Peter Nedergaard
Transnational Learning Processes: European and Nordic 
Experiences in the Employment Field 


Paper for the EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference March 31 – 
April 2, 2005, in Austin, Texas (panel 06B)

Abstract: This paper analyses and compares the transnational learning processes in the 
employment field in the European Union and among the Nordic countries. Based 
theoretically on a social constructivist model of learning and methodologically on a 
questionnaire distributed to the relevant participants, a number of hypotheses concerning 
transnational learning processes are tested. The paper closes with a number of 
suggestions regarding an optimal institutional setting for facilitating transnational 
learning processes.

Key words: Transnational learning, Open Method of Coordination, Learning, 
Employment, European Employment Strategy, European Union, Nordic countries.

Peter Nedergaard
International Center for Business and Politics
Copenhagen Business School
Steen Blichers Vej 22
DK-2000 Frederiksberg
Denmark
e-mail: pne.cbp@cbs.dk


1.	Introduction
The overall aim of this paper is to compare the learning processes that have characterized 
European and Nordic policy cooperation in the employment field. While Nordic 
experiences with transnational learning processes go back many years, they are relatively 
unknown to both the broader public and research communities. On the other hand, the 
European learning processes have been widely studied over the last 4-5 years.

The parallel learning processes at the European and Nordic levels in the employment 
field both take place in separate committees, and they are processes independent of one 
another, even though there are examples of personnel overlapping in one or two cases.  
At the same time, there are a number of differences, as European cooperation in the 
employment field is based upon the Treaty of the European Union with the Council of 
Ministers as a strong political actor. On the other hand, the Nordic cooperation in the 
employment field is more loosely organized, with the Nordic Council of Ministers as a 
much weaker political actor.  As will be demonstrated, however, drawing comparisons 
between the Nordic transnational learning processes and the learning processes of the EU 
Member States – where transnational learning processes or the "mutual learning"  
processes (as they were referred to at the Lisbon summit in 2000) are the raison d'être of 
the so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC) – serves to highlight a number of 
advantages and disadvantages in both cases. This is due to the contrasting institutional 
arrangements surrounding the two ways of promoting transnational learning processes. 
Through the analysis of these contrasting institutional surroundings, it becomes possible 
to approach an explanation of what facilitates and what impairs transnational learning 
processes.

More specifically, the purpose of this paper is to address three questions concerning 
transnational or "mutual learning" processes in the EU and among the Nordic countries: 
first, what characterizes the mutual learning processes of the OMC in the EU 
employment field? Second, what characterizes transnational learning processes among 
the Nordic countries in their joint efforts concerning employment? Third, and most 
importantly, when comparing the experiences with learning processes in the EU and 
among the Nordic countries, what are the reasons for the apparent differences in how 
mutual or transnational learning processes are most efficiently diffused among a group of 
Member States? 

However, a necessary point of departure for addressing these three questions is a concrete 
understanding of what actually constitutes learning. This question will therefore be dealt 
with in the following section.

This paper is structured as follows: section 2 contains an analysis of the discussion of 
analytical approaches to learning in recent literature and presents the model which will 
serve as the theoretical framework for the subsequent analysis in this paper. Section 3 
analyses European learning processes in the employment field, and, especially, the 
learning processes taking place in the European Employment Committee. In section 4, 
the Nordic learning processes in the employment field are analysed. Section 5 presents a 
comparison between the Nordic and the European experiences with the promotion of 
learning in the employment field. Section 6 is the conclusion.

2. What is Learning?
In recent years, the literature in the field of international relations on transnational 
learning or mutual learning has grown significantly. As pointed out by several scholars 
(e.g. Levy, 1994 and Flockhart, 2004), however, the field represents a minefield of 
conceptual and methodological problems, as learning is difficult to define, isolate, 
measure and apply empirically. 

In another paper (Nedergaard, 2005), I have argued in favour of a social constructivist 
approach in which learning is defined as "shifts or change in the language-constituted 
relations to one another." This means that learning is when relevant actors accept or 
become convinced that new concepts or combinations of concepts are more suitable as 
descriptions of the social reality, e.g. when decision-makers accept that "early activation" 
is an instrumental concept for avoiding long-term unemployment, or when decision-
makers accept that "increased labour supply" represents a challenge that will help remedy 
– not exacerbate – the problem of unemployment. According to the approach to learning 
presented above, learning is when people give meaning to the world through new 
concepts  based on their interactions with others. Hence, our understanding of the world 
is a continued social process of reproduction and negotiation, which is embedded in 
language. If this social constructivist definition of learning is accepted, there are several 
factors influencing the potential for learning. 

First, a precondition for learning is contact to other people in some manner or another. At 
the same time, of course, the frequency of contacts is an important precondition for 
learning processes to take place. In the case of this paper, where the object of research is 
the working of a committee, a proxy for this precondition for learning might be the extent 
to which the committee meets on a regular basis and whether or not members participate 
in these meetings. 

Moreover, for analytical purposes, factors that influence the potential for learning 
understood as language-constituted changes due to harmonization through the acceptance 
of new shared concepts can be organized along two different dimensions, i.e. as factors 
that are internal and external to the committee. 

External processes can create conditions that facilitate either the harmonization or 
fragmentation of concepts, thereby either supporting or limiting the potential for learning. 
By harmonization of new concepts, I mean that new concepts are accepted as suitable 
descriptions of the social world, e.g. in the employment field. On the other hand, the 
flipside of the harmonization coin is fragmentation, meaning that there are no broadly 
accepted concepts as descriptions of the social world in a given social context, e.g.a 
committee on employment policy. Firstly, actors in the external environment may restrict 
or expand the room for manoeuvre available to the members of a committee. If the 
external environment constrains the scope for "conceptual manoeuvring" for the 
committee members (e.g. by imposing narrow political mandates), then the fragmented 
positions within the organization are sustained, professional knowledge consisting of new 
concepts is not diffused, and, hence, the potential for learning is impaired. By contrast, if 
the actors in the external environment allow a larger scope for "conceptual 
manoeuvring", learning processes may be facilitated (cf. Wittgenstein, 1953: § 143). I 
propose that the proxies of the room for manoeuvre are, on the one hand, the degree of 
"up-stream" fragmentation, i.e. the degree to which the committee in question is obliged 
to prepare meetings at the political level and, therefore, is forced to allow the discussion 
to rely heavily on political mandates; on the other hand, the degree of "down-stream" 
fragmentation, i.e. the degree of detailed interest expressed by the relevant politicians in 
the work carried out by the committee.

