stability – including nationalist hostility and a damaging blockade from EU member Greece – were grave enough. In any event, for most of its first decade as an independent state, Macedonia confounded the pessimists by surviving.

Now, armed ethnic conflict has come to Macedonia, and the pessimists have reason to feel vindicated. Carl Bildt told a London audience in March 2001 that the present state of affairs in Macedonia reminded him of Bosnia in 1992, or Kosovo in February 1998. Some consider the threat of “Greater Albania” nationalism to be as unsettling for the first decade of this century as “Greater Serbia” nationalism was for the concluding decade of the last century. And critics of NATO suggest (again, not very logically) that the Kosovo intervention was the fateful action in a chain of events leading to the demise of Macedonia.

The current threat to Macedonia is the most serious one it has faced, which is to say that it is very serious indeed. There is, however, a huge difference between Macedonia today and Yugoslavia in 1991-95 or 1998-99. That difference is a central government exercising civilised restraint and trying to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of an Albanian minority which accounts for around one-third of the country's population (the true share is disputed, of course).

The armed Albanian extremists seem to have shared the misconceptions of some Western commentators who argued that, in going to war for Kosovo, NATO demonstrated support for the violent agenda of a “Greater Albania”. The misconception is based on rather simplistic reasoning. Western support for the Macedonian state against Albanian violence is perfectly consistent with military intervention in Kosovo to protect Albanians against Serb violence. This message may finally be sinking through to the Albanian rebels.

Politics and Security

Officials in Skopje have tried to suggest that the armed insurrection is entirely imported from Kosovo. This seems unlikely: Western journalists have found a high degree of at least tacit support for the guerrillas from Macedonia's Albanians; and the fighters themselves include many Albanians from the Macedonian side of the border (a border that is of relatively recent salience anyway). Skopje's accusations do point, however, to a disturbing truth: while the insurrection clearly has some organic connection to the grievances of Macedonia's Albanians, it also has an autonomous life of its own, and thus a strictly political solution to it may not be available.

The political problem is bad enough on its own. Despite the apparent good faith of successive governments, Albanians suffer discrimination in daily life, and have not been made to feel full equality as citizens. Ethnic resentments are palpable, and have been worsened by the recent violence. Srgjan Kerim, the country's Foreign Minister until early May, admits that Albanians have some cause to feel like second-class citizens: "We should have had many more Albanians in national structures ... If Albanians are not part of national structures they can't identify with the country."

Macedonia's Albanian politicians share some of the blame for the current crisis; too often they have put forward agendas that have more to do with nationalist symbolism than with practical measures to improve the lot of the minority. Thus, at various times in the past decade, ethnic relations have been strained by such nationalist rallying cries as demands for an Albanian-language university; the right to fly Albanian flags over municipal buildings; the recasting of Macedonia as a bi-national state; or the designation of Albanian as a second official language. Not all of these demands are unreasonable. Nor is it unreasonable, however, for some Slav politicians to worry about the paralysing effects of bi-national federalism in a small country with a weak state.

The efforts of the West in trying to arrange a political accommodation – including high-level attention from especially, Javier Solana – have been generally in the right direction. These efforts follow a decade of sustained Western attention, and Macedonia's relative stability until now, like the recent advent of a national-unity government, have to be counted among the successes of the West's Balkan policies. That success, however, cannot be allowed to obscure one unwelcome reality: that the transatlantic commitment to the Balkans must include not just an active role in mediating inter-ethnic dialogue, but also a commitment to the integrity of the Macedonian state. This commitment has a military

dimension. In the first instance, this will require KFOR to do everything possible to block the infiltration of fighters and the flow of weapons from the Kosovo side of the border. The Macedonian government has also asked NATO troops to supervise the implementation of a disarmament pact, if one can be reached. The Albanian rebels too have indicated that they would welcome such a NATO role. Yet everything that has been achieved in the Balkans so far could be threatened by Macedonia's break-up, and if the conflict worsens, NATO should be ready to insert a force that is prepared to go beyond peacekeeping: to use force, if necessary, against Albanian guerrillas, and to restrain the potential excesses of Macedonian government forces.

Many in the West will find the prospect mind-boggling. But so was the idea of forceful intervention on the side of the Sarajevo government in the early 1990s, and so was the idea of deploying American troops in Bosnia for one year – much less the five-and-a-half years that they have remained so far. In early 1998, it was mind-boggling to imagine that NATO, with the United States in the lead, would intervene militarily in Kosovo. Critics of these earlier interventions will no doubt seize on any discussion of a deployment in Macedonia as evidence that they were right: Balkan interventions equal mission creep and quagmire. Yet it is difficult to imagine how NATO, after all that it has done and invested in the former Yugoslavia, could stand aloof from a Macedonian civil war.

Civil war is absolutely a worst-case scenario, and one need not assume that it will happen. But options for inserting a NATO force, ready to confront Albanian guerrillas and restrain the potential excesses of Macedonian government forces, need to be on the transatlantic table for open discussion, now. There are four reasons that the discussion cannot wait:

- First, Skopje on its own may not be able master the crisis either politically or militarily. Politically, the ability of a national unity government to agree on constitutional arrangements satisfactory to the Albanian parties and of tangible benefit to the Albanian population is questionable. The state, in any event, is weak, and probably lacks the administrative elan to fully implement such important reforms as the creation of a truly multi-ethnic police force. Moreover, even if the government does succeed, that is hardly a guarantee that a rebellion of hundreds or thousands of well-armed Albanians – whose leaders are not party to the talks – can be turned off like a water spigot. On the contrary, Europe has enough experience with armed terrorism to suggest that political accommodation tends to inflame rather than calm the extremists.

Militarily, Macedonian security forces surprised Western analysts with some early successes. But they have not proven that they are able to quell the rebellion with methods acceptable both to the West and, more importantly, to their own Albanian citizens. American intelligence analysts have expressed disquiet at aerial photos showing burned-out villages reminiscent of Serb scorched-earth tactics in Kosovo. The comparison should be handled carefully: no one is suggesting that Skopje is operating in the same moral universe as Slobodan Milosevic's former regime. But moral chaos flowing from administrative incompetence can be bad enough. Large-scale civilian deaths – even a single shell killing 20 women and children in a cellar – could push Macedonia's ethnic conflict past the point of amicable return. Another Kosovo comparison is worth bearing in mind: the Drenica massacre of early 1998 that turned a limited guerrilla campaign into a Kosovo-wide insurrection.

- Second, the psychologically stabilising impact of having NATO troops just over the border in Kosovo is going to be much diminished unless it is clear that they will be used where they are needed.
- Third, American and European governments have important decisions to make. The Bush administration has to settle for itself the fundamental issue that the Bush campaign raised with its criticism of the Clinton administration's use of American troops for “nation building.” Does America have a serious interest in Balkan stability or not? If so, will it continue to use military force to pursue that interest? And the Europeans have to decide what they will do if the Bush administration stays with its original instincts.
- Finally, time is the enemy. There is very little time for American and European governments to agree on action; the pattern of the past ten years is that such interventions, when they come, are too often too late.

The American Interest

This is an inconvenient crisis for a new US administration that has less of a commitment to the Balkans engagement than its predecessor. On the eve of the recent fighting, Macedonian politicians indicated that they had heard President George Bush's campaign rhetoric, and believed a US withdrawal was imminent. In formulating its policies, the Bush administration should be aware that both Balkan moderates and Balkan extremists are listening.

Since Bush's inauguration, his administration has backed off from talk about a withdrawal. Colin Powell in particular has recognised the dangers such a withdrawal would pose to NATP unity. But the new administration's attitude towards a long-term Balkans deployment will differ significantly from its predecessor. Whether or not US troops withdraw in the medium term, the ambivalence of the American military commitment could be damaging. The crisis in Macedonia, suggesting another intervention and a deeper commitment, makes this painfully clear.

The European allies should recognise that the uncertainties of the US commitment are not just due to the new administration's policies. Rather, such uncertainties arise from American history, domestic politics and geo-strategic responsibilities. The idea of a "division of labour" (as mooted by Bush's National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice), in which the European allies concentrate on peacekeeping and the United States husbands its resources for "major war" contingencies in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, may have troubling implications for NATO solidarity. But the idea also reflects, to a significant extent, present realities. Europeans probably need an American flag to be with them in Macedonia. But they may have to carry it almost alone.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

CEPS-IISS EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM WORKING PAPER NO. 3

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY

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INTRODUCTION

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

The third meeting of the European Security Forum on 9 July 2001, centred on NATO enlargement, prepared, as has become the custom, by papers written respectively from a US, a European and a Russian perspective.

Tomas Ries, while underlining the need to avoid gratuitously damaging relations with Russia, emphasised that the number-one objective for the Europeans was the reinforcement of Europe's stable liberal base and this called for NATO enlargement including the Baltics. Furthermore, he noted that Russia was going to go its own way whatever occurred in terms of NATO enlargement.

Vladimir Baranovsky underscored the hawkish attitude of Russian public opinion (as evinced in opinion polls) against NATO enlargement, particularly vis-à-vis extension to the Baltics. The Kosovo air war was a turning point in terms of this hardening. However, he also stated that such a trend need not preclude practical engagement between Russia and NATO. A "post-Kursk" discussion on maritime security; theatre missile defence; an update of the "3 No's"; the joint handling of Macedonia-style crisis situations – such were some of the issues that could, if they were addressed in a cooperative manner, improve the Russia-NATO climate.

Steven Larrabee, in presenting his paper, drew the group's attention more particularly to three points: (a) The US dynamic was increasingly pointing to the entry of all three Baltic States, even if the case could be made for letting in Lithuania ahead of the others given its good relations with Russia and given the absence of a serious Russian minority issue; (b) The first enlargement had demonstrated that Russian-Polish relations had actually improved to what they had been previously; (c) The EU and NATO enlargement processes should be coordinated.

In addition to these presentations, remarks by a well-placed commentator of Alliance affairs paved the way for the ensuing debate. First, he noted that the new enlargement would be politically easier to handle than the first, precisely because of what didn't happen after that initial round: there had been no "new Cold war", no "new fault line" and no "bankrupting" of NATO. In a sense, the effects of the first enlargement had been overstated by its adversaries as by some of its supporters. Secondly, there were several material differences between the second and the first enlargement. There was more technical preparation this time with

the membership action plans; but there would also be new implications in terms of political cohesion, with the growth in the number of members. As well, Article-V considerations could be of growing importance. In this regard, V. Baranovsky suggested that enlarging to the Baltics could create a new “Berlin vulnerability” problem for NATO, to which others responded that this comparison could be applied in a reverse mode, with the transformation of Kaliningrad into a Russian enclave within NATO. Finally, the commentator picked up Steve Larrabee’s mention of a staggered approach to the next round of enlargement, while pointing out the consequences of enlargement for the security policies of the neutral members of the European Union.

At the behest of the Chairman, several issues were singled out for discussion.

First of all, what would be the effect of enlargement on the nature of NATO? As one participant queried, would a NATO of 27 or 28 still be *funktionsfähig*, let alone *entscheidungsfähig*, capable of making decisions? Others disputed the notion that the growth in numbers would significantly hamper NATO’s effectiveness: “Parkinson’s law did not necessarily lead to Parkinson’s disease”. However, doubt was expressed about NATO’s future direction. The remark was made that NATO hadn’t terribly changed since 1991, that new tasks such as peacekeeping/peace enforcement had simply been added to the old; would this situation last with enlargement – or as another participant put it: Will NATO simply become an OSCE with teeth?

These queries naturally gained salience as the Forum broached the issue of Russian membership of NATO. President Putin has repeatedly raised this prospect during the course of the summer, confirming the view of those who considered that “virtual membership” of Russia should be discussed earlier rather than later. What kind of NATO will we have if the road is opened for Russia membership (if this NATO still had an Article V, what would that mean vis-à-vis China? And if Article V were dropped, would we still have NATO?), and what kind of Russian reaction will we have if NATO spurns Moscow’s overtures?

Then we had the issue of the interaction between the EU and NATO enlargements. The topic was launched with a remark from a prominent analyst of EU affairs that there was no CFSP on NATO enlargement, that this was a process on which the EU as such had no common view, only policies by individual states. As one US participant indicated, the Baltics will play better in the US than Bulgaria and Romania; but a number of EU members have precisely the opposite view. The net result is that

pressure to enlarge to the North will be complemented by pressure to enlarge to the South – thus leading to something closer to a Big Bang than to staggered entries. A brief but heated discussion arose concerning the entry criteria for NATO membership, with one American participant giving great prominence to the economic dimension, to the surprise of some Europeans who could see this as a new obstacle directed against early Bulgarian or Romanian entry. Certainly, economic criteria had not played a prominent role when Greece and Turkey entered NATO half a century ago. However, there was little dispute about the contention that Romania's prospects had not improved since the 1997 discussions at the Madrid summit. Indeed this sense of Romanian lack of progress was reinforced by a question about "sweeteners" for those would not be part of the first pick at the NATO summit in Prague next year.

As for the ultimate extent of NATO enlargement, the question was raised of what could the West's options be if the Kuchma government were replaced in the Ukraine, and if the democratically elected successor regime requested NATO candidacy status. The analogy was made here with the replacement of the Tudjman regime in Croatia and Zagreb's current call for NATO membership.

Further afield, the Forum discussed the interaction between possible Caucasian aspirations to NATO membership (Georgia and Azerbaijan notably) and Turkey's strategic interests. Here the remark was made by a well-placed regional observer that the rapidly expanding Russian-Turkish ties in the field of energy (e.g. the "Blue Stream" gas pipeline) would make Turkey increasingly adverse to confrontation with Russia in the Caucasian area.

Returning to the preparation of the 2002 NATO Summit, Forum participants noted that Russia's leaders were no longer talking in terms of "red lines", or of "no former Soviet territory in NATO"; they were raising the theme of "no NATO infrastructure", along the lines of V. Baranovsky's statements on the "3 No's". However, one East European participant invited us not to forget that "red lines" could be replaced by "pipelines", i.e. that Russia could manifest its negativism towards NATO expansion by seeking greater control of the CIS area, notably through its policy vis-à-vis energy infrastructure connecting Russia to the outside world via the CIS countries.

Kaliningrad would be a key point for NATO-EU-Russia cooperation. Here, we were invited to ponder a recent statement by Admiral Yegorov, Kaliningrad's governor, suggesting that Lithuania's entry into NATO

would not pose unprecedented problems for the oblast since Poland was already a member of NATO.

Finally, as one Western participant indicated, it would be wrong to continue saying that no new lines would be drawn: After all, the EU was not going to include Russia. Thus, a clear and presumably long-lasting line would be drawn between the EU and Russia, once the enlargement to the Baltics had been completed. Thus it is imperative that we get EU-Russia cooperation on the right track; hence also the call of several participants for establishing a new type of institutional relationship between Russia and NATO, whether this would be in the form of an associateship (to use the expression of one Russian participant) or the prospect of membership.

NATO ENLARGEMENT: A EUROPEAN VIEW

TOMAS RIES

Politically, further NATO enlargement in some form is probably unavoidable. On the deepest level, because NATO at its core is an expression of the Atlantic community of liberal democratic values. Refusing entry to new applicants who fulfil the criteria and knock strongly enough and long enough is not only politically embarrassing but undermines the foundation on which NATO rests.

Secondly, from a more immediate perspective, it will be difficult not to follow-up the tacit invitations involved in the MAP and the expectations linked to 2002. Finally pressures for selective enlargement to specific candidates will no doubt arise again from individual NATO members, driven by various peripheral interests.

Whether or not enlargement is desirable is another issue. This is a function of its impact on vital European security interests, which is the focus of this discussion paper. This includes three issues: Firstly, what are Europe's vital Grand Strategy objectives? Secondly, how could NATO enlargement affect these? Thirdly, how can enlargement be modulated to minimise costs?

1. Grand Strategy Objectives for European Security

Five objectives might be considered fundamental for European stability:¹

1. Preserve the North American-European partnership
2. Prevent a new division of Europe with an alienated hostile Russia
3. Support and enlarge Europe's stable liberal base
4. Manage violent instability affecting Europe
5. Maintain an insurance against revived military threats

These are outlined on the following pages, with some thoughts on how enlargement could affect them.

¹ Excluding the need for steady global economic growth, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

2. Preserve the North American-European Partnership

Historically the North American-European partnership is young. It emerged during the Cold War, based on joint economic development and the Soviet threat. The collapse of the USSR removed one key pillar, but the partnership remains important nevertheless. Firstly, because both continue to share the same economic and political base, with transnational economic links generating deeper interdependence than ever before. Secondly, because the same economic links – which fuse the entire OECD community but in which North America, the EU and parts of East Asia are the main players – create shared global security interests, even if the EU's nascent CFSP as yet has difficulty dealing with this. Thirdly, because Europe remains dependent upon US security guarantees and military capability in the event of a revived direct military threat from outside. Fourthly, because North America and the EU are two of today's most powerful global actors, whose relationship affects the world.

NATO remains vital for this partnership even without the Soviet threat. Primarily because it is the only formal political link across the Atlantic, and secondly because of its continued military role. Politically the official ties, along with the intimate and extensive institutional framework, provide a unique forum for a deep and continuous security-political dialogue. This provides essential support for the political relationship as well as a unique capability for joint multinational security-political decision-making and military action. (Europe's military dependency on the US and NATO's military role are dealt with in sections 4. and 5. below.)

From this political perspective NATO enlargement includes two major drawbacks. Firstly, weakened decision-making resulting from a greater number and diversity of members. Secondly, possible strains on the US commitment if frictions from additional members led to US perceptions of a more problematic “entangling” engagement. Positive consequences include adapting the alliance to Europe's evolving political map, and consolidation of the enlarged Atlantic liberal community.

3. Avoid a New Division of Europe with an Alienated Hostile Russia

This remains a vital strategic objective. Maintaining cooperative relations with Russia is essential for European security, while the consequences of an alienated and hostile Russia could be unpleasant for both Europe and the world.

NATO enlargement will almost certainly have negative consequences on this relationship. The question is not whether Russia would react, but how strongly and how deeply. NATO is perceived with suspicion and hostility by Russia's military and parts of the establishment around Putin. At the very least enlargement would lead to strong protests, a chill in relations and probably the rattling of military sabres.

This per se is not unmanageable. The question is whether Russia would go further. This is unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, because there is in fact very little Russia could do. Beyond protesting, freezing diplomatic relations, shaking an already shaky military and rattling her nuclear arsenal there is little she can do. Some of these are bad enough, but they have little real impact. This leaves escalating to the use of various forms of force. However this would raise the crisis to a level almost certainly perceived as too high by the Russian leadership.

Secondly, extreme Russian protests would be curtailed by her economic dependency on the west. Firstly for export revenue, as oil and gas exports are her only serious source of income. Secondly for investment, as the key part of Putin's plan to build a functioning industrial base. Russian resort to violence in Europe would freeze relations with the west, including exports and investment plans. The cost to Russia would thus be inordinately high.

In the short term it is thus unlikely that Russian reactions would go beyond posturing. More serious is the longer-term damage to Russian attitudes towards the west. In the near-term enlargement would almost certainly increase the influence of the Russian military over foreign policy, with a more militarised and hostile stance towards the outside world. Domestically it could boost support for xenophobic nationalist trends within Russia and weaken the liberal, western oriented factions even further.

The long-term consequences of such a development are disturbing. On the other hand this trend is already underway, regardless of western policies. Looking back over the last ten years it is clear that Russia has largely failed to make the much hoped-for transition to a free-market economy, democracy and the rule of law. Instead the economy was captured by a handful of oligarchs, social hardship increased, and domestic politics are steadily growing more authoritarian. While unpleasant to contemplate, events indicate that a deep "Huntington Gap" does indeed separate Russia from liberal Europe.

As a result the political gap between Russia and the west has also steadily grown. The initial mutually enthusiastic hopes of the early 1990s rapidly

faded, and by the mid-1990s both sides had lost faith in the economic relationship, gradually leading to western political indifference and rising Russian frustration. By the end of the decade serious crises in the relationship emerged with increasing frequency: in 1996-1997 over NATO enlargement; in April 1999 over Operation Allied Force; in September 1999 after Russia's second attack on Chechnya, provoking pressure within the EU for sanctions; and most recently on a lower level in the summer of 2000, following indications of new Russian tactical nuclear warheads being moved to Kaliningrad. All of these were virtually unthinkable ten years ago.

Russia is clearly going her own way, and all current indications are that the gap between her and the liberal world will continue to grow. The trend is deep has been underway for some time, and while NATO enlargement may accelerate it, abstaining from enlargement is unlikely to reverse it.

4. Support and Enlarge Europe's Stable Liberal Base

The deepest source of peace and stability in Europe is the community of liberal states based on democracy, market economics, the rule of law and social stability. Supporting those states striving to join this community, and accepting them into it when they comply with its standards, enlarges and consolidates this stable base.

NATO and the EU are the two institutions at the heart of the European liberal community. While NATO has a specific security-political role and the EU shoulders a broader responsibility for embracing the emerging liberal states, opening the alliance between them has two advantages. Firstly, it consolidates the enlarged zone of stability and peace in Europe, both within new members and towards outside powers. This is particularly important in security-political "grey zones" where crises of misunderstanding can arise. These consist of areas in which emerging liberal states – identified by the western public as belonging to the liberal community – are exposed to potential threat. This is the case for the three Baltic states, which parts of the Russian establishment – notably the military – perceive as essential for Russia. Should they be subjected to pressure the combination of domestic opinion and international credibility would make it impossible for the western community to remain indifferent, even without formal commitments. While currently remote, such crises could arise out of misunderstanding which prior NATO membership would pre-empt. It can be argued that Russia's growing alienation noted above is increasing this need.

Secondly, NATO membership may in certain cases need to be synchronised with EU enlargement, which involves a tacit but growing security commitment that the EU is unable to back up for some time. Finally the negative impact of not enlarging must be taken into account. It weakens our liberal credo – this could generate disillusion among aspirants, and may send undesirable signals to the outside world.

5. Manage Violent Instability Affecting Europe

Policing violent instability along Europe's fringe has emerged as one of NATO's most visible tasks since the end of the Cold War. And since 1995 it has managed the actual enforcement task surprisingly effectively, even if subsequent peace building – in which NATO plays a supporting peacekeeping role – has proved more elusive.

This policing capability remains vital for European stability. On the one hand directly, by enforcing order in unstable fringe areas, partly by containing regional violence and partly – though this ultimately remains beyond the reach of pure enforcement – by contributing towards resolving conflicts. On a deeper political level it is equally essential as a means of reaffirming the power and authority of the liberal community, both at home and abroad.

Here NATO is the key instrument, for which no substitute yet exists. Firstly for political crisis management, since its extensive, intimate and tested institutions make it the only multinational organisation capable of hard analysis, decision-making and action. Secondly for large scale military operations, since it alone possesses the integrated military command structure capable of conducting complex large-scale multinational military operations. Thirdly for war fighting, because it alone provides the political and operational link to the US – which is the only power in the Atlantic community capable of serious power projection and advanced high-intensity warfare.

NATO is thus essential for European crisis management, peacekeeping and peace enforcement (i.e. war). While the EU is now endeavouring to develop capabilities in these fields, they will remain very weak for a long time. Strongest are the mechanisms for political crisis management, but they still face considerable teething problems. Operationally the EU is even more limited. At the lowest end of the Petersberg tasks – “Humanitarian Operations” involving humanitarian support, hostage rescue and evacuation – the EU has the most autonomous capability. One step up – peacekeeping missions based on local consent – the EU can deploy smaller contingents, but would need to rely on NATO's integrated military command and US logistic and transport assets for any larger

troop presence. EU efforts to fill this gap will still take many years. Finally at the uppermost end of the scale – peace enforcement – the EU fully depends on both NATO infrastructure and US war fighting assets.

NATO thus remains essential for hard crisis management, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. For these missions enlargement could have two positive consequences. Firstly by increasing the international legitimacy of a given operation, since more states would be backing it and taking part. Nevertheless this would not significantly reduce the need for more basic international mandates for action. Secondly by increasing the pool of assets for peacekeeping missions, though this is already covered by the current partnership arrangements. On the other hand, enlargement would have the major drawback of weakening NATO decision-making.

6. Maintain Insurance against Military Threats

The danger of direct military attack against the European liberal community crumbled with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it remains remote today. Coupled with its inflammatory nature this has placed it far from the political agenda. Nevertheless the return of such a threat cannot be excluded, and while remote, its serious consequences make it prudent – read necessary – to maintain an insurance policy against such an eventuality.

For Europe such a revived direct military threat could take two forms. Firstly, from rogue states with missiles. Secondly, in the event of deep Russian regression, with an alienated and hostile regime under weak and tense domestic conditions, resorting to military and especially nuclear pressure as its only remaining means of influence and respect.

In both cases NATO is vital and has no substitute. Firstly for hard crisis management, as the only organisation capable of joint multinational analysis, decision and military action. Secondly for deterrence, through Article 5. links with the US, which remains the only credible deterrent against conventional and nuclear threats and – perhaps – against rogue states. Thirdly for defence, again through the links to the US, which remains the only state capable of large-scale high-intensity warfare, and is the only member developing TMD.

Under such dark scenarios Europe thus remains deeply dependent on the US, and hence on the NATO link. Consequences of NATO enlargement here are largely negative. A greater number of members would weaken decision-making, extended defensive responsibilities and more “entangling” obligations could weaken US support, extended defence commitments could exceed NATO capabilities and last but not least,

stretching US deterrence to cover a larger, remoter and more diverse set of states could weaken its credibility. On the other hand enlargement advantages include greater depth, notably for existing European members (shades of Germany and Poland), and greater reach.

7. Which agenda for NATO?

From a *realpolitik* perspective NATO enlargement depends upon which security political agenda one prioritises. If emphasis is placed on consolidating and supporting Europe's growing community of liberal states – which is the deepest foundation for stability and peace in Europe – then NATO must remain open to new candidates. This is especially the case for those small states that have confirmed their liberal transition but remain in an exposed security-political situation. The three Baltic states are a case in point. Two further arguments along this vein are that by removing such security political “grey areas” the danger of crises of misunderstanding is reduced. Secondly there is in some cases a need to synchronise EU enlargement with the security support which only NATO provides.

At the same time the drawbacks of enlargement are clear. Internally, greater diversity and larger numbers of members may strain NATO's political cohesion, which in turn will weaken decision-making and may hurt operational efficiency. Externally by further straining the relationship with Russia, since it will inevitably displease key parts of the Russian leadership, at least accelerating the further alienation and isolation of Russia and at worst contributing to deep long-term hostility. Thirdly it may affect the US commitment to Europe, should new members lead to new problems increasing US domestic perceptions of an “Entangling Alliance”. Fourthly it could overextend NATO defence capabilities and US deterrence credibility.

Thus if emphasis is placed on maintaining a powerful military alliance, both for policing the fringes (crisis prevention, peacekeeping and peace enforcement) and as an insurance policy against a revived direct military threat (deterrence or defence against Russia or TMD threats), then such enlargement that would weaken cohesion and military capability is inadvisable. Similarly, if emphasis is placed on not offending Russia, then enlargement should be limited or avoided. However here it is worth reiterating that Russia is in fact gradually alienating herself, regardless of what we do.

However, modulating the way in which enlargement is carried out can reduce some of these costs. This depends on the agenda one assigns to NATO, and is a key issue for discussion. Possibilities to safeguard

alliance cohesion and efficiency include the obvious, such as ensuring that membership criteria (democracy, rule of law, market economy) are fully met. More controversial options would be to preserve full Article 5 guarantees to all new members but envisage limits to their decision-making rights, and/or to establish a new “inner core” of major NATO powers for key issues. However this could in itself also weaken alliance functioning and the credibility of Article 5.

To reassure Russia it is possible to envisage restraint as to the depth and width of enlargement. Depth can be limited by further “Base and Ban” provisions, similar to those of Denmark, Norway, Germany and others. Width can be restrained by excluding geopolitically sensitive applicants even though they meet membership criteria. This is paradoxical however, as it is precisely these countries which most need NATO security guarantees. In northern Europe this includes all three Baltic states.

If we assume that enlargement in some form is politically inevitable the key issue becomes what form it should take. From a *realpolitik* perspective this is a function of which of NATO's Grand Strategy roles we give priority. This is the fundamental issue that needs to be resolved before 2002.

NATO ENLARGEMENT: RUSSIA'S ATTITUDES

VLADIMIR BARANOVSKY

In comparison to the previous phase of NATO enlargement, there may be a difference in Russia's attitude towards a subsequent phase. In particular, there will most likely be strong sensitivity on the issue of expansion onto post-Soviet territories. An emotional reaction might further be reinforced by strategic and security considerations, more concrete and specific than in the case of Central and Eastern Europe. However, this paper does not consider these differences as crucial; instead, it is based on the supposition that Russia's attitude towards NATO enlargement, be it the previous or a subsequent one, forms only part of Russia's attitude towards, and Russia's perception of NATO as such.

Two factors seem essential in this respect. First, the alliance is still very often perceived as a challenge to Russia's security interests, even if only a potential one. Second, Moscow wants to prevent the central security role in Europe from being played by a structure to which Russia does not and will not have direct access.

In the aftermath of the cold war, there seemed to be two main scenarios concerning the future of NATO, both of which were basically acceptable to Russia. The first scenario proceeded from the inevitable disappearance of the Alliance, which having lost its *raison d'être*, represented a kind of memorial inherited from the previous epoch that could only continue for some time due to political and bureaucratic inertia. The second scenario, on the other hand, described NATO as the core of the future pan-European security system, with the Alliance to be radically transformed to include Russia as *sine qua non*.

In actuality, neither of the two scenarios was implemented. The developments in and around NATO followed a "third way" and contained several components that were (and still are) regarded by Russia with considerable consternation. First, this on-going scenario envisages the consolidation and the growing role of NATO rather than its gradual erosion. Second, new military and political tasks are being ascribed to the Alliance *in addition to* the "old" ones rather than *instead of* them. Third, the Alliance, far from getting a lower profile, is carrying out a kind of a triple expansion: it is extending its functions, its membership and its zone

of responsibility. Fourth, instead of making the international law and the UN-based system the core elements of the post-bipolar world, NATO is perceived as disregarding them both and pretending to have an exclusive *droit de regard* with respect to what is going on in the world.

None of these characteristics encourage enthusiasm in Russia about the new dynamism of NATO. Instead, when considered together, they create a critical mass of negative attitudes and a pervasive feeling of depression. Such political and even psychological frustrations represent the source of Russia's vigorous (although not always coherent) opposition to this trend. Noteworthy, however, is that this opposition has endured throughout almost the entire decade of the 1990s and has combined the logic of rational arguments with an acute emotional reaction.

The first wave of Russia's negativism towards NATO was provoked by the discussions on NATO's eventual expansion into Central and Eastern Europe. Russia's official negativism was accompanied by a massive campaign against the enlargement of NATO, the scale of which was unprecedented for the whole of Russia's post-Soviet history. It is alleged that in this campaign, Russia saw the emergence of its first foreign policy consensus bringing together representatives of all major political forces – from communists to democrats and from liberally oriented enthusiasts of market reform to proponents of “Russia's specific (i.e., ‘not-like the-others’) identity”. In terms of Russia's fragmented political life, this phenomenon is rare indeed – although it should be mentioned that the “consensus” was formed by those who had different (sometimes mutually exclusive) explanations of, and motives for their opposition to NATO enlargement. This, in turn, explained the internal weakness of Russia's opposition and the lack of coherence therein.

In addition, some arguments raised at the time were not particularly convincing nor were they consistent with other elements of internationally oriented thought. This was, for instance, the case of the “security argument” developed by many military and civilian strategists; indeed, insisting that the enlargement of NATO would inevitably threaten Russia's security seemed both artificial and reminiscent of the logic of cold war period. Criticism of NATO's enlargement plans was also held as inappropriate in light of the generally recognised right of states to join any international structures (or to refrain from doing so).

The practical results of Russia's “anti-enlargement” campaign also looked rather ambivalent. In Central and Eastern Europe, it was clearly perceived as a manifestation of Russia's “Big Brother” syndrome and brought about increasing domestic support with respect to the policy line of joining

NATO. It is not excluded that the voice of critics would have been better heard if Russia had followed a kind of “do-as-you-wish” formula. In the West, some opponents to NATO enlargement also found themselves in an ambivalent position: while objecting to this prospect in principle, they remained opposed to providing Russia with a veto right in this regard.

At the same time, Moscow's vehement opposition to the enlargement increased the importance of the “Russian question” in Western debates on NATO's future. They highlighted a number of themes that soon became ritual: that the enlargement of NATO is not aimed at, and should not result in, the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe; that in parallel with the extension its membership, NATO should offer a new partnership to Russia; and that the latter should be actively involved in building a new European security architecture.

Whether Moscow was somehow disoriented by such developments or just decided, very pragmatically, to build upon these new themes remains an open question. In any case, Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement went in parallel with attempts to build a relationship with the Alliance as a major pillar of the evolving European security architecture. This line proceeded from the idea of constructing a “special relationship” with NATO that would be deeper and more substantive than the Alliance's relations with any of its other partners. A dialogue between Russia and NATO has developed since the mid-1990s, although its political weight has turned out to be rather limited. In fact, both sides were cautious with respect to an option of increasing its salience, albeit for different reasons: NATO did not want to make relations with Russia excessively “privilege”, whereas Moscow was reluctant to be regarded as accepting NATO enlargement by the very fact of flirting with the Alliance.

When the inevitability of the expansion of NATO membership became clear, the Russian government was actually faced with a very realistic danger of becoming the hostage of its own anti-NATO rhetoric and wide anti-enlargement campaign. Indeed, the enthusiasts of the latter were arguing in favour of reacting in the most energetic way, even at the expense of rational considerations on Russia's own security and political interests. For instance, among the proposed “counter-measures” were the following: building a CIS-based military alliance; re-deploying armed forces in the western areas of Russia; targeting East Central Europe with nuclear weapons; developing strategic partnership with anti-Western regimes and so on.

Moscow opted for another logic: disagreement over NATO enlargement should not be aggravated by other confrontational words and deeds; on

the contrary, the enlargement might make a breakthrough towards constructive interaction even more imperative and urgent. This was confirmed by the decision to sign the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997 – the decision pushed through by then Foreign Minister Primakov against considerable domestic opposition.

Some analysts were (and still are) of highly negative opinion in this respect: Moscow should have refrained from undermining the coherence of its opposition, legitimising the enlargement of NATO and providing this obsolete structure with new rationales for its continuation. Others believe that the result was the creation of the pre-conditions for turning relations between Russia and NATO into one of the central elements of the European system, or even *the* central one.

Testing this optimistic scenario, however, turned out to be impossible. This option was seriously undermined: first, by the failure to provide the established Permanent Russia-NATO Joint Council with a notable role; second (and most dramatically), by NATO's actions in Yugoslavia; and third, by the adoption of a new strategic concept by NATO at its 50th anniversary summit in Washington.

The military operation of NATO against Yugoslavia in the context of developments in and around Kosovo produced the most traumatic impact on Russia's official and unofficial attitudes towards the Alliance. Indeed, it was the Kosovo phenomenon that has contributed to the consolidation of Russia's anti-NATO stand more than the whole vociferous anti-enlargement campaign. The air strikes against Yugoslavia became the most convincing justification for Russia's negativism with respect to the prospect of establishing a NATO-centred Europe.

Moreover, some elements of Russia's attitude towards NATO in the context of the Kosovo crisis were striking because of the apparent lack of coherence. Russia strongly condemned the NATO military operation – but in June 1999, Moscow endorsed the NATO-promoted logic of resolving the crisis in Kosovo. Moscow contributed to the imposition on Belgrade of the settlement designed by NATO – but came very close to a serious conflict with NATO because of the famous “march” of 200 Russian peacekeepers from Bosnia to Pristina (on 12 June 1999). The policy of NATO with respect to Kosovo caused the “freezing” of Russia's relations with NATO – but for some time afterwards Kosovo was the only field of cooperative interaction of the two sides, with all other activities being effectively interrupted and chances of re-launching them looking close to nil.

In an alternative interpretation, all of this testified to a well balanced combination of energetically articulated hostile rhetoric and careful preservation of channels for constructive interaction. Indeed, the 1999 NATO military campaign in the Balkans and Russia's aggressive reaction to it seemed to set a new long-term "cold-war" type of agenda for their future relations. There were serious grounds for apprehending the aggravating erosion that would occur if the Kosovo factor became a constant irritant. Contrary to such expectations, the Kosovo syndrome in Russia's negativism towards NATO was surprisingly short – much shorter than the scope of campaign against NATO aggression, and the overall indignation that both Russian politics and the public opinion at large would have allowed to anticipate.

To a considerable extent this is due to domestic political changes in Russia and the possibility of a "new start" for Russia's new leadership. Indeed, the decision (supposedly, taken against considerable domestic resistance) to "defreeze" relations with NATO is especially impressive after all that was said about this Alliance in the aftermath of Kosovo.

A number of facts deserve mentioning in this regard. First, the pace of positive changes appears to be extremely dynamic. In fact, by mid-2001, the NATO-Russia dialogue has practically resumed in full, and both sides have re-launched the programme of developing the relationship that was stopped in connection with Kosovo. Second, the tone of Russia's comments on NATO have significantly changed; what was predominantly condemning and denouncing just two years ago is becoming more informative and unbiased nowadays; and even the most convinced anti-NATO activists prefer to remain noiseless rather than making a show. Third, the level of officials and representatives meeting on behalf of the two sides has become considerably higher. Finally, the prospect of further rapprochement is no longer excluded, although schemes arguing in favour of developing a kind of "Russia-NATO axis" are not officially endorsed. It is noteworthy that some analysts have started to raise the issue of possible Russian membership in NATO – which would have been absolutely inconceivable just a very short time ago.

What is behind such developments? Three main interpretations can be offered in this context.

First of all, it is a manifestation of pragmatism that has become a key word of the new Russian administration under President Putin. Russia would certainly prefer some alternatives to NATO, but if there are no political, financial and military means for promoting them and for

downgrading NATO, it is better to accommodate to this situation than to re-enter into an exhausting confrontation with minimal chances for success. It is not a green light indicating acceptance of anything that NATO would like to do, but a deliberate decision not to get adversely over-excited over what seems inevitable. At the same time, to the extent that promoting bilateral relations with Western countries and cooperative interaction with the West as a whole is considered to be in Russia's interests, this line should not be damaged by maintaining the spirit of confrontation towards the structure of which most of these countries are members.

Second, there is a need to put Russia's attitude towards NATO into an appropriate context, without making it the central issue of the international agenda. Russia faces numerous challenges and has to deal with them seriously – without being diverted all the time by the issue of NATO. On the contrary, one might even think about using it as a leverage for promoting Russia's interests in other areas. Thus, it was noted by some observers that during the formative period of the new US administration, when its future policy towards Russia raised a lot of concerns in Moscow, the latter seemed to engage in considerably more intense dialogue with NATO officials than with those from Washington. Indeed, this could be viewed as a paradoxical pattern, when the erosion and the degradation of relations with the US were counterbalanced by Moscow via rapprochement with the structure that was traditionally considered as created, inspired and controlled by the Americans.

Third, the most serious test for the future relations between Russia and NATO will be connected with the next phase of the Alliance's enlargement. One might expect that Russia's negativism on eventual involvement of the three Baltic states in NATO will be much stronger than in the case of Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to the latter, Russia's eventual arguments on security implications of such a development could be considerably more coherent and substantive. Also, Moscow might expect that its reservations would more likely to be taken into account—although Russia's right to draw a “red line” will by no means be recognised by other international actors. In addition, the issue might turn out to be an extremely sensitive one in terms of Russia's domestic politics. In a worst-case scenario, a extremely acute situation could emerge, more dangerous than the one that developed in the previous wave of NATO enlargement.

One way of preventing such crisis-prone development would be to change its context in a substantive, if not a radical way. Indeed, Russia's membership in NATO could be a fundamental solution, but it does not

look a realistic prospect – at least for the time being. Another approach along the same line would be to ensure high-level relations between Russia and NATO. If achieved, or at least realistically designed, prior to the Baltic phase of enlargement, this would make Russian concerns on the latter irrelevant. From this point of view, Russia's current rapprochement with NATO will broaden Moscow's future options if and when the issue of membership of the Baltic states in the Alliance is put on the agenda.

It is also important to refrain from over-dramatising the issue in order to avoid becoming hostage to one's own propaganda. Interestingly enough, on the eve of NATO's expansion into the Baltic area, Russia's mass media pay considerably less attention to this prospect than they did with respect to the case of Central and Eastern Europe just several years ago.

By no means, however, is any of this a guarantee against destabilising developments. Failure to ensure a qualitative breakthrough might easily bring about the erosion of relations and even a new crisis in the case of the forthcoming incorporation of the three Baltic states into NATO. Russia still oscillates between instinctive residual hostility towards NATO and pragmatic considerations pushing towards developing positive interaction with the Alliance. Building a consistently cooperative pattern in Russia-NATO relations remains a formidable and challenging task. It is imperative that enlargement does not put this prospect at risk.

NATO ENLARGEMENT: PRAGUE AND BEYOND

F. STEPHEN LARRABEE

NATO enlargement has not been a major issue in transatlantic relations in the last few years. However, President Vaclav Havel's address in Bratislava in May and President Bush's speech in Warsaw in June have changed the dynamics of the enlargement debate and given it new momentum. NATO enlargement is now back on the transatlantic agenda and is likely to stay there for the next 18 months. However, while the debate on NATO enlargement is heating up, a number of ambiguities and unresolved dilemmas remain.

First, the strategic rationale for the next round is not clear. The rationale for the first round – to stabilise Central Europe – was widely accepted within the Alliance as a strategic imperative. But there is no shared consensus about the rationale for the second round. Some Alliance members think it should be to stabilise South Eastern Europe while others feel it should be to complete the stabilisation of Central Europe. Others feel the Baltics should be included.

Second, which candidate will be invited to join still is undecided. With the possible exception of Slovenia, none of the candidates are unequivocally ready to assume the responsibilities of membership, especially in the military sphere. And while Slovenia qualifies on economic and political grounds, adding Slovenia alone does not do much to enhance NATO's military capabilities.

Third, in contrast to the first round, there is no strong European leader on whom the US can rely to do the heavy lifting. In the first round, Germany played a critical role in shaping the NATO debate in Europe. Indeed, NATO enlargement was largely a US-German endeavour. Germany, however, has largely achieved its strategic agenda – the integration of Central Europe. It does not have the same strong strategic interest in further enlargement that it had in the first round. While it will probably support the admission of Slovakia and Slovenia – this would extend the Central European periphery of NATO – the US cannot rely on Berlin to play the role of the “European locomotive” that it played in the first round.

Nor can the US expect leadership from other members of the Alliance. Britain has strong reservations about further enlargement. France is more

interested in strengthening the EU's defence role than in NATO enlargement; it may push Romania's candidacy – at least pro forma – but NATO enlargement is not likely to be an issue high on its foreign policy agenda. Italy favours a southern opening, especially the admission of Slovenia, as do Greece and Turkey. But none of these countries have enough political weight to gain support for their position unless other Alliance members agree.

The Changing Enlargement Landscape

Moreover, the political landscape in Eastern Europe has changed significantly since the Madrid summit. In the period after Madrid, the prevailing view was that the next round would probably include Slovenia and Romania. Slovenia remains a strong candidate. However, Romania's chances have slipped since Madrid, due in large part to the continued infighting within the ruling coalition and a slowdown in economic reform.

Bulgaria's chances have improved somewhat as a result of its strong economic and political performance since the May 1997 elections, which resulted in the emergence of a more democratically oriented reformist government in Sofia. However, Bulgaria still has a long way to go before it is ready for membership, especially on the military side. Moreover, admitting Romania without Bulgaria could leave Bulgaria isolated and could have a very negative impact on the prospects for Bulgaria's democratic evolution.

Slovakia's prospects have also improved. As long as former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar was in power, Slovakia's chances of NATO (or EU) membership were virtually nil. But the election of a democratic government in Bratislava in September 1998 has cast Slovakia's candidacy in a new light. The current government, headed by Mikulas Dzurinda, has embarked on a significant reform path and made membership in NATO and the EU a top priority. As a result, Slovakia has become a strong candidate for NATO membership in the second round.

Finally, the prospects for at least one Baltic state being invited to join the Alliance at the Prague summit have significantly improved. Indeed, the possibility that all three might be invited to join at the summit cannot be excluded. This idea was literally unthinkable at Madrid, where the Baltic states had to fight hard just to be considered eligible for membership at all. Now, however, the Baltic issue is clearly on the table.

US Policy and Objectives

As in the first round, US leadership will be critical. This is especially true because, as noted earlier, there is no European locomotive to pull the European enlargement train the way Germany did in the first round. Thus it will be up to Washington to shape the Alliance debate and provide the political leadership on the enlargement issue.

What position the Bush administration will adopt toward enlargement is not entirely clear. However, in his speech in Warsaw, Bush spelled out an expansive vision of NATO “from the Baltic to the Black Sea” and made clear that the “zero option” was not an option. His speech strongly suggested that the US is thinking in broad geo-strategic terms, even if Washington has not yet formally decided on which specific candidates should be admitted. Moreover, by specifically mentioning the Baltic region and opposing “false-lines,” Bush explicitly rejected the Russian thesis that there was some “red line” which NATO should not cross.

The speech was clearly designed to lay down a marker – that the administration sees an expanded NATO as the cornerstone of European security. His speech suggested that, from the US point of view, the issue now is not whether NATO will expand again but how far and how soon. The administration clearly sees this process of enlargement beginning at Prague, but not ending there. The timing and modalities of expansion still need to be worked out. But the broad outlines of the administration’s vision have now been spelled out. Thus Bush’s Warsaw speech is likely to give new momentum to the enlargement debate, forcing members to focus more concretely on the “who” and “when.”

The Baltic Issue

The most contentious issue is likely to be the question of the admission of the Baltic states. Here there is the possibility of a fault line between the US and some of its key European allies, especially Germany. While there is no clear consensus on the admission of the Baltic states in the US – either in the administration or the Congress – support for Baltic membership has grown significantly over the last two years, and especially in the last six months. Two years ago the idea of Baltic membership in the next round was largely taboo. Today it has increasing support.

Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), the former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, has openly called for admitting the Baltic states and some former officials such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor under President Carter, support admitting at least one

Baltic state in the next round.¹ By contrast, many European members of NATO, especially Germany, oppose or have strong reservations about admitting the Baltic states in the next round, fearing that this could lead to a serious deterioration of NATO's relations with Russia. Thus the Baltic issue could become a bone of contention between the US and many members of the Alliance.

In this debate, Germany's role will be important – perhaps critical. Germany currently favours admission of the Baltic states into the EU, but it is far more hesitant about Baltic membership in NATO. German attitudes, however, are evolving. Recently, two members of the SPD – Peter Zumkley and Markus Meckel openly called for admitting the Baltic states in the next round.² Friedbert Pflüger³, a leading member of the opposition CDU, has also argued for bringing in at least one Baltic state in the next round. While the official German attitude remains hesitant regarding admission of the Baltic states – above all due to fear of the Russian reaction – German reservations could soften if the United States comes out strongly in favour of admitting one or more Baltic states.

The Russian Factor

Russia will be an important factor in the enlargement debate. But it is not likely to play as prominent a role as it did in the first round of NATO enlargement, especially in the United States. The “Russia first” lobby in the US is far weaker today than five years ago. Moreover, the Bush administration has signalled its intention to take a tougher, more “realistic” approach to relations with Russia. Thus Russia's leverage is considerably less than it was in the first round.

Russia continues to oppose enlargement in principle. However, Russia's response is likely to be heavily influenced by which countries are included in the next round. If the next round is limited to Slovenia and Slovakia, enlargement is not likely to have a major impact on NATO-Russian relations. However, the inclusion of one or more Baltic countries would be more problematic – since it would cross an important “red line” which Moscow has sought to impose regarding the admission of former

¹ See Zbigniew Brzezinski, “NATO: The Dilemmas of Expansion,” *The National Interest*, No. 53, Fall 1998, pp. 13-17. See also, Anthony J. Blinken, “NATO Must Grow,” *New York Times*, April 2, 2001.

² SPD-Politiker für NATO-Beitritt der baltischen Staaten,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 17, 2001.

³ Friedbert Pflüger, “Who's Afraid of Round Two?” *The Washington Times*, March 19, 2001.

member states of the Soviet Union and open up the possibility of Ukraine's admission at a later date.

While Russian security concerns should be taken into consideration, Russia should not be given a veto over NATO enlargement. Nor should any country, or group of countries, be excluded because of their geographic location or because they once were part of the Soviet Union. Indeed, a strong case can be made for including at least one Baltic country in the next round of enlargement. Doing so would make clear that there are no "red lines" and that Russia has no veto over the security orientation of any state, even if that state was once part of the Soviet Union. Conversely, excluding the Baltic states could encourage Russia to believe that the West tacitly accepts that the Baltic states are part of a Russian sphere of influence and encourage Moscow to step up pressure on the Baltic states.

Enlargement Options

Conceptually, there are several possible options for the next round.

