Echoes for Today: Lessons from US Policy Toward 
the European Defense Community



By
David T. Armitage, Jr. 




















Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association Conference, March 30-April 
2, 2005, Austin, TX. 




Introduction

At an NSC meeting in June 1954, Secretary of State Dulles expressed concern 
that the administration's "tough policy was becoming increasingly unpopular."  
Particularly in Europe, he worried that "the distrust of US strategy among our allies" was 
"whittling down the influence of the United States."  The conclusion he drew was that 
Washington would have to recognize that "we can no longer run the free world." 
As some have noted and the introductory quote underscores, the US sense of 
"hegemonic dominance" during the Cold War was not as strong as often portrayed.   In 
fact, what was more telling was the manner in which the foreign policy was conducted. 
The purpose of this paper is to trace US policy towards the EDC and to draw 
some lessons that may be applicable in the present transatlantic context.  The paper will 
be divided into two parts.   The first part reviews the evolution and implementation of US 
policy towards the EDC, with a focus on the beliefs and discourse of policy 
entrepreneurs, as well as the influence of domestic politics.  The second section posits 
four lessons that are important for current transatlantic relations.   

We Won: Now What?
The first decade after World War II reflected a critical transitional period, as the 
international system witnessed a remarkable transformation.  There was the creation of 
various international institutions – the UN, IMF and World Bank, the Council of Europe, 
the OECD, and eventually, NATO in 1949.  On the European continent, events leading to 
what became known as the Cold War – unrecognized at the time – occurred.  The 
breakdown of Four Power relations leading to the division of Germany into the Federal 
Republic in the West and the Democratic Republic in the East in 1949 also occurred.  
The Berlin airlift and the Soviet testing of an atomic weapon confirmed the shift toward 
bipolar confrontation.  The economic struggle in Western Europe, as well as the threat of 
communist takeovers in France and Italy, also were important variables, in the sense that 
their flirtation with communism left officials in Washington nervous. 
	During the war, the United States had developed a vast global network of bases 
and basing relationships connected with defense.  While American officials accepted that 
the current network could not be sustained indefinitely at current levels because of 
pressures for returning to a peacetime stance, "a complete return to the status quo ante of 
1940 also seemed unlikely in view of America's now virtually unavoidable role as global 
power and guarantor of the peace."   
	By 1945, the United States possessed or used 434 bases of different size: 228 
were in the Atlantic area, including 63 in the UK, France, and Germany.   What to do 
with these bases and to what extent should the United States maintain a global presence 
became part of a larger debate over America's role in the world.  There was a split 
between "hawks" and "doves."  However, it would be misleading to describe the divide 
as between internationalists and isolationists.  Rather, the debate pitted those that 
advocated keeping a global international presence diplomatically on the one hand, and 
those who pushed for an aggressive forward-based defense strategy.  Those promoting 
the latter often referred to the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and easy captures 
of America's weak Pacific perimeter defense to buttress their case.
	Others, more sensitive to the impact such a move might have on the Soviet Union, 
believed nuclear technology and strategic air power would suffice in defending the 
United States without provoking the Soviets into an unnecessary arms race.     While the 
political debate continued, the Joint Staff quietly conducted numerous plans and reports 
over how best to adapt US military forces to the new postwar environment.   What is 
striking about these JCS military plans and requirements is the continued emphasis on 
hemispheric defense, as well as the anticipated use of air and naval bases on islands in the 
Pacific and off North Africa and the Middle East.  Very little attention is devoted to the 
European continent.  As Harkavy observes:

A large land army presence on the European continent was not anticipated 
nor was…the magnitude of the accompanying large-scale presence of 
forward air and naval bases.  It appears that US planners either 
underestimated the forthcoming Soviet threat, or, somehow assumed that 
forward defense in Europe could be handled by Britain and France. 


The twin goals of maintaining economic prosperity and security at home while 
promoting stability and peace in the world would serve as the underpinnings for US 
policy toward Europe.   There were two schools of thought toward how to bring this 
about.  One school, led by Treasury Secretary Morgenthau and Secretary of State Hull, 
advocated gutting or emasculating the war-making potential of Germany by de-
industrializing the Ruhr and Saar regions.  A second school, supported by John Foster 
Dulles and George Kennan, believed that integrating Germany into a "federalized" 
Europe would be the best option.   According to this school, the Europeans needed to 
rationalize their state system, which had developed based on the concept of nationalism.  
It was the division of Europe and balance of power politics, in John Foster Dulles' view, 
which had led to the disastrous wars of the first half of the twentieth century, and 
Europeans had "an obligation to tie themselves together" to eliminate such nationalist 
tendencies. 
Dulles, for example, considered the "punishment economics" advocated by 
Morganthau and Hull as a recipe for fostering long-term resentment in Germany.  At the 
very least it would almost certainly create a negative backlash and be counterproductive 
for the United States and Western Europe.  
	Certainly, there were concerns of a "Fortress Europe," even as far back as 1942.  
According to one State Department study, the danger existed that, if the Europeans 
developed their own sense of "European nationhood," they might consider using "the 
economic weapon as a means of furthering continental policy" to the detriment of US 
interests.   Secretary of State Hull worried that, if a European union developed, "such a 
union might lead to the formation of other economic power blocs and undermine 
prospects for a liberal trade policy and the formation of an international organization after 
the war." 
	In the end, the question revolved around how best to prevent a resurgence of 
European economic nationalism (the high tariffs and rampant competitive protectionism), 
open the door for American goods, channel European economic potential positively, 
while at the same time encouraging Europeans to develop their militaries strong enough 
to defend against the Soviets but not in a way that would threaten intra-European actors, 
such as France.  A long-term consideration at the same time was: how to build up Europe 
into an organized union of sorts without it becoming dominated by a single European 
hegemon, or eventually turning against the United States in the global order?
	An examination of State Department records reveals the gradual shift from 
supporting European political and/or economic "unification" in 1943 to the more guarded 
and ambiguous wording in early 1944 of "closer economic and political collaboration" in 
Europe.   One possible reason for this shift might be that President Roosevelt did not 
want the creation of a European federation to alienate the Soviets, whom he regarded as a 
partner in the post-war peace process.   As Cook writes, "While maneuvering and 
compromising at Yalta to build his peacekeeping machinery, Roosevelt displayed an 
almost total indifference to problems of postwar Western security in Europe."   His main 
concern was to keep an eye on the latent forces of isolationism.  Roosevelt even went so 
far as to tell Stalin and Churchill that he doubted whether he could keep American troops 
in Europe "for more than two years or so." 
	At first, the Truman Administration sought to continue working with the Russians 
in trying to reach a pan-European settlement.  The concept of defending Europe militarily 
had not gelled.  The emphasis was on avoiding economic and political instability.  There 
was an explicit need to revive the sluggish European economy.  Even though the 
influence on American foreign policy at that time remained that of the late President 
Roosevelt, during the winter of 1946-47, it became increasingly clear that the Soviet 
Union's negative actions limited the chances of pan-European approaches. 
	By spring 1947, the realization began to dawn that the emphasis should switch 
from seeking German unification (fear that it would fall under Soviet domination) to 
promoting European integration, even if it focused only on the western part.  This way, 
Germany's industrial strength would be channeled peacefully and contribute to the 
economic prosperity of its neighbors while also limiting the risk of a return of a new 
Reich seeking military conquest of the Continent.  It would also put the United States in a 
better position to deal with the Soviets.  Planners in Washington at that time still did not 
envision a direct Soviet attack.  The scenario that concerned them was one of "European 
economic disintegration, social demoralization, and political upheaval." 
	Following various recommendations from Kennan and Undersecretaries Acheson 
and Clayton, in June 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall delivered his famous 
Harvard speech announcing what has become known as the "Marshall Plan."  Marshall's 
speech emphasized the Europeans working together amongst themselves (but with 
American financial support and advice) to develop greater political and economic 
cohesion.  There was no mention urging the Europeans to increase their own defense or 
military cooperation.
	By 1948, many in Washington circles noted the continued hardening of Soviet 
positions toward the West.  In February, Moscow orchestrated a coup in Prague, raising 
alarm bells across Europe and the Atlantic of possible takeovers in Norway and Italy.  
While those in Europe feared the prelude to a Soviet attack, most Washington 
policymakers continued to believe the threat to be more political than military.  
Nevertheless, European threat perceptions fostered anxiety, and such fears could not be 
overlooked.  To help alleviate European fears, the State Department proposed an explicit 
commitment to defend Western Europe – but with caveats.  John Hickerson, chief of the 
State Department's Office of European Affairs, sought to assuage Congress that such a 
commitment would not include additional American troops on the Continent.  Instead, 
"Europeans would provide the manpower themselves."   Thus, what the US was 
promising with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 was the 
psychological reassurance the Europeans needed that American military might would be 
there if needed.  
	Kennan and others now worried that, with a treaty signing and legal commitment, 
the United States had formally conceded the division of Europe and had abandoned any 
hopes of fostering unity on the Continent.  Kennan believed that the US had cut off any 
chance to pursue "a real federal structure in Europe which would aim to embrace all free 
European countries, which would be a political force in its own right."  Instead of making 
Europe self-sufficient, allowing the United States to gradually withdraw from the 
responsibility of defending Europe, Kennan now saw the US forced into the "legal 
perpetuation of that responsibility."  According to Kennan, "In the long-run, such a 
legalistic structure must crack up on the rocks of reality; for a divided Europe is not 
permanently viable, and the political will of the US people is not sufficient to enable us to 
support western Europe indefinitely as a military appendage." 
	There were certainly influences in the State Department promoting European 
unity, even to the point of making it an independent (or at least, semi-independent) power 
center.  Hickerson had argued for the establishment of "a third force which was not 
merely the extension of US influence but a real European organization strong enough to 
say 'no' both to the Soviet Union and to the United States, if our actions should so 
require."  
Encouraging European defense autonomy also was supposed to allow the 
Europeans to graduate from dependence on American military and economic assistance.  
In the words of one historian:

