Andreas Maurer  / Daniela Kietz / Christian Völkel

Interinstitutional Agreements in the CFSP: 
Parliamentarisation through the Backdoor? 

Introduction
One of the key features of the EU's constitutionalisation process has been the incremental 
parliamentarisation – i.e. the increased delegation of supervisory, budgetary and legislative 
powers to the European Parliament (EP) – of more and more policy fields since the Single 
European Act (SEA) in 1987. In four Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) – 1985/1987, 
1991/1993, 1996/1999, and 2000 – the EP has seen its own position strengthened.  To date, 
there have been few attempts to understand this process of parliamentarisation.  
Proponents of intergovernmentalism argue that the European Union (EU)'s constitutional 
order "has developed through a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains" and that the 
"most fundamental task facing a theoretical account of European Integration is to explain 
these bargains".  Viewed in this way, the strengthening of the EP depends solely on member 
states interests, which are negotiated at IGCs. However, both the underlying rationale and 
the importance ascribed to IGCs for the constitutional development have increasingly come 
under attack. On the one hand, it has been stressed that on the basis of the rationalist logic of 
consequentialism it is impossible to explain the at least partial parliamentarisation of the EU. 
Indeed, why should governments, which want to maximise their national interests, agree to 
create and empower a supranational parliament, whose powers could conflict with their 
own? On the other hand, it has been argued that IGCs do not act on a tabula rasa. Instead, 
existing institutional arrangements and practices of co-operation predetermine the outcomes 
of the negotiation process. Consequently, the EU's institutional development should not 
simply be seen as the result of isolated, free-standing interstate bargains but rather as the 
product of continuous process of informal and formal Treaty revision, with IGCs often 
merely formalising existing practices.  Looked at this way, the process of 
parliamentarisation occurs through developments which take place between IGCs. But how 
exactly does parliamentarisation between IGCs occur? 
This paper tackles the puzzle of parliamentarisation by analysing the role of Interinstitutional 
Agreements (IIAs). The number of IIAs concluded between the EP, the Commission and the 
Council has sharply risen since the Maastricht Treaty.  IIAs are designed to facilitate 
interinstitutional co-operation and prevent conflicts between the institutions. However, IIAs 
are more than just pragmatic answers to interinstitutional co-operation problems since they 
tend to strengthen the EP's position in the EU's constitutional set-up by expanding the EP's 
control, information and legislative competencies, and placing it on an equal footing with the 
Council. 
We restrict our analysis of the role of IIAs in the parliamentarisation process to the field of 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This is no arbitrary choice. The EU's 
intergovernmental second pillar as opposed to the communitarised first pillar, has always 
provided advocates of intergovernmentalism with an excellent example of the member 
states' dominance at the EU level. Following intergovernmentalist reasoning, it is here that 
one would expect to find the least delegation of powers to the EP. As we will see, however, 
even in the strongly intergovernmental CFSP, the EP has gained considerable ground. By 
tracing the process of negotiations leading to the conclusion of the IIA on the financing of 
the CFSP in 1997, we show how the EP slowly, and outside the formal Treaty revision 
procedure at IGCs, managed to increase its information and consultation rights and subject 
the CFSP to a transparent and reliable budgetary process. We suggest that the 
parliamentarisation of European foreign policy did not only take place during IGCs that lead 
to formal amendments of the Treaties. It is our main hypothesis that IIAs, which are part of 
the informal sphere of EU politics and are agreed upon between IGCs, have been crucial 
instruments for the extension of parliamentary competencies in this field. 
The subsequent analysis is divided into four sections. The first presents IIAs from a 
legal point of view. The second part gives a short account of different approaches to the 
EU's constitutional development of which the parliamentarisation process is an important 
feature. It then continues to explore possible roles for IIAs in this process. The third part 
provides for a general account of the development of parliamentary competencies in the 
CFSP over time. We argue that the extension of the EP's competencies cannot be understood 
unless informal mechanisms, such as the 1997 IIA for financing the CFSP, are taken into 
account. This overview is followed by a detailed study of the negotiation process of the 1997 
IIA (part 5). 

1. The Foundations, Limitations and Legal Effects of IIAs 
The Treaties do not explicitly encourage the EU institutions to conclude IIAs. 
However, article 10 TEU in combination with the Declaration No. 3 to Article 10 TEU, 
annexed to the final act of the Nice Treaty, is commonly interpreted as an implicit legal basis 
for the conclusion of IIAs. The article obliges national institutions and European institutions 
to co-operate loyally. According to the declaration, which for the first time officially 
recognises the existence of IIAs, this obligation of loyal co-operation also extends to 
interinstitutional co-operation at the European level. IIAs are, however, not allowed to alter 
or to complement primary law stipulations.  Whereas these limits are clear on a theoretical 
level, it is in practice much more difficult to determine if an IIA has altered or 
complemented primary law. A possible criterion for determining the limits of IIAs would be 
whether an IIA has altered the institutional balance of power or not. This is, however, 
difficult to determine since the EU's institutional structure – and thereby its institutional 
balance – is continuously changing. Moreover, given the specific items that IIAs deal with, 
an alteration of the institutional balance is likely to result from the combined effects of IIAs 
on EU governance. In practise, IIAs often do indeed at least complement primary law. The 
declaration furthermore legitimises only tripartite agreements and politically has to be 
interpreted as an attempt of the Council to put an end to an increasing number of bipartite 
agreements between the Commission and the EP which also had implications for the 
Council. 
As IIAs are neither primary nor secondary European law,  their legal implications are 
far from clear. This issue is further complicated by the fact that IIAs have taken various 
forms and do not form a homogenous category. They cover very diverse subjects, ranging 
from the budgetary procedure to fundamental rights. As a result of this categorical 
heterogeneity, the effects of IIAs can range from the mere expression of general principles of 
European law to the alteration of hard European Law.  For instance, most IIAs are published 
in the C-Series of the Official Journal, in which notices and general information are 
published, while others appear in the L-series, in which legal acts are published. This 
suggests a very different legal character and effect. Historically speaking, IIAs first took the 
form of an exchange of letters between the Presidents of the institutions concerned. A second 
phase was marked by joint declarations, typically involving all three institutions. The term 
"Interinstitutional Agreements" was first used in the 1988 IIA on the improvement of the 
budgetary procedure and has since been established as the predominant label for such 
agreements.  
In sum, IIAs do not fit easily into standard European legal categories. Key issues, such 
as their constitutional basis or their legal implications still remain unclear and disputed. This 
legal uncertainty surrounding IIAs is due to the fact that IIAs themselves are located on the 
border between law and politics, between a legal obligation and a political declaration. 
