The European Union, Britain, and Scotland:
Cooperation, Conflict, or Compromise?

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the evolving relationship between Scotland and the European Union given the dual dynamics of devolution in Scotland and the United Kingdom's greater integration into the European Union. At first glance, devolution and increased European integration would appear to have opposite affects, since the former provides the constitutional means for the decentralization of power in Britain, while the latter seemingly allocates more authority to the British government and the institutional framework of the EU. It is argued here, however, that European integration and devolution are not only complimentary, but are intricately intertwined with one another. Political institutions created in Scotland under Labour's devolutionary scheme has given Scotland new access to the policy process in Brussels, while encouraging supranational and subnational cooperation between the political institutions of the EU and Scotland.

This research begins with a brief examination of the evolving association between the EU and its regions. Focusing on the institutional framework of the EU and the Scottish Parliament and Executive, this paper then turns to consider how these institutions, when combined with policies such as subsidiarity, are influencing the creation of public policy at the subnational (Scotland), national (Britain), and supranational (EU) levels. Next, case studies from the public and private sectors are utilized to demonstrate the development of a 'Westminster bypass' that is allowing Scottish interests to play an increasingly influential role in supranational policymaking. Finally, the ramifications of these dynamics upon the relationship between Scotland and Britain are considered.

This research is based on field interviews conducted in Brussels, London, and Edinburgh in the spring of 1999.
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Nowhere is the reliance of the whole devolution package on compromise, goodwill, and reasonableness so apparent as in respect of relations with the European Union.
-Scottish Affairs Select Committee, 1998

There is little question that devolution will forever change the constitutional make-up of the United Kingdom. And, while it is still uncertain whether devolution will ultimately result in independence for Scotland, or will serve as a way to reform the British Constitution, it is clear that the establishment of the Scottish Parliament within the framework of the United Kingdom is viewed by the Labour government as a settlement that will mutually benefit both Scotland and the United Kingdom. For Scotland, devolution has given greater democratic control over the policy process to the Scots, while making the government more accountable to the people of Scotland. For the UK and its Labour government, devolution has allowed the government to follow through on its campaign promises of constitutional reform, decentralization of power, and greater transparency in government.

The decentralization of power in the UK has led to the establishment of new institutions, new norms, and new patterns of interaction between those who participate in the political process in Scotland and the UK. Generally, devolution, and its concomitant consequences for Scottish interests, is the subject of this paper. More specifically, this paper argues that the establishment of the Scottish Parliament has weakened the administrative role of the central government in Scottish affairs, resulting in a decrease in Scottish lobbying activity at the central government (herein referred to as London), and an increase in Scottish lobbying activity at the supranational level (Brussels) and the subnational level (Edinburgh). By providing case studies of interests that are part of a wider UK organization, as well as interests indigenous to Scotland, the reader will find that devolution has allowed Scottish interests to redirect their lobbying efforts towards Edinburgh and Brussels, and away from Whitehall and Westminster. Paying particular attention to Britain, this paper begins with a brief examination of the evolving association between the EU and its regions. It then turns to examine the impact of the EU on
Scottish-UK affairs. Having examined Scotland’s post-devolutionary relationships with the UK and the EU, this paper turns to three case-studies that identify how devolution and greater UK integration into the EU is influencing and altering the long-held lobbying strategies of Scottish interests. Each case study is drawn from interviews conducted in the spring of 1999.

**Regionalism in the European Context**

There are two general ways of understanding the system of government that has evolved since the United Kingdom joined the EU in 1973. The first model, termed the 'layered cake' model views government as consisting of several different layers, each with its own areas of competencies. In this model, local government in Scotland, subnational government in Edinburgh, national government in London, and supranational government in Brussels each has a range of responsibilities that are delimited by statutes. Mitchell and Leicester argue that this model is sufficient for all levels of administration except the EU level, for the EU can effectively do whatever its member states uphold it can do within the terms of the treaties that make up the EU (Mitchell and Leicester 1999).

