Public Perceptions of the European Power Hierarchy and Support for a Common Foreign and Security Policy

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Abstract

Prior research on citizen support for European integration has primarily focused on individuals’ evaluations of the process of integration or its institutions, with emphasis on the importance of direct benefits and costs integration can confer. Explanations focus on overall support for integration and little work has been done on explaining public opinion on specific policy areas, such as the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Prior work also does not consider individuals’ evaluations of member states in models. This paper will fill this gap in the research by formulating and testing a political cohesion model, which can be considered complementary to preexisting models. The analysis synthesizes systems theory with social identity theory to produce a core claim that the probability of supporting the CFSP increases with greater levels of political trust in the European Union member-states. The development of political cohesion, as measured by the amount of trust in member-states, is assumed to be reflective of a positive perception. Positive perceptions of member-states are critical because integration’s development is influenced strongly by and dependent upon the resources of the relatively more powerful European member-states. Therefore, positive perceptions of the top EU powers, namely Germany and France, improve the probability of supporting a CFSP, more so than trusting the remaining members. The results hold even when controlling for demographic variables, political values, ideology, and the democratic deficit. Binary logistic regression analysis using pooled repeated cross-sectional data from the Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 1992 through 1997 among individuals of 11 member-states largely support these claims.

Introduction: Political community, European unification, and a Common Foreign and Security Policy

Early thoughts regarding European integration promoted an idealism of uniting a people by establishing a community of Europeans. However, research has since demonstrated that this goal is more pragmatic than idealistic in facilitating positive-sum transactions. A political community can only develop, within a democratic context, if it has support from those that comprise it (Easton 1965). Therefore, without a support for a political community, it may be difficult to see any significant degree of support for other components of the political system (Easton 1965: 189).

Haas stated that a political community is in place when “specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic space” (1958: 5). Etzioni adds that a political community “has a center of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community…and it is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens” (1965: 4). Both of these definitions rest on the need to identify a central node of decision-making. The problem with their definitions occurs when no single central node of decision-making is present. What if decision-making is decentralized? If we relax the notion of centralism, a political community refers to the cohesion among individuals and the decision-makers. Given the EU decision-making structure, these decision-makers are primarily national and are found in the European power hierarchy. Overall, this is what Easton refers to as a political community: “that aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a
political division of labor” (1965: 177). This emphasizes that individuals are drawn together for the purpose of operating in a common structure.

The ideas and practice of European unification is an example of political community building both in its horizontal and vertical dimensions. Jean Monnet and his cohorts in the pan-European movement held a vision that is reflected in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome: integration is a project for the establishment of a common people with a common government. Political cohesion would therefore be a source of support for policies that lead to European integration such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In a fully integrated system, a decision-making hierarchy refers to the power center(s) developed by a constitution. For example, the British hierarchy has the cabinet and prime minister holding the top position in policy making, with the other institutions holding subordinate positions. In the case of the EU, decision-making is primarily in the hands of the member-countries themselves (Moravcsik 1991 & 1993). They, through the IGCs and the European Council, determine the amount of sovereignty given to EU institutions as well as the direction of integration. Therefore the European power hierarchy refers to the pattern of power distribution among the member-states. Decision-making will generally focus on the preferences of the more powerful (i.e., larger and wealthier) member-states.

The central argument is that individuals’ support for the CFSP depends upon the formation of a European political community whose foundation rests on the political trust given to the more powerful member-states, namely Germany and France. Trust develops from the positive perceptions of member-states because such perceptions broaden in-group membership. The remaining sections will go into further detail the importance of in-group membership and its connection with support for the CFSP, as well as the data description and hypotheses testing.
Self-interest, trust, and cooperation

Addressing the question of why individuals would support the potential CFSP requires an assessment of work on overall support for European integration. Easton’s (1965; 1975) theoretical work views public support as being either specific (also known as utilitarian support) or diffuse. This section differentiates the motivations of both types and concludes that given differing motivations, variables that explain one type of support may not be as powerful in explaining the other type. Specifically, motivations for utilitarian support are primarily self-interest in nature while diffuse (what I refer to as loyalty) stems from a common interest motivation. Utilitarian support results from an exchange where outputs (which can be economic or non-economic gains for the individual) are provided by the state in order to maintain the system through citizen support (Easton 1965: 157). Utilitarian support is especially popular among researchers in the context of European integration. They build upon the conceptualization of self-interest, which has long been the cornerstone of understanding political decisions (Olson 1965).¹ Researchers point to the fact that motivations for utilitarian support arise from evaluations of the EU providing rewards that minimize any negative effects, including the changing role of the EU as integration evolves (Anderson and Reichert 1996). Feld and Wildgen’s (1976) work shows a tie between support levels in the four core countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) to that of welfare increases in the early years of

