Poland, Germany and EU Enlargement
The Rising Prominence of Domestic Politics
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Key Hypotheses

- As far as Polish and German strategic foreign policy objectives are concerned, the German-Polish relationship and the enlargement of the European Union to the East are interdependent. After the end of Communism in East Central Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Poland and Germany discovered a ‘community of interests’.\(^1\) This notion was based on the assumption of Poland’s future EU membership.

- Currently, the process of EU enlargement has entered the stage of formal negotiations. The implications of this development for German-Polish relations are twofold. Firstly, the success of the accession process and subsequently the condition of the Polish-German relationship has become more dependent upon progress in all areas of Germany’s and Poland’s European diplomacy. Secondly, the relationship has been exposed to the influence of a larger group of domestic agents, some of which are not so concerned about strategic foreign policy objectives.

- Germany’s current European policy prioritisation and domestic developments in both countries are slowing down the EU enlargement process

with consequences for Polish-German relations. However, both countries strategic objectives - to complete the process of unifying Europe, remain unchallenged.

**Introduction**

The principle of EU Enlargement is largely accepted by political elites on both sides of the Oder. The Polish government declared in its official document - the National Strategy for Integration, that achieving EU membership figures amongst its chief priorities. Successive German governments have also underpinned the notion of Eastern expansion of the EU, as well as supporting further developments in relations with Poland in the context of European integration.

It seems that after centuries of struggle to assert their geopolitical position, Poland and Germany have agreed that their security will be better achieved when both countries are members of the same Western structures. The importance by Polish-German rapprochement for completing the process of ‘United Europe’ was pronounced in numerous declarations of German and Polish statesmen. It was even envisaged that as far as the notion of European integration is concerned, the relationship should per-

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2 See: Danuta Zagrodzka, Stare Leki Nowe Strachy, ‘Gazeta Wyborcza’, 7.12.98. This article analysis the recent opinion polls comparing the German and Polish elites. The research was initiated by the Centre for International Relations, Warsaw.


form a role comparable with the Franco-German axis. This continuing German support for Poland’s West European aspirations has facilitated the current condition of German-Polish relations which has often been described as better than in any other point in history.

On the other hand, since the second half of 1998, the atmosphere in Polish-German relations has deteriorated somewhat. The reasons for this regression have almost always been connected to the issue of EU Enlargement. Initially, it was the question of property rights concerning Western Polish real estate which had been German before the war. Subsequently, the new German SPD/Green government raised some skepticism concerning the EU Enlargement timetable and appealed for a ‘new realism’ in addressing the issue. In Warsaw both these policy statements were received emotionally and with a fair amount of disappointment. Questions were asked whether Germany had altered its policy towards Poland and what kind of consequences such a development would present for Poland’s hopes for becoming a member of the EU.

This chapter argues that with the EU Enlargement process approaching its decisive phase, Polish-German co-operation is becoming more intense.

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7 The Federation of Ethnic Germans expelled from the territories presently belonging to Poland argues that as long as Poland does not fulfil the restitution claims of former German landowners, it is not fit to join the EU. In the run-up to the German 1998 general election, Bavarian CSU and a part of the CDU supported these demands. On 29 May 1998, the coalition of CDU/CSU/FDP voted Heimatvertriebenen Entschließung. In return Polish Sejm reasserted Poland’s border with Germany, although in actual fact the Bundestag did not mention collective territorial claims at all. See: ‘Nie Rzucim, Chetnie Sprzedam’ Rzeczpospolita, 1.6.98 ‘Polens Parlament Kritisiert Entschließung des Bundestages’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4.7.98.

8 See: ‘Rozważni i Romantyczni’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 30.10.98. ‘Apel o Realizm’ Rzeczpospolita, 30.10.98.