Effective integration would enable the Europeans to stand on their own 
feet and allow the United States to reduce the scale of its aid to Europe, 
begun with the Marshall Plan and continued through military assistance to 
the NATO powers.  There was a danger, of course, that a United Europe 
might, over time, prove to be a rival to America, but Washington tended to 
see the perpetuation of European dependency as a greater long-term 
problem.   Partnership, not American dominion, was the objective.   

	Some scholars suggest that the US response was a dual-Containment one toward 
the existing threat from the Soviet Union and a potential one from a fully independent 
and rearmed Germany.     While this may be true, the response was more nuanced than 
that.  The manifestation of such containment was different.  The United States sought to 
contain the Soviets through blocking and counter-blocking moves and isolation.  With 
Germany, though, the Americans sought to contain through integration.  In other words, 
the US employed a containment-by-isolation strategy with the Soviets and containment-
by-engagement strategy with the Germans.
	In the American view, if the Germans gained full independence, there was a fear 
that Germany would be vulnerable to irredentism.   But, as some would argue, the greater 
fear was that Germany might either side with the Soviet Union or try to play the East off 
the West, thus aggrandizing itself while sapping Western efforts to confront the Soviets.   
In a conversation with Churchill in June 1954 before the fate of the EDC had been 
decided, Eisenhower told the British leader that "we could not afford to lose Germany 
even though we were to lose France."   The essential question was how to leverage 
German resources and strength without them posing a threat to the Alliance or 
Germany's neighbors?
	Convincing the Europeans to rearm for their own defense was another issue.  As 
Ambrose aptly describes, "To the Europeans, NATO meant a guarantee that the United 
States would not desert them, that they could count on the atomic bomb to deter the Red 
Army.  They could see little reason to rearm themselves.  Rearmament would merely 
provoke the Russians, they reasoned, without creating sufficient strength to repel them - 
at least without using atomic bombs - and if they were going to use atomic bombs, why 
rearm?"   The danger at the time was not of an immediate nuclear holocaust, but that the 
building up of conventional forces in Western Europe might tempt the Soviets into 
launching a pre-emptive war against the West.  With 175 armed divisions, this would be 
a war the Soviets would not lose on the ground.  NATO had only twelve divisions.  
Eisenhower argued that the Alliance could defend Western Europe with forty (later the 
number would be boosted to 96), only six of which needed to come from the United 
States. 

Crisis in Asia: Dilemma in Europe
The situation reached a crescendo in 1950, ironically, on the other side of the 
world from Europe – on the Korean peninsula.  Following the North Korean invasion of 
South Korea, the United States and its European allies feared that this might be the 
opening gambit of a global Soviet strategy to distract the US and conquer the European 
continent.  It was imperative to buttress the weak military forces in Europe, which were 
still recovering from the end of World War II.
	At the end of June 1950, the US had 122,158 military forces in Europe.   Just 
two years earlier, in 1948, there had been about 140,000 American troops.   The major 
concern in Western Europe following the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea 
was over command and control of NATO forces.  Up to that time, NATO's orientation 
had been toward planning, not commanding.  There was no unified way to conduct a 
Western defense given multiple armed forces under diverse command arrangements.  As 
Field Marshall Montgomery warned, "As things stand today, and in any foreseeable 
future, there would be scenes of appalling and indescribable confusion in Western Europe 
if we were ever attacked by the Russians." 
	Field Marshall Montgomery was not the only one to recognize the need for more 
integrated defense.   A number of leaders in Europe also wanted NATO to have a more 
permanent structure, but the US resisted, hoping to avoid further involvement in the 
defense of Europe.  In early June 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff – aware of growing 
European pressure for a NATO command – admitted that "we can no longer completely 
avoid approaching the question of a command organization under the North Atlantic 
Treaty."   The Korean War changed the US administration's reluctance almost 
overnight.
Given the initial hesitancy of the US role in developing an integrated command 
within NATO, the enthusiasm the Americans displayed toward its implementation may 
seem odd.  According to Pedlow:

Once the US position had swung over to strong advocacy, the United 
States seemed overly conscious of its new, postwar strength and at times 
showed little tolerance for the sensitivities of the other NATO members, 
as was clearly demonstrated in the handling of the SACLANT 
appointment and in the complicated naval command relationships that had 
to be developed in the Mediterranean because the United States was not 
willing to place the Sixth Fleet under a NATO command that was not 
headed by an American.  This stand was strongly influenced by American 
insistence on maintaining a direct chain of command over forces equipped 
with atomic weapons, but a belief that the United States' military strength 
entitled it to fill the key command positions also played a role. 


	However, to suggest that the United States promoted the increase of American 
military troops to reinforce its hegemony over Western Europe is to misread the elements 
of the debate.  Not all wanted to commit to such a step, even after the Korean War 
highlighted the Communist threat.  Others were equally or more concerned over the 
burden that such a move would have on the United States, both in terms of domestic 
freedom and economic prosperity.  According to Williams:

Taft was firm in his belief…that the United States should not assume the 
leadership in the "formation of a great international army" or appoint an 
American Commander in Chief as this would only encourage European 
pressures on Washington to enlarge its presence.  Commitments, he felt, 
could develop a life of their own - and it was essential to prevent this 
happening. 