Once the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCT)  into force, however, the 
legal status of IIAs will be clearer. The Treaty formalises IIAs by stating under title VI "The 
functioning of the Union" that the three major institutions "shall consult each other and by 
common agreement make arrangements for their cooperation. To that end, they may, in 
compliance with the Constitution, conclude interinstitutional agreements which may be of a 
binding nature" (III-397 TCT). When drawing up an IIA, the institutions can now refer to the 
Treaty and explicitly state whether the agreement is legally binding or not. Whether this will 
make IIAs a less attractive instrument to EU institutions, i.e. dissuade them from resorting to 
IIAs in cases where they want to regulate a subject in a rather informal way, remains to be 
seen. 

2. Parliamentarisation as Part of the EU's Constitutional Development 
The process of parliamentarisation is an important feature of the larger debate on the 
evolution of the arrangements of collective problem-solving and transnational governance in 
the EU multi-level system. Only if by comprehending how the EU's institutional and 
decision-making system changes in general, can we understand how the empowerment of the 
EP occurred and which role IIAs play in this process. Therefore we first introduce different 
approaches to the constitutional development of the EU. We will show that the 
intergovernmentalist approach cannot sufficiently explain the parliamentarisation process. 
The historical neo-institutionalist and the structurationist perspectives of institutional change 
in the EU system offer better frameworks for understanding the role IIAs play in the increase 
in power of the EP across policy fields, including the CFSP.
2.1 The Intergovernmentalist Perspective
The EU's dynamic political system is subject to a permanent process of institutional 
change. The very system is structured by process - an ongoing oscillation between para-
constitutional Treaty amendments and Treaty implementation. From the 
intergovernmentalist point of view, the evolution of the EU system takes place through the 
short phases of IGCs as "big bargain decisions"  while the processes between IGCs deserve 
little attention. From this perspective, the member states' governments are the dominant 
actors at the EU level – in daily politics as well as in Treaty reform. At IGCs they make all 
the decisions on the reform of the institutional system on the basis of their fixed national 
interests. Supranational institutions have only been established and endowed with powers in 
order to help maximise the governments' national advantages, e.g. to resolve collective 
action problems and reduce transaction costs. However, the institutions remain at all times 
under the control of the member states. They implement the member states' decisions 
without having an autonomous reform agenda. The clearest expression of this is the fact that 
neither the Commission nor the Parliament have a decisive say on Treaty revisions at IGCs. 
Given this lack of formal decision-making rights in the 'big' Treaty revision procedures, 
advocates of intergovernmentalism conclude that the direct influence of the EP on the shape 
of the EU institutional and decision-making system is at the most indirect and dependent on 
the member states' willingness to transfer power to the EP. The EP would be identified as an 
actor able to steer political debates, to create tension in some parts of the agenda, to make 
issues public, but it is not a decision maker. According to this point of view, the influence of 
the EP appears to be rather limited and thus it cannot explain the increase in power of the 
EP. 
2.2 The neo-institutionalist perspective
Neo-institutionalist explanations of institutional change in the EU system challenge the view 
that member states' governments are the key actors that determine the constitutional 
development of the EU. In line with neo-functionalist assumptions neo-institutionalists assert 
that a plurality of actors participate in the decision-making process. They acknowledge the 
role of autonomously acting supranational institutions that pursue their own reform agendas, 
as well as a dense cluster of governmental and non-governmental actors at all levels of the 
EU. At the core of sociological and historical neo-institutionalist arguments is the claim that 
the scope for action of all these actors is defined by the institutions (informal and formal 
rules, procedures, or norms) in which the policy-making process is embedded.  Moreover, 
historical analyses treat institutional change as a process unfolding over time. Restricting the 
analysis of the institutional change of the EU to IGCs will only yield a snapshot of 
constitutional development. The model of 'path-dependency' of policy preferences, 
institutions and procedures, policy-outcomes and policy-instruments  suggests that in such 
an institutionalised arrangement like the EC/EU, "past lines of policy [will] condition 
subsequent policy by encouraging societal forces to organise along some lines rather than 
others, to adapt particular identities or to develop interests in policies that are costly to 
shift".  Once policy decisions have been made or institutions introduced, they will be 
difficult to reverse. This is due to the institutional barriers to reform, the resistance of actors 
that were favoured by the institution, and the high costs of change once actors start to adapt 
to the new policies/institutions. Hence, every introduction of new rules constrains the 
decision-making options for all actors so that the institutional change incrementally develops 
along certain paths. 
Whereas the original Treaties foresaw a restricted (clear) set of rules for each policy field, 
subsequent Treaty amendments have introduced new institutions and procedures. As a result, 
the Treaty provisions do not set out a clear nomenclature of rules to be applied to specific 
sectors. Instead, in an increasing number of policy fields, different procedural blueprints and 
interinstitutional codes compete for application and raise the potential for conflict between 
the actors involved. The growing variation of institutional and procedural rules reflects a 
variety of opportunity structures for access and participation in the EC/EU policy cycle. The 
new or revised institutional and procedural arrangements do not operate in a political vacuum 
but in a closely connected system and balance of power in which the architects of the Treaty 
have positioned them. Whenever institutions gain more autonomy, they do not use it in 
isolation but in a framework of established rules and centres of political power. 
Therefore, this approach allows us to see the EP as an autonomous supranational actor 
with an independent reform agenda. Since its creation, the EP was able to use the constraints 
and opportunities arising from the mass of decision-making procedures and the multitude of 
actors in the EU's policy making process to subject more and more policy fields to 
parliamentary control and legislation.

2.2. The Structurationist View: Valleys and Summits 
Structurationist approaches to the evolution of the EU system  come to similar 
conclusions. Like historical instituionalists they view the EU's constitutional development as 
an unceasing process of incremental change since the very beginning of the EC with a yet 
open end. They claim that instead of the member states' interests, the process of Treaty 
reform during which these are constructed must be analysed. Following the notion of path 
dependency, the reform process is structured by pre-defined demands on the IGC, the 
convergence of beliefs about the outcome and the constraints and opportunities established 
by past choices. 
Proponents of this approach have described Treaty reform as a series of summits – the 
IGCs – and valleys – the periods of Treaty implementation between the summits.  IGCs are 
seen as high points in a lengthy process of Treaty review, reform and revision. However, the 
momentous developments of EU integration occur in between the summits, namely in the 
valleys. In the dense and pluralistic EU decision-making process, the introduction of new 
procedures or actors can have unintended consequences which where not predictable at the 
time when they were introduced. For example the content of the SEA and the internal market 
programme were influenced by previous events such as the Cassis de Dijon judgement of the 
European Court of Justice and the Commission's white paper on the internal market which 
already narrowed the options for change by identifying some reform proposals as per se 
inappropriate.  Thus Treaty reforms do not come out of the blue as a 'deus ex machina' 
dispatched by some distant masters but they are reactions to prior trends, for example IIAs. 