- *Limited Enlargement.* In this option NATO would enlarge to only 2 to 3 countries in the next round – Slovenia, Slovakia and perhaps Lithuania. This would show that the Open Door was "real". It would be modest enough to be able to achieve an internal NATO consensus. It would also expand NATO in all three geographic directions – South Eastern Europe, Central Europe and Northern Europe – thus ensuring a balanced enlargement. Finally, including Lithuania would underscore that there are no "red lines" and pave the way for the inclusion of the other two Baltic states at a later date.
- *The "Big Bang".* Some observers have suggested that NATO should admit as many as possible of the nine candidates at once. The advantage of this approach is four-fold:
 1. It would avoid an unseemly "beauty contest" among candidates, with some trying to get ahead and elbowing others aside.
 2. It would also avoid a prolonged, acrimonious battle with Russia over enlargement. Having brought in as many of the nine candidates as possible at once, NATO would then be able to move on with its relations with Russia rather than having to fight the same battle over again every few years.
 3. It would avoid having to engage in the time-consuming effort to obtain Senate and parliamentary ratification every few years.

4. It would help defuse the Baltic issue and make it more difficult for Russia to oppose inclusion of the Baltic states.

However, many members of the Alliance are likely to oppose such a radical expansion because it would weaken NATO's coherence and military effectiveness. In addition, it is questionable whether the Alliance could "digest" so many new members at once, without risking political and institutional paralysis. Finally, such a large expansion would make any further enlargement unlikely for a long time and could have negative consequences for countries not included in the second round such as Ukraine or Croatia.

- *A Pause.* A third option would be to explicitly or implicitly declare a "pause" in enlargement. This would give aspirants more time to prepare themselves for membership. It would also give NATO more time to digest the first round and sort out its priorities. Finally, it would give NATO time to try to develop a more stable relationship with Russia. Once this had been achieved, Russia might be more willing to accept another round of enlargement. The disadvantage of this approach is that it would undermine the credibility of the "open door" and could lead to a retreat from reform in some of the candidate countries. Moreover, it now seems highly unlikely, in light of Bush's visit to Brussels and his speech in Warsaw.
- *EU Enlargement First.* In this option, NATO would wait until after the EU had enlarged before expanding again. Like the pause, this would buy time for NATO to sort out its priorities and reengage Russia. It would also make it easier, at least in theory, for NATO and the EU to harmonise their membership. However, it would allow the EU to determine NATO's priorities and policies, which many US Senators would find unacceptable.

Staggered Membership: A possible solution?

The best option might be a combination of the Big Bang and Limited Enlargement. In effect, the Alliance would announce that it intends to enlarge to include all the countries "from the Baltic to the Black Sea" as soon as they are ready to assume the responsibilities of membership. NATO would begin this process at Prague by inviting a limited number of countries – perhaps, Slovenia, Slovakia and Lithuania – and announce that further invitations would be issued at the next summit in 2005. In the meantime, the Alliance would begin membership discussions with the other aspirants, setting target goals that needed to be met by the time of the next summit. Such a strategy would have a number of advantages:

- It would make the “open door” serious and credible.
- It would end much of the uncertainty about NATO’s future and who’s in and who’s out.
- It would not overburden the decision-making process.
- It would give aspirants more time to prepare and an incentive to do so.
- It would make clear that there are no “red lines.”
- It would leave open the prospect that countries such as Ukraine – and perhaps even Russia – could still join some day.
- It would make it easier to coordinate EU and NATO enlargement. While the two processes have different dynamics and requirements, they are part of the same broader process and should be harmonised as closely as possible.

Admittedly, such a process would change the character of NATO over time, making it more of a “political” entity. But NATO is moving in that direction anyway. The main impetus for the creation of NATO – the Soviet threat – has disappeared and a similar existential threat is not likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. Article V will remain an important Alliance mission. However, increasingly the key military requirement for Alliance forces will be deployability and the ability to contribute to crisis management, not collective defence.

**THE EU'S RAPID
REACTION CAPABILITY**

**CEPS-IISS EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM
WORKING PAPER NO. 4**

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY

**CHARLES GRANT
KORI SCHAKE
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INTRODUCTION

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

ate determined that the fourth meeting of the European Security Forum occurred on the eve of the epoch-changing attack of 11 September. Therefore, this summing-up will be somewhat out of the ordinary to the extent that it will attempt to single out those elements of the discussion that may prove of relevance after the hyper-terrorist outrage, while leaving to the side those that have been overtaken by events.

At the outset, the Chairman requested the three paper-givers to take into account, in their oral presentations, three questions:

- What are the EU's rapid reaction capabilities for?
- What budget efforts are required to give this capability substance, as well to keep under manageable proportions the "gap" with the US?
- How serious is the Turkish issue?

Charles Grant, speaking from a European perspective, gave as a clear answer to the "what for" question: aside from the Balkans, the force also has to be able to operate in Africa and the Middle East.

In budgetary terms, the EU's defence budgets are now mainly flat, rather than dropping overall. One particular item of expenditure, the A-400M military transport aircraft, would be indicative of the seriousness (or lack thereof) of ESDP. He deplored the current relatively low public and political profile of ESDP, which is now essentially taken seriously by Defence Ministers – whereas higher-level involvement would make it more likely to resolve contentious issues such as Turkey. On this score, he expected things to get worse before they would get better: Cyprus' prospective entry into the EU in 2004-05 would not be taken gladly by Turkey.

Finally, he noted that the EU's current institutions are less than optimal if one wishes to effectively integrate the impressive array of European soft and hard power instruments.

Dmitry Danilov, from the Russian perspective, made the point that Moscow doesn't work on ESDP or its strategic or military merits, since it is far from clear that ESDP actually exists: Russia's attitudes towards ESDP and its RRC are essentially driven by political considerations: the EU (and ESDP with it) is considered as politically positive insofar that it

further the Russian aim of a “multi-polar world”, and because the Russian/EU (and ESDP) interface helps place Russia in Europe, while partnership with the EU (and ESDP) increases Russia’s voice in Europe.

Kori Schake, the American paper-giver, attributed the Bush administration’s relaxed attitude towards ESDP in part to Prime Minister Blair’s visit to Washington. On this occasion, Tony Blair was understood by his interlocutors as emphasising that ESDP was only about Petersberg tasks, and that the latter were essentially about peacekeeping. This minimalist vision of ESDP was not the one the Clinton administration had been exposed to.

On the autonomous planning issue – which is the bone of contention with Turkey – Kori noted that the US has been doing plenty of autonomous planning on its own in EUCOM, alongside, not inside, NATO. Therefore, there is little reason for the Americans to get excited if the EU wishes to do the same.

In the subsequent debate, a senior ESDP figure confirmed that military budgets were in a steady state. On the planning issue, he noted that Turkey should not be singled out, that some found it convenient to hide behind Ankara. On the substance, he recalled that what was at stake in that discussion were not US assets but collectively owned NATO assets – such as AWACS.¹ Finally, he suggested leaving the scope of Petersberg open to ambiguity, for case-by-case decision-making.

Other participants were highly critical of current European attitudes:

- Why is it so difficult, asked one prominent non-European politician, for the Europeans to put together even the modest capabilities called for in the Balkans (a question that was all the more apposite since on the day of Forum, the Europeans decided not to pick up Colin Powell’s suggestion to make the next, very modest, stage of military involvement in Macedonia a European venture)?
- Why rule out Asia from the high-end of European intervention interjected a European analyst?
- Why is it that Blair’s support and involvement appear to be fading asked yet another European?

However, an official from an EU and NATO country downplayed the consequences of limited high-level support: after all, the show is on the

¹ Subsequent to the 11 September attack, 5 NATO AWACS have been put at the disposal of the US for the protection of US airspace, thus releasing national US AWACS for use in US-led operations in the Indian Ocean.

road, and a compromise would occur with Turkey in time for the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002. As for planning, many European countries used SHAPE as their multilateral venue of choice: national planning by Britain or France posed a problem to such partners who were by definition left out.

Turkish participants, while not expressing unanimous enthusiasm for Ankara's PR strategy, rejected Charles Grant's characterisation of Turkey as "unreasonable and inflexible". The difference between US and EU perceptions of Turkey was underlined: unlike the Europeans, the Americans look at Turkey in a broad strategic perspective.

An interesting debate took place on the emerging division of labour between the US and Europe. One American participant considered that this trend was driven by military and technical reality rather than by political design: interoperability was becoming more and more problematic, as American military transformation, supported by defence spending increases, overtook European efforts. A European participant however also stressed the fact that the US was actually encouraging the EU to think essentially in peace-keeping terms – as confirmed by the account of the Bush-Blair meeting given earlier by Kori Schake. A European official did not accept that any given geographical location could be ruled out (with East Timor being cited here) and Petersberg operations could be of a much higher-risk intensity and tempo than NATO's UN-style collection of arms in Macedonia.

A former US official indicated that a deliberate geographical and functional division of labour would be deeply destructive.

On the issue of access to NATO assets, another former US official pointed out that NATO assets as such were rather limited – AWACS and a totally useless pipeline, as it were – and that what was ultimately at stake was access to US assets. And Mogadishu had proven that even for low-end peacekeeping one needed high-end assets as back up.

In the concluding round of statements by the paper-givers, the following points were made:

- Kori Schake confirmed that the Bush administration actually believes, since the Blair visit, that the EU will essentially confine itself to peacekeeping and that NATO has secured a right of first refusal. She expressed her scepticism vis-à-vis technical fixes to the US-EU gap: DCI is not moving in a promising manner on top-end interoperability, and a major asset such as AGS remains stuck in the mud.

- Dmitry Danilov underlined the prospects of EU-Russia crisis management in the Balkans.
- Charles Grant, in closing, was hopeful that EU policy was gradually replacing national policies in the Middle East. This growing-up of CFSP would be mirrored by the evolution of ESDP. The EU is gradually gaining confidence while in the Balkans the US is pulling back.

A EUROPEAN VIEW OF ESDP

CHARLES GRANT

A Lack of Political Leadership

It has become something of a commonplace to say that the European Union is suffering from a lack of political leadership. Where are the Delors, Kohls, Mitterrands and Thatchers of today? This dearth is especially evident in the specific area of defence policy. For the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is a new and still largely embryonic venture. The progress made over the past three years has been striking, but there is a real risk that the ESDP that finally emerges will be much less impressive or noteworthy than had been promised.

The ESDP's biggest problem is that very few senior politicians are giving it much time or energy. Tony Blair, who together with Jacques Chirac set the ball rolling with the December 1998 Saint Malô declaration, has been strangely silent on European defence since the Nice summit (though the major role taken by UK forces in Macedonia suggests that the Blair government remains committed to the project of European defence). Mr Chirac now appears to have other priorities and interests, while neither Lionel Jospin, Gerhard Schröder, Silvio Berlusconi nor Jose Maria Aznar has ever shown much interest in European defence.

Nor have foreign ministers such as Joschka Fischer, Hubert Vedrine and Robin Cook been great advocates of European defence (it is too early to tell whether Mr Cook's replacement, Jack Straw, will be). The defence ministers have generally shown more interest, with Geoff Hoon, Alan Richard and Rudolf Scharping all making valuable contributions. But much of the hard work of building the ESDP has fallen to senior officials, such as political directors and heads of policy in defence ministries.

This may not be enough to ensure that the ESDP fulfils expectations. Some of the problems covered by this paper – such as the difficulties of enhancing capabilities and dealing with Turkey – are probably not resolvable without some leadership from, or at least support from prime ministers, foreign ministers and finance ministers.

This paper will not focus on US attitudes to the ESDP, for I no longer regard them as a serious problem. Most senior figures in the Bush administration are broadly supportive of what the EU is trying to do. Evidently, some influential voices in Washington oppose the idea of the EU developing military capabilities. But the general line of the Bush

administration appears to be this: if the ESDP succeeds in boosting European capabilities, that is good for the US; and if the ESDP fails to achieve that end, no great harm will have been done. In any case, the US defence establishment has more pressing priorities, such as the Quadrennial Defence Review, missile defence and NATO enlargement.

The Problem of Turkey

Turkey has still not accepted the accord on EU-NATO relations that every other member of NATO – including the US – approved last December. Turkey has demanded the right to be included in the ESDP's decision-making. The EU's response is that Turkey should be involved in the shaping of decisions and the management of operations, when Turkish forces participate; but that because Turkey is not a member of the EU, it cannot claim the right to veto autonomous EU actions that do not involve Turkey.

Because of this blockage, the EU does not have guaranteed access to NATO planning facilities at SHAPE. Furthermore, NATO has to approve any formal contact between EU and NATO officials on a case-by-case basis. This hampers the EU's efforts to build up its military organisation.

Last May the British, with some help from the Americans, seemed to have brokered a deal on Turkish involvement in the ESDP. Foreign minister Ismail Cem accepted a compromise at a Brussels meeting of NATO foreign ministers. But he appears to have been over-ruled by the Turkish general staff when he returned home. Then Greece said that it could not accept the compromise either. Indeed, some of those directly involved in trying to solve this problem complain that Greek positions – such as attempts to restrict the EU's use of NATO assets – are extremely unhelpful.

It is quite possible that Turkish-EU relations will get considerably worse, before they get better. And this has little to do with the ESDP. It now seems likely that Cyprus, without the northern part, will join the EU in 2004 or 2005. This may lead Turkey to annex the north of the island, an act that would be illegal under international law.

The problem of Turkey's role in the ESDP will not be resolved unless those outside Turkey try hard to understand its position. This is rather difficult, because the Turks have – in my opinion – made very little effort to explain their views to policy-makers and opinion-formers. Their PR strategy has been little short of disastrous. Whatever the true merits of the Turkish case, they have come across as unwilling to compromise,

inflexible and unreasonable. This stance has been losing them friends in Europe.

Their chief concern, as far as I can tell, is that the EU might intervene in an area of strategic interest to Turkey – such as Cyprus, the Aegean or the Balkans. If the EU wanted to borrow NATO assets or command structures for an operation, all NATO members would have to give their approval on a case-by-case basis, which means that Turkey would have the power of veto. But it worries about the prospect of autonomous missions, which it would not be able to veto. And Turkey may be concerned that Greece could use its membership of NATO to block a NATO military mission in these sensitive areas, with the result that the EU – soon to contain two Greek-speaking countries – would have to run the operation.

If Turkey continues to block an accord on EU-NATO relations, the EU will have to think seriously about ways of getting round the problem. Building up an EU equivalent of SHAPE would be very expensive. But the EU should strengthen its links with national planning staffs – such as Britain's Permanent Joint Headquarters, or the American headquarters at Stuttgart. It should be fairly easy for the EU to run an autonomous operation through drawing on the expertise of such national planners, without any help from SHAPE.

If the EU did start to develop ways of bypassing NATO, one might suppose that Turkey would see reasons for lifting its veto, and that the US would increase its pressure on Ankara to accept the compromise of last May. And there is not much doubt that if a serious security crisis blew up, the US would be extremely keen for the EU and NATO to collaborate as closely as possible – without obstacles – in handling the crisis.

Turkey has to make a strategic choice that is about much more than ESDP. Does it want to return to the path of *rapprochement* with the EU; or will it continue to allow its chiefs of staff to set its foreign policy priorities? The answer to that question is unclear.

The Problem of Military Capabilities

The EU has much progress to make on building up its military capabilities. The capabilities conference in October will, like its predecessor, review the imbalance between the forces that are required to fulfil the headline goals, and what the governments have offered.

The biggest shortages are on the logistical side: EU members lack sufficient air-lift and sea-lift; transportable docks, communications equipment and headquarters; and intelligence-gathering satellites, aircraft

and UAVs. But there are also some serious gaps at the sharper end of military operations, such as the suppression of enemy air defences, combat search-and-rescue and precision-guided weapons.

These gaps are not only a problem because they limit the scope of any autonomous mission that the EU may wish to undertake. They are also a huge public relations problem, particularly in the US. It is hard for Europeans to answer the question of American sceptics – “where's the beef?” – when many of their governments appear to be doing very little about developing the necessary capabilities.

The EU's success or failure in boosting capabilities can be measured in a number of ways. One criteria is budgets. Both pessimists and optimists can find figures to support their positions. The IISS's *Strategic Survey 2000-01* measures defence spending by the EU-15 in constant 1999 dollars, reporting a decline from \$178 billion in 1997 to an estimated \$147 billion in 2001. But given the shrinking value of the euro over the past three years, any dollar measurement of European defence budgets is bound to show a decline, regardless of whatever real resources governments devote to their armed forces.

NATO provides figures for the period 1995-2000 (with the 2000 figure estimated), based on constant local currencies. These tell a different story: the defence budgets of the European NATO countries (not counting the three that joined in 1999) went up a little from \$184 billion to \$190 billion.¹

George Robertson also says that eight out of the 11 EU members of NATO have raised defence budgets in real terms this year, including Britain, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands (though I note – with regret – that he has not given hard numbers).

More important than the amount of money in defence budgets is how effectively it is spent. And on that criterion, Europe does seem to be making progress. As of next year, France will have an all-professional army. Spain and Italy have begun to abolish conscription. Germany's recent emphasis on building up crisis-reaction forces is having some effect: it does have 500 soldiers available for Macedonia, in addition to some 8,000 already serving in Bosnia and Kosovo. Sweden has restructured its armed forces, reducing from 29 to eight the number of brigades focused on territorial defence, while increasing the forces available for peacekeeping.

¹ My colleague Daniel Keohane has written an article on these budgetary issues, available on the CER website (www.cer.org.uk).

Another way of measuring success is to look at procurement programmes. Britain has taken delivery of its first few C-17 transport aircraft. France recently announced a modest increase in its procurement budget over the next five years. And four EU countries have created OCCAR, an organisation that should improve the efficiency of the management of transnational weapons programmes. In addition, three more EU countries are in the process of joining OCCAR.

The A-400M transport plane – backed by Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Turkey – is a litmus test of whether Europe is serious about the ESDP. If a contract is signed soon, Europe will be showing the world that it is serious about building up its heavy-lift capability. But without a contract, the A-400M project may unravel – and the ESDP would lose credibility.

The arguments over the institutional arrangements for delivering improved capabilities remain unresolved. How should the EU fill the gap between what it needs and what governments offer? How can it ensure that governments meet their pledges? And what are the appropriate mechanisms for generating peer-group pressure? What is at stake is how much the EU's own force planning system should be different and independent from that of NATO. Some of the arguments on this issue have degenerated into the worst sorts of abstract theology.

There is widespread agreement that NATO and the EU should work together closely on capabilities and force planning; and that the EU need not have the same force planning process as NATO, given that the Petersberg missions it envisages are different from much of what NATO plans. What has not been agreed is the composition and the level of the committees that discuss these issues. Another issue is timing: the NATO planning cycle runs over two years, while the EU presidencies rotate every six months.

It might be helpful if the EU agreed to follow the NATO time-cycle, and also if the EU defence ministers met together on a more regular and formal basis, so that they could generate some peer pressure for enhancing capabilities. However, the fundamental problem on capabilities is not constructing the perfect institutional mechanism. It is rather an issue of political will. Either Mr Schröder decides that the ESDP is important, and so he must find enough money to ensure that the A-400M is built – or he does not. And linked to the question of political will is the broader issue of the saliency of European defence.

One socialist member of the Bundestag said to me recently: “Of course I will go on voting for a smaller defence budget. My constituents want

more schools and hospitals, not warplanes. And they are right, there is no military threat out there.” In a sense, he is right. But Germany itself had to take over half a million refugees from Bosnia – which shows the kind of problems the EU will have to face if it lacks the means to manage crises in its near abroad.

The EU and the UN

One issue on which member states do not agree is whether an EU military mission would require a UN mandate. Some say yes, some no and some maybe. Of course this is only relevant for a mission to a country where the local government has not issued an invitation. Both Sierra Leone and Macedonia have invited peacekeepers to their countries.

The EU's various documents on its new defence policy have deliberately left this matter ambiguous. That is probably as it should be. In a crisis, some of the governments that are keenest on a UN mandate will be pragmatic enough to drop their objections. Thus 19 governments supported the NATO military campaign against Serbia, though it went far beyond peacekeeping and had no UN mandate.

A more interesting issue is the extent to which the EU could assist the UN in coping with security crises in places other than Europe. To quote one senior British official, speaking in a personal capacity: “Could the EU give the UN the Rapid Reaction Capability it needs?” The UN can usually raise enough peacekeepers for forces in places such as Eritrea. What it cannot easily do is find the troops for an intervention force, such as that which was required to stop the bloodshed in East Timor.

The US is certainly not going to want to provide such forces to the UN. The EU, however, might be able to provide high-intensity forces, with lift capability and command structures. After the initial intervention, other forces could replace those provided by the EU. All this would be paid for out of the UN budget. Kofi Annan is apparently interested in these ideas – as are, I believe, senior figures in Rome, Paris and London.

Final Thoughts

For all the problems, the EU has made much progress over the past three years. Three important new institutions, the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff, have been established. And despite the lack of political leadership, the idea that the EU should be able to manage a military operation is not opposed by any mainstream political party in the Union, bar Britain's Conservatives.

Whether or not the EU chooses to declare the ESDP “operational” by the end of the year, it is already capable of carrying out small-scale Petersberg missions involving a few thousand troops. And if it was able to draw on NATO assets, it would be able to undertake more ambitious operations. Some of the longer-term challenges that lie ahead include:

- Making sure that the EU can integrate the economic, diplomatic and military sides of its external policy. The current institutional arrangements, with responsibilities split between the Commission and the Council, Coreper and the PSC, and Patten and Solana, are sub-optimal. A potential strength of the EU, compared with other international organisations, is that it should be able to draw upon a wide range of foreign policy tools – ranging from technical assistance, to humanitarian aid, to trade sanctions, to warplanes. At the moment, the EU makes a poor job of coordinating these various instruments, and is weaker as a result.
- The EU has to find effective ways of slotting into the ESDP not only NATO members outside the EU, such as Turkey, but also countries that are in neither the EU nor NATO. Russia, for example, is interested in working with the ESDP. Given that countries such as Russia and Ukraine are unlikely to join NATO for a very long time, they could be offered a meaningful stake in the European security system through some sort of associate link with the ESDP.
- The EU needs to think more about developing common military capabilities, particularly at the softer end of the military spectrum. The budgetary advantages of governments collaborating on, for example, a common fleet of air transport planes, or air-tankers, or UAVs, are potentially huge: each country could save money on bases, servicing, maintenance and training.
- There is also money to be saved through role specialisation. Even the larger European countries cannot maintain every sort of military capability on limited budgets. For example, it would not make sense for several European air forces to separately develop the capability to destroy hostile radar systems.

Moves towards role specialisation or common capabilities would, inevitably, provoke political opposition in several member states, and not only in Britain. This once again illustrates, however, the importance of political leadership: prime ministers and ministers need to sell the benefits of, and the case for, European defence. They are currently failing to do so.

MANAGING DIVERGENCE

KORI SCHAKE

Many opponents of emerging EU defence capabilities, both in the US and Europe, are concerned that it will presage the divergence of US and European military forces. This is occurring, and will continue to occur, whether or not the EU focuses its defence policy and money on meeting the Helsinki Headline Goal. The divergence is primarily a function of the technological and, increasingly, organisational change occurring in US forces. EU states are unlikely to spend the requisite money to keep pace with US transformation (except for Britain and possibly France), largely because they are not concerned with the demanding non-European scenarios driving innovation in US forces.

The important improvements in power projection and forces for peacekeeping underway in the EU as a result of the Headline Goal will benefit US interests by providing a force capable of filling the gap between US-led military interventions and the United Nations standard. Turkey's refusal to allow the use of NATO assets is likely to continue, raising the cost to the EU of pursuing ESDP. However, devising alternatives to "assured access" is likely in the interests of both the US and EU, irrespective of Ankara's actions. If the EU were to emphasise *constructive duplication* – innovative ways to replicate by more cost-effective means the high-end capabilities on which US and NATO forces depend – it would make the use of force by the EU genuinely autonomous. It would also make EU states an even more valuable set of allies for the US because, instead of drawing on assets scarce even in US forces, they would be making a critically important contribution to coalition warfare.

The Bush Administration has taken a much more encouraging approach toward ESDP than its predecessor, but that support is contingent on ESDP developing as outlined by Prime Minister Blair: with a NATO right of first refusal, and missions limited to peacekeeping.¹ Secretary of State Powell, widely considered the architect of the more EU-friendly posture in the Administration, believes he has assurances from his EU counterparts that ESDP will develop "in a way that will be fully

¹ Bush, Blair Joint Press Conference at Camp David, 23 February 2001 (www.usinfo.state.gov).

integrated within the planning activities of NATO.”² This actually secures for the Bush Administration the constrained ESDP that the Clinton Administration's “three d's” policy had been designed to produce.

The Bush Administration is also less interested than its predecessor in the use of military force for conflict management – the Petersberg tasks that ESDP is being designed for – either in or outside Europe. An EU reaction force optimised for peacekeeping would facilitate the Administration's “à la carte multilateralism”, reducing the pressure on the US to become involved by filling the gap between NATO operations and the much less capable standard of the United Nations.³

The Turkish veto remains a wild card in the development of ESDP. Many in the EU explain Turkish objections to the use of NATO assets solely as an aspiration to leverage influence for Turkish accession to the EU, without giving sufficient credence to Ankara's concerns about deployment of EU forces negatively affecting Turkish security. Turkey should be suspicious of an EU role in the Aegean, especially if Cyprus becomes an EU member, and likely has supportable concerns about the EU intervening in the Caspian region, Palestine, or even in support of Kurdish communities. Sanctimonious commentary from the EU about only members being able to influence EU decisions hardly facilitates resolution either.

Nevertheless, Ankara seems oddly unwilling to come to terms, which suggests a more punitive strategy. By preventing the use of NATO planning staffs and other assets, Turkey can potentially force three damaging effects on the EU:

- an expensive duplication of NATO headquarters (which currently number 13,000 staff);
- uncertainty on the part of potential adversaries about whether NATO would reinforce an EU operation; and
- estrangement between the US and EU, as the Bush Administration continues to oppose duplication of NATO planning.

Moreover, these could appear to be problems of the EU's own making, since the EU would have to choose to initiate planning outside of NATO.

² Bush, Blair Joint Press Conference at Camp David, 23 February 2001 (www.usinfo.state.gov).

³ Ambassador Richard Haass, “US Foreign Policy: How Much Change is Possible? How Much is Desirable?”, speech given at the Nixon Center, 28 July 2001.

Whether the US would or could constrain Turkey's options is unclear. The common interests Ankara and Washington have in managing Turkey's neighbours (Iraq, Iran and Syria), and supporting Israel gain Turkey the benefit of the doubt. Americans are more sympathetic than EU states to Turkish concerns about ESDP, more likely to believe the EU should carry over rights that had been provided Turkey in the WEU and very sceptical of the soundness of bringing Cyprus into the EU.

Resolving the Turkish veto would require three unlikely things to happen: 1) the EU to give Turkey full participation in decisions about deployments to regions affecting Turkish security (at a minimum, the eastern Aegean and Cyprus); 2) the US to be willing to provide US assets directly to the EU if Turkey prevents the assignment of assets through NATO; and 3) Turkey to accept that its exclusion from the EU has a legitimate basis in the domestic structures and policies of the Turkish government. None of these three conditions is likely to obtain.

Turkey withholding NATO assets to the EU may, in fact, turn out to be beneficial to the EU, NATO and the US. It will force an end to the politically expedient but potentially catastrophic reliance on "assured access" to NATO – and, implicitly – US assets. The two most important practical problems with the EU relying on NATO assets are:

- To what degree are US assets committed to and planned for NATO, on which NATO operations fundamentally depend, going to be made available for EU operations? and
- Would the use of NATO military capabilities create an implicit obligation on the part of NATO countries?

The very assets the EU will most likely want to rely on NATO to provide are strategic intelligence collection and assessment, theatre reconnaissance, secure communications, airlift, precision strike forces and logistics to sustain deployed forces. These capabilities are very expensive and scarce even in US forces. The EU is unlikely to be able to rely on guarantees of availability for European crisis management of assets that the US also needs for fighting wars and managing crises globally. A real assurance of availability would mean that the crisis management priorities of the EU would take precedence over the other responsibilities and interests of the US.

The Kosovo campaign, although smaller in scope than anticipated Major Theatre Wars, employed nearly the entire allocation of air assets for an MTW and adversely affected US commitments elsewhere. Had the US been challenged in Korea, the Persian Gulf or Taiwan, the US would

have reduced the tempo of operations in Kosovo or, depending on the severity of the contingency, withdrawn altogether as the critical military assets were assigned to those higher priority missions.⁴ If the retasking of US military forces were considered during a NATO operation, it is even more likely that the US would withhold or withdraw them from an EU operation.

The kinds of information and communications technology the US has bought into its military forces for more than a decade have given our military the ability to see the battlefield more precisely from greater distances, transmit information securely to forces more widely dispersed, and acquire targets more accurately. The change has been occurring for a sufficient amount of time that it is beginning to affect how the US organises for, trains, and even thinks about warfare. Maintaining the ability to fight together in transatlantic coalitions will become more difficult as a result of these changes occurring in US forces.

The shrinking US government budget surplus will likely encourage even greater experimentation and transformation. The Bush Administration, Congressional leaders and the military all agree that we cannot execute the current strategy or afford to sustain the current forces. The service chiefs' request for an additional \$100 billion – an additional 1% of GDP! – made their solution out of the question. Even Americans' amazing tolerance for high defence spending will not likely countenance an additional \$100 billion with so little threat to the country. Hard choices will have to be made about priorities, risk tolerance, and other seminal issues; and the Administration cannot equivocate on the choices in a fiscal environment this tightly constrained.

The EU's focus on improving power projection forces – while greatly to be commended – will also aggravate the problem, as the very low rate of commitment to meeting Defence Capability Initiative Goals demonstrates. In the same time frame that EU defence planners will be concentrating on constructing interoperable forces at the lower-end of the conflict spectrum, the US military will be accelerating in its efforts to capitalise on the information and communications technologies that are transforming US operations at the high end of the spectrum.

We should no longer pretend that either the EU or NATO is going to spend its way out of the problem. Money that could be made available through reprogramming – “spending smarter” – has not materialised. The defence budgets on which EU states are operating will not permit them

⁴ US Department of Defense, Kosovo Lessons Learned Report to Congress, p. 120.

the luxury of replicating in the EU the same patterns of military organisation and operation that exist in NATO, even before accommodating the transformation underway in US forces. While indexing EU defence spending in constant dollars is perhaps unfair, the IISS analysis drives home the point that EU defence spending increases are marginal. The dependence of EU militaries on very expensive and scarce US assets cannot be overcome by modest increases in spending unless the EU finds very creative ways to employ force with greater cost effectiveness (and perhaps tolerating greater risk). The EU will simply not be able to employ force the way the US is going to, or even the way NATO currently does.

Which is not to say that the EU cannot, or should not employ force autonomous of NATO and US support. It can and it should. The EU is just going to have to think differently, and much more cost-effectively, about sufficient and sustainable ways of providing capabilities. This would be a painful transition, as it will likely involve relinquishing comfortable ways of doing business that produce jobs and status symbols. But it will gain for the EU a near-term, substantial increase in their capability to meet the Helsinki Headline Goal and successfully conduct the Petersberg tasks.

As an example of how the EU could improve on strategic lift, instead of pursuing the A-400M, perhaps the EU should look into some combination of leased governmental lift from countries like Ukraine and Russia, creating a civilian reserve air and sea fleet program to enlist the commercial lift of EU states for crisis deployments, and pooling funding to purchase existing aircraft. None are solutions as satisfying as developing and buying the A-400M, all the approaches have associated risks, and the project would require intensive multinational planning and tighter integration of EU forces. However, the EU probably cannot afford to meet all the demands of autonomous operations if it does business as expensively as developing the A-400M. Similar solutions are in range for strategic intelligence, theatre reconnaissance, strike forces, and research/development/procurement.

Such a radically different way of doing business would make interoperability more problematic in the near term. NATO would likely have to accept a division of labour corresponding to geographic areas of operation since the US and EU forces would be less able to connect with each other. But a geographic division of labour is surely preferable to a functional division of labour of the sort in evidence during the Kosovo air campaign. NATO's military structure could even – in the long term – end up as the two pillars connected only at the top wished for by many a

French diplomat. But the Atlantic Alliance is strong enough to manage the divergence of US and European militaries as long as NATO continues to have common interests and military forces on both sides of the Atlantic continue to make politically meaningful contributions to coalition warfare.

The status quo of transatlantic military interoperability is not sustainable. Beginning by allocating scarce defence euros to duplicating capabilities that both enhance EU autonomy and reduce the burden on heavily-taxed US military assets creates the prospect of constructive duplication of assets between the EU and NATO. Improving the European Union's ability, and fostering its willingness, to take more responsibility for managing crises with less reliance on the US need not damage NATO. The practical problems are manageable, and trying to sustain the status quo would be equally problematic.

A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

DMITRY DANILOV

Frankly speaking, it appears that Russia is not ready to face the EU's determination to provide for its own operational capabilities in the framework of ESDP. Whereas these new developments have become a matter of high priority in the West, interest in the subject in Russia is primarily confined to academic circles.

Even when the decision was taken by the EU to proceed with the creation of a European rapid reaction capability (RRC) and the Helsinki EU Summit in December 1999 agreed to set the Headline goal of establishing the RRC by the year 2003, there was no strong interest manifested in Russia. This was partly the consequence of Russia focusing its foreign policy on other aspects of security relations with the West that were considered essential (NATO strategy, use of force, role of the UN and OSCE, Chechnya, etc.). To some extent it can also be explained by Russia's scepticism about the EU's stated intention to become a more independent actor in the European security arena, especially in the area of defence policy. Russia's assessment of the situation was further confirmed by events in Kosovo. In any case, the "RRC in 2003" was perceived in Russia as a somewhat exotic notion rather than as an impending political reality. Such a political assessment (or, more precisely, the lack of it) made the special evaluation of the EU's future capabilities of crisis management meaningless. This component of the Western military structure simply was not taken into account by the Russian military planning bodies.

In principle, the RRC could be a matter of direct significance for Russian military policy for two reasons. Firstly, the RRC could be a factor in terms of the military risks it implies or as a destabilising influence in the European political-military situation. Secondly and on the contrary, if Russia's eventual interaction with the RRC could contribute to resolving some of Russia's defence and security problems. Neither of these, however, seems to be realistic.

Operational Assessment of RRC in the Context of Russian Security Interests

Let us consider whether Europe's development of a rapid reaction capability would be considered a military risk by Russia. Notwithstanding the fact that there was obviously no reason for such a

consideration in a military sense (it would seem premature at best for Russia to make corresponding adjustments in its assessment of the Western military power), it was not excluded politically. In fact, in Russia, strongly opposed to NATO's use of force in Yugoslavia and employing anti-western rhetoric, the mood now appears to be concerned with new, additional risks. Conceivably, as a component of the Western military machinery, the EU's future development of a rapid reaction force could pose such a new risk, especially in the context of EU enlargement.

Such an interpretation of the RRC is highly improbable, however, not only from military perspective, but also in light of the content of the present Russian-EU relationship. The prevailing view maintains that the RRC does not present any threat or military danger to Russia. Although Russian attitudes towards the ESDP remained rigid till the autumn of 2000, such an evaluation was voiced informally by some Russian officials including, most surprisingly, high-level generals (for example, General L. Ivashov, then Head of the MoD's General Department of the Military International Cooperation). This position was confirmed definitively by the subsequent official recognition by Russia of the positive nature of the ESDP development.

Another question raised by the RRC is whether it could be useful to Russia in resolving its defence and security tasks. In the medium-term perspective, such an interest would clearly be assessed as rather negligible. Russia does not consider the EU as an operational partner in the CIS space. In other European regions, where Russia might eventually have an interest in being directly involved in crisis management, the RRC doesn't offer any additional advantages. As long as the modalities of Russian participation in European-led operations are not more promising compared to those in NATO-led operations, the latter could even be preferable. Under a scenario in which EU crisis-management capabilities are deployed in a non-European area, where the US does not wish to be involved (Africa, for example), Russia could hypothetically find some interesting opportunities. In situations that did not conflict with its particular political and security ambitions, Russia could act as the EU's partner in military-technical cooperation. This would cost the EU less than if it used American assets and would not be a source of great concern to the US itself, as compared to a cooperative EU-Russian military partnership in Europe. But such illusory and rather modest ad-hoc dividends can't significantly influence Russia's assessment of the RRC's usefulness.

Therefore, Russia cannot consider its defence and security tasks to be directly influenced by or to benefit from the establishment of a RRC.

And, ultimately, this is what determines the specifics of Russia's attitude, compared to other security actors in Europe. It is unnecessary to argue that for the EU itself, the RRC is an indispensable instrument of efficient foreign and security policy. From a US and NATO perspective, it will also contribute to more effectiveness crisis management as a result of enhanced European capacity and responsibility in the Atlantic community as well as optimising its military structures and resources. Specifically, shaping the EU crisis management capability is an important factor in the implementation and credibility of the NATO's CJTF concept. For European countries striving to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, the RRC represents a way to resolve security problems in this area. Moreover, the closer these CEE countries are to EU accession, the more they perceive the RRC as their own instrument. Thus, clear practical interests give visible argument for all these actors to support the RRC project, some differences in their political motivation notwithstanding.

By contrast, owing to lack of such practical interest, Russia's attitude towards the RRC is reduced to its political implications: how will obtaining a RRC change the EU political landscape and the European security architecture and to what extent could these changes correspond to Russian security priorities and aspirations?

Russian Security Priorities in the Context of the RRC Project

Russia, striving for a significant and active role in international policy and European cooperative security, has to take fully into consideration the dynamics and prospective consequences of the ESDP developments, notably its crisis management capabilities. It is also obvious that the EU-Russia strategic partnership, which became the definitive priority in Russian foreign policy under President Putin, made its opposition towards ESDP absolutely excluded. Moreover, in its relations with the EU, Russia has from the very beginning advocated dialogue on international policy and security as well as practical cooperation in these fields. This strategy was emphasised by the new Russian leadership, which expressed the intention to enhance the EU-Russian security partnership, including its military, political and technical aspects. This intention was evidenced by the Joint Statement of the Russia-EU Summit in May 2000: "President V.V. Putin expressed the positive interest towards forming EU security and defence policy" and noted in this respect the existing possibilities for cooperation. A more important result of the next Summit, in October 2000 in Paris, was Russia's step beyond its rather vague policy of simply declaring its interest and "special

attention” in ESDP towards lending constructive support aimed at development of a practical partnership.

There are three general motives that seem to be crucial in explaining Russia's attitude. First, Russia is interested in increasing the EU's political weight, which is consistent with Russia's concept of a multi-polar world. Second, this would increase the potential for a two-sided strategic partnership, which is considered by Russia as especially important for its integration into Greater Europe. Third, the increasing EU autonomy in foreign and security policy in combination with the development of partnership with Russia would bring new opportunities for the latter to reach its security aims and to strengthen its own voice in Europe. Examination of the ESDP/RRC through the combined lens of these three main motives gives Russia compelling arguments to support these EU activities.

First of all, Russia recognises the significant importance of the EU developing its own crisis management capabilities for its appearance as the political power, namely in the European security arena. This “militarised” EU is not a factor in Russian defence concerns as much in a functional sense (being about the Petersberg tasks and far from collective defence), as it is in an operational sense (limited operational capacity). Moreover, paradoxically and more significantly, an EU with its own RRC would be a factor of demilitarisation of international relations: the EU military dimension will take auxiliary role in the broad security policy – in contrast with NATO, where military activities are the core of security management. This EU's broad approach to security, which is clearly manifested in the ESDP development, makes it a more attractive partner of Russia, compared with NATO.

Russia also proceeds from the premise that in order for the EU to be a strong political and security player, it has to strengthen the relationship with Russia. On the one hand, this would favour managing Russian security policy in a cooperative way. On the other hand, taking into account that Russia could not only be important in the security field, but also an equal partner (unlike many other cooperation areas where an imbalance is typical), this dimension of cooperation could be essential for promoting the strategic nature of the EU-Russia partnership in general.

Russian Aspirations: (In)compatibility with EU Interests

At first sight, Russian and EU interests with respect to RRC coincide in the main, considering the EU's ambition to obtain a greater role as a political and security player as well as to strengthen its partnership with Russia. In expressing its readiness to support the ESDP/RRC, however,

Russia is looking to gain certain objectives that don't necessarily correlate with EU interests.

Russia would like to influence EU crisis-management capabilities in a manner that would correspond with the criteria that are asserted by Russia in its dispute with the West. It also seeks cooperation in this area based on the principles of equality, including common decision-making. Taking into consideration that the ESDP is in the formative stage and, consequently, the EU could be relatively flexible in shaping its crisis-management capabilities, Russia is trying to attain compatibility of its aspirations with the development of ESDP/RRC. It is thought that the EU could and should take into account serious mistakes that, from Russia's point of view, have been committed by the West (NATO) in Yugoslavia with regard to the modes and methods of the use of force as well as to its relations with Russia. It is also believed that the EU is sufficiently interested in securing cooperative relations with Russia and its support of ESDP/RRC to avoid the emergence of serious differences with Russia and respond to its main concerns. Thus, Russia is trying to activate practical cooperation with the EU in the context of the emerging RRC in order to increase Russian ability to influence it.

But that is exactly what apparently is inducing the EU to refrain from instigating greater cooperation with Russia owing to still significant differences in their respective approaches towards ensuring European security, especially in crisis management. Strengthening Russia's voice in the ESDP and RRC would have put the EU in the position of broadcasting these Russian-Western differences into these matters. It is quite obvious that the EU doesn't want to risk making its new-born child – ESDP/RRC – the hostage to these differences. The EU is not only concerned with considerable or excessive Russian influence on a RRC, but would prefer to exclude it altogether, in the near-term at least.

Moreover, the instrumental significance of the ESDP/RRC for the security policy of Russia, which would like to channel the development of the European crisis management potential towards the mainstream of Russian interests, is in contrast to the EU's emphasis on its practical aspects. In an attempt to avoid this inherent conflict, EU doesn't rely on practical cooperation with Russia, even if the latter possesses military capabilities that are attractive for EU-led operations in principle and that are proposed by Russia. The matter of key importance for the EU is cooperation with NATO/US in order to get access to their assets to fill RRC shortages. Establishing practical cooperation with CEE countries that are not members of the EU or NATO is also, unlike Russia, a matter of importance for EU owing to its enlargement policy and their

association status in the EU/WEU. As a result, for EU the development of practical co-operation with Russia, as well as for Russia itself, could be mainly instrumental. But unlike Russia, the EU has no visible political impetus to rely upon this cooperation. Furthermore, it could aggravate the EU's difficulties with regard to obtaining its ESDP priorities and operational goals, as testified by the difficulties experienced in reaching the EU-NATO agreement on access to Alliance assets. One could argue that this has become a "technical" obstacle for the elaboration of the modalities of the third countries' participation in EU-led operation. But in the Russian case the implications seem to be more serious. Due to the key significance of the Atlantic aspect in the EU policy towards its crisis management capabilities, the EU couldn't risk jeopardising the NATO/US supportive attitude towards ESDP by "excessive" *rapprochement* with Moscow.

Policy Implications

As a result of these differing motives, Russia and EU have exchanged their roles after the Paris Summit. Before the Summit, the vagueness of the Russian position towards ESDP limited the prospects for political security cooperation with EU. But now, on the contrary, Russia stands up for strengthening cooperation and for its moving into practical interaction on an equal basis, including in future European crisis management operations; and for adequate structuring of the EU – Russia security relationship – that equals at least, the institutional level of the NATO – Russia dialogue.

On the other hand, the EU, having obtained Russia's political support for ESDP/RRC, does its best to limit Russian influence and stresses the autonomy in its decision making when it comes to deploying the RRC. To some extent, Moscow, when negotiating with the EU its participation in the Petersberg operations, strengthens the perception, that it could be some source of trouble for the EU. Russia consistently proposes, firstly, to delineate the geographical boundaries of future operations (read: area of responsibility); secondly, to commit itself to conduct such operations under UN SC mandate. This is a clear reflection of the Russian post-Kosovo position towards crisis management intervention.

How to reconcile this position and deployment of the RRC in a pragmatic way? The EU in any case will neither have capabilities, the political ability, nor the political will to undertake unilaterally any action as in a Kosovo scenario. Also, the EU repeatedly committed itself to act in accordance with the UN Charter and other basic international agreements. But the EU can't restrict its RRC geographically, because the "area of

responsibility” of the CFSP is not reduced to the European integration space. As the approach to crisis management of Europeans, allied in NATO, is different from the Russian one, it is also hard to believe, that they renounce it in the framework of the EU – Russia dialogue. In other words, the Russian preoccupation with the deployment of the RRC is far from just a contingency plan because politically the EU couldn’t answer Moscow in a satisfying way. At the same time they push partners apart, limiting their practical co-operation.

This Russian duality is in fact proof of the suspicion of Moscow’s counterparts, that there remain motives to counter pose the “good West” (EU) to the “bad West” (NATO/US) in Russian approach. It is true, that in Russian political debates the perception of the European security and defence identity as a counterbalance to NATO, existed. But now Moscow understands more clearly, that the “European project” is definitely developing in the framework of Atlantic solidarity and Alliance, and the access to NATO capabilities is conditional for RRC to be credible. The problem is that this understanding is not put in the right manner into practical policies, especially as a result of remaining differences between Russia and NATO. So, the EU is considered by Moscow as a more appropriate partner than NATO, with RRC establishment opening the possibility to develop the co-operation on crisis management with the West from a clean page. These Russian aspirations strengthened due to the political crises that erupted after-Kosovo between Russia – NATO, having induced Russia to bring new dynamics into the security dialogue with the EU. But having succeeded in this, Russia faces the situation, where the development on this base of co-operation in crisis management is hindered by lack of due progress in its relations with NATO, which are, in turn, determined to a large extent by the content of Russian-American relations. Their aggravation, decrease of the Russian weight in the US foreign policy would make Europeans face a more pressing choice between US and Russia, damaging EU – Russia security relations. So, to be successful, Russian striving for their stepping up has to be combined with a course for consolidation of positive dynamics of the relations with US and NATO. This course would meet strong support among Europeans.

Thus, Russian attempts to establish some kind of “special relationship” with the EU in crisis management and to succeed in this by changing the respective Western approaches, seem unsuccessful. Furthermore, they could result in the opposite effect, increasing Atlantic accents in policy of Europeans. From the practical point of view, these attempts are also far from realistic, if to take into consideration limited EU’s operational

potential and its integral role in the Euro-Atlantic security structure, and especially its reliance on NATO. So, the qualitative progress in the NATO – Russia security cooperation is of key importance for the establishment of the workable EU – Russia mechanisms of crisis management.

There is a growing understanding of this dialectic in Russia. It is symptomatically, that the idea of the tri-lateral NATO- EU – Russia co-operation in crisis management has been voiced firstly (but unofficially) by Russian diplomats. However, this demonstrates Russia's in principle readiness to co-operate on an equal footing with all interested partners, as well as the fact that there are no anti-NATO motives in the Russian position towards the EU – Russia crisis management interaction. In practice, Russia is rather unable to explore constructively such a relationship formula owing to remaining differences with NATO and particularly on the eve of the challenge "2002" of NATO enlargement. So does the EU, which, firstly, didn't settle the issues of its own interaction with NATO and which, secondly, doesn't want to actualise the problem of the Russian participation in the Petersburg operations before RRC is in disposal, i.e. at least until 2003-04.

Some Prospects

The most likely near-term scenario of EU-Russia co-operation on crisis management issues will be a development of the political dialogue in this field without visible progress in practical co-operation. This trend has been evidenced already by the results of the Russia-EU Moscow Summit in May 2001, where besides the rhetoric about the significance of the mutual partnership one could find the European stand up to keep restraining from meeting Russian aspirations for practical co-operation in the context of the RRC formation. After they succeeded in getting Russia's loyalty, Europeans are focused now on its consolidation. The Summit decision "to intensify the security policy dialogue, including on the work of the EU on military and civilian crisis management" should be sufficient to support the status quo.

But Russia apparently will keep itself to holding its higher-standards position of concretising the crisis management co-operation, including establishment of the appropriate mechanisms of common activities. At the same time, Russia, most likely, will not be too persistent, acknowledging the shortages of the EU potential, as well as existing impediments (first of all, coming from Russia – NATO angle), as well as the importance to progress towards other partnership areas, considered to be essential. However, after stepping over the lines "2002" (i.e. reviewing

the enlargement process by NATO) and “2003” (i.e. reaching the headline goal by the EU), Russia, if not satisfied with the level and format of the political and security co-operation with the EU, could become the aggravating factor for practical application of the new peace-keeping forces of the EU. So, it would be logical to look forward to some EU steps to come closer to the approach of Russia, which could be an important political partner of the EU, but also an attractive military-technical one.

In this respect, the logic of the EU, arguably, when working on RRC, that its application is conditioned by its availability, could be extended to co-operation with Russia. Indeed, EU and Russia have no instruments for eventual common crisis management actions. To take decisions about the possibility and necessity to act in common, preparatory work is needed to shape the adequate mechanisms of consultations and, perhaps, of decision-making, on contingency planning of common operations, on interoperability, including the joint exercises etc. Respective proposals has been tabled by Moscow on the eve of the EU – Russia Summit in May, 2001. Such a practical co-operation could be organised before the deadline of 2003. It would not undermine the EU crisis management autonomy while would allow to rely, if and when it would be the mutual interest and agreement to act, upon created instruments of interaction. Beyond these practical considerations, one could find also political advantages. Firstly, this would ensure more consistent support of the EU component of crisis management by Russia. Secondly, this would become strong instrument for strengthening the EU – Russia partnership as a whole. Thirdly, this would inevitably promote the development of the Russia – NATO relations and interaction.

**THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE WORLD ORDER**

**CEPS-IISS EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM
WORKING PAPER No. 5**

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY

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INTRODUCTION

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The horror of the unprecedented terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and against the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, changed the agenda of international security in many respects. It was therefore essential for the European Security Forum to address the consequences this change was having on European security in the first meeting after the events. At the time of this meeting, the military campaign against terrorism was still in its early stages in Afghanistan, with uncertainty over the duration and effectiveness of air attacks. The discussion focused on three main aspects: 1) implications for Europe's alliance with the US, 2) strategies vis-à-vis Middle Eastern countries and 3) the importance of values for the long-term success of the war.

The first speaker, David Gompert, defined the strategic task the US and others were facing as reacting to the "failure" of 11 September in a way that would keep both safety and values intact without triggering an adverse escalation of the fundamental problems that exist in the wider Middle East, or even triggering a "global civil war" as Osama bin Laden may have been hoping. This required a long-term strategy to reduce vulnerability to large-scale terrorism, mainly through improved law enforcement and intelligence efforts as well as civil and infrastructure protection. In addition, a process of reform, political openness and renewed legitimacy would be required in the Middle East to remove the roots of terrorism. Such a long-term strategy could only be pursued effectively in a multinational manner, not unilaterally by the US. The US-European link had to be at the heart of this effort, setting a role model for a more equal and more global joint approach to international security.

Alexei Arbatov underlined from a Russian viewpoint that the strike against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan had become a test case for the wider war against terrorism and therefore needed to succeed. He suggested that Russia had emerged as the principal political partner for the US with a broad potential for improved cooperation. However, President Putin had to be able to show positive results lest he may be forced to turn away again from his Western course. Russia therefore would have to be involved in the planning of operations and in post-war arrangements, and receive Western support for strengthening its own defence against the new threats. In his analysis of the emerging strategic situation in and around Afghanistan, Arbatov stressed the dangers of Pakistan's nuclear

arsenal getting out of control and the need to rebuild Afghanistan economically to replace the drug trade.

François Heisbourg provided a systematic interpretation of the extent and nature of the “epochal” strategic change since 11 September. The reality of existential terrorism had accelerated the end of the post-Cold War era. Russia had shifted closer to the West. The vulnerability of developed societies had been demonstrated, as had the problem of failed and dysfunctional states. Europeans would have to pick up more of the burden in the Balkans. In the mid- and long-term, there had to be an expectation of violent change in the Middle East. NATO’s old rationale, the automatic defence of Europe by the US, was dead. NATO had gained a new role in non-Article 5 operations, but after the Kosovo campaign the US would be unlikely to ever again tolerate a parallel chain of command through NATO. All this came at a time when the EU was at a crucial point in defining its future identity, role and structure. Europe’s reaction after 11 September had been schizophrenic: Instead of displaying a common position, Europe had turned to its national leaders and their bilateral links to Washington. At the same time, extraordinary new initiatives of deep European integration such as the European arrest warrant proved possible in the field of justice and home affairs, doing away with national sovereignty. In defence, however, there was no readiness for moving beyond the limitations of the Petersberg tasks and for increased spending. Finally, Mr. Heisbourg pointed to the weakness of the “coalition” in the war against terrorism. It was not a coalition at all, certainly not akin to the Gulf War coalition. Instead, the US had chosen to be alone in the lead, with some consultation. He suggested that a restatement of the values that bind the US and its worldwide allies together in the new era of existential terrorism, like the Atlantic Charter that was proclaimed by Roosevelt and Churchill in 1941, would provide both legitimacy for the joint effort and guidance for shaping the new era, especially vis-à-vis the Middle East. Authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia should be put on notice that in exchange for ensuring their security they will have to abide by a set of rules that imply major change.

In the discussion, American participants underlined that the US strategy in the ongoing war against terrorism was unilateral only in respect of military operations – because this was a case of self-defence – but not as matter of principle. It was multilateral in all other respects. Those who feared that the US commitment in the wider Middle East would be ephemeral ought not underestimate the degree of change in the US mind. Americans felt they had been forced to go to war and were now prepared to reliably engage in a long-term effort.

One participant suggested what was truly new since 11 September was that for the first time a non-state actor had had a major strategic impact by exploiting a new dimension of asymmetric warfare. Other discussants pointed to the achievements and further promises of the ongoing military transformation in US defence for coping with this kind of challenge. It was suggested that the US needed to promote a better understanding of the quality and strength of its own asymmetric war-fighting capabilities – with rapidly deployable, versatile forces with effective force protection and precision-strike capabilities – to prevent an unnecessary and damaging downscaling of political objectives vis-à-vis the terrorist challenge in spite of having both legitimacy on one's own side and control of unprecedented military capabilities. Regarding the desirable scale of military objectives in Afghanistan, one discussant warned that conquering and holding territory and taking control of the capital would be of limited value unless one could be certain that one would eventually leave it in better shape.

On the transatlantic alliance, it was remarked that there was no equality between US and EU – especially not in military capabilities – but that there were common interests. It was noted that Europeans were disappointed over the US rejection of their offer of direct military support under Article 5, and that for political reasons the US should have been more open to such a multilateral framework. Several European participants suggested that European NATO countries needed to strengthen their military capabilities and increase outlays both for internal and external security. Also, it was felt that with the new unity of effort in the war against terrorism, ESDP would have to move into collective defence because the “Petersberg world” could not be separated anymore from the “Article 5 world”. One speaker suggested that once European defence would face up to the military implications of the large potential security risks in the Middle East, similar military transformations as already underway in the US would be required in Europe. Then there would be a new opportunity to work together in NATO to get right.

Since 11 September, the EU – and especially the European Commission – found themselves thrown into the security realm, including issues such as critical infrastructure protection. Several participants stressed that the EU could do more in support of the war against terrorism in home and justice affairs, especially with respect to the control of illicit financial transactions. These efforts were seen as a likely impulse for institutional change and more integration in the EU.

Some discussants proposed that to win respect in a Middle East context it was essential to avoid any impression of weakness and to employ

overwhelming force even if this was not “politically correct”. One Russian participant commented that overwhelming force had not been a successful, stabilising strategy in Chechnya. Others felt that it would also undermine support in Western societies. It was accepted that in response to the virtually open-ended threat of Al Qaida terrorism to kill Americans wherever, the concept of proportionality would indeed allow very intense levels of force. However, efficacy and political sustainability were likely to put the focus on special operations forces, not just in the case of the US.

The war against terrorism was also seen to have a public relations aspect as an effort to win the hearts and minds of people both at home and vis-à-vis the Islamic world. The latter, as one participant remarked, did not just consist of foreign countries but was also present in European cities. It was observed that most of the Muslim world was apparently still in a state of denial and was not facing the question why Islamic societies had produced this extreme form of terrorism. While there was a recognition that improved welfare and education in those countries would be desirable, most participants felt that it was above all the deficit of democracy and its underlying values that was causing the problem in societies where dissent was only possible through violence and under the cloak of religion.

Several speakers thought it was necessary to define rules for dealing with authoritarian regimes in the wider Middle East that were supportive of the fight against terrorism or were otherwise helpful, such as Saudi Arabia for energy supply security. One speaker wryly commented that this was a case of A.O.S. – all options suck. A realistic view, it was claimed, would recognise that Islamic societies were not ready for the imposition of democratic values, and any such attempt would risk provoking the wrong results. Others blamed such a narrow realist approach for the present problems and stressed that it was conceptually insufficient for coping with the challenges of relations with Islam. Several speakers underlined that the community of democratic societies would not possibly have the required staying power for sustained joined efforts if the population were not driven by idealism and shared values. No part of the world was off limits for universal values. There was no reason to assume that Islam and democracy couldn't coexist. As elsewhere, the rise of the middle classes with their economic, political and legal demands would likely lead to democratic change. One participant reminded discussants to be inclusive in this context and not to speak of “Western” values as this would undermine the anti-Islamist efforts in secularised, moderate Muslim societies.

At the end of the meeting, there was – on the one hand – a feeling that the still uncertain, unfolding events in the war in Afghanistan would determine the future course of many of the issues discussed. On the other hand, there was agreement that since the attacks of 11 September old rules and priorities had clearly changed, as reflected in the determined, impressively well-focused actions taken by governments on the national and international level since then. In many respects, however, it remained unclear which systemic and institutional consequences the new era would generate. It was clear, though, that the quality of political interaction and cooperation between North America and Europe, including Russia, would be one of the crucial factors that would shape this new era.

THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD ORDER: A EUROPEAN VIEW

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

1. The End of the Post-Cold War Era

If the Gulf War of 1990-91 was a “defining moment” – one in which countries had to take sides – 11 September 2001 was much more, a “transforming moment”: not only was there an obligation to stand up and be counted, but with the advent of hyperterrorism, the post-Cold War era itself came to an abrupt end. Before discussing the implications of this “transforming moment”, two preliminary remarks are in order.

The first is that there is more that we do *not* know about the post-September 11 world than there are areas of firm knowledge; we may know that the world is being transformed, but we do not know what the world is being transformed *into*. The complex interaction between traditional nation-states, failed states and non-state actors (from humanitarian NGOs at one end of the spectrum to the hyperterrorist multinational al-Qaeda at the other) will eventually produce a redistribution of rules and roles, the nature of which is as difficult to divine as it would have been for a European of 1618 to predict the content of the Treaties of Westphalia closing the Thirty Years War in 1648-49. In the current era of globalisation, we know that the Westphalian order is being fundamentally redefined; and September 11 opens a new and spectacular phase of that redefinition: but we cannot know what the ultimate result will be. Simply, it would be more than surprising if state sovereignty, as defined in 1648-49 survived more or less unscathed, and if the states continued to be characterised by their “triple monopoly” on the coining of money, the rendering of justice and the use of armed force. Any European or, in very different circumstances, any African, will recognise the strength of the trend away from that definition of the state’s core business.

Unfortunately, one of the few things that the attacks of September 11 and the follow-on events have irrefutably taught us about the future world order is that groups of human beings are both willing and able to visit acts of mass destruction on humankind for purposes other than those classified as political in the Clausewitzian sense.

The second remark is that on the eve of September 11, there were numerous signs that the post-Cold War era (1990-2001) was drawing to an end. What September 11 has done is to close that epoch with a horrid bang rather than in soft and easy stages. And the very brutality of the close will make the new era rather different from what it would otherwise have been. To summarise, on the eve of September 11, the end of the post-Cold War era was approaching notably through the following trends:

- Globalisation, with its empowerment of cross-border non-state actors operating in highly interdependent and vulnerable post-industrial societies.
- The multiplication of both failed states (mostly in Africa but also in Asia, with Afghanistan standing out) and dysfunctional states (most clearly the dictatorships of the Greater Middle East, increasingly incapable of rising to the political, social and economic challenges of globalisation).
- America's unilateralist drift, moving towards institutional practices and foreign policy profiles akin to those corresponding to the first 150 years of the US Republic, a trend described by Bob Zoellick in his article in the Autumn/Winter 1999 issue of *Survival*. In the defence arena, the experience of the Kosovo war, the new US unilateralism and European conduct were leading to a situation of de facto division of labour between the US and Europe, eroding the traditional NATO ethos of risk-sharing.
- The beginning of a Russian attempt to modernise *with* the West, rather than against the West in a latter-day version of a multi-polar union of "proletarian nations". By the summer of 2001, this trend included the tentative mention of the possibility of Russia joining NATO by President Putin and Chancellor Schröder.
- The European Union's progress towards a make-or-break situation, with an unsustainable contradiction between the advent of the euro, the enlargement towards the new democracies and the absence of meaningful institutional political reform.

September 11 has accelerated some of these changes while recasting others in a new light.

2. The Acceleration of History

In the "accelerating" category, I will single out from a European perspective, the following:

- the death of old NATO,

- “crunch-point Europe”,
- the Russian *rendez-vous* with the event and
- the Middle East implosion.

These are not exclusive of other acceleration processes notably in the economic sphere (e.g. the aggravation of the global economic slowdown).

a) Announcing *the death of NATO* obviously contains an element of exaggeration, if only because the Atlantic Alliance will continue to exist and, indeed, quite possibly prosper. But in several respects, the “old” NATO has truly been killed off:

- Given the experience of the Kosovo air war, many observers considered that NATO would never again be allowed by the US to run a major military operation in which the US would be bearing the bulk of the burden. These views were reinforced by Wesley Clark’s book. The competition between the national US chain-of-command and the NATO chain-of-command plus the difficulties of running a war in a committee of 19: these factors have convinced the Americans that whenever possible, something simpler would be in order. For those who were not convinced of this before September 11, the “don’t call us, we’ll call you” conclusion of the September 27 NATO Defence Ministerial may have come as a shock. Nowadays, NATO is running Macedonian-style peacekeeping operations, which are the sort of thing which used to be done by the UN.
- In the same way that the Kosovo air campaign was NATO’s first and last major war, Article V may have been meaningfully invoked for the first and the last time on September 12. The Europeans did well, vis-à-vis the US, to call upon Article V: this initiative may prove to be of durable help in avoiding a post-“Enduring Freedom” US lapse into withdrawal. But all of us – the Europeans, the Americans – also ensured that Article V means “pick and choose”, creating no more than the presumption (not the obligation) of active military assistance.
- Finally, US commitments after September 11 will naturally enough lead to a greater European share in the Balkans burden, presumably with assured access to NATO assets. One of the ironies of history is that the access issue has been posed in practical terms for the first time since the 1996 Berlin Summit with its “separable but not separate” principle, to the advantage of the US, not to the Europeans.

As was fitting, Washington secured unstinting access to NATO assets (notably the transfer of NATO AWACS to US airspace, releasing USAF

AWACS to the Indian Ocean). The Europeans will presumably benefit from this precedent. *En attendant*, the trend towards a US-European division of labour is confirmed, to the detriment of the risk-sharing ethos of “old” NATO.

In summary, NATO is no longer a defence organisation, but a security and defence services institution. In itself, this is not negative: indeed, enlargement to the Baltics and possibly to Russia, should be made politically more palatable by such an evolution. The accession of the Baltics to the new NATO can no longer be construed by Moscow as a threat; and Russia’s accession may be more acceptable to China under the new circumstances.

But let us not forget: this is truly a different NATO; the old one is dead.

b) “*Crunch-point Europe*” needs comparatively less explaining, since well before September 11th it was clear, after the debacle of the intergovernmental conference in Nice last year, that the institutional status quo would be unsustainable – that the 2004 convention would be crucial. However, September 11th has dramatised the situation further, although it has not clarified it:

- On the one hand, in the fight against hyperterrorism, the EU dimension has proven to be a major asset vis-à-vis actions confined to nation states: the decisions taken by the EU on 20-21 September (and notably the European arrest warrant) have proven, even to the most dyed-in-the-wool eurosceptics, the relevance of transfers of sovereignty including in an area as “Westphalian” as the exercise of judicial authority.
- On the other hand, nation states, not the EU institutions, have been emotionally and politically in the lead in the reactions to events of September 11. Furthermore, those national reactions were not tightly coordinated during the first two months after the attacks: Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder and the Chirac-Jospin diarchy did not generally operate in tandem. The three-way meeting on October 19 in the margins of the Ghent Council only served to underscore the split between EU members. The somewhat broader meeting in London on November 4 (six EU countries represented plus the Belgian EU presidency and the CFSP High Commissioner) didn’t really help to correct the impression.

c) *The Russian rendez-vous* with the West has been particularly spectacular and has deservedly drawn much comment, which I need not elaborate upon. I will only make one observation here. President Putin has clearly taken a real political risk in helping open the door of Central

Asia to the US (Americans, as the crafters of the Monroe Doctrine, should have little trouble understanding that Moscow's green light was of material importance in securing the cooperation of the states of Central Asia). It is to be hoped that the US will reciprocate, particularly on the issue of the ABM Treaty: for Moscow, it is essential that a treaty framework continues to exist in the field of strategic nuclear arms control on both offensive and defensive systems. The Russians can accept missile defence; but they can hardly take on board a non-legally binding "new framework" as defined by President Bush in his NDU speech of 1 May 2001. Given the Europeans' agreement with Russia on the importance of legally binding commitments, an American refusal to compromise on this issue could have serious transatlantic consequences.

d) *The Middle East implosion.* The Greater Middle East is one of few parts of the world where there has been essentially no political, economic and social change during the last thirty or forty years with the limited, and hardly encouraging exception of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979). The progress of globalisation is making this time-warp ever less sustainable. There are many reasons for this situation, most of which spring from the region itself. However, the West also has a major responsibility. The US, through its cynical support of Saudi Arabia, one of the most regressive and benighted states on this planet; Europe, through its own brand of so-called *realpolitik*, has not been shy in its support of some of the world's most repressive regimes. Human rights and democracy were somehow left off the scope in the area extending from the Sahara to the Indus.

Central and Eastern Europe, East Asia, Latin America, even Africa, have been treated in a less cynical and counterproductive manner. We are now reaping the return on our investment. Osama Bin Laden refers himself to the ideological-religious roots of the Wahhabi regime to denounce the "hypocrites" in power in Saudi Arabia. He has based his platform – and appeal – on the West's consistent – and until now – successful attempts to maintain the status quo in the region: French intervention saved the House of Saud in 1979, the US and Western forces did so more visibly in 1990-91. We were spared from dealing with the consequences of the fall of an Arab version of the Soviet Union (Saudi Arabia is an artefact created in the 1920s on the ideological basis of militant Wahhabism). We now have to cope with Wahhabi hyperterrorism and may yet have to pick up the pieces of an imploding Saudi/Soviet Arabia.

Change in the Middle East is as inevitable as it has been in Latin America, East Asia and the ex-Soviet empire, areas in which comparatively principled, value-based, policies by the West from the

mid-1970s onwards have favoured transformation which have been generally peaceful (with Yugoslavia and Chechnya standing out as the exceptions, not the rule). Unfortunately, we have no such basis to work on in the Middle East. However, it is not too late to start: the EU and the US can, and should, make it clear, hopefully together, that we expect that the rules enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights – which these countries have signed – will eventually prevail, that these states should expect to come under substantial pressure not to remain the spawning grounds of repression, hate and, ultimately, hyperterrorism. A value-based declaration of principles from the West would be an act of enlightened self-interest. Admittedly, this is easier said than done; but done it must be if we want to have at least the embryo of a chance that change in the Middle East will not be exceedingly radical in the long term (extremism being probably inescapable in the short term). We simply cannot base our policy on the assumption that the status quo, and particularly the Saudi status quo, will continue to prevail.

This assumption that wrenching change will occur in the Middle East has defence implications. The Europeans, like the Americans, may well have to cope militarily with upheaval in the region in the short to medium term. This is a change from the pre-September 11 situation in which concerns about the Middle East were focused on the conduct, or misconduct, of Iran and Iraq, rather than on systemic change. If this new reading is correct, the Europeans need to break with the post-Cold War “peace dividend” era: defence spending needs to increase. In particular, Europe’s rapid reaction capability, which has been tailored for Balkans-type contingencies, should be upgraded both in terms of its missions (Petersberg rules as currently defined are too narrow) and its capacities (notably in terms of lift and C4ISR). This will cost money, as will the improvement of European force readiness levels. Without additional defence spending, Europe will simply not be able to provide significant forces alongside US forces in the Middle East, with a satisfactory level of interoperability.

Coping with the evolution of the Middle East is an issue in which the perils of US-European – or of intra-EU – divergence would be particularly damaging. This consideration leads to the last point.

3. From US Superpower to Fortress America?

Many observers have jumped to the conclusion that post-September 11 coalition-building is a sure sign that the US will now commit itself to an engaged, multilateral, posture on the world stage, breaking with the first months of the Bush administration. Such a multilateral outcome would be

desirable for the world, which can hardly be managed without the active engagement of its militarily and economically strongest member. However, it would be premature to assume that such an evolution is inevitable. First of all, much can go wrong in the conduct of the war against hyperterrorism. It is also all too easy to conjure up scenarios in which the US draws into itself, for instance after a US-Europe split resulting from a unilateral US initiative to broaden the war to Iraq or Yemen on the basis of not entirely convincing evidence. Second, and without having to generate scenarios, the fact is that the current anti-terrorist array is not a coalition comparable to that which functioned during the Gulf War. Many US partners, including Saudi Arabia, are already on the verge of neutrality (see inter alia Saudi official statements on the war in Afghanistan and government-sponsored funding drives for the victims of the “American” war); and traditional European allies, for a variety of reasons, are peripheral to the war effort (their contribution, and this remark includes the UK, to the war is much less than during the Gulf War).

This is entirely understandable given the nature of the aggression and of the corresponding anti-terrorist operation: but such a state of affairs does not clearly promise a more multilateral post-war world.

Third, and most importantly in the long run, we don’t know what conclusions the US people will draw after the war. The level of aggression the US has been subjected to is in part at least a consequence of the role it is seen to play in world and regional affairs as a superpower: thus, bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa centres on the US-Saudi nexus. The temptation may well arise that a 1920s-style policy, not of isolationism (that came with the Depression) but of non-alliance, would be less onerous than the high-profile permanent security and defence commitment of the US in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. In effect, the US would renounce the burden of its superpower status. As a European, I would dread such a prospect. But we’ve been there before, and one cannot pretend it can’t happen again. And let it not be forgotten, the US share of world GDP in the 1920s was just about what it is today (some 23 to 24%); it is simply not true to say that the US doesn’t have a Fortress America option: with robust spending for its homeland defence, the US could cope quite as well as it did during the 1920s.

The existence of such an option makes it all the more important for the Europeans to act in a manner that increases the likelihood of the US remaining engaged: a multilateralist outcome is not a given. Its probability is in no small measure a function of European policies.

THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD ORDER: A RUSSIAN VIEW

ALEXEI G. ARBATOV

The tragic events of September 11th, 2001 should have launched a new era of world politics and US national security strategy. Indeed, perceptions of the new changed order of international security priorities for the civilised world, the sympathy towards the victims of the massacre and the condemnation of the barbaric act were overwhelming. Also impressive was the degree of cooperation in the anti-terrorist operation against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, built in the shortest possible time between the West, led by the United States, and Russia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Central Asian states (foremost Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), with political support by China, India and Iran.

Two months after “Black September”, however, the weaknesses of the coalition and deficiencies of the operation are becoming more and more evident, as well as the confusion and inconsistency of the United States and other major players in adopting a new security strategy and still less in implementing it.

1. Legal and Political Framework of Anti-terrorism Policy

As with any ad hoc coalition, the present one is quite fragile and is not based on a clear common definition of the threat or a common understanding of joint interests and the means of fighting for them. There is no accepted universal definition of “international terrorism” in international law, nor any UN-approved or other multilateral convention on countering it, which might be compared to definitions of “aggression”, “self-defence”, “peacekeeping” or “peace-enforcement”.

Luckily, the subject of retaliation is the Taliban, based on the territory of war-ravaged Afghanistan, not recognised internationally, discredited by its extremist policies and barbaric behaviour, and not closely affiliated with any great world or regional power (except Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which are relatively easily managed by Washington). Hence uniting against it was rather easy. The case would be very different were the obvious base of the terrorists Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Turkey or Pakistan. Or were the target of such a horrendous act a West European country, Russia or Japan. Repeated US indications of its plans

to hit other suspected regimes already strain the coalition and may split it if such plans are implemented.

Lacking a recognised definition of “international terrorism”, its “harbouring states” and legitimate targets and means of retaliation, American arbitrary choice of scapegoats among the states disliked by Washington anyway is raising the question about the legitimacy of hitting other states suspected of supporting terrorist organisations, but friendly to the United States (e.g. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Albania, Jordan, etc.).

A selective attitude towards terrorist organisations and their paramilitary forces, as well as towards the states harbouring them, based only on American political preferences, cannot provide a long-term foundation for the international anti-terrorist coalition or its allied strategy. On the contrary, such policies may turn the fight against terrorism from a major uniting international factor into a great new point of international discord, leading to a confrontation between great world and regional powers and even straining the Western alliance itself.

2. Implementation of the Anti-Terrorist Operation in Afghanistan

Washington should be given credit for making an effort to secure authorisation by the UN Security Council for conducting its operation, in contrast to its earlier disregard for the United Nations. The two adopted resolutions provide some legal framework for the use of force, although opinions differ as to how long and on what scale this war would stay within the bounds of legitimacy. Nonetheless in planning and implementing the military operation the United States is keeping to its tradition of unilateralism of the 1990s – at best consulting its NATO allies and informing Russia, but not doing any joint planning or coalition war-fighting.

This may partially be explained by the fear of intelligence leaks, but mainly, no doubt, by US determination to retain maximum freedom of action in using its overwhelming power, selecting targets and countries for attack and conducting negotiations with whatever counterparts on conditions of Washington’s preference.

This is why, aside from Great Britain and few other allies, US partners and Russia are not in a hurry to join the fighting, confining their support to political declarations and some indirect material cooperative actions. Moreover there is a growing concern in some West European states, Russia, China, India and Iran about the practical goals of the US operation and its diplomacy in the post-war settlement in Afghanistan.

This is already seriously detracting from the military effectiveness of the operation.

Bin Laden's formations and other terrorist organisations in Afghanistan cannot be routed out without destroying the Taliban army and political leadership. The Taliban, in contrast to Slobodan Milosevich or Saddam Hussein, cannot be brought to its knees by high-altitude air bombardment or cruise missiles alone – if only for a lack of cost-efficient targets in Afghanistan and total disregard for civilian casualties by the Taliban. It may only be defeated on the ground by large-scale offensive combat operations, which neither of the major powers is willing to contemplate for obvious reasons. The only remaining alternative is to arm, train and advise the Northern Alliance to do the job with close air support of the anti-terrorist coalition and with the help of its selective special (commando) actions on the ground. Aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea or military bases in the Persian Gulf area are too far away to permit effective implementing of such a campaign.

Conducting massive and prolonged military actions from Pakistan is impossible because of the fragility of its domestic situation and the threat of fundamentalist uprisings and extremists gaining access to nuclear weapons.

India is not a viable option either for geographical and terrain reasons, as well as because of the threat of destabilising Kashmir and disenchanting Pakistan and other Muslim nations. Iran is an even less likely candidate as a base, in light to the United States' failure to take any serious initiative in recent times to improve relations with this country and to overcome past grievances. Moreover, neither Pakistan nor Turkey would be happy about such rapprochement.

Hence the only base for US (or US-British) combat operations would be Central Asia – primarily Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. That would have to deeply involve Russia both politically and militarily. The transit of supplies would have to go through Russia's air space and ground communications (and that of Kazakhstan, since Turkmenistan is neutral).

Besides, Uzbekistan's relations with Tajikistan are very tense at present, as are the relations among respective ethnic groups in the Northern Alliance. It would not be wise for the United States to rely fully on Uzbekistan, since this would estrange Tajikistan and Tajiks in Afghanistan, while Uzbek units of the Northern Alliance (commanded by general Rashid Dustum) are militarily quite weak and relatively few in numbers.

3. The Russian Position, Domestic Views and Concerns

Moscow has repeatedly hinted at its willingness to give Washington broader support, beyond sharing intelligence, providing an air corridor for shipments of humanitarian cargo, participating in rescue operations and supplying arms to the Northern Alliance.

Russian leadership has probably gone as far as possible in cooperating with the West and much further than could be expected from President Putin, judging by his previous cautious middle-of-the-road policy, based on a bureaucratic consensus (e.g. his positions on the national anthem and symbols, land reform, budget policy, military reform, etc.). The majority of Russian public opinion, parliament, mass media and military bureaucracy do not support his line on the antiterrorist campaign, although there has been little open opposition to Vladimir Putin due to the general curtailment of any political opposition to the Russian President since the middle of the year 2000 (last presidential elections in Russia).

Part of this internal opposition to cooperation with the United States is due to long-accumulated mistrust of and hostility towards US unilateral policies and force deployments during the 1990s (NATO expansion, military action against Yugoslavia, arbitrary strikes at Iraq, rejection of the ABM Treaty, START-2 and follow-on strategic agreements, CTB Treaty, etc.). In many cases US policy towards Russia has been deliberately formulated in an arrogant and insulting manner. Thus, an obvious question is: Why should Russia now help the Americans?

Another reason is the unwillingness of a large part of the Russian political elite and strategic community to go for much closer cooperation, much less some kind of alliance with the West – owing to its domestic and foreign policy implications.

Finally, there is a widespread fear in the society of becoming involved in another quagmire of a counterinsurgency war after their bitter experiences in Afghanistan in 1979-89, two bloody and largely futile campaigns in Chechnya in 1994-96 and 1999-2001, as well as a fear of terrorist attacks on Russian civilians. A popular concern is that the United States would eventually pull out and abandon Russia to deal with the disturbed hornets nest.

Hence, Putin's cooperative strategy is tolerated for the time being, but should there be a major mishap or significant US unilateral and arbitrary action, the pressure inside Russia would be enormous for a radical policy reversal.

4. US Policies in and around Afghanistan

It's possible to speculate that Russian leadership, despite strong domestic opposition, would be ready, under certain circumstances to provide robust military advice and direct air cover to anti-Taliban forces, as well as coordinate air and missile strikes against the Taliban with the United States. These main conditions could be: Russian participation in US political and military planning; some sort of US (Western) security guarantee and promise of assistance to Russia in case it becomes a target of terrorist retaliation; and Western sharing of the financial burden of Russian aid to the Northern Alliance and other war efforts.

This would virtually amount to an allied relationship. Neither Washington nor its NATO allies, however, seem ready for such a breakthrough. They fear implications of this new relationship for other Western interests: i.e. NATO extension, BMD/ABM Treaty problems, Russian foreign debt, the war in Chechnya, rivalry over the Caspian oil shelf, etc. This would also mean that Washington would reach a consensus with Moscow on the post-war settlement in Afghanistan (taking into account the interests of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as well), which may take a lot of effort to bring Pakistan on board, straining relations with this principal American partner in the region.

Moreover, determined to exterminate bin Laden and his main organisation al-Qaeda, Washington still has reservations about fully destroying the Taliban (which is inseparable from either al-Qaeda or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) out of concerns about the post-war settlement and peace-reconstruction in Afghanistan, as well as about relative influences of external powers on Kabul. This inconsistency makes it easier for the Taliban and al-Qaeda to withstand US-British air raids and to bargain for eventual compromise.

The three main dangers exist with respect to the current operation:

1. Destabilisation of Pakistan and Islamic extremists' access to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
2. Splitting of the anti-terrorist coalition due to further unilateral military actions or behind-the-scenes talks by Washington, or due to excessive collateral damage of air strikes that is otherwise inefficient in crippling the Taliban.
3. US military failure and curtailment of the campaign, after which the Taliban attacks to the north across the borders of Tajikistan or Uzbekistan. This would make Russia fight on the ground without any guarantee of US protection, participation or serious assistance.

As of now, the way in which the coalition led by the US, is acting suggests that it is neither prepared to meet any of these contingencies, nor capable of decisively defeating the Taliban in its current war campaign.

* * *

The war against the Taliban is only partially affecting and damaging international terrorism. Due to the dynamics of political developments since September 11th, however, the anti-Taliban campaign has become a symbol and a litmus test of the capability of the civilised world to deal with the new and horrible threats of the 21st century. A victory over the Taliban and bin Laden would provide a chance to press further with a joint and comprehensive anti-terrorist strategy to cope with this danger. A failure of the coalition would precipitate an expanding international chaos and escalating violence, which a civilised democratic world will not be able to survive.

The United States, Russia and some other countries may come out of this war either in a much closer relationship to go on and continue to suppress terrorism elsewhere – or in a more conflictual relationship, which would strengthen the forces behind terrorism. Despite some impressive initial progress, as time goes by, the coalition is losing momentum and making insufficient efforts to move ahead and build on its strengths to reinforce mutual trust and cooperation. What can be done to change this?

In the short term, the United States should abandon its unilateral mode of operation and involve Russia in the decision-making process on defining political and strategic goals of the operation in Central Asia, as well as military planning and, if need be, joint combat actions. The world has really changed since September 11th: Russia has suddenly become the main potential American partner in the most important US security issue – much more important in fact than all NATO members or other US formal allies. This reality must be recognised both in terms of practical policy-making in Washington and in formal agreements being negotiated.

Indeed, if Russia is to become more deeply involved in this war, it would need US (or Western) security guarantees analogous to North Atlantic Treaty Article V, at least with respect to the present operation in Afghanistan – in case Russia or its citizens, troops or assets become the victim of a terrorist attack, as presently threatened by Islamic extremists.

The cowardly and unrealistic idea of distinguishing the Taliban from other terrorist organisations or of distinguishing between “bad” and “good” Talibs should be abandoned as well. Taliban political regime and army must be destroyed, while alternative moderate Pushtan

organisations should be created as an alternative to the Taliban and as a participant in the peaceful settlement of Afghanistan in the future.

Washington and Moscow must closely cooperate to bring together Tashkent and Dushanbe and their respective proxies in Afghanistan, as well as to arm and train them for counteroffensive operations to defeat the Taliban army on the ground. The two great powers should cooperate in establishing the necessary infrastructure in Central Asia in order to provide the Northern Alliance with close air support (possibly joint US-Russian-British) and other forms of military assistance.

It is necessary to prepare for the possible destabilisation of Pakistan, primarily by planning to evacuate or destroy its nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and research-production-testing facilities.

Washington should urgently attempt to improve its relations with Iran and India (in both of which Russia could give it assistance), as alternative partners in Central and Southern Asia, in the event that Pakistan is destabilised.

The mid- and long-term policy should aim at elaborating and adopting a legal framework for defining “international terrorism” and elaborating ways of dealing with it. Possibly a permanent UN structure to monitor this problem would be useful, as well as regional organisations in NATO, EU, CIS, etc. If there is an international convention on this subject, it must be ratified by all states, while those opposing it should be subjects to international sanctions.

Traditional alliances and bilateral relations should be revised on the basis of our understanding of who is harbouring and funding international terrorists. Terrorists must not enjoy immunity obtained as a result of great power or allied protection.

More aid and assistance in economic development has to be provided to post-war Afghanistan and other countries of this kind to fight poverty and ignorance, which are fuelling extremism, and to give the population other ways to earn a living other than the drug business. The democratic evolution of the most advanced Islamic nations is also desirable, if it does not opening the way to power for fundamentalist parties. As valuable as it is, however, this goal should not be seen as a *sine qua non* for fighting terrorism. Terrorism has numerous motives and sources and should be decisively and directly fought – without reservations or apologies related to poverty and oppression as its fuelling factors. The examples of terrorism in Spain (the Basque separatists) and British Ulster, where the level of affluence and democracy is far beyond any imaginable prospect

of terrorism-plagued Islamic nations, should be a constant reminder of this caveat.

The regimes governing the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems must be made much more stringent and unbiased as to their application to some states. India and Pakistan should be pressured to join the CTB, provided that the United States ratifies this treaty.

Russia and the United States should agree to deep cuts in their strategic offensive weapons (down to 1000 warheads or less), while introducing amendments to the ABM Treaty to permit extensive testing of new technologies for possible future joint deployment. In the meantime, the two powers and their allies could start developing theatre anti-missile defence system to protect Europe (including Russia), Asian Russian territory and US allies in the Far East. Other countries may be invited to join the project if they eliminate their missiles of medium and shorter range (as defined by the INF Treaty).

This may seem a tall order indeed, but such steps cannot be seen as excessive if the notion of a new “post-September era” of international security is anything more than a pompous political declaration.

**THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD ORDER:
AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE**

DAVID C. GOMPERT

September 11 did not so much change the world as show that the world had changed but our means of managing it had not. For the United States – superpower, Great Satan, victim – the awakening means renewed multilateralism *plus* unabashed assertiveness. It will spawn new US strategies based on far more than military power *plus* unhesitant use of force when the nation is threatened. For Europeans, closest and ablest of all US allies, the situation means higher expectations and, if and as capabilities and actions match those expectations, more clout. For the United States and Europe, it both demands and opens the path to a more equal and more global partnership, beginning with but not limited to countering terrorism.

1. Dangers and Illusions

As of that day, our darkest fears about the new era seem to be coming true all at once: elusive terrorists bent on mass murder by suicide and germ attacks; anti-American frenzy in the Muslim world; a humanitarian crisis of biblical scale; an imploding failed state (whose chief export, besides terror, is hard drugs); war in a region where at least five countries – India, Pakistan, China, Israel and Russia – have nuclear weapons; the risk that world oil markets will yet be disrupted. In the face of this, we have learned that national and international institutions devised for a bygone order are inadequate to deal with the new disorder, despite the ample warning we had to update them.

Illusions have ended. For Europeans who had not noticed, insecurity has “globalised”. An attack on Manhattan, inspired from a cave in Afghanistan and planned in Hamburg and Kuala Lumpur, has torn the fabric of Western life, triggered combat in Central Asia, caused unrest from Nigeria to Indonesia, and fed tension between Pakistan and India. Awareness of global insecurity has already affected the outlooks and actions of US allies. They have offered, in NATO, to take military action outside of Europe in response to an attack outside of Europe. Unfortunately, the forces needed for distant and demanding operations cannot be built overnight. Yet, European defence budgets will likely shift upward as European defence strategies shift outward. The United States

could reinforce this by accepting even modest allied offers to fight in Afghanistan.

If Europeans are more aware that security is global, Americans are more aware that global security requires cooperation. The broader the strategy, beyond military force, the greater that requirement. Because the financial, intelligence, criminal and civil protective components of counter-terrorism exceed both the borders and the reach of the superpower, a unilateral campaign will fail, and serious Americans know it.

2. The Future of American Multilateralism

It is too soon to judge whether renewed US multilateralism is broad and lasting – accepted even when the particulars are not ideal, or just a la carte. The upright stance of the UN Security Council and, as usual, the Secretary General, and US responses toward the UN, give reason to hope. US interest in a UN role in post-Taliban Afghanistan suggests a more creative, though still self-interested, US policy toward the world body.

Will this shifting sentiment reverse US positions on specific conventions: Kyoto, CTBT, ABM Treaty, international code of justice? Not likely. But it could make the United States more inclined to address multilaterally such difficult problems as climate change and renewable energy, nuclear offensive and defensive force limitations, and global law enforcement. Insofar as new openings appear, US negotiating partners would do better to engage US positions on their merits than to ask Washington simply to eat hat and sign.

3. End of Sanctuary; End of Innocence

The other American illusion to end is, of course, that of sanctuary. Not since the Civil War – Spotsylvania, to be exact – have so many Americans been slain on a single day, and never this many civilians. That terrorists struck the United States is neither new nor strategically significant. That the first mass-destructive terrorist attack should be on the superpower is. It brings home to its citizens the drawbacks of being chiefly responsible for the security of dangerous regions and ungrateful regimes, of being addressee for every grievance, of being hated for reasons neither the hated nor the haters truly comprehend.

With 4000 still buried at the base of the World Trade Center, Americans react with bewilderment and fury to anti-US rallies choreographed by religious militants in countries that their country has supported. The thanklessness of providing security in the Middle East is accepted; but the claim that the United States “had it coming” is not. It cannot be excluded

that anxiety mixed with anger will cause the United States to want out of the front lines of global security, especially in the Middle East. Americans were already more ambivalent than others may think about leading and policing the world.

Though there is no sign yet of political backlash, no voice for retreat, it is early. Still, because US security responsibilities intersect American economic interests, a strategic pull-back is very unlikely, barring failure in the struggle against terrorism (see below). Foreign actions have a greater-than-usual effect on US politics and policies; so far, the net effect is good. The declaration by allies that an attack on America is an attack on all had a big impact and will not be forgotten. The cohesion of the wider coalition is also politically important, signifying that the US cannot yet need not tackle this problem solo.

4. Homeland Defence

An obvious question is whether the loss of sanctuary could alter US defence priorities, with protection of US territory displacing or at least competing with the projection of power. This is illogical and unlikely: Homeland defence is overwhelmingly a civil, not military, responsibility. What military support is needed will come from the reserves, not power projection forces – the latter being less suitable than the former. Moreover, it would be a strategic blunder, which the United States will not make, to signal that a threat against US territory could divert intervention forces. In any case, homeland defence and power projection is two sides of the same coin: on one side, US *ability* to defend its interests, friends and peace; on the other, US *resolve*.

As for counter-terrorist military operations, this mission underscores the need to transform and improve the versatility of US forces. While current circumstances politically preclude cutting even old, slow, heavy US force structure, look for that to begin – cautiously – after hostilities end.

September 11 has sharpened, not settled, the question of NMD. A consensus could emerge in favour of unhurried development of a multi-layered capability. (Warning: this may be the author's wishful thinking). A Russian OK to revise the ABM Treaty, and a consequent easing of allied concerns, could take the edge off opposition in Congress.

5. Catching up with Globalisation

Beyond military affairs, the new insecurity demands that institutions and policies be updated in view of globalisation. This should entail

collaboration in many transnational fields, motivated by but not limited to counter-terrorism:

- World financial systems and markets have proved surprisingly shock-resistant.
- Transportation systems and markets have not.
- Transnational law enforcement is weak.
- Intelligence sharing is blocked by suspicions among former foes and even old friends.
- Global cyberspace is a potential combat zone.
- Disease control and food systems are vulnerable and unready for malicious acts.
- Energy markets, facilities and flows are too.

Thus, as we destroy al-Qaeda and co., we must construct policies, institutions and norms to secure globalisation – the way post-war order was planned as earlier wars were being won. This is not as simple, or as impossible, as creating some monolithic supranational governance. It means a variety of international means, with varied purposes and effects on sovereignty. For the United States, famously wary of foreign entanglements, it means sacrificing control in order to advance US interests. US policies in international trade agreements and financial oversight suggest that it is quite capable of such compromises.

Well after al-Qaeda has been torn up, open societies will remain vulnerable to all sorts of harm, including terrorism. This is an unavoidable consequence of five facts of life:

(1) the integration of the infrastructures, links, and systems of the world economy; (2) the fact that our societies and the exchanges among them are based on trust; (3) the inexorable spread of potentially deadly technologies and skills; (4) the prohibitive price, in treasure and freedom, of total security; and (5) complexity.

Better, and shared, intelligence is the most cost-effective way to combat large-scale terrorism, which depends on networks, skills, money, time to plan, and safe haven – each of which increases the chance of detection. But even with better intelligence, we will be vulnerable. Even if we were to constrict personal freedoms, privacy, trust, and convenience beyond acceptable limits, we will be vulnerable. Even with improved international cooperation, we will be vulnerable. And even if we were to

devote greater national defence resources and forces to homeland defence, we will be vulnerable.

To some extent, we must and can live with this, provided our intelligence enables us to prevent large attacks. But we must also kill the roots. We are in a race between a growth in our vulnerability and efforts to destroy the basis of large-scale terrorism. To be clear, “destroying the basis” does not mean meeting terrorists' demands, which would only hurt security (in the Middle East, for example). Rather, it means spreading democracy, thus giving hope and recourse to those masses upon whose disaffection terrorists feed.

6. New Middle East Politics

In this light, we surely must see that political business-as-usual in the Middle East is not compatible with long-term security, including our own. While other once-dangerous, undemocratic regions have progressed in the past decade or two, the Middle East remains dysfunctional and a thus a source of continuing peril.

Placing blame for September 11 on US policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict misses two important points: First, a promising peace process will incite at least as much anger as the absence of one; after all, al-Qaeda's platform hardly endorses Arab peace agreements with Israel. Intifadas are about winning just peace; jihads are about killing infidels.

Second, it is the wider, deeper politics of the greater Middle East, for which *many* bear responsibility, that has created a climate conducive to despair and rage. We have turned a blind eye to illegitimate, hypocritical, and malfeasant elites that dread democracy as much as they dread fundamentalism. Let's name names: Saudi Arabia, Gulf sheikhdoms, Pakistan, with Egypt and several North African regimes in a second echelon of illegitimacy. The problem is not that our values pollute the Middle East but rather that those values have had no chance to penetrate the closed politics, education, and media policed by the “moderate” hereditary regimes that we protect.

The West has played Middle East politics so counter-strategically that we are now in a position where we are afraid to attack Iraq for fear of offending the very people Iraq has threatened and could again. Even though we know that Iraq is becoming more dangerous to the region and to us, we are stuck because of the political failings of clients whose politics we have backed. Having ignored the illegitimacy of our so-called friends, we seem to have no alternative but to back them still. The time never seems to be right to insist on reform as the price for, and key to,

long-term security. The USA is especially guilty of favouring – indeed, embracing – the devil it knows. But Europeans, oil companies, banks and others have been active accomplices.

Extricating ourselves from this predicament will not be easy. But the United States and Europe need to make a clear strategic decision: either these regimes change or we will not save them. Moral justifications aside, the *security* risks of not making such a decision are too high. It is not clear that we have the foresight and courage to make such a decision or the skill to implement it without unleashing revolution instead of reform. But if we do not insist on political accountability from our Middle East clients coming out of this crisis, it will be harder to do so next time.

Crucial to this is the need to reduce dependence on oil. Not just imported oil: oil. It is shocking, when one thinks about it, that we depend vitally on a source of energy that lies beyond our control, sits mainly beneath the most unstable corner of the Earth, is managed by actors with unsteady hands and unhelpful interests, requires us to be prepared to fight large and increasingly dangerous wars, and is bad for the environment to boot. The need to begin the shift to renewables is apparent. Failure to do so will perpetuate a political order that is bad for the people of the Middle East, bad for us, and sure to produce future crises. On this, US-EU co-leadership is indispensable.

7. The Worst Case

There is an alternative to the scenario of destroying the al-Qaedas of the world and creating a new order. At the moment, it is not under consideration. And it is unlikely in any case to be chosen. However, if the military operations fail, if the coalition splinters, and if global terrorism, Middle East turmoil, and large-scale homeland attacks persist, there could be a strategic retreat. Americans could head for the ramparts of fortress America. Europeans could revert to the regional self-absorption from which they are now emerging. Both could make homeland defence the preoccupation of their military forces. Both could write off the Middle East. The United States could shed the international responsibilities that have made it a target, and Europeans could decline to accept any responsibilities lest they become one.

Globalisation, already assaulted at Seattle and Turin, might falter. Private forces of economic integration are strong; however, the essential commitment of states to remove obstacles to integration is less strong. If globalisation sputters, what about the hopes of economic growth for us and of development for the poorer societies? What about the entry of China into the community of responsible nations? Are we going to throw

the progress of the last twenty years into reverse gear? This is why we cannot fail.

8. The Centrality of the US-EU Relationship

“Not failing” means maintaining and deepening a strategic coalition. At the coalition’s centre must be a stronger US-EU partnership. US-European cooperation is relevant to every facet of counter-terrorism. Together, the United States and EU possess most of the economic, technological, military and diplomatic resources for globalising security. Compared to the US-EU relationship, all others pale. This is the one we must get right.

To get it right, Europeans and Americans will both have to overcome some deep doubts: in the American case, whether Europeans are willing and able; in the European case whether Americans will hear and heed their voices, including an increasingly unified and distinct voice. The last eight weeks are moderately promising.

**RUSSIA'S SECURITY POLICY
AND
EU-RUSSIAN RELATIONS**

**CEPS-IISS EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM
WORKING PAPER NO. 6**

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY

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INTRODUCTION

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

In their oral presentation, the three paper-givers were more particularly urged to give their views on: 1) the durability of President Putin's policy of modernisation "within the West" if Western, and specifically US, *quid-pro-quo*'s were seen to be lacking; 2) the extent of potential EU-Russian relations, notably in security terms; to what extent would Kaliningrad be a test case for EU-Russian relations? and how well is the EU organised to handle the relationship? and 3) what kind of division of labour could be worked out between the US, the EU and Russia in terms of managing security in what Angela Stent has called the "post-Soviet space"?

Dmitri Trenin, Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center emphasised that Putin's strategic vision was not primarily driven by foreign policy considerations, but aimed at achieving modernisation which in turn implies a policy of non-confrontation with the West: this had already begun before 9/11 and has become clearer since.

Therefore, the main problems that the Russian President could encounter would be the result of insufficient economic returns, whereas US unilateral measures on political-strategic issues such as ABM, Iraq or NATO enlargement would have less impact. As far as EU Russian relations are concerned, there would be little to be gained from talk about EU membership. The relationship should be driven by the need to modernise Russia, 40% of whose foreign trade is with the EU: therefore the relationship should not focus too heavily on military affairs – although EU military cooperation with the Russia armed forces could favour military reform. In terms of the "post-Soviet space", President Putin had dropped the old "Great Game" logic and was emphasising co-management in Central Asia, although old-style geopolitics were more visible in the Caucasus, notably in Georgia.

Stephan De Spiegeleire, from the RAND Corporation's Europe office, underscored the need to move away from a ritualised, institutionalised, model of EU-Russia and NATO-Russia relations. He was cautious about the durability of Putin's course, noting that it was occurring as economic (and notably oil-related) factors were uncertain, with a United States not terribly interested in expending political capital on Russia. Indeed there was something of a US backlash against the symbolism characteristic of

American relations with Gorbachev and Yeltsin. In this context EU-Russian relations are growing in importance.

On the plus side, Russia is facing few external security threats. Conflicts could possibly be dealt with in a cooperative manner between Russia and its partners, but with the need to prioritise conflict resolution as a function of actual circumstances: Transnistria coming before Abkhazia for instance.

Angela Stent, Director of the Georgetown University Center for Eurasian, Russia and East European Studies disputed de Spiegeleire's characterisation of US indifference: Washington actually has something of a concerted strategy of integrating Russia in the European space – and there is a significant constituency paying attention to Russia in the US body politic. Global issues, and particularly concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, will be of great importance from the US standpoint in shaping US-Russian relations.