9 See: Janusz A. Majcherek, Widmo Nowej Realpolitik, ‘Rzeczpospolita’, 3.11.98.
than ever before. On the other hand, precisely because of this increased intimacy, the potential scope for the emergence of conflicts between some smaller economic and political agents is multiplying. There are three crucial consequences of this process. First, it is hard to imagine that Germany will back down from pressing for enlargement in which its administration has been so strongly involved and has subsequently adjusted itself technically to deal with. Second, dealing with EU enlargement will increasingly involve a larger number of agents in the dense network of German and Polish economic and political systems which will make the process more problematic. Third, Germany’s support for EU Enlargement will increasingly depend on the government’s successes and failures in those areas of European policy which remain vital for the promotion of its own interests.

This chapter will examine the bilateral dynamics of Polish-German relations, looking initially at the process of reconciling strategic objectives and subsequently discussing the impact of domestic Polish and German developments on the pace of EU Enlargement. The first part of the paper addresses some key issues in Polish-German relations that led to the current advanced stage of the process of EU Enlargement. The second part concentrates on the importance of indigenous factors, namely party politics and bureaucratic arrangements, for the construction of German and Polish policies on EU Enlargement. These domestic developments are addressed in the context of other objectives of Germany’s European diplomacy. Finally, the conclusion provides summary remarks and a brief discussion on Polish policy during EU Enlargement negotiations.

1. Polish-German Relations and Strategic Foreign Policy Objectives

There has always been a strong connection between Germany’s and Poland’s broader geopolitical aspirations and the condition of their bilateral relations. Due to their geographical closeness and shared experience of being a nation at the centre of the continent, Polish and German strategic
foreign policy objectives have never been indifferent to each other. In fact for most of the modern age both nations believed that what they saw as their ‘national interests’ were mutually exclusive. And it was not until the end of the Second World War that this perception slowly began to change, first in West Germany and subsequently, under much more restrained conditions, in Poland.

Under the dominating overlay of Cold War bipolarity there was a gradual realisation on behalf of the West German and Polish political elites that a number of their interests were in fact agreeable with each other. These included most prominently peace and stabilisation in Central Europe and decreasing both countries' dependence upon their respective patrons. Also, although Polish Communists remained dogmatically opposed to German unification, a part of the pro-democratic opposition in Poland held an opposing view based on the assumption that German unification and the end of Communism were closely interrelated.

Bilateral ‘normalisation’ in the 1970s; West Germany’s temporary recognition of the Oder-Neisse border and Polish consent for the departure of

ethnic Germans from Poland, had a mutually positive outcome. On the one hand it resulted in lessening Poland’s economic dependency on the Soviet Union, and on the other hand it constituted a vital step in West Germany’s advocacy of détente and the subsequent enhancement of its security. The additional bonus for the Federal Republic was its growing prestige in the Western bloc and the realisation of its key importance for the resolution of the East-West conflict.

However, by the 1980s it became apparent that West Germany’s Ostpolitik was in deadlock and that it would not be able to be overcome without a fundamental change in the structure of international relations. This opportunity was created by the ending of the Cold War, through which a number of bilateral Polish-German developments took place. Soon after the completion of the German unification process, the border dispute was finally unravelled and both countries signed the treaty on ‘Good Neighbourliness’ in which Germany committed itself to supporting Poland’s EU membership. Also, the non-communist government of Poland saw the unification of Germany as an obvious precondition for Poland’s integration with the West, hence its undisputed support for the process as well as for the continuation of Germany’s NATO membership.

17 ibid.
Since 1990, Germany has refrained from pursuing a unilateral policy towards Poland and other East Central European countries; instead it has continuously underpinned the idea of extending West European structures to the East. In fact it is largely due to the consistent efforts of German diplomacy that the issue of EU Enlargement appeared at the top of the EU’s agenda and that recently the accession process has entered the stage of negotiation.

