Belgian participation in the European decision making process.
The impact of cultural aspects of Europeanisation on the success of coordination in a 
federal country.




Baetens Marleen
Helsen Sarah
Bursens Peter


University of Antwerp
Department of Political Science
Korte St-Annastraat 6
B-2000 Antwerp
Belgium


marleen.baetens@ua.ac.be
sarah.helsen@ua.ac.be
peter.bursens@ua.ac.be



Paper to be presented at the EUSA 9th Biennial Conference in Austin, Texas 
March 31 - April 2, 2005








First Draft
Please do not quote without the permission of the authors


1. Introduction

In the past decades the European Union has evolved from a Community cooperating on a 
limited number of issues into a partly supranational Union with extensive competences 
(Nugent 2003). As a result the interconnectedness of the national and European policymaking 
has increased significantly. More actors became involved in the European policy making 
process and the need for coordination became obvious (Kohler-Koch 2003). This change in 
policy practice has led to a shift in scholarly attention as well. Whereas former studies 
focused either on the domestic or on the European level, the relationship between both has 
become an important issue in current literature (Goetz and Hix 2001). Studies on 'multi-level 
governance' (Conzelman 1997; Coleman 1999; Hooghe 2001; Hooghe and Marks 2001; 
Peters 2001a; Peters 2001b) and on 'Europeanisation' (Mény, Muller et al. 1996; Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 1999; Goetz and Hix 2001; Knill 2001; Börzel 2002; Jordan 2002; Featherstone 
and Radaelli 2003) are features of this new interest. Although we will not contribute to the 
theoretical debate on Europeanisation, this concept is a starting point for our analysis. 

We join authors like Börzel (2002) and Radaelli (2000) who consider Europeanisation as 
national adaptation caused by European integration.  Adaptation can occur at the level of 
structures, cultures and policies (Héritier and Knill 2001; Börzel and Risse 2003; Burch and 
Gomez 2003; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003). One of the structural demands put on member 
states is to organise internal coordination mechanisms (Kassim, Peters et al. 2000; Héritier 
and Knill 2001; Knill 2001; Anderson 2003). There is a need for vertical coordination 
between policy levels, horizontal coordination between departments and intermingled 
coordination both across levels and policy domains (Dierickx 2003). These mechanisms are 
prerequisites for good national performance at the European level (Kohler-Koch 2003). As all 
elements of structural Europeanisation their installation entails costs. Coordination can reduce 
the autonomy of separate departments, strengthens the internal control and changes the 
hierarchy. It can bring along a redistribution of power and resources (Schout 1999). To 
coordinate successfully one must overcome hindrances of sectoralisation, fragmentation and 
policy interdependence (Wright 1996).  Therefore we cannot expect nation states to respond 
automatically to the European pressure for coordination. Different authors mention different 
intermediating factors, facilitating or hampering adaptation to European demands. They speak 
of the number of veto-players, political leadership, formal institutions, norm entrepreneurs, 
etcetera (Héritier and Knill 2001; Knill and Lenschow 2001; Börzel 2002; Börzel 2003; 
Börzel and Risse 2003). We from our side want to put forward certain elements of cultural 
Europeanisation as factors facilitating structural Europeanisation. Structural Europeanisation 
is thereby conceptualised in terms of coordination practice. Within the concept of cultural 
Europeanisation we focus on the recognition of the European Union as an important policy 
arena. Concretely we wonder whether this recognition can lower the relative cost of investing 
in national coordination mechanisms, that way facilitating good coordination practice. 

We focus our study on federal countries and more precisely on Belgium. Being already 
significant in unitary states, both the pressure to coordinate and the obstacles to achieve good 
coordination are more outspoken in federal countries. More actors and levels are involved. On 
the one hand, this adds a need for vertical coordination to the overall requirements 
(Kovziridze 2002). On the other hand, it hampers a smooth responding to the European 
demands. One of the obstacles to federal adaptation is the higher number of veto players 
(Héritier and Knill 2001; Kovziridze 2002). This applies especially to Belgian federalism 
where regional and federal authorities stand on an equal footing and no central authority or 
'strong leader' exists (Kerremans 2000; Maarten and Tombeur 2000). A second important 
obstacle relates to the reaction of the federated entities on the hollowing out of their 
competences as a consequence of European integration. They feel high pressure to reach 
favourable coordination arrangements and will strive for strong positions during the internal 
coordination process. This way they try to compensate for the loss of direct policy control 
(Börzel 2002; Kovziridze 2002). Lastly, much depends on the political culture in the federal 
country. In member states were a spirit of cooperation has existed prior to the European call 
for coordination, power struggles can be avoided. Belgium however is characterised by 
confrontational federalism, grounded on the history and specificity of its federalisation 
process (Börzel 2002; Van Reybroeck, Helsen et al. 2003).  Far from facilitating structural 
adaptation, the confrontational culture will be in itself subject to European pressure. 

All these elements make federal states like Belgium critical cases for testing our hypotheses 
about the influence of cultural Europeanisation (in terms of recognition of the European 
Union as an important policy arena) on structural coordination (in terms of successful 
coordination practice). We will focus our study on agricultural and environmental policy in 
Belgium. Although both are highly comparable due to the huge European input and the 
mainly regional competences, there are clear differences in the workings of coordination 
mechanisms in both fields. Using survey data on the evaluation of coordination mechanisms 
by Belgian officials in the agricultural and environmental domain on the one hand and on 
their recognition of the EU as an important policy arena on the other hand, we will investigate 
whether their European attitude has some influence on the coordination performance. More 
than putting the recognition of Europe forward as the most important factor explaining 
coordination success, our aim is to explore whether it has some value as an explanatory 
variable. 