The reforms try to address institutional and procedural weaknesses identified during the 
implementation of previous provisions, or to adapt the Union to new – external and/or 
internal – contexts. 
Looked at this way, system development takes place incrementally in a valley of day-
to-day politics where reform is not simply a matter of inter-state bargaining. Incremental 
change suggests that Treaty reform is subject to a wide range of actors  and to an unceasing 
process of discovering political preferences and 'problem solving' in an unstable setting. 
Member states identify their preferences not simply as a fixed set of demands, but their 
rather preferences are shaped during the process of Treaty implementation and Treaty 
reform. They are but single players in a cluster of actors, each of which has an impact on the 
constitutional process and which are constrained by previous decisions and developments.  
IGCs are the highlights of Treaty reform; they are not the most critical events. They often 
"merely codify" key institutional features "which have already occurred [...] away from the 
'intergovernmental' negotiating table, in the depths of the valleys in between" such as the 
gradual "empowerment of the European Parliament". 
2.3 IIAs: Instruments to Beat Paths for Parliamentarisation in the Valleys up to IGC 
Summits 
Where can we place IIAs along the valleys and summits of constitutional reform? 
Currently, IIAs are interpreted as pragmatic answers to interinstitutional tension "because 
they can be arrived at through ad-hoc interinstitutional negotiation […] avoiding the 
cumbersome procedure of Treaty amendment."  IIAs matter insofar as they are instrumental 
in containing interinstitutional conflicts. The case of IIAs in CFSP – which will be analysed 
in detail below – lends at least partial support to this interpretation. The successful 
conclusion of IIAs seems to presuppose some kind of conflict or tension between the 
institutions. However, there is a need to go beyond this analysis. 
Following the structurationist approach, IIAs can be regarded as an important element 
that predetermines reform options in the valleys between IGCs. Indeed, many Treaty 
provisions refer to procedures formerly decided upon in IIAs.  The Treaty only constitutes 
the formal framework for the EU's institutional system. IIAs are part of the informal 
interinstitutional activity (customs, routines etc.) taking place outside the treaty revision 
process. Even though they are informal, arrangements like IIAs institutionalize and are able 
to modify the real institutional balance without formally changing the Treaties.  Even if 
IIAs cannot amend the Treaties , in practice they can go far beyond what has been agreed 
under the Treaties. IIAs have sown "the seeds of future Treaty amendments".  Based on the 
assumption of path dependency, IIAs can be seen as rules or procedures that, once 
introduced, shape the realm for further developments by narrowing the scope for possible 
change and by indirectly obliging member states to think only of the incremental revision of 
existing arrangements. IIAs can create facts. They start off at the micro-level by introducing 
informal procedures making the co-operation of the main EU institutions more concrete. 
However, these procedures, once agreed upon, will be difficult to reverse at some later point 
because of the resistance of actors who benefit from the IIA, the adaptation of actors to the 
provisions of the IIA and the high costs that interinstitutional conflict negotiation would 
involve. Every following IIA or treaty revision is likely to build on and go beyond the 
provisions of the existing IIA. Hence, IIAs create constraints but also opportunities for actors 
to advance their interests. They can introduce procedures that can have unanticipated 
consequences and lead to shifts in the institutional balance of power. Often provisions 
introduced in IIAs institutionalise and are at a later point integrated into the formal Treaty 
provisions. 
In our view the EP has used IIAs as instruments to strengthen its own position in the EU 
decision-making process.  Since the EP has no decision-making power at IGCs, it has 
deliberately used IIAs – and not just in the field of the CFSP – to create irreversible facts, 
informally increase its power and precondition future Treaty reforms at IGCs. Numerous 
statements of MEPs and parliamentary reports show that parliamentary actors see IIAs as 
instruments to counteract the EU's democratic deficit by strengthening the EP's role in the 
EU's institutional set-up  and link the conclusion of IIAs to the unfinished process of 
constitutionalisation.  In line with structurationist arguments set out above, IIAs are seen as 
temporary solutions which should at a later point result in alterations of the Treaty 
provisions. Against this background it is not surprising, that the EP has been the main 
initiator of IIAs since Maastricht.  According to Hummer, most IIAs serve the purpose of 
granting the Parliament decision-making competencies and participation rights, which it had 
been deprived of by the founding Treaties and he hence sees IIAs as initiators of 
constitutional change.  
3. The Parliamentarisation of European Foreign Policy 
How did the EP's supervisory and budgetary powers in European foreign policy 
grow over time? It is especially interesting to examine this process in the intergovernmental 
second pillar of the EU, which, for advocates of intergovernmentalism, has always served as 
a major example of member states' dominance at the EU level. It is striking how even in this 
policy field the EP has gained considerable competencies going beyond the role foreseen for 
it in the Treaties.

3.1. The EP in Foreign Policy through Maastricht 
The first attempt to develop a "real" European foreign policy, the so-called European 
Political Co-operation (EPC), remained outside the European legal framework until the SEA. 
As the EPC rested on an intergovernmental structure, concrete and tangible rights for the EP 
remained fairly elusive. Article 30 IV SEA only obliged the member states to ensure that the 
EP was closely associated with the EPC and that its views on EPC matters were duly taken 
into consideration. It did not, however, specify how this was to be accomplished. The 
Maastricht Treaty codified the EPC and the newly created security policy, under the label of 
the CFSP, as the second pillar of the EU. The EP obtained the right to ask questions, to put 
forward recommendations to the Council and to be "regularly" informed by the Council 
presidency and the Commission about the progress made in the CFSP. How regular the 
information should be provided was however still open to differing interpretations. Also, the 
EP's right to be consulted was limited to the "main aspects" of the CFSP (ex-Article J.7 
TEU), with the Council presidency alone deciding on the scale, content and timing of the 
information provided. Despite the new competencies, progress was hence modest at best. 