Although she concurred with Trenin's analysis on Putin's reforms, the question remains: where is the "new blood" (mentioned in Trenin's paper), the constituency with which Putin is supposed to conduct his policy? In effect, the durability of Russia's policy is dependent both on Putin's popularity (currently high) at home and on US *quid-pro-quo*s. Professor Stent would like to see NATO, but also EU, membership as a long-term proposition vis-à-vis Russia: new dividing lines had to be avoided, and in any case, adopting EU criteria would help Russian modernisation.

Finally, "post-Soviet space" management will occur more along cooperative lines than as an explicit division of labour.

In the debate, a number of points emerged:

- Putin is his own foreign policy advisor, and his constituency is limited (some political allies – Yavlinsky, Luzhkov and a few analysts); but the limits of his constituency are not necessarily a problem.
- On EU-Russian relations, an important question was raised, i.e. the risk of contradictions arising between the EU and the US, notably on issues such as policy towards Iraq: although this risk was summarily discussed in somewhat reassuring tones, it would deserve further exploration, notably in light of President Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech.

- The creation of a high-level EU-Russian Council was suggested, drawing the remark that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) already made this possible and that the PCA was unique to Russia: would it help to graft yet another institution to an already complex away?
- Kaliningrad was widely mentioned as a test case. As one participant put it, “if we can’t agree on that, what else can we agree on?”.

But then, the Kaliningrad discussions are on track. There will be no “Fortress Kaliningrad” even if there are more tanks in the enclave than in the combined French and British armed forces: it’s a military parking lot. However, if the EU holds a full array of keys vis-à-vis Kaliningrad, the EU has yet to develop a strategy.

- The expression “post-Soviet space” drew some pointed remarks about the need not to create such a new geopolitical category: it would be better to call places by their names (the Caucasus, Central Asia, etc.). It was noted in passing that names also changed: what is traditionally called Transcaucasia is now often called the South Caucasus in the US.
- The term “triumphant unilateralism” was used to characterise contemporary foreign policy-making (not simply that of the US): a country (e.g. Russia) decides what it wants to do, and foreign policy flows therefrom. In the case of Russia, this helped explain the fading of the Balkans as an area of major interest, and the probability that Iraq would not become the “banana skin” in US-Russian relations.
- On Russian policies towards specific regions, it was noted that Putin still had more of a strategic vision (one participant used the expression “an instinct”) than a strategy: for instance, Russia’s Middle Eastern policy was pretty much a blank. Russia is however discovering how much it has in common with Israel, in part because of the war in Chechnya.
- Only the EU can work with Russia in peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet Union: NATO won’t do it. It was remarked that prospects were not too good: Russian military thinking remained unreconstructed, and a number of conflicts in the former Soviet Union were worsening, not improving.
- On NATO-Russian relations there was lively exchange on the implications of the British-proposed “20” Council: if this were to

be a true “20” Council, with no pre-arranged agenda and with no prepared NATO positions, how would this differ from a NAC including Russia – in other words something resembling Russia’s entry into the political councils of NATO; conversely, if the scope of items up for discussion in the “20” were to be restricted, would that create trust? As one prominent politician put it, if the project is mishandled, for example if Russia overplays the possibilities involved, “we’ll be thrown back in terms of trust”. To this was added the question: what of Ukraine, which like Russia, has a Permanent Joint Council with NATO; why not consider joint meetings of the two PJCs?

In conclusion, several suggestions were made:

- For Russia, the biggest quid-pro-quo would be the *write-off the Soviet debt*. Accelerated WTO membership, although important, would also be extremely painful for Russia. Quid-pro-quos would become particularly important from the end of 2002 onwards (after NATO’s Prague Summit).
- The EU-Russian and NATO-Russian interfaces should continue to be dealt with *separately*, if only because the first one works reasonably satisfactorily and focuses on practical issues (notwithstanding the EU’s limitations in terms of strategy and leadership), unlike the second one. The forthcoming *Danish presidency* of the EU should put a high premium on *Kaliningrad*.
- ESDP/Russian relations are still in an early stage. They could benefit from the participation of high-level *Russian military officers* in the current ESDP/Russia bilateral discussions.

A RUSSIA-WITHIN-EUROPE: WORKING TOWARDS A NEW SECURITY ARRANGEMENT

DMITRI TRENIN

At the beginning of the 21st century, the central issue of European security is how, not whether, to integrate Russia within Euro-Atlantic institutions. The conditions are now right to move ahead towards that ambitious goal.

September 11, 2001 marked the end of the post-cold war period. With the new security agenda having moved to the centre stage, the cold war one is not only irrelevant; it is also seen as irrelevant. This opens the way to dismantling the existing, and still formidable, infrastructure of military confrontation.

The second opportunity in a decade to create a Euro-Atlantic security community that would include Russia can now be seized upon for several good reasons.

Putin's decision to side with the West was not made on the spur of the moment. A close analysis demonstrates he had been avoiding confrontation with the US and reaching out to Western Europe ever since coming to office. A combination of narrowly pragmatic, broadly "philosophical" and very personal reasons is responsible for the new strategy – not tactics! – in foreign policy. This course is in full harmony with the main thrust of Putin's economic and social reform programme, which can be defined as modernisation through Europeanisation. As evidenced by a series of post-September developments, including the Russian reaction to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the new Kremlin policy line is sustainable domestically and sufficiently protected against adverse international political conditions.

Of course, Russia's rapprochement with Europe is only in the second instance a foreign policy exercise. Its success or failure will primarily depend on the pace and depth of Russia's economic, political and societal transformation. Russia's "entry into Europe" cannot be negotiated with Brussels. It has to be first "made in Russia" itself. A decade after the end of the Soviet Union, there are fewer and fewer illusions among both the elite and the public about a "unique Russian way". The next hurdle to take is to recognise that Russia as a self-contained and self-sustained "pole" (or a traditional great power) is already history.

Faced with the challenge of international terrorism, the United States has moved further away from the cold-war mindset. Russia is not on America's mind to the extent that Washington can reduce its strategic nuclear forces unilaterally and withdraw from a major arms control pact without fearing Moscow's response. Although a Russian-American alliance can only be situational, and the winding down of the Afghanistan operation would again reduce the importance of Russia in American eyes, there are a number of potential situations in the new strategic environment where Russia's assistance to the US could be invaluable.

Americans have no reason to oppose Russia's rapprochement with Europe, knowing full well that a Moscow attempt at "wedge-driving" between them and the West Europeans would be dramatically counterproductive. A Russia-within-Europe – which it will never be able to dominate – meets core US national security interests. It forecloses even the remote chance of Russia resuming its hegemonic geopolitical posture and associates the former superpower with America's closest allies. The US may be wary of Russia joining the European caucus on some issues of contention between the transatlantic allies, and in particular of "eroding NATO from within". On balance, however, these concerns do not outweigh the benefits of Russia's integration. They can be best met by an enlightened American leadership, within a more mature transatlantic partnership.

The West Europeans have an even more compelling interest than the Americans in securing an organic relationship with Russia. As the European Union becomes more integrated internally and expands eastward, it has to define itself as a political, as well as an economic actor. Thus, it needs a long-term outward-looking strategy, not only an inward-looking one. This strategy should concern itself in particular with the Union's immediate neighbourhood, which includes, next to the Balkans and North Africa, Turkey, Ukraine and Russia. Indeed, the EU objectives with respect to each of these various relationships speak a lot about the way the Union and its member countries view themselves in the 21st century world and about the role they aspire to and are prepared to play.

Exactly because one is necessarily looking for an organic relationship, Europe's problems with Russia are more fundamental, and more difficult to tackle than those of the United States. It can be stressed again and again that the EU enlargement model may work for the Baltics, Central and eventually even South Eastern Europe, but not for Russia, and this is certainly true. Yet, drawing a permanent borderline between the expanded Union and Russia – and possibly also Ukraine and Belarus –

would be marking not only the limit of Europe's expansion but also the limit of its ambitions. However, even if the EU were to opt for a "Europe without Russia", this does not weaken the case for close security cooperation between the two.

The options for security cooperation leading to security integration between Russia and Western Europe are several. One is NATO. The North Atlantic Alliance, to which most of the EU member states, as well as North America belong, will remain the principal Western security mechanism for the foreseeable future. NATO will necessarily evolve, but it will not wither away any time soon. Russian membership in NATO is not feasible in the near and even medium term. Russia's association with NATO, however, is. Integrating Russia within common councils with the Alliance will serve the main purpose of demilitarising the Russian-Western (including Russian-Western European) relationship. Collaboration on the new security agenda – from fighting international terrorism and organised crime to dealing with WMD/missile proliferation to peacekeeping – will largely contribute to that.

Obviously, Russia's security relationship with the European Union will cover the areas in which the Union as a unit will be competent. These are mainly soft security issues, which are most relevant for contemporary Europe. At one end of the spectrum, one will deal with environmental and NBC security (including nuclear waste disposal, chemical disarmament, etc.); at the other, the Petersberg tasks. As the European Union admits former Warsaw Pact states and ex-Soviet republics, it will become more concerned about the safety of its immediate eastern neighbourhood.

The Kaliningrad enclave is a case in point. In view of the Union enlargement dynamic, one cannot afford, either in Moscow or in Brussels, not to deal with it. It is also a test case for EU-Russian cooperation, including in the security field. Kaliningrad also calls for a measure of EU-NATO-Russia coordination.

Another place for such trilateral collaboration can be the Balkans. To the extent the US largely turns over the peacekeeping operation in the region to its European allies, and the EU endows itself with a military capability of its own to serve in crisis areas, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia may evolve into a long-term European responsibility. When the Russians will be dealing with NATO there, they will be dealing increasingly with the Europeans.

The peace settlement of the conflict in Moldova, where Russia is currently reducing its peacekeeping/arsenal guard duty military presence

and where Ukraine and the OSCE play a limited role, may be an opportunity to geographically expand EU-Russian cooperation in peacekeeping.

Other potential loci for Russian-EU peacekeeping lie in the Caucasus. Having (correctly) acquiesced in a US and European presence in Central Asia, which is likely to outlast the American anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, Moscow should be more open in the future to having its European partners shoulder some of the burden of peacekeeping in Abkhazia. Another potential deployment area for EU peacekeepers is Nagorno-Karabakh, but this calls for an agreement between the parties to the conflict that is not yet in sight. South Ossetia is the easiest case by comparison, but it may yet continue under the present arrangement.

As to Chechnya, any foreign military involvement there will remain unacceptable for Russia. Humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring are the two elements of Western (mainly European) involvement. When a political settlement is finally reached, complete with a working model for self-government and based on Russian-Chechen and Chechen-Chechen reconciliation, the necessary economic rehabilitation of the war-ravaged republic and the North Caucasus as a whole would call for EU involvement on the ground.

This should not be regarded as sheer charity. Bordering on the Moslem world (from North Africa to the Balkans to the Caucasus to Central Asia) and containing significant Moslem minorities within its borders – whether as several ancient ethnic homelands or as millions of mostly recent immigrants – both Europe and Russia have to deal with the factor of Islamic activism, including radicalism and extremism. Already now, European and Russian forces are based in Tajikistan with a view to combating extremism in the region. Moreover, the Europeans make up the bulk of the international peacekeeping force in neighbouring Afghanistan. (Russia's decision not to send its own forces to Kabul is again correct: too little time has passed since the Soviet intervention in that country.)

What is often overlooked in Russia is that close cooperation of the kind outlined above would require a major overhaul of the Russian military system. In its present form and quality, this system allows for very limited and often mutually frustrating cooperation. From the Russian national perspective, demilitarising the country's relations with the West creates the conditions and provides the incentives for genuine military reform which would produce a system geared to current and future risks and threats, rather than those of the past. Exchanges of various kinds with

the European militaries – at NATO, EU and bilateral levels – can be instrumental in bringing about the necessary changes.

Another area facing drastic restructuring is the Russian defence industry. In the last decade, it was virtually kept in the “Asian ghetto” as far as arms trade was concerned. This is unhealthy, especially from the strategic point of view. Allowing the Russian producers to compete in a non-discriminatory environment in Europe, and cooperating with them in modernising Soviet-era equipment still held by several European nations, some of them NATO members, is a serious engagement proposal. Looking ahead into the long-term future, Russia can hardly remain self-sufficient in all required weapons systems. For its part, Europe could substantially enhance its defence industrial capacity by means of joint ventures and various forms of integration with Russia.

Military and industrial cooperation logically calls for close political cooperation. On most international issues, Russia’s position comes close to those of EU member states. This is a good basis for joint action in a variety of regional and functional areas, from the Middle East and Central Asia to non-proliferation and arms control.

There is no single forum for Russian-European security relations. Some issues – mostly hard security stuff or global in nature as dealing with the proliferation challenge and developing missile defences – are best handled within NATO. The British-proposed formula of a NATO-Russia council “at 20” is most promising and should be developed into a working mechanism. The best model for that council is NATO itself.

The current EU-Russian relationship includes 6-monthly summits between the Russian president and the European presidency and the Commission. These could be elevated to an EU-Russia council, to oversee the implementation of decisions made at the top level. To the extent common foreign/security/defence policies and structures take shape within the EU, establishing a practice of regular consultations between them and their Russian counterparts becomes necessary. Russia should strive for observer status in the relevant EU bodies, and be prepared to open its own government bureaucracy for permanent liaison links with Brussels.

This is an ambitious outline. It requires vision at the top, able and enlightened leadership at the political level and a professional and responsive government bureaucracy, as well as a modern-thinking security community. The element in shortest supply is the people to fill the relevant positions. In Russia’s case, this would amount to nothing less

than a bureaucratic revolution to sustain the emerging revolution in foreign and security policy thinking.

To energise the official Russian foreign and security policy community, an influx of new blood is badly needed. Some managerial talents could be lured to come, even on secondment, from the business community. More importantly, a new generation of diplomats and military officers has to replace what still remains, largely, a Soviet elite.

EUROPE'S SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA: STAYING THE COURSE

STEPHAN DE SPIEGELEIRE

Recent geopolitical changes, including the new “alliance” between the US and Russia on counter-terrorism, have led to various clarion calls for a bold new move to dramatically upgrade the security relationship between Russia and the West (e.g. by opening a debate on Russian membership in NATO). These statements make reference to a window of opportunity to tie Russia much more closely to the Western security community, but they may underestimate a number of difficulties that have to do both with the realities of today's Europe and today's Russia, and with the changing nature of security cooperation. It is therefore dubious whether any such radical moves are either necessary or desirable from a European point of view. Europe might be better advised to stay its current course.

Europe's Security Strategy towards Russia

Over the past decade, Western Europe has pursued a patient but determined long-term strategy of re-integrating Russia into Europe, and thence into the world. This strategy is distinctly European: it is quite long-term; incrementally integrationist; multi-dimensional; multi-level (sub-national, national and supra-national); and both functional and institutional. It closely mirrors the neo-functional logic that has served Western Europe so spectacularly well over the past half century: economic integration “spilling over” in political and eventually in security integration. Thus the European approach to the “Russian security question” has been basically (and characteristically) indirect: to assist the country's painful transformation process across the board, in the hope that at some point in time this will also yield security benefits.

Unlike in the US, Russia's salience to European and world security and stability has never been questioned in Europe. The concurrent widening *and* deepening of the European Union have only strengthened the shared European conviction that it is imperative to find appropriate ways of engaging and accommodating Russia. The main focus of these efforts has clearly been on “first pillar” issues, in line with the aforementioned “European” logic. But Russia has also been one of the main targets of the “new” Common Foreign and Security Policy as defined in the Maastricht and then Amsterdam Treaties on European Union. When member states

decided to create a new CFSP instrument in the form of “common strategies”, for instance, it was self-evident that Russia would be the first country for which such a “common strategy” would be developed.

The actual security agenda between Russia and the European Union, however, remains fairly modest, certainly in the so-called “hard security” field. The political dialogue with Russia on various international security issues dates back to the activation of the PCA instruments and it received a further push with the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia and also with the various agreements to provide Russia with some interface on the new common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP).¹ As a result, there are now a number of different institutional linkages between the Russian Federation and the European Union through which the two sides can exchange opinions about international security issues. So far, however, these interfaces have not yielded any visible breakthroughs, despite efforts from at least the EU side to identify and pursue possible areas for joint progress (e.g. on Chechnya or Moldova).

In the purely military field, Europe’s direct engagement of Russia remains very (arguably even disappointingly) limited. There are various bilateral military assistance, cooperation and outreach programmes – some uniquely valuable, but all largely uncoordinated among each other.² The EU itself has a few “military” projects it supports mainly out of the Community budget (TACIS). And even in the potentially interesting military industrial field, there have been some spectacular “misses” (such as the joint Russian-Ukrainian AN-70), and very few significant success stories.³ Theatre ballistic missile defence appeared to be another promising avenue for cooperation, but has not led to any real breakthroughs.

Changes in the Context and the Terms of Security Cooperation

Security and military cooperation remains of course one of the most difficult areas of inter-state cooperation. NATO’s successes in

¹ Starting under the French presidency with the “Joint Declaration on strengthening dialogue and cooperation on political and security matters in Europe”.

² The coordination of these different military-to-military programmes of EU MS, for instance, seems like a worthwhile task for the new EU Military Staff; or even the new EU Institute for Security Studies.

³ Possible exceptions here are agreements between Russia and the W/EU Satellite Centre on the provision of Russian satellite imagery; and on long-haul air transport with the now-defunct WEU itself.

establishing and sustaining historically unique degrees of military cooperation may have obfuscated some of these intrinsic difficulties. But anybody familiar with NATO's (and *a fortiori* the EU's) daily struggle to sustain that level of military cooperation even between fairly like-minded and structured countries is likely to be more cautious on cooperation with Russia in these areas.

Recent changes in the security agenda have only brought these intrinsic difficulties more to the fore. *Traditional territorial defence* probably remains the "easiest" area to establish the durable, formal and very politically "heavy" forms of security cooperation that NATO for instance embodies. But this is also an area where close cooperation with Russia remains a very distant possibility, even if only because of Russia's very exposed Southern borders. The two up-and-coming areas on the security agenda – peace operations and countering the new terrorism – clearly lend themselves much more to cooperation with Russia, but the nature and the terms of security cooperation in those areas are likely to be very different from the institutional arrangements that we are familiar with today.

Russia clearly has some experience (albeit a chequered one) with *peace support operations* both in its own "near abroad" and in Europe's "near abroad" – some of which shoulder-to-shoulder with European forces. There is also a clear possibility for closer Russian-European cooperation in such operations in areas where for various reasons US participation might be problematic. The Caucasus and Moldova have for instance been mentioned as possibilities here.⁴ But it has to be recognised that with the important exception of the Balkans, peace operations are frequently coalitions of the willing that tend to be cobbled together relatively quickly outside of the existing institutional arrangements, and therefore are more difficult to use for setting up new durable (and costly – both financially and politically) mechanisms. Furthermore Europe's recent activism in this area has led to a situation where its military resources are extremely stretched (and likely to remain so for quite some time) because of existing commitments, thus hardly leaving any room for taking on sizeable new commitments in any of those areas.

Another potential limiting factor for closer European-Russian military cooperation in the field is the fact that Russia remains a problematic security partner. Despite some encouraging recent trends, Russia's current military policy seems largely untenable (for reasons that would ring home with Europe's own military establishment), with extreme

⁴ See e.g. Michael Emerson, *The Elephant and the Bear*, CEPS, October 2001.

financial constraints⁵ and many urgent needs to even sustain minimal military capabilities, let alone modernise. Quite a few European militaries now also have real life experiences in fighting alongside Russian soldiers – an experience that has not always strengthened Russia’s reputation. Russia’s track record in civil military relations is likely to remain another sensitive topic. And finally, President Putin has embarked upon a little noticed but quite dramatic international military retrenchment (withdrawal from Vietnam and Cuba; cutbacks in the Balkans; signs of a rethinking of Russian military presence in the near abroad⁶; and the decision not to participate in the peace operations in Afghanistan), that makes Russian participation in “new” international peace operations less rather than more likely.

Finally also the “new-style” security threats (“*hyperterrorism*”) that have gained so much attention since 9-11, are even less likely to require the types of security arrangements that are frequently discussed between Russia and the West. In the first instance, these threats require multi-dimensional responses including parties of our governments that have little experience (and quite a few professional impediments) in sustained institutional – let alone politically visible – cooperation. But maybe even more importantly that that, the network nature of these new opponents is probably best combated through (looser) network coalitions than through more formal arrangements with pre-established mechanisms and procedures.

None of this is to argue that security cooperation with Russia cannot or should not be improved. But it does suggest that the terms of such an enhanced cooperation may look different from the ones we have grown accustomed to thinking about.

⁵ The Russian military budget increased by 8% in 2000, and 5% in 2001; but it is still only € billion (e.g. President Bush’s FY02 proposal for BMD alone is about the same sum). This sum has to sustain a still-bloated military infrastructure, a costly war in Chechnya that is cannibalising extremely scarce resources (at a very high opportunity given the puny size of the Russian federal budget) and a military reform.

⁶ The costs of maintaining the Black Sea fleet in Ukraine, peacekeeping in the Balkans, Georgia and Moldova, 201st motorised infantry division in Tajikistan and other military facilities abroad add up to \$50 million a month, more than half a billion dollars a year – more than 5% of the Russian defence budget, and that for a military contingent that represents less than 1% of the Russian armed forces.

The Transatlantic Dimension

Europe and the United States are currently pursuing different security agendas with respect to Russia employing different policy instruments and through different institutions. Without exaggerating the differences, it is important to note that Russia's "ideal" security policy looks somewhat different as seen from European capitals than from Washington, D.C. While both Europe and the US are interested in a further normalisation and demilitarisation of Russia's foreign and security policy and of genuine military reform, they also differ in their views on the desirability of genuinely multilateral approaches to security challenges; on the relative weight of the military arrow in the external affairs quiver (and hence spending), and also on the political weight of the military in the decision-making process.

Also with respect to *instruments*, European member states tend put more emphasis on indirect levers over Russian security policy than on direct security negotiations. The institutional translation of this difference is that Europe is also investing more political and other capital into the EU as a main vehicle for dealing with Russia than in NATO. This is all the more relevant since the "new" security agenda focuses more on non-military aspects of security, which belong to the Justice and Home Affairs portfolio and therefore to the EU. Since the mechanisms of information-exchange and coordination between the "principals" dealing with Russia in the EU and in the US remain far less developed than the analogous mechanisms in NATO on purely military issues, this may lead to a dangerous disconnect. There is therefore probably still quite a bit of room for improving the direct US-EU-interface on issues such as Russia,⁷ of which an improved EU-NATO interface could be the "military arm".

To give just a few concrete (modest but with significant value-added) examples in the security sphere where this direct EU-US interface could be useful:

- Although the current US administration has shied back from its initial threat to scale back the Comprehensive Threat Reduction, the long-term future of this programme remains questionable. In the meanwhile, the EU is setting up its own joint action in this field, which is likely to receive very significant long-term financial support from a number of EU MS. Coordinating these two

⁷ The EU's Common Strategy on Russia foreshadows such a triangular formula, but its implementation to date has been disappointingly limited.

programmes in a politically visible way could be quite useful to all involved.

- There could probably be better coordination between the respective outreach programmes to the Russian military. One of the main centres of transfer of knowledge in this field, for instance, is the Marshall Center,⁸ funded predominantly by the US Congress (with some additional support from the German government) but located in the Bavarian Alps. Making this a truly joint US-EU centre might be a useful idea.
- The EU could also cooperate more closely with NATO in some of these areas. One possibility here might be the Partnership for Peace Consortium for Defence Academies and Security Institutes, which is for the time being primarily funded by the US, German and Swiss governments, but where the EU could probably make both a substantive and a material contribution.⁹

Potential Dangers of Putin's Rapprochement to the US

In Europe, President Putin's first steps in the international arena have been warmly welcomed (far more so than President Bush's first steps). The higher emphasis put by Russia on Europe as an international actor, but also the more relaxed attitude towards the US role in Europe could not fail to please European capitals, which had been pushing hard for such an outcome for quite some time.

Yet in recent months, President Putin has gone significantly further than those initial changes, seemingly reversing some long-held Russian reservations on some key security issues such as US plans for missile defence, cooperation with the US in general and NATO enlargement. Many European governments seem to have been taken aback by this apparent Russian volte-face, and one of their big fears concerns the sustainability of this new Russian policy, and the potential consequences of a backlash.

In Russia, President Putin's bold new overtures towards the West may be sustainable in the short- to medium-run within the current political environment. Yet Russia's political scene remains fragile. For the first time under Putin's stewardship, just as he is about to embark on his "third

⁸ <http://www.marshallcenter.org>

⁹ <http://www.pfpconsortium.org>

wave” of reforms¹⁰ and a quickly dwindling petrodollar buffer, real opposition is emerging from various quarters.¹¹ Against this background, the sustainability of this new more pro-western policy will to a large extent be predicated on some concessions from the West which are likely to prove quite difficult.¹²

On the *Western* side too, the sustainability of the current course seems questionable. The overall picture of developments in Russia continues to look decidedly ambiguous from a Western point of view. Encouraging signs in the economic and legal realms are being counterbalanced by disturbing realities and trends in others (the re-centralisation of power, the way in which the war in Chechnya is fought, freedom of the press,...). Although some of these more negative elements have recently been downplayed by the West in recent months for obvious tactical reasons, this is unlikely to continue forever – neither in Western Europe (where the first signs are already visible¹³), nor in the United States

This seems most likely in the *US*, where Russia’s salience has shrunk to a level that many in Europe find frighteningly low. The political economy of the US relationship with Russia is radically different from that of Western Europe, with fairly insignificant economic links, no direct neighbourhood issues and no real political (or economic) constituency for a sustained activist Russia policy. If – as now looks likely – some of the last residual cold war issues (mainly in offensive and defensive strategic nuclear arms) get solved, Russia will become even less important in US foreign and security policy. And even with respect to the “new” agenda on which the allegedly “new” strategic partnership is based, Russia’s

¹⁰ Igor Bunin, Alexei Zudin, Boris Makarenko, Alexei Makarkin, Mark Urnov, *Nachalo “tretei volny”: Analiz i prognoz politicheskoi situatsii*, Tsentra politicheskikh tehnologii, 04.12.01. <http://www.politcom.ru>.

¹¹ Including in his own ‘constituency’, the so-called ‘power structures’.

¹² Dmitri Glinski-Vassiliev nicely summarises Putin’s record so far: “The ABM Treaty has been discarded; the militaries of several NATO countries are present on the soil of Russia’s immediate neighbours and, at least in a formal sense, allies, and are not rushing to leave; and NATO has apparently opted for the ‘big-bang’ scenario of admitting all nine East European applicants, while the plan to re-format Russia’s relations with the Alliance into the ‘group of twenty’ giving it an equal voice with others has been shelved” (see Dmitri Glinski-Vassiliev, *The Myth of the New Détente: The Roots of Putin’s Pro-US Policy*. PONARS Policy Memo No. 239, December 2001).

¹³ See for instance Marie Jégo, “Oubliées par l’Occident, les exactions russes en Tchétchénie se multiplient”, *Le Monde*, 27 December 2001.

“value added” may start to look very differently after the current stage of the war on terrorism.

But even in *Europe*, it is unclear whether the current system could “carry” a new qualitative improvement in the security relationship. Already as a consequence of 9-11, the European Union has ratcheted up its institutional relationship with Russia by providing a new consultation mechanism with the new Political and Security Committee (a mechanism that doesn’t even exist with the US¹⁴). Given the current disappointing state of CFSP and ESDP, it is unclear whether this new channel will really live up to Russian expectations, especially since as in NATO it is essentially restricted to an exchange of information.

If Russian disappointment with the *quid pro quo* it receives for its pro-Western security *aggiornamento* leads to a new reversal in Russian security thinking (or even a backlash), the consequences might be quite severe. Russian recriminations would probably be even more virulent than in previous episodes like German reunification or the first round of NATO enlargement, and Russian-Western relations might be set back at least a couple of years.

Two Scenarios

Looking ahead to the near to medium-term future, the security relationship between Russia and Western Europe will to some extent depend on the course of the current Russia-US rapprochement. If the security relationship between the US and Russia remains positive – an outcome all Europeans undoubtedly prefer – the Russia-Western European security relationship will likely remain at its current low levels with few incentives for any substantial policy changes. The fundamental integrationist strategy will be pursued on its own terms, and the security relationship between the two will be gradually but slowly upgraded.

If on the other hand the current US-Russian rapprochement does indeed prove to be unsustainable and is either stopped or reversed, all sides involved might have an interest in keeping the (modest) Russia-Europe security channel as alive as possible, and as isolated as possible from the vagaries of US-Russia (and possibly also NATO-Russia) relations.

If correct, this assessment would suggest that Europe’s current strategy is robust against both scenarios, and it would only strengthen the argument to shy away from any radical new moves.

¹⁴ Although the EU’s relationship with the US has other mechanisms – both formal and informal, and both within and outside the “new transatlantic agenda”.

What is to be done?

Most of the proponents of a bold new upgrade of the relationship argue for some new institutional arrangement. The extent to which both Russia and the West appear to be enamoured with “institutional solutions” to the Russia *problématique* is sometimes striking. Russia expands a lot of political capital to get a foot into various institutional doors; and both NATO and the European Union are frequently equally tempted to satisfy either Russia’s or their own dissatisfaction with Russia’s current place by creating “new” institutional instruments, such as the Permanent Joint Council, the new NATO-Russia format at “20”, the new COPS mechanism in the EU, etc. This institutional fetishism is all the more regrettable since these new constructs are superimposed on existing mechanisms that have frequently not been used to their full potential – a point that applies to both the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and the EU; but also to NATO’s Partnership for Peace, EAPC and PJC.

President Putin’s new openings towards the US should be welcomed and no doubt be reciprocated in some way. It is unclear, however, whether Europe can or even should be the one to reciprocate. From a European point of view, the relationship with Russia is arguably too important to leave it hostage to the conjuncture of various impulses. Europe has a long-term strategy for Russia in place. It may not always be clearly or convincingly articulated in official EU documents. It is also not easily “mediatised” and may lack the drama of the US-Russia relationship. But it is also far more intrusive, as it reaches into the fibre of the Russian society and polity in a way that no other external actor could currently come close to.¹⁵ And it is probably also robust against a couple of short-to medium-term scenarios that could be envisaged for the future relationship between Russia and the West. It would be a pity to squander the advantages of that strategy for short-term political expediency.

¹⁵ This is clearly borne out by various public opinion and elite polls, showing that Europe and the European Union are significantly more popular in Russia than the United States.

AN AMERICAN VIEW ON RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY AND EU-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

ANGELA STENT

American and European views of Russia's security policy reflect a basic asymmetry: the United States evaluates Russian policy in the context of its global interests and perspectives, whereas EU countries focus on the security implications of Russia's actions for Europe. While America and Europe share a fundamental commitment to integrating Russia into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, their interpretations of Russia's overall interests and actions occasionally differ because the United States views Russia's policies through a global, as opposed to a regional prism. Moreover, on some issues, such as relations with Iran or the role of the United Nations, the EU's perspectives are closer to those of Russia than to those of America. Similarly, Russian policies toward the United States and toward the EU are based on different calculations: a decade after the collapse of the USSR, Russia continues to seek recognition from the United States as an equal global partner, whereas its goals toward the EU are more regionally focused. Although the Soviet penchant for seeking to exploit differences between the United States and its European partners has largely disappeared since communism collapsed, the current Russian government is not averse to making common cause with European countries on security issues over which much of Europe disagrees with the United States – most notably, the ABM Treaty.

American views of Russian security policy fluctuated considerably during the first post-Soviet decade. The Clinton administration embarked on its Russia policy convinced that Russia's domestic developments were the key to determining its foreign policy. It found a responsive partner in Andrei Kozyrev, the first post-communist foreign minister, who encouraged US involvement in Russia's domestic transition and vocally espoused a pro-western policy. By the time Kozyrev was replaced by Yevgenii Primakov in 1996, there was disillusionment with Russia's domestic transition and debates about the United States' role in promoting capitalism Russian-style both in Russia and in the United States. Primakov's rejection of a pro-western policy and espousal of "multi-polarity" as the cornerstone of Russia's security policy evoked considerable criticism in the United States. When Primakov's tenure ended, NATO enlargement, the Kosovo campaign and growing Russian economic and political contacts with "rogue" states had considerably

soured relations between the two countries. American officials and experts believed that Russia was incapable of abandoning “old thinking” in foreign policy, viewing relations with the United States as a zero-sum game and persisting in supporting states that, from Washington’s viewpoint, supported terrorism and were opposed to US interests. When Putin succeeded Yeltsin, the second Chechen war and Moscow’s continued commitment to promoting a “multi-polar” world placed further distance between America and Russia. By the end of the Clinton administration, relations were at low ebb.

The Bush administration came into office committed to downgrading and normalising relations with Russia, de-personalising them and focusing on a new strategic framework, as opposed to Russia’s domestic situation. Indeed, policy towards Russia became a major issue during the election campaign, and the Congressional Cox Report heavily criticised the Clinton administration for betraying American and Russian interests in its Russia policy.¹ Nevertheless, after taking office, the Bush administration quickly realised that, given its objective of deploying a missile defence system and creating a new strategic framework, intensified dialogue with Russia was essential. When Presidents Bush and Putin met in Ljubljana in June, the obvious rapport between the two presidents was a welcome respite, from the Bush administration’s point of view, from the disagreements between the United States and the EU over a wide range of issues, and European accusations of American unilateralism. Thus, prior to September 11, the US-Russian relationship, including the personal ties between the two presidents, was on a positive trajectory.

The Aftermath of September 11: A new security agenda?

Since President’s Putin’s call to President Bush in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, both the perception and the reality of US-Russian relations has become more positive. From the American point of view, Putin has made the strategic choice to support fully the anti-terrorist coalition by not interfering with US overflights and bases in Central Asia, and has eschewed, for now, talk of multipolarity. Many officials and analysts attribute Putin’s support to pragmatic reasons. More cynical observers point out that the United States and its allies have succeeded in accomplishing what Russia, for the past decade has been unable to do: ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban, whose influence has destabilised a number of Central Asian countries, and whose spillover effects within the Islamic areas of the Russian Federation have caused

¹ See *Russia’s Road to Corruption*.

Moscow great concern over the past years. The anti-terrorist coalition promises to bring greater stability to Central Asia and to Russia. Moreover, by making the direct link between Russia's Chechen problem and al-Qaeda, Putin has all but silenced American criticism of continuing Russian military action in Chechnya.

Although it is undeniable that Russia's security interests are served by America's actions in Afghanistan, it is nevertheless also true that Putin faced considerable domestic opposition, both from the military and parts of the foreign policy elite, to his vocal support for American policies. His willingness not to prevent the establishment of an American military presence in Central Asia, and share Russian intelligence on the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and his muted reaction so far to the Bush administration's announcement that the United States intends to withdraw from the ABM Treaty continue to raise opposition domestically. However, his personal popularity is so high that, at this point, this opposition has not cost him politically at home.

As the anti-terrorist campaign continues, the Bush administration seeks to balance its commitment to Missile Defence and withdrawing from the ABM Treaty with its recognition that Russia should receive a quid pro quo for its support of the United States. After all, one could argue that, up till now, Russia's contribution to the anti-terrorist campaign has been greater than that of most of America's NATO allies, with the exception of the United Kingdom. The agreement at Crawford that both sides will pursue deep cuts in their strategic nuclear arsenals was a beginning. After a year-long review of all Comprehensive Threat Reduction programmes in the FSU, the administration has decided to retain the bulk of these programmes, contrary to signals that were initially given in February of 2001. Washington has also offered Russia accelerated WTO membership and the possibility of other economic incentives, including permanent graduation from the Jackson-Vanik amendment tying most-favoured nation status to emigration policies; further debt rescheduling or even debt forgiveness – an issue on which the United States and Russia's major creditor, Germany, do not agree. But there is also recognition that the United States and its allies should take more concrete steps toward encouraging Russia's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

As the NATO alliance debates the next round of enlargement before this fall's Prague summit, NATO is seeking to enhance the NATO-Russia relationship and create an institutional framework that will be more effective than the PJC, towards which Russian officials have always felt profound ambivalence. The United States and its European partners are still grappling with the modalities of a new NAC-Russia body. If it is not

to be a repeat of the PJC's "19+1", it must give Russia more of a voice – which, as Lord Robertson has said, also implies potentially a veto. From the American point of view, the question is how far Russian thinking on NATO has now evolved since the low point of the Kosovo campaign and whether the innate suspicion of NATO and "zero-sum" mentality has dissipated. Russia's own actions will, of course, have an impact on this debate, and so far, President Putin has responded to the intra-western debate with caution.

Despite this new US-Russian rapprochement, Washington's concerns with other dimensions of Russia's security policies persist. The United States remains preoccupied by the activities of Russian entities – technically not government entities, but closely allied to them – that it considers have exacerbated nuclear proliferation, thus endangering global security. Russia's ties with Iran, Iraq and North Korea are the prime concerns. Washington also remains concerned about Russia's policies towards many of its CIS neighbours, its use of energy leverage in Ukraine and other CIS countries and its continued support of undemocratic regimes, the most egregious example being that of Belarus' Alexander Lukashenko. Thus, the United States continues to view its security relations with Russia within a broader global context.

EU-Russian Relations: The US View

Broadly speaking, the United States has supported EU policies toward Russia and has viewed them as complementary to American goals. As expressed in the EU's 1999 common strategy, the twin goals of "a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Russia, governed by the rule of law and underpinning a prosperous market economy" and "maintaining European stability, promoting global security and responding to the common challenges on the continent through intensified cooperation with Russia" are basically those of the United States.² Throughout much of the 1990s, the United States and the EU shared an assessment of Russia's domestic evolution, and American and EU assistance policies were directed toward similar sectors. American advocacy of neo-liberal economic policies, however, which were espoused by Gaidar, Chubais and other officials in the early and mid-1990s, were not echoed in EU policies.

Nevertheless, both the United States and the EU recognise the imperative of supporting Russia's institutional integration into Europe as the most desirable path both for Russia and for Europe. Putin has reiterated that he

² *Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia*, 4 June 1999, p. 1.

made this choice – for integration with the West – some time ago, and that September 11 was merely the culmination of a long process of resolving Russia's identity. Nevertheless, both the US and the EU recognise that Russia's choice of a European, as opposed to a Eurasian, identity is an ongoing process whose end result is not yet clear.³ Both believe that closer institutional cooperation between the EU and Russia will also affect Russian perceptions of the relative value of a European choice, but that concrete results will be important. In the tradition of Russian modernisers since Peter the Great, reportedly one of Putin's heroes, the Russian president seeks both to import Western techniques and organisational structures and to increase economic and political ties with Europe. Nevertheless, as Putin has also reiterated, Russian history and culture differentiates it from the mainstream of European civilisation, and it is as yet unclear whether Russia's closer integration into European structures will involve a wholesale acceptance of European values. Although these questions might appear at first sight as rather abstract, they do have an impact on security policies, because they affect how Russia views its place in Europe and how far it is willing to eschew its belief in the legitimacy of its uniqueness to become part of the European mainstream.

In terms of EU policies, during the 1990's, there was some concern in Washington that the EU initially moved too cautiously in its move to bring the post-communist states into Europe. Indeed, the United States would have preferred an accelerated timetable for EU enlargement, particularly toward the Baltic States, because that might have altered the debate about NATO enlargement. With the next round of EU enlargement in sight, the US recognises Russian concerns about the impact of Baltic enlargement on Kaliningrad and the ensuing economic and security issues. The place of Kaliningrad, should the Baltic states be invited to join NATO, is also a major Russian preoccupation, although so far Russia has expressed more equanimity about EU Baltic accession than about NATO enlargement to the Baltics.

Both the EU and NATO have recognised that, in the post-September 11 climate, it behoves the West to reassure Russia that the dual enlargements will bring greater prosperity and security closer to Russia's borders and that neither enlargement is intended to isolate Russia. Indeed, given the large Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia, the EU will gain a bloc of Russian-speaking members after Baltic accession. Since Russians still

³ For a discussion of this choice, see Dmitri Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization* (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2001).

view NATO through a cold-war lens but do not have this perception of the EU, it is easier to dispel Russian concerns about EU enlargement. Nevertheless, the Schengen regime and its impact on Russian mobility – particularly in Kaliningrad – pose major challenges. Despite Western assurances to Russia, it is undeniable that the prospect of an EU and NATO that stop at Russia's borders could have the impact of creating a Europe of "haves" and "have-nots", which poses a long-term security challenge to both the United States and the EU. A Europe in which Russia remains outside the mainstream of European stability and prosperity is not a recipe for long-term security on the continent.

As the EU intensifies its cooperation with Russia on a broad range of issues – as outlined in the EU-Russia October 2001 joint statement – the issue of Russia's role in ESDP has become more salient. The initial American response to ESDP ranged from hostility, to scepticism, to enthusiasm. The Bush administration has generally supported the evolution of ESDP, but continues to express scepticism about the resources that will be devoted to it and whether it will function effectively with these limited resources. Nevertheless, the concept of Russia participating in future ESDP operations of the Petersberg type would probably be welcomed by the United States if they contributed to greater stability in Europe. As the U.S. looks towards phasing out its involvement in the Balkans, there will be new opportunities for European-Russian joint efforts.

Future Security Challenges and Opportunities for US-EU Russian Cooperation

The events of September 11 have made it abundantly clear that traditional security challenges, while still important, have been overshadowed by the new security challenges – terrorism, bio-terrorism, WMD proliferation and activities that enable terrorism to flourish, particularly money-laundering and illegal movement of people across borders. Both the EU and the United States have recognised the need to confront these threats more directly, and both have initiated new cooperative mechanisms with Russia for dealing with these challenges. However, these new mechanisms will have to be improved and their area of application widened. Intelligence-sharing between the United States, the EU and Russia will remain a major means of coping with our common threats, and will require overcoming traditional constraints on such cooperation.

Beyond dealing with money-laundering and similar issues, however, the United States, Russia and the EU must begin thinking more proactively about broader security in the post-Soviet space. Before September 11, the

major reasons that the West paid any attention to Russia, according to one scholar, were three-fold: “the atom, the veto and the location”.⁴ Since the terrorist attacks, location has assumed an even greater importance. Neither America nor Europe has, so far, approached its policies toward Russia in the broader framework of the entire post-Soviet space. Yet this is now more imperative than before, because Russia’s security is indivisible from its place in that post-Soviet space. Central Asia and the Caucasus may be a long way from Europe and the United States, but their future will be key to dealing with the longer-term threat that terrorism poses in a globalised world. The EU and the United States should discuss more systematically a possible framework for post-Taliban cooperation in Central Asia. This could include the United States, the EU, Russia, China, the Central Asian states and their South Asian neighbours, and would involve creating and maintaining a more stable environment there. There would of necessity be a division of labour, since the United States would focus more on military tasks, and the EU more on non-military economic and political tasks. Such a framework will be difficult to construct and maintain. Nevertheless, if the history of the past 20 years teaches us anything, it is that walking away from Afghanistan and Central Asia after a military victory – or defeat – is a recipe for future troubles.

In the 1990s, the United States and the EU were largely preoccupied with containing the potentially negative impact of Russia’s weakness on the rest of Europe. September 11 showed that we have to move beyond this containment policy. The challenge for the United States and the EU in the next decade is to encourage a domestic evolution in Russia that combines market-oriented economic reform with as much pluralism, democracy and rule of law as the Putin administration will tolerate, while strengthening trilateral security cooperation in Europe. But that cooperation will have to move beyond Europe’s borders to the broader post-Soviet space. Otherwise, the EU’s goals, as set out in the Common Strategy on Russia, will not be realised and Russia will remain outside Europe’s zone of prosperity, democracy and security, with potentially devastating consequences for the entire continent.

⁴ Robert Legvold, “Russia’s Unformed Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2001.

**THE ROLE OF EUROPE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

**CEPS-IISS EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM
WORKING PAPER No. 7**

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY

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INTRODUCTION

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

In approaching Europe's role in the Greater Middle East, the European Security Forum had the benefit of three essentially complementary papers, with Alain Dieckhoff's focus on Europe's positioning vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian nexus, Anthony Cordesman's broad-spectrum view of the region and Vitaly Naumkin's Russian view of the EU's role. The proceedings occurred before both the Beirut summit of the Arab League and the Israeli occupation of Ramallah and other West Bank cities.

In their oral presentations, the paper-givers were requested by the Chairman to address more particularly the question of what the EU should do, notably in relation to US policies, and to what extent the effectiveness of EU institutions could be improved.

Alain Dieckhoff (Senior Research Fellow, CERI, Paris) expressed his pessimism since Sharon's political interest is to end the Oslo process. He noted that there would be a tremendous effect in Israel if the Palestinians confined their use of violence to the Occupied Territories. He emphasised the need for close coordination of EU policy with US policy – provided the US resumed a political (not simply a security-agenda) role in the conflict.

As for the EU, there could be an advantage in providing greater responsibility to Javier Solana, not least in terms of exploiting the "Taba acquis", in case a peace process resumed.

Anthony Cordesman (Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS, Washington, D.C.) underscored the fact that only countries (or organisations) that are direct players in the Middle East will be taken seriously. This is demonstrated inter alia by the fact that regional tolerance (or support) of US operations against Saddam Hussein's regime would be more important than European attitudes. He emphasised the scope of security challenges: attacks involving chemical weapons (CW, notably 4th generation agents not necessarily covered by the CW convention) and biological weapons (BW) had to be expected. Such prospects implied a high degree of international cooperation in a broad range of fields. Nor was the world's dependency on Middle Eastern oil going to diminish, with the Gulf's share of oil exports set to rise from 45% in 2002 to 60% in 2020. Most of this consumption will result from

Asian demand, and will entail increased reliance on maritime transport through the Straits of Hormuz. Middle Eastern demographics were insufficiently taken into consideration, notably in light of the enormous pressure building up in hyper-urbanised and alienated societies; in parallel, economic growth in a number of countries (Morocco, Tunisia...) continued to be more dependent on rainfall patterns than on macroeconomic factors.

A political settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians would simply not be possible along 1967 borders; rather, it could look like Taba but with non-territorial issues (such as water) thrown in. He did not expect the US to resort to any major economic pressure against Israel, even if the latter crossed "red lines".

Vitaly Naumkin (President, International Center for Strategic and Political Studies, Moscow) concurred with the assessment that Sharon was basically interested in military solutions. On the political side, the Abdallah Plan would have zero chances of being accepted in Israel if the issue of refugee return was included at the Syrians' insistence. As far as military operations in Iraq were concerned, he voiced the fear of regional instability unless the Americans could succeed rapidly in working with the central Baghdad power structure; he noted Saddam Hussein's attempts to entice the Russians by offering an "oil for debt" scheme (Iraqi oil exported under the Russian flag to repay Iraq's debt to the USSR): this was unlikely to work.

In the debate, the issue was raised of a broadening of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to other countries as well as of the implications of the conflict for possible US operations against Iraq. The risks of an extension of the conflict were considered as limited, given the military weakness of Syria, Egypt and Jordan, notwithstanding the precedent of 1967 in which Jordan was forced into a war it didn't want. Conversely, it was pointed out that the US would have extreme difficulty in operating from the Middle East if Israel pursued its operations, notably to the point of engaging in forced relocation of population. The likelihood of ethnic cleansing, up to the Jordan River, was low, notwithstanding Sharon's longstanding support for a Palestinian entity lying on the east of the River Jordan. However, forced relocation within the West Bank was another matter, since there was little chance that Israel would return to the 1967 borders; indeed such transfers were already occurring in the name of security measures.

Close attention was paid to the prospects of re-launching a peace process. Here, converging views were held concerning the failure of

incrementalism: in particular, the “7 day cease-fire clause” – as a preliminary first step – was denounced, since this made everyone a “prisoner of the last extremist”. In effect, the outlines of a potential peace settlement were well known (notably since Taba): these had to be revived, and “shoved down the throat of the contenders” by the outside world, not least the US and the EU (see on this score the subsequent opened piece by Gareth Evans in the *International Herald Tribune* of 10 April 2002).

The EU could benefit from its good positioning vis-à-vis the Palestinians. Conversely, it wasn’t entirely clear whether the EU’s role was aided or hampered by the diversity of its institutional forms of presence (Commission, CFSP, member states, etc...): for some this created flexibility; for others, this variety betrayed a lack of agreement between EU actors.

In any case, the US and the EU simply had to try and try again, since there was no way of telling in advance when the “magic moment” had arrived for a successful re-launching of the peace process. One of the intrinsic difficulties of any peace process is that the Israelis are faced with the prospect of relinquishing physical assets (land, water) in exchange for intangibles (recognition, security cooperation). Nonetheless, Israel has a vital need of recognition of its permanent place in the region: the reality of demographic trends is inescapable.

Consideration was given to the new dynamic of confrontation. Rather than a straight religious “Muslim versus Jew” confrontation, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be drifting towards “Bosnification”, i.e. an ethnic/national confrontation (albeit with religious overtones) akin to what has occurred in Bosnia, with Israeli Jews against Arabs (including Christians).

Concerning the evolution of the Palestinians’ situation, the prospect was raised of Palestine becoming a failed state even before it was born. In any case, the competition for the succession to Arafat was in practice open, with on the one hand the “old guard” (Abu Ala, Abu Mazen...) and on the other the “new guard” (e.g. Marwan Barghuti). These potential successors tend to be more, not less, nationalistic than Arafat, but they were, in its time, in favour of the Oslo process. Palestinian terrorism, whatever its other characteristics, was not at this stage a “terrorism with a global reach”; and although this was faint consolation, there was none of the narcotics or kidnapping-for-money incidents present in the current violence.