In the following, we start with the conceptualisation of our model. We argue first that good 
coordination is a requirement to good performance and that way an element of structural 
Europeanisation. Efficiency on both the European and the national level asks for national 
deliberation in advance. However, as we said, the organisation of coordination entails costs. 
In a second part we state that some aspects of cultural Europeanisation, namely the 
recognition of the EU as an important policymaker, can decrease the relative costs of 
coordination facilitating that way its installation. The recognition of Europe is conceptualised 
as European expertise, opinions on Europe and attention accorded to the European policy 
level. We end the second chapter with some concrete hypotheses on the influence of these 
three factors on coordination success. After a third short chapter discussing the Belgian 
coordination practice on agricultural and environmental issues, we take up the empirical 
analysis.  Firstly, we give explanations on our dataset, we proceed with the operationalisation 
of the dependent and independent variables and finally we test our hypotheses by linear 
regression analysis. The paper is concluded with a discussion of the results and some 
suggestions for future research. 

2. Conceptualising the explanatory model

The Europeanisation of structures, cultures and policies does not take place in separate places. 
The adaptations are on the contrary interconnected (Eising 2000; Radaelli 2000; Börzel 2002; 
Anderson 2003). Our hypothesis focus on the relationship between cultural Europeanization 
(in terms of recognition of the EU) and structural Europeanization (in terms of coordination 
practice). Differently put, our hypothesis states that 'the recognition of the European Union 
facilitates the development of successful coordination practice by lowering the relative 
cost of organising that coordination '. 

2.1. Successful coordination practice as the dependent variable

Pappas  states that effectiveness of European policymaking is largely dependent on efficiency 
at the national level. It presupposes national mechanisms and procedures to define national 
stances, to enable the application and control of community law, to reach a common 
understanding of European regulation, etcetera. Moreover, other scholars speaking from a 
national point of view, plead likewise for the installation of national coordination mechanisms 
(Schout 1999; Kassim, Peters et al. 2000; Knill 2001; Kovziridze 2002; Börzel 2003). Their 
plea is grounded on the assumption that good national performance at the European level 
requires good national deliberation in advance. So, no matter the perspective – European or 
national - the existence of a European policy level asks for internal coordination mechanisms. 
The development of a succesful coordination practice is thus an element of structural 
Europeanisation, driven by European pressure and the will to perform well. Interesting 
question thereby is the exact meaning of 'good performance'. As Maurer, Mittag et al. state 
(2003) different conceptualisations of the 'European success' of member states give different 
evaluations of this success. As criteria, he mentions the implementation record of the member 
state, the comparability of national and European constitutional features and the policy 
outputs. However, no matter the criteria chosen, the evaluation will remain partial. It seems 
thus more valuable to our research to point at potential consequences of a lack of coordination 
for national performance.  

Schout (1999) discusses several risks. Firstly, ill functioning coordination mechanisms 
heighten the possibility of a reactive approach towards European policymaking. One is unable 
to develop a proactive strategy and to upload national policy preferences. Since a successful 
upload of policy preferences facilitates the download of European policy afterwards (Howell 
2004), it is obvious that coordination mechanisms can have an effect on the implementation 
phase as well. Schout mentions the risk of a division of preparation and implementation of 
European policy. Through deliberation, the use of available expertise and the participation of 
both people responsible for preparation and implementation of policy, one can make a more 
complete impact analysis of the proposed European regulation. This information can help to 
define the national standpoint and to prevent implementation problems later. Implementation 
problems mentioned by Schout are financial risks and delays. Finally, he speaks of the 
possibility of open conflict and inconsistency. Following the argument of Kassim, Peters et al. 
(2000) that a coherent bargaining position heightens the chance to be heard during European 
negotiations, these open conflicts are not conducive to success. 

The arguments above are not the only ones in favour of good coordination. Also on legal 
grounds, the member states are obliged to speak with one voice at European forums (Beyers, 
Delreux et al. 2004). If they want to guarantee the interest mediation of all national actors, 
preceding deliberation is necessary (Maurer, Mittag et al. 2003). However, with the expansion 
of the European competences and the increase of the actors involved, it is no longer self-
evident to define a common stance and strategy. More than ever a well functioning 
coordination machinery is required (Kohler-Koch 2003; Maurer, Mittag et al. 2003). 

Summarizing, the existence of a European policy level and the wish to perform well at that 
level press for successful national coordination practice. However, it is not self-evident to 
define 'successful coordination practice'. A normative discussion is always nearby. Moreover, 
types of coordination are so diverging that an overall comparison is not feasible. Coordination 
practices differ in their degree of centralisation (Kassim 2003), degree of formalisation 
(Kohler-Koch 2003), ambition (Kassim 2003), timing of coordination (Wright 1996),  there is 
horizontal and vertical (Kovziridze 2002),  positive and negative (Schout 1999), hierarchic 
and cooperative coordination (Maurer, Mittag et al. 2003). In literature we do find opinions on 
'successful coordination' but no overall system of evaluation. Some authors state for example 
that a cooperative strategy will be more successful than a hierarchic one because it lowers or 
at least spreads the costs of adaptation (Börzel 2002; Börzel and Risse 2003). Others state that 
centralised coordination with an ultimate decision maker can sometimes be preferable to this 
option since it guarantees the definition of national stances (Wright 1996; Schout 1999). 
Again others focus on the differences between formal and informal coordination and point at 
the capacity of informal coordination networks to respond quickly to sudden changes in the 
complex European reality (Wright 1996; Schout 1999). In view of this discussion, it seems 
not feasible to evaluate the Belgian coordination mechanisms by looking at the input side, id 
est the configuration of coordination. That is why we will focus on the realisation of the 
coordination objectives: successful coordination is obtained when coming (1) to the 
formulation of a common stance and (2) to a strategy for participation in the European 
policymaking (cf.infra).