	Equally important, the Maastricht Treaty created a new battlefield by raising the issue 
of financing European foreign policy actions, thereby introducing, at least in principle, 
foreign policy issues into the core of parliamentary competencies, namely the budget. The 
EP's budgetary powers concerning the CFSP are its "hardest" competencies in the entire 
foreign policy field.  Central to the financing of the CFSP is the distinction introduced in 
ex-Article J.11 TEU between administrative and operational expenditures for the 
implementation of the CFSP. Operational expenditures are charged to the Community 
budget and therefore subject to the normal budgetary procedure except in cases where 
operations have military and defence implications or where the Council decides unanimously 
to charge the costs directly to the member states (ex-Article J.11.II TEU). Administrative 
expenditures are always charged to the Community budget but they are not subject to the 
ordinary Community budgetary procedure. Some member states considered CFSP 
administrative expenditures to be part of the Council's own administrative expenditures over 
which, by virtue of a Gentlemen's Agreement between the Council and the Parliament, the 
EP does not exercise control. In sum, the Maastricht provisions opened the door to 
parliamentary oversight of CFSP spending. In practise, these provisions were interpreted so 
as not to extend democratic control over foreign policy funds, but rather to keep 
parliamentary control to a minimum. 
Like other Treaties before and after it, the Maastricht Treaty left the EC institutions 
with a wide range of questions, particularly regarding their roles and powers in the policy-
making process. A number of IIAs concluded since October 1993 were a pragmatic answer 
to ease the resulting tension between the main institutions. However, the EP's proposal 
(December 1993) for an IIA on the implementation of the CFSP failed.  In February 1994 
the Council informed the EP that it did not wish to enter into negotiations. 
3.3. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice
The Treaty revisions following the Maastricht Treaty did not expand the powers of 
the EP regarding the CFSP.  This is especially striking considering the dynamic evolution 
of the CFSP during the same period, the shortcomings pointed to above, and the EP's 
general increase in legislative and supervisory competencies in most policy fields since 
1993. However, "real" progress in the parliamentarisation of the CFSP can only be correctly 
assessed if informal mechanisms like the IIA on the financing of the CFSP are taken into 
account.
3.3.1. The Amsterdam IIA on the CFSP
The conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty was directly linked to the conclusion of an 
IIA on the financing of the CFSP. The IIA consists of three core features concerning 
budgetary rights. First, it states unmistakeably that CFSP expenditures shall be treated as 
non-compulsory expenditures, thus granting the EP the final say over CFSP expenditures 
charged to the Community budget. Second, within the CFSP budget chapter, it proposes six 
concrete budgetary lines, e.g. EU envoys and conflict prevention, into which expenditures 
resulting from CFSP action must be entered. Third, it makes clear that no operational CFSP 
expenditures shall be entered into a reserve, thereby excluding a parliamentary rejection of a 
proposed reserve transfer. However, the Commission's right to make credit transfers 
between articles within the CFSP chapter is reasserted, which provides for the necessary 
flexibility in implementing the CFSP budget. Another main achievement of the IIA is the 
extension of the normal concertation procedure  to the CFSP for cases where the EP and the 
Council cannot immediately reach an agreement on the total amount of CFSP expenditures 
and on the allocation to the different budgetary items.  
However, the agreement goes beyond the financial competencies of Parliament. It links 
the budgetary issue to the EP's ex-ante-consultation and ex-post-information rights. The 
Treaty provisions regarding informing the EP about CFSP matters are reaffirmed and new 
obligations for both the Council and the Commission introduced. The agreement establishes 
a formal consultation procedure with the Parliament about the main aspects of the CFSP. It 
requires the Council to consult with the EP yearly on the main aspects of CSFP, including 
the financial implications for the Communities' budget. According to the agreement, the 
Council shall, each time it adopts a decision entailing expenses in the field of the CFSP, 
immediately communicate to the EP a detailed estimate of the costs envisaged in the form of 
a "fiche financière". Finally, it requires the Commission to inform Parliament on an at least 
quarterly basis of the implementation of the CFSP and to provide financial forecasts for the 
remaining period.  
On the basis of the preliminary draft budget established by the Commission (which 
therefore keeps the right of initiative in the case of the CFSP budget), the two branches of 
the budgetary authority need to agree on the total amount to be spent on CFSP activities as 
well as the allocation of the amount among the respective sections of the CSFP budget 
chapter. EP powers come to the fore if the Council and EP cannot reach an agreement on the 
amount to be spent on the CFSP. If this is the case, the above mentioned concertation 
procedure shall be set up. If, however, a consensus can still not be found, an amount similar 
to the prior year's expenditures shall be fixed. The Council is thus prevented from acting 
alone. As with the co-decision procedure, the Parliament's consent is necessary. If a budget 
is agreed upon but becomes insufficient during a financial year, the EP and the Council 
together have to find a solution – based on a proposal of the Commission. Here again the 
EP's consent to further financial planning is necessary. IIAs have thus proven instrumental 
in strengthening the EP's role in the CFSP. By deciding on the total amount of the budget 
and on allocation within the chapter the EP substantially participates in the active and policy-
making in the field of the CFSP. 
Overall, the 1997 IIA sensibly extends the EP's information and consultation rights in 
the field, confirms its budgetary powers and introduces concrete budgetary procedures that 
lead to increased planning reliability – a process which restricts rival actors' ability to assert 
their preferences and thereby increases the reliability/predictability of outcomes – for both 
the EP and the Council. In light of this IIA, it is certainly correct to say that the Treaty 
provisions give only "a very incomplete picture of the role of Parliament in contributing to 
budgetary policy."  Despite the significant changes introduced by the IIA, was published in 
the C-series suggesting its non-legal character. 
In May 1999 the short text of the 1997 IIA was integrated into the comprehensive new 
IIA on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure for reasons of 
transparency and coherence.  
3.3.2. Post-Amsterdam Developments in the CFSP
Due to ongoing dissatisfaction of the EP with the quality and timely delivery of the 
information by the Council, the 1997 IIA was amended by a Joint Declaration of the three 
institutions in 2002.  Very concrete dates and procedures for the budgetary process and the 
Council's annual CFSP report were introduced – for example the EP has to be informed no 
later than five days after the Council took a decision that entails CFSP expenditure. This 
declaration also provides for a regular political dialog on the CFSP in the framework of 
which the Council shall "give early warning on CFSP Joint Actions which might have 
important financial implications". The EP is however still dissatisfied with how these 
arrangements work in daily politics.  This makes future amendments to the IIA likely.  

From the EP's perspective, the TCT does bring some preferable changes to the CFSP. 
The new Foreign Minister, for example, will have to consult and inform the EP on the main 
aspects and basic choices of the CFSP. It should also be recalled that the EP's rules of 
procedure do provide for the individualized appointment of all Commissioners and that this 
will also be applied to the new Foreign Minister in his function as Vice-president of the 
Commission. Besides these changes, there was no political will at the 2003/2004 IGC on the 
TCT to endorse the parliamentarisation of the CFSP, since the formulations used in Art. I-40 
§ 8 and I-41 § 8 TCT are still similar to the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty.  There is, 
however, one small improvement. Instead of once a year, as laid down in the Treaty of Nice, 
the EP shall in future hold a debate twice a year on the implementation of the CFSP. 