¹The utilitarian support approach also stems from the endogenous political economy literature, which approaches the study of integration through a rational framework. It is closely related to other works that explain the behavior of domestic forces by looking at group motivations and their impact on national government decision (Downs 1957; Gamson 1961; Ames 1987; Levi 1988; Geddes 1994; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). The primary motivation of the political elite is either to remain in power or to allow a particular political party to remain in power. Therefore the politician will form coalitions among societal groups for this end. The wishes of the domestic forces need to be satisfied before the next turn in the political cycle occurs. Endogenous economic theory applies this logic to nation-state policy formulation regarding the global economy. Individuals form coalitions depending on their role in the economy (Stopler and Samuelson 1941). Such roles are economic factors (Rogowski 1989), economic sectors (Gourevitch 1986), or sectors that have specific assets (Frieden 1991). Each group will make their economic cost-benefit calculations and support foreign economic policies on this basis.
integration. The attempt at explaining support continued with Handley (1981) who descriptively notes that the economic downturns of the 1970s dramatically lowered support levels for the EEC. Eichenberg and Dalton’s (1993) refined the testing of this argument by looking at the various levels of influence on support levels with similar results. Others have also built upon this method of analysis with similar results (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Duch and Taylor 1997). Moreover, others have taken a more direct approach by examining an individual’s socio-economic position and predict the probability of their support given an individual’s position in the economy and the theoretical outcomes of the effects of market integration (Anderson 1991; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998).

Other individual motivations, while being self-interest in nature, are not necessary economic. The founders of European integration were driven by the memories of catastrophic wars and hoped that regional integration would be a vehicle for a permanent peace (Deutsch et al 1957; Haas 1958; Etzioni 1965; Mitrany 1966). Europeans also supported integration, in its early years, in part for its promise to prevent war (Hewstone 1986). However, with the passing memory of war and the end of the Cold War, physical security is not as strong a factor in supporting integration as it once was (Gabel 1998). Other benefits include a more effective form of governance that is lacking at the national level due to underdeveloped welfare benefits and high levels of corruption (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).

These studies provide insights into utilitarian support levels, but answer only a narrow range of questions and provide, at best, short-term explanations. Business cycles and other factors that lead to self-interest motivations help to explain utilitarian support, but may not be able to explain the support that will produce stability in the system in the long term. These models assume that individuals make no other calculations and beg the question if this alone is
enough to explain support. While significant in their contribution, it tells us only part of the story behind citizen support. The other half of the story begins by understanding affective support.

Affective support is a “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants” (Easton 1965: 273; 1975: 444). Affective support should not be equated with specific support because outputs themselves are not the focus of attention; it is the political object itself. Therefore affective support “is an attachment to a political object for its own sake, it constitutes a store of political good will. As such, it taps deep political sentiments and is not easily depleted through disappointment with outputs” (1965: 274). What “an attachment” refers to is not quite clear. He does mention that it is associated to a “sense of community” (1965: 325) but this concept also lacks specificity by leaving its definition as “the degree of solidarity” (1965: 184). In the simplest formulation, affective support occurs after a period of time when specific support is present (Easton 1965). Affective support enters the picture when the political system has a “communal ideology” that promotes a common interest (Easton 1965: 333). However, common interest is not entirely separate from self-interest. It is possible for a collection of individuals to have similar interests; however the summation of these interests does not necessarily define a common interest. Common interests arise from a coordination of similar self-interests. This coordination is more likely at higher rates of political cohesion, as measured by trust in the member-states. Common interest develops because there is a “sense of community” where individuals strongly identify with one another (Easton 1965: 326).

To overcome collective action problems, a political community would need to develop along common interest motivations. These motivations stem from a common identification,

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2 See Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt (1981) for the evidence of this process in the case of post-war Germany.
because without this identity formation all that can be predicted is short-term cooperation instead of community building (Deutsch 1957; Russet 1963; Lasswell 1972). Short-term cooperation or coalitions have relatively low levels of cohesion and tend, over time, to become unstable (Almond and Verba 1963; Gamson 1964). Since European integration is not an effort in short-term cooperation, its durability would lie in political community building. This community building relies on common interest motivations, which are dependent upon social identities. One will tend to develop common interests when one can conclude that one has a common fate with others. As Wendt argues, “identification is a continuum from the negative to the positive – from conceiving it as an anathema to the self to conceiving it as an extension of the self” (1994: 386). If Europeans develop a positive identification through the process of integration, then this will be associated with cohesiveness among those within a broad European political community. If this holds, it is possible to detect common interest motivations in addition to self-interest motivations for the citizenry’s support for European integration.