Currently, developments in Polish-German relations are almost completely focused on the issue of EU and NATO enlargements. Poland will continue to expect from Germany that it will persist in advocating Poland’s Western integration. Indeed it is difficult to imagine that Germany may dramatically alter its policy and start to argue against Poland’s membership in the European Union. Therefore, the post-1990 Polish-German ‘Community of Interests’ or in other words ‘Community of strategic foreign policy objectives’ will continue to develop. In fact, it is currently stretching beyond bilateral relations to the East, where both Poland and Germany share an interest in making sure that concluding Poland’s Western integration will not alienate other East Central European countries which are not included in the same process.

On the other hand, as the relationship is growing more intimate, some differences in emphasis are beginning to emerge. These mostly concern the desirable timetable for completing Poland’s EU membership and some internal EU developments, most prominently within the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy. On several occasions, the new German government made it clear that it intends to slow down the pace of integrating East Central Europe with the EU.\(^{20}\) This resulted in turn in more skeptical assessments of Germany’s foreign policy by some members of the Polish government as well as worsening public attitudes in Poland towards Ger-

\(^{20}\) See:‘Wolniej do Unii’ Zycie, 29.10.98. ‘Bez Złudzeń w Sprawie Poszerzenia’ Rzeczpospolita, 29.10.98
many.\textsuperscript{21} Also, Germany’s policy of strengthening the European dimension of international security has been less-than-welcomed in Poland.\textsuperscript{22} Faced with a choice between the European or Atlantic dimension of security provision, it is unlikely that Poland may in the near future prefer the former, at least as long as it remains outside the EU. In fact, the critical reactions in Poland to the proposal by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher, to cancel NATO’s first nuclear strike option, may mark the beginning of a longer discrepancy in Polish and German perceptions of security and security institutions.\textsuperscript{23}

Considering the long-term strategic foreign policy objective of the Federal Republic to work towards an ‘ever closer’ Europe, it is crucial for the continuity of Germany’s support for expanding the EU that this notion does not undermine the Community’s internal cohesion. The Polish government appears to be well aware that it is in its best interest to pursue a double and simultaneous development of the European Union. The chief negotiator of Poland’s EU membership - Mr Kulakowski, often underlines that the notions of opening the EU to the East and its deepening are mutually complementary.\textsuperscript{24} On the other hand, some Polish political parties seem to opt for a looser model of European integration.\textsuperscript{25} Should these

\textsuperscript{21} See: Interview with Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, Die Woche, 28.10.98. Also: ‘Geremek: Nie Wiemy, Czego Oczekiwac’ Gazeta Wyborcza, 29. 10. 98. For an impact of these developments on the public opinion in Poland see: Danuta Zagrodzka, ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} See: Bartosz Jalowiecki, Stare czy Nowe NATO, ‘Zycie’, 8.6.98.

\textsuperscript{23} ‘Atomowa Wpadka’ Gazeta Wyborcza, 25.11.98. ‘Uslyszec Nasz Glos’, ibid. ‘Polen will auf den Atomschirm der NATO nicht verzichten’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7.12.98.


\textsuperscript{25} For an analysis of the attitude of Polish political parties towards the notion of European Integration see: Jerzy Hausner, ‘Partie wobec Integracji’, in: Przystapienie czy Integracja? EU-Monitoring II, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Warszawa, Marzec
voices become more powerful, Germany may be forced to rethink its support for Poland's EU membership.

However, in spite of these disagreements, it seems apparent that Poland and Germany have come a long way since reconciling their strategic differences. It is also clear that the question of integrating Poland with the European Union remains of key importance for the condition of this relationship. The emergence of some differences of opinion in security orientations, however important, are part of the wider Euro-Atlantic security debate, and are therefore unlikely to endanger the fundamentals of post-1990 Polish-German rapprochement. In fact, the appearance of such a debate proves the current intensity of the relationship.