Detailing the responsibilities of the EU becomes a bit easier when using a multi-level approach to governance that views the political system not as a series of jurisdictional layers, but as multiple layered systems that are interconnected, interdependent, and interactive with one another (Mitchell and Leicester 1999). For example, local government, the Scottish Office, the UK government, and the EU have successfully worked together in the past to implement structural funds, CAP funds, and other policies in Scotland. Today, the role of the Scottish Office has been replaced by the Scottish Parliament, but it remains clear that shared competencies have developed among the multiple levels of governance and that devolution and European integration have served to deepen these shared competencies.

For political scientists, these shared competencies become particularly intriguing and troublesome when examining regional relationships with the European Union. According to EU treaties, relations with Europe are the responsibility of the UK Parliament and government. However, the White Paper *Scotland's Parliament* states that "the Scottish Parliament and Executive will have an important role in those aspects of
European Union business which affect devolved areas (Scotland's Parliament 1999: § 5.1). The shared competencies that exist between Edinburgh, London and Brussels become troublesome, then, because while the EU has competence over a range of matters that have been devolved from London to Edinburgh (e.g. agriculture and health services), London might still retain control over certain affairs devolved to Scotland by virtue of London having responsibility for these matters at the EU level (Mitchell and Leicester 1999). Thus, responsibilities can seldom be confined to one level of government as European integration becomes increasingly complex.

Edinburgh, London, and Brussels are not unique as far as shared competencies between regions, national governments, and the EU are concerned. The German Länder have retained considerable control of their economic and political relationships with the EU, while regions in Spain, France and Italy have all seen increased autonomy when it comes to the implementation of EU policies in their respective regions (Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998). Previous research indicates that regions throughout Western Europe have turned to the institutions of the EU to represent their economic, political, and cultural concerns unique to their regions (see LaGalis and Lequesne 1998; Keating and Jones 1985; Jones and Keating 1995; Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998; and Marks et. al. 1996) because of the institutional framework of the EU. The European Union lends itself to regional interest articulation due to its many institutional points of access, divided institutions, and fragmented directorates within the European Commission (Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998: 2). Another reason why subnational regions turn to the EU is because EU policies, such as structural funds and CAP payments, are determined on a regional, and not a nation-state, basis. As a result, it is often beneficial for subnational regions to lobby as a region within the EU as opposed to a region within a member-state.

As regions have turned toward the EU to represent their interests to the EU, Brussels, in turn, has welcomed this regional influence. Not only have the EU Commission and Committee of the Regions (CoR) willingly listened to these regional concerns, but key treaties and principles that constitute the very foundation of the EU have been interpreted and enforced in such a way as to allow regional influence into the EU policy making process. Whether by design (Wallace and Young 1997; LeGalis and Lequesne 1998), or through hard-fought political battles (Archer and Main 1980; Keating
and Jones 1985), regional participation in the policy making process in the EU has increased while European integration has encouraged the revival of regionalism and has prompted the establishment of regional offices to lobby EU institutions in Brussels.

*Regions in the EU Policy Making Process*

Directives (laws) made at the EU level are now an integral part of regional policy. Nation-state membership in the European Union challenges the domestic distribution of powers between the central government and its regions in a number of ways. The deepening political, economic and social integration of these nations into the EU, especially since the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty reforms of 1992 and 1997, has led to an expansion in the competencies of the EU into areas of exclusive regional powers. For example, the Scottish Executive must implement agricultural and environmental directives created at the EU level under the current devolution scheme. Frequently, the European Union advances into the responsibilities of the regions, which in turn limits the capacity of the regions to legislate in their own domains.

Perhaps the greatest challenge to the domestic distribution of power between the central governments and their regions is the makeup of the European Union itself. The EU is a treaty-based institution entered into by its member-states, not by regions within these nation-states. While regional governments and their administrations are responsible for implementing and applying EU legislation within their own areas of regional competence, Articles 169 and 170 of the EU treaties enable the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to proceed against a member state for failure to fulfill its EU obligations. Thus, while the region may be responsible for implementing EU legislation in areas of regional competence, from an EU and ECJ perspective, responsibility for complying with EU obligations rests exclusively with the member-state.