Developing explanations for supporting integration by understanding the role of common interests are not new. One of the more cited sets of work in this area is the postmaterialist argument. Inglehart’s (1971; 1977a; 1977b) explanation is that Europeans were socialized in an environment of high rates of economic growth. As a result individuals in the post-war era developed a different set of values (different from prior generations) that are amiable toward the prospects of regional integration. These individuals personally identify with supranational institutions and thereby give the process their support. However, Janssen (1991) and Gabel (1998) dispute this claim with empirical evidence. Their research finds little evidence for the relationship between postmaterialism and support for integration. In fact, the little evidence that does exist indicates that postmaterialists are less likely to support integration. However, the
problem here is not in the value of the postmaterialist explanation, but what it was trying to explain. Researchers used the postmaterialist variable in order to explain utilitarian support. However, the postmaterialist argument is not suited for such an explanation. Postmaterialism cannot tell us how postmaterialists or materialists reach their opinions (Rochon 1998). In fact, it may be possible for both value extremes to favor regional integration policy but for different reasons. It is easy to see that materialists would be in favor if they believe that regional integration will provide material and physical security. One can assume that postmaterialists would be in favor if they believe that it is a means to solve trans-national problems (e.g. clean air, water, etc.). Explaining support for integration policy would benefit from a model that taps into the notion of common interests; in other words a model that understands individuals’ evaluations of the political community the European elite is trying to build. This requires a model whose primary concern is not what Europe can do for individuals, but what idea of Europe is in the perceptions of individuals.

A political cohesion model for supporting the CFSP

Research that looks at common interest motivations for individual support for integration has mainly focused on the role of factors that would impede the formation of the political community. They echo the claim by Dahl (1989) that an attachment allows for easier rule because it adds legitimacy to the governors by the governed. They are also differentiated from prior work in that they do not focus on the non-EU level explanations for support. McLaren (2002) demonstrates that hostility towards other cultures determines attitudes towards the European Union. Carey (2002) also demonstrates that a strong national attachment lowers the probability that an individual will support regional integration. In addition, Van Kersbergen (2000) explains support for the EU by examining the role integration has in forming primary
national allegiances. Their claim is that these attitudes pose a problem in developing a European identity and thereby lowers the chances of supporting the EU. In developing a political cohesion model for supporting the CFSP, I shift attention away from individuals’ direct evaluations of the EU and towards the evaluations of member-states. The political cohesion model looks at the development of a political community and thereby focuses on common interests. In producing this model, I will also emphasize that common interest and self-interest are not mutually exclusive. By being part of a political community, an individual recognizes that one’s self-interest and the common interest are interdependent.

The idea of integration and its support may require that individuals think of the project as a group effort and one based on long-term gains. The longer time horizon therefore requires individuals to support the idea of a CFSP because it is a collective good requiring collective action. I link support for integration to individuals’ perception that the project is a group effort. This perception can have a positive effect on support and tied to the usual collective action problems. Support improves with the higher the level of cohesion. Greater cohesion lowers the barriers to collective action to solve the problems facing Europeans, such as issues dealing with security and foreign affairs.

Political cohesion is closely associated with establishment of a common identity. Through a common identity, individuals can rationalize that individual problems are actually collective problems and that societies need to forge links, by way of integration, if they are to be solved. A common identity is not necessarily associated with a foundational mythos, ethnic affiliation (Obradovic 1996), common language, or shared customs (Smith 1992), or any characteristic that we usually use for national identities (Zetterholm 1994; Cederman 1996; McKay 1996). However, it does have a similarity with national identities in that it is “imagined” and develops
through the construction of a society (Anderson 1991). This notion of “imagined” speaks to the malleable nature of identity and is therefore a construction or adaptation to new political and/or economic realities rather than from biological or common blood rationalities. In its construction, individuals make choices as to who can and cannot belong to a specific identity. In fact, individuals may also choose to belong or not to belong given the characteristics of those who already claim the identity. This concept of in-group/out-group identity (who is and is not a member of group) will be shown as being important in the social-psychological dynamics within and among such groups in a political community.

The construction of a European identity has been associated with a common belief in liberal-democratic values (Moravcsik 1993; Beetham and Lord 1998), which have been codified in the legal formation of European citizenship. However, many EU citizens may not have this level of sophisticated understanding of identity given that they are not well informed (Anderson 1998). The more reasonable approach in explaining identity and its implication on EU policy support is through the psychology of common interest evaluations.