In order to address the current developments in Polish-German relations in the context of EU enlargement toward the East, it does not seem sufficient any longer to keep discussing strategic issues of high politics which may diverge in some details, but will more or less remain congruent. Since the start of the actual process of negotiating Poland's accession to the European Union, it has become apparent that the usual dynamics of European integration, marked by the ever-greater involvement of a larger number of agents, are playing an increasingly prominent role in this relationship. In other words, foreign policy strategic considerations may prove to be of limited impact for the present stage of Polish-German relations. Therefore, in order to analyse these current developments in the context of EU enlargement negotiations, which is predominantly a technical process, it is necessary to focus on the domestic scenes. Crucially, two indigenous factors need to be addressed: the economic and political considerations and factors that influence German and Polish interest formation in this process and the decision-making patterns of German and Polish European diplomacy.

2. EU Enlargement Negotiations and the European Diplomacy of Poland and Germany

The overall nature of processing and conducting European diplomacy has increasingly become considered to be an internal rather than foreign affair. The amended Article 23 of the German Basic Law has in fact formally introduced the concept of domestic European policy including extensive constitutional rights for the German Länder to participate in the decision-making process. Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber, argued that European policy should be exclusively considered an internal rather than foreign policy, and that consequently it should remain outside the competencies of the Auswärtiges Amt. In Poland, where European integration is increasingly affecting some individual sectors of industry, the government is often targeted by industrial lobbying. This in turn has prompted some departments, particularly the Ministry of Agriculture, to speak independently of the government’s official line. In addition, after the 1998 administrative reform, the competencies of the Polish regions have significantly increased and their greater involvement in the European process should be expected, too.

On the whole, in order to analyse German and Polish European diplomacy in the process of preparing positions for the EU enlargement negotiations, three current domestic factors need to be addressed: the bureaucratic decision making process, party politics and regional interests (the latter will not be discussed here due to the limited remit of this paper).


27 Klaus Bachmann, Czy Polska Drużyna Umie Grac w Pilke, ‘Rzeczpospolita’ 10.6.98.

However, it is also important to see that as far as Germany is concerned, enlarging the EU to the East is just a part of its overall European diplomacy. This implies that after the complex process of constructing a domestic consensus, Germany’s position on EU enlargement is also confronted with other objectives in European policy.

**EU Enlargement and ‘Other’ Objectives in European Diplomacy**

The outcome of the 1998 elections to the Bundestag marked a change in Germany’s conduct of European policy. The new, more economically focused government, has particularly supported the three following developments.  

1. Reform of the system of financing the EU in a way that would ensure lower German contributions to the EU’s budget and secure a ‘fairer’ allocation of resources.  

2. The development of and further synchronisation of employment policies. To tackle rising unemployment through the creation of state-sponsored jobs and equalisation of labour costs across the EU.  

3. Harmonisation of corporate taxes in EU Member States.  

In the period since the new administration has been in office it has become clear that Germany’s pressure to carry out these policies has considerably affected the EU’s readiness to admit new members. Although


29 See the coalition agreement between the SPD and Alliance 90/Greens. The documents addresses directly first two of the above mentioned policy objectives.  


31 ‘Germany to Push Ahead with EU Tax Harmonising Plans’ Financial Times, 24.11.98.
calling for budget reform was in fact initiated by the former coalition,\textsuperscript{32} the new government has pronounced its priorities more assertively and in a way that antagonised some other members of the Community.\textsuperscript{33} Also, the new administration directly linked finance reform with the Eastern expansion, declaring a policy of Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform (No enlargement without financial reform).	extsuperscript{34} The second policy objective, the development of employment policy, does not easily reconcile with extending the free movement of workers to the countries where the costs of labour units are considerably cheaper than in Germany. Finally, the third postulate to harmonise corporate taxes all over the EU antagonised the United Kingdom, the chief advocate of EU Enlargement outside Germany.\textsuperscript{35} This may potentially lead to another sidelining of Britain and the return of a non-cooperative style of European policy - a development which would certainly delay the pace of enlargement.\textsuperscript{36}