By the late 1980s, regions were beginning to turn to EU institutions, treaties, and its policy process in an attempt to ensure an opportunity to influence those policies that they as regional governments would be charged to implement. Much of the progress for a regional representation was gained by demands from the German Länder as the Länder attempted to advance the position of the regions in the EU policy-making process (Hrbek 1999: 219-220). Mitchell and Leicester (1999) note that the Länder battled what they
saw as the centralization of power through greater European integration through a three-step process. First, they urged the institutions of the EU to observe restraint in the introduction of EU measures by criticizing the 'actionism' and 'flood of regulation' coming from Brussels. At the heart of their argument was the principle of subsidiarity, though the Länder also urged the European Commission and other EU institutions to observe restraint in the introduction of EU measures. Second, the Länder actively lobbied the German Bundestag to guarantee formal rights of participation in those EU matters that impacted upon Germany, while taking initiative at the EU level aimed at giving the Länder direct participation at that level. Finally, through the establishment and development of autonomous EU activities with EU institutions and actors, the Länder were able to develop a 'Bonn bypass' to circumvent the federal government in Germany (Mitchell and Leicester 1999).

Jeffrey (1996) notes that the German Länder placed a number of demands on the German government and the European Community as European integration increased in the 1980s. At the heart of these demands was the principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity granted the EC jurisdiction over only those policies that could not be handled effectively at lower levels of government. However, the larger impact of the subsidiarity principle was that it opened the door for greater demands by the regions. By insisting upon adherence to the subsidiarity principle during the policy making process, regions were able to leverage other powers from the EC as it prepared for greater integration under the Maastricht Treaty. Subsidiarity was used to open up the Council of Ministers in matters of exclusive sub-national responsibility to ministers from the regional level. Regional demands to create a legislative body designed to represent the regions in the EC legislative process were also established, as was the right of appeal from the regional level to the ECJ against infringements of rights by the European Council or Commission (Jeffrey 1996: 256). Thus, while the main focus of the subsidiarity principle was on the relationship between the member-states and the EU, the principle did lay the groundwork for some rights given to the regions once the Maastricht Treaty went into effect.

Regional involvement in EU affairs and policy-making depends largely on the domestic constitutional position of the regions and the kind of relationships they have with their central state. For instance, the Austrian Federal Constitution and the German
Basic Law guarantee the constitutional status and powers of regional Länder
governments in Austria and Germany. In Spain, however, the Spanish Constitution of
1978 sets out an asymmetrical system of regionalized government in which power is
shared between the central state and the seventeen regions of Spain. Unlike the federal
systems in Germany and Austria, Spain's unitary system allocates each region its own set
of competencies, with these competencies varying from region to region. For instance,
the historic regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country enjoy a number of powers and
exclusive competencies not given to other Spanish regions (Heywood 1995).\footnote{The
distribution of power in the UK closely resembles the Spanish situation, a country where
the regions (e.g. Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) have varying power allocated to
them under various Acts of Parliament.}

**The Impact of the EU on Scottish-UK Affairs**

The European Union is a supranational institution in which the member-states
play the leading role. All EU policies, which the UK votes upon and are bound to
implement, are negotiated by the UK's Permanent Representation to the European Union
(UKRep). However, while the UKRep is responsible for communicating and negotiating
the UK position in the institutions of the EU, much of the legislation passed by the EU is
implemented at the regional level. As a result of this multi-layered policy making and
regional implementation, there needs to be a considerable degree of coordination between
Whitehall and the Scottish government in order for Scotland to maximize the benefits of
UK membership in the EU.

In 1991, the Audit Commission in the UK published a report that identified three
ways in which EU policies encroach upon local authorities throughout the EU, including
those in the UK. These EU policies consist of EU regulations, European economic
integration, and EU funding that impose certain obligations on subnational levels of
government. These policies are dealt with in order here.