Taft's view though was not purely isolationist.  His concern focused primarily on 
the trade-off between short-term exigencies and long-term principles.  For Taft, it was 
essential to set strict limits on the parameters of a US troop deployment to Europe.  
Without such "safeguards," Taft believed that the American commitment could quite 
easily escalate, resulting in an American military presence "more enduring and 
substantial than was either desirable or necessary."   As one can see, while no one 
disputed the Soviet threat, what was disputed was how to respond.  
Moreover, Taft's national interests differed from those of Truman and Acheson, 
reflecting different philosophical views of foreign affairs. More than most Republicans, 
Taft had a definitive alternative to the Truman/Acheson foreign policy.  His position was 
that the priority for American foreign policy should be its internal effect on America 
rather than the external impact on other nations.  As Williams describes: 

Taft's starting point for thinking about foreign policy was not the kind of 
world he would like to see, but the kind of America he wanted.  The 
Truman Administration, in contrast, began from the premise that the 
freedom of the United States was inseparable from that of its European 
allies, that security was indivisible for the members of the Atlantic Pact, 
and that the obligations and responsibilities shouldered by the United 
States from 1947 onwards had to be fulfilled regardless of how costly and 
burdensome this proved. 


	Taft was not unaware of the Communist threat.  In fact, he considered the threat 
to be of a long-term nature.  Thus, he feared that the surge in cost to support Western 
Europe would be too high price that in the end would drain American resources and 
reduce liberty by promoting big government and a large armed forces.   Again, 
compared to traditional isolationists, Taft would refrain from that association.  Rather, he 
argued that the United States should be a "good citizen" of the world, no more, no less.  
He was one of the first to warn against the dangers of overstretch and even the possible 
development of a "national security state" or what Eisenhower later referred to as the 
"military-industrial complex."  The strategy proposed by Taft was this: 

Priority was to be given to the defense and protection of America, the 
"Citadel" of the free world.  This entailed an American attempt to obtain 
control of both sea and air.  Taft was a strong advocate, therefore, of an 
expanded air force and argued that the strategic capabilities of the United 
States had been allowed to deteriorate as a result of the Administration's 
short-sightedness….   


Taft believed that building up the air force would prove a greater deterrent and 
more successful than a ground force build-up, which might actually have a counter-
productive effect, even to the point of possibly provoking the Soviets to conduct a pre-
emptive war before Western forces were prepared.
	Nevertheless, Taft recognized that the Administration's announcement of sending 
more US troops to Europe had to be honored, since the Allies' expectations had been 
raised.  Since it was too late to withdraw the offer, the next best step would be to tone 
down and limit the numbers, with more a token show of support in "the spirit of the 
Atlantic Pact" than actual major substantive increases.   
	In the end, by raising numerous questions over the role and limits of the 
Executive branch to deploy troops overseas, as well as the terms of the American security 
commitment to the defense of Europe, Taft introduced into the discourse many of the 
issues (most notably, the burden-sharing debate) that continue to this day.  It was in the 
context of debate over how high a price should the United States be willing to pay for its 
security and the role that Western Europe played in that security policy that the idea of 
the Europeans establishing their own defense force evolved.  It became a suitable 
political response, even if not an optimal military one.  Several prominent Republican 
congressmen were in the lead in suggesting that the Europeans should be pressured into 
providing more of their own defense, especially in terms of ground forces.  After all, the 
United States, according to these Republicans, was already providing the overwhelming 
bulk of naval and air forces in the defense of Europe.  Other, more internationalist 
Republicans, such as Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, felt that it should not be an 
either/or proposition.  Consequently, various formulas and ratios were argued, but what 
came out was that there should be a link between an American military contribution and 
the European one.  How the Europeans would do more was left open.

Germany: Problem and Solution? 
	This raised a big question in the minds of many: what to do about Germany?  
Resolving the "German question" was key to organizing a credible defense against a 
conventional Soviet threat.  Only Germany had the requisite troop numbers to add real 
teeth to the forces on the ground.  However, valid fears about German irredentism (above 
all in France) required a delicate handling of the situation.  So, the question was: how 
best to integrate Germany into the West without provoking potential negative responses 
in communist-laden countries such as France and Italy?  The psychological 
considerations had to be addressed.  Surveys revealed that, in some quarters, French 
respondents were more fearful of Germany than they were of the Soviet Union.  After all, 
the Germans had ravaged France three times within the living memory of some French.  
Such trauma is not easily forgotten – or forgiven.
	A solution was found in NATO.  In September 1950, at the Foreign Ministers 
meeting in New York, Secretary of State Acheson announced a revamping of NATO to 
include both an integrated military command and the introduction of German divisions 
within a unified NATO structure, subordinate to an American Supreme Allied 
Commander (SACEUR).  
	The proposal represented the optimal short-term solution to the "German 
problem" and most efficient from a military perspective.  Even the French military agreed 
that the NATO solution was best.  The nuclear guarantee was not nearly as established as 
many would believe, especially around 1950.   The advantage of the NATO plan was it 
would account for the French fear because the German contribution would be subsumed 
under a NATO integrated command, under the leadership of the American SACEUR.  
Unlike the EDC, the NATO plan would include the US and UK, which would ensure that 
Germany would not be in a position to threaten France.
	However, France was the only ally that did not approve the NATO solution at the 
time. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, who were trying to 
implement the Schuman Plan creating a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 
worried that Acheson's NATO proposal might jeopardize their European project.  If 
Germany regained its full sovereignty – including rearmament – then German enthusiasm 
for ECSC might wane.  Faced in September 1950 by the united Anglo-American front, 
Schuman insisted that the proposal needed to be vetted by the French Cabinet and 
brought before the entire Assembly as well.
	The resulting debate created a clash between logic and emotion.  For the 
Americans, the argument was straightforward: the Pentagon had calculated that NATO 
needed an additional twelve divisions (Congress had already agreed to the presence of 
four US divisions) to defend against a potential Soviet attack in central Europe.  Because 
of overseas obligations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, the French physically did not 
have the forces to fulfill that requirement.  Thus, the American perspective was that the 
US should be allowed to look to Germany. 
	The French also had a logical response, though it was a cover for the emotional 
trauma stemming from three German onslaughts in just over a generation.  The French 
response was as follows: Of course, German troops could be used to defend against a 
Soviet invasion, but the Americans were proposing the impossible – "a one-way army, a 
German legion built to march only East, never West."   This would be historically 
unprecedented, and there was no guarantee that Germany could or would remain a pliant 
tool of Western policy.  The French reminded Americans that Germany's rise to power 
came from its ability to toggle back and forth between Russia and Western Europe.  The 
fear was that Germany, after a few years, might outgrow the bounds imposed by the US 
and invade East Germany to try to unite Germany by force, sparking the very war with 
Russia that the West so fervently sought to avoid.   Therefore, the perfect French 
response to a question that could not be answered by either a "yes" or a "no" was 
"Europe."   The French responded, one month later in October 1950, with the Pleven 
Plan: what would become the European Defense Community.
	The Pleven Plan attempted to solve two separate problems of Germany at once by 
infusing them into one grand bargain solution.  The first was political, and the second 
was military.  Whereas the Americans treated them as distinct issues, the French 
managed to integrate them into the EDC concept.  The Pleven Plan was named after René 
Pleven, who had made his name originally as a Gaullist.  Ironically, the proposed ESDP 
fifty years later would also spring from Gaullist heritage.  However, the strongest 
resistance to the EDC had come from the communists on the left and the Gaullists on the 
right.
The American government's initial reaction was considerable skepticism toward 
the project.   After all, NATO had just been formed only a few years earlier in 1949 and, 
while there was a certain logic to the integration of European coal and steel sectors, the 
same logic was questioned when applied to European military integration.  American 
political officials in particular questioned the efficiency and nature of establishing a 
European army that would be answerable to a common assembly.  As one commentator 
noted, "By the time Jules Moch, the Defense Minister of France, had finished explaining 
the Pleven Plan to the NATO Council it was evident that Washington's second thoughts 
more accurately mirrored American official policy."  
	According to Secretary of State Acheson, both he and President Truman reacted 
with "consternation and dismay" to the proposal.  They concluded that the Pleven Plan 
was "hastily conceived without serious military advice and…unrealistic and 
undesirable."   As Walton describes:

Washington blew hot and cold. Secretary of State Acheson first welcomed 
the Pleven Plan as a means of lessening differences between the United 
States and France but on second thought recognized that acceptance of the 
French proposal meant an indefinite postponement in building the 
effective fighting force that America felt was necessary. 