As explained by mainstream organization theory, another condition that may facilitate 
learning is the degree of uncertainty surrounding a committee (Mintzberg, 1979). If the 
level of uncertainty is great, learning can be expected to be facilitated, as the actors in the 
committee will be less confident in their previous standard operating procedures and 
more susceptible to new solutions to their problems (cf. Simon in Nedergaard, 2001: 65). 
Conversely, if the level of uncertainty is low, learning processes will be impaired, as 
members will be satisfied with their already existing knowledge. A proxy for the level of 
uncertainty is the existence or absence of political failure as it could be argued that 
political failure, more than anything else, is what renders actors susceptible to innovative 
solutions. Additionally, in the particular case of European and Nordic cooperation in the 
employment field, political failure is tantamount to the (perception of the) unemployment 
rate. In other words, learning is more likely when facing a high unemployment rate.

However, processes internal to the committee may also support or impair learning 
processes.  For example, the existence of a common set of accepted concepts among the 
members of the committee implies that the members will be able to relate to one 
another's knowledge of already existing concepts (cf. Wittgenstein, 1953: § 570). Of 
course, the harmonization of concepts only involves learning if and when this 
harmonization results from open and free "argumentative competition" based upon good 
and bad domestic practices, as opposed to harmonization due to a political dictate. In 
reality, argumentation in most committees is a combination of both, however, at varying 
degrees leaving open a differing scope for "conceptual manoeuvring". A proxy for 
harmonization (or lack thereof) in the use of concepts in a committee may be a common 
professional background (or lack thereof) for the members of the organization. At the 
same time, officials participating in international cooperation at the generalist level 
normally have an academic background in the social sciences (though, of course, this 
background can be varied). Therefore, this proxy might not be of any great value in order 
to test differences as far as learning is concerned unless this hard data is combined with 
detailed interviews.

Another possible condition for facilitating learning inside a committee is having an 
authoritative persuader within the committee (authority is possibly used here as a hybrid 
of Weber's bureaucratic authority and charismatic authority). Authority based on 
professional knowledge and a refined and broadly accepted set of concepts might support 
learning, as other members will be more susceptible to the concepts in arguments made 
by actors with this kind of authority. A proxy for the degree of authority a member of an 
organization may possess is the length of his or her membership in the committee or any 
other extraordinary social or professional attributes such as being recognized for 
possessing analytical knowledge considerably above normal. However, a problem with 
this proxy is that it might require a detailed study to discern who is an authoritative 
persuader in a committee and what influence he or she actually has.

The figure below contains a model that presents the potential for learning as determined 
by external and internal processes in which learning is conceptualised negatively in terms 
of the fragmentation of concepts (i.e. there are no broadly accepted concepts as 
descriptions of the social world in a given social context) and positively in terms of the 
harmonization of concepts (i.e. new concepts are accepted as suitable descriptions of the 
social world) or, in other words, as changes in language-constituted relations to other 
actors.

It is important not to mix the internal and external analytical perspectives on what 
facilitates or constrains learning. Each of these two aspects may work as a constraining 
factor on the overall learning in a committee. For instance, the extent of learning in a 
committee with both an authoritative persuader and members with a common 
professional background may remain quite limited by factors such as narrow political 
mandates and detailed political interest in what is transpiring within the committee. 
Consequently, the analytical division between internal and external factors is essential for 
making correct prescriptions as to what may maximize learning procedures in 
committees. 

Figure: Model for analysing the potential for learning

Fragmentation

3) Limited potential for mutual 
learning
4) No potential for mutual 
learning
1) Large potential for mutual 
learning
2) Limited potential for mutual 
learning

Harmonization                              Internal pressure                            Fragmentation 
 

The model above presents the dynamics of mutual learning as a result of internal and 
external constraints for the harmonization or fragmentation of concepts. In short, internal 
constraints facilitating learning include participants with a common professional 
background; having an authoritative persuader in the group; and a high frequency of 
meetings. External pressures facilitating learning are insulation from the political level 
and the perception of political failure. In the model above, the first quadrant represents a 
large learning potential (i.e. a potential for harmonization of concepts), whereas the 
second and third quadrants represent limited potentials for learning, and the fourth 
quadrant indicates that learning is impossible. Naturally, the movements between the four 
squares in the model may be interpreted as a continuum.

Based on the model for analysing the potential for learning, five hypotheses concerning 
possible independent variables in the learning processes of the European cooperation and 
Nordic cooperation in the employment field can be established. 

This paper seeks to analyse these five hypotheses on the basis of qualitative analysis and 
quantitative data accumulated via a questionnaire distributed to members of the European 
Employment Committee (in short EMCO) and the Nordic  Committee of Senior Officials 
for Labour Market and Working Environment Policy (the so-called EKA).

A working hypothesis can be derived at the empirical level from each of the theoretical 
determinants of learning:

Hypothesis 1): learning is more likely 
when a group meets repeatedly

Working hypothesis:
More meetings lead to higher scores on the 
learning index.
Data and test:
Independent variable: times respondents 
have attended meetings and frequency.
Dependent variable: composite learning 
index.

Hypothesis 2): learning is more likely 
when a group is insulated from direct 
political pressure

Working hypothesis:
The perceived interest of the minister and 
state secretary is inversely proportionate to 
the score on the learning index.
Data and test:
Independent variables: 
a) The degree to which the agenda is 
governed by the ministerial meetings or 
not. 
b) Perceived interest from minister and 
state secretary.
Dependent variable: composite learning 
index. 

Hypothesis 3): learning is more likely 
when a group member is confronted by 
clear evidence of political failure.

Working hypothesis: 
Higher than average unemployment causes 
respondents to be more susceptible to 
learning and thus increases their ranking on 
the learning index. 
Data and test:
Independent variable: unemployment rate 
in country of respondent compared to 
average.
Dependent variable: composite learning 
index.

Hypothesis 4): learning is more likely in 
groups in which individuals share a 
common professional background.

Working hypothesis:
A higher proportion of the group sharing 
the same professional background results in 
a higher score on the learning index.
Data and test:
Independent variable: share of the 
participants with same background.
Dependent variable: composite learning 
index.

Hypothesis 5): learning is more likely 
when an authoritative member is the 
persuader.

Working hypothesis:
Having an active senior participant in the 
group increases the score on learning 
index.  
Data and test:
Independent variable: number of active 
senior participants in the group. 
Dependent variable: composite learning 
index.


The testing of the five hypotheses is based upon both qualitative and (where possible) 
quantitative data. The dependent variable in all five instances is a composite learning 
index that will be established in order to compare the learning processes among the EU 
Member States as well as among the Nordic countries.