Finally, the broader regional context was reviewed. On this score, it was noted that Saddam would have little incentive to accept international inspectors (whose task it is to help prevent Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction), if the operative US objective were the overthrow of the dictator, come what may. In contrast, it was pointed out that the risk flowing from Iraqi WMD in terrorist hands was substantially greater than anything resulting from the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation.

On the economic level, and independently of the Iraqi situation, the view was expressed that little is to be expected from regional economic integration as a force of progress: there isn't enough complementarity between the various (mostly rentier) economies of the region, and the economic barriers between each country are inordinately high.

THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN NEW WAR OF ATTRITION: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

ALAIN DIECKHOFF

Whereas in July 2000, the Middle East peace process seemed near completion – at least on the Israeli-Palestinian track – two months later, violence engulfed the region showing just how fragile the achievements of one decade of negotiations were. Although the situation has not given way to a full-scale war, the current “low-intensity conflict” has already cost a high price to both parties in human, economic and diplomatic terms. This will leave deep wounds, which will not be easily cured. The prospects are rather grim: violence is not on the wane, but rather expanding; the descent to regional war, even if it is more through insidious deterioration than through choice is still looming ahead. In this paper we will look at three things: Arafat’s and Sharon’s current political positions, the most probable scenarios concerning the evolution of the situation and a possible European role in the region.

Arafat and Sharon’s Political Position

Shut up in Ramallah since 3 December 2001, head of a Palestinian Authority that has been undermined by the continuous assaults of the Israeli army and demonised by Israel, the Palestinian leader seems to have lost the game and more and more people are waiting for the post-Arafat era. Although it would be hazardous to speculate on his political fate, it seems indisputable that Arafat’s political weakening is partially the consequence of a failed strategy and of tortuous tactics. I do not share the argument, largely spread by Israeli officials and analysts, that Arafat was the initiator of the al-Aqsa intifada, but I do think that he tried to capitalise diplomatically on it. His aim was to involve directly the international community in the management of the crisis, hoping that it would lead to an internationalisation of the solution. This hope proved to be wrong. Arafat was able to secure the rhetorical support of his natural allies, the Arab and Islamic world, but unable to get an internationalisation of the crisis (through the sending of international observers). Indeed he badly misread the international scene, overstating Europe’s influence and the new American administration’s willingness to find a way out of the crisis.

On the tactical level, Arafat had contradictory objectives. On the one hand, he approved at least tacitly the use of arms because he saw this as a way to give freedom of action to the “generation of the first Intifada” among his own Fatah movement. Thus he was able to get a new legitimacy as leader of the Palestinian resistance. On the other hand, he wanted still to be recognised by the international community as the Chairman of the PA (Palestinian Authority) and the sole accountable interlocutor. Thus the recurring calls to a cease-fire and the arrests of Islamist militants and activists. This two-fold tactic rendered his message rather obscure and has confused the Israeli public. This structural ambiguity has objectively helped Ariel Sharon to throw discredit upon the Palestinian leader, equating him with Bin Laden. Sharon holds fast to his nationalist vision: he still thinks that Israel’s interest would be best served by the dismantling of Palestinian institutions, which will weaken, it is hoped, the Palestinian national movement for years. He thought that, in the immediate aftermath of September 11th, the situation was ripe, but had to lessen his expectations when he saw that the Bush administration choose instead to bind solidly the PA to the anti-terrorist coalition by endorsing publicly the prospect of Palestinian statehood.

Things changed in late November-early December 2001, after new suicide attacks against civilians inside Israel: this time the US was convinced that Arafat played a double game and considered that the reprisals against the Palestinian Authority – now defined as an entity supporting terrorism – were legitimate acts of self-defence. This American understanding has clearly played into the hands of Sharon’s aim to de-legitimise Arafat but has yet stopped short of endorsing his definite toppling. The American parameter is still putting some constraint on Sharon, which has also to take into account his Labour partner in the national unity government, which wants to maintain at least minimal contacts with the Palestinian side.

Three Possible Scenarios

Although it is rather difficult to decipher the future because the situation on the ground is quite complex, I would suggest three possible evolutions.

Without doubt the general trend of the last 17 months has been a growing militarisation of the conflict: on the Palestinian side, stones and Molotov cocktails have given way to more and more mortar shells, drive-by shootings and suicide bombings; on the Israeli side, to the shootings by snipers have been added “extra-judicial killings”, shells by tanks and bombings by helicopters and airplanes. Even if Sharon has declared

Arafat irrelevant, however, contacts between Israelis and Palestinians have never completely stopped at the security and political level (the most regular meetings are those between Shimon Peres and the speaker of the Legislative council, Abu Ala'a).

The most likely scenario in the short term is the carrying on of the "low-intensity conflict" and on-going contacts. A progressive de-escalation that the EU (with Miguel Angel Moratinos and Javier Solana) and the US (with General Zinni) have tried to achieve during the last months is only possible if two conditions are met. First, a growing weariness of the populations coupled with an awareness of the deadlock of militarisation. In such a context the pragmatics in each camp ("old guard" of the PLO, left and centre figures in Israel) could take the lead. Such a change could only occur if a second condition is met: the outline of a political perspective. The Peres-Abu Ala'a initiative, which provides for the immediate establishment of a Palestinian state on the 42% of the West Bank already under total or partial control by the PA and the resumption of negotiations for a final settlement, is clearly such an attempt to refuel the political process. Unfortunately such a revival should overcome both Sharon and Arafat's reluctance: the former thinks it is already too much, the latter, too little. An exit from the current crisis will not be easy to manage because it requires a close synchronisation between lull of violence and diplomatic action.

The second scenario is the worst one. If the violence is growing (especially an increase of suicide attacks inside Israel), the temptation to totally dismantle the PA will be irresistible. The aim would be to close the Oslo parenthesis by reasserting Israeli control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip either by taking over directly the A zones or by putting Palestinian proxies into place. In a climate of hardened violence, Sharon will benefit from a double support for such an objective. Within Israel, the general mood will be one of "patriotic union": if human bombs are blowing up in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the feeling that Israel is fighting for its very existence can only grow and with it the belief that the only way out is a complete military defeat of the Palestinians. In such a context Sharon who has already garnered an appreciable support from the Bush administration will get an ever-freer hand to act against the PA. At a time when an American power undertakes a wide fight against "international terrorism", suicide attacks can only deepen US understanding for Israel's own will to defeat terrorism (of course, to reduce the Palestinian struggle to its terrorist outbreaks is debatable but what interests us here is the fact that the terrorist paradigm is now part of a global vision largely shared by Israel and the US in the post-September

11th situation). However, the destruction of the PA and the re-occupation of the Territories would surely not be the end of the game: the Palestinian guerrilla war would go on, at least for a while, with the Islamist groups (Hamas and Jihad) taking a leading role. This would barely be a blessing for Israel.

Finally, there is a third scenario. It implies that the Palestinians choose to restrict their attacks to the Territories occupied in 1967, to the settlers and the soldiers. This trend was clearly noticeable in February 2002, but it is still too early to affirm that we are witnessing a strategic change. Let us assume it is. Even if Israeli leaders will still depict attacks on settlers and soldiers within the Territories as terrorist acts, they are clearly seen as acts of resistance by the Palestinians and get even a certain amount of understanding from the outside. Such a situation will not be without consequence within Israeli society: indeed, restricting the use of arms to the Territories will surely increase the internal rifts. The public statement taken, late January, by hundred of reservists who have stated that they will refuse to serve in the Territories because they do not want to support an immoral occupation is a clear indication that the purely repressive answer is openly challenged by some.

These dissenting voices will become more numerous if Palestinian attacks are concentrated on the Territories. Indeed such a move will be interpreted as signalling that the Palestinian political aim is only to get rid of the occupation in order to build a Palestinian state beside Israel. A majority of Israeli Jews still think that, in the long term, it may be not the best, but the least bad solution. Going in that direction requires Arafat to make the utmost effort to control the activities of the Islamist groups and to prevent them from bombing civilians in Israel: ambiguity has to stop. If the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation is focused on the Territories, political options will become once again credible. A negotiated agreement specifying the terms and conditions of Israel's withdrawal would be the best solution but if this way is closed, there is still another issue: a unilateral withdrawal. More and more people in Israel have put the idea forward, from the right to the left. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shlomo Ben Ami, has presented the most sophisticated account of this plan. For him, the land vacated by the army (80% of the West Bank and the last third of the Gaza strip) should be handed over to an American-led multinational force, which would also supervise the dismantling of the settlements. At the same time negotiations would start with the Palestinians on the basis of the Clinton parameters, in order to organise the transfer of sovereignty to them. Of course, a unilateral withdrawal does not go forward without problems. One of the most acute

is surely that it could revive the “Lebanon syndrome”, i.e. be to seen, as was the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000, as a sign of weakness and, thus, fuel hostility towards Israel rather than dampen it. Despite its shortcomings, however, the unilateral option could rise to the top of the agenda if there is no diplomatic breakthrough in sight while violence goes on in the Territories.

The European Role

We can discern three stages in Europe’s involvement during the last 18 months. During the first phase (September 2000-September 2001), the EU – as an entity or through its member states – was very active setting up a lasting cease-fire, first in coordination with the Clinton administration (Sharm el-Sheikh summit), and then alone, as the Bush administration stayed in the background. Goodwill was present but all the different attempts failed because the parties were unwilling or unable to stop the violence. On a more diplomatic level, the EU has maintained continual political contacts with the Israelis and the Palestinians through its high representative and special envoy. Even if the practical outcomes have been limited, the EU has been right to do so. Indeed political dialogue has in a time of crisis a virtue in itself because it prevents the emergence of a “bloc logic” which can only harden the confrontation.

Then came September 11th, which opened a new phase. Attacked on its own soil, the US had no choice but to assume a leading role on the international scene. This led to a renewal of a multi-dimensional presence whose Middle Eastern outcome was the conditional endorsement of Palestinian statehood by Bush and Colin Powell. The new American attitude was indeed welcomed by the EU, but Europe seemed so relieved to see the US back that it was content to play a junior role. This demotion was eased in the immediate post-September 11th period, which saw the national logic prevail, as each “big” European country chose to play it alone, diplomatically and militarily, rather than foster cooperation with its European partners. This partly self-inflicted marginalisation of the EU as a community of nations was regrettable, even more so because the American insistence on the (legitimate) military fight against terrorism took a growing place on their agenda to the detriment of diplomacy. The prioritisation of terrorism had a direct impact on the Middle East: Arafat was de facto disqualified as an interlocutor as long as the Palestinian semi-underground groups were not totally disarmed and dismantled. Thus, the US sided objectively with Sharon and his harsh reprisal tactics.

This *reductio ad terrorem* – obvious in President Bush’s State of the Union speech – has finally led the Europeans to a reassessment of their

position: force cannot be the only game in town, politics matters. Here began the third phase (February). It has been characterised by a series of European proposals, which, although they differ in their details, have one thing in common: they aim at restarting a political process. The general framework has two pillars: new elections or a referendum in the Territories in order to give a new legitimacy to the Palestinian leaders – immediate proclamation of a Palestinian state whose precise outlines will then be negotiated with Israel on the basis of UN Resolutions 242 and 338. This “stock of ideas” came up immediately against two major difficulties: enduring differences among the EU-15, with the UK and Germany insisting on the priority of security considerations (a recipe for inaction in my view because calm is not achieved by a miracle: a political “cover” is essential) – staunch opposition from the US and the Sharon government (except Shimon Peres) which are sticking to the Mitchell report and the prerequisite of seven days of complete calm. Even if the Europeans are able to bridge the differences between them, this new set of ideas has no chance getting off the ground without a nod of assent from the Americans, which seems highly unlikely. Does this mean that Europe is powerless? I don’t think so, but the EU should be much more resolute in *using the means it already has* at its disposal as a civilian power.

Two questions have been singled out by the EU as a source of worry: terrorism and settlements. In both cases the EU has the means to press hard on the parties. Europe has heavily subsidised the Palestinian Authority out of a correct assessment that the Palestinians need their own public institutions in order to exercise their right of self-determination. Nevertheless, the PA cannot take this financial aid for granted; it is conditional on politically accountable behaviour. The EU has been clearer than ever by stating that the PA has to dismantle the terrorist networks of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and must prosecute suspects. If Arafat’s apparent goodwill does not materialise, the EU should make it clear that it will reduce the funds channelled towards the Palestinian institutions (not the population). Of course, Europe has to take into account the specific situation of the Palestinians as a people under occupation, but as a power committed to the rule of law, Europe cannot tolerate ambiguity towards para-military groups which perpetrate killings against civilians within a sovereign state by any entity that receives its financial support.

On the Israeli side, the EU has repeatedly stated that the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are major obstacles on the road to peace. It is high time for the EU to give an effective

translation to its declarative diplomacy: the EU should strictly apply the “rules of origin” to the goods produced in the Territories and exclude them from the benefit of lower tariffs. Sure, the economic impact of such a measure will be limited, but the Israeli leaders will not miss its symbolic meaning. The statement of the European Commission (November 2001), which specifies that the goods from the settlements cannot benefit from the preferential treatment included in the EU-Israel association agreement, should be applied without delay.

Coercion in the short term should be accompanied by proposals for the medium and long term. Europe could play an eminent role in three fields: the resumption of the negotiations, peacekeeping and long-term solutions.

When serious negotiations resume, one question will inevitably arise: at what point should negotiations be renewed? Should only signed agreements serve as a starting point? Legally, yes; politically, no. Proposals and ideas raised from Camp David (July 2000) to Taba (January 2001) cannot be pushed aside as if they never were on the table. They are part of an *acquis diplomatique* that the EU has been partly entrusted with keeping. Indeed, at Taba, the Special Envoy was the sole third party witness of the negotiations and he has kept a memorandum. This document will be of tremendous importance when negotiations for a final agreement resume.

Even when the violence stops, there is a risk – especially after such a bloody crisis – of relapse into violence. To avoid such a negative development, the EU, which has endorsed the principle of “third-party monitoring” should restate its readiness to assume an active role of peacekeeper. With a clear mandate and the cooperation of the parties in implementing it, a peacekeeping force would have a positive input. For Europe, such an involvement would perfectly suit its wish to have a military capacity. Indeed, crisis management (humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping and peacemaking) has been explicitly included in the Amsterdam Treaty and forms the backbone of the nascent European defence system.

Finally, the EU should play a greater part in the “final status” questions by suggesting creative solutions. In 1998, two working groups (Palestinian refugees and water) have been set up under the aegis of Mr. Moratinos. The documents presented within these informal groups should serve as a basis for defining a common European position. The fear expressed by some member states of interfering with the negotiations between the parties is baseless, not only because there are no negotiations going on today, but also because it will be useful for the EU’s position to

be known once these difficult questions are tackled (after all, President Clinton also forwarded his proposals on the territorial basis of the Palestinian state, Jerusalem and the refugees in late December 2000). It might also be advisable for the EU to support second-track diplomacy.

These different steps would give more visibility and coherence to the European position towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. As in the Balkans, Europe can play a constructive role in the Middle East. This role is not contradictory to the one played by the US but rather is complementary. It will be decisively enhanced if transatlantic links are strengthened in a more multilateral setting, an evolution however that is far from obvious today.

EUROPE'S ROLE IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST: A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

VITALY NAUMKIN

One may cite several factors that seriously influence relations between Europe and the Greater Middle East (GME): economic interests (including one in the sphere of energy resources); the Mediterranean proximity; the demographic "link" (in particular, the presence in Europe of huge numbers of people from the countries of the Middle East); the need to neutralise threats coming from the region (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, religious extremism and international terrorism, the smuggling of drugs, weapons, uncontrollable population migrations, etc.); transatlantic commitments (in particular, support for actions undertaken at the initiative and in the interests of the US); the existence of unsettled conflict situations in the region, the Arab-Israeli conflict above all; and the necessity of assisting economic development and democratisation. The appreciably increased role of the European Union is combined with an increased weight of national governments, whose policies concerning the region as a whole, regional problems and individual states manifest, given the existence of national interests, naturally significant differences which, in the view of an observer from Moscow, somewhat decrease the efficiency of the all-European course. Trips by European states' officials to the Middle Eastern region, as can be judged from the information being reported, do not fall within the framework of actions coordinated by the European Union (EU). Bilateral relations are generally of great importance, given the disparity of Europe's Middle Eastern negotiation partners: in the Middle East one can hardly find two or three states that would successfully coordinate their policies in relation to the most pressing regional and global problems.

Certainly, the Middle East conflict is a key problem for all international players in the region. Russia, which inherited from the Soviet Union the role of co-sponsor in the Middle East peace process, has in recent years displayed a tendency not only to cooperate more actively with Europe on the Middle Eastern issue, but also to recognise the EU role as an independent force which is able to make an important contribution to the settlement of the conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis. Sources in Moscow noted that the EU, though lacking an official co-sponsor status, is nevertheless vigorously trying to participate in the resolution of the

entire range of regional problems. The growing interest of the EU countries in the Middle East settlement, analysts in Russia believe, is explained both by the existence of substantial economic interests in the region, especially in the Mediterranean region, where the integration process is gathering momentum, and by regional security considerations conditioned by geographical proximity between the Middle East and Europe.

A change in Russia's position in favour of a recognition of a greater role for the EU has taken place not only under the influence of the real situation vindicating this role and due to the desire for a rapprochement with the EU, but also due to certain disappointment, though implicit, about the potential of the format of the American-Russian co-sponsorship, which has proved unable to ensure a successful continuation of the Middle East peace process. A more robust independent policy by Russia is hindered by a number of limitations, first and foremost of a financial and economic character. In view of this factor, the EC's economic role may be seen as especially significant.

For the EU, rendering financial and economic assistance to the countries of the Middle Eastern region is the key factor of influence on the peace process. As is known, the EU countries are the largest donors of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The volume of funding annually allocated by the European Union within the framework of economic assistance to the peace process, averages more than 810 million euro. Furthermore, the EU annually allocates to Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt (on a bilateral and multilateral basis) up to 610 million euro.

Within the framework of multilateral negotiations on the Middle East, the EU is the leading organiser of the multilateral working group on regional economic development, whose objective is the financial and economic support of the peace process and the encouragement of regional economic cooperation. Simultaneously, the EU is co-organiser of working groups on refugees, water resources and environment, most of whose subdivisions are supervised by individual European countries and the EU.

In the political sphere, the EU has reserved for itself the status of an "observer of the peace process" with the right of "rendering assistance in case of necessity for the realisation of the international agreements made between the parties." The EU has till now considered its participation in it as supplementing the co-sponsors' efforts, instead of running counter to it. However, European policy has recently been manifesting a growing independence. Some European initiatives are going beyond the framework of the co-sponsors' efforts, between whose positions there are

also considerable differences, but there is a coordination of diplomatic activity and consensus on key elements (for example, the need to resume the peace process). It is significant that European policy is subjected to criticism in Israel as being pro-Arab.

In the “Israeli-Palestinian Code of Behaviour” (October 1997) and the “EU Appeal towards Peace in the Middle East” (December 1997), the EU countries defined their common position, whose major aspects are: the prolongation of the transition period in the Palestinian Territories by one year; holding intensive talks on the final status during this time; support of the Palestinians’ right for self-determination, including the creation of their own state. On Jerusalem the Europeans’ position was formulated in the Statement of the European Union on the Peace Process in the Middle East (October 1996), which emphasised that the EU “confirms that East Jerusalem is a subject of principles incorporated in Resolution 242 of the UN Security Council, indicating the unacceptability of the seizure of Territories by force; consequently, they are not under Israeli sovereignty. The EU also stands for the necessity of renewed negotiations on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks of the Middle East peace process on the basis of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and on the basis of the principle of “land in exchange for peace”.

As is well known, 1996 saw the creation of the institution of an EU special representative on the Middle East peace process. Mr. Moratinos was nominated to this post in December 1996, and he is holding active consultations with all the parties involved in the conflict, and also with the co-sponsors of the peace process, and applying vigorous efforts for the resumption of negotiations on the Syrian-Lebanese sector of settlement. His activity is highly valued in Russia. In parallel, the EU Supreme Representative for Defence and Foreign Policy, Javier Solana, is working within the framework of the international Mitchell Commission formed in accordance with the decisions of the Sharm-el-Sheikh summit (October 2000) in order to find out the reasons for the new outbreak of confrontation.

At the EU summit in Laeken (December 2001), the Europeans also put forward a number of specific demands: on the PNA leadership – to liquidate the terrorist infrastructure of HAMAS and Islamic Jihad, to arrest and punish the persons involved in terrorist activity, to make an appeal in Arabic to stop the armed intifada; to Israel – to withdraw its troops, to stop the practice of extra-judicial punishments, to lift the blockade of Palestinian Territories, to freeze settler activity, and to stop hitting the Palestinian infrastructure. The European Union, just like

Russia, spoke for an immediate and unconditional implementation of the Tenet plan and recommendations of the Mitchell Commission.

The EU foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels (January 2002) for the first time put forward a position whose major component is that measures in the security field would be realised in parallel with political ones. This position was concretised in the plan of the peace settlement in the Middle East submitted by the French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, which, in particular, provides for the return of the Israeli troops to the positions they held before the beginning of the 2000 intifada, the holding of democratic parliamentary elections, the proclamation of an independent Palestinian state and its recognition first of all by Israel and the holding of negotiations on the border question between Israel and Palestine.

On the whole, the French initiative was positively met by representatives of all EU member countries at the meeting of heads of European foreign ministries in Caceres (February 2002). At the same time, analysts in Russia have noted that there are a number of divergences among the Europeans on key questions, in particular, on the problem of elections.

As is known, the French plan proposed to Yasser Arafat that he should call elections based on the principle of non-violence, but other European states did not support Minister Vedrine's plan. Joschka Fischer stated that elections at this stage can further radicalise Palestinian society. Britain was clearly opposed to any plan substantially out of line with the US policy. Spain was reported to seek a less ambitious plan than the French one. Thus both disagreements between the Europeans and the Americans, and among the Europeans themselves obviously prevented Europe's more active role as a broker of the peace process.

In other words, as things stand today, the EU member countries do not have a uniform position on the Middle East settlement. For example, the British Foreign Office supports the dominant American-Israeli approach, according to which it is necessary first to reach a complete cease-fire, and then resume the peaceful dialogue.

The Russian Federation, as co-sponsor of the peace process, generally welcomes any initiatives within the framework of the four international representatives (the Russian Federation, the US, the EU and the UN) and regards the EU as the important element of this group, and as one of the brokers of the peace process. However, the French initiative received a cool welcome by the Russian side, as Russia believes that any position involving a simultaneous realisation of measures in the field of security and in the political domain is unfeasible.

Nevertheless, the Russian vision of the situation in the Middle East does not run counter to the European vision. Russia perceives Yasser Arafat as the legitimate leader of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian National Authority. His role as negotiator is still essential and he is still able to control the situation.

Events that followed September 11th have shown the role of US military power in resolving political tasks in the Middle East and in other regions from which threats to global security may arise. Europe, which does not have such power, cannot independently resolve such tasks with its assistance. The US, having been confronted with a real threat to its security, resolutely preferred to work unilaterally, and even such an efficient mechanism as NATO was not necessary for the successful accomplishment of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. The discontent shown by many EU member countries with respect to US unilateralism is basically in line with Russia's sentiment. The subsequent march of events in the struggle against the sources of threats in the Middle East (WMD proliferation, terrorism, etc.) will show whether it will be possible to maintain and develop the international anti-terrorist alliance.

In this respect, the position of the European Union on Iran and Iraq is seen as especially important. Understanding well that these countries are capable of acquiring a nuclear capability, the Europeans, as Russia sees it, have a common vision of how Iran has to be dealt with, based on engagement – not sanctions and isolation. More differences exist between the US, Europe and Russia, as well as between the Europeans themselves, on policy towards Iraq. Russia is opposed to the idea of a military action against Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein. The Russian government believes that this may destabilise the whole region. Russia thinks that the return of UN inspectors to Baghdad should be linked to the lifting of sanctions when an appropriate report is delivered by them. Wide disorder of opinions among the Europeans – from Haider who has recently made a visit to Saddam Hussein to the British who, jointly with the US, are subjecting Iraq to bombardments, show the difficulty of forging a pan-European position.

Certainly, Mediterranean cooperation is an important element of European-Middle Eastern ties. The Mediterranean partnership, the engagement of the Mediterranean states in the European processes and economic integration will contribute to the stabilisation of the situation in the region.

The acuteness of the anti-terrorist campaign and the continued violence in the Middle East have overshadowed many lines of activity in which the European countries in the past put forward useful initiatives. One may cite, in particular, work on designing the fundamentals of the future collective security system in the Middle East, based on inclusiveness and a cooperative approach.

On the whole, on both the official and informal levels, Russia sees a European role in the Middle East as that of an active partner which is able to effectively promote the economic development of the countries of the region, as well as to facilitate the settlement of crisis situations. The countries of the European Union lack a common position on a number of major problems, however, and this reduces the potential of their impact. It would be useful in the long term to make the Russian-European dialogue on the Middle East more active, and possibly to create a new mechanism for it.

THE ROLE OF EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN

We need to be very careful about labels when talking about such issues as the role of Europe in the Middle East. To begin with, the West does not deal with the “Middle East”; it deals with specific problems and contingencies that affect some 21 to 23 different nations that are located in an arc that reaches from Morocco to Iran, Yemen and Somalia.

There are at least four strategic sub-regions: North Africa, the Levant, the Gulf, and the Red Sea and the Horn. Roughly two-thirds of the states in the Middle East have borders or coasts that extend beyond the region, and problems and contingencies often cut across regional boundaries. This was the case when Libya invaded Chad, it is the case with the conflict in Afghanistan and the Western Sahara, and there are grey areas like Cyprus where a geographically Middle Eastern state is a longstanding source of political conflict between two members of NATO: Greece and Turkey.

There also is no “Europe” in the sense that European states share a common set of interests and priorities. Immigration and illegal labour, like drugs, are a common problem to some degree, but some European states have far more serious problems with the Middle Eastern aspects of these issues than others. The Mediterranean states are necessarily more concerned with developments in North Africa. There still seems to be considerable uncertainty in “Europe” as to whether Turkey is a European state, and Turkey has common boundaries with two major regional problems: Iran and Iraq.

All European states are dependent on global trade and the flow of oil imports from the Middle East, but again to different degrees. The Balkans are certainly part of Europe, but cannot be separated from the issue of Islam and related problems in the Middle East. Looking towards the future, if Russia and the states of South Eastern Europe are fully recognised as parts of Europe, the already-blurred lines between the Middle East and Central Asia will become even more of an issue, and other European priorities will be added to those of today’s “Europe”. Moreover, some issues are Atlantic, some primarily involve the US, and some primarily involve Europe. Algeria is not Saudi Arabia.

These points are obvious at one level, but not at another. There is a tendency to assume that the best solutions are common solutions involving Atlantic or European unity. One demands that institutions such as NATO and the EU should be able to take common action, often without thinking out the consequences. Political leaders and diplomats call for common consultation, often with an implied veto by those to be consulted or an implied view that Atlantic or European coalitions are more important than regional coalitions. Military planners and strategists talk about the need for common capabilities and unified power projection forces without defining the contingency or the mission capabilities that are needed.

Given this background, the primary answer to the question of what role “Europe” should play in the “Middle East” is that it should play a pragmatic one in which different mixes of European states bring different mixes of capabilities to an issue and actively work towards a viable solution. There will be times when action should occur on a NATO or EU basis; there will be many – if not most – times when it should not. There will also be many times when action will be “Atlantic”, and involve the US and a limited number of European states.

The second intifada, Iraq, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the war on terrorism are all very complex issues and they are only part of the issues that Europe must deal with. If “Europe” is to play the right role in the “Middle East”, it will have to play the equivalent of three-dimensional chess and do so with the equivalent of 20 or more players on the “European” side. There will be many cases where US action must focus on regional coalitions with Middle Eastern states, and where planning and operations cannot depend on US consultation or common action that is “Eurocentric” in character. This is not an excuse for American “unilateralism”, but it is a reality that serious consultation only involves players in the game, not those who sit on the sidelines.

The Priorities for “European” Action: Looking Beyond the Military Dimension

Many of the most important roles that Europe can play will not be military. Energy is a case in point. Both US and European forecasts call for massive increases in OPEC production, the vast majority of which must come from the Middle East and the Gulf. The Persian Gulf nations are expected to be the principal source of marginal supply to meet increases in demand. The US Energy Information Agency (EIA) projects that OPEC production will be over 57 million barrels per day by 2020 (almost twice its 2000 production) in its reference case. It will be 45

million barrels in the high-price case, and 67 million in the low-price case. (The forecasts of total world demand for oil range from about 125 million barrels per day in the low-price case to about 115 million barrels per day in the high-price case.)

The sheer scale of the shift in global dependence on Middle Eastern oil exports (and Europe like the US is dependent on the global economy and the global flow of oil exports to meet national demand) is illustrated by the radical shifts that are predicted in dependence on the Persian Gulf. The EIA reports that the historical peak for Persian Gulf exports (as a percent of world oil exports) occurred in 1974, when they made up more than two-thirds of the crude oil traded in world markets. (The most recent historical low came in 1985 as a result of more than a decade of high oil prices. Less than 40% of the crude oil traded in 1985 came from Gulf suppliers. Following the 1985 oil price collapse, the percentage of Gulf exports began to increase gradually, but tapered off in the 1990s at 40 to 50% when non-OPEC supply proved to be unexpectedly resilient.)

The fact that 66% of the world's proven oil reserves are in the Persian Gulf (25% in Saudi Arabia alone), and well over 70% are in the Middle East, has steadily changed these figures since that time. The EIA now estimates that Gulf producers will account for more than 45% of world-wide trade by 2002 — for the first time since the early 1980s. After 2002, the Gulf's share of world-wide petroleum exports is projected to increase gradually to almost 60% by 2020. In the low oil-price case, the Persian Gulf's share of total exports is projected to exceed 67% by 2020. All Gulf producers are expected to increase oil production capacity significantly over the forecast period, and both Saudi Arabia and Iraq (assuming the lifting of United Nations export sanctions after 2002) are expected to nearly triple their current production capacity.¹

The expansion of productive capacity will require major capital investments and political stability or at least enough stability to allow the oil and gas sectors to operate. The tension, poverty and demographics of the Middle East, however, ensure that stable energy development, production and exports will raise major problems concerning political stability, asylum, terrorism and immigration. This means that Europe must play a critical role in trade policy, development aid and energy investment, and the realities of world politics and the world economy are such that Europe must play a role that is far greater than its proportion of dependence on Middle Eastern energy imports.

¹ EIA, *Annual Energy Outlook 2002*, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/results.html#report>, 29 January 2002.

The non-military role of Europe must extend into several critical areas of diplomacy, investment, trade and aid:

- *The second intifada and the Arab-Israeli peace process.* The events of September 11th have demonstrated all too clearly just how important progress is in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and how vital it is for both the US and Europe to take visible action to prove they will do everything possible to bring an end to the second intifada. It is far from clear that there is any near-term solution. Some US strategic planners and intelligence experts see this as an enduring conflict where the US must plan for four to ten years of continuing struggle and episodic crises with no good end in sight. The fact remains, however, that both the US and Europe must try to help bring an end to this conflict and to do so regardless of reversals and success. It is also clear that Europe can play a more “pro-Arab” role than the US, although taking sides is scarcely the road to success. The EU and several European states have already played an important role and they must do even more in the future, as well as strengthen aid programmes. If nothing else, this can help defuse the impact of the second intifada in fuelling the broader tensions between Islam and the West.
- *A European focus on North Africa.* The US can invest in North Africa, improve its relations with Libya and play a useful role in conflicts such as the war between Morocco and the Polisario. The Maghreb is, however, a largely European area of interest. It is a largely self-inflicted wound in political, economic and demographic terms and – like all of the Middle East – change and reform must come largely from within. Europe, however, can and must play a critical role in leading the outside aid effort.
- *Supporting political and economic stability.* The military security of the Gulf is, and will remain, a largely US concern. The political and economic stability of the Gulf, however, is an area where Europe can and must play a critical role. The southern Gulf states all need foreign investment and help in development. Population growth has turned oil wealth into the threat of oil poverty and a youth explosion has led to 30% real unemployment among Saudi young men. The primary struggle for Gulf security is now one for Gulf development.
- *A distinctly European role in diplomacy and investment.* Europe can play a number of diplomatic and investment roles the US cannot. Despite all the talk of an “evil axis”, the West must still deal with Iran and Iraq. This may mean the US is locked into a role of

containment and military action, but if the US must play the role of “bad cop”, Europe can play the role of “good cop”. The European dialogue with Iran, and Europe’s willingness to invest in Iran in spite of US sanctions law, such as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, is a case in point. Similarly, Europe can help take the lead in helping the Iraqi people by adapting “oil for food” and sanctions and investing in oil production and development. This does not mean European tolerance of Iranian and Iraqi proliferation, extremism and terrorism, or their action against Israel. It does mean that there are times when a divided or dialectical Atlantic approach is much better than a unified one.

- *The problem of Iraq.* The Bush administration has delayed, not avoided, a major military confrontation with Iraq. At best, this means there must be a highly visible roll-back in Iraqi missile efforts and development of weapons of mass destruction. It may mean major US strikes on the Iraqi leadership until it is forced from power if there is any firm evidence linking Iraq to the attacks on the US or if Iraq carries out any significant military adventure or supports terrorist activity on any of its borders or against the Kurds.

Some European countries have tended to underplay this threat or the dangers Iraq poses. The US may or may not be overreacting. It is vital, however, that a quiet transatlantic dialogue take place on this issue as soon as possible.

There may – at a minimum – be a need for a common statement that neither Europe nor the US will tolerate aggressive action by Iraq, and that any such Iraqi action will lead to war. At the same time, this approach would require the US to cooperate with Europe in looking beyond “smart sanctions” to “wise sanctions”, and finding ways to offer the Iraqi people more help on both a humanitarian and development basis.

The other case is planning for the contingency of war in ways where the US avoids unilateral action, where some common set of requirements or red lines are established for defining what kinds of Iraqi conduct would lead to military action, and some common effort is made to define the post-conflict roles Western states should play in helping Iraq create a stable and moderate regime. It is always easy to go to war, and it may even be possible to win one relatively quickly. Winning a peace on both Iraqi and regional terms will be far more difficult.

- *The problem of Iran.* If Europe has tended to understate the problem of Iraq, the US has overstated the problem of Iran. Even before

President Bush used the phrase “axis of evil”, the acute divisions in Iran probably made it impossible to create any kind of formal US-Iranian relations. It may, however, be possible for the Bush administration to allow Europe to take a more aggressive approach to investing in Iran with the certainty that ILSA will be avoided with waivers. Similarly, continued European support of any form of US and Iranian dialogue will be of value.

- *Ensuring Turkish development.* Only Europe can ensure the economic stability and development of Turkey, a strategic priority whose importance is often understated because of Turkey’s part and current willingness to be a bridge between Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Islamic world. It is worth pointing out here that Cyprus may primarily be a humanitarian issue in purely European terms, but is a strategic issue in the broader context of the Middle East.
- *A European role in Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Caspian, the horn and the rest of the Red Sea states.* These states are more peripheral problems and it will be impossible to develop any concerted approach. The role of individual European states will be critical, however, in aiding development and political evolution, and minimising the problem of cultural conflicts, extremism and terrorism.

The Priorities for “European” Action: The Security Dimension *outside* the Middle East

No matter how successful the US and Europe are in dealing with the problems in the Middle East, they will still have to deal with the problem of terrorist and asymmetric attacks inside the US and Europe. The end result is that some of the most important security actions that Europe can take in dealing with the Middle East will have to be taken either in Europe or on a transatlantic basis. To be specific, the problems and tensions in the Middle East require the following steps on the part of both Europe and the US:

- *Institutionalising cooperation in counter-terrorism.* Parallel, lasting, and well-institutionalised efforts will be needed in intelligence, counter-terrorism, law enforcement and related activities such as customs, coast guard and port control. Some clear decisions will be needed about the relative role of NATO and the EU versus national action, and the creation of new agreements to detail cooperation and

set standards for the West. The role of Interpol will also need re-examination.

- *Developing a new approach to biological attacks.* The West needs to rethink internal security planning, public health and response and defence efforts to deal with the broad range of CBRN threats. The treatment of hoof and mouth disease and “mad cow” disease is almost a model of how not to deal with such cooperation, and a warning of how much more effort is needed.

Particularly within Europe, there may well be a need for integrated response plans that can rush capabilities from one country to another, and deal with any kind of outbreak of human and agricultural disease. Transatlantic efforts to stockpile vaccines and antibiotics, develop common travel and quarantine procedures, develop common warning and public health approaches could prove critical in treating and containing an emergency. Cost-effectiveness would also be a critical issue.

- *Creating common approaches to information warfare and defence.* Efforts have already been made to cooperate in fighting cyber-crime. A dedicated NATO effort to deal with cyber-warfare, backed by clear commercial standards for data protection, liability, recovery capability and other defence measures could be equally critical.
- *A transatlantic approach to transportation, hazardous materials, high-risk facility and critical infrastructure security.* The US and Europe should pursue the creation of common security standards for air, road, rail, and maritime traffic, airport security, port security, security for containers ports and shipments, energy and hazardous material shipments. Some common standards for the protection of key commuter facilities, e.g. subways, critical infrastructure facilities like nuclear power plants, plants producing or storing large amounts of hazardous materials, and key public facilities and government buildings, may also be needed.
- *Rethinking insurance laws and regulations.* Some form of a common approach to insurance, best practices, liability and other risks needs to be examined. International insurance and the handling of common risk pools could be critical to limiting costs.
- *Rethinking the problem of immigration and human rights.* Immigration has long been seen largely as a national problem, and not a global security problem. At the same time, few Western nations have attempted to fully analyse the trade-offs between the need for

additional labour to compensate for their ageing work force, the cultural impact on their society and the need to preserve human rights and tolerate cultural diversity.

It may well be impossible to develop anything approaching a common strategy to deal with immigration and security, but the West should at least try. A purely national series of efforts is unlikely to meet either security or human needs and is likely to exacerbate tensions between the West and the Islamic world.

- *Rethinking foreign assistance and outreach programmes in the light of terrorist and asymmetric threats.* It is at least possible that the West may blunder into a clash of civilisations with the Islamic world by default. There is a clear need to coordinate better on information programmes, foreign aid and every other aspect of outreach activity to try to bridge the growing gap between the West and Islamic world.
- *Rethinking the problem of “globalism”.* While the relationship between the West and the Islamic world is part of the structural problem of terrorism, the West needs to look further and be equally aggressive in making the case for global economic development and growth. The next set of terrorist attacks could have a very different cause and come from a different part of the world.

The growing tension over “globalism” – which is a reaction to many different patterns of change – illustrates the broader problems that North-South tensions create. In the process, the West needs to look for alliances with the successes in the developing world and pay close attention to the “tigers”, China and to joint efforts with long-developed Asian powers such as Japan.

- *Reshaping the expansion of NATO and Partnership for Peace.* Both the US and Europe need to re-examine the role of Russia and non-NATO states in security cooperation in the light of the problem of terrorism and asymmetric warfare. It may now be possible to cooperate in new ways, and the incentive for such cooperation seems much stronger.
- *Rethinking arms and export controls.* Much of the transatlantic debate over CW, the ABM Treaty, BWC, and CTTBT has avoided coming to grips in detail with the threat of asymmetric attacks and terrorism, and has a heritage of focusing on large-scale conventional war-fighting.

The same has been true of export controls. A joint effort at a comprehensive review of how to change arms control agreements and

export controls – looking at the CBRN and advanced technology threat as a whole – is needed to develop a more effective common strategy.

The Priorities for “European” Action: The Military Dimension *inside* the Middle East

The military dimension of Europe’s role in the Middle East is not unimportant, but it should be clear from the previous analysis that it is not the dominant role that Europe should play and that NATO, the EU and European capabilities should not be judged in terms of creating Eurocentric military coalitions or new European military power projection capabilities. There is a European tendency to act as if the fact that the US is now the “world’s only superpower” in terms of global military power projection somehow sets the standards and priorities for strategic action, and that what the world needs is another “world’s only superpower” in the form of Europe. It is far from clear that this is the case.

The Gulf War and the Afghan conflict have shown that even a limited military contribution from European states and NATO can have tremendous political value. The long-standing strategic relationship between Britain and the US in the Gulf, and again in Afghanistan, has shown how important limited coalitions can be in demonstrating Western solidarity and reducing the image that the US is acting in isolation and as some form of “neo-imperialist”. In all frankness, the role of those European nations that choose to play an active role in US-led military actions in the Middle East has also helped temper an American tendency to overreact – or at least overstate. It has also often forced the US to at least pay far more attention to opposing views and different options.

At the same time, there really seems to be no practical prospect that Europe will either produce a true war-fighting, power projection force capable of fighting a major contingency in the Middle East for at least the next decade, or any coherent NATO or EU approach to force modernisation that will give more than select elements of a few national military forces anything like parity with US forces. In spite of the endless exhortations for such forces (on both sides of the Atlantic), the desirability of the unobtainable is a moot point. Worse, it tends to distract both Europe and the US from what Europe can and should really do.

Barring an all-out war for the security of the Gulf, involving threats that do not now exist, “Europe’s” key military roles in the Middle East will be to assist individual friendly states in dealing with internal and low-level conflicts as was the case in Chad, to help in peacemaking and nation-

building exercises, and to assist the US in adaptive coalitions where the US must – as was the case in the Gulf War and Afghanistan – give primary attention to regional alliances with Middle Eastern states.

NATO can play a critical role in providing a forum and infrastructure base for such European action, but it is important to note that such roles and missions do not require cohesive NATO or EU action or broad technological parity with the US. They do not require European airlift, air combat, naval or amphibious capabilities on a par with the US. They do not require independent corps and multiple air wing-sized power projection forces. Indeed, the fact that “mission unfundable” is “mission impossible” will often be irrelevant.

What such operations do require is a willingness to commit peacekeeping forces to missions that involve casualties. It means rethinking a large number of current arms sales efforts to looking beyond profiteering and transform them into serious military and security assistance efforts with equally serious efforts to at least reduce the endemic corruption and dishonesty in European arms sales to the American level – which is scarcely beyond reproach. It means taking a truly serious look at the need to expand the role individual European states play in helping Middle Eastern states improve their intelligence and internal security operations.

At the same time, it means rethinking individual national force plans so that the emphasis on grandiose and unobtainable levels of force improvements are replaced with practical efforts to develop force elements that can be projected into the Middle East on a national level in a form that is fully interoperable with US and regional forces and that does not end up in diverting more US C⁴/ISR/BM/BDA (command, control, communications, and computer/intelligence and strategic reconnaissance/battle management/battle damage assessment) and logistical resources than the contribution is worth. The fighting in Afghanistan has shown that properly trained European Special Forces can be worth at least as much as heavy armour in some contingencies. The Gulf War showed that the European lead in mine warfare forces could be of critical strategic value.

While the Gulf and Afghan wars have shown the value of extremely expensive US satellite and UAV, command, control, communications, and computer, intelligence and strategic reconnaissance, and battle management systems that Europe cannot afford to duplicate, they have also shown that properly configured modern European attack aircraft can fight very effectively using US capabilities if they have the right secure communications, data links and laser or GPS-guided weapons. In short, if

the issue is how to play a useful role – rather than achieve technological parity – there are affordable solutions to creating many needed mission capabilities.

More broadly, if European nations are willing to focus on the military art of the fundable and the possible, there are three other areas they need to examine in terms of both potential military missions in the Middle East and supplementing them with new approaches to arms control and counterproliferation:

- *Force transformation and asymmetric warfare.* The US Quadrennial Defence Review calls for transforming US forces to fight asymmetric warfare and perform homeland defence tasks. The need may be equally great for Europe. The US emphasis on force transformation for asymmetric warfare is still nascent and in the process of being transformed into practical concepts and force plans. European nations should, however, look closely at the new US force plans that will come out of the Quadrennial Defence Review and Nuclear Posture Review, and see what new concepts are practical and needed. It may be that Europe can sometimes leapfrog over the past emphasis on heavy and high-cost power projection and find cheaper or high-priority answers to European force development. One solution might be a new NATO Force Planning exercise that looked beyond both the US focus on power projection outside of Europe, and the narrow limits of the European Self-Defence Initiative, and explored common approaches to these tasks.
- *Rethinking arms controls.* As stated earlier much of the transatlantic debate over the CW, ABM Treaty, BWC and CTTBT has avoided coming to grips with the threat of asymmetric attacks and terrorism, and has a heritage of focusing on large-scale conventional war fighting. Arms control is a means to an end, not an ideology, a form of morality, or an end in itself. The US may well be too deeply involved in some of the operational threats involved to take a truly innovative look at what is really required to change today's approach to arms control and specifically to create real-world approaches to transfers of conventional arms, long-range delivery system technology and the proliferation and the development of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.
- *Anti-proliferation, export controls, deterrence and retaliation.* The US is committed to active counterproliferation in terms of offensive capabilities and defences like theatre ballistic missile defences. These are extremely expensive capabilities. Prevention, however, is far

cheaper, if scarcely enough. Europe not only can do much more to control its own exports, it can do a great deal to refocus its intelligence efforts and to increase its diplomatic efforts to persuade key nations like Russia and China to crack down on their own suppliers. A joint effort at a comprehensive review of how to change arms control agreements and export controls – looking at the CBRN and advanced technology threat as a whole – is needed to develop a more effective common strategy.

More broadly, however, the US and Europe should at least consider cooperation in creating a form of extended deterrence and military retaliation against any nation that uses weapons of mass destruction against a nation without such weapons, or aids or tolerates a terrorist movement that uses such weapons. At least on the part of the US, this should involve the tacit threat of escalating to the use of nuclear weapons. Arms control and well-meaning security agreements are probably not going to be enough. Limiting the worst forms of asymmetric warfare and terrorism are going to take sticks as well as carrots.

The Need for Difference, Disunity and Dialectics

In summary, the most useful role that Europe can play in the Middle East is to not be the United States, to not seek an impossible European or transatlantic consensus and to not attempt to create European military capabilities that are broad copies of American forces. Far too much of the dialogue on Europe's role in the Middle East either focuses on how to critique American policy rather than refine European policy or on how to replicate US military capabilities or build impossible European institutions rather than determine what European capabilities are both affordable and needed. As we say in English, the eternal lingua franca of Europe, *vive la difference!*

**DEALING WITH COMPLEXITY:
THE RANGE OF MAJOR ISSUES IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND BEST AND WORST CASES**

(ADDENDUM TO PAPER BY A. CORDESMAN)

The “clash within a civilisation”?

Western fears of a clash between civilisations are only a side effect of the struggle within the region to modernise its political structure, economy, social structure and Islamic practices. Economic progress has lagged behind population growth for nearly a quarter of a century, threatening to turn oil wealth into oil poverty and sharply lowering living standards in many states. Governments have talked and not practised economic reform, and have failed to modernise and open-up political systems.

A massive youth bulge is only beginning to create critical unemployment problems, and the percentage of young men and women in the labour force will increase for at least two decades because of population momentum. At the same time, hyper-urbanisation and population mobility are destroying traditional social safety needs, while the modern media publicise the region’s weakness and constantly portray secular wealth many citizens can never obtain. The end result is to drive many back towards religion and some towards an Islamic extremism that is at least as much anti-change and anti-regime as anti-Western.

The best case

Most regimes and pro-reform/pro-modernisation elites finally face the fact they are dealing with an enduring crisis that only they can solve. Economic reform plans are actually implemented. The need for birth control is recognised and acted upon. Educational systems are modernised to create job skills. Moderate Islamic scholars meet the challenge from Islamic extremists. Political systems are liberalised enough to create a rule of law, stable structure for economic development and broader popular participation. It is a close race between reform and regression, and the race is lost in some countries. In broad terms, however, the more progressive forces win.

The worst case

Regional elites continue to talk and not act, and export the blame and responsibility for their problems. A systemic mix of economic and population problems creates massive internal instability. The West gets much of the blame, but effective political leadership, economic action and modernisation become impossible. Moderate Islamic leaders continue to temporise and avoid coming to grips with extremists. The end result plays out differently in each state, but the cumulative result is structural economic collapse and political turmoil with no near-term prospect of progress.

The Impact of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Second Intifada

The struggle between Israel and the Palestinians and the broader struggle between Israel and its Arab neighbours is only one factor fuelling regional extremism, resentment of the US and the West, and terrorism. It is, however, a critical one. If Arab leaders sometimes use it as a scapegoat or distraction for their own failings, it also remains a real human tragedy for Israeli and Arab alike.

The best case

An early return to serious peace talks and to the terms of Tabah and Camp David seems impossible. The second intifada may well drag on for several years in some form, and escalate sporadically even under best-case conditions. Sheer exhaustion and frustration, however, eventually force changes in political leadership in both Israel and the Palestinian Authority and leads Syria to face the need for real-world compromises. Israel, the Palestinians and Syria edge back towards negotiations. They finally reach a series of compromises that are unpopular on all sides but that all sides can live with. Peace, however, is still based on anger, distrust and sometimes hate. Violence without peace is replaced by peace with some level of violence.