	Not just political officials were doubtful.  US military planners also were 
skeptical of the practical defense implications of a European army where German units 
were integrated below the division level.  General Eisenhower initially hated the project, 
believing that it would actually produce disharmony and friction rather than unity, not to 
mention the plan being "militarily unsound and ineffective." He suspected that the French 
had introduced the plan hoping it would be rejected and thus either delay or prevent 
German rearmament. 
	From the French perspective, the British position was key to getting the 
Americans on board.  If the French could persuade London to participate, they might 
have a better chance of "softening American opposition."   However, the initial British 
response under the Labor government was not promising.  In a speech on October 31, 
1950, the British government pledged "full support toward building Europe's defenses 
within the Brussels Pact and NATO."   There was no mention of a European army or the 
need for one per se.  In fact, a House of Commons report in November 1950 was even 
more explicit, stating that the government would be "unable to accept the proposals put 
forward for a European Army and a European Minister of Defense" because such fell 
under NATO's purview.  The Pleven Plan would only result in "duplication, confusion 
and divided responsibility." 
	For the British, there remained a lingering doubt about US staying power and 
commitment to Western Europe.  What was interesting was how British Foreign Minister 
Eden viewed the permanence of NATO compared to a possible EDC.  Eden, whose 
political life included the decade of the 1930's American isolationism, worried that the 
US would get fed up with the Europeans and withdraw back to its shores.  The British 
Foreign Minister's main concern was the "haunting possibility that [America] may slip 
back into a new form of isolationism…and try to 'go it alone,' or, alternatively, be 
tempted to 'do a deal' with the other great Power in the world."   Eden came to view the 
Atlantic Alliance as a "temporary" coalition and had no assurance that the Americans 
would remain committed to Europe's defense.  Meanwhile, he considered a European 
army as a "permanent" force.   
	Eden's influence was revealed when Ernest Davies (the author of the earlier 
House of Commons report denouncing the European Army concept) announced that the 
"Government did not rule out altogether the possibility of a European Army being fitted 
into the pattern of the Atlantic defenses provided that there was no delay in building up 
Western defenses and no danger of weakening the security of the Atlantic Powers." 
	Despite reservations, the United States agreed to allow the French to explore their 
proposal.  However, the Americans continued to pursue the NATO solution.  Thus, for 
about 18 months, there were two sets of discussions on how to rearm Germany: the 
Pleven Plan in Paris and the NATO plan at the Petersberger Hof in Germany.  As one 
observer notes, "[T]hese discussions went their separate ways, like a two-ring circus, 
with spectators bobbing their heads back and forth to find out what was going on." 
	The discussions reflected different views of how to incorporate the German 
military potential.  In Paris, the French framed the desired outcome as one that essentially 
brought the Germans in almost as legionnaires, in small units of 3,000-4,000 and under 
an international flag.  Their potency as a massed force would be almost completely 
subsumed under the EDC rubric.  The French contribution, however, would remain 
unified as France's army in Europe until the very last moment, thus allowing Paris to 
maintain its dominance both in force terms as well as its control of the EDC military 
staff, comprised mostly by French officers. 
	Meanwhile, the talks in the Petersberg were much more focused on speed and 
military capacity.  This was much more in line with German and US Army desires.  As 
White notes, "The United States Army wanted German troops, flesh and blood soldiers, 
quickly, not a long philosophical discussion about the creation of a new superstate.  
Philosophers might talk at Paris, but soldiers talked at the Petersberger Hof."   
Moreover, military specialists remained skeptical that a multilingual fighting force was 
possible. 
	The contrast was stark. Whereas in Paris, the Germans would provide forces in 
3,000-4,000 person increments, in the Petersberg talks, Germany would contribute 
250,000 troops, twelve heavily armored divisions, complete with its own General staff 
and War Minister.  The equipment would be provided by the United States, until the 
Germans could resume their own armaments production. 
	The composition of the EDC was forty standing divisions.  Of those, 14 would be 
French; 12 German; 11 Italian; and 3 from the Benelux countries.  Soldiers would be led 
by their own nationality up to the division level.  After that, the nationalities would be 
mixed. 
	Some observers noted the consequences of promoting a new institution, even if 
that were to be an internal institution within NATO.  The fact that the UK and the United 
States were excluded from the institution suggested the seeds of NATO's own potential 
demise, since there was no guarantee that the continental Europeans would maintain 
similar interests as those in London or Washington.  
	Radical revision of the Pleven Plan made the EDC more palatable to the 
Americans.  Taking advantage of the transition following the June 1951 French elections, 
the Americans persuaded the French to accept a shift in the Plan.  The German units 
would be the same size as the French, and they would all be brought under control of the 
supranational authority simultaneously.  With the encouragement of Monnet, 
Eisenhower, and Bruce, the Americans moved the plan forward and made it possible.  
Eisenhower's staff at SHAPE formed the military structures, while Bruce's staff outlined 
the civilian and budget and political organization of the EDC. 
	Enthusiasm for the Pleven Plan waned as early as a year later, even in France.  
The very reason that the Pleven Plan was considered the superior route was that it would 
"solve" the German problem by incorporating German forces (and thus diluting their 
power) into a larger European force.  Yet, even as early as December 1951, French 
Defense Minister Jules Moch worried that the EDC concept had merely become "a 
camouflage for a revived Wehrmacht."   Thus, even at that stage, there were continued 
doubts about the EDC's ability to assuage French fears and fulfill American military 
goals.  Yet, the American position remained in favor of the Pleven Plan and EDC.
	In October 1951, the Conservatives regained power, which seemed to heighten 
French hopes that the British would join the EDC.  However, those hopes were soon 
crushed when, on November 28, 1951, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe told the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg that the UK would remain outside.  As 
Walton notes:

France and England seemed astonished at the other's action and in a real 
sense both camps had a measure of reason on their side.  The 
Conservatives had never once intimated that they would actually join a 
supranational authority and resented what they felt was a 
misrepresentation of their position.  On the other hand, the French had 
never made any attempt to conceal their interpretation of the Churchill 
motion as a supranational project and felt incensed that Churchill, the 
Prime Minister, was unwilling to support Churchill, the parliamentarian. 