Piaget (1965) stated that building attachments to groups is part of normal human behavior. These attachments promote cohesion among group members that are associated with the social-psychological phenomena of in-group bias and subjective images. One reason why an individual becomes a group member (the in-group) is due to an affective attachment (Terhune 1964; Winter 1973; Stogdill 1974; McClelland 1975; Bass 1981). An individual forms an emotional attachment because the group fulfills some symbolic value. At the level of national identity, individuals attach themselves because they see the nation as the embodiment of what is important (DeLamater et al. 1969). Also individuals will interact with individuals who are members of another group if this group’s members share some commonality with in-group
members (Brewer 1968). The members of both groups are more trusting of each other and thereby facilitating of cooperation among members. One often cited definition of trust is “the probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing anything to bring them about” (Gamson 1968: 54). That is, group members will not need to monitor each other because there is confidence that interests are aligned. Putnam (1993) shows that the level of trust one has for others produces effective institutional performance because of the higher probability of obtaining cooperation. It lowers the costs of association because of the perception that individuals will not cheat or defect. In paraphrasing Wintrobe (1995: 46), trust yields a stream of future returns on exchanges that would not otherwise take place because trust makes behavior predictable and stable. Therefore, groups may overlap to a certain extent to function not only as separate units but also, as an integrated unit when perceived similarities are present. When similarities are not present, overlapping memberships do not occur and group status becomes exclusive. The importance of similarities in building cohesion lies in understanding in-group biases.

In-group bias is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of their in-group versus others who are not members (the out-group members) (Tajfel 1978). In early psychological experiments individuals tended to give more rewards and side with other members of their group because of their affiliation. These biases occurred even when test subjects were only recently informed that they belong to a particular group and had never met or interacted with other in-group members (Tajfel 1978; Turner 1978; Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1982; Brewer and Kramer 1985; Messick and Mackie 1989). The cause of this bias, as put forth by Tajfel (1981; 1982), is due to positive evaluations individuals have for members of their group. They join and are identified by such groups because, as stated above, the group symbolizes a set of values. By associating with similar-valued individuals, self-esteem improves because values are reinforced.
This self-esteem further improves when individuals make favorable comparisons between the in-group and out-group. Not only are they part of a subjectively valued group, the in-group is also subjectively judged as better than the other out-groups. Therefore, by tying an individual’s social identity to the importance of the in-group, group maintenance or cooperation for group survival becomes important. To this end, individuals will tend to give favorable biases to fellow group members.

Since cohesiveness is a function of in-group evaluations associated with identity, it is important to revisit the possible phenomenon of overlapping in-groups. This is important in the context of Europe because the formation of a supranational identity is not theorized to replace national identities but to coexist with them (Deutsch et al. 1957). This is where the concept of image becomes important. Kelman states that image

…refers to the organized representation of an object in an individual’s cognitive system. The core of an image is the perceived character of the object to which it refers – the individual’s conception of what this object is like. Image is an inferred construct, however, rather than a mere designation of the way the object is phenomenally experienced. (1965: 24)

Scott, more succinctly, defines “…an image of a nation (or of any other object) constitutes the totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation” (1965: 72). In addition such an image is the “property of the individual who beholds the object” (Kelman 1965: 27) meaning that the image is not objective and may therefore be dependent on various factors. Individuals can therefore use images of other groups to formulate likes and dislikes for and positive or negative stereotypes of out-groups (Druckman et al. 1974; Hewstone 1986; Druckman 1994). Image therefore implies that multiple identities form as members of in-groups view the values of out-group members as similar and therefore compatible. Groups can, by this mechanism, tie themselves together in a unifying identity, in one extreme, much like individuals
do with one another in forming group attachments. Recall that individuals tend to form groups, in
part, because of emotional importance to the group’s symbolic values. If a subset of such values is
present in other groups, then a broader identity will form without necessarily dissolving prior
identities. The individuals in the broader group (one that includes two or more in-groups) can now
operate with similar cohesiveness as the individual in-groups.

In the context of European identity, an individual may adopt the broader identity when s/he
has a positive image of other member-states. This perception may result from evaluations of
similar preferences on a number of issues leading individuals to view member-states as more in
line with the in-group versus an exclusive out-group identity. However, each member-state does
not have an equal weight in the decision-making process. Also the member-states have different
capabilities when it comes to making a CFSP a credible reality. Therefore a positive perception of
the more powerful states is of greater importance.

The structure of the European system of states, like the global or other regional systems, is a
function of power relations. This structure determines the outcomes through the opportunities it
offers to, and the constraints it puts on, the leadership of each country (Lenin 1939; Waltz 1979;
Organski & Kugler 1980; Keohane 1984; Keohane & Milner 1996). The organization of the
international system is a hierarchy where the preponderant actor rests on top of pyramid-like
structure, with weaker powers grouped beneath it, depending on their individual relative strengths
(Krasner 1976; Keohane 1980; Organski & Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981). The same description
applies to the organization of regions around the globe (Lemke 1996; Tammen et al. 2000).
However, as stated by Wendt (1992), the structure is important only due to the resulting influence
it has on the actors involved. He hypothesizes that countries go through a process of socialization
due their interactions within the structure. They are transformed “…by the institution of
sovereignty, by an evolution of cooperation, and by intentional efforts to transform egoistic identities into collective identities” (Wendt 1992: 395). A regional system is an environment where countries learn about their position relative to others and from this conclude what opportunities there are for cooperation as well as conflict. Relative wealth, population, and capabilities (among others) determine which country’s preferences will be enacted and which ones will be held in check. The more powerful (the largest and wealthiest) will tend to have their wishes debated and implemented.