The worst case

Three failed leaders – Sharon, Arafat and Assad – slowly drag their countries into a steadily escalating conflict. Israel responds with a policy of forced separation, pushing Palestinians out of some areas and leaving them without an economy and the shell of a state. The Palestinians acquire longer-range weapons. Jordan is destabilised and becomes anti-Western, anti-peace and pro-Iraqi. Egypt distances itself from peace and from the US. Nuclear and biological sabre-rattling becomes a constant pattern. Syria and Iran expand their support of extremists and use of

proxies in a low-intensity war. The US and the West get much of the blame, and terrorism becomes a constant fact of life.

Saudi Arabia and the Southern Gulf States

Events since September 11th have created major new tensions between the West and the Gulf states and particularly between the US and Saudi Arabia. They have also exposed the degree to which Saudi Arabia must take urgent action to diversify and privatise its economy, deal with its massive population problems and youth bulge, modernise its education system and implement Saudisation, and come firmly to grips with the need for religious modernisation and cope with Islamic extremism.

The best case

The US and Saudi Arabia realise that military disengagement and political feuding are no substitute for forging a more effective partnership. Crown Prince Abdullah and President Bush concentrate on creating a new strategic partnership. Saudi Arabia aggressively implements its economic reform plans, efforts to diversify and privatise its economy, and efforts to encourage economic reform. The educational system is reformed and the regime comes firmly to grips with the need to oppose Islamic extremism and terrorism while maintaining its religious legitimacy with the moderate Ulema. Political reform keeps pace with the evolution of Saudi society.

The worst case

The US and Saudi Arabia reach the point where the US largely disengages in military terms, creating a power vacuum in the Gulf, leaving Saudi Arabia without effective military advisors and technical support, and making effective cooperation in counter-terrorism impossible. Saudi efforts at economic, population, educational, religious and political reform falter and create growing internal instability. The Saudi regime falls, along with progressive technocrats and businessmen. The result is a weak, extremist Saudi Arabia that cannot achieve the level of investment necessary to expand oil exports to meet world demand.

The Impact of Iran

Iran is not "evil" but it is deeply divided between religious hard-liners and more moderate elements. It is a major proliferator and has significant capabilities to threaten and attack the flow of oil through the Gulf. It is committed to supporting anti-Israeli movements. At the same time, its internal economic problems threaten its stability as an oil exporter and

ability to attract the outside investment and technology it needs to maintain and expand energy exports.

The best case

The moderate factions in Iran slowly win their long political battle with the hard-liners and extremists. Iran carries out serious economic reform and restructures its energy sector to attract large-scale foreign investment. Proliferation is cut back and major CBRN forces are not openly deployed. Iran seeks regional stability and peaceful political influence. Its opposition to Israel is reduced to political opposition and it accepts an eventual peace settlement.

The worst case

Moderation and a significant degree of democracy fail because the hard-liners successfully block reform, assert their power over the internal security apparatus and drag Iran into conflicts with the West, Israel and Iran's neighbours both as a means of mobilising the state and out of conviction. Iran supports terrorism and expands its arms shipments to Palestinian and Lebanese extremists. It openly proliferates and uses its missiles and CBRN capabilities to openly threaten its Gulf neighbours, Israel and US forces in the region. It expands its maritime and air threat to Gulf shipping to use it as a further means of politico-military leverage.

The Impact of Iraq

More than a decade since the Gulf War has left Saddam Hussein's regime in power, left a still powerful conventional military machine in place, left Iraq with considerable capability to proliferate and made Iraq a continuing threat to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iraq plays a growing role in supporting Palestinian hard-liners. At the same time, renewed oil wealth and oil for food have not begun to correct the effects of some 20 years of crisis and war and failure to develop; nor is there a stable climate to develop energy resources.

The best case

Iraq's regime proves to be far more fragile than is expected and internal tensions destroy not only Saddam Hussein but also the elite around him. Leaders emerge who focus on the peaceful development of Iraq and can force sufficient unity of action by Sunni, Shi'ite and Kurds. Economic reform takes place; resources go into social development and not arms; and Iraq becomes a major but peaceful player in regional and Arab politics.

The worst case

Saddam Hussein's tyranny continues and becomes hereditary as his younger son institutionalises his power. Efforts to support an uprising around a weak opposition fail and strengthen Saddam by default. This "Bay of Kurdistan" deprives the US of the regional allies it needs for a major war to remove Saddam from power. Saddam breaks out of UN sanctions, rearms and re-proliferates. He is a constant source of tension throughout the Middle East and supports terrorism by proxy. This hardens Iranian attitudes and poses a constant threat to the region and its energy exports.

Another "Algerian Civil War" in North Africa?

Algeria has "won" its civil war against its Islamic extremists, but every North African state has failed at effective economic reform and faces a major demographic crisis. Islamic extremism is gaining in influence for the same reasons it is gaining influence in other parts of the Middle East.

The best case

North African states finally act upon their economic and political reform plans. They aggressively deal with the problem of population growth. They encourage serious privatisation and foreign investment and avoid military adventures. Morocco, Libya and Tunisia succeed in internal economic reform. Algeria's vicious and corrupt military junta is overthrown without shifting power to Islamic extremists.

The worst case

North Africa becomes a cesspool of failed regimes and economies. A new Algerian-style civil war breaks out. Energy investment is inadequate and political and economic instability encourages attacks on energy facilities, massive new flows of immigration and the export of terrorism.

Extremism and Terrorism

The Middle East is scarcely the only source of global terrorism, but it is a serious problem in many countries and among many movements.

The best case

Regional regimes realise that they cannot tolerate extremism and the export of terrorism without being counter-attacked, without encouraging their own eventual overthrow, and without further crippling their prospects for social and economic development. In the short run, they

deal effectively with internal security issues. In the long run, they make the economic, social, political and religious reforms necessary to deal with the root causes of terrorism.

The Worst Case

Leaders temporise, dither and exploit extremism and terrorism for short-term advantage. Terrorists are used in both regional and global proxy wars and attacks. Radical regimes steadily encourage terrorism and provide better weapons. They tolerate or encourage the acquisition of CBRN weapons. US and Western counter-terrorist attacks and campaigns win tactical victories but cannot address the root causes and each success breeds more skilled and determined terrorist groups.

Proliferation and CBRN Weapons

Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Syria, the Sudan, Iran and Iraq are all proliferators. Al-Qaeda has shown that terrorists have a serious interest in CBRN weapons as well. Current arms control and export control policies cannot deal with the problem.

The best case

A total roll-back in CBRN weapons capability is impossible, and no amount of controls and inspection can prevent states from being able to manufacture significant amounts of biological agents with nuclear lethality with only limited warning, if any. The resolution of regional quarrels, political and economic reform, and some form of inspection and arms control, does, however, reduce proliferation to very low-profile stockpiling, eliminates the spectre of hair-trigger missile and air delivery forces, and produces true roll-back in some countries.

The worst case

The race for weapons of mass destruction becomes increasingly region-wide and spills over into the India-Pakistan conflict. Sabre-rattling and CBRN threats become endemic. Nations develop first-strike options, launch on warning and launch-under-attack options. Terrorists leverage this fragile situation to trigger a major exchange somewhere in the region, or a radical leader starts a process of escalation that cannot be stopped.

Immigration, Labour Mobility and Prejudice

Europe already sees regional immigration – particularly illegal immigration – as a major security threat. Economic and demographic

pressures can make these threats much worse in the future. The resulting racial and religious prejudice can harden Islamic antagonism with the West and encourage terrorism.

The best case

Widespread economic and population control reforms attack the root cause of the problem while Western and regional governments work far more closely together to limit its near-term impact.

The worst case

Massive waves of attempted and successful illegal immigration trigger draconian European responses and equally hostile regional reactions. A so-called “clash between civilisations” becomes a clash over immigration.

**EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE
POLICY: TAKING STOCK**

**CEPS-IISS EUROPEAN SECURITY FORUM
WORKING PAPER NO. 8**

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY

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INTRODUCTION

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

When the eighth meeting of the European Security Forum was convened, Robert Kagan had not yet published his landmark article¹ on US-European relations in the July issue of the journal *Policy Review*. Not surprisingly, the propositions set forward in that piece were at the centre of a particularly lively discussion, after the presentations given by:

- Madame Nicole Gnesotto, Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies
- Dr. Viktor Kremenyuk, of the Russian Academy of Sciences
- Mr. Robert Kagan, Senior Research Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The presenters and the participants in the discussion were invited by the Chairman to bear in mind the following questions:

- What is the most relevant response to the emerging threat of terrorism of mass destruction? Are the traditional tools of military power the most relevant vis-à-vis what looks less like a Hobbesian jungle (where power goes to the big and the strong) than a fight against mutating viruses in which small is both ugly and powerful? Are military capabilities, and the readiness to use them, the primary benchmark for measuring power?
- Is NATO condemned to play an essentially regional role in managing a Kantian Europe (“OSCE in uniform”) or will it play a global role? And wouldn’t the latter option imply that the US military be fully part of NATO, not simply the comparatively small US European command (EUCOM): Is such an evolution likely?
- Is the EU as feckless as it is sometimes portrayed? Are we all Woodstock-era flower children, despite the fact that most EU members have an imperial legacy and notwithstanding the recurring use of force by a number of European countries in recent years as well as in the previous decades?

¹ “Power and Weakness”, *Policy Review*, June-July 2002

- Conversely, is the US as ready to act decisively as we are sometimes invited to believe? More specifically, what does the US refusal to assault Tora Bora tell us about the US military's readiness to run risks?

The Chairman also made two points, directed at Mr. Kagan:

- The choice of multilateralism is not a mere reflection of weakness. From 1941 onwards until the 1990s, the US chose the multilateral road whenever possible, with unilateralism being chosen if there was no other option. Multilateralism is not simply for wimps.
- To portray Europe as Kantian is largely correct; but it's a double-edged depiction: Kant was not pursuing the quest for Perpetual Peace out of pacifism; he was the philosopher of the categorical imperative. Indeed, he was widely read in Prussian military academies. Kant is not for wimps either.

To these points Robert Kagan made the following remarks in his presentation:

- US instincts are not currently more unilateralist than they were at the beginning of the cold war. Current unilateralist trends predated the Bush administration. However, the attacks of September 11th put "unilateralism on steroids".
- Concerning military interoperability within NATO, the US is not going to make itself weaker in order to cater to European military insufficiencies.
- Europe has an ambitious worldview, which calls for more expenditure on the means of power. Being upset with the US is not providing enough of a motive for the Europeans to spend more money on defence. Indeed, a prominent European participant endorsed this view in the subsequent discussion.

In the ensuing debate, a participant made a vigorous set of comments:

- The US over-emphasises the military component of power.
- Is Russia the most dynamic element in the current international landscape, as was put forward by V. Kremenjuk, or is it simply an unstable one?
- The US needs to take into account the burden represented by the reunification of the European continent for the EU.

- To quote Guillaume Appolinaire, the Europeans need to learn from America's ability to "dare and simplify": there is a different US relation to power, with the EU not having the same sense of global responsibility.

Along similar lines, a number of participants queried the nature of Europe's identity: is it simply "not America" or is it (as tended to be the view around the table) more than the negative definition? This query led in turn to the issue of the generation of an EU strategic culture.

This brought the comment from a European that it is through actions that a strategic culture would be generated. More generally, he pointed out that ESDP was motivated by reference to the US, albeit not in a negative sense: ESDP was established to do what the US wouldn't do, as well as to work with the US. As for EU introversion, the fact is that there has been no major debate on the EU's global role in world affairs, because it hasn't – until now – needed to have one: the Convention would have to work on this.

On the degree of divergence between the US and Europe, several European and American participants suggested that synthesis was more likely than incompatibility: the US is actually more engaged in soft power than is often acknowledged (and indeed sometimes more so than the EU, notwithstanding the latter's unique contribution to development aid); nor is the US unhappy at being a single superpower rather than being part of the more benign European vision; in any case, a Europe at peace is seen in Washington as a strategic asset for the US.

To this was added by an American participant the suggestion that the relative and absolute increase of US power during the last 20 years was probably slowing down, with information technology no longer driving economic growth, while the costs of homeland defence are rising: the US should be in the market for partners. Paul Kennedy has ceased to make his "strategic over-stretch" argument: he was wrong at the time he made it, he may be wrong again by no longer making it.

These benign remarks drew some European ripostes: the US was acting in an aberrant, largely unpredictable manner, as an autocrat who didn't care about the views of others. Indeed, notwithstanding US exhortations that the Europeans should spend more on defence, the US didn't really want the Europeans to spend more: the US was quite content to see the Europeans confined to peacekeeping tasks, while making the point that it is the "mission that makes the coalition" (a form of denial of the relevance of permanent alliances), and shooting at European attempts to

build up their aerospace and defence-industrial base (with US moves against “Galileo” being a recent example).

As for the Europeans, the point was made notably from a Russian participant that they had no reason to be unduly proud of their soft power role: the US was leading the field in the former Soviet Union whether in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme, or in nation-building in the Caucasus or on migration issues on the Chinese-Russian border. Similarly, Europeans deplored the EU’s incapacity to “self-start” on the simple, obvious moves: there was no European-wide action during operation Alba in Albania or the recent deal on the evacuation of Palestinians from the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. Nor had there been a European-wide initiative to meet the obvious requirement to increase defence spending after September 11th. Unfortunately, it looks as if nothing short of a 911-type attack against Europe itself would trigger a serious European response.

In closing, the three speakers made the following points:

- The focus is on military power, because this is what most divides the American and the Europeans, not because it is the only measure of power (R. Kagan).
- The two forces that determine the current direction of Russian foreign policy are the quest for security – with the US being the prime interlocutor – and economic development, where Europe should play a major role (V. Kremenyuk).
- Soft security or so-called low-intensity tasks are neither easy nor risk-free: indeed, they can be costly and high risk – but Europe thus tries to avoid the creation of “future jungles”. As for transatlantic disagreements, the debate on the role of military power is not the most important divergence. The biggest disagreement is on global governance and democracy in international affairs (N. Gnesotto).

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: A EUROPEAN VIEW

NICOLE G NESOTTO

As of mid-2002, taking into account the impact of 11 September, the prospect of EU enlargement and the emerging work of the Convention on the Future of the EU, most commentators tend to believe that the momentum for ESDP has been lost: the Europeans appear to be as divided as ever, the technological “gap” between European and American military forces is supposedly increasing every day, the NATO-EU relationship is still in limbo and, except for the Balkans, where the EU is showing real political involvement, the Europeans are suspected of being unwilling to tackle any security issue seriously.

There is no doubt that the Europeans are having some difficulty in adapting to the new international context created both by the terrorist threats and by political and military developments in the US after the attacks. Over-militaristic and hyper-unilateralist, the United States has somehow become a destabilising factor in traditional European security thinking.

1. New World, New Rationale, More ESDP

But it would be a mistake to conclude that the momentum for implementing a European Security and Defence Policy within the EU framework is dead. The momentum is changing, simply because the rationale for ESDP is today totally different from what it was in 1999.

Back to Saint-Malo, there were two main reasons why the 15 decided to include defence among the EU’s normal competencies. The first related to internal European debate and policy: a defence dimension was felt necessary in order to complete CFSP and give the EU more coherence in its foreign policy; the lessons from the Balkans crisis, and, moreover, the weakness of the EU during the military campaign in Kosovo played an essential role in the EU’s new determination. The second rationale had to do with transatlantic relations and the future of NATO: a European military capability was considered necessary to compensate for the new uncertainty over US military involvement in crisis management in Europe (both the French and the British learned this from their experience in Bosnia). It would also be a way for the Europeans to seriously influence US military strategy, in cases where the US decides to be involved. And

finally, it could help to strengthen NATO by strengthening European military capabilities, once it was clear that NATO itself had failed to create, within the old rules of its ESDI, any European political or military momentum.

What has changed in 2002? On the EU side, the issue is not so much ESDP as how to improve the EU's CFSP. The real issue is the functioning of CFSP itself via the questions raised by the Convention: how can the EU define a common foreign policy with enlargement approaching? What do the 15, and later the 23 or 27, want to do in common vis-à-vis the rest of the world? What might be the international role of the EU, especially in crisis prevention and crisis resolution, once it has become the leading economic and demographic power? How will an enlarged EU be able to decide and to act? In other words, it is now policy, and not defence, that is (rightly) at the heart of the European debate. Defence has reverted to its normal role as a technical instrument at the service of a common policy.

On the transatlantic side, the issue is no longer NATO but the US itself. There is no point, in this short paper, in listing all the drastic changes that President Bush has imposed in US military and political thinking. But there is little doubt, in Europe, that the United States has become a totally new and different actor. Actually, three conclusions can be drawn from this new US policy. First, regarding peacekeeping, there is no US uncertainty any more: we know that the US has other priorities than peacekeeping in the Balkans, Afghanistan or anywhere else. The US is even more explicit on its refusal to accept this burden. But we also know that somebody has to do it. So the Europeans will have to do the job, whether they like it or not, more and more, and increasingly by themselves. Second, US aversion to multilateral constraints, including within NATO, will change the ways and means the Europeans will have to find if they still wish to influence any US policy: this can be done through bilateral relations, or by creating greater European capabilities. If the US understands only military criteria, then the EU will have to do more in that area too. Third, if NATO moves from being a collective constraining organisation to a flexible reservoir of ad hoc coalitions, then strengthening this new – and enlarged – lego-type NATO may become problematical: whatever the Europeans decide to do, it could appear more and more irrelevant to the future of NATO.

The result of this new security context is clear: the paradoxical effect of terrorism is to make the Petersberg tasks more urgent and more necessary. For the EU, ESDP is no longer an option but a necessity, whether the Europeans like it or not:

- Firstly, for security reasons: either because they will be the only ones able to carry the future burden of peacekeeping and crisis management, at the request of the US (it was the Americans who first asked the EU, in December 2001, to take the lead in Macedonia after the end of NATO's Operation Amber Fox). Or, because the Europeans will feel more and more exposed and unprotected, if the US is so concerned by other strategic issues, in Asia notably, that European security becomes the last of its priorities.
- Secondly, for political reasons, because of the US obsession with military-counting. If the Europeans want to remain capable of operating with the US in a military coalition, and if they want to be relevant to America in order to influence US policy, the EU will have to demonstrate that it can speak the same (military) language as the Americans.

Less America in Europe = more ESDP: this could be the defining formula in Europe post-11 September.

2. National Sovereignty, Still

Since Maastricht (which established the CFSP) and Cologne (ESDP), European security and defence policy has been implemented within the limits of two essential constraints: the national sovereignty of member states on the one hand, the US role and the Atlantic alliance on the other. The two basic dilemmas have been how to reconcile national sovereignty and political integration, and how to reconcile a strategic and political Union with a strong and permanent NATO. ESDP has been created and implemented in the room for manoeuvre left by these two issues.

In 2002, these two factors still help to explain both the progress and the limits of ESDP. But there is now a marked difference between these two traditional constraints:

- the US/NATO factor has drastically changed since 11 September. One of the consequences of this evolution is that the United States is now pushing (more than preventing) the Europeans to take the lead in crisis management. The US today acts more as a driving factor than as a limitation on future EU military responsibility.
- However, national sovereignty is still, or is still perceived to be, an essential constraint on future European political integration. The veto right in CFSP and ESDP remains unquestionable for most of the member states.

The result is that national sovereignty remains the main obstacle to the development of a military Europe. Implementing CFSP and ESDP depends more upon the political will of member states than upon the state of the alliance. This does not mean at all that ESDP is becoming easier. The problems are well known: first, the discrepancy in the EU between interventionist and abstentionist states, and between the specific military strength of each of them. Second, the different perceptions of power among the member states. Third, the question of big and small, which can be a kind of red flag in all debates on the future organisation of a more political EU.

These are the main questions the Convention will have to address. 2003 will be the moment of truth both for ESDP and for the EU: by the end of the year, the headline goal will have to have been met (for the time being, the member states have fulfilled more than two-thirds of the 144 capability requirements identified in the Helsinki Catalogue). Equally, on that same date, the Intergovernmental Conference will have been completed under Italy's presidency, with the obligation to adopt new rules, institutions, and decision-making processes enabling the larger EU to work, decide and act, including in security and defence matters.

3. Military power, but for what?

But all future developments of ESDP and CFSP will depend on the common vision that the Europeans arrive at, or not, of the proper international role of the EU, and thus on the objective and use of power. No doubt the European view and practice of power are markedly different from America's.

- The Europeans seem more convinced than the US about the structural limits of military power, and the al-Qaeda attacks have reinforced this conviction for at least two reasons: first, it is precisely because of the unquestionable US superiority in the military and technological fields that the terrorists have chosen to engage in asymmetrical warfare against the US, killing civilians and using civilian assets; the attack against the World Trade Center has been perceived in Europe as an example of the (unfortunately) successful circumvention of traditional military power. Second, despite all the additional billions of dollars that the US has decided to spend to increase its strategic superiority, Bin Laden is reportedly still alive and the situation in the Middle East is getting worse.
- Equally, dealing with "jungles" using military means alone does not seem to be the most successful strategy. The Europeans do not

contest that the attack against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was necessary and maybe successful. But what about future or virtual jungles, such as the dozen or so failed states that exist in Africa, Asia and even on the fringes of Europe? The Europeans have the feeling that they are the ones who are trying to deal with them, with their aid and development strategy, giving priority to this policy of prevention before these states become new sanctuaries for terrorist networks. Insisting on non-military means of crisis management will therefore remain one of the main European differences. “Soft” security is not an easy thing to deal with, not any more anyway, than all the “hard” wars that the US claims to be the only one to fight. And this is also a reason why the EU is so concerned about the priority the Bush administration is giving to military solutions to Iraq.

- Needless to say, the Europeans are also upset by the series of contradictions in the US obsession with military statistics when it tries to evaluate its European allies. Why should the Europeans be convinced that they should increase their defence efforts if the US repeatedly shows a preference for unilateral military actions and ad hoc coalitions where they pick up ad hoc allies (and often the same ones)? How can the EU take military warfare seriously if the US proposes task-sharing in which it assigns to Europe the peacekeeping and peacebuilding burden? Moreover, the Europeans cannot but notice that every time they try to coordinate their industrial and military efforts (see the aeronautic or Galileo projects), the US launches a vigorous industrial campaign against them. Does the US really want the Europeans to fill the gap, or does it simply want the Europeans to buy American? In the same way that military power cannot be the alpha and omega of power, the military gap is not and cannot be, in European eyes, the only criterion for the future transatlantic partnership.
- Finally, and maybe most importantly, the Europeans are more concerned by the growing cultural gap between themselves and their American counterparts. The so-called “transatlantic community of views” has disappeared from almost all international issues, from Iraq to the Middle East, from environmental questions to arms control, from the International Criminal Court to the status of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, etc. Thus, the serious Euro-American debate is not between military or soft power, but between unilateralism and international law, between power and democracy. The Europeans will definitely stick to the latter.

CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY LANDSCAPE: A RUSSIAN VIEW

VICTOR KREMENYUK

In the process of preparing this paper, I studied some related publications, including among them the Chaillot Paper No. 42, *European Defence: Making It Work*, September 2000. A group of well known and, very possibly, the best European security experts headed by François Heisbourg had written it. And it was not so much the contents of this publication that impressed me, although what they wrote was good. Rather, what made me pay special attention to the paper was its subtitle, as if the authors writing about such an important subject actually had doubts on whether or not it would work.

A seemingly simple question of defence. Evidently, nations and groups of nations must defend themselves as well as the principles according to which they live. But why should one “make it work”? For me it meant that something important and sophisticated was behind it, that was understood but not said. And, while preparing a paper on what Russia can, will and should see in European security for itself, for the preservation of Europe as the source of the modern civilisation, for the global balance, I continued to ask questions: What does “European defence” mean in the wake of the end of the cold war and the continuing existence of NATO? Does it mean only “there is no more relevant enemy” or does it mean that “we should get prepared for totally different security challenges”?

And in both cases, what should Russia think about it since it lives next door to Europe, has China at its backdoor, the Islamic world under the window and global US everywhere around it?

Two tasks at least are clear: first, we must look at Russian-European relations, because so far they have not been probed at full length (and will not be probed for another decade before the whole paradigm of “Russia” and “Europe” cease to be what they have been for last 80 years). Second, we must try to put this dichotomy into a larger context of the current international system. And from there to get back to the Russia-ESDP issue.

Some Basic Facts

The whole period of the cold war has strengthened the traditional Russian view of Western Europe as a source of vital threat. Put together, the age-old memories of European forays into Russia (Polish, Swedish, French and German) and ideological idiosyncrasies as a result of the Marxist-Leninist view of Europe have produced an effect on both Russian thinking and Russian strategy, leading to deep mistrust, suspicion and hostility. Equally, Russian forays into Europe, starting with early 18th century, have engendered European mistrust and suspicion towards Russia. Anti-communism has also worked. Both sides seemed to be doomed to eternal confrontation.

So far, nothing has happened of a magnitude that would change this tradition completely. Russia and Europe continue to be two major neighbours on the continent (accompanied by some US presence), both have developed security strategies and capabilities and both are capable of taking short-sighted decisions that may lead to a resumption of their conflicts. Equally, they may take some decisions based on a longer-term perspective, but that would be contrary to their habits and nature. At the same time, it would be fair to say that a lot has changed that may upset this traditional European setting.

On the one hand, Russia has ceased to be a super-power and an “evil empire” as it was perceived by many in the West during the cold war. It is far from having become a “democratic state” as some observers believe, but it is definitely not the absolutist monolith it was under the Czars or the Commissars. It is evolving into a regional power that is still strong enough to deal with any enemy but at the same time it is weak economically and incapable of securing its domestic stability through the prosperity of its population. It vacillates between attempts to build a democracy following the standards and examples of developed nations and the necessity to adhere to some sort of police regime because of the shaky foundation of its political and economic systems. From the security point of view, however, what matters is that it has ceased to be a powerful competitor with Europe in fighting for space and influence.

Equally Europe has ceased to be a traditional arena of rivalries and competition. In the economic area, it still has giants that compete for markets. It has some strong cultural differences but not of the scope and type that may be rated as “conflicts of civilisations”. What matters greatly is the fact that in the political area due both to the impact of the US and demands of technology, Europe has become a more homogeneous than a heterogeneous entity and is moving quickly towards becoming a union.

This fact has also greatly contributed to the changes in the field of security and to the relations with Russia.

Thus, there are evident shifts in the security landscape in the relations between Russia and Europe and it would be useful to identify at least two groups of issues in this respect: where are these changes heading in the foreseeable future (5-10 years) and what impact might they have on Europe both in the EU context and in a larger geographical dimension, i.e. including Russia.

New Developments

Much has already been said about recent changes in Europe. The evolution of European affairs in the 1990s has been studied extensively and the conclusions sometimes seem suspiciously similar. First, Europe continues to move towards something that was labelled in the early 20th century as “the United States of Europe”; second, its security agenda is changing in the direction towards some new specifically European identity; third, in this regard it is running into some structural problems with NATO which until recently was the pivot of European defence and security; fourth, Europe is approaching the point of bifurcation at which it will have to decide on its relations with the US, Russia, the Islamic world and China. While all these questions are in the heads of policy-makers, relations continue with almost no open crises or confrontations.

But this fact and those suspiciously similar conclusions fail to touch upon some really fundamental questions. Among them are included the division of labour between NATO and European defence and security policy and the relevance of existing security doctrines and structures.

To begin with, besides solving the issue of confronting the Soviet Union and its allies, NATO has also played a distinguished role in keeping old European rivalries under control, especially that between Germany and France. This is achieved primarily by keeping the former “down”. Security policies in Europe have not become “nationalised” which has helped to avoid a possible race between individual European nations. Rather, security policy has served as an instrument for forging cohesion among the Europeans.

Now, with the changes in relations between East and West, to what extent do these elements continue to play the role? Under the “no more enemy” scenario, is there any reason to continue the collectivist approach to security with its attendant huge bureaucratic structures? The policy of enlargement does not help to answer this question, but it is definitely not the answer.

Second, by virtue of a deterrent capacity in nuclear weapons, open hostilities in Europe (not counting the Soviet Union's periodic forays into the Territories of its dissident allies) were a probability but never a reality. The whole security concept developed as a "possible scenario", although it has never been regarded as a subject for immediate action. Both sides – Soviet and Europeans – developed scenarios based not so much on their real doctrines as on the assessment of their mutual capabilities. Disregarding some impressive evidence of their mutual desire to avoid hostilities (as manifested during the Berlin Wall crisis in 1961), they still pretended to believe that their official doctrines were relevant and, hence used them as the basis for security planning. This has contributed to the growth of a certain dichotomy in Western security planning in the 1990s: on the one side, there is a continuation of a "search for strategy" (war in Yugoslavia, NATO enlargement); and on the other, there are attempts to make security policy more relevant and closer to real world issues (ESDI).

This same dichotomy can be detected in the Russian security doctrine: statements of loyalty to nuclear deterrence, on the one hand and the search for relevant military tasks in the conventional area on the other. And all through this, one hears heated debate within the Russian military on the priorities and distribution of resources.

Third, Russia has ceased to be an enemy but has not become a friend. So far, there has been no serious effort to evaluate this prospect. There were and are numerous propagandistic statements declaring Russia a "partner". There are frequent meetings with Russian authorities both within NATO and the EU at which sweet words are uttered. In reality, however, Russia is kept at a distance: it is not (and will not be) invited to join NATO; it is not invited to join the EU (although there may be a change on that front). And although it has developed economic ties with some European nations, Germany and Finland in particular, it still has only a chance to become a full member of the WTO and of other important institutions.

And this is not simply an explosion of a Russian ego. This is a fact to be understood for further planning: the distance between Russia and Europe may become a crucial element of their future relationship. If, due to different reasons, they become closer, there is a strong hope that Russia will turn into an integral part of Europe (at least in the context of de Gaulle's understanding: "Europe from Brest to the Urals"). If the status quo continues, Russia will drift away looking for new partners in the East and the South. And then, after some time, the possibility of new confrontation may materialise again.

Two Strategies: Where to go?

The real picture of Europe in the beginning of the 1990s was as follows. On the Western “front”, there were no serious changes. The alliance survived the cold war. Only a few things hinted that there may have been a profound reappraisal of the existing order: it was mainly the words that “there was no more enemy” that questioned whether the arrangement of NATO should have survived. On the Eastern “front”, changes flooded the terrain. The Warsaw Treaty disappeared. The Soviet Union collapsed. The rise of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a substitute for the USSR raised more questions than it answered.

The whole concept of security in Europe collapsed. First, it was no more bloc-to-bloc confrontation. Second, it was no longer two hostile worlds facing each other. Third, instability and disintegration (USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) became the obsession of policy-makers. It was an extremely important period.

From the point of view of the Russian interest, the whole problem revolved around a central question: what role would Russia play in the future European order? It had ceased to be an enemy, it had demobilised its armies and agreed to the freedom of both former Soviet allies and former Soviet republics. Now, what would be its future role in the continent where lay almost half of its legitimate interests: security, economic, cultural and social.

Abstractly, there could have been two answers to this question and two relevant strategies. One meant that Russia will be accepted by the Europeans as a full-sized ally and member of the family. In essence, the situation was returned to the Geneva Conference of 1922 where the issue of ties between Russia and Europe had to be discussed and ended in isolation of Russia (which in turn turned to Rapallo Agreement with Germany which to a great extent devalued the Versailles *dictat*). Now, after almost 70 years of confrontation, the issue has returned to the initial question: Will Europe open its arms to dissident Russia and thus help it to overcome another hard period in its history or will it abstain, leaving Russia to overcome its problems by its own.

The other meant that further European development will go the way of incorporating all former Soviet allies and subjects, leaving Russia aside for some distant future. In the meantime the Central and Eastern Europe countries will be absorbed by Western Europe, and the continent will reunite as an anti-Russian or not-friendly-to-Russia entity. We would then witness something like traditional schemes of *Grand Armee* strategy; Europe vs. Russia.

Both strategies and approaches have a right to exist. “Europe vs. Russia” is more traditional, “Europe and Russia” is less traditional and more doubtful. As it seems, there are questions that currently loom large in the air to which NATO has almost no answers, while the ESDP may offer a profound and novel approach.

Why ESDP?

It seems strange to make such statements in the wake of the NATO-Russian agreement “at 20”. Formally it may seem that this idea, once put into practice, may find a solution to two different sets of issues: first, the Russian-US relationship on the basis of a quasi-alliance (and thus to help Mr. Putin to avoid forthcoming criticism of having “sold” Russia on ABM, the Caucasus, and other important issues) and, second, to install a basis for Russia-European *rapprochement* on security and cooperation.

But in reality the solution is much more complex and multifaceted. The NATO-Russian agreement signed in Rome has exceeded the scope of traditional NATO responsibility and overshadowed the area of “Petersberg tasks”. NATO, under the strong influence of Washington, has decided to pursue two different sets of goals: on the one hand, to continue the traditional NATO policy of enlargement and war preparations (in the Balkans and in the Persian Gulf) without any changes regardless of what the Russians say; on the other, to borrow some ideas from the ESDP and turn them into the basis for NATO-Russian cooperation. The herald of this idea was British Prime Minister Tony Blair.

This move kills two birds with one stone: it helps Mr. Putin to hush his domestic critics, and at the same time, pulls together Europeans without necessarily alarming the Americans.

This is the area that would typically be called “inter-imperialistic controversies” in Soviet times. In our time, it may be labelled as search for security identities without separation: the US has found it in unilateralism, Europe, in ESDP and in “Petersberg tasks” which, as it happened, coincided in time with the American search for a new global enemy (China) and thus helped the Europeans to understand that they needed a distinct security policy that would not drag them into unnecessary conflicts. Both efforts, unilateralism and ESDP were directed towards Russia. What role could it play if it moves towards Europeans and absorbs their format? Evidently, there will be a highly promising entity where both Europe and Russia could largely help each other without asking for assistance from Washington. Cooperation between the two “Petersberg subjects” will help to solve challenges to the European security and leave the US to its own global tasks.

What would happen if Russia responds to the “at 20” idea and accepts US embraces? Evidently, the US would strengthen its inclination to deploy national missile defence (NMD) in order to act unilaterally in crisis zones (Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Central Asia and India-Pakistan), thus leaving Europe to its narrow margin. In a way, the situation is unique and unforeseen. Both transatlantic allies have given to Russia the key to their relationship in security area. All three actors are in a sort of stalemate. Neither the US nor Europe wanted it. Russia did not expect it.

What can Russia do if finally it grasps the situation and tries to use it for its own benefit?

First, it may think of some sort of “triangular” relationship putting all three in the area where they can indeed be useful to each other and thus serve its great-power status in Europe, in the CIS, in Asia and in relations with both India and China. Second, it may go further and try to sort out areas of cooperation which may help both in their own security and in their economic reform through new investment in Russian defence and space industries. Third, it may even think of playing a certain role between the two strategic allies, lubricating or, on the contrary, exploiting their differences. Finally, fourth, it may think of a sort of “triumvirate” in other areas: the Mediterranean and the Balkans, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf or the Indian subcontinent.

In any event, the security landscape in Europe and in the neighbouring area is changing. It is not that threatening to the all-European order, but it exists and may hit Europeans in their weakest points: combating terrorism and proliferation of weapon of mass destruction. They will not be of the scope that will necessarily demand US involvement but they may still be a burden for European security efforts if not accompanied by Russian participation.

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POWER AND WEAKNESS

ROBERT KAGAN

It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power – the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power – American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realisation of Kant’s “perpetual peace”. The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less. And this state of affairs is not transitory – the product of one American election or one catastrophic event. The reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in development and likely to endure. When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges and fashioning and implementing foreign and defence policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways.

It is easier to see the contrast as an American living in Europe. Europeans are more conscious of the growing differences, perhaps because they fear them more. European intellectuals are nearly unanimous in the conviction that Americans and Europeans no longer share a common “strategic culture”. The European caricature at its most extreme depicts an America dominated by a “culture of death”, its warlike temperament the natural product of a violent society where every man has a gun and the death penalty reigns. But even those who do not make this crude link agree there are profound differences in the way the United States and Europe conduct foreign policy.

The United States, they argue, resorts to force more quickly and, compared with Europe, is less patient with diplomacy. Americans generally see the world divided between good and evil, between friends and enemies, while Europeans see a more complex picture. When

confronting real or potential adversaries, Americans generally favour policies of coercion rather than persuasion, emphasising punitive sanctions over inducements to better behaviour, the stick over the carrot. Americans tend to seek finality in international affairs: they want problems solved, threats eliminated. And, of course, Americans increasingly tend toward unilateralism in international affairs. They are less inclined to act through international institutions such as the United Nations, less inclined to work cooperatively with other nations to pursue common goals, more sceptical about international law, and more willing to operate outside its strictures when they deem it necessary, or even merely useful.¹

Europeans insist they approach problems with greater nuance and sophistication. They try to influence others through subtlety and indirection. They are more tolerant of failure, more patient when solutions don't come quickly. They generally favour peaceful responses to problems, preferring negotiation, diplomacy and persuasion to coercion. They are quicker to appeal to international law, international conventions, and international opinion to adjudicate disputes. They try to use commercial and economic ties to bind nations together. They often emphasise process over result, believing that ultimately process can become substance.

This European dual portrait is a caricature, of course, with its share of exaggerations and oversimplifications. One cannot generalise about Europeans: Britons may have a more "American" view of power than many of their fellow Europeans on the continent. And there are differing perspectives within nations on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, Democrats often seem more "European" than Republicans; Secretary of State Colin Powell may appear more "European" than Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Many Americans, especially among the intellectual elite, are as uncomfortable with the "hard" quality of American foreign policy as any European; and some Europeans value power as much as any American.

Nevertheless, the caricatures do capture an essential truth: The United States and Europe are fundamentally different today. Powell and Rumsfeld have more in common than do Powell and Hubert Védrine or even Jack Straw. When it comes to the use of force, mainstream

¹ One representative French observer describes "a US mindset" that "tends to emphasise military, technical and unilateral solutions to international problems, possibly at the expense of cooperative and political ones." See Gilles Andreani, "The Disarray of US Non-Proliferation Policy," *Survival* (Winter 1999-2000).

American Democrats have more in common with Republicans than they do with most European Socialists and Social Democrats. During the 1990s, even American liberals were more willing to resort to force and were more Manichean in their perception of the world than most of their European counterparts. The Clinton administration bombed Iraq, as well as Afghanistan and Sudan. European governments, it is safe to say, would not have done so. Whether they would have bombed even Belgrade in 1999, had the US not forced their hand, is an interesting question.²

What is the source of these differing strategic perspectives? The question has received too little attention in recent years, either because foreign policy intellectuals and policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic have denied the existence of a genuine difference or because those who have pointed to the difference, especially in Europe, have been more interested in assailing the United States than in understanding why the United States acts as it does – or, for that matter, why Europe acts as it does. It is past time to move beyond the denial and the insults and to face the problem head-on.

Despite what many Europeans and some Americans believe, these differences in strategic culture do not spring naturally from the national characters of Americans and Europeans. After all, what Europeans now consider their more peaceful strategic culture is, historically speaking, quite new. It represents an evolution away from the very different strategic culture that dominated Europe for hundreds of years and at least until World War I. The European governments – and peoples – who enthusiastically launched themselves into that continental war believed in *machtpolitik*. While the roots of the present European worldview, like the roots of the European Union itself, can be traced back to the Enlightenment, Europe's great-power politics for the past 300 years did not follow the visionary designs of the philosophes and the physiocrats.

As for the United States, there is nothing timeless about the present heavy reliance on force as a tool of international relations, nor about the tilt toward unilateralism and away from a devotion to international law. Americans are children of the Enlightenment, too, and in the early years

² The case of Bosnia in the early 1990s stands out as an instance where some Europeans, chiefly British Prime Minister Tony Blair, were at times more forceful in advocating military action than first the Bush and then the Clinton administration. (Blair was also an early advocate of using air power and even ground troops in the Kosovo crisis.) And Europeans had forces on the ground in Bosnia when the United States did not, although in a UN peacekeeping role that proved ineffective when challenged.

of the republic were more faithful apostles of its creed. America's eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century statesmen sounded much like the European statesmen of today, extolling the virtues of commerce as the soothing balm of international strife and appealing to international law and international opinion over brute force. The young United States wielded power against weaker peoples on the North American continent, but when it came to dealing with the European giants, it claimed to abjure power and assailed as atavistic the power politics of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European empires.

Two centuries later, Americans and Europeans have traded places – and perspectives. Partly this is because in those 200 years, but especially in recent decades, the power equation has shifted dramatically: When the United States was weak, it practised the strategies of indirection, the strategies of weakness; now that the United States is powerful, it behaves as powerful nations do. When the European great powers were strong, they believed in strength and martial glory. Now, they see the world through the eyes of weaker powers. These very different points of view, weak versus strong, have naturally produced differing strategic judgements, differing assessments of threats and of the proper means of addressing threats, and even differing calculations of interest.

But this is only part of the answer. For along with these natural consequences of the transatlantic power gap, there has also opened a broad ideological gap. Europe, because of its unique historical experience of the past half-century – culminating in the past decade with the creation of the European Union – has developed a set of ideals and principles regarding the utility and morality of power different from the ideals and principles of Americans, who have not shared that experience. If the strategic chasm between the United States and Europe appears greater than ever today, and grows still wider at a worrying pace, it is because these material and ideological differences reinforce one another. The divisive trend they together produce may be impossible to reverse.

The Power Gap: Perception and Reality

Europe has been militarily weak for a long time, but until fairly recently its weakness had been obscured. World War II all but destroyed European nations as global powers, and their post-war inability to project sufficient force overseas to maintain colonial empires in Asia, Africa and the Middle East forced them to retreat on a massive scale after more than five centuries of imperial dominance – perhaps the most significant retrenchment of global influence in human history. For a half-century after World War II, however, this weakness was masked by the unique

geopolitical circumstances of the cold war. Dwarfed by the two superpowers on its flanks, a weakened Europe nevertheless served as the central strategic theatre of the worldwide struggle between communism and democratic capitalism. Its sole but vital strategic mission was to defend its own territory against any Soviet offensive, at least until the Americans arrived. Although shorn of most traditional measures of great-power status, Europe remained the geopolitical pivot, and this, along with lingering habits of world leadership, allowed Europeans to retain international influence well beyond what their sheer military capabilities might have afforded.

Europe lost this strategic centrality after the cold war ended, but it took a few more years for the lingering mirage of European global power to fade. During the 1990s, war in the Balkans kept both Europeans and Americans focused on the strategic importance of the continent and on the continuing relevance of NATO. The enlargement of NATO to include former Warsaw Pact nations and the consolidation of the cold war victory kept Europe in the forefront of the strategic discussion.

Then there was the early promise of the “new Europe”. By bonding together into a single political and economic unit – the historic accomplishment of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 – many hoped to recapture Europe’s old greatness but in a new political form. “Europe” would be the next superpower, not only economically and politically, but also militarily. It would handle crises on the European continent, such as the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, and it would re-emerge as a global player. In the 1990s Europeans could confidently assert that the power of a unified Europe would restore, finally, the global “multipolarity” that had been destroyed by the cold war and its aftermath. And most Americans, with mixed emotions, agreed that superpower Europe was the future. Harvard University’s Samuel P. Huntington predicted that the coalescing of the European Union would be “the single most important move” in a worldwide reaction against American hegemony and would produce a “truly multipolar” twenty-first century.³

But European pretensions and American apprehensions proved unfounded. The 1990s witnessed not the rise of a European superpower but the decline of Europe into relative weakness. The Balkan conflict at the beginning of the decade revealed European military incapacity and political disarray; the Kosovo conflict at decade’s end exposed a transatlantic gap in military technology and the ability to wage modern

³ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower”, *Foreign Affairs*, March-April 1999.

warfare that would only widen in subsequent years. Outside of Europe, the disparity by the close of the 1990s was even more starkly apparent as it became clear that the ability of European powers, individually or collectively, to project decisive force into regions of conflict beyond the continent was negligible. Europeans could provide peacekeeping forces in the Balkans – indeed, they could and eventually did provide the vast bulk of those forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. But they lacked the wherewithal to introduce and sustain a fighting force in potentially hostile territory, even in Europe. Under the best of circumstances, the European role was limited to filling out peacekeeping forces after the United States had, largely on its own, carried out the decisive phases of a military mission and stabilised the situation. As some Europeans put it, the real division of labour consisted of the United States “making the dinner” and the Europeans “doing the dishes.”

This inadequacy should have come as no surprise, since these were the limitations that had forced Europe to retract its global influence in the first place. Those Americans and Europeans who proposed that Europe expand its strategic role beyond the continent set an unreasonable goal. During the cold war, Europe’s strategic role had been to defend itself. It was unrealistic to expect a return to international great-power status, unless European peoples were willing to shift significant resources from social programmes to military programmes.

Clearly they were not. Not only were Europeans unwilling to pay to project force beyond Europe. After the cold war, they would not pay for sufficient force to conduct even minor military actions on the continent without American help. Nor did it seem to matter whether European publics were being asked to spend money to strengthen NATO or an independent European foreign and defence policy. Their answer was the same. Rather than viewing the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to flex global muscles, Europeans took it as an opportunity to cash in on a sizeable peace dividend. Average European defence budgets gradually fell below 2% of GDP. Despite talk of establishing Europe as a global superpower, therefore, European military capabilities steadily fell behind those of the United States throughout the 1990s.

The end of the cold war had a very different effect on the other side of the Atlantic. For although Americans looked for a peace dividend, too, and defence budgets declined or remained flat during most of the 1990s, defence spending still remained above 3% of GDP. Fast on the heels of the Soviet empire’s demise came Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the largest American military action in a quarter-century. Thereafter American administrations cut the cold war force, but not as dramatically

as might have been expected. By historical standards, America's military power and particularly its ability to project that power to all corners of the globe remained unprecedented.

Meanwhile, the very fact of the Soviet empire's collapse vastly increased America's strength relative to the rest of the world. The sizeable American military arsenal, once barely sufficient to balance Soviet power, was now deployed in a world without a single formidable adversary. This "unipolar moment" had an entirely natural and predictable consequence: It made the United States more willing to use force abroad. With the check of Soviet power removed, the United States was free to intervene practically wherever and whenever it chose – a fact reflected in the proliferation of overseas military interventions that began during the first Bush administration with the invasion of Panama in 1989, the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992, continuing during the Clinton years with interventions in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. While American politicians talked of pulling back from the world, the reality was an America intervening abroad more frequently than it had throughout most of the cold war. Thanks to new technologies, the United States was also freer to use force around the world in more limited ways through air and missile strikes, which it did with increasing frequency.

How could this growing transatlantic power gap fail to create a difference in strategic perceptions? Even during the cold war, American military predominance and Europe's relative weakness had produced important and sometimes serious disagreements. Gaullism, *Ostpolitik*, and the various movements for European independence and unity were manifestations not only of a European desire for honour and freedom of action. They also reflected a European conviction that America's approach to the cold war was too confrontational, too militaristic and too dangerous. Europeans believed they knew better how to deal with the Soviets: through engagement and seduction, through commercial and political ties, through patience and forbearance. It was a legitimate view, shared by many Americans. But it also reflected Europe's weakness relative to the United States, the fewer military options at Europe's disposal, and its greater vulnerability to a powerful Soviet Union. It may have reflected, too, Europe's memory of continental war. Americans, when they were not themselves engaged in the subtleties of *détente*, viewed the European approach as a form of appeasement, a return to the fearful mentality of the 1930s. But appeasement is never a dirty word to those whose genuine weakness offers few appealing alternatives. For them, it is a policy of sophistication.

The end of the cold war, by widening the power gap, exacerbated the disagreements. Although transatlantic tensions are now widely assumed to have begun with the inauguration of George W. Bush in January 2001, they were already evident during the Clinton administration and may even be traced back to the administration of George H.W. Bush. By 1992, mutual recriminations were rife over Bosnia, where the United States refused to act and Europe could not act. It was during the Clinton years that Europeans began complaining about being lectured to by the “hectoring hegemony”. This was also the period in which Védérine coined the term *hyperpuissance* to describe an American behemoth too worryingly powerful to be designated merely a superpower. (Perhaps he was responding to then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s insistence that the United States was the world’s “indispensable nation”.) It was also during the 1990s that the transatlantic disagreement over American plans for missile defence emerged and many Europeans began grumbling about the American propensity to choose force and punishment over diplomacy and persuasion.

The Clinton administration, meanwhile, though relatively timid and restrained itself, grew angry and impatient with European timidity, especially the unwillingness to confront Saddam Hussein. The split in the alliance over Iraq didn’t begin with the 2000 election but in 1997, when the Clinton administration tried to increase the pressure on Baghdad and found itself at odds with France and (to a lesser extent) Great Britain in the United Nations Security Council. Even the war in Kosovo was marked by nervousness among some allies – especially Italy, Greece and Germany – that the United States was too uncompromisingly militaristic in its approach. And while Europeans and Americans ultimately stood together in the confrontation with Belgrade, the Kosovo war produced in Europe less satisfaction at the successful prosecution of the war than unease at America’s apparent omnipotence. That apprehension would only increase in the wake of American military action after September 11, 2001.

The Psychology of Power and Weakness

Today’s transatlantic problem, in short, is not a George Bush problem. It is a power problem. American military strength has produced a propensity to use that strength. Europe’s military weakness has produced a perfectly understandable aversion to the exercise of military power. Indeed, it has produced a powerful European interest in inhabiting a world where strength doesn’t matter, where international law and international institutions predominate, where unilateral action by

powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations regardless of their strength have equal rights and are equally protected by commonly agreed-upon international rules of behaviour. Europeans have a deep interest in devaluing and eventually eradicating the brutal laws of an anarchic, Hobbesian world where power is the ultimate determinant of national security and success.