\footnote{For instance, the Catalan statute of Autonomy specifies that Catalonia has exclusive responsibility for
areas such as culture, transport within Catalonia, fisheries and agriculture. Similar exclusive powers are
allocated to the Basque Country, although the Basques enjoy the further right to raise their own taxes
(Heywood 1995).}
EU Regulations

As we saw in the previous section, regulations from the EU impose unavoidable obligations on sub-state levels of government to implement, enforce and monitor EC legislation. Prior to devolution in Scotland, the Scottish Office was responsible for ensuring that EU rules were applied effectively in Scotland. A survey of the work of the Scottish Office found that roughly 75% of the divisions in the Office had some degree of involvement in EU affairs, while 20% of the Office’s staff worked on EU-related functions. The range of divisions dealing with the implementation of EU legislation was obviously considerable, and included divisions in agriculture, fisheries, electricity, water, environmental protection, rural affairs, roads, vocational education, and a number of others.

Following devolution, the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive are largely responsible for the implementation of EU regulations in Scotland. The Scotland Act states that any action by the Scottish Parliament or the Executive that breaches a European rule is outside of their respective powers, but the day-to-day implementation of EU policies rests with these institutions. A European Committee has been established within the Scottish Parliament to debate EU issues, as well as sift through EU documents on behalf of the Parliament to see what EU policies will need to be implemented in Scotland (Burrows 1999: 127). The European Committee works closely with the other committees in the Scottish Parliament to ensure that EU regulations are followed.

European Economic Integration

In the early 1970s, one of the arguments against the EC by its opponents was that the Scottish economy would not benefit from EC membership. The argument was that areas in and around the capital cities of Europe, most notably the 'golden triangle' of London, Paris, and Bonn, would benefit most from EC economic integration, while the periphery would not experience similar benefits. Research conducted by Cheshire and Gordon confirmed the widely-held belief that most rural and urban regions that fell outside of the 'golden triangle' did not benefit economically from European economic integration, noting that there is "very strong statistical evidence confirming the fact that

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European integration is of much greater benefit to the more central regions of Europe than it is to the more peripheral ones (Cheshire and Gordon 1995: 331).

Since the early 1990s, however, the European Commission has worked more closely with national and regional governments in order to help peripheral regions in Europe benefit from greater economic integration into the EU. One of the EU’s success stories is Glasgow's revitalization from a labor and manufacturing center to a center for technology and services. Glasgow's revitalization, as well as the development of the "Silicon Glen" that runs north from Glasgow into the Highlands of Scotland, can largely be credited to greater economic integration into European markets that has been supported by Whitehall and the EU (Personal interview with J. Russell Simpson). A 1997 survey completed by the Commission shows that, while striking economic differences still exist between the center and periphery in Europe, economic convergence has begun to occur. The Commission report argues that this partial convergence is due to the Commission's ability to attract investment into regions where costs are lower and labor and other resources are plentiful, and their ability to encourage the transfer of technology and best practices from leading to lagging regions (Personal interview with Charles White).

EU Funding

One of the most evident and tangible benefits of Scotland's relationship with the EU over the years has been the flow of EU funds into Scotland through structural funds and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Mitchell and Leicester 1999: Chapter 3). Prior to 2000, Scotland received around £220 million per year in structural funds from the EU, while CAP revenues exceeded £400 million per annum. These amounts were negotiated for Scotland by the UKRep, and were allocated to Scotland to help the nation benefit from increased economic integration and funding opportunities.

Recent changes in EU funding will require that London and Edinburgh coordinate their EU strategy to an even greater extent if Scotland hopes to continue to reap the benefits from EU funds. In March 1999, the European Council agreed to reduce structural funds in the Agenda 2000 program from €29.4 billion in 2000 to €26.7 billion in 2006. Likewise, enlargement into the Central and Eastern European countries
(CEECs) promises to significantly restructure the CAP, causing benefits to be reduced to those western European countries that have benefited from the CAP. Thus, for Scotland, EU enlargement means two things. First, it will mean that there will be less CAP and structural fund monies available from the EU. And second, in order to obtain maximum resources from those funds still available, Scotland will need to work more closely with Whitehall and other devolved regions in the UK in order to maximize their shrinking resources and satisfy the Commission's dogged desire for effectiveness and transparency.

In addition to Euro-regulations, European economic integration, and EU funding, inward investment from the EU has also required the Scottish government and Whitehall to coordinate their policies. Intense competition for inward investment from the EU to its various regions has developed in recent years, and the regions within the UK are not immune from competing in an attempt to secure this inward investment. In the past, attempts to minimize the adverse effects of competition between UK regions for these funds have been achieved through coordination at Whitehall (Mitchell and Leicester 1999: Chapter 3). Since territorial ministers - such as the Scottish and Welsh Secretaries of State - are members of the same government, the Prime Minister's Cabinet has in the past been able to work out a common policy position that has been moderated by the Treasury.