2.2. The recognition of the European Union as the independent variable

Besides the adaptation of the structures and policies, the adaptation of the political and 
administrative culture in the European member states is another feature of Europeanisation. 
The range of potential changes in the cultural field is very broad. Literature discusses the 
emergence of new loyalties, identities and role perceptions (Checkel 1998; Egeberg 1999; 
Lewis 2001; Beyers, Delreux et al. 2004; Beyers and Trondal 2004; Trondal 2004), changing, 
norms, values and belief systems (Radaelli 2000; Bache and Marshall 2004) and the 
transformation of policy paradigms and practice (Radaelli 2000; Bache and Marshall 2004). 
Finally, attention is accorded to some specifically European aspects of cultural 
Europeanisation. Examples are the development of European expertise, of opinions about the 
EU and of attention to European aspects in the working practices of the administrations 
(Roller 2000; Héritier and Knill 2001; Smith 2001; Kassim 2003). To demarcate our variable 
we define 'the recognition of the European Union' as a part of cultural Europeanization, 
comprising (1) European expertise, (2) opinions on Europe and (3) attention to Europe. We 
elaborate on these three features of recognition of the EU. 

Smith (2001) speaks of Europeanised 'working practices' and 'outlook and ethos'. With the 
first concept he points at the growing attention to European expertise in national 
administrations due to European integration. Membership and participation in the European 
policymaking requires indeed the development of EU-knowledge (Jordan 2002). This 
European expertise heightens the understanding of and ability to deal with European matters 
(Smith 2001). Using the concept of 'European outlook and ethos' Smith puts attention to the 
development of 'a European way of thinking' wherein administrative practices and 
conventions would be partially adapted to the European way of working and thinking. Page 
and Wouters (1995) speak of 'contagion' pointing at the adoption of European values, and of 
a 'demonstration effect' when discussing the adoption of some aspects of the European 
practice. According to Smith (2001), a Europeanised 'outlook and ethos' will in extremes lead 
to the dominance of EU-centred objectives over narrower domestic-based concerns. 
Regarding administrative practices, officials would be encouraged to 'consider the possible 
implications which the EU dimension might have as they go about the business of designing 
and implementing national policies'. Eising (2000) confirms that preferences can change as a 
consequence of European integration. Checkel (1999) and Egeberg (1999) point at the 
socialisation effect of participation in the European decision making. European experience 
can alter the opinions, aims and practices of national actors and so can knowledge (Checkel 
1997). In our work we connect the concept of 'working practices' to measurements of 
European expertise, and the concept of 'outlook and ethos' to measurements of officials' 
opinions about the EU and of the degree of attention devoted to the European policy level 
during domestic policymaking.  

2.3. Hypotheses

In this chapter we will discuss our expectations on the influence of the three elements of 
recognition of Europe (European expertise, opinions on Europe and attention to Europe) on 
the successful coordination practice. 

According to Nomden and Schout European expertise would encourage the development of 
good coordination (2000). Due to newly acquired knowledge an actor starts realising the 
importance and impact of the EU. This awareness calls for strong national positions since – as 
we said – a strong and common stance heightens the chance of having an influence during 
negotiations (Kassim, Peters et al. 2000). When an actor realises that coordination can lead to 
a strong national position at the European level, the relative cost of coordination will decrease 
(Beyers 2001). Burch and Gomez (Burch and Gomez 2003) express the same idea: 'Growing 
awareness of the broader relevance and implications of European Union policy and legislation 
[…] compelled regional and sub-regional players to establish 'overarching' European policy 
machinery. In this respect, Europeanisation has created a coordination imperative.'  In a 
federal country not only the external aim of a strong national position counts. When the 
federated entities become aware of the saliency of the EU, they will strive for participation 
(Maurer, Mittag et al. 2003). Knowing the principle of 'one country, one voice', they realise 
that the internal coordination mechanisms are the most important forums to exert regional 
influence and thus merit the necessary investments (Kovziridze 2002). It is true that the 
installation of coordination mechanisms is costly but when actors become conscious that 
some coordination practice is inevitable, they will probably support it and try to be there when 
the actual form of coordination is decided on (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999). Summarising, 
European expertise adds new information to the considerations of the actors and can change 
that way the balance of costs and benefits of coordination made by them. Attention to Europe 
is a quite direct indicator of this balance. Clearly, actors think it is worth it to take into 
account the European policymaking during daily policy practice. Besides, it is very probable 
that attention to Europe has a reinforcing effect on expertise by way of experiential learning 
(Checkel 1999; Héritier and Knill 2001). Finally, we have some thoughts on the effect of 
opinions about Europe on successful coordination. According to Héritier and Knill (2001) 
EU-opinions are foremost important in predicting or explaining the direction of change by 
Europeanisation. Some authors expect a positive relationship between a pro-European attitude 
and adaptation to the European policy level (Buller and Gamble 2002; Dyson and Goetz 
2003). Buller and Gamble (2002) for example, state that attachment to the European idea 
facilitates change. Kassim though expects the opposite relationship. He presumes that a 
favourable opinion will be translated into a relaxed attitude towards the European decision 
making (2003). Following his argument Europhile countries would invest only little in 
coordination mechanisms since they trust European outcomes. We however presume that 
positive opinions towards the EU will facilitate successful coordination practice.