This is no reproach. It is what weaker powers have wanted from time immemorial. It was what Americans wanted in the 18th and early 19th centuries, when the brutality of a European system of power politics run by the global giants of France, Britain and Russia left Americans constantly vulnerable to imperial thrashing. It was what the other small powers of Europe wanted in those years, too, only to be sneered at by Bourbon kings and other powerful monarchs, who spoke instead of *raison d'état*. The great proponent of international law on the high seas in the 18th century was the United States; the great opponent was Britain's navy, the "Mistress of the Seas." In an anarchic world, small powers always fear they will be victims. Great powers, on the other hand, often fear rules that may constrain them more than they fear the anarchy in which their power brings security and prosperity.

This natural and historic disagreement between the stronger and the weaker manifests itself in today's transatlantic dispute over the question of unilateralism. Europeans generally believe their objection to American unilateralism is proof of their greater commitment to certain ideals concerning world order. They are less willing to acknowledge that their hostility to unilateralism is also self-interested. Europeans fear American unilateralism. They fear it perpetuates a Hobbesian world in which they may become increasingly vulnerable. The United States may be a relatively benign hegemony, but insofar as its actions delay the arrival of a world order more conducive to the safety of weaker powers, it is objectively dangerous.

This is one reason why in recent years a principal objective of European foreign policy has become, as one European observer puts it, the "multilateralising" of the United States.⁴ It is not that Europeans are teaming up against the American hegemony, as Huntington and many realist theorists would have it, by creating a countervailing power. After all, Europeans are not increasing their power. Their tactics, like their goal, are the tactics of the weak. They hope to constrain American power

⁴ Steven Everts, *Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe? Managing Divergence in Transatlantic Foreign Policy*, Centre for European Reform Working Paper, February 2001.

without wielding power themselves. In what may be the ultimate feat of subtlety and indirection, they want to control the behemoth by appealing to its conscience.

It is a sound strategy, as far as it goes. The United States is a behemoth with a conscience. It is not Louis XIV's France or George III's England. Americans do not argue, even to themselves, that their actions may be justified by *raison d'état*. Americans have never accepted the principles of Europe's old order, never embraced the Machiavellian perspective. The United States is a liberal, progressive society through and through, and to the extent that Americans believe in power, they believe it must be a means of advancing the principles of a liberal civilisation and a liberal world order. Americans even share Europe's aspirations for a more orderly world system based not on power but on rules – after all, they were striving for such a world when Europeans were still extolling the laws of *machtspolitik*.

But while these common ideals and aspirations shape foreign policies on both sides of the Atlantic, they cannot completely negate the very different perspectives from which Europeans and Americans view the world and the role of power in international affairs. Europeans oppose unilateralism in part because they have no capacity for unilateralism. Polls consistently show that Americans support multilateral action in principle – they even support acting under the rubric of the United Nations – but the fact remains that the United States can act unilaterally, and has done so many times with reasonable success. For Europeans, the appeal to multilateralism and international law has a real practical pay-off and little cost. For Americans, who stand to lose at least some freedom of action, support for universal rules of behaviour really is a matter of idealism.

Even when Americans and Europeans can agree on the kind of world order they would strive to build, however, they increasingly disagree about what constitutes a threat to that international endeavour. Indeed, Europeans and Americans differ most these days in their evaluation of what constitutes a tolerable versus an intolerable threat. This, too, is consistent with the disparity of power.

Europeans often argue that Americans have an unreasonable demand for “perfect” security, the product of living for centuries shielded behind two oceans.⁵ Europeans claim they know what it is like to live with danger, to exist side-by-side with evil, since they've done it for centuries. Hence their greater tolerance for such threats as may be posed by Saddam

⁵ For that matter, this is also the view commonly found in American textbooks.

Hussein's Iraq or the ayatollahs' Iran. Americans, they claim, make far too much of the dangers these regimes pose.

Even before September 11, this argument rang a bit hollow. The United States in its formative decades lived in a state of substantial insecurity, surrounded by hostile European empires, at constant risk of being torn apart by centrifugal forces that were encouraged by threats from without: national insecurity formed the core of Washington's farewell address. As for the Europeans' supposed tolerance for insecurity and evil, it can be overstated. For the better part of three centuries, European Catholics and Protestants more often preferred to kill than to tolerate each other; nor have the past two centuries shown all that much mutual tolerance between Frenchmen and Germans.

Some Europeans argue that precisely because Europe has suffered so much, it has a higher tolerance for suffering than America and therefore a higher tolerance for threats. More likely the opposite is true. The memory of their horrendous suffering in World War I made the British and French publics more fearful of Nazi Germany, not more tolerant, and this attitude contributed significantly to the appeasement of the 1930s.

A better explanation of Europe's greater tolerance for threats is, once again, Europe's relative weakness. Tolerance is also very much a realistic response in that Europe, precisely because it is weak, actually faces fewer threats than the far more powerful United States.

The psychology of weakness is easy enough to understand. A man armed only with a knife may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a tolerable danger, inasmuch as the alternative – hunting the bear armed only with a knife – is actually riskier than lying low and hoping the bear never attacks. The same man armed with a rifle, however, will likely make a different calculation of what constitutes a tolerable risk. Why should he risk being mauled to death if he doesn't need to?

This perfectly normal human psychology is helping to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe today. Europeans have concluded, reasonably enough, that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is more tolerable for them than the risk of removing him. But Americans, being stronger, have reasonably enough developed a lower threshold of tolerance for Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction, especially after September 11. Europeans like to say that Americans are obsessed with fixing problems, but it is generally true that those with a greater capacity to fix problems are more likely to try to fix them than those who have no such capability. Americans can imagine successfully invading Iraq and toppling Saddam, and therefore more than 70% of Americans

apparently favour such action. Europeans, not surprisingly, find the prospect both unimaginable and frightening.

The incapacity to respond to threats leads not only to tolerance but sometimes to denial. It's normal to try to put out of one's mind that which one can do nothing about. According to one student of European opinion, even the very focus on "threats" differentiates American policy-makers from their European counterparts. Americans, writes Steven Everts, talk about foreign "threats" such as "the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and 'rogue states'". But Europeans look at "challenges", such as "ethnic conflict, migration, organised crime, poverty and environmental degradation". As Everts notes, however, the key difference is less a matter of culture and philosophy than of capability. Europeans "are most worried about issues . . . that have a greater chance of being solved by political engagement and huge sums of money". In other words, Europeans focus on issues – "challenges" – where European strengths come into play but not on those "threats" where European weakness makes solutions elusive. If Europe's strategic culture today places less value on power and military strength and more value on such soft-power tools as economics and trade, isn't it partly because Europe is militarily weak and economically strong? Americans are quicker to acknowledge the existence of threats, even to perceive them where others may not see any, because they can conceive of doing something to meet those threats.

The differing threat perceptions in the United States and Europe are not just matters of psychology, however. They are also grounded in a practical reality that is another product of the disparity of power. For Iraq and other "rogue" states objectively do not pose the same level of threat to Europeans as they do to the United States. There is, first of all, the American security guarantee that Europeans enjoy and have enjoyed for six decades, ever since the United States took upon itself the burden of maintaining order in far-flung regions of the world – from the Korean Peninsula to the Persian Gulf – from which European power had largely withdrawn. Europeans generally believe, whether or not they admit it to themselves, that were Iraq ever to emerge as a real and present danger, as opposed to merely a potential danger, then the United States would do something about it – as it did in 1991. If during the cold war Europe by necessity made a major contribution to its own defence, today Europeans enjoy an unparalleled measure of "free security" because most of the likely threats are in regions outside Europe, where only the United States can project effective force. In a very practical sense – that is, when it comes to actual strategic planning – neither Iraq nor Iran nor North Korea

nor any other “rogue” state in the world is primarily a European problem. Nor, certainly, is China. Both Europeans and Americans agree that these are primarily American problems.

This is why Saddam Hussein is not as great a threat to Europe as he is to the United States. He would be a greater threat to the United States even were the Americans and Europeans in complete agreement on Iraq policy, because it is the logical consequence of the transatlantic disparity of power. The task of containing Saddam Hussein belongs primarily to the United States, not to Europe, and everyone agrees on this⁶ – including Saddam, which is why he considers the United States, not Europe, his principal adversary. In the Persian Gulf, in the Middle East, and in most other regions of the world (including Europe), the United States plays the role of ultimate enforcer. “You are so powerful,” Europeans often say to Americans. “So why do you feel so threatened?” But it is precisely America’s great power that makes it the primary target, and often the only target. Europeans are understandably content that it should remain so.

Americans are “cowboys”, Europeans love to say. And there is truth in this. The United States does act as an international sheriff, self-appointed perhaps but widely welcomed nevertheless, trying to enforce some peace and justice in what Americans see as a lawless world where outlaws need to be deterred or destroyed, and often through the muzzle of a gun. Europe, by this old West analogy, is more like a saloon keeper. Outlaws shoot sheriffs, not saloon-keepers. In fact, from the saloon-keeper’s point of view, the sheriff trying to impose order by force can sometimes be more threatening than the outlaws who, at least for the time being, may just want a drink.

When Europeans took to the streets by the millions after September 11th, most Americans believed it was out of a sense of shared danger and common interest: The Europeans knew they could be next. But Europeans by and large did not feel that way and still don’t. Europeans do not really believe they are next. They may be secondary targets – because they are allied with the US – but they are not the primary target, because they no longer play the imperial role in the Middle East that might have engendered the same antagonism against them as is aimed at the United States. When Europeans wept and waved American flags after September 11, it was out of genuine human sympathy, sorrow and affection for Americans. For better or for worse, European displays of solidarity were a product more of fellow feeling than self-interest.

⁶ Notwithstanding the British contribution to patrols of the “no-fly zone”.

The Origins of Modern European Foreign Policy

Important as the power gap may be in shaping the respective strategic cultures of the United States and Europe, it is only one part of the story. Europe in the past half-century has developed a genuinely different perspective on the role of power in international relations, a perspective that springs directly from its unique historical experience since the end of World War II. It is a perspective that Americans do not share and cannot share, inasmuch as the formative historical experiences on their side of the Atlantic have not been the same.

Consider again the qualities that make up the European strategic culture: the emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism. It is true that these are not traditionally European approaches to international relations when viewed from a long historical perspective. But they are a product of more recent European history. The modern European strategic culture represents a conscious rejection of the European past, a rejection of the evils of European *machtpolitik*. It is a reflection of Europeans' ardent and understandable desire never to return to that past. Who knows better than Europeans the dangers that arise from unbridled power politics, from an excessive reliance on military force, from policies produced by national egoism and ambition, even from balance of power and *raison d'état*? As German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer put it in a speech outlining his vision of the European future at Humboldt University in Berlin (12 May 2000), "The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648". The European Union is itself the product of an awful century of European warfare.

Of course, it was the "hegemonic ambitions" of one nation in particular that European integration was meant to contain. And it is the integration and taming of Germany that is the great accomplishment of Europe – viewed historically, perhaps the greatest feat of international politics ever achieved. Some Europeans recall, as Fischer does, the central role played by the United States in solving the "German problem". Fewer like to recall that the military destruction of Nazi Germany was the prerequisite for the European peace that followed. Most Europeans believe that it was the transformation of European politics, the deliberate abandonment and rejection of centuries of *machtpolitik*, that in the end made possible the "new order". The Europeans, who invented power politics, turned themselves into born-again idealists by an act of will, leaving behind

them what Fischer called “the old system of balance with its continued national orientation, constraints of coalition, traditional interest-led politics and the permanent danger of nationalist ideologies and confrontations”.

Fischer stands near one end of the spectrum of European idealism. But this is not really a right-left issue in Europe. Fischer’s principal contention – that Europe has moved beyond the old system of power politics and discovered a new system for preserving peace in international relations – is widely shared across Europe. As senior British diplomat Robert Cooper recently wrote in *The Observer* (7 April 2002), Europe today lives in a “post-modern system” that does not rest on a balance of power but on “the rejection of force” and on “self-enforced rules of behaviour”. In the “post-modern world”, writes Cooper, “*raison d’état* and the amorality of Machiavelli’s theories of statecraft have been replaced by a moral consciousness” in international affairs.

American realists might scoff at this idealism. George F. Kennan assumed only his naïve fellow Americans succumbed to such “Wilsonian” legalistic and moralistic fancies, not those war-tested, historically minded European Machiavelli’s. But, really, why shouldn’t Europeans be idealistic about international affairs, at least as they are conducted in Europe’s “post-modern system”? Within the confines of Europe, the age-old laws of international relations have been repealed. Europeans have stepped out of the Hobbesian world of anarchy into the Kantian world of perpetual peace. European life during the more than five decades since the end of World War II has been shaped not by the brutal laws of power politics but by the unfolding of a geopolitical fantasy, a miracle of world-historical importance: The German lion has laid down with the French lamb. The conflict that ravaged Europe ever since the violent birth of Germany in the 19th century has been put to rest.

The means by which this miracle has been achieved have understandably acquired something of a sacred mystique for Europeans, especially since the end of the cold war. Diplomacy, negotiations, patience, the forging of economic ties, political engagement, the use of inducements rather than sanctions, the taking of small steps and tempering ambitions for success – these were the tools of Franco-German *rapprochement* and hence the tools that made European integration possible. Integration was not to be based on military deterrence or the balance of power. Quite the contrary. The miracle came from the rejection of military power and of its utility as an instrument of international affairs – at least within the confines of Europe. During the cold war, few Europeans doubted the need for

military power to deter the Soviet Union. But within Europe the rules were different.

Collective security was provided from without, meanwhile, by the *deus ex machina* of the United States operating through the military structures of NATO. Within this wall of security, Europeans pursued their new order, freed from the brutal laws and even the mentality of power politics. This evolution from the old to the new began in Europe during the cold war. But the end of the cold war, by removing even the external danger of the Soviet Union, allowed Europe's new order, and its new idealism, to blossom fully. Freed from the requirements of any military deterrence, internal or external, Europeans became still more confident that their way of settling international problems now had universal application.

“The genius of the founding fathers”, European Commission President Romano Prodi commented in a speech at the Institute d'Etudes Politiques in Paris (29 May 2001), “lay in translating extremely high political ambitions into a series of more specific, almost technical decisions. This indirect approach made further action possible. *Rapprochement* took place gradually. From confrontation we moved to willingness to cooperate in the economic sphere and then on to integration”. This is what many Europeans believe they have to offer the world: not power, but the transcendence of power. The “essence” of the European Union, writes Everts, is “all about subjecting inter-state relations to the rule of law”, and Europe's experience of successful multilateral governance has in turn produced an ambition to convert the world. Europe “has a role to play in world ‘governance’”, says Prodi, a role based on replicating the European experience on a global scale. In Europe “the rule of law has replaced the crude interplay of power . . . power politics have lost their influence”. And by “making a success of integration we are demonstrating to the world that it is possible to create a method for peace”.

No doubt there are Britons, Germans, French and others who would frown on such exuberant idealism. But many Europeans, including many in positions of power, routinely apply Europe's experience to the rest of the world. For is not the general European critique of the American approach to “rogue” regimes based on this special European insight? Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya – these states may be dangerous and unpleasant, even evil. But might not an “indirect approach” work again, as it did in Europe? Might it not be possible once more to move from confrontation to *rapprochement*, beginning with cooperation in the economic sphere and then moving on to peaceful integration? Could not the formula that

worked in Europe work again with Iran or even Iraq? A great many Europeans insist that it can.

The transmission of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe's new *mission civilisatrice*. Just as Americans have always believed that they had discovered the secret to human happiness and wished to export it to the rest of the world, so the Europeans have a new mission born of their own discovery of perpetual peace.

Thus we arrive at what may be the most important reason for the divergence in views between Europe and the United States. America's power, and its willingness to exercise that power – unilaterally if necessary – represents a threat to Europe's new sense of mission. Perhaps the greatest threat. American policy-makers find it hard to believe, but leading officials and politicians in Europe worry more about how the United States might handle or mishandle the problem of Iraq – by undertaking unilateral and extralegal military action – than they worry about Iraq itself and Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. And while it is true that they fear such action might destabilise the Middle East and lead to the unnecessary loss of life, there is a deeper concern.⁷ Such American action represents an assault on the essence of "post-modern" Europe. It is an assault on Europe's new ideals, a denial of their universal validity, much as the monarchies of 18th and 19th century Europe were an assault on American republican ideals. Americans ought to be the first to understand that a threat to one's beliefs can be as frightening as a threat to one's physical security.

As Americans have for two centuries, Europeans speak with great confidence of the superiority of their global understanding, the wisdom they have to offer other nations about conflict resolution, and their way of addressing international problems. But just as in the first decade of the American republic, there is a hint of insecurity in the European claim to "success", an evident need to have their success affirmed and their views accepted by other nations, particularly by the mighty United States. After all, to deny the validity of the new European idealism is to raise profound doubts about the viability of the European project. If international

⁷ The common American argument that European policy toward Iraq and Iran is dictated by financial considerations is only partly right. Are Europeans greedier than Americans? Do American corporations not influence American policy in Asia and Latin America, as well as in the Middle East? The difference is that American strategic judgements sometimes conflict with and override financial interests. For the reasons suggested in this essay, that conflict is much less common for Europeans.

problems cannot, in fact, be settled the European way, wouldn't that suggest that Europe itself may eventually fall short of a solution, with all the horrors this implies?

And, of course, it is precisely this fear that still hangs over Europeans, even as Europe moves forward. Europeans, and particularly the French and Germans, are not entirely sure that the problem once known as the "German problem" really has been solved. As their various and often very different proposals for the future constitution of Europe suggest, the French are still not confident they can trust the Germans, and the Germans are still not sure they can trust themselves. This fear can at times hinder progress toward deeper integration, but it also propels the European project forward despite innumerable obstacles. The European project must succeed, for how else to overcome what Fischer, in his Humboldt University speech, called "the risks and temptations objectively inherent in Germany's dimensions and central situation"? Those historic German "temptations" play at the back of many a European mind. And every time Europe contemplates the use of military force, or is forced to do so by the United States, there is no avoiding at least momentary consideration of what effect such a military action might have on the "German question".

Perhaps it is not just coincidence that the amazing progress toward European integration in recent years has been accompanied not by the emergence of a European superpower but, on the contrary, by a diminishing of European military capabilities relative to the United States. Turning Europe into a global superpower capable of balancing the power of the United States may have been one of the original selling points of the European Union – an independent European foreign and defence policy was supposed to be one of the most important by-products of European integration. But, in truth, the ambition for European "power" is something of an anachronism. It is an atavistic impulse, inconsistent with the ideals of post-modern Europe, whose very existence depends on the rejection of power politics. Whatever its architects may have intended, European integration has proved to be the enemy of European military power and, indeed, of an important European global role.

This phenomenon has manifested itself not only in flat or declining European defence budgets, but in other ways, too, even in the realm of "soft" power. European leaders talk of Europe's essential role in the world. Prodi yearns "to make our voice heard, to make our actions count". And it is true that Europeans spend a great deal of money on foreign aid – more per capita, they like to point out, than does the United States. Europeans engage in overseas military missions, so long as the

missions are mostly limited to peacekeeping. But while the EU periodically dips its fingers into troubled international waters in the Middle East or the Korean Peninsula, the truth is that EU foreign policy is probably the most anaemic of all the products of European integration. As Charles Grant, a sympathetic observer of the EU, recently noted, few European leaders “are giving it much time or energy”.⁸ EU foreign policy initiatives tend to be short-lived and are rarely backed by sustained agreement on the part of the various European powers. That is one reason they are so easily rebuffed, as was the case in late March when Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon blocked EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana from meeting with Yasser Arafat (only to turn around the next day and allow a much lower-ranking American negotiator to meet with the Palestinian leader).

It is obvious, moreover, that issues outside of Europe don’t attract nearly as much interest among Europeans as purely European issues do. This has surprised and frustrated Americans on all sides of the political and strategic debate: Recall the profound disappointment of American liberals when Europeans failed to mount an effective protest against Bush’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. But given the enormous and difficult agenda of integration, this European tendency to look inward is understandable. EU enlargement, the revision of the common economic and agricultural policies, the question of national sovereignty versus supranational governance, the so-called democracy deficit, the jostling of the large European powers, the dissatisfaction of the smaller powers, the establishment of a new European constitution – all of these present serious and unavoidable challenges. The difficulties of moving forward might seem insuperable were it not for the progress the project of European integration has already demonstrated.

American policies that are unwelcome on substance – on a missile defence system and the ABM Treaty, belligerence toward Iraq, support for Israel – are all the more unwelcome because for Europe, they are a distraction. Europeans often point to American insularity and parochialism. But Europeans themselves have turned intensely introspective. As Dominique Moisi noted in the *Financial Times* (11 March 2002), the recent French presidential campaign saw “no reference . . . to the events of September 11 and their far-reaching consequences”. No one asked, “What should be the role of France and Europe in the new configuration of forces created after September 11? How should France

⁸ Charles Grant, “A European View of ESDP,” CEPS-IISS European Security Forum Working Paper, April 2001.

reappraise its military budget and doctrine to take account of the need to maintain some kind of parity between Europe and the United States, or at least between France and the UK?" The Middle East conflict became an issue in the campaign because of France's large Arab and Muslim population, as the high vote for Le Pen demonstrated. But Le Pen is not a foreign policy hawk. And as Moisi noted, "for most French voters in 2002, security has little to do with abstract and distant geopolitics. Rather, it is a question of which politician can best protect them from the crime and violence plaguing the streets and suburbs of their cities".

Can Europe change course and assume a larger role on the world stage? There has been no shortage of European leaders urging it to do so. Nor is the weakness of EU foreign policy today necessarily proof that it must be weak tomorrow, given the EU's record of overcoming weaknesses in other areas. And yet the political will to demand more power for Europe appears to be lacking, and for the very good reason that Europe does not see a mission for itself that requires power. Its mission is to oppose power. It is revealing that the argument most often advanced by Europeans for augmenting their military strength these days is not that it will allow Europe to expand its strategic purview. It is merely to rein in and "multilateralise" the United States. "America", writes the pro-American British scholar Timothy Garton Ash in the *New York Times* (9 April 2002), "has too much power for anyone's good, including its own". Therefore Europe must amass power, but for no other reason than to save the world and the United States from the dangers inherent in the present lopsided situation.

Whether that particular mission is a worthy one or not, it seems unlikely to rouse European passions. Even Védrine has stopped talking about counterbalancing the United States. Now he shrugs and declares there "is no reason for the Europeans to match a country that can fight four wars at once". It was one thing for Europe in the 1990s to increase its collective expenditures on defence from \$150 billion per year to \$180 billion when the United States was spending \$280 billion per year. But now the United States is heading toward spending as much as \$500 billion per year, and Europe has not the slightest intention of keeping up. European analysts lament the continent's "strategic irrelevance". NATO Secretary General George Robertson has taken to calling Europe a "military pygmy" in an effort to shame Europeans into spending more and doing so more wisely. But who honestly believes Europeans will fundamentally change their way of doing business? They have many reasons not to.

The US Response

In thinking about the divergence of their own views and those of Europeans, Americans must not lose sight of the main point: The new Europe is indeed a blessed miracle and a reason for enormous celebration – on both sides of the Atlantic. For Europeans, it is the realisation of a long and improbable dream: a continent free from nationalist strife and blood feuds, from military competition and arms races. War between the major European powers is almost unimaginable. After centuries of misery, not only for Europeans but also for those pulled into their conflicts – as Americans were twice in the past century – the new Europe really has emerged as a paradise. It is something to be cherished and guarded, not least by Americans, who have shed blood on Europe's soil and would shed more should the new Europe ever fail.

Nor should we forget that the Europe of today is very much the product of American foreign policy stretching back over six decades. European integration was an American project, too, after World War II. And so, recall, was European weakness. When the cold war dawned, Americans such as Dean Acheson hoped to create in Europe a powerful partner against the Soviet Union. But that was not the only American vision of Europe underlying US policies during the 20th century. Predating it was Franklin Delano Roosevelt's vision of a Europe that had been rendered, in effect, strategically irrelevant. As the historian John Lamberton Harper has put it, he wanted "to bring about a radical reduction in the weight of Europe" and thereby make possible "the retirement of Europe from world politics".⁹

Americans who came of age during the cold war have always thought of Europe almost exclusively in Achesonian terms – as the essential bulwark of freedom in the struggle against Soviet tyranny. But Americans of Roosevelt's era had a different view. In the late 1930s the common conviction of Americans was that "the European system was basically rotten, that war was endemic on that continent, and the Europeans had only themselves to blame for their plight".¹⁰ By the early 1940s, Europe appeared to be nothing more than the overheated incubator of world wars that cost America dearly. During World War II Americans like

⁹ John Lamberton Harper, *American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 3. The following discussion of the differing American perspectives on Europe owes much to Harper's fine book.

¹⁰ William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940* (Harper Bros., 1952), p. 14.

Roosevelt, looking backward rather than forward, believed no greater service could be performed than to take Europe out of the global strategic picture once and for all. “After Germany is disarmed”, FDR pointedly asked, “what is the reason for France having a big military establishment?” Charles DeGaulle found such questions “disquieting for Europe and for France”. Even though the United States pursued Acheson’s vision during the cold war, there was always a part of American policy that reflected Roosevelt’s vision, too. Eisenhower undermining Britain and France at Suez was only the most blatant of many American efforts to cut Europe down to size and reduce its already-weakened global influence.

But the more important American contribution to Europe’s current world-apart status stemmed not from anti-European but from pro-European impulses. It was a commitment to Europe, not hostility to Europe, that led the United States in the immediate post-war years to keep troops on the continent and to create NATO. The presence of American forces as a security guarantee in Europe was, as it was intended to be, the critical ingredient to begin the process of European integration.

Europe’s evolution to its present state occurred under the mantle of the US security guarantee and could not have occurred without it. Not only did the United States for almost half a century supply a shield against such external threats as the Soviet Union and such internal threats as may have been posed by ethnic conflict in places like the Balkans. More important, the United States was the key to the solution of the German problem and perhaps still is. Germany’s Fischer, in the Humboldt University speech, noted two “historic decisions” that made the new Europe possible: “the USA’s decision to stay in Europe” and “France’s and Germany’s commitment to the principle of integration, beginning with economic links”. But of course the latter could never have occurred without the former. France’s willingness to risk the reintegration of Germany into Europe – and France was, to say the least, highly dubious – depended on the promise of continued American involvement in Europe as a guarantee against any resurgence of German militarism. Nor were post-war Germans unaware that their own future in Europe depended on the calming presence of the American military.

The United States, in short, solved the Kantian paradox for the Europeans. Kant had argued that the only solution to the immoral horrors of the Hobbesian world was the creation of a world government. But he also feared that the “state of universal peace” made possible by world government would be an even greater threat to human freedom than the Hobbesian international order, inasmuch as such a government, with its

monopoly of power, would become “the most horrible despotism”.¹¹ How nations could achieve perpetual peace without destroying human freedom was a problem Kant could not solve. But for Europe the problem was solved by the United States. By providing security from outside, the United States has rendered it unnecessary for Europe’s supranational government to provide it. Europeans did not need power to achieve peace and they do not need power to preserve it.

The current situation abounds in ironies. Europe’s rejection of power politics, its devaluing of military force as a tool of international relations, have depended on the presence of American military forces on European soil. Europe’s new Kantian order could flourish only under the umbrella of American power exercised according to the rules of the old Hobbesian order. American power made it possible for Europeans to believe that power was no longer important. And now, in the final irony, the fact that United States military power has solved the European problem, especially the “German problem”, allows Europeans today to believe that American military power, and the “strategic culture” that has created and sustained it, are outmoded and dangerous.

Most Europeans do not see the great paradox: that their passage into post-history has depended on the United States not making the same passage. Because Europe has neither the will nor the ability to guard its own paradise and keep it from being overrun, spiritually as well as physically, by a world that has yet to accept the rule of “moral consciousness”, it has become dependent on America’s willingness to use its military might to deter or defeat those around the world who still believe in power politics.

Some Europeans do understand the conundrum. Some Britons, not surprisingly, understand it best. Thus Robert Cooper writes of the need to address the hard truth that although “within the post-modern world, i.e., the Europe of today, there are no security threats in the traditional sense”, nevertheless, throughout the rest of the world – what Cooper calls the “modern and pre-modern zones” – threats abound. If the post-modern world does not protect itself, it can be destroyed. But how does Europe protect itself without discarding the very ideals and principles that undergird its pacific system?

“The challenge to the post-modern world”, Cooper argues, “is to get used to the idea of double standards”. Among themselves, Europeans may “operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security”. But when

¹¹ See Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrens Dorf, *Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace* (University Press of Kansas, 1999), pp. 200–201.

dealing with the world outside Europe, “we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary.” This is Cooper’s principle for safeguarding society: “Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle”.

Cooper’s argument is directed at Europe, and it is appropriately coupled with a call for Europeans to cease neglecting their defences, “both physical and psychological”. But what Cooper really describes is not Europe’s future but America’s present. For it is the United States that has had the difficult task of navigating between these two worlds, trying to abide by, defend, and further the laws of advanced civilised society while simultaneously employing military force against those who refuse to abide by those rules. The United States is already operating according to Cooper’s double standard, and for the very reasons he suggests. American leaders, too, believe that global security and a liberal order – as well as Europe’s “post-modern” paradise – cannot long survive unless the United States does use its power in the dangerous, Hobbesian world that still flourishes outside Europe.

What this means is that although the United States has played the critical role in bringing Europe into this Kantian paradise, and still plays a key role in making that paradise possible, it cannot enter this paradise itself. It mans the walls but cannot walk through the gate. The United States, with all its vast power, remains stuck in history, left to deal with the Saddams and the ayatollahs, the Kim Jong IIs and the Jiang Zemins, leaving the happy benefits to others.

An acceptable division?

Is this situation tolerable for the United States? In many ways, it is. Contrary to what many believe, the United States can shoulder the burden of maintaining global security without much help from Europe. The United States spends a little over 3% of its GDP on defence today. Were Americans to increase that to 4% – meaning a defence budget in excess of \$500 billion per year – it would still represent a smaller percentage of national wealth than Americans spent on defence throughout most of the past half-century. Even Paul Kennedy, who invented the term “imperial over-stretch” in the late 1980s (when the United States was spending around 7% of its GDP on defence), believes the United States can sustain its current military spending levels and its current global dominance far into the future. Can the United States handle the rest of the world without much help from Europe? The answer is that it already does. The United States has maintained strategic stability in Asia with no help from

Europe. In the Gulf War, European help was token; so it has been more recently in Afghanistan, where Europeans are once again “doing the dishes”; and so it would be in an invasion of Iraq to unseat Saddam. Europe has had little to offer the United States in strategic military terms since the end of the cold war – except, of course, that most valuable of strategic assets, a Europe at peace.

The United States can manage, therefore, at least in material terms. Nor can one argue that the American people are unwilling to shoulder this global burden, since they have done so for a decade already. After September 11, they seem willing to continue doing so for a long time to come. Americans apparently feel no resentment at not being able to enter a “post-modern” utopia. There is no evidence most Americans desire to. Partly because they are so powerful, they take pride in their nation’s military power and their nation’s special role in the world.

Americans have no experience that would lead them to embrace fully the ideals and principles that now animate Europe. Indeed, Americans derive their understanding of the world from a very different set of experiences. In the first half of the 20th century, Americans had a flirtation with a certain kind of internationalist idealism. Wilson’s “war to end all wars” was followed a decade later by an American Secretary of State putting his signature to a treaty outlawing war. FDR in the 1930s put his faith in non-aggression pacts and asked merely that Hitler promise not to attack a list of countries Roosevelt presented to him. But then came Munich and Pearl Harbor, and then, after a fleeting moment of renewed idealism, the plunge into the cold war. The “lesson of Munich” came to dominate American strategic thought, and although it was supplanted for a time by the “lesson of Vietnam”, today it remains the dominant paradigm. While a small segment of the American elite still yearns for “global governance” and eschews military force, Americans from Madeleine Albright to Donald Rumsfeld, from Brent Scowcroft to Anthony Lake, still remember Munich, figuratively if not literally. And for younger generations of Americans who do not remember Munich or Pearl Harbor, there is now September 11. After September 11, even many American globalisers demand blood.

Americans are idealists, but they have no experience of promoting ideals successfully without power. Certainly, they have no experience of successful supranational governance; little to make them place their faith in international law and international institutions, much as they might wish to; and even less to let them travel, with the Europeans, beyond power. Americans, as good children of the Enlightenment, still believe in the perfectibility of man, and they retain hope for the perfectibility of the

world. But they remain realists in the limited sense that they still believe in the necessity of power in a world that remains far from perfection. Such law as there may be to regulate international behaviour, they believe, exists because a power like the United States defends it by force of arms. In other words, just as Europeans claim, Americans can still sometimes see themselves in heroic terms – as Gary Cooper at high noon. They will defend the townspeople, whether the townspeople want them to or not.

The problem lies neither in American will or capability, then, but precisely in the inherent moral tension of the current international situation. As is so often the case in human affairs, the real question is one of intangibles – of fears, passions and beliefs. The problem is that the United States must sometimes play by the rules of a Hobbesian world, even though in doing so it violates European norms. It must refuse to abide by certain international conventions that may constrain its ability to fight effectively in Robert Cooper's jungle. It must support arms control, but not always for itself. It must live by a double standard. And it must sometimes act unilaterally, not out of a passion for unilateralism but, given a weak Europe that has moved beyond power, because the United States has no choice but to act unilaterally.

Few Europeans admit, as Cooper does implicitly, that such American behaviour may redound to the greater benefit of the civilised world, that American power, even employed under a double standard, may be the best means of advancing human progress – and perhaps the only means. Instead, many Europeans today have come to consider the United States itself to be the outlaw, a rogue colossus. Europeans have complained about President Bush's "unilateralism", but they are coming to the deeper realisation that the problem is not Bush or any American President. It is systemic. And it is incurable.

Given that the United States is unlikely to reduce its power and that Europe is unlikely to increase more than marginally its own power or the will to use what power it has, the future seems certain to be one of increased transatlantic tension. The danger – if it is a danger – is that the United States and Europe will become positively estranged. Europeans will become more shrill in their attacks on the United States. The United States will become less inclined to listen, or perhaps even to care. The day could come, if it has not already, when Americans will no more heed the pronouncements of the EU than they do the pronouncements of ASEAN or the Andean Pact.

To those of us who came of age in the Cold War, the strategic decoupling of Europe and the United States seems frightening. DeGaulle, when confronted by FDR's vision of a world where Europe was irrelevant, recoiled and suggested that this vision "risked endangering the Western world." If Western Europe was to be considered a "secondary matter" by the United States, would not FDR only "weaken the very cause he meant to serve – that of civilisation?" Western Europe, DeGaulle insisted, was "essential to the West. Nothing can replace the value, the power, the shining example of the ancient peoples". Typically, DeGaulle insisted this was "true of France above all". But leaving aside French *amour propre*, did not DeGaulle have a point? If Americans were to decide that Europe was no more than an irritating irrelevancy, would American society gradually become unmoored from what we now call the West? It is not a risk to be taken lightly, on either side of the Atlantic.

So what is to be done? The obvious answer is that Europe should follow the course that Cooper, Ash, Robertson and others recommend and build up its military capabilities, even if only marginally. There is not much ground for hope that this will happen. But, then, who knows? Maybe concern about America's overweening power really will create some energy in Europe. Perhaps the atavistic impulses that still swirl in the hearts of Germans, Britons and Frenchmen – the memory of power, international influence and national ambition – can still be played upon. Some Britons still remember empire; some Frenchmen still yearn for *la gloire*; some Germans still want their place in the sun. These urges are now mostly channelled into the grand European project, but they could find more traditional expression. Whether this is to be hoped for or feared is another question. It would be better still if Europeans could move beyond fear and anger at the rogue colossus and remember, again, the vital necessity of having a strong America – for the world and especially for Europe.

Americans can help. It is true that the Bush administration came into office with a chip on its shoulder. It was hostile to the new Europe – as to a lesser extent was the Clinton administration – seeing it not so much as an ally but as an albatross. Even after September 11, when the Europeans offered their very limited military capabilities in the fight in Afghanistan, the United States resisted, fearing that European cooperation was a ruse to tie America down. The Bush administration viewed NATO's historic decision to aid the United States under Article V less as a boon than as a booby trap. An opportunity to draw Europe into common battle out in the Hobbesian world, even in a minor role, was thereby unnecessarily lost.

Americans are powerful enough that they need not fear Europeans, even when bearing gifts. Rather than viewing the United States as a Gulliver tied down by Lilliputian threads, American leaders should realise that they are hardly constrained at all, that Europe is not really capable of constraining the United States. If the United States could move past the anxiety engendered by this inaccurate sense of constraint, it could begin to show more understanding for the sensibilities of others, a little generosity of spirit. It could pay its respects to multilateralism and the rule of law and try to build some international political capital for those moments when multilateralism is impossible and unilateral action unavoidable. It could, in short, take more care to show what the founders called a “decent respect for the opinion of mankind”.

These are small steps, and they will not address the deep problems that beset the transatlantic relationship today. But, after all, it is more than a cliché that the United States and Europe share a set of common Western beliefs. Their aspirations for humanity are much the same, even if their vast disparity of power has now put them in very different places. Perhaps it is not too naïvely optimistic to believe that a little common understanding could still go a long way.

IRAQ – IF OR WHEN?

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INTRODUCTION

FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG

Meeting on 9 September 2002, the European Strategy Forum addressed the prospective war with Iraq three days before President Bush's speech at the UN General Assembly. The topic was introduced by Ambassador Edward Djerejian, Andrei Zagorski and Marta Dassù.

All three paper givers, in their oral as well as in their written presentations, supported a referral of the issue to the UN Security Council: Edward Djerejian thus recommended a "*festina lente*" approach, while Andrei Zagorski noted that Russia had learned a lot from the Milosevic precedent and Marta Dassù remarked that the absence of a UNSC resolution would lead to a complete disruption of the legality of the use of force: Kosovo was an exception, two exceptions would be too much.

In the debate, much consideration was naturally given to the role of the UN Security Council. In this regard, three types of resolution could be considered in rising order of robustness:

- a resolution stating what Saddam needed to do, but without stating explicitly the consequences of non-compliance nor setting a deadline (a so-called "wimp resolution");
- a resolution with a deadline. Such an approach could be preceded by the "wimp resolution"; or
- an explicit resolution in terms of use of force and providing for coercive inspections.

It was generally noted that what counted for the Europeans, and possibly for Russia, was the very existence of a UNSC-sanctioned decision, and that they would go along with whatever was decided, even if it went beyond their preferences in terms of the use of force. Similarly, there was a widely shared view that the UNSC had to be involved: the absence of UNSC involvement would undermine the UN's credibility more surely than its engagement (although the point was made that the UNSC's authority could be damaged if a resolution were seen as authorising regime change). There appeared to be no dissent with the view that the despatching of inspection teams to Iraq should not be "made hostage" to the fear that Baghdad could take them as hostages to pre-empt US-led operations.

Generally, the view was expressed that a resolution should avoid escape clauses, with a view to ensuring a rapid outcome. Russia was particularly emphatic on this point: Moscow had no interest in seeing the matter drag into the next Russian presidential election. Indeed Russia's particular role was underscored: a strong containment policy backed by Russia would have a different meaning than one in which Moscow would be a weak link.

Turkey's place in the confrontation with Baghdad gave rise to a number of remarks that went beyond the traditional – and correct – observation that Ankara's position would be of great importance. Thus, it was noted that there would be considerable opposition in Turkey to a truly federal system in Iraq, which could exercise a centrifugal effect in South-Eastern Turkey.

Post-war issues were also raised. What would be the status of US (or coalition) forces in Iraq after the war? What were the prospects for democratisation in Iraq? A number of participants made the observation that neither of these questions could be considered in a short-term perspective. Indeed, post-war reconstruction would be a long-term endeavour, with Western forces in a "MacArthur mode" (albeit on a smaller scale) rather than delegating rapidly in an indirect rule "Sykes-Picot" mode. One participant styled the post-war force as a big ISAF, not confined to the capital. Europe's role would be substantial in any long-haul reconstruction effort.

In terms of a possible war, differing views were held, with one American participant putting the question of alternatives (ranging from deterrence to intrusive inspections). If war did occur, some considered that it could happen as soon as December, possibly after the end of Ramadan (7 December).

HOW TO DEAL WITH IRAQ: THE EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS

MARTA DASSÙ

There is no common European position on how to deal with Iraq. Confronted with the beginning of a rather intense US debate – from leaks over military planning to the US Senate hearings in August – the EU has produced only one declaration, confirming the European support for UNSC Resolutions 1284 and 1409,¹ followed by a statement of the Council (July 21) concerning embargo derogations already agreed by the UN.

A more articulated “common position” – more than urging Iraq to comply with UN resolutions – is simply not there. Why? We can offer three different explanations:

1. First, the *British factor* – or perhaps the *German* this time: i.e. European divisions make it impossible to achieve a common position. Strictly speaking, a common position (as a technical device of CFSP) is not there, simply because a common position (as the result of a common political standing) is absent.
2. Second, the *Kagan factor*, i.e. that mix of introversion, strategic weakness and no habit of thinking in global terms, which make it impossible for the EU to articulate an autonomous position on problems like Iraq – except to criticise how these issues are tackled by Washington.
3. Third, the *wait-and-see factor*, i.e. the tacit hope that the Europeans might stay aloof, at a safe distance, as long as the situation is not amenable to simple solutions. A sort of deliberate choice for inaction – leaving the US at the risk of overexposing itself.

My overall impression is that each of the three explanations contains a grain of truth, which means, in brief, that a common position does not exist today. It is also unlikely to emerge any time soon, however – except perhaps in a post-conflict scenario.

¹ See Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on Iraq, which “calls on Iraq to comply with the Resolutions without delay, in particular by agreeing to the return on inspectors to Iraq in accordance with Resolution 1284”, Brussels, 20 May 2002, 8884/02 (Press 143).

Since there is no “active” common stance, Europe is concentrating for the time being on a reactive position. Since Europe lacks a common view on how to deal with the Iraqi issue, what is left is only a more or less negative European perception of US intentions and tactics – which are still unclear at best.

In a realist but somewhat static view, we may argue that these basic features make any European role practically irrelevant. The individual European countries will find themselves, at some point, faced with a choice of “take it or leave it” with regard to a US decision. Unlike 1991 and the Afghan precedent, the temptation – almost a race – to “take” (that is, to offer some kind of direct participation and then claim some credit) will be less strong than the tendency to “leave” (that is, to stay out of the fight and keep a marginal role). But it is equally likely that most of the major European countries will eventually ratify an American action – once faced with an actual conflict.

Moreover, they will be directly affected by its consequences and thus will be unable to avoid a degree of involvement.

Allowing oneself a bit of wishful thinking, but with a more dynamic view, one can argue that it is precisely the divisions and uncertainties inside the US administration, and the recent emergence of a pretty heated debate, that could open up some space for a European role. As the doubts over the military rationale and economic costs of a conflict against Iraq mount in Washington, the existence of European reservations may even prove useful. What I will try to analyse in the second part of this paper is how and under which conditions. First, it is worthwhile to briefly illustrate the positions of individual European countries – since it is clear that any meaningful European role would imply a convergence between the major EU partners.

National Positions

Lack of a common European position does not mean that there are no national attitudes and policies, which are somewhat more articulate. A look to the four major countries – plus Turkey, given its particular relevance to the Iraqi affair – shows the importance of a common thread: a majority of public opinion against military action. However, each government is reacting in its own way to this reality.

Germany: Iraq as an electoral issue

In the midst of an electoral campaign which finds him in an uncomfortable position, Schroeder has decided to bring Iraq into the

election debate, moving away from the US stance (and provoking a firm US diplomatic reaction). In the speech launching the Social Democratic Party's electoral campaign in Hanover (August 5), the German Chancellor declared: "Pressure on Saddam Hussein: yes. But I can only warn against playing games with war and military intervention. That won't be done with us". At the party level, the SPD has stated that Germany would not take active part in a conflict against Iraq even in the presence of a Security Council mandate.² And, in a former speech (August 2), Schroeder already declared that: "Every form of division of labour which says the Germans won't participate but they will pay; this form of division of labour doesn't exist any more – at least not with me".

Very explicit statements indeed, with a national flavour (the "German way" to Iraq) but also clearly affected by the pre-election climate; in any case, they seem to indicate that, from the current government's standpoint, an Afghan scenario is unlikely to repeat itself in Iraq.³

In a context of widespread national anti-war feeling, Stoiber's foreign-policy spokesman, W. Schaeuble, criticised Schroeder for making Iraq a campaign issue, adding that "nobody says now that we will never take part in military action",⁴ since such a stand amounts to weakening deterrence vis-à-vis Iraq. On his part, E. Stoiber has openly termed "irresponsible" Schroeder's position on Iraq;⁵ on the whole, however, he has been taking a low-profile stance so far, by defining an Iraq intervention as just hypothetical and then reverting to France's "UN-first" position.⁶

My sense is that a victorious Stoiber would keep Germany in a marginal position with respect to the military conflict: no one in Washington, by the way, expects Germany to fight in Iraq anyway.⁷ It is equally probable, however, that he would attempt – just like all other new entries among the European executives – to show good credentials to Washington by justifying the eventual US decisions (whatever they might be), rather than

² *Financial Times*, 6 August 2002, p. 2.

³ *Financial Times*, 5 August 2002, p. 1.

⁴ *International Herald Tribune*, 6 August 2002, p. 1.

⁵ *Le Monde*, 27 août 2002, p. 1.

⁶ Stoiber was quoted in the *Financial Times*, 29 August 2002, as saying "The monopoly on decision-making and action on this question lies with the United Nations. Unilateral moves on this issue by a country, without consultation with, or a mandate from, the international community, are not compatible with this".

⁷ *International Herald Tribune*, 6 August 2002, p. 1.

play the national card which Schroeder is now gambling on as a last-minute electoral tactic to appeal to a large portion of German voters.

In fact, German officials say privately that Berlin will be side-by-side with Washington on Iraq, as long as the Bush administration convincingly makes its case and honestly seeks unconditional weapons inspections before going to war.

Political support without military participation: this will likely be, in the end, the German position.

France: The UN cover – or the Linus blanket?

Does France hold the same position? The two countries stated – in the joint declaration of the bilateral Schwerin summit of July 30th – that both consider it necessary to obtain a UNSC mandate before undertaking any military intervention against Iraq. And, in the concluding press conference, Jacques Chirac repeated that any attack against Iraq would have to be justified by a decision of the UNSC.⁸

It is likely – as shown by the cautious response France gave to the letter addressed (on August 1) by Naji Sabri to Kofi Annan – that Paris will maintain a UN-first line over the next few months, playing the card of Unmovic's return to Iraq, in agreement with Annan and perhaps with Moscow's cooperation. It is equally likely, however, that France will refrain from taking any high-profile stance, given the serious risk of losing all of its stakes. Having already burned its fingers at Rambouillet, France is probably unwilling to take any chances of overexposure this time around, especially by embarking on a path that might well turn out to lead nowhere in terms of visible political results.

Economic interests, moreover, are not as relevant as they were before: French officials emphasise that since 2001 – given its support to the smart sanctions programme and the reduced volume of oil for food revenues – France has been losing around 70% of former legal contracts with Iraq.

On regional priorities, France is clearly wary of US intentions. According to a French diplomat, while the Bush administration “is obsessed about Iraq...we are obsessed about achieving peace between Israeli and Palestinians”; “the important thing is to build a coalition for peace in the

⁸ *Bulletin Quotidien Europe*, No. 8267, 1 août 2002 and *Le Monde*, 8 août 2002, p. 2.

Middle East, not to build a coalition for war in Iraq”.⁹ Still, this point was absent from the French Foreign Minister’s most recent speech, signalling an apparent decision to mute criticism of the US.¹⁰

French officials insist, privately, that their country’s position does not oppose – unlike Schroeder’s electoral stance with respect to Germany – any French involvement in the use of force, but rather that the eventual use of force must be clearly legitimised. That implies, first, that the stated objective of an attack has to remain the disarmament of Iraq (according to UN Resolution 687) and not regime change; second, that military action is seen as an option of last resort – following other attempts to obtain renewed inspections. If that option fails, the UNSC would have to take a decision about an international military action to force respect of the cease-fire conditions. A fresh mandate, in strict legal terms, would not be necessary – even if that would clearly be France’s preferred option.¹¹

Going back to the initial question, France apparently sounds closer to Germany; but in fact perceives itself (at the government level, much more than among the public) as closer to Great Britain – especially given the gradual adjustment of the British position on the use of force against Iraq. This shows the weakness of the former Franco-German axis in European security issues, but also – given the current distance between Blair and Schroeder on the Iraqi issue – the weakness of an eventual “tripolar” leadership in CFSP which is not still there.

Great Britain: Less easy than expected

Tony Blair, too, has a less smooth policy issue on his desk than he seemed to have just a few months ago. First, there has been the rise of vocal domestic critics, supported by the Anglican Church (led by the next Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams), significant sectors of the Labour Party, and important and bipartisan dissidents in Parliament. Then he must consider the growing anti-American sentiment in public opinion, according to a May poll published in *The Economist*. A more recent poll by Channel Four, made available in mid-August, saw more than half of the population opposed to sending British troops to Iraq in case of a war initiated by the United States.