Mitchell and Leicester (1999) warn, however, that the coordinating internal mechanisms of the Cabinet should not be exaggerated given the need for each territorial minister to be viewed as acting in the interests of his own region. Citing the EU's drive toward transparency in the bidding and budgeting process, along with devolution and the increased competition for UK funds brought on by its implementation, Mitchell and Leicester note that:

In reality the competition for inward investment is likely to intensify in the wake of the introduction of the Euro rendering the niceties of internal coordination within the state superfluous. The notion of a strong centre intervening to prevent damaging competition between regions seems against the spirit of the times - indeed against both devolution and competition. In practice, the centre will be able to do little more than ensure that rules and guidelines are not breached, in hopes of avoiding a bidding war which becomes a self-destructive race to the bottom. Obvious abuses or perverse outcomes will be screened out, but otherwise we can expect an increasingly competitive market in inward investment within the UK (Chapter 3).
The UK's place in the European single market is likely to play a significant role in the level of competition that will exist within the UK for inward investment from the EU. Should British voters favor joining the Euro via a national referendum, competition between UK regions for inward investment is likely to increase. As the UK moves toward greater economic integration within Europe and inches toward the Euro zone, Whitehall's ability to minimize regional competition for inward investment - that is its ability to coordinate an inward investment strategy for the whole of the UK - becomes less consequential.² As a result, interest representation is likely to become more vital in British regions as each lobby for a shrinking allotment of the EU budget.

Scotland and the Unitary British State

The Treaty of Union in 1707, which consolidated the Scottish and English parliaments at Westminster, was largely a settlement between two patrician classes for economic and political gains. Scotland did not cease to be a nation or a civil society in 1707, but instead became a key political and economic element of a new United Kingdom. As the British state developed politically, policy-making responsibilities moved from Edinburgh to London. At the same time, for obvious reasons, interest groups in Scotland began moving to London in order to influence the policy process at Westminster. In time, despite the fact that the Treaty of Union allowed Scotland to keep its unique educational, religious, and judicial institutions, Westminster was obviously the place for interest groups to lobby in an attempt to influence UK policies that would impact upon Scotland.

Like all governments in Western Europe, the UK has seen a proliferation of pressure groups since the 1960s. Directly lobbying the government through ministers or MPs, or agents within the bureaucracy such as senior civil servants or Whitehall advisors, is the approach most often utilized at the national level. Jordan and Richardson (1987)

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² It should be noted here, however, that public opinion in the UK is largely against the Euro and increasingly anti-EU. A MORI poll released in April 2001 showed that 52% of those expressing an opinion favored Britain "staying out" of the "Eurozone". Perhaps more alarming to the Blair government is that the same poll showed that 47% of respondents would like to see Britain "get out" of the EU if Britain was assured of a free trade agreement with the EU if they left the EU. Only 34% responded that Britain should "stay in" if such a free trade agreement were reached.
argue that the bureaucracy in the UK is a favorite target of UK interests, given the UK's strongly partisan legislature (57), but indirect lobbying through party structures and public opinion exists as well. Baggott (1995, 1992) and others (Grant 1989, Miller 1990, Jordan and Richardson 1987) note that the concentration of executive power in the UK's unitary government in recent years has not gone unnoticed by British interests, since it is widely believed by these lobbies that ministers and civil servants at the national level have the greatest influence over policy (Baggott 1995: 84).

The necessity of lobbying at the national level is not lost on those groups charged with representing Scotland's interests in the policy process. Because of the conditions of Scotland's 1707 Act of Union with England, the Secretary of State for Scotland - a member of the Prime Minister's Cabinet - has enjoyed more autonomy than his counterparts in Wales and Northern Ireland. This greater autonomy takes many forms, but one of the most important consequences is that, compared to Wales and Northern Ireland, Scotland is better represented on both cabinet committees and in UK ministerial teams that participate with the UKRep as they represent British interests to the Council of Ministers in Brussels (ibid. 1995: 12). Scotland Europa, an organization representing Scottish interests in Brussels, has direct links to the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Scottish Office, as does Scottish Enterprise, the economic development arm of the Scottish Executive.