Summarising, we defined three aspects of cultural Europeanisation: European expertise, EU-
opinions and attention to the European policy level. Based on literature, we presume that 
these three factors, labelled as 'recognition of the EU', influence structural Europeanization in 
terms of the development of successful coordination practice. We expect a positive 
relationship between the three aspects and the coordination success. Firstly, EU expertise 
increases the officials' ability to participate constructively to the European policy making 
process. Contrastingly, it can also result in consciousness of the European impact and 
importance and lowers that way the relative cost of coordination. Secondly, attention to 
Europe can be considered to be an indicator of a 'balance of costs and benefits favourable to 
the organisation of good working coordination mechanisms. On the other hand it enforces 
European expertise by way of practical learning. Finally, regarding EU-opinions authors are 
not sure about the consequences of a pro-European attitude. We however, presume a positive 
relationship between opinions on the EU and successful coordination. 

Before starting our analyses we shortly discuss our study subject with attention to the 
environmental and agricultural policy and to the characteristics of Belgian federalism. 
 
3. Coordination in the environmental and agricultural field in Belgium

Research on Europeanisation gives way to mainly two comparisons: a first one between 
countries (or sub national entities) and a second one between policy domains (Knill 2001). 
This study is a cross-policy study in the specific context of a federal country, Belgium. We 
will compare coordination practice in environmental and agricultural policy. Both domains 
are highly Europeanised in the sense that domestic policy is strongly dependent on European 
regulation (Knill 2001). On the European level policy can be defined as positive integration, 
imposing certain norms (Knill 2001; Knill and Lenschow 2001). Contrary to the mainly 
regulating environmental policy, agricultural policy has important redistributive effects as 
well. We conclude that, on a European level, both domains resemble each other sufficiently to 
ease comparison. The same counts for the Belgian level where environmental and agricultural 
policy are highly federalised.  Belgian federalism took a start in 1970 and has lead to the 
current situation after four more rounds of state reform (Van Reybroeck, Helsen et al. 2003). 
Taking into account the continuous struggle for more competences, Belgian federalism can be 
marked as 'confrontational federalism' as defined by Börzel (Börzel 2002). Aside from the 
federal level Belgium consists of three communities  and three regions . Every federated 
entity has its own legislative and executive institutions. The communities are mainly 
competent for those domains related to culture and to the individual well being. Their origin 
lies in linguistic differences. The regions have power in the fields connected to their region or 
territory in the widest meaning of the term. They are - between others - competent for 
agricultural and environmental policy. However, history and the concrete workings of 
federalism are slightly different in these domains. 

The federalisation of environmental policy started in 1980. After several steps, the last round 
of state reform in 2003 made the regional authorities the central decision makers in this 
domain. However, the federal level is still responsible for issues concerning atmosphere, 
product policy, waste transit, grants and coordination on European and international 
issues(Van Reybroeck, Helsen et al. 2003). To reach common stances on European issues 
coordination between at least four actors is thus needed. Agricultural policy was only 
federalised in 2003 but the reforms were very extensive and resulted in a situation comparable 
to the one in the environmental field. Here too the regions are the prior decision makers. The 
federal level kept mainly competences concerning food safety and the financial situation of 
the farmers (Beyers, Delreux et al. 2004). The division of competences results again in 
minimally four actors involved in coordination. Notwithstanding the similar division of 
competences, coordination practice in the agricultural and environmental field differs.

The Belgian system of coordination is based on consensus and ministerial autonomy . There 
are several levels of coordination ranging from sectoral coordination on the regional level to 
general coordination on the inter-federal level. Nowhere in the system there is a central 
authority, able or competent to force a decision (Kovziridze 2002). Federal authority for 
example may not judge the legality or desirability of regional actions (Maarten and Tombeur 
2000). Between others, this open ending of the coordination chain, makes informal and ad hoc 
coordination an important element of the current practice . Another important characteristic 
are the cross-sectoral differences in coordination practice. However, each Belgian position to 
defend at European (or international) negotiations must be confirmed during a coordination 
meeting at the federal ministry of foreign policy, directorate-general Europe and Coordination 
(DGE). What happens before depends highly from domain to domain. (Kerremans and Beyers 
1998; Kerremans 2000; Beyers, Kerremans et al. 2001; Frack, Leclercq et al. 2003)

In the environmental field coordination at DGE is preceded by sectoral inter-federal 
coordination at the 'Coordination Committee on International Environmental Policy' (CCIE). 
Since almost all actors involved are represented in this CCIE, DGE-coordination is most of 
the time limited to the formalization of the CCIE-conclusions. The federal as well as the 
regional entities prepare themselves internally to defend their interests during the CCIE-
meeting. The Flemish Region has created a formal coordination mechanism for this purpose. 
There is no formal interregional coordination preceding the CCIE-meeting (Van Reybroeck, 
Helsen et al. 2003). At the end of the internal negotiation rounds, the Belgian position is 
defended by a regional Minister of Environment during the European Council on 
Environment. A rotation system was created to indicate the region competent to represent 
Belgium at the Council every time during a period of six months. The federal Minister of 
Environment assists at the negotiations in the role of 'assessor', helping and controlling the 
regional spokesperson (Cooperation Agreement 2003a). 

Similar to the CCIE there exists a Permanent Working Group of the Interministerial 
Conference on Agricultural Policy  (PWG ICA). This PWG ICA prepares the coordination on 
agricultural issues at DGE (Beyers, Delreux et al. 2004). Apart from this formal meeting, a 
permanent inter-federal service was created: the Agricultural Bureau (AB). This service 
consists of federal and regional officials responsible towards their respective departments but 
brought together (literally) in one service responsible for permanent deliberation (VOLT 
2003). Another interesting feature of the coordination practice in the agricultural field is the 
very extensive informal deliberation. Since the regionalisation of agriculture is of a very 
recent date, the officials know each other very well, being ancient colleagues at the federal 
administration. This clearly encourages a spirit of cooperation. There are no interregional or 
regional formalized coordination mechanisms. Although the regional authorities have – as in 
the environmental field – the main responsibility concerning agriculture, it is the federal 
Minister of Agriculture who is - most of the time  - the Belgian spokesperson during 
European Councils on Agriculture and Fisheries (Cooperation Agreement 2003b).  The reason 
lies within the differing agricultural interests of the Walloon and the Flemish Region. The 
result however is somewhat contradicting since the federal authority has little competences in 
the field, has only a very small corps of agricultural officials and limited input during the 
Belgian coordination process.  The regional authorities assist at the Council as assessors 
(Beyers, Delreux et al. 2004). 