	Some of the questions that lingered in 1952 after the EDC Treaty had been signed 
(but not ratified) reflected fundamental concerns over the practical nature of a 
supranational armed force operating during crisis.  For example, would the decision-
making structure, which required unanimity, prove to be too slow and bulky to be 
effective?  Would linguistic challenges create misunderstanding in the transmission of 
orders through the chain of command, with costly and catastrophic results?  Would the 
military formation of groupements, untested in war or peace, stand up to a potential 
invasion by seasoned Russian troops?  Would national troops be willing to cede 
homeland territory for tactical advantage?   All of these questions remained unanswered 
as the United States considered its policy position toward the EDC.
	The debate continued in Washington over how to view the EDC proposal.  
Ambassador to France David Bruce, an ardent Europhile and close confidant of Jean 
Monnet, favored it strongly, arguing that a European army would expedite the rearming 
of the Continent through European rather than national channels, thus fostering 
economies of scale and eliminating unnecessary duplication of limited resources.  Such 
an effort would meet US short-term needs and speed up the process of strengthening 
NATO by "reducing [the] number of its major elements to three: United States, Brit[ain], 
and Europe." 
	After receiving instructions from Washington to force the French to accept the 
Petersberg Plan to integrate German units directly into NATO, Bruce wrote his own 
"long telegram" on July 3, 1951, where he responded to the EDC critics.  In it, Bruce 
outlined why the Pleven Plan (in addition to the Schuman Plan for the European Coal and 
Steel Community) actually would lead the French to accept German parity with France.  
According to Bruce, the "French must recognize that German integration with European 
community through Schuman Plan and European Army must be their main safeguards."  
Bruce went on to argue that US leverage with the French would be lost if Washington 
rejected the Pleven Plan, thus causing a huge break in the relationship with France.  In 
Bruce's words, "Such rift in Atlantic community would be most damaging and great 
opportunity would have been missed to create real situation of strength in Europe, 
perhaps for period far into future."   The cable from Bruce, along with an endorsement 
from SACEUR Eisenhower and backing from McCloy in Germany, seemed to work, 
because a month later, Acheson reversed his position.  
	Once it was clear that France would not accept the NATO plan, others – including 
the US and UK turned their attention to the EDC, despite the obvious drawbacks.  
Acheson concluded that the United States might be able to accept the EDC, but only if it 
"did not detract from NATO's strength and did not delay Germany's contribution to the 
defense forces of Western Europe….The European army and its command structure had 
to be strictly integrated within NATO."   In other words, there would be no autonomous 
European command.  The EDC would be a pillar within the Atlantic Alliance – but not 
separate from it.
Even after the agreement for EDC, it was an uphill battle for Americans 
promoting it.  According to Lankford: 

At a high-level NATO meeting, Bruce found himself "almost its sole 
upholder" when the subject of EDC came up within the American 
delegation.  He urged State to forget about alternatives and to pressure 
"participants to bring matter to conclusion as rapidly as possible."  He 
called the NATO Council's ratification of EDC "the most significant 
political action (outside of war) taken in Europe for centuries."  He knew 
the critical point would come later when individual parliaments voted on 
the plan, and he anguished over what he called Washington's insensitivity 
to French concerns and the Pentagon's pro-German attitudes. 


	According to one biographer, "The decision to back the EDC happened because 
American Europeanists, mainly Bruce, Eisenhower, and McCloy, saw a vision of long-
term benefit in the military as well as the economic integration of Europe." 

Delay…delay…delay… 
	Following a bogged down, drawn out negotiating and ratification process 
(delayed most conspicuously in the French assembly), the future of the EDC languished 
as world events changed.  The Korean War ended in armistice, Stalin died, and no assault 
came in Europe from Russia.  The changing international circumstances had an impact on 
French and German views of EDC, most notably in terms of diminishing the sense of 
urgency for incorporating German troops into Western defense.  The French were 
growing weary of their military efforts in Southeast Asia and increasingly felt the weight 
of their overseas commitment in Africa.  Some in Paris also feared that, because of these 
overseas military obligations, the Germans might come to dominate the EDC over time.  
Such a prospect worried many swing voters in the French Assembly.
	New governments existed in both Washington and London.  There was a marked 
contrast toward the EDC between the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations.  Chief of 
Staff Bradley had thought the EDC was impractical and militarily inoperable.  Acheson 
had allowed for grudging support, primarily based on the benefits to US-French relations.  
Eisenhower, on the other hand, recognized the political and economic benefits of 
favoring the EDC. Even before becoming President, Eisenhower came to believe that 
European unification would solve many of the problems facing him, both in terms of 
alleviating the drain on American resources, promoting the security of Western Europe in 
the long-term, and facing up to the Soviet threat.  As he told Averell Harriman, "Every 
day brings new evidence that Western Europe must coalesce both politically and 
economically, or things will get worse instead of better.  It seems remarkable that all 
European political leaders recognize the truth of this statement but just sit down and do 
absolutely nothing about it." 
Once he had decided, Eisenhower proceeded to tout the European army idea, from 
public speeches to Senate testimony.   For example, testifying before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Sub-Committee in July 1951, Eisenhower argued:

I believe in it this much – when I came over here [to Europe] I disliked the 
whole idea of a European Army, and I had enough troubles without it.  
However,…I made up my mind to go into the thing with both feet…and I 
realize that a lot of my professional associates are going to think I am 
crazy.  But I tell you that joining Europe together is the key to the whole 
question! 

	By the time Eisenhower found himself in the White House, domestic arguments 
for supporting the EDC added to his conviction.  Here was a chance for the 
Administration to scale back its resource commitments, develop geo-political flexibility, 
all at the marginal relative cost of power.   In fact, the Eisenhower Administration took 
the original French-inspired Pleven Plan and turned it into an American one, becoming 
essentially more converted than the original creators themselves. 
	By the summer of 1953 – the critical run-up to the now famous rejection by the 
French assembly in 1954 – US agitation over the EDC situation was making European 
allies nervous.  There were rumors that the US was considering a redeployment of US 
forces in Europe.  Admiral Arthur Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was 
considered to be one of the leading figures to be "beating the tom-toms" on 
redeployment. 
	The other element was the reconsideration of the use of nuclear weapons to 
defend Europe.  Three factors influenced Eisenhower's thinking in this regard.  First, he 
sought to reduce the high defense budget he inherited from the previous administration.  
Second, he believed that, from a military standpoint, the US should rely less on quantity 
(hundreds of aircraft employing conventional munitions) and more on quality (i.e., 
tactical nuclear weapons).  Finally, it was important for Eisenhower to avoid making the 
impression that the United States planned a fixed and permanent presence in Europe.  He 
continued to stress that Europe should be primarily responsible for its own security.  
From his perspective, it was not "possible – and most certainly not desirable – that 
Europe should be an occupied territory defended by legions brought in from abroad, 
somewhat in the fashion that Rome's territory vainly sought security many hundreds of 
years ago."   Although redeployment of US forces in Europe was a long-term US 
government goal, Eisenhower wanted to keep it quiet lest such a move create anxiety 
among the European allies, reduce NATO cohesion, and kill the concept of the EDC (and 
thus force the Americans to remain on the Continent). 
	The latter half of 1953 proved a difficult time.  Secretary of State Dulles issued 
his famous "agonizing reappraisal" message in Paris in December 1953, a statement that 
reverberated throughout Europe.   President Eisenhower was upset because it went 
contrary to a National Security Council meeting earlier that month, where it was agreed 
that only the President would speak publicly to US troop considerations.   The first order 
was to ensure the establishment of the EDC.  Any hint of a change in US policy towards 
Europe would have the potential of "important psychological implications" in Europe.   
Therefore, was this a failure of diplomacy?  Or was it a calculated political risk, designed 
to exert leverage on a divided French assembly?  If it was a deliberate effort on Dulles' 
part to sway the French, it seems to have backfired.  The initial response in France was to 
galvanize the anti-EDC lobby.
	The difference between selling the Schuman Plan and selling the Pleven Plan of 
EDC rested in persuading the French.  However, unlike the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the EDC concept was much more complex.  As one observer at the time 
noted, "It has become too complex in detail for ordinary people to understand its critical 
essence, and thus the politicians who support it have difficulty rallying popular 
support."   Moreover, while the institutional structures and logic of the ECSC and EDC 
were comparable, they led to different implications.   According to the same observer: 

The Schuman Plan could be explained to Frenchmen as an act of common 
sense, for one could bring the delinquent back to decency only by giving 
him a decent opportunity to earn a decent living.  But it was something 
else to give a delinquent Germany arms again so swiftly after she had so 
shockingly abused them.    