Given that authoritative power in the UK was highly concentrated in London prior to devolution, it is not surprising to find that successful interest groups in Britain were also highly centralized. For obvious reasons, interest groups focus their efforts at the points where power resides, and in Scotland prior to devolution, that meant a concentration in London. As a result, unions, farmers, veterans and business groups are each represented primarily by one major interest group, which includes a greater percentage of the relevant population than do the several groups that represent each interest area in the United States. A contemporary example of this concentration of power is the Trades Union Congress (TUC), which encompasses 85% of all trade.

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3 Since 1536, Wales and England have been administered as one unit. Although a Welsh Office and a Welsh Secretary of State do exist, in legal and educational terms, Wales and England are one nation.

4 Prior to devolution, Scottish Enterprise fell under the authority of the Scottish Office. Today, Scottish Enterprise is funded under the Scottish Executive's Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Department. Scotland Europa is a wholly owned subsidiary of Scottish Enterprise.
unionists in Britain. In the United States, the AFL-CIO, the central trade union body in the United States, has less than 21% of the unionized laborers. Unlike the TUC, other labor groups in the US, such as the Teamsters, the United Mine Workers, and the United Auto Workers (UAW) are not affiliated with one another.

Having examined the impact that the EU has on regions throughout Europe, and the impact that EU integration is having upon the relationship between national and subnational actors in the EU member-states, the reminder of this paper utilizes this framework to examine the affect that these evolving relationships are having on the behavior of Scottish interest groups. Scottish interests examined here are broken into two groups: Those interests that are units of a larger British-wide organization; and those indigenous to Scotland. During field research in Scotland in the spring of 1999, this differentiation was made between different types of groups in order to analyze whether there was a difference in lobbying tactics employed by each type of interest group. Interviews from the National Farmers Union of Scotland (NFU-Scotland) are utilized to represent interest groups that are part of a wider UK organization. Interviews from the Scotch Whisky Association and the Church of Scotland are utilized to represent interest groups that are indigenous to Scotland. Although some differences in lobbying techniques between these two groups will be identified in the section that follows, it is clear that devolution and European integration provide all interests examined here with new and greater access to the policy process at the subnational and supranational levels.

**UK-wide Interests**

*Representing Scottish Agriculture:*

*The Case of the National Farmers' Union of Scotland*

The National Farmers' Union of Scotland (NFUS) is one of nine regional offices of the National Farmers' Union (NFU) of the United Kingdom. The NFUS acts largely in an autonomous nature at the Scottish level, but a Board of Management directs and monitors the UK-wide organization from its national headquarters in London. Eight national committees develop the NFU's policies for representation to government and others on behalf of the membership of the NFU, with the NFU having "dedicated policy analysis and representation expertise" that attempt to influence policy-makers at all levels.
of governance (www.nfus.org.uk). The operating budget for the NFUS during fiscal year 1999 was £1.5 million.

Nearly one in ten of all Scottish jobs - about 200,000 in all - depend on the agricultural sector (Scotland's Farming Manifesto, 1998: 1). The NFUS seeks to promote and protect these jobs and the interest of the Scottish farming industry by lobbying in Brussels, London and Edinburgh. Headquartered just outside of Edinburgh in the town of Ingliston, the NFUS counts among its 12,500 members Scottish farmers, growers and crofters, and is organized into nine district regions.

Polly McPherson, Communications Director for the NFUS was interviewed in Edinburgh. McPherson equated the NFUS lobbying strategy to "peeling different layers off of an onion," utilizing a comprehensive approach to interest representation that lobbies the various centers of political power in Brussels, London and Edinburgh. The NFUS spends resources lobbying at the local council level, and with its 108 regional offices throughout Scotland, the NFUS's lobbying effort is truly a grassroots effort that mobilizes members at the local level and allows the NFUS to keep in touch with its members and their many interests.