Accordingly, it is very likely that on this basis the EP will ask the Council to deliver in 
future two annual progress reports instead of only one.

4. Interaction of Formal and Informal Arenas of Treaty Revision 
Our overview reveals a certain tension between the formal Treaty revision procedure 
and the informal mechanism of Treaty revision. In the IGCs, governments were reluctant to 
increase parliamentary rights in the CFSP, leaving the EP frustrated with the outcomes of 
Treaty negotiations. By contrast, informal mechanisms like the IIA tend to increase 
parliamentary competencies. The next section tries to shed some light on this tension by 
analysing in depth the process that led to the 1997 agreement. The conclusion of the IIA on 
financing the CFSP offers a good example of how different arenas of Treaty development 
can interact, since not only was it linked to the IGC but its key provisions are also 
diametrically opposed to the first IGC drafts.
4.1 The Background: The First CFSP Actions 
During the first year after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty the EP 
concentrated only on strengthening its consultation and information rights in the CFSP. Its 
negotiations with the Council on an IIA on the implementation of the CFSP – which failed in 
spring 1994 – did not cover financial issues at all. 
The implementation of the first CFSP joint actions, however, brought to light the 
problems generated by the Maastricht Treaty provisions on financing the CFSP, which gave 
rise to considerable institutional tension between the two arms of the budgetary authority. 
This in turn severely decreased the efficiency of the first European actions under CSFP.  At 
first many member states were in favour of financing actions through national funds. They 
were reluctant to use the Community budget for CFSP actions in order to prevent a 
"communitarization of intergovernmental action through the back door"  since CFSP 
expenditures were non-compulsory expenditures over which the EP had the final say. The 
first actions however showed that most member states did not even come close to fulfilling 
their financial obligations due to tight national budgets. It became clear that there was no 
alternative to the use of EC funds. However, the Council again tried to circumvent 
Parliament by declaring huge sums – which in part were obviously operational costs – as its 
own administrative expenditures which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. 
The EP was "outraged" about the decisions of the Council. In late 1994, its Budget 
Committee issued a report on the CFSP financing. It highlighted the tension created by the 
"constitutional oddity"  of the Treaty provisions for the CFSP, namely the division of 
competencies regarding on the one hand the definition of CFSP contents which lies with the 
Council and on the other hand the budgetary competence in this field which is divided 
between the EP and the Council.  The report took the view that the definition of 
administrative and operational expenditures had an overarching importance and that every 
arbitrary division was to be considered as a unilateral breach of the aforementioned 
Gentlemen's Agreement. This report was a clear signal to the Council that the EP would 
terminate the Gentlemen's Agreement not to interfere with the Council's administrative 
costs if the Council continued to finance CFSP actions through its administrative budget. It 
put severe pressure on the Council for more co-operation. This pressure still increased when 
negotiations on an IIA on the funding of CFSP actions once more failed in 1995.  Against 
this background and as foreseen by the 1993 IIA on the improvement of budgetary 
discipline, Treaty provisions concerning the budgetary procedure were reconsidered during 
the Amsterdam IGC.  
4.2 The EP's Position at the Amsterdam IGC
In light of these interinstitutional tensions, the EP criticised the implementation of 
CFSP joint actions at several occasions in the period between the introduction of the CFSP 
to the EU Treaty and the Amsterdam IGC. The EP complained that there was no clear 
structure for the costing of actions, which made an effective comparison of actions in 
financial terms impossible. Moreover, the Council had neither defined the objectives of joint 
actions in a transparent and operational way nor informed the EP about detailed costs.  In 
all EP documents, the prevailing belief is that according to "the principles of parliamentary 
democracy, which are amongst the most fundamental values of the EU", only the EP's 
participation supplies European foreign policy with sufficient democratic legitimisation.  
In the run-up to the IGC, the EP formulated its critique in the field of the CFSP along 
the lines of budgetary rights and information and consultation rights. It should be mentioned, 
however, that these were of course only two issues out of many. While topics such as the 
introduction of a High Representative for the CFSP dominated the majority of discussions at 
the IGC itself, the information and budgetary rights of the EP were dealt with in informal 
side arenas. 
The EP repeated its longstanding demand to abolish the distinction between 
compulsory (CE) and non-compulsory expenditures (NCE).  This has remained a major 
demand of the EP because the EP only exercises its budgetary authority over NCE. In case 
of CE, defined as the expenditures directly based on Treaty provisions – which is a purely 
political definition – the Council has the last say on the final amounts. Concerning the CFSP 
in particular, a more transparent and detailed way of financing joint actions was called for. 
As far as information rights in the second pillar are concerned, the EP again demanded to 
be both better and more quickly informed on the basis of the Maastricht provisions, which 
had not yet been implemented. It regretted especially that the Council did not issue a yearly 
written report on the implementation of the CFSP, which the EP could have used as the basis 
for its annual foreign policy debate (Article J.7 TEU).  The EP even wanted to see its role 
strengthened by making parliamentary hearings mandatory before the adoption of a common 
position or strategy!  
The first yearly report of the EP's Committee on Foreign Affairs on the progress in 
the field of the CFSP brought the two issues of financing and information rights together and 
proposed to settle them together in an IIA. It did however not link the demand for an IIA to 
the IGC.  
Altogether two points are evident: First, since 1993 the EP openly had favoured and 
repeatedly demanded the conclusion of an IIA on financial, implementation and information 
issues related to the CFSP, which was turned down by the Council several times. Second, the 
EP did by no means want to obstruct progress in the field of the CFSP. It did not, however, 
want to retain its input into the financing and political scrutiny of the contents of actions in 
order to ensure a democratic and efficient decision-making and implementation process in 
the CFSP. 
4.3 The Council's and the Presidencies' Positions at the IGC
Not surprisingly, the Council's Report on the functioning of the Treaty on European 
Union of April 1995 was very critical of delegating more competencies, be it budgetary or 
information rights, to Parliament. It stated, that the "experience gained in the area of CFSP 
financing shows up the discrepancy between the EP's powers of political control and its 
budgetary power as the Parliament tries to increase its involvement in CFSP by exercising its 
budgetary powers." 