	In the end, what it proved was the limit of executive influence by one government 
on the legislative assembly of another.  The United States had a goal of the EDC; yet, it 
failed to persuade the French assembly – the one legislature yet to have ratified – to 
confirm the project.  Thus, American government policy was blunted, and Washington – 
as well as the West – needed to find an alternative.  As the French government continued 
to delay the debate and vote on the EDC Treaty in the assembly, American and British 
frustration grew.  For example, in March 1954, after Prime Minister Laniel once more put 
off the EDC debate, Dulles was "deeply disturbed," and the British foreign minister was 
"furious."   There was increasing concern that such delay would spillover into US 
congressional views toward troops and money in Europe, as well as fostering pressure on 
Germany and in the Alliance as a whole.
	The response to that frustration was to move as close as possible to reassure the 
French of US and British commitment to the defense of Western Europe.  Thus, virtually 
the entire defense of the West was held hostage to the whims of the French assembly.  
For its part, London beefed up its commitment to associate with the EDC, including the 
promise to put a British division under an EDC commander.  Washington agreed to keep 
American troops in Europe, reinforcing its commitment to NATO and calling for a close 
relationship between NATO and the EDC.   It seemed that the French held all the cards.  
If France did not agree, there was greater fear that Germany would be lost to the Soviets 
(or neutralism), and Germany was the key for defending the West.
	Thus, with so much at stake, it seemed remarkable that the United States was 
unable to exert greater pressure on Paris to follow through.  It was as if the US could go 
only so far, just as Washington had failed to persuade London to take the lead in 
European integration a few years earlier.
	In the United States, the domestic constraints were considerable.  While the 
hardening of the US position toward France in the spring of 1954 reflected frustration 
from French vacillation on EDC over the previous two years, it also stemmed from the 
situation in Congress, specifically the approaching consideration of the Mutual Security 
Budget for Fiscal Year 1955.  What was at stake was the Richards Amendment, which 
specifically prohibited military assistance to those EDC countries that had not ratified the 
treaty (e.g., France), while giving full assistance to non-EDC NATO countries such as the 
UK.  State Department officials predicted that, if France did not ratify the EDC by the 
time hearings on the Budget began in April, "our 'agonizing reappraisal' will occur but in 
the most explosive place – the floor of the Congress."    Thus, to add pressure to French 
ratification, as well as stave off Congressional action, the State Department 
recommended "shock treatment" for the French by having the administration support the 
Richards Amendment.  

Asia – Again 
	Just as the situation with the EDC appeared to reach a climax in the spring of 
1954, events in Asia once more provided a critical external factor into the equation.  This 
time it was Vietnam.  The French were seeking to withdraw honorably after the loss at 
Dien Bien Phu in May.  The Americans were not happy, interpreting the French 
administration's preoccupation with Geneva peace negotiations yet again as another 
delaying tactic.   According to one historian: 

The Americans were frustrated by this latest source of delay and some in 
Washington thought the French might be "deliberately stalling" on the 
EDC in order to improve their negotiating hand at Geneva….But the 
French, concluding that their negotiating hand with the Soviets vis-à-vis 
Indochina would be stronger if they appeared to retain the power to veto 
German rearmament, seemed ready to risk arousing Washington's 
displeasure. 


	The Americans were worried that if there was too much pressure on the Laniel 
government, his coalition might fall, and the consequent government might not be so pro-
EDC as Laniel's was.   The domino theory was not limited to the spread of communism 
in Indochina.  As Dulles warned, "We must be on our guard lest Indochina also carry 
[the] European Defense Community down the drain." 
	It seemed that the issue of national identity was preoccupying France just as 
everyone else needed the French to sacrifice some of their sovereignty for the sake of the 
EDC.  The collapse of Vietnam and the pooling of forces for the EDC would be too 
much.  Dulles remarked, "France seems to be deteriorating as a great power and losing 
capacity to govern itself or to deal with its problems."    Reaction to France's defeat at 
Dien Bien Phu was "out of all proportion to its military importance."  Its loss symbolized 
the shattered image of a country having totally lost all confidence in itself and a metaphor 
to the "collapse of French will, in relation both to Indochina and EDC."   The irony was 
that Paris seemed to be the pivotal player in those decisions affecting US national 
security strategy not just in Europe but also in Asia.  Washington was dependent on 
France, despite the prominence of American military and economic power.  American 
leverage seemed to be insufficient to move the French assembly.  For example, by the 
spring of 1954, the United States "was underwriting around 75 percent of the total 
financial cost of the French war effort" and did not want to squander that investment. 
	On July 13, 1954, as the pressure built on France to move on EDC, Dulles met 
with Mendès-France.  Dulles implied that if France did not support EDC – and soon – the 
United States might just do what Eden had feared and "write off what we have tried to do 
to build up the defensive strength of Western Europe as a noble but unproductive 
experiment."  Dulles implied that he would recommend the US opt for a "peripheral form 
of defense involving the UK, Spain, Greece, Turkey and other peripheral countries," as 
Congress and the Pentagon preferred.   
	Mendès-France found himself in a corner.  In order to relieve domestic pressure 
and external pressure from the US, he tried to foist the eventual blame for any failure of 
EDC onto his European partners.  On August 19, 1954, all the EDC powers met in 
Brussels.  At that gathering, the French proposed major modifications, changes they 
knew the other powers would almost certainly reject. In essence, France was asking 
everyone to alter the very nature of the EDC in both form and content.
	The level of frustration in Washington continued to build.  According to Ruane:

Ultimately, what probably irritated the Eisenhower administration most 
was the new French Premier's determination to put his country's interests 
before those of the United States….In many ways, therefore, 1954 was the 
year that "France finally declared its independence of Washington," with 
Mendès-France sowing the seeds that de Gaulle would later reap. 

	What probably made matters worse was that the United States had committed all 
its energies into the EDC, with no fallback position.  In other words, Eisenhower had no 
contingency plan to France and the EDC.  Churchill criticized the Americans for their 
"obstinate adherence" to EDC and "natural reluctance to countenance any competitive 
idea." 
	In the end, the Americans had focused on the French, hoping they would take the 
lead on European defense.  However, with French vacillation in the 1950's culminating 
with their ultimate rejection of the EDC, American confidence in French leadership was 
permanently lost.  A plan conceived in peace for an imminent war that never came, the 
EDC fell victim to French domestic politics too powerful for the United States to 
overcome.
	
What About Today?
	There are at least four lessons that can be drawn from the review of how the US 
approached the European Defense Community that are relevant for today's transatlantic 
relations.

Lesson One: Threat perceptions differ from threat responses.  By 1953, all had agreed on 
the threat Soviet aggression posed.  However, there were degrees of difference on how 
best to respond to the threat, and for some, the Soviet Union itself was not the sole threat.  
Consequently, uncertainty and friction developed between the US and European allies 
over how best to counter the threat.  The battle over ratification of the EDC is one such 
example.  For the US, it represented an opportunity to build on the previous efforts to 
force Franco-German reconciliation and promote European unity.  The US fervently tried 
to persuade the French to take the lead in European security affairs and became frustrated 
when Paris wavered.  The Americans were in the midst of a defense review, seeking to 
reposition their forces out of Europe, primarily to save money.  
For France, the EDC was more than just to counter the Soviet threat.  It also 
represented an abdication of sovereignty and another step in the decline from empire.  
The French also feared the re-emergence of German military might.  Thus, the conflation 
of these interests (Soviet threat, German threat, and sovereignty threat) meant that the 
French were unwilling to respond in a way that the Americans desired.  Since the 
Americans pushed only one option – the EDC – there was no flexibility on alternative 
means for countering the threat.
	Similarly, there is general consensus regarding the dangers posed by transnational 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed or fragile states.  There 
needs to be more thorough discussions on how best to respond to those threats. 