Summarizing, the most important differences between the coordination practice in the 
environmental and agricultural domains are: the existence of formal Flemish coordination on 
environment, the existence of the Agricultural Bureau, the extensive informal deliberation on 
agricultural issues and the representation of Belgium in the Council of Ministers. 

4. Empirical analysis: Explaining successful coordination practice by 
Recognition of the European Union

In this fourth chapter we come to our empirical analysis. Firstly, we discuss the data used. 
Then, we throw light upon our dependent and independent variables. And finally, we 
investigate the relationship between both.

4.1. The data

The following analyses are based on data gathered via a survey conducted between October 
2003 and July 2004 in the Flemish and Walloon administrations of agricultural and 
environmental policy . We conducted standardized face to face interviews with all officials of 
the mentioned administrations who are in their job regularly confronted with European 
matters. We think of officials assisting at negotiations at the European level and of officials 
participating in Belgian or regional preparation or implementation of European policy. In total 
we interviewed 62 agricultural officials (36 of the Flemish and 26 of the Walloon Region) and 
75 environmental officials (51 of the Flemish and 24 of the Walloon Region). Probably due to 
the method of face to face interviewing, there was no real non-response . Respondents were 
questioned about their participation in formal and informal deliberation, their opinions on the 
EU, its policy and structures, about the functioning of Belgium in the European context, about 
their expertise and the structural and cultural Europeanisation of their service. Since federal 
competences concerning agriculture and environment are limited and since the Brussels-
Capital Region is – certainly in the agricultural field  – of much lower importance than the 
Walloon and the Flemish Region, we presume that our sample gives a very good overview of 
the Belgian officials involved in European policymaking on agriculture and environment. 

4.2. The dependent variable: successful coordination 

The central hypothesis in this paper is that European elements of cultural Europeanisation can 
partly explain the success of coordination. However, as we mentioned above, 'good 
coordination' cannot easily be defined. It depends on the situation, on the configuration and 
on structural as well as cultural characteristics of the services involved. A partial solution is to 
focus on the output instead of on the input side when evaluating coordination practice. In 
other words, we have to check whether the purpose of defining a common Belgian stance and 
strategy for European negotiations is reached. A first way to do this is to focus on one or 
several policy cases and to unravel the internal coordination process on these issues. Since we 
want to compare the environmental and agricultural field in general, this method is not 
suitable. We will therefore measure the overall success of coordination by asking the 
participants to do so. We will thus not depart from objective criteria for good coordination but 
from the (subjective) evaluations of the actors involved. By aggregating their opinions, we 
expect to get a good indicator of coordination success. The officials were questioned on two 
subjects: the success in defining a common stance and in making good arrangements about 
the representation of Belgium at the European level. Four propositions lead before the 
respondents during the interviews, were relevant in this context. In all four cases 
environmental officials were far more skeptical about the coordination performance of 
Belgium than the agricultural officials. Table 1 gives the overall percentages and the degree of 
significance for the differences between the agricultural and the environmental domain. 

Table 1: The evaluation of coordination practice by Belgian environmental and agricultural officials.
  
Strongly 
agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly 
disagree
N
Factor-
loading
The internal coordination of the Belgian 
stance runs smoothly. (***)
4,1%
50,0%
43,4%
2,5%
122
0,842
The instructions I get from my 
department about the stance I have to 
defend, are always clearly defined. (**)
3,5%
31,3%
52,2%
13,0%
115
0,663
The current system of delegation of 
officials towards the expert committees 
runs smoothly. (***)
11,2%
55,2%
28,4%
5,2%
116
0,830
During the preparations of European 
regulation it is not self-evident to take up 
the same line with all Belgian authorities. 
(*)
13,5%
70,6%
15,1%
0,8%
126
 /
* p = 0,05  ** p = 0,01 *** p = 0,001

To construct an overall measurement instrument for coordination success, we controlled 
whether all four questions loaded on one factor. If so, this factor could be considered to be an 
indicator of coordination success. However, principal component analysis comprising all four 
propositions led to a quite low factor loading on the fourth question (0,385).  A reproduction 
of the PCA without the last question resulted in a solution with one factor and high loadings 
on all three variables (table 1). The percentage of variance explained is 61,3 % and the degree 
of consistency is high enough to allow scale construction (alpha= 0,68). This option was 
worked out by recoding the answers on the three questions into values between 2 (strongly 
agree) and -2 (strongly disagree) and by computing an average score for each respondent. 
This resulted in a linear scale variable ranging from -2 to 2. High scores point at good 
coordination practice.

Table 2: Scores of Belgian agricultural and environmental officials on the scale variable for coordination 
success
 
Mean scale score
N
Standard deviation
Significance 
(anova)
Agriculture
0,532
47
0,676
0,000
Environment
-0,306
49
0,852
 
Total
0,104
96
0,875
 

As pointed out in table 2 and in line with previous results there is a clear difference in the 
evaluation of the coordination practice by the environmental and agricultural officials. Since 
the officials were asked to ground their evaluations on their experiences in their own policy 
domain, we can conclude that coordination in the agricultural field is evaluated more 
positively than coordination in the environmental field. This difference was a prerequisite to 
make our research question relevant. The next step is to try to explain these differences.