Functional outcomes of relations among countries, such as trade patterns, fall under the influence of this dynamic. In the EU context, each step in integrating the decision-making systems of member-countries is mainly due to the preferences of the more powerful members (Moravcsik 1991 & 1993). Since the project is one of voluntary cooperation, countries can and do opt-out of further integration if their preferences are not inline with the more powerful members. The propensity to integrate comes under certain structural conditions: a regional system must include both a set of asymmetrical power relationships and an associated satisfaction with how to develop integration (Efird and Genna 2002). The regional leader of the hierarchy strongly influences the institutional construction jointly through its preferences and its ability to foster stability (Krasner 1976; Keohane and Nye 1977).

In the quest for the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Germany played this role by first promoting and then requiring inflationary stability for the establishment of the euro (McNamra 1998). The establishment of the “inclusion criteria” (low inflation, fiscal deficits, and public debt) and European Central Bank autonomy were requirements insisted upon by Germany. Germany benefited in establishing the EMU due to its large share of total intra-EU

3 See also Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990).
trade (De Grauwe 1997). By changing the nature of monetary sovereignty along with the other eleven EMU members, Germany would garner the returns due to a common currency (Molle 1997), while still pursuing the monetary policy that it prefers.

The relevance of understanding the structure’s influence on integration, in this research, is due to its relationship with supporting the CFSP. More precisely, individuals’ images of EU member-states may influence the amount of trust they will have in them. Geva and Hanson (1999) have shown in experimental work that individuals’ reactions to events by countries do modify how they think of them. While their work focuses on crisis points, one can comfortably assume that influences on country perceptions can also occur over a long set of iterated events such as those found in the process of integration. Given the nature of a CFSP, the committed role of the more powerful countries in Europeans’ perceptions would need to be credible. Defection from an established CFSP by Belgium would be quantitatively and qualitatively difference than a defection by Germany. In fact, one can reason that a Belgian defection would be a disappointment while a German defection would be catastrophe. Therefore trust in the member-states would be divided along a latent variable that measures the member-states status within the Union. The more powerful countries would occupy one dimension (Germany and France), the small but wealthy countries in another dimension (Denmark and the Benelux countries), and the rest in a third dimension. In sum, trust in the more powerful member-states will have a greater influence in predicting the probability of an individual supporting a CFSP than trust in the other members.

Data description and testing procedures

The public opinion data come from multiple Eurobarometer surveys (1992-1997). These surveys were selected because they all included the key independent variables, political trust in member-states. The survey responses fall under the category of a repeated cross-sectional data.
Time series techniques would therefore be inappropriate (Beck and Katz 1995). As with most studies using secondary data, great efforts were taken to optimize the operationalization of the variables by following the suggestions made by Kiecolt and Nathan (1985). Given data constraints, the analysis includes only samples from eleven members of the EU, which include the first twelve members except Luxemburg. Some of the samples were collapsed while others were not included: The Northern Ireland sample was collapsed into the British sample and the East German sample was omitted given its unique attributes.4 I used a weighted variable (the nation weight) so that no sub-national group will be over or under representation and results can be interpreted with attention to variations within country samples.5

OLS regression techniques are not permissible because the dependent variables are dichotomous. Applying OLS techniques will produce inefficient coefficients that may lead to type one and two errors. The appropriate technique is to employ binary logit regression models (Long 1997). The evaluations of the coefficients will be based on their significance, direction of signs, and their contribution to predicting the probabilities of the dependent variables.

Dependent variables

The dependent variables are individual support for a common defense and common foreign policies. A question frequently asked in the Eurobarometer surveys is whether a type of policy would be best handled at the national level or the European level of decision-making:

4 The East German sample may exhibit questionable results given its early phase of democratic transition and its recent membership, which may distort findings. One such fear is an inaccuracy of questionnaire responses due to the public’s long legacy of authoritarianism.

5 The nature of the hypotheses requires an individual level analysis. While some researchers believe that aggregation of individual level responses to opinion surveys remove random “noise” from the measurements (Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), recent research shows that the error associated with individual level variation may be systemic (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000). Therefore aggregating the data would not remove any associated “noise,” but instead may harm the robustness of potential results due to a lower number of observations.
Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Community. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Community.

1. Should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government
2. Should be decided jointly within the European Community [Union]

Security and defense and Foreign policy towards countries outside the European Community [Union] were two policy areas presented to respondents. Responses were recoded so “national level decision-making” has a value of zero and “EC/U level decision-making” has a value of one. The logit models can then be interpreted as the probability of an individual favoring such polices decided at the EU level.