Lesson Two: Understanding one another is vital, including appreciating the role of 
domestic politics.
	At the NAC ministerial on December 14, 1953, Secretary of State Dulles 
delivered a speech where he stated that, if the Europeans did not ratify the EDC, the US 
would be forced into an "agonizing reappraisal" of its policy toward Europe.  In a 
telegram only a month before, Ambassador to France Dillon urged Dulles to be careful 
about how the US position was presented.  He wrote, "I feel that it is not fully effective to 
picture EDC ratification as primarily a great crisis for France.  In particular, I worry 
about telling the French that if they do not ratify by some date, they will lose European 
leadership.  I also worry about telling them that non-ratification will force the United 
States to change its policy which has heretofore favored France….I am afraid that talk of 
this kind might…not have the hoped for effect."  Later on, Dillon advises, "a straight 
presentation of the bad results for France could lead in many cases to resentment and 
stubbornness….I realize that this may sound like hair splitting, but in the super-charged 
emotional atmosphere that is beginning to build up here, I feel that even nuances of 
presentation can have determining importance."   Dulles and others exhibited growing 
frustration with French intransigence and decided to do exactly what Dillon had urged 
him not to do.  Consequently, the French assembly turned the EDC ratification as an 
attack on France rather than a threat to Western security.  Threats to France did not 
persuade the French to give in but only made them dig in their heels and resist greater.  
 
Lesson Three: Recognize the collateral effect of the rhetoric and positive effect of 
symbolic gestures.
	A similar and related lesson to be drawn is the impact of rhetoric on the overall 
relationship.  Dulles' initial effort as Secretary of State was to project an image of a 
strong America prepared to defend itself and its allies against Soviet aggression by any 
means, including and especially nuclear weapons.  However, this strategy ironically had 
the unintended consequence of creating fear and anxiety among European allies 
regarding US intentions. 
	Differences between Americans and Europeans over the value of using nuclear 
weapons to deter all war (not just general) became clear and divisive.  In January 1954, 
the Eisenhower administration unveiled its new national security strategy.  This strategy 
promoted "more security at less cost," which meant a greater reliance on deterrence (and 
nuclear weapons) than ever before.  Yet, to the Europeans, it looked like a withdrawal 
and provoked new anxieties.  According to one historian, "America's nuclear weaponry, 
for all its sheer destructiveness, did not possess anything like the psychological and 
symbolic value of large manpower deployments."   Unlike today, it was the mass army 
that instilled fear and respect in the minds of the enemy and comfort and security for 
allies, not the atomic bomb.  The Administration's "New Look" was scary to the 
Europeans, who feared that the Americans would remove the comfort of troops for the 
bulls-eye of nuclear weapons.  As Dulles acknowledged at an NSC meeting on 10 
December 1953, "While we regarded atomic weapons as one of the great new sources of 
defensive strength, many of our allies regarded atomic capability as the gateway to 
annihilation."   
	The consequence of this situation was that American statements designed to 
encourage the Europeans had the boomerang effect of creating additional fear of US 
intentions and apathy about contributing to European defense among the very 
governments the US had sought to reassure.  As Dockrill notes, "[A]lthough Dulles and 
[SACEUR] Gruenther had hoped to strengthen European morale by emphasizing the 
importance of the contribution of American nuclear weapons to European security, this 
emphasis was, in fact, likely to have the opposite effect." 
	Similarly, in the fight against terrorism, strong rhetorical statements may have the 
counter-productive effect of reducing support from allies.  Small gestures of consultation 
would go a long way in making clear the purpose and intent of US action.  Reintegrating 
the military tool with other national security policy instruments (diplomatic, 
informational, and economic) for maximum effect also is necessary.  

Lesson Four: Flexibility is a two-way street.
Some have argued that the US and Europe are tied together by democratic values 
and common history.   Others note the important role that economics and investment 
play in the relationship.   While these arguments are important, few have made the 
argument that the US and Europe are linked by a "security interdependence" – that is not 
tied to the Soviet threat.  By this, I mean the notion that the Americans and Europeans 
still need one another even after the end of the Cold War.  America cannot deny its 
European heritage.  Europe cannot deny its American debt.  The costs of going it alone 
are too high in patterns of repeated transactions.  The quality of the relationship is such 
that, defections may be necessary, but they are counterproductive in the long run.  The 
US and Europe need to work together to develop such flexible cooperation.
	What Americans and Europeans need to do is restore the politics of trust.  If the 
most powerful fails to restrain its power, what is the impact of building resentment 
among the weak?  Dulles learned that sometimes threats alone are insufficient to carry the 
day.  The administration became torn between its desire to take a tough stand with the 
Soviets by emphasizing nuclear deterrence and retaining allied loyalty.  In the end, the 
administration compromised on the rhetoric, softened its approach, in order to maintain 
alliance cohesion.   Such compromise worked in the end.  Although Dulles's hope for 
the EDC died in 1954, he did permit the British to offer a plan to bring Germany fully 
into NATO while respecting French concerns over sovereignty and German irredentism.  
He recognized the value of flexible cooperation.  Similarly, the two sides need to find 
ways to compromise tactically (in the spirit of confidence building) in order to not lose 
sight of the big picture.  The stakes are too high to fail.