Some declarations of the Polish Government regarding the preferred model of joining the EU contradict some of the newly declared policy objectives of Germany’s European diplomacy. For example, the argument of the Polish Minister of Agriculture against the proposed reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy in Agenda 2000, serves to strengthen the calls for no reform in the financing of the EU.\textsuperscript{37} A second point is the government’s opposition to the introduction of transition periods on the


\textsuperscript{33} ‘EU North and South Split on Spending Freeze’ Financial Times, 7.12.98

\textsuperscript{34} See: ‘Bundesregierung: Keine EU Erweiterung ohne Finanzreform’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3.12.98.


free movement of labour which complicates Germany’s postulate to harmonise the EU’s employment policy.  

On the whole, the policy prioritisation of the new German administration outlined above complements the long term objective of all German Governments - to enhance and deepen European integration. However, the era when the Federal Republic was ready to make more material sacrifices than any other member state in order to achieve this priority has gone. The notion of EU Enlargement, although remaining high among Germany’s policy objectives, is unlikely to be fully supported as long as at least some of the policy reforms mentioned above are undertaken. Ironically, the current position of Poland to become a full member of the Union with as little and as short transition periods as necessary (with the exception of environmental policy and land purchasing) may at the moment delay Germany’s readiness to uphold Poland’s EU membership. However, both German and Polish domestic constraints make it difficult for their governments to alter their declared European policies in a way that would speed up the enlargement process. Also the shape of current political debates in both countries as well as some developments in administering the EU enlargement process by the German and Polish civil service seem to confirm this observation.

38 For the German discussion about the Polish position on the extension of the free movement of labour see: ‘Warschau will Anfang an Vollwertiges EU Mitglied Sein’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Donnerstag 26 Februar 1998. Nr.48.
Political Parties

The key features of German and Polish politics are in fact strikingly similar to each other. Due to their electoral laws - proportional representation with a five percent threshold - politics in both countries are dominated by a centrist orientation and a system of coalition governments. The political struggle between coalition partners and the potential for a change of government through a switch of partner, result in similar consequences. In both cases the electoral constitutions stimulate the elimination of radical tendencies and nurture a more consensual style of politics. Currently it is the junior partners in Polish and German governments that hold the departments of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, in some ways the impact of domestic politics upon the conduct of Polish and German European diplomacy is structurally comparable.

As far as the positions of individual Polish and German parties on Poland’s membership in the EU are concerned, there is a cross-party consensus in both countries to support this strategic foreign policy objective. The idea of expanding the EU eastwards has in fact never become a matter of political discussion between the opposition and a government, certainly not in a way that would clearly identify that one party is principally against the notion.

In fact, in Germany under the former CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, the SPD and the Greens attacked the government for displaying skepticism in the enlargement area. Currently, the roles have been reversed, so that

40 See: Danuta Zagrodzka, ibid.
42 ‘Polska Nie Lezy Miedzy Niemcami a Francja. Rozmowa z Günterem Verheugenem, Ekspertem SPD’, Rzeczpospolita, 1.7.98. ‘Niefortunna Rezolucja. Verheu-
the red-green coalition is criticised for slowing down the process. It is therefore clear that the notion of EU Enlargement has become part of the German European ‘philosophy’ which normally remains unchallenged by the opposition. This restraint in abusing an anti-enlargement argument is particularly remarkable considering the reluctance of the German general public to underpin Poland’s EU membership. In Poland, some Euroskepticism has been displayed on the right of the governing AWS as well as in the opposition PSL. Therefore, as in the German case, the actual debate continues to be held outside the main lines of political division within, and not between the government and opposition.

Both German and Polish junior coalition parties (the UW and the Greens) present significantly more pro-European positions than their senior counterparts. The Greens and the UW also see issues of European diplomacy as constituting their electoral assets and address them accordingly in order to further their domestic popularity. These generally Euro-friendly attitudes of the junior parties also have some impact upon their policies towards the ‘difficult areas’ of EU enlargement. It is apparent that the Greens present a more consensual approach than the SPD and that the UW is easier to negotiate with than the AWS. For example, in the area of the free movement of labour, Germany’s Green Foreign Minister takes a more relaxed position than the Chancellor. The liberal UW is less assertive on the issue of land buying in Poland than the more traditional AWS.