Independent variables

The following are the explanatory variables, each of which measures the respondents’ trust in other member-states. The question asked the respondent the following:

Which, if any, European Community [Union] country or countries do you think can be more trusted politically than others?
0. Not mentioned 1. Mentioned

The respondents go through the list of member-states and indicate which members are more trust than others, including their own. The data was recoded so that all responses indicating trust in the respondents’ own country are considered missing because the independent variable is to measure trust in member-states other than the respondents’ own state.

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6 While this question does not directly ask if the member-states can be trusted in the context of the EU or integration, the years in which they were asked (1992 – 1997) were years of the deepening of integration (implementation of the Single European Act and the Maastricht debate). The public discourse in these years would therefore reflect the saliency of the EU.

7 So as to include consistency for the 1992-1997 analysis, only trust in the first twelve members of the EU are included.
This question was not posed to all national samples in all years. Table one indicates which countries populations were sampled by year. There is a larger frequency of respondents coming from France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and Spain. The Danes, Irish, Portuguese, Belgians, Dutch, and Greeks were polled only once either in 1994 or 1995. Only the Italians were polled consistently from 1992-1997. Since the Luxemburg respondents were not polled at all, this leaves a total of eleven national samples. This pattern of sampling is not statistical problem for two reasons. First, since the nation weight is employed in the analysis, the results explain within country variances. Therefore no biases are introduced. Second, since country dummy variables are also employed (see the following section), the analysis will control for country effects.

Control variables

The analysis requires the use of control variables so that the results are understood in the light of some prevailing hypotheses.

**Education.** To measure this variable, I use a standard question found in all *Eurobarometer* surveys: *How old were you when you stopped full-time education?* The responses are then collapsed into 9 groups: values from 1 to 8 begin with the age of 14 and end with the age of 21, with the value 9 assigned to those who finished after the age of 22. Individuals who are still studying are coded missing. This may introduce error into the measurement because the hypothesized link with the dependent variable is in regard to the amount of education and not when the individual finished formal schooling. Anyone who is still studying may have already been in school for some time and have reached a hypothetical threshold of having had enough education to influence support for the CFSP. Unfortunately they will not be included because it is unknown where they are in their education.
Democratic Deficit. This variable attempts to capture the degree to which individuals are satisfied with democracy at the EU level. This question was asked in 1992-1994 and then again in 1997:

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Community [Union]?
1. Very satisfied  2. Fairly satisfied

The democratic deficit is a widely talked about problem in EU politics (McCormick 1999; Schmitter 2000). The magnitude of the problem can be seen in the large public protests outside EU Council and Intergovernmental Conference meetings. Rohrschneider’s (2002) analysis indicates that there is a positive relationship between being satisfied with EU level democracy and support for integration. Therefore perceptions of EU level democracy may therefore have a similar relationship with support for the CSFP. This variable was recoded so that larger values represent satisfaction with democracy at the EU level. Since this question was not asked in all years, sample size will considerably vary between models that include and do not include this variable.

Age. This information, measured in years, is included in the regular set of demographic variables found in the Eurobarometer surveys. The variable was recoded into five categories representing specific age cohorts. An alternative argument would be that memories of war would influence older Europeans to favor the CFSP, more so than younger Europeans. Prior research on support for integration demonstrated that this factor has diminished as the memory of the war fades (Gabel 1998). However, it may still prove important in the context of this analysis.

Income. Respondents were asked to choose from among four categories that approximates their annual household income in each survey. An alternative hypothesis is that respondents’ with higher incomes are more likely to support for a CFSP.
**Postmaterialism/Cognitive Mobilization.** The questions that measure these two variables are normally asked in these surveys. Please see Inglehart (1977b; 1990) for details on constructing these two variables. Both are hypothesized to be positively correlated with support and identity. However, as previously mentioned in the literature review, research has determined that their explanatory values are not as significant as once first thought. Also, the postmaterialist variable was only included in the 1992-1994 surveys and the cognitive mobilization variable was omitted from the 1994 survey. Therefore models that include these variables will have different sample sizes than those that do not include them.

**Ideology.** Prior research demonstrates the negative association nationalism has on support for integration (McLaren 2002; Carey 2003). One method to measure this possible effect is through left-right self-evaluations. The respondents were asked to place themselves on a left-right continuum. The range is one to ten with ten being the most extreme rightist ideology. An alternative hypothesis is that the higher values of this variable will be negatively associated with supporting the CSFP.

**Country and year effects.** Country and year dummies are included in each of the models but the results are not reported due to space constraints. These dummy variables control for effects that are specific to either the countries in the analysis or the year of the surveys. In each regression the base country is Belgium and the base year is 1992.