3. Data on European Learning Processes in the Employment Field
Basically, the European Employment Strategy (EES) adheres to the following sequence: 
guidelines – indicators – national plans – evaluation – peer reviews. At the end of "the 
EES year", the Commission and the Council conclude on which problems Member States 
are not addressing and issue recommendations for policy reform. The cornerstone of the 
organization of the EU European Employment Strategy is the Employment Committee 
(EMCO), which is the committee that coordinates and discusses all elements of the EES.

Since the construction of the EES processes, there has been continuous debate concerning 
their effect and impact. In 2002, the Commission conducted a comprehensive review of 
the first five years of EES operations. This report was positive, concluding that, "there 
had been significant changes in national employment policies," and that, "the Strategy 
has brought a shift in national policy formulation and focus – away from managing 
unemployment, towards managing employment growth" (Commission, 2002). Among 
EES scholars, Kerstin Jacobsson (2003) has also pointed out a number of positive effects 
of the EES. She concludes that the most important effect thus far has been that it has 
fostered "a cognitive consensus" around common challenges, objectives, and policy 
approaches. At a more general level, Borrás & Jacobsson (2004) have argued on "policy 
learning" that "the development of common discourses, establishing certain key concepts 
as well as policy principles and understanding of causal linkages, has been instrumental 
in the development of the new policy co-ordination processes." Other scholars, however, 
have been much more critical about the evaluation of the EES; it appears as though "there 
is no academic consensus yet either on whether the strategy works or – if it does – how it 
brings about change" (Trubek & Trubek, 2003: 13). 

At the end of 2003, an investigation took place concerning, among other things, the 
learning effects of the EES. The basis for this investigation was a questionnaire 
distributed to all of the EMCO members (Ørnsholt & Vestergaard, 2003). The members – 
and the social partners – were asked about the learning effects at the national level 
resulting from the EES. 

On the basis of the response from 21 of a total of 41 EMCO members, a composite 
learning index was constructed. The composite learning index consists of three different 
indicators based on questions regarding how often respondents have learned something 
new from the European cooperation in the employment field; how often they have 
reconsidered or changed their preferences as a result of ideas, knowledge or 
documentation obtained at the meetings; and how often ideas and experiences from other 
EU Member States have made a strong impression on them.   

The exact wording of the three questions is the following: 
1) "How often have you or your national colleagues learned anything new from the Open 
Method of Coordination, about which methods and policies are the best in dealing with 
employment policies?"
2) "How often have ideas and experiences from other member states made a strong 
impression on you or your national colleagues?"
3) "How often have ideas, knowledge, and documentation from the Open Method of 
Coordination made you or your national colleagues reconsider or change your 
preferences concerning the choice of employment policies in your country?"

Participants could rate their response from "Very often" (= 5 points) to "Never" (= 1 
point ) or "Don't know" (= 6, subsequently eliminated), and as all three indicators 
contain variables designating the same scale, the learning index can be constructed by 
simple addition, thereby creating an index with a minimum value of 3 points (no 
learning) and a maximum value of 15 points (maximal learning).   

However, the tests of partial correlations between the three indicators do raise some 
preliminary questions. In order to ensure that the index indicators are in fact measuring 
the same dimension without being redundant, partial correlations ought to have a gamma-
value  between 0.3 and 0.8.

This holds for the relationship between the questions concerning "New knowledge" 
(question 1 above) and "Preferences" (question 3 above), and between the questions 
concerning "Strong impression" (question 2 above) and "New knowledge" with gamma-
correlations of 0.844 and 0.538, respectively. However, the partial correlation for the 
questions concerning "Strong impression" and "Preferences" is much weaker, the gamma 
value being 0.262, indicating that they are not measuring quite the same thing.  

The wording of the question could be a probable cause, as "Strong impression" could 
imply both negative and positive impressions. Moreover, while positive strong 
impressions can be regarded as indicative of learning, the opposite might be true of 
negative impressions, because they entail the harmonization of fewer concepts. 

As I have argued elsewhere (Nedergaard, 2005), a methodology using questionnaires 
might generally underestimate the potential learning effects stemming from the EES. 
Instead, a methodology based on a social constructivist approach to learning would have 
analysed the main discourses in the employment field in the various Member States, the 
rise in and hegemony of new concepts in the policy debate etc. On the other hand, the 
primary aim in this paper is to analyse the learning processes among the EU Member 
States compared to the learning processes among the Nordic countries. In other words, I 
am looking for differences between the international institutional arrangements as far as 
learning processes are concerned and how these differences might influence the learning 
processes, where learning processes are mainly understood as possibilities for 
harmonization to take place in the EMCO. Hence, it is of no importance whether or not 
the methodology used underestimates learning effects, because I assume that the 
underestimations in the EU and the Nordic countries are of similar size. 

The 21 respondents from EMCO who had answered all of the questions regarding 
learning in Ørnsholt & Vestergaard (2003) had a group mean of 9.3 on the learning 
index, with the minimum score being six and the maximum score being 12. As mentioned 
above, the full possible range on the composite learning index is from a value of three to 
a value of 15. In this paper, I suppose that what is meant by transnational or mutual 
learning processes is, in fact, that all participating countries stand to learn from 
participating in the work of the same committee. This does not mean that all countries 
have learned the same and that all countries have learned to the same extent. In order to 
test the hypothesis in the rest of this section, the differences in the position of the 
countries on the composite learning index becomes important.  

Therefore, based on the composite learning index above and as a necessary digression of 
the overall argumentation, it can be concluded that learning effects in Denmark and the 
Netherlands could be judged to be small. As far as Belgium, the UK, Ireland, Italy, Spain, 
Germany and Austria are concerned, the EMCO members experienced moderate learning 
effects. A third group of Member States were France, Finland and Sweden, where the 
EMCO members had experienced relatively high learning effects according to the 
questionnaire responses, cf. the table below. 

Table: Composite Learning Index for EMCO Member States 
Member State

Composite learning index
Sweden
12
France
10.5
Finland
10.5
UK
10
Germany
10
Belgium
10
Italy
9.5
Ireland
9
Greece
9
Spain
9
Austria
9
Denmark
8
Netherlands
7

Source: Ørnsholt & Vestergaard (2003). 


After this digression, I will now return to the main line of argumentation in this paper. As 
a result of the model of learning (or lack of learning) presented earlier in this paper, five 
hypotheses were presented as explanations of the learning processes taking place. In the 
rest of this section, these hypotheses are considered in turn based on the qualitative and 
quantitative data:

Re hypothesis 1): learning is more likely when a group meets repeatedly.