4.3. The independent variable: the recognition of Europe 

As said we want to relate the recognition of Europe (being an aspect of cultural 
Europeanisation) to the coordination success in the agricultural and environmental domain 
(being an aspect of structural Europeanisation). We distinguished between three aspects of 
recognition: European expertise, opinions on the EU and attention to the European level in 
policy practice.

The first aspect is the presence of European expertise in the respective administrations. We 
suppose that expertise can lead to better coordination practice both because of its influence on 
the ability of the officials to participate constructively to the European policy process and 
because of the officials' heightened consciousness of the importance of Europe and thus of 
good coordination (cf. supra). Since coordination was evaluated more positively in the 
agricultural than in the environmental administration, our hypothesis can only stay credible if 
EU-expertise of the agricultural officials is higher than the expertise of their environmental 
colleagues. To measure this, we asked the respondents whether their service suffered from a 
lack of personnel with European expertise. It is important to point at the dual meaning of this 
question. It asks for both a quantitative (enough personnel) and a qualitative (with expertise) 
evaluation. During the interviews it became obvious that mainly the quantitative aspect was 
decisive in the answers of the respondents. It was often stated that the present personnel did 
have European expertise but that the amount of people available was too limited.  Of the 
agricultural officials 46 % acknowledged that there was a lack of personnel with expertise in 
their service. In the environmental field 67 % agreed with this proposition . The difference is 
thus in line with the before mentioned expectations. 

A second aspect of the independent variable is the officials' opinion on Europe. As 
mentioned, literature is unclear about the relationship between opinions and coordination 
success.  There are arguments to expect both a positive or negative effect of pro- European 
stances. We presumed a positive relationship with pro-European opinions leading to 
coordination success. We measured the respondents' general approval of the EU by three 
questions on the utility of a European Union . All questions loaded on one consistent factor. 
The scale variable which was constructed, gives high scores for favorable opinions on the EU. 
There are only small differences in the respondents' answers. Moreover, these differences are 
not situated on the dividing line between the environmental and agricultural administration. 
Probably the general opinions on the EU will thus not suit as an explanatory variable for the 
differences in coordination success in the agricultural and the environmental domain.

Table 3: Scores of Belgian agricultural and environmental officials on the scale variable for opinions on 
the European Union
 
Mean scale score
N
Standard deviation
Significance (anova)
Agriculture 
1,264
58
0,506
0,677
Environment
1,302
75
0,529
 
Total
1,286
133
0,518
 

A last aspect of the independent variable is the attention accorded to Europe during domestic 
policy work. We consider this variable as an indicator of a 'Europe friendly' balance of costs 
and benefits, probably leading to coordination success. On the other hand attention to Europe 
has a learning effect and can contribute to a consciousness of the impact of European 
policymaking and thus of the importance of good coordination. 

We led five propositions before the officials about the attention accorded to Europe in their 
respective services. The questions range from a measurement of the degree of interest in 
European policymaking to a measurement of the degree of prioritising European regulation . 
PCA showed out that all questions load on one consistent factor, allowing scale construction. 
High scores point at extensive administrative attention to European policymaking. The results 
are very much in favour of the Flemish and the Walloon administrations. There is an overall 
agreement that domestic policy work takes the European dimension into account. This does 
not hinder however the emergence of differences between the environmental and agricultural 
departments. Although a broad agreement is apparent in both domains, consequently more 
agricultural officials agree strongly on the propositions. Since we expected a positive 
influence of attention to Europe on coordination performance and since this coordination 
performance was evaluated more positively by the agricultural officials, the differences 
between the attention accorded to Europe by agricultural and environmental services are in 
line with the expectations.

Table 4: Scores of Belgian agricultural and environmental officials on the scale variable for officials' 
attention to Europe
 
Mean scale score
N
Standard deviation
Significance (anova)
Agriculture 
1,381
54
0,443
0,000
Environment
1,009
65
0,569

Total
1,178
119
0,547


4.4. Analysis and discussion

After having discussed separately the dependent and independent variables, we will connect 
them to each other in an empirical analysis. We will control our hypothesis that the 
recognition of Europe facilitates coordination success.  To do this we test an explanatory 
linear model for successful coordination by taking the linear scale for successful coordination 
as the dependent variable and the recognition of Europe as the independent variable. They are 
respectively elements of structural and cultural Europeanisation. Recognition is split in three 
aspects: European expertise, opinions on Europe and attention to Europe. Expertise is 
included as a dummy variable. Opinions on Europe and attention to Europe are included as 
linear scale variables.  Table 5 gives an overview of the model.

Table 5: Summary of the explanatory model for coordination success
Variable
Type
Meaning
Expected 
relationship
Degree of successful coordination practice
Scale
High score = successful coordination
 
European expertise available in service
Dummy
Yes = a lack of expertise
negative 
Opinions about the EU
Scale
High score = support for the EU
positive
Attention to Europe
Scale
High score = a lot of attention
positive 

In the first instance, we carried out a linear regression analysis including all variables 
discussed above.  Due to the high amount of questions included in the analysis, the ultimate 
number of observations included is only 60 % of the total number of respondents (N=82). 
However, since agricultural and environmental officials are equally represented in this 
sample, the reduction of observations included in the analysis, is not problematic. 

The results in table 6 partially confirm our expectations. Both European expertise and 
attention to Europe have a significant positive effect on coordination success. Although the 
difference between the relative weight of the influence of expertise and of the influence of 
attention is limited, attention to Europe is indeed the most direct indicator of coordination 
success. Regarding opinions, our expectations seem to be contradicted. The bèta coefficient is 
negative meaning that pro-European stances would lead to less successful coordination. This 
supports the arguments of Kassim (2003) that a pro-European attitude is not necessarily 
conducive to good performance at the European level. We must however be careful with this 
conclusion since the relationship is not significant. Based on our material we cannot really 
solve the scholarly discussion on the positive or negative influence of opinions on 
coordination success. Regarding the agricultural and environmental field in Belgium, we must 
conclude that the opinions on Europe are no good explanatory variable for coordination 
success. Probably, this is partially due to the limited differences between the opinions of 
agricultural and environmental officials. For that reason we retested the model with only two 
explanatory variables: expertise and attention. 