**Explaining support for the Common Foreign and Security Policy**

The overall results of the analysis show that political cohesion is an important factor in explaining support for the CFSP. Specifically, trust in the more powerful member-state, Germany, improves the likelihood that the respondent would favor a common set of security and foreign polices. Figure one illustrates the distribution of trust in the four wealthier members of
the EU by national sample. Almost all the national samples selected Germany as the most trusted
among the four. The only exceptions were the Irish and Portuguese samples, which favored
France. France was the second most trusted with the exceptions being the Dutch and Danish
samples, which favored Britain as their second choice. Although not included in the figure, all
other member-states received small percentages.

In order to determine if the trust questions measure the hypothesized three latent variables,
a maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis (varimax rotation) was conducted. Recall
that the variables were hypothesized to group together along power dimensions. The larger
powers of Germany and France (and perhaps Britain) were hypothesized to fall into one group,
the small but wealthy member-states would fall into a second group, and the remainder would be
in a third grouping. The results presented in table two indicate that trust in these twelve member-
states do indeed fall into the three categories. However the factor loading coefficients for top
powers do not cluster very well. Therefore reliability coefficients (alphas in table two) were
calculated to determine if each of the groups can adequately be included in an additive index.
The alphas for the second and third tier country index are respectable (.71 and .72, respectively),
but the first tier alpha of .51 is unacceptable (DeVellis 1991). The twelve trust variables are
therefore reduced down into five separate variables: two indices for the second and third tier
countries and three separate variables for Germany, France, and Britain. The indices are summed
together and divided by the number of countries included. By dividing the additive term by the
appropriate number, the range of the variable is restricted to between zero and one, thereby
allowing comparability among the five trust variables.

Table three presents the first results of the binary logit regression with support for a
common defense and security policy as the dependent variable. Each of the three models is
significant as shown by their respective chi-squares. Model one tests the relationship between trust in Germany as well as the second and third tier member-states while controlling for various variables. The results indicate that trust in Germany and the second tier member-states are statistically significant in predicting support for a common defense and security policy. However, the third tier index is not significant. These results are in line with the hypothesis: the further down the power hierarchy, the less significant in predicting support. The second column of results in table three shows the marginal changes in the predicted probabilities. Each value is the change in the probability associated with each independent variable as it moves from its minimum to its maximum value while holding the other variables constant at their median values. A respondent is about 10 percentage points more likely to support a common defense and security policy if s/he perceives Germany as being politically trustworthy than if s/he does not. The probability increases is less, about 7 percentage points, if the respondent trusts all four second tier member-states. The larger value for the Germany-trust variable compared to the second tier variable indicates that individuals’ trust in Germany explains a larger amount of change in the likelihood that individuals will support a common defense and security policy.

Model two in table three substitutes the Germany-trust variable with the France-trust variable. Of the three trust variables, only the France-trust and second tier trust variables are significant. However, this time the second tier trust variable explains a greater amount of change in the dependent variable. Trusting all four of the second tier member-states improves the probability of support by .08. However, the France-trust variable only improves the same probability by .04.

---

8 The country and year dummy variables where included in the regression but not listed due to space constrains. Also, the postmaterialist, cognitive mobilization, and satisfaction with EU level democracy were also included in separate regressions with no effect on the key trust variables.
Model three completes the analysis of support for the common defense and security variable. This time the Britain-trust variable is substituted. In this model, the Britain-trust and third tier trust variables are not significant, leaving only the second tier trust variable to be able to predict support. When the average respondent trusts all four second tier member-states, the probability that s/he will support a common policy improves by .082, which is similar to the probability established in model two.

In sum, trust in Germany explains the largest amount of change in the likelihood that the respondent will support a common defense and security policy. Also, recall that model one includes national samples from the eleven member-states expect Germany. Therefore trust in the most powerful EU member-state, among the non-German national samples, explains the largest change in the likelihood of support. This stands in stark contrast with the results of the non-French national samples, which did not return a strong association with trusting France. The worst performer of the three top European powers was Britain: trusting Britain has no statistical significant association with support for a common defense policy and is therefore no different than the third tier member-states in this regard.

Table four presents the results of the binary logit regression with support for a common foreign policy as the dependent variable, but with slightly different results. While the Germany-trust variable is still explains a larger change in the probability for support, trust in the second tier member-states loses some of its value. Model four’s results show that only the Germany-trust variable has statistical significance. Also, trusting in Germany improves the probability to support a common foreign policy by about .04. Model five indicates that trusting France improves this probability by .022 and trusting all four second tier member-states similarly improves the probability by .023. However, both the variables in model five are weakly
significant. Model six indicates that trust in Britain is very weakly significant and does not change the probability much, relatively speaking. In fact, the second tier trust variable has a larger marginal change, .033 vs. .014. As before, trust in Germany predicts the largest change in the probability for supporting a CFSP among individuals in the non-German national samples. It also has greater significance than the other trust variables.