The EMCO meets repeatedly and normally four times annually for a one-day meeting in 
Brussels. The precondition for learning, namely that the group meets repeatedly, is, 
therefore, fulfilled. Under the EMCO, an Indicator Group and a so-called Re Hoc 
Committee are established. The work of these groups, however, is closely connected to 
the work in the EMCO; their tasks are merely to support and prepare the EMCO work. 

Upon reviewing the results of the questionnaire, it became apparent that this measure was 
somewhat skewed, as most of the respondents had participated in more than five 
meetings, earning them a maximal score of 4 (scores ranging from 1 for 0 meetings to 4 
for 5+ meetings). A gamma test did reveal a moderate positive correlation of 0.541 
between the number of attended meetings and the score on the learning index; however, 
this correlation was not significant, as the p value was higher than 0.05, at 0.124. 

On the other hand, simply comparing means may provide an impression of data: 
respondents who had attended one or two meetings had a learning index mean of 8.33 
(n=3), whereas the respondents who had attended three or four meetings had a learning 
index score of six (probably an outlier), and the large group of respondents who had 
attended more than five meetings had a mean score on the learning index of 9.64 (n=17). 
This is an (admittedly impressionistic) indication that having attended more meetings 
may increase the respondents' score on the learning index.   

Concerning Hypothesis 1, I conclude that it has been confirmed.

Re hypothesis 2): learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political 
pressure.

The EMCO meetings are closely linked to the preparation of the meetings in the Council 
of Ministers. They are therefore normally held roughly a fortnight prior to these 
meetings. In other words, the EMCO agenda is almost completely governed by the 
political agenda of the ministers. 

All of the points on the agenda of the Council of the Ministers pertaining to employment 
and dealing with questions under the Open Method of Coordination are discussed by the 
EMCO, which also issues notes to the ministers accounting for its opinions; these 
opinions are generally endorsed by the Council of Ministers. This ministerial 
endorsement hardly comes as a surprise, however, as they are usually briefed prior to the 
Council meetings by the very same civil servants who have taken part in the EMCO 
meetings. The actual negotiations in the EMCO are also highly politicised. Most EMCO 
members either negotiate based on a "soft mandate" (= the member negotiates in the 
"spirit" of the minister) or a "hard" mandate (= the member negotiates on the basis of 
instructions accepted by the minister). The so-called EMCO support team normally 
produces the documents discussed at the EMCO meetings, this support team being the 
de-facto EMCO secretariat. The support team consists of officials from the Commission. 

The Commission also directly participates in the EMCO meetings,  where they play a 
situation-defining role even though an elected representative from one of the Member 
States always holds the presidency. The Commission representative (which is the general 
secretary or deputy general secretary of the General Directorate for Employment and 
Social Affairs) normally presents his or her own view concerning the point on the agenda 
as the first speaker. This also means that the EMCO debates are often based on a verbal 
presentation by the Commission. While the Commission plays the situation-defining role, 
it does not possess the status of being an actor with professional authority. The majority 
of the EMCO members perceive the Commission as a political player among others in the 
EMCO. Very often, the following discussions in the EMCO meetings are also akin to a 
political dogfight from word-to-word and sentence-to-sentence as concerns the 
recommendations issued to the ministers as cover notes regarding the various reports 
from the Commission. 

The conclusion concerning Hypothesis 2 is that it is difficult to substantiate whether or 
not it has been confirmed. However, there might be some evidence that the lack of 
learning processes taking place among the European Union Member States are due to the 
fact the learning processes here are excessively politicised. 
 
Re hypothesis 3): learning is more likely when the group is faced with clear evidence of 
political failure.

According to the quantitative data concerning this hypothesis, members with higher than 
average unemployment rates in their Member States did indeed report a higher degree of 
learning as a result of their EMCO participation. A positive correlation between the 
unemployment rates in the Member States of the respondent could be established based 
on the quantitative data. Assuming a linear relationship between the variables, a moderate 
positive Pearson correlation  of 0.384, the correlation is significant with a p-value of 
0.043. In conclusion, the working hypothesis of Hypothesis 3 can to some extent be 
substantiated by the statistical analysis; of course bearing in mind the limited number of 
respondents in the survey.  

Re hypothesis 4): learning is more likely in groups in which individuals share a common 
professional background.

The various presidencies also organize an informal two-to-three day meeting twice 
annually in which the presidency has included an element of socializing. The agenda is 
often broader, including elements of exchange of policy information and academic 
presentations reflecting the fact that most EMCO members have a longstanding 
professional background in European employment policy. The aim is to further boost the 
level of professionalism for officials, all of whom share a background in the social 
sciences, i.e. law, economics or political science.

At the same time, the EMCO participants are forced to "sell" the common EMCO 
opinions to their own ministers when they are briefing him or her prior to the Council of 
Ministers meeting. In this manner, the common knowledge of the EMCO is often 
transformed into what is perceived to be a national stock of knowledge regarding 
employment policy, though often only at the political level. 

As far as the EES is concerned, in other words, the learning processes are basically 
highly politicised, meaning that there are fewer shifts in the language-situated relations to 
other decision-makers such as, for example, new hegemonic concepts etc., as the 
professional background is often more or less "compromised" by the high degree of 
politicising. A fact pulling in the same direction is that many of the EMCO participants 
are senior officials from the ministries' international or European relations department, 
which often has limited contact to the domestic policy departments in the ministries. 
Hence, the ability of the EES to create trajectories of participation is somewhat limited.

In conclusion, it is impossible to confirm Hypothesis 4 on the basis of the empirical 
material in this paper.

Re hypothesis 5): learning is more likely when an authoritative member is the persuader.

The fundamental concepts characterizing the EMCO meetings are the twin concepts of 
flexibility and security with regard to rules on notice, maximum working hours, part-time 
work etc. The EMCO debate is normally fragmented into Member States stressing 
flexibility and security, respectively. According to the wing stressing flexibility,  
increasing labour market flexibility is required to unlock dynamics of significance to 
employment creation, whereas job security regulations ought to be modernized with 
regard to an increased focus on improving employability. This wing regards the 
Commission as a prime defender of "pure" security regulations on the labour market 
together with, among others, France, Luxembourg, Spain, Greece and Belgium. In 
practice, the EMCO decisions are made unanimously, which is, at the same time, a force 
behind the harmonization of the point of view around the fundamental concepts. The final 
EMCO decisions are, therefore, normally a delicate political balance between flexibility 
and security on the labour markets. 