Table 6: Estimates of the explaining linear models for coordination success
 
Model 1
Model 2


Bèta
Significance
Bèta
Significance
European expertise
-0,295
0,005
-0,269
0,010
Opinions about the EU
-0,170
0,117


Attention to Europe
0,333
0,002
0,283
0,007
Adjusted R²
0,164
0,142
Model Significance
0,001
0,001

The bèta coefficients are – of course – in line with former results. European expertise and 
attention to Europe have a positive effect on coordination success. The relative weight of 
attention to Europe is again somewhat higher than the relative weight of European expertise 
but differences are limited. Again, both relationships are significant. Looking at the model 
statistics we must admit that the model is significant but that the degree of variance explained 
is quite limited. We must thus conclude that in terms of European expertise and attention to 
Europe, the recognition of Europe has indeed a positive effect on coordination success but 
that these variables are surely not the only factors explaining this coordination success.  

5. Conclusion

In this paper we investigated the relationship between cultural and structural Europeanisation. 
We wondered whether the recognition of Europe in terms of European expertise, opinions on 
Europe and attention to the European policy level, has an impact on coordination success. As 
a starting point we argued that good performance during European policymaking asks for 
national coordination in advance. However, the installation of good working coordination 
machinery entails costs. These costs are even higher in federal countries where – 
paradoxically - the pressure to organise coordination is more outspoken too. In a second step 
we presumed that the obstacles to coordination would decrease in relative importance when 
the governors would recognise the importance and impact of the European Union.  EU-
expertise would alter the balance of costs and benefits of coordination investments, 
facilitating structural Europeanisation in terms of coordination efforts. A comparable effect 
was presumed regarding attention to Europe. Attention can be considered as an indicator of a 
'European friendly' balance of costs and benefits and can moreover have an indirect effect on 
coordination performance by way of practical learning. Also with regard to opinions on 
Europe, our expectations were positive, reasoning that the appreciation of the EU can work 
supporting since the actors will make the necessary efforts to reach European objectives. 

Empirics partially confirmed our hypothesis: cultural Europeanisation conceptualised as the 
recognition of Europe, has indeed some influence on structural Europeanisation in terms of 
successful coordination practice. Regarding European expertise and attention to Europe our 
expectations were correct: both have a positive effect on coordination success. It is important 
to point again at the dual meaning of the question on expertise: to reach good coordination it 
seems important to have enough officials (1) who dispose of enough European expertise (2). 
The results on the effect of pro-European opinions on coordination success were less clear. As 
said, literature argues both on a positive and negative effect of pro-European stances on 
coordination success. In our hypothesis we choose the side of the optimists. Unfortunately, we 
could not fully clear out this discussion. The data seem to contradict our expectations and to 
prove a negative influence of pro-European stances on coordination success. The level of 
significance is however too low to be sure about the results. Regarding our research subject 
the limited differences between the opinions of agricultural and environmental officials can 
explain the inexistence of a relationship. In general however, the ambiguity of both literature 
and empirics calls for more extensive research. It is for example plausible that the real 
relationship is a curvilinear one: positive attitudes would support coordination efforts but at a 
certain point support for Europe would turn out to be too straight resulting in a rather passive 
attitude towards European policymaking. These are however speculations, pleading for more 
empirical research. 

In sum, we found out that cultural Europeanisation has indeed some influence on structural 
Europeanisation. Concretely, European expertise and attention to Europe can serve as an 
explanation for coordination success. Due to the relatively low degree of variance explained 
we must however admit that the explanation put forward is only partial and that other 
explaining factors should be investigated too.  That is why we finish this paper with some 
suggestions for future research. Firstly, there are the remaining differences between the 
agricultural and environmental domain. Although both are highly comparable due to the huge 
European impact, their regulating character and the mainly regional competences (cf. infra), 
we can still make assumptions on the explanatory value of policy differences in explaining 
coordination differences. It is for example very plausible that differences in the regulating 
instruments used at the European level result in different degrees of adaptation, for example in 
the field of national coordination (Knill 2001; Anderson 2003). Whereas environmental 
policy is built on a variety of regulating instruments, agricultural policy mostly makes use of 
regulations. Besides, the level of policy or institutional misfit shapes the pressure for 
adaptation  and differing pressures can result in differing degrees of (coordination) change 
(Knill 2001; Börzel and Risse 2003). A third factor concerns the age of European policy. 
Agricultural administrations are pioneer ministries since there is already a long-standing 
tradition of European policy. Probably they are already better adapted to the European reality 
than their environmental counterparts (Maurer, Mittag et al. 2003). Lastly, the balance of 
costs and benefits is not necessary the same in each policy domain. European agricultural 
policy is marked by its huge budgets and its redistributive character. On the one hand, 
potential benefits can stimulate an active participation and extra coordination efforts (Kassim 
2003). On the other hand, it is assumable that regional competition for funding prevents good 
coordination (Dyson and Goetz 2003). This is very likely because of the differences in 
agricultural reality in the Walloon and the Flemish Region (Beyers, Delreux et al. 2004). On 
this last point our results point at the other direction with less coordination difficulties in the 
agricultural than in the environmental field. 