Conclusion

The political cohesion model can be an aid in explaining the probabilities for supporting the CFSP. Trust in the member-states among individuals is significantly associated with higher probabilities of support. However, not all member-states are viewed in the same manner. Three distinct groupings exist with each grouping determined by country size and wealth. The smaller and less wealthy a country is, the less of an impact it has on influencing support for a CFSP. But when it comes to the top powers in Europe (Germany, France, and Britain) clear distinctions are made among the respondents. Trust in Germany has more importance among individuals than trusting the other larger and wealthier powers, namely France and Britain. Trust in France does give us some explanation for support, but values are not as large as those associated with Germany. Britain proves to be statistically not significant.

Two important issues must be considered with regard to these results. Neither of these issues would necessarily put into question the results found in this paper, but are important enough to consider. First, given that the earliest surveys used in this analysis are about ten years old, we would need to obtain up-to-date data that indicates that the association between trust and support has not changed. However, there is nothing in the model’s logic that makes the arguments any less salient today. Year dummy variables were not significantly different from the base year, which indicates that there is a lack of temporal influence. However, more current data
is an important way to determine if the findings of the 1990s hold today. The major assumption is that the largest power, Germany, is trusted because its interests are also viewed as being inline with the EU’s common interests. There is little that would indicate that this has changed. Chancellor Schröder’s foreign policy decisions with regard to international terrorism and the Iraqi war reflect attitudes found in EU public opinion. Therefore, given the results of this paper, a safe assumption can be made that the relationship between trust in Germany and support still holds. However, only data analysis can falsify this claim.

Second, the EU’s eastward expansion adds complexity to model. The security and foreign policies of countries such as Poland are not inline with those of Germany. Decisions on troop deployments to Iraq and heated disagreements at EU Council meetings over the Iraqi war are evidence of this. If this conflict permeates public opinion, then we may witness greater societal opposition to the formation of the CFSP. However if such an opposition would occur, it is still inline with the central claim of this paper: German foreign and security polices need to be trusted to be aligned with the common interest of Europe for CFSP to achieve popular support. If trust in Germany levels decline, the probability of supporting the CSFP will also decline among individuals in the national samples. Data analysis would be needed to determine if the relationship exists in the eastern expansion national samples.
Table 1. National samples for “political trust” variables by year

<table>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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</tr>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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<td>●</td>
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</tr>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
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<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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<tr>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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<td>●</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Table 2. Maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis for trust in EU member-states
(varimax rotation)

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<tr>
<th>Trust in:</th>
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<th>Factor loading</th>
<th>Factor loading</th>
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<td>France</td>
<td>.602</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>.476</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>.347</td>
<td>.188</td>
<td>.158</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>.169</td>
<td>.627</td>
<td>.127</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.597</td>
<td>.140</td>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>.240</td>
<td>.540</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>.582</td>
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<td>.137</td>
<td>.559</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.082</td>
<td>.533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.333</td>
<td>.377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 533.83; \text{df}=33; p<.000$

Trust in first tier countries reliability $\alpha = .51$

Trust in second tier countries reliability $\alpha = .71$

Trust in third tier countries reliability $\alpha = .72$
Table 3. Logit model: Support for EU defense and security policy on trust in member-states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Probabilities</th>
<th>Model 2 Probabilities</th>
<th>Model 3 Probabilities</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust variables</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.437*** (.044)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in France</td>
<td></td>
<td>.162*** (.050)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Britain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.025 -.006 (.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in second tier</td>
<td>.304*** (.082)</td>
<td>.365*** (.078)</td>
<td>.402*** (.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in third tier</td>
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<td>-.092 (.136)</td>
<td>-.095 -.021 (.130)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.010 (.013)</td>
<td>.012 (.013)</td>
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<td>.088*** (.008)</td>
<td>.088*** (.008)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>.081*** (.019)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left/Right self-placement</td>
<td>-.052*** (.010)</td>
<td>-.045*** (.016)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>.239 (.226)</td>
<td>.385 (.224)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(\chi^2) (degrees of freedom)</td>
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</table>

Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses; 
***p ≤ .000; ** p ≤ .010; * p ≤ .050
Table 4. Logit model: Support for EU common foreign policy on trust in member-states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Probabilities</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Probabilities</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.055)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in France</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.186**</td>
<td>.022</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.062)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in Britain</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.115*</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.066)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.015</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.096)</td>
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<td>1.36***</td>
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Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses; ***p ≤ .000; ** p ≤ .010; * p ≤ .050
Figure 1. Percentage of trust in European powers by country samples
References