⁹ See Patrick E. Tyler, “Europeans Split with US on Need for Iraq Attack”, *New York Times*, 21 July 2002.

¹⁰ De Villepin’s speech opened the Conference of the French Ambassadors. See “France shifting stance on Iraq”, *International Herald Tribune*, 29 August 2002, p. 1.

¹¹ My interviews in Paris, end of August 2002.

Second, there is strong resistance in the Foreign Office and among British uniformed officials – which seem to go hand-in-hand with the reservations expressed by sectors of the Pentagon.

Third, Blair’s strategic design – his ability to serve as authoritative go-between for the US and Europe – requires a capacity to deliver in order to remain credible. For now, in the Iraqi case this capacity is still very much in doubt. In last April’s meeting with Bush, Blair apparently failed to persuade the American President to choose a posture that the Europeans collectively consider more acceptable: to envisage an armed intervention against Iraq only after the successful launch of a solution – or at least a significant reduction in intensity – of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And, clearly, Blair’s chosen role of “transatlantic ambassador” becomes much more challenging with the American lack of clarity on Iraq and the perceived widening of the Atlantic. It is doubtful, at present, whether Blair can in fact perform a function similar to what he did politically for the Afghan operation, i.e. make a convincing case for war and present it to the other Europeans.

For the time being, the British government has chosen, with Jack Straw, to indicate weapons inspectors as a means to reduce the threat by Iraq, leaving military action as a background option.¹²

In any event, the British “military” exception is bound to stay with us: the dispatch of the aircraft carrier *Royal Oak* to the Mediterranean, the recall of British forces from Afghanistan (which the Italian Defence Ministry stands ready to replace) and the possible call for reservists in September are all tangible signs of London’s intention to directly participate in military operations in Iraq (in the land invasion scenario, apparently enjoying less support today than some time ago, the participation of 25,000 British soldiers was envisaged). In any case, the domestic front signals that the Prime Minister’s room for manoeuvre is much more limited than was initially assumed. For the necessary exercise in consensus-building Blair needs time, plus hard evidence of the threat posed by WMD in Iraqi hands. For these reasons London tends to exercise a restraining pressure on Washington.

Italy: The pro-US stance under probe

Prime Minister – and currently interim Foreign Minister as well – Silvio Berlusconi has not taken a high-profile stance on Iraq yet. The centre-left opposition, instead, has spoken against a military operation without a new

¹² “Straw plays down Iraq war talk”, *BBC News*, 22 August 2002.

UNSC Resolution. Italy, however, feels no urgency to take a strong position, as it would not have a direct military role but rather would act in support (possibly by replacing some of the Anglo-American forces in Afghanistan, as anticipated by Defence Minister Martino: the decision, however, has not yet been discussed in the Parliament).

In case of war, the Italian government will thus not be able to rely on a bipartisan consensus – which was available for Kosovo and for Afghanistan. And it will be vulnerable to a widely critical public opinion, with an anti-war front comprising the pacifist movement (both on the left and among Catholics), despite the Vatican's less vocal condemnation of the war option than in 1991.

In practice, it is almost certain that, faced with a US decision to move ahead with military operations, Rome would opt for supporting Washington politically: the unpalatable alternative for Berlusconi is to weaken the long-sought special link and positive relationship he has built with President Bush over the past year. At the same time, the Italian government might conceivably try to capitalise on its perceived constructive relations with both the Arab countries and Moscow, launching some more or less realistic mediation effort. Some diplomatic sources say that Italy is currently engaged in a joint initiative between the Europeans and the Arab countries (the key counterparts being Egypt and Jordan) designed to exert a coordinated pressure on Saddam Hussein and persuade him to unconditionally accept the return of the weapons inspectors. However, the very same diplomatic sources admit they still have to secure the support of London and even Paris (neither of which is happy to grant Italy the role of chief mediator of their own Middle East policy).¹³

Turkey: The Western choice

Turkey, too, with a grave domestic political crisis on its hands, is trying to buy time. The Turkish Defence Chief of Staff, Kirvikoglu, has openly stated that his country is not capable of tackling a military emergency before 2003, in view of next November's electoral deadline.

As is well known, Turkey has its own distinctive concerns: above all, the feared creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq (since the federal option is not regarded as credible by Ankara), and the repercussions of a war on Turkey's already-battered economy. Having said this, Turkey has precious few realistic alternatives.

¹³ "Iniziativa italiana per una soluzione pacifica", *Il Corriere della Sera*, 8 August 2002, p. 11.

In case of conflict, it will have to support the US by at least granting use of the air bases and possibly by sending troops into northern Iraq precisely in order to avoid the risk of its neighbour's fragmentation. Reports from Ankara suggest that Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz's July visit achieved informal understandings of Turkish-US military cooperation in toppling Saddam Hussein.¹⁴

So far, Ankara has reaped benefits from the US response to September 11th. It has been assigned the command of ISAF in Afghanistan and is reasserting a degree of influence in the Turkish-speaking area of the Caucasus and Central Asia, thanks to Washington's cooperation. At the same time, Ankara's relations with Moscow have improved with regard to this vast region. The combination of these geopolitical interests (guarded by the Turkish military) and the economic interests of the country (linked to IMF loans), produces a situation where the pro-Western component of Turkey's elite (now opposing Ecevit) cannot be weakened beyond a certain extent.

In sum, however uncomfortable Turkey's predicament vis-à-vis an Iraqi conflict, Ankara will have no choice but to be involved.¹⁵

Good and Bad European Arguments

Our analysis of the national positions shows that the European countries have a major common problem: how to manage their own domestic consensus, in a situation in which most European people do not consider Iraq a direct, imminent threat. From this perspective, selling Iraq to the Europeans involves making the case for war, starting with convincing evidence about the WMD threat. A pretty solid argument of course would be provided by reliable intelligence information that al-Qaeda has been testing and possibly building crude chemical weapons with active help from the Baghdad regime or even in Iraq proper. Unconfirmed hints that something along these lines may actually be occurring in Iraqi Kurdistan is indeed a difficult piece of news to handle, since that portion of Iraq is actually out of Saddam Hussein's control.

¹⁴ *International Herald Tribune*, 9 August 2002, p. 5 ("Talking of attacking Iraq is already paying dividends").

¹⁵ According to Ozdem Sanberk, former diplomat and now director of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, "Our policy is a little bit like Britain's. We do not want the operation to be carried out but, if it is, we have no choice but to be involved", quoted in Quentin Peel, "Indifference in Washington", *Financial Times*, 5 August 2002.

Threat assessment

Looking at threat perceptions it is probably true that one of the major weaknesses of any position the Europeans take in discussing Iraq with Washington is that there is no apparent serious thinking – except in Britain – about the WMD threat. On the other hand, uncertainties abound in assessing Iraqi capabilities. US sources – based on satellite and aerial imagery – believe Baghdad is secretly storing a significant quantity of chemical warfare agents – a conclusion shared by independent analysis.¹⁶ The same is true for biological weapon capability: since UNSCOM reported in 1998 that Iraq had failed to provide a full account of its biological weapons programme, the widespread assessment is that – in the absence of inspections – Iraq retains stockpiles of biological agents. British sources recently estimated that Iraq could rebuild its biological warfare programme within months. French intelligence, according to unconfirmed sources, goes in the same direction. Still – as emerged in the hearings held before the US Senate last month – no unequivocal evidence of the resumption of Iraq’s proscribed programmes has yet been collected.

As for nuclear capability, US intelligence agencies do not believe that Iraq has a nuclear weapon or is near to acquiring one. Moreover, according to independent analysts, nobody knows when Iraq might have the means to deliver chemical or biological weapons.¹⁷ Since 1998, according to the US, Iraq has kept some 20 Scud-type ballistic missiles despite UNSCOM accounting: these systems, however, are likely to be poorly maintained.¹⁸

In the end, there is no evidence that Iraq has a nuclear weapon, or will soon have one; but it almost certainly has chemical and biological agents that would complicate any military actions. It is not clear, however, whether and how these capabilities are increasing in the absence of UN inspections, and when Iraq will have the means to deliver those biological or chemical agents. Threat assessment remains a difficult exercise, in a situation in which “we do not know what we do not know; and this is

¹⁶ *Iraq’s WMD Arsenal: Deadly but Limited*, Carnegie Endowment, Issue Brief, No. 11, 28 August 2002.

¹⁷ See the testimony submitted to the US Senate by Jon Woflsthall, <http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/article.asp?NewsID=3378>.

¹⁸ The agencies conclude that for the next several years at least Iraq will not advance beyond MRBM systems and is unlikely to test any ICBMs before 2015. See *Iraq’s WMD Arsenal*, op. cit.

why – whatever the truth is – inspectors have to go back in”.¹⁹ In addition, it can be argued that weapons inspectors were able to destroy more facilities, missiles and weapons after the Gulf War than during actual military operations – an argument for an approach to pre-emption that should focus on intrusive inspections and more containment, rather than a new military campaign.

In short: threat assessment divides the two sides of the Atlantic. Europeans have a point in underlining the lack of convincing evidence about not only the links between Saddam and al-Qaeda; but also about current Iraqi capabilities. But their unwillingness to seriously consider even the potential, longer-term Iraqi threat as a priority weakens their bargaining position vis-à-vis Washington.²⁰

Regime change: Can it be the stated goal?

Since Iraq is not perceived as an imminent threat, the Europeans clearly wish to buy time; they all (including Great Britain) would prefer to give a last chance to the return of the inspectors. If that involves a credible “unconditional” basis, such an opportunity – for the Europeans – would be worth grabbing.

This scenario – if ever implemented – would show the existence of one basic difference between the US and the Europeans: for the US, regime change has been declared as an end in itself; for the Europeans, containment – when successful – would be enough.

In other terms: Europeans (including Great Britain, again) see the only legitimate goal of external policies vis-à-vis Iraq as curbing the Iraqi threat – not toppling Saddam.

A change of government in Iraq would be welcomed, as a consequence of the use of force; but it cannot be the stated aim of an action whose legitimate goal has to remain curbing the WMD threat and forcing respect of UN resolutions.

With the inspectors back on an unconditional basis, Europeans would clearly find it even more difficult to endorse the scenario of a violent removal of Saddam Hussein.

¹⁹ Fouad El Khatib, “Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction”, unpublished manuscript, IISS, London.

²⁰ According to a French official, the reason why the Europeans are less sensitive to WMD threat also depends on bureaucratic reasons: understaffing (on proliferations issues) in Foreign and Defence Ministries and lack of intelligence are the rule – more than the exception.

That very difference shows not only transatlantic differences over the legal boundaries of “external intervention” for regime change purposes, but also different perceptions about how to stabilise the Greater Middle East.

A different set of priorities in the Middle East

European reservations contain, from this region-wide angle, good arguments: legitimate, again, but quite shaky as well. The first has to do with the Israeli-Palestinian issue: confronting Iraq is not the immediate priority – so runs the argument from the European capitals – because we first need to “solve” the Palestinian issue. This means at least restarting a meaningful peace process. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in the European perception, is and has to remain the highest priority. Opening a new war front now would deepen the regional crisis, dragging in, this time, Israel. It would fracture the anti-terrorism coalition and make life harder for moderate Arab states. For Javier Solana, it will be “very, very difficult” to sustain allied support for an assault against Iraq unless progress is first made towards creating a Palestinian state. It will be very difficult, for instance, having the Palestinian elections during a build-up for war in Iraq.²¹ Timing, for the Europeans, is thus narrow enough (on the Israeli-Palestinian front) to suggest a delay of plans for Iraq, but frankly, no one has indicated (or can realistically indicate) at what stage a “peace process” would be sufficiently established and self-sustaining to enable the West to tackle Iraq. The US knows this, and the European argument is viewed as little more than a way to slow down the course of events.

The US, moreover, seems to think that toppling Saddam Hussein first can produce positive (and not negative, as the Europeans think) regional consequences. A new US attitude could emerge over the next few months, in which a grand “vision” for the greater Middle East is set forth. Such a vision (sketched out in an embryonic form by Robert Kagan in a July piece in the *IHT* and later “dramatised” by the RAND briefing on the future of Saudi Arabia) could include the attempt to eliminate the Saddam regime in Iraq, but also a major push to set up a closely monitored new regime and actually make it the centrepiece of an ambitious US strategy to democratise the Middle East. Now, it is by no means certain that this high-profile policy will prevail over more traditional and modest alternatives; however, the current state of US-Saudi relations, and the vastly incomplete Iranian transition to a full reintegration in the

²¹ See the interview reported by Patrick E. Tyler in the *New York Times*, 21 July 2002.

international community, make such thinking more attractive than in the past. The pillars of stability in the region are not solid (Turkey is also less stable in some respects than in recent years, as it gets closer to potential EU candidacy; and Israel is clearly losing a series of public relations battles without gaining in terms of security). Thus, a proactive and high-risk approach becomes less unthinkable from a US perspective.

All this would have the value of providing the Bush administration with a much broader purpose in attacking Saddam: seizing a regional opportunity rather than just getting rid of a kind of personal enemy and settling old scores.

The Europeans, however, are highly sceptical about a grand plan to democratise the Middle East. More specifically, they do not share the confident view that a US intervention in Iraq will not only finish off Saddam Hussein but also unlock the Israeli-Palestinian question and usher in a new era of democracy and reform in the greater Middle East.²² The order of priorities – as seen above – is rather believed to be the reverse. Still, the European approach sounds more like a status-quo attitude than an alternative view on how the region could be stabilised: the old remnants of the Barcelona Process, combined with some new collective steps (such as the trade agreement with Iran), indicate the usual preference for engagement – but without enough money and without a clear strategic design. European oil lobbies – traditionally searching for business in the holes left by the big failures of the “double containment” – also apparently favour the status quo – more than a geopolitical shift able to promise a new, and more difficult competition between oil actors.

Listing a different set of priorities in the region and in the greater Middle East, European officials finally add that it would be crucial, before opening a new war front, to achieve some stability in Afghanistan, where the security of the interim Karzai government is not to be taken for granted, due to given the external reluctance to deploy enough troops, an issue looming large, and largely amplified, in a post-conflict Iraq.

The future of Iraq

Another legitimate European argument has to do with the consequences of a war on the future of Iraq itself, both from a military and a political viewpoint. It is true that on this side of the Atlantic we tend to exaggerate the consequences of a military operation; but in this case the unknowns are indeed very significant – from possible use of chemical/biological

²² Steven Everts, “Some strategies work better than force”, *International Herald Tribune*, 1 August 2002.

weapons by Saddam to a retaliation against Israel (which will likely react this time) to a fragmentation of the country.

To be brief: the European perception is that a second Gulf War on Iraq would be a wholly new chapter. Thus, the scenario of a massive land invasion from both north and south (requiring 250,000 troops) is viewed as too dangerous and costly in terms of human losses as well as regional repercussions: this is, incidentally, the only option that would imply a relevant active role for British forces and possibly the deployment of European mine-hunters and minesweepers, as in 1991.

An alternative scenario of massive and extended air strikes without support from land forces is not believed to be effective, given the fragility of any internal opposition to Saddam, and will pose daunting problems in managing domestic consensus both in the West and in the Arab world. In this case, European support would be *de facto* irrelevant, also due to the Pentagon's resistance to sharing command of the operations.

An "in-out" scenario to decapitate the Iraqi regime provoking a coup by elements of the regime itself, would theoretically be preferable but would present many uncertainties (past attempts to encourage internal revolts have failed abysmally) and considered illusory by most European observers and analysts. In any case, under this option British special forces would support US special forces with the infiltration tasks.

The European perception is that, in any of the hypotheses under discussion, an Iraqi intervention will not be another Desert Storm, another Kosovo or another Afghanistan. And unless a new grand coalition of the 1991 type is put together, something that is currently not in the cards, the European supporting role would be marginal – with the exception of British forces and the logistical cooperation of Turkey.

From the very beginning of the Iraqi debate, moreover, the Europeans have been asking questions not only about the risks of a military action – in which, as seen above, Europe's military irrelevance makes its doubts irrelevant too. But also on the post-war scenarios – and here, on the contrary, Europe's role in any re-building effort makes its questions legitimate ones.

From this point of view, it is likely that the Europeans will tend to support the more "realist" view of a post-war Iraq as envisaged by the State Department (a new authoritarian post-Saddam leadership) rather than the grander visions apparently sponsored by the US Defence Department (a democratic government, to serve as an example for the rest of the region) and supported by some of the Iraqi opposition

organisations.²³ As argued above and already shown by the European reactions (including British) to the regime change theory in Palestine, the Europeans are not particularly confident about the idea that forcing western-style democracies in the region is an easy exercise. With specific regard to Iraq, the dominant view is that the historic hostility between Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites would lead to bitter infighting over power-sharing and oil resources.

Rather than working with the fragmented opposition groups – with whom only London has sufficiently close links – the other Europeans will tend to look for any chances of an internal change of the guard in the Iraqi regime. This is also consistent with the overriding logic of keeping the country united, since a disintegration would destabilise its neighbours too.

This fundamental concern – which is also a Turkish priority – requires an arrangement between the Shiites in the south (led by Ayatollah Hakim) and the Kurds in the north regarding the political future of Iraq. To this end, Iranian support also becomes necessary, although this might be less difficult to get than one might think. Both Russia and Europe itself would welcome and facilitate a deeper Iranian involvement.²⁴

In broader terms, Europe and Russia (plus some of the Arab states) could find common ground with respect to Middle East priorities and particularly on how to deal with Iraq. But it is quite evident that neither Europe nor Russia will value their mutual relations more than their ties to the US. In addition, on the European side there is a fear that, as with NMD, an American-Russian deal may have already been struck (whereby the Russians would get the economic compensation they ask for) – even if Russia's domestic management of the Iraqi dossier seems complex enough to defy easy predictions.

The Arabs are divided over this issue. King Abdallah has clearly stated that attacking Iraq before having solved the Palestinian issue is far too dangerous. But according to some, in the end he might be ready to provide a strategically important logistical rearguard which could facilitate operations designed to take control of Western Iraq – a crucial task if the chance of Iraqi missiles hitting Israel is to be reduced. Regime

²³ “Special Report: America and Iraq”, *The Economist*, 3-9 August 2002, pp. 20-22.

²⁴ According to Richard Perle, Iran would eventually come down on the US side. See the interview he gave to *Politique Internationale*, No. 95|2002. See also the results of discussions by the Iraqi opposition in Tehran in early August, as reported by Jim Hoagland, *International Herald Tribune*, 9 August 2002, p. 5.

change might actually be in Jordan's interest after all, although the hypothesis of a return of the Hashemite monarchy in Baghdad appears unrealistic.

Saudi Arabia and Syria certainly prefer a weak Iraq under Saddam Hussein to a new regime that might become a regional competitor in alliance with the US. Egypt, too, is fearful of such a prospect. And most of them are anxious not to lose the advantages derived each year from illegal trade – which has abundantly voided the smart sanctions programme.

Ultimately, it can be ruled out that Europe, Russia and the Arab states will join forces (which would *de facto* end up being a coalition designed to contain the US itself, not Iraq). This is certainly a good thing, given the devastating effects it would have on transatlantic relations.

A new UNSC mandate?

Good or legitimate arguments are combined, in the European positions, with “formalistic” arguments. I would include in this category the position whereby a military action will in any case require fresh legitimacy emanating directly from the UNSC.

It goes without saying that a renewed UNSC approval would be highly preferable in terms of international legitimacy and support²⁵ – also because it is legally disputable whether a military operation has already been legitimised by the repeated violation of existing cease-fire resolutions. The US Administration,²⁶ the British Government and some French officials think so: but the debate will unavoidably go on.

My view is that this very issue – whether or not to go for a new UNSC mandate – cannot be put on the table as a sort of precursor to collective action. It must, instead, be left to the final end of a more complex strategy. In order to take a credible UN-first line, the Europeans would

²⁵ For the reasons explained, among other, by Richard C. Holbooke, “Bush should seek Security Council approval”, *International Herald Tribune*, 28 August 2002, p. 7. For a legal view against a military operation without a new UNSC mandate (and without new Congressional approval: what the author defines as the “double unilateralism”), see Bruce Ackerman, “But what’s the legal case for preemption?”, *Washington Post*, 18 August 2002.

²⁶ According to Mr. Cheney, it would be a useless, if not a dangerous delay to seek a new UN resolution. According to the White House, moreover, the President does not need Congressional approval, even if he would “consult” with Congress about Iraq. See “Cheney Says Peril of a Nuclear Iraq Justifies an Attack”, *New York Times*, 27 August 2002.

have to follow, in fact, a much more concrete and more explicit path, taking two coherent steps together.

First: Exercise *serious*, intense and sustained pressure on Saddam Hussein, giving him one last chance to re-admit the arms inspectors forced out in 1998. According to an Italian diplomat, the Europeans have so far attempted only half-hearted pressure and, in some cases, rather ambiguous policies, affected by the economic stakes promoted by various lobbies, which have never given up links with Iraq, and weakened by the lack of a real threat perception. In other words, at least some of the European countries have not pursued even the containment option in a serious manner.

Second: State explicitly that either Saddam accept the kind of intrusive and unconditional inspection regime requested, or other means to enforce the UN Resolution on Iraqi disarmament – including military action – will become unavoidable. As rightly noted by Christoph Bertram, European governments must not only demand unconditional inspections, they must also lobby within the UN – whatever the practical results – for using international force should Saddam Hussein fail to bend to other pressures. This is not the case where opposition from Russia would be unavoidable (Moscow, as said before, is not going to risk the relationship with the West for the sake of Saddam Hussein), nor China's abstention impossible.

Europe could for instance suggest that the Quartet on the Middle East (consisting of the EU, Russia, the US and the UN) hold meetings also on Iraq, devising the broad lines of an agreed international strategy on how to deal, at this point, with Saddam. The existence of a joint-position – on forcing the inspectors back and acting in the case it fails – would clearly reinforce the international hand with Saddam. The Quartet format would underline the connections between one crisis and the other in the Greater Middle East.

An extremely slippery slope would have to be walked, probably by indicating a deadline beyond which such use of force would be considered. Otherwise, an endless debate would ensue on when “enough is enough”.

Only the credibility of the latter position makes the former credible. Without the latter – missing so far, except in the British stance – the European reference to complying with UN resolutions becomes purely formalistic. More importantly, this undermines the good arguments against the wisdom of the current US approach.

Summing up. My opinion is that the Europeans are advancing meaningful arguments, but their failure to take seriously the problem of what to do in case of a continuing stalemate renders them shallow.

In a sense, if it is true that whatever concession Saddam will make is not going to satisfy the US to give up on regime change (as Javier Solana has put it, “if Saddam thinks that this option is inexorable, why would he yield to inspectors?”²⁷), it is also true that whatever violation Saddam will continue to pursue, it seems insufficient for the Europeans to contemplate a reaction.²⁸ A two-step position, as sketched out above, is needed: giving, in a sense, British (explicit) and French (less explicit and probably more ambiguous) attitudes a wider European backing.

The “Europe Speak-Up” Scenario

The assumption behind such a Europe “speak-up scenario” – considered to be positive by some American analysts²⁹ – is that only when the US and Europe are united behind the demand for effective inspections, including the threat of the use of force, do they stand a chance to get their way.

Just as the Europeans – sharing a credible threat – would enforce the deterrence side of the equation, so would the Americans – giving up on regime change as an end in itself, independently of inspections – increase the chances of succeeding in pressuring Saddam.

A re-balancing and re-calibrating is needed on both sides. It is one thing to punish Iraqi violations of UN resolutions, it is a totally different one to strike at a cooperative Iraq. On this crucial point, as seen above, Britain too has distanced itself from the Bush administration, affirming that the objective has to remain ending the threat of WMD, and not regime change per se – however desirable it may be.³⁰

It is true that the chances of Iraq becoming cooperative under Saddam are slim. If past behaviour is any guide, the cautious openings that the regime is currently making towards the UN are likely to be tactical manoeuvres to gain time and divide the Security Council as well as the West.

²⁷ See again Patrick E. Tyler, *op. cit.*

²⁸ See Roberto Toscano, “CFSP and Transatlantic Relations”, in forthcoming issue of *Aspenia*.

²⁹ Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, “Speak Up, Europe”, *Financial Times*, 9 August 2002.

³⁰ See the interview of a British official in Tyler's article, *op. cit.*

The letter sent by Naji Sabri to Kofi Annan on August 1st – containing the invitation to Hans Blix for discussions in Baghdad on Unmovic’s missions, after the third round of talks with the UN broke down in Vienna in early July – has generated, not accidentally, different reactions: intransigence in Washington, scepticism in London, satisfaction in Moscow (where this is seen as a result of a mission of Russian deputy Foreign Minister, Alexandr Saltanov’s mission to Iraq) and an interested wait-and-see attitude in Paris and Rome.³¹ In any case, Kofi Annan’s spokesman said that the procedure proposed by Baghdad “is at variance with the one laid down by the SC in its resolution 1284”, a position later adopted by the Security Council as a whole.³²

Many observers believe that Washington will impose conditions for unfettered inspections that are so strict as to be unacceptable to Saddam. This could open the way for differing interpretations in the US, Europe and Russia on what “unconditional inspection” means.

It is crucial that this outcome be avoided – conferring enough credit to Blix’s personal assessment. Only a joint international position – as said before – will be capable of forcing Saddam to accept the UNSC conditions.

In the end, however, there may be no alternative to using force where international law, diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions and military threats have been to no avail.

If it comes to that, as seen before, the Europeans will have no choice other than to support it – even by playing a marginal military role.

Therefore, it is in Europe’s interest that such a military operation, if it has to occur, be understood as the inevitable result of a collective political strategy pursued to the very end and in an honest manner; not as the unilateral choice of the superpower that cannot be refused. In this scenario – as hinted above – a fresh UNSC mandate would be preferable in my view; but it will not prove to be indispensable.

³¹ Evelyn Leopold, “UN skeptical on new Iraqi offer of Arms Talks”, Reuters, 2 August 2002.

³² According to Hans Blix, the Iraqi thesis (that there are unresolved issues and how these issue are tackled should be agreed upon with Unmovic before the resumption of inspections) is not acceptable, “for the very good reason that before [such an understanding] we need to see what changes have occurred on the ground in Iraq since the end of 1998” – according to the Resolution creating his inspection team.

Supporting the use of force against Saddam will not be easy for European leaders who share with their voters – as seen before – a deep scepticism towards the use of force for political ends.

Yet, this two-fold strategy is clearly in Europe's best interests at least for two reasons: first, because it puts any eventual use of force within an international framework – however uncertain its configuration may be; and, second, because it allows European governments to shape the issue in their respective domestic context, instead of appearing hypnotised by what the US might or might not do.

Implications for US-European Relations

Showing that they take the threat posed by WMD in Iraq seriously, Europeans could also reasonably claim a right to discuss preventively the costs and implications of forceful action against Iraq. Such consequences and costs will obviously affect different European interests, from the strategic balance in the Middle East to economic repercussions of an armed clash. From this latter perspective, Europeans will likely argue for an "economy-first" approach to security, cautioning against the economic implications of a conflict (surge in oil prices, inflationary pressures) in rather fragile economic times.

We cannot in fact entirely dismiss a scenario in which President Bush simply postpones the military stage through the winter, while pressing for UN inspections and getting something also thanks to Russian and European mediation. If we reach the spring of 2003 with no massive military offensive ready to start, a focus on the economy might prevail in Washington too, in order to ensure that Bush comes out as a good domestic President while the 2004 Presidential campaign enters its active phase. This delay option, justified with economy-first reasons, would certainly be supported by the Europeans – as mentioned above. Indeed, European reserves could in the end offer President Bush a hand in devising a face-saving line (from overexposure on Iraq).

Again in terms of economic costs, post-conflict management would in any case require a strong European contribution both in financial terms and in terms of providing troops for peacekeeping tasks: according to some forecasts, an international force able to guarantee a post-Saddam stability would need at least 75,000 troops. This would be needed at a time when the Europeans are showing clear signs of dissatisfaction (see Schröder's statements mentioned above) with a division of labour where their role is confined to that of the transatlantic "cleaning lady" – an expensive role in the long run.

Even recognising that the US is now willing and able to conduct large-scale operations on its own and that Europe is becoming superfluous in this context, the implications of an Iraqi military conflict will be measured by a significant level of tension across the Atlantic should substantive preventive consultations be lacking on conflict and post-conflict scenarios.

A situation of “polite mutiny” on the part of European allies, as suggested by Pfaff, would also be very grave for future relations: it would amount, in practice, to a “no” to a US attack on Iraq regardless of circumstances.³³ This scenario, however, is most improbable: as we have seen, politically, the major partners (possibly including a post-electoral Germany) will end up supporting an American action in some way, though not necessarily taking part in it. NATO’s European facilities, moreover, are useful but not indispensable: which European country is ready to risk the US’ political wrath by moving first, when in practice a large-scale military offensive would still be conducted, thanks (worst of all) to the last-minute concession by some other European country, coupled with availability from Turkey and a few Arab countries?

Barring a speak-up (i.e. positive) scenario or a polite mutiny (negative), Europe would in the end remain taking a purely reactive posture, subordinated to American choices that are still in the making. At that point, only the level of public relations and communications efforts, along with the form and duration of the military phase, would determine the higher or lower level of tension in domestic opinion across the continent. Most of the governments will likely fall into line.

In conclusion, while America debates the how and when of going to war with Iraq, Europe has to go back to reality. In all the possible scenarios, Europe will in any case be involved: to stay on the sidelines will only be a temporary illusion. It is wiser, then, to try something else first – make a credible renewed international attempt to force Baghdad to accept intrusive inspections. If that fails, regime change may become a Western – more than an American – security choice.

³³ William Pfaff, “Nato’s Europeans could say no”, *International Herald Tribune*, 25 July 2002, p. 6.

AN INVASION OF IRAQ? REFLECTIONS ON A POSSIBLE ACTION BY RUSSIA

ANDREI ZAGORSKI

I. Preliminary Remarks

This paper discusses eventual action that can be taken by Moscow provided that the military invasion of Iraq has started. Although it does not address the issue of what Russia could undertake before the invasion, the second part of the memo does discuss scenarios preceding the actual beginning of the war for a simple reason that any Russian action, feasible or desired, largely depends on the way the war begins.

II. Russia's Interests

Moscow certainly does not belong to the champions of the idea to kick out Saddam Hussein by a military action of either the US and Britain, or of a larger coalition. It is important to note, however that, most recently, Russia has demonstrated much greater restraint in public criticism of the US plans to strike against Iraq than many of the traditional US allies. All in all, though not being enthusiastic about US intentions, Moscow seems prepared for an easy, if not a cooperative response.

The overwhelming interest of Russia is to sustain the momentum of the recent developments in US-Russian relations since the beginning of the war on terror. It is against the Russian interest to endanger further improvement of cooperation with the US. Moreover, even though Moscow is not supportive of the eventual strike against Iraq, a benevolent reaction to it could significantly boost Russian-American cooperation.

Indeed, eventually, Russia can extract political benefits from a benevolent reaction to US strikes in the same way as it did from its boldly cooperative participation in the war on terror.

There isn't any (politically) strong economic pro-Iraqi lobby in Moscow although several sectors of the Russian economy have interests in the country. The usual economic argument in favour of closer cooperation with Iraq is the multi-billion dollar debt of the latter accumulated over the Soviet years in the course of intensive arms sales to Iraq. Since then, however, the military cooperation has been curbed, and, under current

circumstances, the Russian military industrial complex no longer perceives the Iraqi regime as an important client.

Russian companies have been actively engaged in the implementation of the oil-for-food programme and, indeed, have been successful in processing up to one-third of Iraq's allowed oil exports over the last years. Russian companies are also active in reconstruction, or in construction of power plants in Iraq. However, this programme is largely funded by the Russian governmental credits (Iraq is the 6th biggest recipient of the credits provided by the Russian government).

In fact, there isn't any powerful pro-Iraqi political-economic lobby in Moscow that could be compared to the pro-Iranian one. And an eventual normalisation of the situation around Iraq could even open new business opportunities in the country.

Moscow seems to have made the choice between the Iranian and the Iraqi cases in favour of the former several months ago while recognising that it can (and should) not sustain two major issues of controversy overshadowing its relations with the US.

An invasion of Iraq of any sort certainly will strengthen anti-American sentiment in the Russian political class and, probably, for another short period, in Russian public opinion. In the absence of any real political opposition to Putin, however, this is going to pose only a limited problem to the Russian leader.

Still, though any controversy over Iraq is unlikely to affect the outcome of the presidential election in Russia in 2004, the closer to the election the invasion starts and/or lasts, the more restricted will be the Russian leadership's response and the more rhetoric it can apply to appease public opinion and neutralise the opponents.

For this purpose, however, Moscow can fully enjoy its privilege of not being a formal ally of the US and thus not being pushed into the need to formally approve or disapprove of US action. The only exception – and the significant one – is going to be any vote that takes place in the UN Security Council.

The single most important dilemma posed to Russia by an eventual invasion of Iraq is the legitimisation of such an action by the UN Security Council.

There is a very strong feeling in Moscow, especially after the Kosovo war, that any military intervention in a third country must receive the formal approval of the UNSC. This has been Moscow's major

preoccupation since 1999, when it saw the danger of undermining the UN and the relevance of Russia's status of a permanent UNSC member.

This explains the strong desire on the Russian side that any US action against Iraq must go through the Security Council.

On the other hand, it is exactly this demand that puts Moscow into a very unpleasant situation of being forced to either support (by voting for or abstaining) or veto US intervention.

The way this dilemma is solved will largely determine the official reaction in Moscow to the strikes.

Russian Middle East experts emphasise the domestic complications of any attempt to remove Hussein, and the wider collateral damage in the region. The demise of Hussein's regime may result in the destabilisation of the country with regional consequences not just in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict but with regard to other countries (the problem of the Kurds, for instance, which may have a destabilising effect on both Turkey and Iran).

Those problems, however, do not appear to be of immediate concern to the Russian leadership. They imply little direct impact on Russia, and remain remote secondary issues. They are rather seen as US business and none (or almost none) of Russia's.

Furthermore, Russia could indirectly benefit from mid-term destabilisation in the region generated by the US invasion. Those problems may keep Turkey busy – a country which, rightly or wrongly, is perceived as a country of concern in Moscow. They also could divert much of the international community's attention from controversial issues of Russian politics (Chechnya), or from the regions where Russian policy is perceived in the West as ambivalent (i.e. Georgia).

Therefore, the eventual "collateral damage" is rather an argument to caution the US than an expression of direct concern of Russia.

While considering its response to the invasion, Moscow certainly will have to consider not only the eventual impact of its action on US-Russian relations but also its impact on the current US administration.

Moscow would like to see a strong president in the US, but Putin apparently has learned to go along with Bush. Since there is no really strong alternative candidate in sight (though this may be a premature judgement at this stage), the preference of Moscow should be the re-election of Bush in 2004.

Therefore, Moscow's interest would be that any US invasion of Iraq, once it happens, is as short and as successful as possible, and that it does not turn into a disaster for Bush.

The bottom line:

- Should the US decide to invade Iraq, there is no strong reason for Moscow to take any action against it. The demonstration of reasonable cooperativeness could help to further improve relations with the US.
- The strike should be legitimised by a UNSC resolution rather than be a unilateral action. It should take place sooner rather than later and be as short and as successful as possible.

III. Short of War Problem

The major preoccupation of Russia is whether or not the US is going to seek UNSC legitimisation for its eventual strike against Iraq or not.

The benefits of a cooperative approach to the US action should overrule the hesitation of the Russian side to appear as a proponent of the strikes by endorsing the resolution effectively empowering the US to go ahead.

Therefore, Russian diplomacy should seek an early resolution by the UNSC which would imply the option of use of force against Iraq and would avoid laying out precise criteria for doing so. Since any other reason may not be perceived as a legitimate rationale for the use of force, this option shall be linked to the sanctions against Iraq to be applied in case of the latter's refusal to readmit UN weapons inspectors unconditionally.

Turning to the language of the resolution, Moscow would acquiesce to whatever language would be acceptable to France (and Germany). It would have to play a key role, however, in convincing the Chinese to at least abstain from voting on the resolution.

The adoption of a UNSC resolution authorising the use of force option is the key to any Russian action after the invasion begins. Should there be no such a resolution, the options available for Russia's action are going to be very limited.

IV. What role for Russia?

Any discussion of Russia's action after the war begins should be based on a realistic assessment of any eventual role the country would play in the further developments.

1. Moscow can and shall not prevent the US decision to go to war with Iraq. Nor can it stop the invasion once it has started. Any action against the invasion (political and especially military) would be neither successful nor helpful in the context of US-Russian relations. This implies that *the role of an active opponent of the invasion is not a good option* for Russia.

2. *The role of an advocate of the Iraqi regime*, based on existing contacts with the leaders of the country at different levels, is also not available to Moscow. Russia does not have the leverage to influence the US policy and to force it into a compromise with Hussein. Nor would such role be in the interest of Moscow.

3. Any attempt to take over *the role of an advocate of the West* vis-à-vis Iraqi leadership is also highly unlikely to be successful. Russia does not have sufficient leverage with Iraq, nor can it force the US to compromise on the objectives of the invasion. It could have some role, however, if the US wanted to make a deal with any groups within the current regime to replace Hussein. Here Russian contacts may prove helpful.

4. Russia can hardly be expected to be an *active participant of the anti-Hussein coalition*.

5. The most reasonable role for Russia would be, therefore, that of *a critical "positively neutral" party* which would not exclude tacit cooperation with the US.

This 5th option would also imply that cooperation with the US on the Iraqi problem would mainly go through bilateral channels while the multilateral track should be concentrated in the UNSC.

In order to avoid giving the impression of being part of the anti-Iraqi coalition, Moscow should prevent the issue being placed on the agenda of the Russia-NATO Council of 20.

V. What action by Russia?

The response of Moscow to the invasion, in any case, will consist of a mix of criticism of war as a means of solving problems, and of tacit or explicit cooperation with the US. The intensity of both elements would depend primarily of whether or not the strike against Iraq can be justified, at least to some extent, by a UNSC resolution.

1. Should there be *no UNSC resolution* providing some sort of legitimisation for the US action, the major objective of Moscow would be to bring the case back to the UN Security Council.

In this case, the public criticism of the invasion would be most sound in Moscow. The major focus of the criticism would be the need to restore international law and order, and to enact the Security Council.

The lack of legitimisation from the UNSC would reduce options for cooperation with the US to a political minimum. Moscow would have to reassure Washington that, despite public criticism, it is not going to be a trouble-maker. And it would have to work intensively on a UNSC resolution to address the post-war settlement in Iraq.

Should, however, Iraq use or try to use weapons of mass destruction against any targets in the region, this can help to reverse the official position of Moscow and to improve cooperation with the US, especially if such a development would lead to a UNSC resolution that could be regarded in Moscow as an important step to bring the case back into the UN tube.

To accelerate the political process, and in exchange for the US cooperation in working on a UNSC resolution, Moscow can offer Washington its good services in contacting relevant figures in the Iraqi elite who would be prepared to make a deal with the US at the expense of Hussein.

Should the war against Iraq result in a major increase of oil prices, Russia certainly would be cooperative in increasing its exports of crude oil in an attempt to balance the markets. However, the capacity of Russia to have a major impact on the oil markets is very limited, and it can not replace Saudi Arabia which is going to be the crucial actor in this respect.

2. Should the strike against Iraq be at least to some extent *legitimised by a UNSC resolution*, the response of Moscow would be to cooperate to the extent possible (within the “positive neutrality” notion).

There certainly will be some criticism of using coercive power to solve problems, as well as calls for restoring peace as soon as possible. This public criticism, however, would be balanced by blaming Hussein’s regime for the lack of cooperativeness, and for the plans of obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Should the Iraqi regime use or try to use weapons of mass destruction against any targets in the region, this can result in pulling Russia explicitly to the side with the US, especially if European allies do the same.

Political cooperation with the US within the UNSC as well as within the bilateral framework (including offering good services in contacting relevant figures from the Iraqi elite), as well as responsiveness with regard to keeping oil prices at a reasonable level may be occasionally

complemented by some cooperation related to the military operation as such.

Military cooperation could primarily include intelligence-sharing and/or sharing the data from the Russian over-the-horizon ground-based early warning stations, especially from those in Mukachevo and probably Gabala (to the extent the latter would matter).

Although direct participation of Russia in any invasion would be excluded, the exchange of relevant information related to tracing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction as well as monitoring the eventual use of Iraqi missiles could be a reasonable element of cooperation between Russia and the US.

3. Though it is difficult to foresee the length and the final outcome of the invasion, Russia certainly would draw attention to the need of an international effort to help the Iraqi people to *reconstruct and to develop the country*. International assistance and investment would be needed to achieve that goal.

It would certainly be of interest to Russia that it is rewarded for its cooperation during the war by obtaining relevant contracts within the reconstruction programmes, at least in the areas it has been active in Iraq until now, such as oil fields development and the development of the energy sector.

4. Any particular action to be taken by Moscow shall be *determined by the following considerations*:

- the extent to which it helps to keep the case within (or to return the case to) the UNSC framework,
- it does not over-stretch US-Russian relations;
- Moscow does not need to compete with the UK for cooperativeness, but
- it shall not drop its level of cooperation with the US below that eventually provided by France and Germany.

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ

EDWARD P. DJEREJIAN

The US decision to refocus the world's attention on Iraq and the threat it poses to international peace and security under Saddam Hussein results from the ongoing adjustment of US strategy as a consequence of the attacks of 11 September 2001. The US is leading the campaign against global terrorism – a campaign that can only be won by successful international coalition-building. For some time before September 11th, the nexus between weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorist groups and states that support terrorism had been identified as the major strategic threat. This definition is at the core of the new US strategy. Due to the nature of this threat, this definition has also given rise to the concept of pre-emptive strikes, and it has implications for the established policies of containment and deterrence. For building and sustaining effective coalitions, the US will have to work with its allies and partners to build on these changes of its national security strategy for the needed elaboration of an international strategic framework and agreed policy for dealing with the threat.

The Bush Administration

As the formulation of the administration's policy on Iraq was evolving, a range of positions on the approach to Iraq has been expressed up to the summer of 2002 among Bush administration officials. President George W. Bush himself established the link between Iraq and terrorism by stressing the need to deny sanctuary to terrorists anywhere in the world¹ and pointing to the totalitarian threat posed by state sponsors of terrorism with potential access to weapons of mass destruction.² He also declared that it was the stated policy of his government to have a change of regime

¹ “We have entered the second stage of the war on terror – a sustained campaign to deny sanctuary to terrorists who would threaten our citizens from anywhere in the world.” (remarks by President Bush at The White House, 11 March 2002).

² “The evil that has formed against us has been termed the new totalitarian threat. The authors of terror are seeking nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Regimes that sponsor terror are developing these weapons and the missiles to deliver them. If these regimes and their terrorist allies were to perfect these capabilities, no inner voice of reason, no hint of conscience would prevent their use.” (speech by President Bush at the German Bundestag, 23 May 2002.)

in Iraq,³ as US legislation indeed had called for since 1998, believing that unlawful aggression and the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction are the essence of Saddam Hussein's rule and would not end as long as he was in power. However, Bush put the issue of full compliance with UN decisions on the dismantlement of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes at the centre of his international efforts vis-à-vis Iraq, insisting that the issue here is not inspections but disarmament.⁴ On September 15th, President Bush addressed the subject of Iraq in a major speech at the United Nations.

At the same time, Vice-President Richard Cheney advocated determined US leadership to force Saddam Hussein from power in his remarks before a veterans group in Nashville in August 2002. Cheney said that old security doctrines did not apply in the new strategic environment. Containment was not possible when dictators obtained weapons of mass destruction and were prepared to share them with terrorists who intend to inflict catastrophic casualties on the United States. He also claimed that “many of us are convinced that Saddam Hussein will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon”. A tentative US approach to Iraq would mean that Saddam would simply be emboldened, and it would be even harder to assemble friends and allies to oppose him. In a post-Saddam world, however, moderates in the region would take heart and extremists would rethink their commitment to Jihad, and the broader cause of Middle East peace would be advanced. Cheney assured his audience that the Bush administration would not simply look away, hope for the best and leave the matter for some future administration. He also promised that the US would not turn its back on Iraq after Saddam's departure but would stay to help it rebuild with “territorial integrity” and to craft a democratic, pluralistic, ethnically representative government.

Secretary of State Colin Powell highlighted the need for the United States to lead the international community in its approach toward Iraq and build international support. He stressed the role of the UN Security Council and WMD inspectors as a first step toward enforcing compliance and disarmament on Saddam Hussein and his regime, with serious consequences if he does not comply.

The Debate

These positions reflect a debate in the US over the right strategy that continues in certain aspects and includes the following issues:

³ Press conference by President Bush, 8 July 2002.

⁴ President Bush speaking to congressional leaders on Iraq, 4 September 2002.

- What is the clear and present threat to US security interests that justifies going to war?
- Why abandon the proven policies of containment and deterrence, which worked in 1991 (cf. James A. Baker III's ultimatum to Tarik Aziz before Desert Storm)?
- Should the US, as an historically “benign power”, move towards a paradigm shift to pre-emptive war without the elaboration of an international strategic context and policy?
- What are the consequences and implications of the US going it alone if there is little international support for military action?
- What is the role of Congress and American public opinion?
- What is the role of the United Nations and a new UNSC resolution on disarmament of WMD through inspections? Shall the US build a unified position within the UN that provides international legitimacy and political force?
- Does a policy of both WMD inspections and regime change establish disincentives for Saddam Hussein?
- Will a military attack in which his regime's survival is at stake result in the use of chemical and biological weapons against US military and/or neighbouring states?

A number of respected Republicans such as James A. Baker III, Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Lawrence Eagleburger and Chuck Hagel have spoken out in recent months reminding the administration of the need to reflect on these questions, as have leading Democrats such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Joseph Biden, Richard Holbrooke and Samuel Berger. European views pointed in the same direction, even if the positions expressed cover a wide spectrum from Blair and Straw, Chirac and Villepin to Schröder at the other end. Relevant contributions to the debate have also come from Arab and Israeli political leaders.

The Critical Issue: After Saddam, What?

The US must be clear in its policy about its own strategic objectives. Is the major goal to have an Iraq without weapons of mass destruction? In this respect, the US must determine whether it views WMD inspections and disarmament as an end in itself or not. If so, will it agree that UN Security Council sanctions related to WMD are lifted in due course?

What would be the political nature of the Iraqi regime and its military force structure in terms of the stated US goal that Iraq no longer be a

threat to its neighbours? If the territorial integrity of Iraq is a major objective, how will this be assured in a post-Saddam scenario? In terms of a government in Iraq that is broadly representative of Iraq's diverse population, will such a government emerge as an "Iraqi political solution" not imposed from outside and, conceivably, including Iraqi insiders and outsiders?

The notion of regime change raises three controversial questions in this context:

- Is regime change a necessary step in the effort to eliminate WMD in Iraq?
- Is regime change in Iraq a precedent for action towards other states with WMD programmes?
- Is it meant to lead to "democratisation" in the Middle East?

In trying to answer these questions, it is helpful to consider what would be the likely outcome of regime change in Iraq. Would we be trading Saddam for another Saddam? A Musharraf? A Karzai? Or a broadly based and representative leadership?

This leads immediately to the key question: What would be the nature, extent and duration of the US commitment to a post-Saddam Iraq in terms of military presence and provision of security, economic development and assistance, as well as policy coordination with allies and regional countries?

In both too little and too much commitment, there are potential issues of unintended consequences. In designing the proper strategy, the US needs to consider likely consequences of available courses of action in a number of dimensions:

- Arab and Muslim world reaction,
- Israeli-initiated action in case of war or in reaction to specific threats to Israel,
- impact on European allies and their long-term relationship with the US,
- impact on the prospects for Arab-Israeli peace,
- economic repercussions and the extent of an oil-price spike and energy supply and security.

In my view, the essential evaluation must be to keep Iraq's territorial integrity intact after Saddam. The stakes are high because the

dismemberment of Iraq would have serious geopolitical consequences in the Middle East. Kurdish separatism would have a direct impact on key states such as Turkey, Syria and Iran, which have important Kurdish minorities. The creation of an independent Kurdish entity in Iraq could lead to a quest to establish a greater Kurdistan. The ensuing political destabilisation could lead to regional conflict. Differences between Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites could impel the Shiites to go their own way and thereby destabilise Iraq's southern borders with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and its eastern border with Iran.

Given these potential consequences, it is important that whichever group comes to power in Baghdad that it is able to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq. The best way to ensure that outcome is for a successor regime to provide the broadest political participation possible for the diverse ethnic and religious groups in Iraq so that they can share power and meet the political, economic and social needs of their constituencies.

There is reason to believe, for example, that the two major Kurdish factions in Iraq – the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdish Democratic Party – would opt to remain in a united Iraq if they were able to share national political and economic power effectively in a central government in Baghdad. This key requirement would apply also to the other groups in Iraq, especially the Shiites.

But in anticipation of political change and given the stakes involved, we should actively promote among the Iraqi civilian and military opposition the United States' strong commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq and underscore and encourage the need for broadened political participation there after Saddam Hussein.

Concluding Comments

The combination of the urgent need to address an existential threat and the complicated nature of the international strategic environment in the Middle East and the Gulf leads to a recommendation to act along the lines of *festina lente* (“to make haste slowly”) and deliberately to assure that there is sufficient domestic and international support for actions decided upon so that the outcome is successful and enhances Persian Gulf security and US global interests for peace and security.

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