Regarding the financing issues, a majority of member states during the negotiation 
phase of the IGC - with the notable exception of the UK and France – wanted to finance 
CFSP actions through the Community budget to avoid national costs.  However they were 
in favour of changing the nature of CFSP expenditures by considering it as compulsory, 
which would give the Council the final say. The classification of CFSP expenditures as 
compulsory would not only deprive the EP of its budgetary power but also runs completely 
contrary to the EP's long established demand to abolish the distinction between NCE and CE 
altogether! Proposals by the Presidencies included amendments to the then article J.11 TEU 
which declared that operational CFSP expenditures were compulsory.  This must be 
interpreted against the background of the "tortuous experience" of financing the first CFSP 
actions as described above.  The funds would have been quickly available, national costs 
avoided, and the EP 'legally' excluded from decision-making. This rationale was clearly laid 
down in the several documents of the Council presidencies during the IGC which set forth 
that because CFSP expenses were currently classified as non-compulsory, the EP has the 
final say in budget matters and can therefore acquire significant participation in the political 
decision-making.  Despite strong criticism by the EP, which considered the amendment as 
hostile to its interests and contradictory to the Treaty,  the proposal was included in the 
Draft submitted by the Dutch Presidency in March 1997.  
4.4 The Final Deal
The President of the EP harshly criticised the proposals of the Council presidencies  
and the EP decided to push for an IIA on the financing of the CFSP in order to avoid the 
classification of CFSP expenditure as compulsory.  Informal negotiations started on the IIA 
to solve the issue of financing the CFSP outside of the formal IGC arena. An agreement was 
reached directly after the IGC that linked the non-revision of expenditure classification to the 
conclusion of an IIA on financing the CFSP. At large, the IIA represents a compromise 
between the EP's interest not to see the classification of expenditure in the field of the CFSP 
revised at the IGC and the member states' interest to retain the separation between the 
political substance of the CFSP and the EP's budgetary powers, in other words not to grant 
the EP substantial political rights that go beyond information.  
	All in all, the IIA clearly strengthened the role of the EP in the field of the CFSP. 
Why did the Council agree to an IIA this time? This question needs to be examined in detail. 
First, when the Council declined the EP's previous offers for an IIA, it was still hoping 
to finance CFSP actions through national budgets. The experiences with the implementation 
of CFSP actions however soon showed that they needed to be financed through the EC 
budget. Foreign policy actions have to be implemented immediately once agreed upon. Any 
delay can be detrimental, as witnesses by developments in former Yugoslavia. Therefore the 
quarrel on financing between member states and between Council and Parliament needed to 
be kept at a minimum. The financing through the regular budgetary procedure and co-
operating with Parliament gave the Council the planning reliability which is essential in 
short notice matters such as CFSP actions. It can therefore be assumed that the Council made 
the concessions in order to ensure planning reliability and enhance the efficient 
implementation of CFSP actions. 
Here, the fact should not be overlooked that because of the IIA, the EP lost the right to 
introduce a special CFSP reserve to the budget, to which it used to allocate bigger sums than 
to the actual CFSP budget. For each transfer out of this reserve to finance CFSP actions the 
Council needed the EP's approval. This provision of the IIA constitutes a loss in influence 
for the EP and provides the Council with much more planning reliability. It clearly shows 
that the IIA did not one-sidedly advantage the EP. Furthermore, the IIA did not go beyond 
ex-post information rights for the EP. It does not allow for an a priori consultation before the 
decision on common strategies. This would have been completely unacceptable for member 
states such as the UK. 
A second point is that even though the EP did not have the formal means to keep 
member states from declaring CFSP expenditures as compulsory at the IGC and thereby 
solving all problems related to the financing, the Parliament can always put pressure on the 
Council through its general budgetary rights. It can simply reduce appropriations for 
budgetary lines that are very important to the Council even if not related to the CFSP and it 
can in the worst case scenario refuse to agree to the annual budget. As Farrell and Héritier 
state, the EP's bargaining power in negotiations with the Council is enhanced for several 
reasons.  The EP is likely to use this power by threatening non-co-operation and delaying 
the budget or legislation in order to put pressure on the Council and push for concessions. It 
has often shown that it is "willing to lose in the short term" by e.g. obstructing 
legislation/budget "in return for (constitutional) reforms that guarantee its interests in the 
longer term".  
  This bargaining power could be somewhat lowered by the TCT provisions. On the 
one hand, the Constitutional Treaty largely strengthens the EP by introducing a reformed 
annual budgetary procedure which finally abolishes the distinction between CE and NCE 
and hence gives the EP authority over the whole budget. On the other hand the informal 
procedure of negotiating IIAs and multiannual financial perspectives, which set the 
framework for the annual budgets, is incorporated into the Treaty and hence made 
obligatory. This deprives the EP not only of a certain room for manoeuvre. It could in the 
worst case also reduce the EP's role in the negotiation of the multiannual financial 
frameworks which are now only subject to the simple assent procedure.

5. Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research

Taking our example of the CFSP, this essay has tried to link the wider phenomenon of 
parliamentarisation to the increasing importance of IIAs. We outlined the principal general 
approaches that set out to explain the change in the EU's institutional set-up. The 
intergovernmental reasoning offers only limited explanations for the parliamentarisation 
process. Neo-institutionalist and structurationist explanations of how the EU's institutional 
systems changes are better suited for this purpose. The EP acts as an autonomous 
supranational actor which pursues its own reform agenda over the long-term and has various 
means of incrementally impacting the reform process, especially in the informal arena. We 
identified IIAs as examples of such informal rules or procedures that are established in 
between formal Treaty reforms at the micro level and which incrementally change the 
institutional set up of the EU. Often seen as pragmatic answers to interinstitutional conflicts, 
we argued that IIAs possess non-pragmatic aspects and that further research is needed to 
capture their importance for the EU's constitutional development and, more specifically, for 
the process of parliamentarisation.
The CFSP example broadly confirms our main hypothesis that the EP uses IIAs as 
instruments to increase its powers vis-à-vis the Council and the Commission. The IIAs in the 
CFSP have acknowledged and even increased the political role of the EP in the EU's policy-
making process. The EP managed to confirm its budgetary control and increased its 
information and consultation rights, which were very vague in the Treaty provisions and 
never entirely implemented by the Council.  In line with the argument that the EP 
deliberately uses IIAs as an instrument to strengthen its position, we saw that the EP clearly 
takes the role of an agenda setter in the negotiation of IIAs in the CFSP. This active role 
contrasts with the EP's formal non-role at the IGC. The informal arena tends seemingly to 
offer a favourable environment for the realisation of EP demands. 
The example of the 1997 IIA lends some support to the concept of rule-specification.  