The main challenges to the Commission's situation-defining role have increasingly been 
issued by the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland and occasionally Germany 
(especially since the initiation of the Hartz reform process of the German labour market). 

In general, the organization of the EES is a highly centralised political "compromise 
machine". Due to the tensions within the EMCO and the fight over sentences and 
concepts, the outcome is normally balanced and a result of the argumentative "survival of 
the fittest"; however, the Commission plays the situation-defining role. 

At the same time, Member States with a successful employment policy are normally able 
to act as authoritative EMCO members. They are occasionally able to play a persuasive 
role vis-à-vis the Commission and other Member States. Obviously, domestic policy 
success increases your authority within the EMCO – and vice versa. This will, of course, 
increase the potential learning effects of participating in the EMCO meetings. At the 
same time, there are clear limits as to how much certain Member States (no matter how 
successful they are) can go against the prevailing and argumentative logic within the 
EMCO as defined by the Commission and the supportive Member States. 

The conclusion concerning Hypothesis 5 is that there is a lack of hard empirical evidence 
to confirm it. However, the strong role of the Commission might be an indication of the 
impossibility of others playing the role as an authoritative persuasive member.

4. Data on Nordic Learning Processes in the Employment Field
Even though the OMC is now connected to the EU, policy coordination along the same 
lines as in the OMC has existed for many years among the Nordic countries (Iceland, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the three semi-autonomous areas: Greenland, 
the Faroe Islands and the Aaland Islands). In the employment field, the convention on a 
common Nordic labour market was implemented in 1954. In 1971, this kind of Nordic 
"hard" law was supplemented with "soft" legal coordination procedures, according to 
which officials as well as various experts meet on a regular basis in order to discuss 
experiences with their national labour market policies. The cornerstone of the Nordic 
learning processes in the employment field is the Nordic Committee of Senior Officials 
for Labour Market and Working Environment (the usual abbreviation used for this 
committee is EKA, which is an acronym of the committee's Scandinavian name). 

The data for this study has been collected using an electronic questionnaire (SurveyXact), 
which was e-mailed to respondents in the Nordic countries on January 10, 2005. The 
respondents were given approximately three weeks to complete the questionnaire.  
Electronic surveys remain a relatively new approach, and a possible source of error 
inherent to this approach in the past has been bias in sampling, as some groups tend to 
use IT less than others, i.e. senior participants.  This source of error is minimal in this 
study, however, as the entire population was online. 10 of the 15 EKA members 
responded to the questionnaire, providing an acceptable response rate of roughly 67 
percent. Although the EKA response rate does not raise any serious questions regarding 
the validity of the survey, the low finite number of respondents may cause problems in 
subsequent statistical analysis, as most statistical models require n to be larger than 30 in 
order to be exact. 

As in the case of the EMCO, the composite learning index consists of three different 
indicators based on questions in which respondents were asked how often they have 
learned something new from the Nordic Co-operation; how often they have reconsidered 
or modified their preferences as a result of ideas, knowledge or documentation obtained 
at the meetings; and how often ideas and experiences from other Nordic countries have 
made a strong impression on them.  

As in the questionnaire distributed among the EMCO members, the participants could 
rate their response to the three questions from "Very often" (= 5 points) to "Never" (= 1 
point ) or "Don't know" (= 6, subsequently eliminated). As all three indicators contain 
variables designating the same scale, the learning index can be constructed by simple 
addition, thereby creating an index with a minimum value of three points (no learning) 
and a maximum value of 15 points (maximal learning).   

In the table below, the composite learning index for the Nordic countries in the EKA is 
presented. This is – as in the case of the EMCO – a necessary digression in the analysis 
of the paper, as the national differences are used to test the hypothesis in the rest of the 
section.

Table: Composite Learning Index for Nordic Countries in the EKA  

Country
Composite learning index
Finland
9
Sweden 
10
Norway
8.5
Iceland
11
Faroe Islands 
7.5
Aaland Islands
12
Greenland  
15
N = 10.

Ørnsholt & Vestergaard (2003) used the same index (with minor variations ) in their 
study of the EMCO from 2003. Hence, the data from the EMCO and the EKA are 
perfectly comparable. As was the case in the study of the EMCO, however, the tests of 
partial correlations between the three indicators do raise some preliminary questions. As 
was mentioned in section 3, in order to ensure that the indicators in the index are in fact 
measuring the same dimension without being redundant, partial correlations ought to 
have a gamma-value of between 0.3 and 0.8. In reality, the gamma values of the EKA 
study were 0.445 , 0.407  and 0.192 , indicating that 'Strong Impression' is not a 
strong indicator to add to the learning index; however, at the same time, it was not a 
significant source of error. In order to ensure comparability with the EMCO survey, the 
following has therefore been included in the analysis:   

As in section 3, five hypotheses are suggested as explanations of the learning processes 
(or lack thereof). In the remainder of this section, these hypotheses are analysed on the 
basis of the qualitative and quantitative data.

Re hypothesis 1): learning is more likely when a group meets repeatedly.
In the employment field, the Nordic ministers meet annually and the EKA meets together 
semi-annually with a number of expert committees (on health and safety at work, safety 
at work research, on labour law, and on labour market policy), which themselves also 
meet twice a year. In this study, as only one of the respondents had attended less than five 
meetings, this measure was skewed and not a valid parameter for repeated and frequent 
interaction. 

The ministers normally meet in September, and the EKA meets a fortnight before in 
order to prepare the ministerial meeting. In all cases, the meetings last about two days 
and contain an element of socialising. In many ways, the EMCO functions correspond to 
the EKA, but the number of EKA meetings is only half that of the EMCO. This fact 
points in the direction of a lower learning potential in the EKA than in the EMCO. On the 
other hand, the number of meetings that members have attended probably only tells part 
of the story about the learning potential in the committee, also in the case of the EKA. 
Besides, relative to the EMCO, the EKA meetings are "supported" by a large number of 
expert committees.

The average score on the composite learning index for the 11 respondents of a total 
number of 14 from the EKA is slightly lower than the overall average for the Nordic co-
operation in the employment field in general (including all of the expert committees), 
with a score of 9.80 compared to an average of 10.04. 

The conclusion concerning Hypothesis 1 is that is impossible to determine whether or not 
it is confirmed on the basis of the data presented in this paper. However, due to the 
general score on the composite learning index, it appears as though the general frequency 
of meetings in the EKA is at a satisfactory level in order not to impair the learning 
processes.

Re hypothesis 2): learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct political 
pressure.