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43 See: Danuta Zagrodzka, ibid.
44 30% of German general public is in favour and 52% against Poland’s EU membership. See: Eurobarometer, 47, Spring 1997, Annex B.20.
45 See: Jerzy Hausner, ibid. Polacy wobec Integracji Europejskiej, ibid.
47 See: ‘Gespräch mit Joschka Fischer über das Koalitionsklima und die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik’ Der Spiegel, Nr. 48/23.11.98.
However, the crucial elements of German and Polish positions on EU Enlargement negotiations may in fact depend more upon internal power struggles within both senior parties in government. These ‘in-house’ disputes are also more difficult to verify, since they are not directed to the general public and have little or no vote-winning power. Both the German SPD and the Polish AWS remain lacking in strong and coherent leadership. Although in the Polish case this problem is far more profound, since the AWS is not a party in the traditional sense but a loose centre-right alliance put together by the trade union ‘Solidarity’. Nevertheless, it is clear that the powers of the Polish as well as the German leaders in Government remain significantly constrained by the internal politics of their parties. In both cases, the issues of European integration constitute a vital element of a struggle within the AWS as well as inside the SPD.

In Poland, issues of European integration continue to raise controversies within the governing AWS. Although Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek holds a moderate position, there are strong tendencies within the party to play hard with the European Union and not to give up on ‘Polish national interests’, unless this is absolutely necessary. The EU Enlargement negotiations are often portrayed in Poland as a zero-sum game. Consequently, the willingness to compromise during the accession talks remains low within the AWS. Also, the fact that the Minister of Agriculture from the AWS is politically engaged in attracting the votes of farmers may prove to have some impact upon the government’s position on Agenda 2000.

On the whole, party politics in Germany and in Poland do not address the principle of EU Enlargement which remains generally accepted. On the other hand, due to recent advances, the process of integrating Poland with

48 See: ‘To zły Minister’, Rzeczpospolita, 22.7.98.
50 See: Klaus Bachmann, ibid.
51 ibid.
the EU is increasingly dependent upon developments in other areas of European policy, such as budget reform or employment policy. These issues constitute a crucial part of Germany’s domestic debate. Therefore, any political developments in constructing Germany’s policy in these areas will continue to affect the EU enlargement process and consequently Polish-German relations.

The Civil Service

The German and Polish structures of administrating European diplomacy appear considerably decentralised. The Federal Republic’s constitutional provisions prompted relative autonomy for the individual branches of government and they have established the federal system of governance as well. In Poland the key decision-making competencies in European affairs are divided between the Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign Office. Also, due to the recent administrative reform, the role of the regional dimension will grow. However, the crucial features of Germany’s and Poland’s European diplomacy are to a lesser extent determined by constitutional rules than by political developments.

Germany: Under the former German administration the EU enlargement decision-making process was formally co-ordinated in the Foreign Office and the Economics Ministry in specially established task-force groups (Arbeitstäbe). Informally, in spite of the lack of an exclusive European Affairs division, the Chancellor’s Office claimed to hold key coordinating functions in all European issues, including enlargement. On the whole, it was clear that due to the relative weakness of the Ministry of Economics, the key powers in the sphere remained in the Foreign Office, with some degree of guidance from the Chancellor’s Office. This system confirmed the importance of strategic foreign policy considerations in handling the EU enlargement process. It also contributed to the establish-
ment of widespread support for the notion apparent among the German political class.\(^5^3\)