As Treaty provisions result from interstate bargaining processes, their wording is often 
ambiguous and, hence, leaves room for different and sometimes not easily reconcilable 
interpretations. According to the hypothesis of rule-specification, the EP is able to exploit 
vague Treaty wording to propose interpretations that strengthen parliamentary 
competencies.  The 1997 IIA on the CFSP can be interpreted as an attempt to translate the 
vague Treaty description of the EP's consultation rights in the CFSP into practise in order to 
attain more influence on the content of CFSP actions. In general terms, IIAs make 
parliamentary rights more tangible, often by institutionalising specific consultation or 
information procedures, and thus reduce the discretionary powers of the Council or the 
Commission.
Nevertheless, it should be noted, that the EP's calls for an IIA remained unanswered 
for a long time, with two draft IIAs turned down by the Council.  This example warns not 
only against generally overstating parliamentary bargaining power in the informal arena, but 
suggests that the successful conclusion of IIAs depends on a number of factors, most 
importantly the shared perception of interinstitutional conflict. We showed that the IIA did 
not one-sidedly advantage the EP or that the EP threatened the Council into the agreement 
by using its general budgetary powers. The Council itself had its own reasons for entering 
into the agreement such as the planning reliability for common actions. 
Furthermore, we showed that in line with the notion of path dependency, 
interinstitutional negotiations do not take place in an institutional or political vacuum. The 
final 1997 IIA goes back to at least two failed IIAs, many critical reports of the EP repeating 
reform proposals, and reflects the problems of implementing the first CFSP actions. The IIA 
was not restricted to institutional experiences made in the CFSP, e.g. it introduced the well-
established conciliation procedure to the CFSP. The trade-off between the in beginning 
diametrically opposed positions of the EP and the member states shows how existing 
practises and power constellations narrowed down the options for change. Both the member 
states' demand to classify CFSP costs as compulsory expenditures and the EP's demand for a 
priori consultation on every decision taken in the CFSP lay outside the range of possible 
options. There is a clear path towards slowly increasing parliamentary information in the 
sensitive field of the CFSP without however offering the EP the same influence as in the first 
pillar. 
The present essay suggests that relevant research questions open to theoretical 
modelling include, inter alia, the interaction of constitutional and infra-constitutional arenas 
of Treaty development and differences in bargaining power. More research is also needed on 
failed IIAs. Under what circumstances does the EP succeed in proposing and agreeing on an 
IIA? Based on our example, the shared perception of institutional conflict seems to be a 
necessary condition for the successful negotiation of an IIA. 

  	On the EP's system development function see W. Wessels and U. Diedrichs, 'A New Kind of Legitimacy for a New 
Kind of Parliament:the Evolution of the European Parliament' (1997) 6, EIOP (http://eiop.or.at); A. Maurer, What 
next for the European Parliament, (London, 1999); A. Maurer and W. Wessels, Das Europäische Parlament nach 
Amsterdam und Nizza: Akteur, Arena oder Alibi? (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2003), R. Corbett/F. Jacobs/M. 
Shackleton, The European Parliament  (London, 2003).
   	Cf. S. Hix, 'Constitutional Agenda-Setting Through Discretion in Rule Interpretation: Why the European Parliament 
Won at Amsterdam' (2002) 2, British Journal of Political Science, pp. 259-280; B. Rittberger, 'The Creation and 
Empowerment of the European Parliament' 41 JCMS (2003), pp. 203-226.
  	A. Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the European Community, A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach' 31 
JCMS (1993), pp. 473-524 at p. 473.
  	G. Falkner, 'EU treaty reform as a three-level process' 9 JEPP (2002), pp. 1-11.
  	Cf. for a very good historical overview and and empirical analysis W. Hummer, ‚Interinstitutionelle Vereinbarungen 
und "institutionelles Gleichgewicht"' in W. Hummer (ed.), Paradigmenwechsel im Europarecht zur 
Jahrtausendwende. Ansichten österreichischer Integrationsexperten zu aktuellen Problemlagen. Forschung und 
Lehre im Europarecht in Österreich (Vienna 2004), pp. 111-180.
  	Cf. Hummer, note 5 above. 
          Cf. Hummer, note 5 above.
  	This is clear from the fact that IIAs are not mentioned in the catalogue of European legal instruments in Art. 249 EC 
Treaty. 
  	For an extensive list of possible legal effects see F. Snyder, 'Interinstitutional Agreements: Forms and Constitutional 
Limitations' in G. Winter (ed.), Sources and Categories of European Union Law. A Comparative and Reform 
Perspective (Nomos, Baden-Baden 1996), pp. 453-466 at p. 463 and J. Monar 'Interinstitutional Agreements: The 
Phenomenon and its new dynamics after Maastricht'  31 CML Rev (1994),  pp. 693-719. 
  	This chronology follows F. Snyder, note 8 above, pp. 454-458 and Hummer, note 5 above.
    Cf. Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European Union, No. C310, 
Volume 47, 16 December 2004.
  	Cf. A. Moravcsik 1993, note 3 above; A. Moravcsik 'Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder' 33 
JCMS (1995), pp. 611-628; A. Hurrell and A. Menon, 'Politics Like Any Other? Comparative Politics, International 
Relations and the Study of the EU' 19 West European Politics (1996),  pp. 386-402; A. Moravcsik and K. 
Nicolaidis, 'Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interest, Influence, Institutions' 37 JCMS (1999), pp. 59-85.
      P. Pierson, (1998), 'The Path to European Integration: A Historical-Institutionalist Analysis' in W.  Sandholtz and A.   
Stone Sweet (eds.), European Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford, 1998), pp. 27-58.
  	Cf. P. Pierson, note 12 above.
  	P. Hall and R. Taylor, 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms' 44 Political Studies (1996), pp. 936-
957 at p. 941.
  	Cf. T. Christiansen and K.E.Jørgensen, 'The Amsterdam Process: A Structurationist Perspective on EU Reform' 
(1999) 1 EIOP (http://eiop.or.at); T. Christiansen, 'Bringing Process Back In: The Longue Durée of European 
Integration' 21 Journal of European Integration (1998), pp. 99-121.
  	Cf. T. Christiansen and K.E. Jørgensen , note 16 above.
  	Cf. T. Christiansen and K.E. Jørgensen , note 16 above.
  	Cf. D. Skidmore and V. Hudson (eds.), The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and and Foreign Policy 
Formulation  (Boulder 1993).
  	Cf. U. Sverdrup, 'Precedents and Present Events in the European Union: An Institutional Perspective on Treaty 
Reform' in K.-H. Neunreither and A. Wiener (eds.), European Integration after Amsterdam (London 2000), pp. 241-
265.
 	T. Christiansen and K.E. Jørgensen , note 16 above, p. 17.
  	J. Monar, 'The Finances of the Union's Intergovernmental Pillars. Tortuous Experiments with the Community 
Budget' 35 JCMS (1997), pp. 57-78 at p.69. Italics in the original.