A second interesting research track is grounded on historical institutionalism and studies 
about federalism. A detailed analysis of the history and characteristics of Belgian federalism 
in the agricultural and environmental domain can probably contribute significantly to our 
model of explanation. An interesting study on agriculture in Belgium is the one by Beyers, 
Delreux et al. (2004). In the environmental field Dierickx, Bursens and Helsen conducted 
some research (Dierickx 2001). We discern three elements of federalism having a potential 
impact on the Europeanisation of coordination: the type of federalism, the moment of 
federalisation and the division of competences (Van Reybroeck, Helsen et al. 2003). Firstly, 
there is the type of federalism. Coordination would run more smoothly in a cooperative than 
in a confrontational form of federalism (Börzel 2002). Although Belgium is mostly 
characterised as a confrontational federal state, generalisations must be handled carefully. It is 
for example very plausible that the degree of competition is much less outspoken in the 
agricultural than in the environmental field. Speaking of these policy differences we point at 
the second characteristic of federalism: the moment of federalisation. Probably regional 
tensions are more limited in the agricultural domain because of the still very recent character 
of federalisation. Till 2003 regional officials were federal colleagues. A first consequence is 
that they know each other quite well. A second one is that they partly share a common 
administrative culture. Both elements enhance cooperation. Another consequence of the 
recent federalisation of the agricultural domain is that there was the possibility of adapting the 
regional agricultural administrations immediately to European reality. Contrary, the 
environmental administrations had to adapt themselves ex post. However, it is highly 
disputable that the discussions on the federalisation of agriculture took European reality into 
account from the beginning. During the interviews it was often mentioned that only after the 
big political decisions on federalisation the European issue came into mind and that it were 
the administrations who had to organise themselves in relation to the European policymaking 
afterwards. Making abstraction of the exact timing of the adaptations, it is clear that some 
structures were consciously created in order to guarantee good European performance. We 
think then of the Agricultural Bureau, being permanently responsible for inter-federal 
coordination. A last important characteristic of federalisation concerns the division of 
competences (Roller 2000; Börzel 2003). Although both agriculture and environment are 
foremost regional competences, the degree of federal involvement differs. Federal 
competences on environment are more extensive than those on agriculture. It is thus plausible 
that a struggle for competences is still more apparent in the environmental field (Roller 2000). 
On the other hand however, there is the federal role of spokesperson at the European Council 
of Agriculture, potentially hampering coordination success. 

We are convinced that the two suggested research tracks would contribute to the explanation 
of coordination success. We must be aware however that it is not possible to test a model 
comprising at the same time cultural, policy and federalisation characteristics. The three 
presumed relations find place at different levels of reality and thus of analysis. We can 
investigate the influence of all three aspects but we will never be able to control for their 
relative weight.  Therefore findings about the influence of cultural Europeanisation on 
structural Europeanisation are – regardless of the limited variance explained –in themselves 
already a significant contribution to our knowledge on coordination success. 


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Annex

Table 7: Questions about the utility of a European Union: overall percentages and scale construction
 
Strongly 
agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly 
disagree
N
Factor-
loadings
Without the EU, member states would not 
be able to compete with other economic 
world powers.
36,0%
61,0%
2,2%
0,7%
136
0,728
The EU is indispensable because at the 
moment there are so many problems 
passing the national borders. 
52,9%
45,6%
1,5%
0,0%
136
0,795
Some actual problems can be managed 
much more efficiently by the EU than by 
the national governments.
25,4%
65,7%
7,5%
1,5%
134
0,778
PCA: R²= 58,9 %	alpha= 0,65

Table 8: Questions on the attention to Europe: overall percentages and scale construction
 
Strongly 
agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly 
disagree
N
Factor-
loading
In my department, European actuality is 
followed closely. (*)  
55,6%
40,6%
3,0%
0,8%
133
0,766
In my department, Europe is subject of 
informal discussions.  (*)  
32,6%
56,3%
9,6%
1,5%
135
0,616
In my department, when new domestic 
policy challenges appear, we control 
whether - apart from the domestic level - 
the European level is involved. (*)  
28,5%
61,5%
9,2%
0,8%
130
0,729
In my department, both domestic and 
European aspects of a policy problem are 
taken into account. (*)  
26,8%
67,7%
4,7%
0,8%
127
0,732
In my department, European regulation is a 
priority. (*)  
39,6%
48,5%
11,9%
 0,0%
134
0,606
PCA: R²=48,0 %	alpha= 0,73

  The French speaking, the Flemish and the German speaking Community.
  The Walloon, the Flemish and the Brussels-Capital Region.
  This permanent working group is the administrative counterpart of the Interministerial Conference on 
Agricultural Policy (ICA). Work is mainly done in the PWG, the ICA formalizes the decisions on a political 
level.
  For the issues concerning fisheries it is always the Flemish Region who defends the Belgian position. This is 
simply due to the fact only Flanders is bounded on the sea.  
  The data were gathered for the purpose of a policy preparing research project on the Europeanisation of 
Belgium. This research is part of the 'Steunpunt Bestuurlijke Organisatie Vlaanderen', financed by the Flemish 
government. Apart from the data used in this paper members of parliament and cabinet workers were also 
interviewed. Moreover, besides the attention to agricultural and environmental policy, interviews were 
conducted in the administrations of Education and Foreign Policy as well.
  Some people who were contacted had recently changed of service or tasks. Besides these persons, everyone 
contacted was willing to participate. 
  Due to the urbanised character of the Brussels-Capital Region agricultural policy is only rarely relevant to this 
territory (Beyers, Delreux et al. 2004).
  The difference between the agricultural and environmental evaluation of expertise is significant (p= 0,016).
  An overview of questions, overall percentages and indicators of the factor analysis is added in the annex, table 
7.
  An overview of questions, overall percentages and indicators of the factor analysis is added in the annex, table 
8.
 
 
 
 


25