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  The author is a visiting research fellow at the National Defense University's Institute for National 
Strategic Studies in Washington, DC.  He is on leave from the Department of State where he specializes in 
European Union affairs.  The following are his personal views and do not reflect the official positions of 
NDU or the Department of State.
   NSC 204th meeting, 24 June 1954, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-54, Vol. 5 (Washington, 
DC: USGPO, 1983), 690-695 (hereafter FRUS).
  For example, see Erik Jones, "Debating the Transatlantic Relationship: Rhetoric and Reality," 
International Affairs 80 (2004): 595-612.
  See Melvyn Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold 
War, 1945-1948," American Historical Review 89 (April 1984), 346-381.  Also, Alan Milward, The 
Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); and Olav 
Riste, ed., Western Security: The Formative Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
  Robert Harkavy, "The Changing Strategic and Technological Basis, 1945-1962," in Simon Duke and 
Wolfgang Krieger (eds.) US Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970 (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1993), 43.
  Harkavy, 45.
  For good analyses of the debates over American foreign policy during the early years after the end of 
World War II, see George Quester, American Foreign Policy: The Lost Consensus (New York: Praeger, 
1982); and John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American 
National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
   See US Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Overall Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military Bases and Rights," 
JCS 570 Series, Joint War Plans Committee 361/5 (Washington, DC: September 4, 1945).  
  Harkavy, 49.
  Kevin Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defense Community, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
2000), 25.
  Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe (London: Macmillan, 1993), 7.  
Also, see Pierre Mélandri, Les Etats-Unis face à l'unification de l'Europe, 1945-1954 (Paris: Pedone, 
1980), 27.
  Alvin Hansen and Jacob Viner, "American Interests in the Economic Unification of Europe with Respect 
to Trade Barriers," (14 September 1942). Quoted in Winand, 8.
  Winand, 8.
  See "How Would Political Unification of Europe Affect the Interests of the United States?" 
Subcommittee on Problems of European Organization of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign 
Policy, (US Department of State, The Records of Harley A. Notter, Record Group 59, National Archives, 
Washington, DC, Box 84, R63c, December 10, 1943); and "How Would Closer Economic and Political 
Collaboration of Europe Affect the Interests of the United States?" (US Department of State, Records of 
Harley A. Notter, RG 59, Box 84, R63d, January 21, 1944).  Quoted in Winand, 8.
  Donald Cook, Forging the Alliance: NATO, 1945-1950 (London: Seeker and Warbung, 1989), 6.
  Ibid., 10.
  Leffler, "United States and Strategic Dimensions of Marshall Plan," 279.  Also, see John Lewis Gaddis, 
The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia Univeristy Press, 
1972); and Melvin Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and 
the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).
  Winand, 19.  Also, quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold 
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 63. 
  Kennan Draft Memorandum for Marshall and Lovett, Policy Planning Staff Records (Box 27, Europe 
1947-1948, September 26, 1948).  Quoted in Gaddis, Long Peace, 63.  Also, quoted in Winand, 19.
  Hickerson Memorandum of Conversation with Lord Inverchapel, FRUS 1948, vol. 3 (January 21, 1948), 
11.  Quoted in Winand, 15.
 Ruane, 25-26.
  See Geir Lundestad, "Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), chapter 1; and Ruane, 1-15.
  See Ronald Pruessen, "Cold War Threats and America's Commitment to the European Defense 
Community: One Corner of a Triangle," Journal of European Integration History (Spring 1996): 51-69.  
Also, Lundestad, "Empire" by Integration. 
  FRUS 1952-44: V.1, (Memorandum of Conversation Eisenhower-Churchill, 27 June 1954), 985-987.
  Stephen Ambrose, Americans at War (Jackson: University of Mississippi, 1997), 178.
  Ibid., 181-182.
   "Deployment of Military Personnel by Country," U.S. Department of Defense, Washington 
Headquarters Services. Available at http://www.whs.mil/mmid/military/history/hst0650.xls, accessed 
October 22, 2004.
  Cook, 32.
  Quoted in Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954 (Paris: NATO Information Service, 
1955), 30.
  Gregory Pedlow, "The Politics of NATO Command, 1950-1962," in Simon Duke and Wolfgang Krieger 
(eds.) US Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 
16.
  Pedlow, 41-42.
  Phil Williams, The Senate and US Troops in Europe (London: Macmillan, 1985), 55.
  Ibid.
  Ibid., 52.
   For more on Taft's views on American foreign policy, see his own book, Robert Taft, A Foreign Policy 
for Americans (New York: Doubleday, 1951).  Also useful is J.P. Armstrong, "The Enigma of Senator Taft 
and American Foreign Policy," Review of Politics 17 (April 1955): 206-231.
  Williams, 53.
  Ibid., 54.
  See Ernest May, "The Impact of Nuclear Weapons on European Security 1945-1957," in Rolf Ahmann 
et. al. (eds.) The Quest for Stability (London: Oxford University Press, 1993).
  See Williams, Senate and US Troops in Europe; Simon Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, eds., US Military 
Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); and Theodore 
White, Fire in the Ashes: Europe in Mid-Century  (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1953). 
  White, 267-268.
  Ibid., 268.
  Ibid.
  Much of the debate in the United States focused on the utility of building up European ground forces to 
protect against a Soviet challenge, especially compared to other means of defense, such as air power and 
nuclear weapons.  For example, see Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical 
Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York: Knopf, 1951).  Still others expressed a sense of 
defeatism even toward attempting to build up European defenses at all, arguing that to do so would only 
invite an aggressive Soviet response.  For a useful overview of various strands of the debate at the time, see 
Lawrence Kaplan, "NATO and its Commentators: The First Five Years," International Organization 8 
(November 1954): 447-467.
  Clarence Walton, "Background for the European Defense Community," Political Science Quarterly 68 
(March 1953), 55.
  Dean Acheson, The Struggle for a Free Europe (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1971), 142-143.  
Also quoted in Winand, 27.
  Walton,  54-55.
  Winand, 27-28.
  Walton, 55.
  Ibid.
  Quoted in Walton, 56.
  Ruane, 76-77.
  For more on Eden's views of the permanence of the American commitment to European defense, see 
(Lord Avon) Anthony Eden, Memoirs: Full Circle (London: Cassell, 1960). Also, see David Dutton, 
Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation (London: Arnold, 1997).
  House of Commons, Debates, vol. 481, c. 1333.  Quoted in Walton, "Background," 57.
  White, 269.
  See Edward Fursdon, European Defense Community: A History, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 
especially chapter 5, and White, Fire in the Ashes, 269-272.
  White, 270.
  Walton, 58.
  See Fursdon, 168-174.  Also, see White, Fire in the Ashes.
  White, 280.  Also, see Fursdon, 160-161; and Walton, 67.
  Although acknowledging the global interests and demands of the United States and British Empire, 
Lionel Robbins argued the dangers of developing institutions within institutions, especially if the UK 
remained excluded.  See Lionel Robbins, "Towards the Atlantic Community," Lloyds Bank Reivew 
(London: New Series 17, July 1950): 1-25.  Advancing a French neutralist position, Jacques Gascuel  
welcomed the potential of a continental supranational community, but his argument – that the new 
European polity would emerge as a powerful neutral bloc, leave NATO, and mediate between the 
Americans and the Soviets – only reinforced the fears of those who argued against such a path.  See 
Jacques Gascuel, "Vers une politique européene," Politique Étrangère 15 (September 1950): 437-446.  For 
references to others who worried that promoting a supranational European polity would create a new "Holy 
Roman Empire" that would destroy NATO, see Kaplan, "NATO and its Commentators." 
  White, 275.  For more on the role of Eisenhower's staff at SHAPE, see Robert Wood, "The First Year of 
SHAPE," International Organization 6 (May 1952), 175-191.
  Walton, 61.
  Ibid., 62.
  Ibid., 69.
  FRUS 1951 (Vol. 3, part 1), 805-812. Quoted in Winand, 28.  
  Quoted in Nelson D. Lankford, The Last American Aristocrat: The Biography of Ambassador David K.E. 
Bruce (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1996), 232.  Also, Martin Herz, David Bruce's "Long Telegram" of 
July 3, 1951 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1978), 19.
  For more on the impact of American mixed messages toward European integration, see F.S.C. Northrop, 
"United States Foreign Policy and Continental European Union," Harvard Studies in International Affairs 
4 (February 1954): 7-35; and Hojo Holborn, "American Foreign Policy and European Integration," World 
Politics 6 (October 1953): 1-30.
  Winand, 27.
  Lankford, 234.  See also FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 5 (January 3, 1952), 574.
  Lankford, 233.
  Quoted in Ambrose, Americans at War, 182-183.
  Fursdon, 118-119.
  Ernst Hans van der Beugel, European Integration as a Concern of American Foreign Policy 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing, 1966), 272-273.  Also quoted in Fursdon, 119.
  For more on Eisenhower's thinking, see Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower the President (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1984). Also, see Louis Glambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. NATO and the 
Campaign of 1952: XII (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
  For more on this point, see John Hulsman, "The Guns of Brussels: Burden Sharing and Power Sharing 
with Europe," Policy Review (June/July 2000), 35-49.
  Ruane, 63.
  Galambos, 369.  Also, see Winand, 36; and Ruane, 64.
  FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 5, 435.
  For analysis on Dulles' statement, see Brian Duchin, "Agonizing Reappraisal: Eisenhower, Dulles, and 
the European Defense Community," Diplomatic History 16 (1992): 201-221.
  Ruane, 67-68.
  Ibid., 66.
  White, 280.
  Ibid., 267.
  Ruane, 74.
  Ibid., 75.
  Quoted in Ruane, 81.
  Ruane, 81-82.
  Ibid., 84.
  Quoted in Ruane, 85.
  Ibid.
  FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. 5, 941.  Also, quoted in Ruane, 85.  For background on US-French relations at 
this time, see Lawrence Kaplan et. al. eds., Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations 
1954-1955 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1990).
  Ruane, 85.
  Ibid., 92.  See also, Winand, 54-59.
  Ruane, 95; See also Irwin Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 187.
  Quoted in Ruane, 104.
  FRUS 1952-1954, 5.
  Ruane, 78.  See also Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961 
(London: Macmillan, 1996); and Williams, Senate and US Troops.
  Saki Dockrill, "Cooperation and Suspicion: The United States' Alliance Diplomacy for the Security of 
Western Europe, 1953-1954," Diplomacy and Statecraft 5 (1994), 163. 
  Ibid.
  For example, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995).
  For a recent example, see Daniel Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan, Partners in Prosperity: The Changing 
Geography of the Transatlantic Economy (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2004).
  Dockrill, "Cooperation and Suspicion," 165.


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