    	For an overviews see table 6 in A. Maurer and W. Wessels, note 1 above, p. 171.
     Cf. J.A. Stacey, 'Constitutional Re-engineering in the European Union: The Impact of Informal Interinstitutional 
Dynamics', Paper presented at ECSA Seventh Biennial International Conference, 2 June 2001, Madison, Wisconsin.
  	Cf. J. Monar, note 9 above, p. 719.
  	MEP Metten in OJ 1993 Debates, Annex No. 3-429-252, EP Sitting of 11.3.1993, p. 251.
  	Cf. for an early statement in this direction M. Waelbroeck, Michel and D. Waelbroeck, 'Les "Déclarations 
communes" en tant qu'instrument d'un accroissement des compétences du Parlement Européen' in : J.-
L Victor and D.Waelbroek (eds.), Le Parlement européen dans l'évolution institutionelle (Bruxelles 
1988), pp.79-86 at p.85. 
        CF. Hummer, note 5 above.
  	For a clear expression of this finalité politique aspect see EP, Willcox report on the Incorporation of the 
Common foreign and security policy CFSP in the EC budget (1994), PE A4-0028/1994.
   	Cf. Hummer,  note 5 above, p. 133.
        Cf. Hummer,  note 5 above.
   	Cf. U. Diedrichs, 'The European Parliament in CFSP: More than a Marginal Player ?' 39 The International Spectator 
(2004), pp.31-46 at p. 38; A. Laschet, 'Parliamentarisation of the European Security and Defense Policy' DCAF 
Working Paper No. 82 (2002).
   	Cf. Draft IIA on the CFSP of 1. December 1993 (PE.207.087).
    	Cf. J. Monar, note 9 above, pp. 716-717; A. Maurer, 'Perspektiven für das Europäische Parlament' in A. Maurer and 
B. Thiele (eds.), Legitimationsprobleme und Demokratisierung der Europäischen Union (Marburg 1996), pp. 15-38; 
A. Maurer,  note 1 above.
   	Cf. U. Diedrichs, note 32 above, p. 32.
  	Cf. IIA of 29 October 1993 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary 
discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure. OJ C 331, 7.12.1993.
  	Cf. IIA of 16 July 1997 between the European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission on provisions 
regarding the financing of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, OJC 286, 22.09.1997. 
  	IIA, note 33 above.
  	R. Corbett/F. Jacobs/M. Shackleton,  note 1 above, p. 217. 
  	IIA of 6 May 1999 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and 
improvement of the budgetary procedure, OJ 1999/C 172/01. 
   	Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on financing the CFSP in accordance with 
the IIA of 6 May 1999, http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/dokumenter/ft/bilag/2002_2003/20030305/.
     	Cf. Justification of Committee of budgets of proposed amendment 0767 the 2004 budget, Annex to texts adopted at 
the sitting of Thursday 23 October 2003, http://www3.europarl.eu.int/omk/omnsapir.so-
/calendar?APP=PDF&TYPE=PV2&FILE=2003-10-23ena4.pdf&LANGUE=EN, p.38.
     	Cf. U. Diedrichs, note 32 above, p.40.
  	Cf. U. Diedrichs, note 32 above.
  	For a detailed account  see J. Monar, note 22 above.
   	J. Monar, note 22 above, p. 57.
  	J. Monar, note 22 above, p. 59.
  	Cf. EP, note 29 above.
  	Cf. J. Monar, note 22 above, p. 70.
  	Cf. IIA, note 36 above.
   	Cf. EP, Report on the Proposal for an Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council 
and the European Commission on provisions regarding the financing of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Committee on Budgets. 15 July 1997. PE 222.910fin (1997).
  	EP, Bericht über die Fortschritte bei der Durchführung der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Matutes-
Report), A4-0083/95, point 3 (1995). 
  	Cf. EP,  Resolution of 17 May 1995 on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union with a view to the 1996 
intergovernmental conference - implementation and development of the Union.
   	Cf. EP, note 52 above. 
   	Cf. EP, note 52 above.
   	Cf. EP, note 53 above.
  	Cf. EP, note 52 above.
  	Cf. EP, Briefings on the Intergovernmental Conference, Briefing No. 17, Budgetary Issues and the IGC, 21st 
September 1995, http://www.europarl.eu.int/igc1996/fiches/fiche17_en.htm.
  	Cf. Amsterdam IGC 1996/1997: Irish Presidency. The European Union today and tomorrow. Adapting the European 
Union for the benefit of its peoples and preparing it for the future. A generel outline for a draft revision of the 
treaties, 5 December 1996, Document CONF/2500/96 and Italian Presidency, Progress report on the 
Intergovernmental Conference to the European Council– Draft texts, 17 June 1996, Document 38/60/1996.
   	Cf. J. Monar, note 22 above, p. 76.
  	Cf. Amsterdam IGC 1996/1997: Note no. 26, Italien Presidency, Financing the CFSP (and JHA) Document 
CONF/3826/96.
  	Cf. EP, as note 51 above.
  	Cf. Amsterdam IGC 1996/1997: Dutch Presidency, Note on IGC Ministerial Meeting - 29/30 April 1997. Provisions 
on a common foreign and security policy, 21 April 1997 Document CONF 3889/97.
   	Cf. EP, Initial Analysis of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Committee on Institutional Affairs , 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/topics/treaty/index_en.htm. (1997).
      Cf. Amsterdam IGC 1996/1997: Copy of Letter from Ms Elisabeth Guigou and Mr Elmar BROK, Representatives of 
the European Parliament to the Intergovernmental Conference to Mr Michiel PATIJN, Chairman of the 
Intergovernmental Conference Group of Foreign Ministers' Representatives on the CFSP, 10 April 1997, Document 
CONF 3885/97.
  	Cf. EP, note 51 above. 
   	H. Farrell and A. Héritier, 'Formal and Informal Institutions under Codecision: Continuous Constitution Building in 
Europe' (2002)3, EIOP (http://eiop.or.at), p. 594. The EP e.g. has a longer time frame for action than the Council 
due to the rotating presidencies which seek to see a progress during their short periods in office and the EP is not as 
sensitive to failure since the governments in the Council are immediately evaluated in their home countries regarding 
the progress in policy fields that are crucial to them.
  	Hix, note 2 above, p. 271.
  	This mechanism was first identified by Hix, note 2 above. 
  	CF. Hix, note 2 above.
  	Cf. EP, Roumeliotis Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the conclusion and adaptation of 
interinstitutional agreement, A3-0043/93.
7