At all three of the levels – i.e. the ministerial level, senior official level and expert level – 
involved in the Nordic cooperation in the employment field, cooperation is characterised 
by a very intensive exchange of information and a significant degree of autonomy. Each 
of the participating countries produces reports for every meeting regarding the latest 
developments in the employment field. Much of the Nordic meetings are spent on 
presenting these reports. At the same time, the committees on all three levels each have 
their own budget, which can be used to organize seminars, minor research projects etc. in 
order to exchange views and best practises. At the end of the day, however, the EKA 
determines which of the expert committee projects are to be implemented, and the EKA 
can, at the same time, initiate projects of its own.

All projects concern initiatives where so-called "Nordic utility" is included, i.e. projects 
where the Nordic countries encounter similar problems concerning their national 
employment policies. Examples of these projects are the integration of immigrants into 
the labour markets; decreasing the number of people on sickness absence; statistical 
questions concerning equal treatment of men and women; and health risks in various job 
functions. The numerous seminars, projects, meetings and conferences have created an 
environment in which mutual learning through a relatively decentralised exchange of 
information and experiences proceeds very quickly among the Nordic countries.   

No academic research has previously been conducted to analyse the effects of the Nordic 
"open method of coordination" in the employment field. However, one should expect 
relatively large learning effects due to a relatively high degree of de-politicisation owing 
to the relative autonomous status of the EKA compared to the EMCO, which is more 
insulated from political constraints than is the EMCO. This is also underlined by the 
budgetary freedom to organize projects on mutual learning; the informality and lack of 
power plays at the Nordic meetings; and the fact that the national representatives in 
Nordic committees often comes from departments which are involved in domestic policy-
making in various areas of the employment policy. Trajectories of participation are 
hereby created, resulting in larger mutual learning effects when everything else is equal. 

However, contrary to the working hypothesis, the variable concerning interest on the part 
of the minister reveals a moderately strong positive correlation with learning (gamma = 
0.630), and the correlation is significant with a p-value of 0.019 below the threshold of 
0.05. This means that EKA members have a higher score on the composite learning index 
when their minister is interested in the work proceeding within the EKA; however, the 
statistics behind this result are deemed inadequate, as n is too small.

The variable interest on the part of the state secretary also reflects a moderately strong 
positive correlation with learning (gamma = 0.500), which is at odds with the working 
hypothesis; however, the correlation here is not significant, with a p-value higher than 
0.05, at 0.089.

A probable conclusion concerning hypothesis 2 is that political interest from ministers 
and state secretaries has a positive influence on learning; however, only when they 
maintain this interest at the general level allowing the autonomous discussion and free 
deliberation to proceed. In other words, as far as the facilitation of learning processes is 
concerned, the optimal institutional arrangement appears to be when ministers and state 
secretaries have a general interest in the work of a committee without interfering in the 
discussions, demanding mandates approved before discussions in the committee, and 
allowing the preparations of the ministerial meetings to occupy only a small part of the 
agenda of the committee. 

Re hypothesis 3): learning is more likely when the group encounters clear evidence of 
political failure.

In the working hypothesis concerning hypothesis 3, it is asserted that the proxy for policy 
failure in this particular field is the unemployment rate. In general, the variation in the 
size of the unemployment figures is much smaller among the Nordic countries than is the 
case among the European Member States. This ought to indicate a lesser potential for 
learning among the Nordic countries. 

This is also confirmed by the data from the EKA study on the grounds that when using 
the unemployment rate in 2003 from the Nordic countries as a proxy for political failure, 
a linear relationship between unemployment and learning can be tested (treating both 
variables as scale). There appears to be no significant relationship in the data, as the p-
value is 0.539 far above the threshold of 0.05. The same holds true when drawing 
comparisons with the unemployment rate in 2001.   

Hypothesis 3 was confirmed in the analysis concerning the EMCO. At the same time, the 
conclusion concerning hypothesis 3 is, therefore, that one ought to expect a much larger 
potential for learning in the EMCO than in the EKA.
 
Re hypothesis 4): learning is more likely in groups in which individuals share a common 
professional background.

The professional background of the EKA members is the social sciences (law, 
economics, and political science), as in the EMCO. On this basis, it is difficult to find any 
differences; however, the professional background in the EKA (as well as in the EMCO) 
is reinforced through the professional arrangement concerning employment policy. 

On the basis of the empirical evidence concerning the Nordic countries in this paper, it is 
impossible to confirm Hypothesis 4.

Re hypothesis 5): learning is more likely when an authoritative member is persuader.

The secretariat of the Nordic Council of Ministers is represented at all of the EKA 
meetings, but it merely serves as the facilitator and practical organizer of the meetings. 
The Nordic country holding the presidency is normally playing the situation-defining 
role; however, compared to the EMCO, the Nordic meetings are more loosely structured. 
This is also because relatively few concrete results are expected to come out of these 
meetings. Recommendations and reports are adopted, but this is not – as in the case of the 
EMCO – part of an annual routine, and the public rarely notices it. In short, the material 
concerning whether or not a member is playing the role of an authoritative persuader is 
relatively limited.

In conclusion, on the basis of the empirical evidence concerning the Nordic countries in 
this paper, it is not possible to conclude anything concerning Hypothesis 5.


7. OMC Learning Effects: European and Nordic experiences in comparison 
For the 10 respondents from the EKA, the mean score on the composite learning index is 
9.8, while the mean score for the 21 EMCO respondents is 9.3. On the surface and from 
this perspective, it can be concluded that the learning effect was higher in the EKA than 
in the EMCO. 

In order to accept this conclusion, however, a central underlying assumption must also be 
accepted: that both variables are not measured in a sample, but instead are measured in 
the entire relevant population. This assumption is supported by the fact that the EMCO 
learning score was calculated for 21 respondents out of a total of 41 possible respondents 
(a response rate of roughly 51 percent), while the EKA learning score was calculated for 
10 of 15 possible respondents (a response rate of roughly 67 percent). It is clear, 
however, that any statistical analysis is weakened by the low absolute number of 
respondents, as most statistical models require n to be larger than 30 in order to calculate 
significance and correlations in a valid manner. 

When results are treated as samples of a finite population, it is no longer possible to 
conclude that there is any difference in the learning index mean between groups, as the 
maximum possible value of the EMCO mean in the population (9.775) is higher than the 
minimum possible value of the EKA mean in the population (8.945), meaning that the 
learning index means may be equal in the populations. 