The recent change of government as well as the development of EU enlargement negotiations marked some considerable reorganisation in the decision-making process. The European department of the Economics Ministry, including a task-force for enlargement, has been moved to the Finance Ministry. Also a special European Affairs unit is being created in the Chancellor’s office with Mr. Silberberg (who previously led the EU enlargement task-force in the Foreign Office) appointed as its chief executive. Although the Auswärtiges Amt has not been formally stripped of any competencies, it is clear that taking over European Affairs by the strong Finance Ministry may increase the potential for internal competition. The strengthening of the Finance Ministry’s position in European Affairs also signifies a change in Germany’s EU enlargement policy. The importance of the Foreign Office in the process has been additionally undermined by the decision issued by the Chancellor’s Office concerning the division of competencies in this area.\(^5^4\) Although, according to this document the Auswärtiges Amt remains a chief co-ordinating body as far as EU expansion is concerned, the Finance Ministry will take the lead when the economic and financial issues are raised during the accession talks.\(^5^5\)

The Foreign Office, traditionally concerned with Germany’s strategic aims and objectives, pushed in the past for a quick enlargement with relatively little regard for the immediate costs of the operation. The Finance Ministry aided by the Chancellor’s Office will object to any move that might increase Germany’s EU budgetary contributions or endanger its labour market. EU enlargement is perceived at the moment as compro-


\(^5^3\) See: Danuta Zagrodzka, ibid.

\(^5^4\) November 1998 - Schreiben von Dr. Frank Streist, Kanzleramt.

\(^5^5\) ibid.
mising these other objectives, hence its secondary importance for the current government.

Poland: In Poland, the process of constructing European diplomacy is principally divided between the Foreign Office (FO) and the Office of the Council of Ministers (OCM), each of them run by different political parties. In addition the unit that negotiates Poland’s EU accession was set up outside of the Office of the Committee of European Integration (OCEI), although both these divisions are parts of the OCM. In theory the division of labour is clear cut. The Foreign Office prepares policy guidelines and looks at bilateral issues of EU Enlargement. The OCEI turns the policy guidelines into policy directives and co-ordinates the work of other Ministries. Finally the Negotiating Team negotiates Poland’s EU accession with Brussels. However, in practise there is a lot of policy overlap between and within these key departments and a fair amount of politically driven competition.

The OCEI, which belongs to the OCM, was established as a counterbalance to the FO, run in the past by presidential nominees. The appointment of the head of the negotiating team, Mr Kulakowski, counterbalanced the nomination of Mr. Czarnecki (a mild Euroskeptic from the AWS-ZChN) who formerly ran in the OCEI.\(^{56}\) Finally, the personal conflict even occurred within the OCEI between Minister Czarnecki and his deputy from the UW.\(^{57}\)

This potentially conflictual setting and subsequent problems of poor co-ordination was probably one of the reasons contributing to the loss of 34 million ECU from Poland’s share of the PHARE programme\(^{58}\) - a decision which was formally justified by the incompetence of the projects prepared by the Polish side. As an effect of the political crisis prompted

\(^{56}\) For views of former Minister Czarnecki on Poland’s role in the EU see: ‘Rozmowa z Ryszardem Czarneckim’ Rzeczpospolita, 5.11.97.

\(^{57}\) See: ‘Klotnia Ministrow’, Rzeczpospolita, 7.7.98.
by the EU’s decision, the running of Poland’s European Affairs was partially de-politicised; Minister Czarnecki was sacked and the OCEI was taken over by a ‘non-political’ Secretary of State responsible directly to the Prime Minister.

Providing that the latter development remains a permanent practice it will probably smooth the decision-making process in the running of European Affairs by the Polish government. However, it is still apparent that party politics remains to have a considerable impact upon the process of constructing Poland’s European policy. This persistence of a direct link between politics and the civil service affects the latter’s ability to create a long-term European strategy open to short-term compromise in less important aspects. Consequently, it affects Poland’s readiness to accommodate some of the objectives of Germany’s European diplomacy, a motion possibly speeding up the EU enlargement process.