As has been argued throughout this paper, there are therefore pros and cons as far as the 
institutional arrangements of the EMCO and the EKA are concerned when the aim is to 
investigate the institutional arrangement facilitating transnational learning processes the 
most. The dimensions of the Nordic learning processes might be somewhat higher than 
among the EU Member States, but the there are undoubtedly also factors found in the 
European Employment Strategy facilitating transnational learning processes which are 
nonexistent in the Nordic cooperation in the employment field such as the more routine 
decision-making, the more in-dept documentation, and the fact that the EES is, in 
general, taken more seriously than the Nordic cooperation in the employment field.
  
As far as hypothesis 1 is concerned – which asserts that learning is more likely when 
groups meet repeatedly – the impressionistic indication concerning the EMCO is that 
attending more meetings may increase respondents' scores on the composite learning 
index. It was, however, difficult to substantiate this hypothesis using statistical methods. 
In the EKA, this is the case to an even lesser degree. At the same time, a discrepancy 
between the EMCO and the difference between the EMCO and the EKA is that the 
EMCO meets four times annually, while the EKA only meets semi-annually. In principle, 
therefore, the learning potential in the EKA ought to be lower than in the EMCO due to 
this factor alone. However, the relative high score in the EKA seems to indicate that 
semi-annual meetings are sufficient to safeguard a large learning potential.

Hypothesis 2 asserts that learning is more likely when a group is insulated from direct 
political pressure. As far as the EMCO is concerned, the agenda is governed by the 
political agenda of the Council of Ministers. Consequently, the EMCO negotiations are 
highly politicised, and the EMCO discussions are akin to a political dogfight from 
sentence-to-sentence over the content of the policy recommendations that the committee 
must send to the Council. All told, this reflects a relatively low potential for learning 
stemming from participation in the EMCO meetings. However, contrary to the working 
hypothesis regarding hypothesis 2, the variable concerning interest on the part of the 
minister reveals a moderately strong correlation with learning. This means that the 
member of the EKA has a higher score on the composite learning index when his or her 
minister is interested in the EKA work. Although the statistics behind this result are 
inadequate, as n is too small, a probable conclusion concerning this hypothesis is that 
political interest from ministers has a positive influence on transnational learning; 
however, only when the ministers are not interfering with discussions in the committee 
through "hard" or "soft" mandates, and only when the preparations of the ministerial 
meetings only constitute a small part of the committee agenda.

Hypothesis 3 asserts that learning is more likely when a group encounters clear evidence 
of political failure that can – in the employment field – be interpreted as a high 
unemployment rate. According to the quantitative data concerning this hypothesis, the 
EMCO members with higher than average unemployment rates in their Member States 
did indeed report a higher degree of learning as a result of their EMCO participation. 
Assuming a linear relationship between the variables, a moderate positive correlation 
could be established, though one must bear in mind the limited number of respondents in 
the survey. The opposite situation was the case for the Nordic cooperation in the EKA: 
when using the unemployment rate in 2003, there appears to be no significant 
relationship in the quantitative data. In general, however, the variation in the size of the 
unemployment figures is much smaller among the Nordic countries than among the EU 
Member States. This indicates lesser potential for learning among the Nordic countries. 
In short, however, the hypothesis appears to have been confirmed.

Hypothesis 4 asserts that learning is more likely in groups in which individuals share a 
common professional background. Both in the EMCO and in the EKA, academic 
presentations and discussions based upon the background of the participants in 
economics, law and political science appear to be a general characteristic intended to 
further elevate the level of professionalism in employment policy. At the same time, the 
learning potential for this group of people is probably somewhat smaller relative to the 
participants with a specialist education in, for example, medicine. Besides, because of the 
highly and very directly politicised intellectual environment in the EMCO, the common 
professional background might play a less important role in the EMCO, thereby 
impairing the potential learning processes in the EMCO relative to the EKA. However, in 
short, there is not enough empirical evidence to substantiate Hypothesis 4 in this paper.

Hypothesis 5 asserts that learning is more likely when an authoritative member is 
persuader. There is no hard data concerning Hypothesis 5 in this paper. On the one hand, 
the Commission is playing the situation-defining role in the EMCO, whereas it is the 
country holding the presidency in the EKA. This might point in the direction of a higher 
learning potential in the EKA if the country holding the presidency has the necessary 
authority, which the Commission often lacks on the grounds that it is perceived to belong 
to the "employment protection wing" of the EMCO. This might point in the direction of 
larger learning effects in the EKA. On the other hand, the EKA is more loosely 
structured. This is because relatively few concrete results are expected to come out of the 
EKA meetings. Recommendations and reports are adopted, but this is not – as in the 
EMCO – part of a yearly routine and is hardly ever noticed by the public. This might 
point in the direction of fewer learning effects at the Nordic level, as at least the same 
level of interest from the political level appears to facilitate learning, cf. Hypothesis 2.   

8. Conclusion
In the introduction to this paper, three questions were addressed concerning the 
transnational learning processes in the EU and among the Nordic countries: first, what 
characterizes the mutual learning processes of the OMC in the EU employment field? 
Second, what characterizes the mutual learning processes among the Nordic countries in 
their cooperation in the employment field? Third, and most importantly, when comparing 
the experiences with the learning processes in the EU and among the Nordic countries, 
what are the reasons for the apparent differences on how mutual or transnational learning 
processes are most efficiently diffused or facilitated among a group of Member States? 

Transnational learning processes in the EU employment field have a number of specific 
characteristics. The participants meet frequently and regularly, creating a solid basis for 
potential learning processes. However, the meetings of the European Employment 
Committee are totally governed by the agenda of the Council of Ministers and, therefore, 
highly politicised. This fact reduces the efficacy of the potential learning processes. At 
the same time, the fact that variations in political failures in the employment field are 
relatively large in the EU increases the learning effects, according to participants. The 
professional background is the usual generalist education in various social science 
disciplines, though naturally with a longstanding specific knowledge in employment 
policy. Finally, there is no actor with persuasive authority facilitating the European 
learning processes.

Transnational learning processes in the employment field among the Nordic countries 
also have a number of specific characteristics. Participants meet on a regular basis two 
times a year. The meetings are highly depoliticised, allowing room for a free and open 
exchange of views and information on employment policy; basically, this facilitates 
transnational learning processes. However, the present paper also points to the fact that 
some degree of political interest on the part of the minister actually facilitates the 
transnational learning processes among the Nordic countries. The Nordic countries lack 
great variations in the unemployment figures, meaning that the potential is somewhat 
reduced. The professional background of the officials engaged in the Nordic cooperation 
is the same as for the participants in the European co-operation, however, more Nordic 
officials hail from domestic policy departments in their national bureaucracies, which 
increases the learning potential.

When comparing the experiences with transnational learning processes in the EU and 
among the Nordic countries, I will tentatively suggest that an optimal institutional setting 
intended to facilitate the transnational learning processes would be one which 
?	means that officials meet on a regular basis two times annually or more; 
?	has a system of expert committees that supports the international committees for 
cooperation with expertise;
?	involves the relevant ministers and state secretaries to an extent to which they 
display an interest in the work dealing with transnational learning processes;
?	ministers avoid directly interfering in discussions in the work of the committees 
through mandates; 
?	sets up the institution in order to organize the learning processes, allowing 
considerable room for deliberation;
?	sets up the institution in order to function as more than an organ that merely 
prepares meetings at the political level; 
?	concentrates the transnational learning processes on efforts in policy areas where 
the variations in the policy results are large; 
?	involves officials that are persons with a longstanding professional background; 
and
?	chooses persons for international work with transnational learning processes that 
possess an authority in domestic policy making and administrative work.

However, much more research appears to be necessary in order to investigate all of the 
aspects of transnational learning processes among the European Union Member States 
and the Nordic countries. Several of the hypotheses listed in this paper have not been 
sufficiently substantiated, as the empirical evidence in the collected data was too weak. 
Obviously, the methodology used should be supplemented with interviews of relevant 
participants in the analysed learning processes. At the same time, there would appear to 
be reason to believe that the need to understand the learning processes in the international 
and political sphere will grow dramatically in the years to come as the traditional 
regulatory methods are exhausted.  
 


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Trubek, D.M. & L.G. Trubek. 2003. Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social 
Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Coordination. Working Paper of the 
Governance Project. University of Wisconsin-Madison. Center for European Union 
Studies. Wisconsin Madison, December 2003.

Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Ørnsholt, K. & T. Vestergaard. 2003. Den åbne koordinationsmetode – en europæisk 
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europæiske beskæftigelsesstrategi. Unpublished Master Thesis. Aarhus: Aarhus 
University.


  I would like to thank my research assistants, Thomas Horn and Kasper Lindskow, for their assistance in 
preparing this paper. I would also like to thank Ove Kaj Pedersen, Maja Lotz, Lars Bo Kaspersen, Tore 
Olsen and Carsten Greve who forced me to think things over once again.
  Norway, Iceland and the semi-autonomous areas of Greenland and the Faroe Islands are not members of 
the European Union.
  Transnational learning and mutual learning are used as synonymous concepts in this paper. 
  'Concept' is used here in accordance with Wittgenstein's terminology; political theorists may note that it 
is applied here with predominantly philosophical connotations.
  The internal processes that facilitate learning processes understood as the harmonization of linguistic 
categories and acceptance of new concepts might be initiated from the outside, but they nonetheless 
function internally and are categorized accordingly.
  In the current questionnaire, "Very often" is designated (1), and "Never" is designated (5), but the 
numbers must be inverted in order to construct a valid index; otherwise a low score on the index would 
imply a high degree of learning. Ørnsholt & Vestergaard (2003) designated "Very often" (5) and "Never" 
(1).
  A gamma value can be defined as a symmetric measure of the association between two ordinal variables 
ranging between negative 1 and 1. Values close to an absolute value of 1 indicate a strong relationship 
between the two variables. Values close to zero indicate little or no relationship.
  The alpha value for the index that designates overall reliability also rises from 0.66 to 0.76 when "Strong 
impression" is left out, meaning that the learning index is more reliable when "Strong impression" is not 
included as an indicator. The alpha value can be defined as a model of internal consistency as based on the 
average inter-item correlation. 
  The secretariat of the Council of Ministers is also represented at the EMCO meetings, but normally 
remains very quiet.
  The Pearson correlation coefficient measures the linear association between two scale variables.
  On account of problems with e-mail addresses, five e-mails were sent between January 11 and January 
17. Over the course of the process, several reminders were sent to respondents who had not yet answered. 
  Ørnsholt & Vestergaard (2003) also used electronic questionnaires. They noted that the response rate for 
respondents in some Member States with less Internet penetration was slightly lower than average; 
however, they attempted to compensate for this bias by posting printed questionnaires upon request. 
  See section 3 for the exact wording of these three questions.
 In the current questionnaire, "Very often" is designated (1), and "Never" is designated (5), but the 
numbers must be inverted in order to construct a valid index; otherwise a low score on the index would 
imply a high degree of learning. Ørnsholt & Vestergaard (2003) designated "Very often" (5) and "Never" 
(1).
  Denmark is not mentioned in the table, as the Danish representative did not answer all of the questions 
relevant to the construction of the learning index.
  Although the respondent from Greenland may be an outlier, the response does fit with other measures, 
that is, that the answers from the respondents fit the questions on learning in the questionnaire. 
  The words "Open Method of Coordination" have been substituted with "Nordic Co-operation" in the 
questionnaire for this study.
  Partial correlation on the questions concerning "New knowledge" (question 1 in section 3) and 
"Preferences" (question 3 in section 3) controlling for "Strong Impression" (question 2 in section 3).  
  Partial correlation on the questions concerning "New knowledge" (question 1 in section 3) and "Strong 
Impression" (question 2 in section 3) controlling for "Preferences" (question 3 in section 3).
  Partial correlation on the questions concerning "Strong Impression" (question 2 in section 3) and 
"Preferences" (question 3 in section 3) controlling for "New knowledge" (question 1 in section 3).
  This problem can be illustrated by treating the results from both of the above groups as samples of finite 
populations. If both learning index means have been compiled on the basis of samples, then the uncertainty 
caused by inferring from a sample to a population also must be added to the equation by calculating a 
confidence interval: for the EMCO group, the standard error of mean is 0.353, whereas the correction for a 
finite population is a factor of 0.707, and a z-score of 1.96 is chosen. The standard error of mean was 
calculated by SPSS, while the finite population correction factor =v (( N – n ) / ( N – 1 )), has been 
calculated by inserting N = 41 and n = 21, and the z-score of 1.96 is for a 95 percent confidence interval, 
meaning that the mean will be within the calculated range in 95 percent of cases. The mean for the 
population is calculated as mean +/- standard error x z-score x correction factor. The same goes for the 
EKA calculations. The calculated mean for the EMCO population is then 9.286 +/- 0.489. For the EKA 
group, the standard error of mean is 0.786, whereas the correction for a finite population is a factor of 
0.555, and the z-score of 1.96 is again chosen. The calculated mean for the EKA population is then 9.8 +/- 
0.855.

 
 
 
 


34