3. Conclusion

To sum up, it is clear that the most prominent feature of the Polish-German ‘Community of Interests’ has been to integrate Poland with the West. For Germany, EU and NATO enlargements to the East represent a stabilisation of its external environment therefore an improvement of its own security. For Poland, it is the end of the experience of a ‘land in between’ that undermined nationhood in the past. It is therefore clear that there are ‘hard interests’ on both sides that are crucial for explaining German-Polish rapprochement. At the same time, it is important to see that matters of self-interest or external factors do not provide all answers to explain the current state of the relationship.

58 See: ‘Polska traci 34 Miliony ECU’, Rzeczpospolita, 26.5.98. ‘Polen will WU-Gelder besser verwalten’ Focus, 2.6.98.
59 A recent departure of a non-political civil servant Ms. Fendler who headed the OCEI, reopened the way for a squabble among Poland’s centre-right coalition for the post. See: 'Reforms Face Political Turmoil', Financial Times, 21.12.98.
Two other issues need to be addressed here. First, EU membership has far more profound implications than belonging to a security alliance. It has an impact upon industry, politics and the culture of the member state. It affects the everyday life of individuals and sense of their identity. Also, the EU gathers countries ruled by elected liberal-democratic regimes. Therefore in order to explain the post-1990 closeness between Germany and Poland aspiring for EU membership, it is necessary to look into a number of domestic developments such as the process of democratisation and changing political culture. In other words, the Polish-German ‘Community of Interests’ can be equally referred to as a ‘Community of Values’ of two democratic states.

Second, precisely because of the fact that both Poland and Germany have democratically elected regimes, their mutual relationship in such a complex process as European integration (that itself often resembles domestic bargaining) is addressed by a number of political and economic agents which bring to the process their own particular interests. Therefore, in spite of the existing congruence of strategic foreign policy objectives, a fair amount of disagreement will continue to occur between the Polish and German participants in the EU enlargement negotiating process.

The recent change in Germany’s European diplomacy has already affected the pace of EU enlargement. As argued before, it is unlikely that the current government will continue to press for Poland’s EU membership unless it is satisfied with the progress in other areas of European policy. This does not necessarily mean that the process of completing Poland’s EU accession will be delayed, nor that the Polish government has nothing left to do but keep referring to historical arguments. There are a number of strategies that can be possibly undertaken by the Polish side in order to speed up the accession negotiations and enter the EU on favourable terms and conditions.

60 See: ‘To Zły Minister’, ibid.
The Polish government should clearly and fully support the development of the European Union as it is envisaged in Agenda 2000. It should not complain that this document creates double standards for the agricultural sectors of future members. Indeed, it is difficult to see a credible reason why the Polish agricultural sector that employs a fourth of the labour force while producing only 6% of GDP should be encouraged to expand.\(^1\)

It is also possible, although probably not necessary nor advisable, that the Polish side can voluntarily declare a trade-off proposed by the American economist Jeffrey Sachs.\(^2\) According to this proposal, Poland would voluntarily resign from participating in some of the EU’s aid programmes as well as from having unrestricted access to the EU’s labour market. In exchange, Poland would not have to apply the Community’s environmental standards and some branches of the Polish industry would remain protected. In fact, the Prime Minister, Jerzy Buzek, declared recently that in order to speed up the enlargement process, Poland does need to join all EU’s promotion and development programmes.\(^3\)

However, most importantly, Poland should constructively participate in a discussion about the future of the EU. This may be also connected with outlining and arguing in defence of these specific interests, values and institutions which the Polish side considers vital for the protection of its own identity. As it was suggested by the Polish former ambassador to Germany, Janusz Reiter, the best forum for this kind of debate already exists with the ‘Weimar Triangle’ formed by Germany, Poland and France.\(^4\) Such a development might simultaneously serve three purposes,

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it may improve the process of European unification, enhance Polish-German relations and finally it should serve well the overall notion of European integration.