To represent their interests to the institutions of the European Union, the NFUS takes a two-prong approach to interest representation in Brussels. First, the NFUS maintains an office in the Brussels Agricultural Bureau. The Bureau, centrally located near the institutions of the EU, serves as an umbrella organization for farming interests in the United Kingdom. Residents representing British farming interests from Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland maintain offices in the Brussels Agriculture Bureau, and each of the NFU's regional offices maintain offices there as well.

McPherson noted that despite the autonomy enjoyed by the regional offices in the UK, the proximity of the four offices representing the UK's four nations in Brussels facilitates the coordination of NFU strategies there. This coordination, McPherson added, is largely a natural occurrence, since issues and policies (elaborated upon below) that are decided at the EU-level are largely the same for farmers throughout the UK.

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5 Scotland has just 72 constituencies represented in the British House of Commons. As a result, with its 85 regional offices, the NFUS has thoroughly penetrated the Scottish countryside.
The NFUS is also a member of the Comité des Organisations Professionnelles Agricoles de L’ue (COPA), or the Committee of Agricultural Organization in the EU. COPA is the largest European farm lobbying organization in Brussels, and represents the agricultural interests of members from all 15 EU nation-states. Given the different emphases of agriculture throughout the regions in the UK, each regional office of the NFU subscribes to the services of COPA. However, McPherson was quick to point out that COPA is one of only 47 agricultural groups that maintained a lobbying effort in Brussels (1999 figures). Other important agricultural lobbies in Brussels representing a wide-range of EU nation-states include the European Crop Protection Association, the European Liaison Committee on Agricultural Trade, and the Grain and Feed Trade Committee of the EEC (Directory of Interest Groups: 1996).

McPherson states that the NFUS at the EU-level targets all EU bodies, however, the clear emphasis is at the Commission level. Given that legislation is written at the Commission level, the NFUS hopes to influence the writing of legislation before it is ever sent to the Council of Ministers for consideration. Access to the Commissioner of Agriculture is frequently granted to large interest groups such as COPA, but the NFUS's strategy of gaining access to the Commission has focused on the Commission officials ("Eurocrats") and the Commissioner's Cabinet who oversees the day-to-day operations of the Commission and serves the Commissioners in various ways. McPherson notes that "our stock and trade is information, either feeding it down to our members, or feeding it back up to the layers of government, and the Commission, along with many other groups in government, is thirsty for any bit of information they can get" (Interview with McPherson). For this reason, the NFUS as a broker of information has found the Commission to be quite accessible.

Access to the Commission is the ultimate goal of the NFUS when it comes to lobbying in Brussels, but the organization does not rely solely upon gaining direct access to the Commission in an attempt to influence agricultural policy sent down to the EU regions. As co-decision becomes more the rule in the EU policy-making process, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have become increasingly important targets for interest groups. Likewise, Scottish Ministers, and the officials who brief them, have become important targets because of their access to British-level ministers who vote
on issues in the Council of Ministers and work closely with the UKRep. Scotland House, the title given to the Scottish Executive's representation in Brussels, also serves as a point of access for the NFUS, as do enterprise groups housed in Scotland Europa such as Scottish Enterprise and other local enterprise groups. The NFUS even lobbies local councilors in Scotland, as these councilors have access (or serve as members) to the Committee of the Regions.

In all communications, the NFUS is deeply concerned about the environmental and land use regulations written in Brussels that negatively impact upon the Scottish farmer. For this reason, the NFUS targets the European Commission and the European Parliament - and not the governmental structures in London - as they seek to influence these regulations. In their 1998 election publication entitled Scotland's Farming Manifesto, the NFUS encourages candidates for the Scottish Parliament, European Parliament and local government elections to realize that Scottish farms have been weakened vis-à-vis farms on the continent due to a strong Pound Sterling and denial of CAP support. Interestingly, Scottish MPs at Westminster were not targeted by the publication. The NFUS supports the UK's rapid entry into the 'Eurozone,' and supports subsidies from the EU to Scottish farmers who are forced under EU land use regulations to take land out of production to produce a public good: Scotland's landscape. In McPherson's words: "If the EU wants public goods - a pretty country-side, that don't have a market value, then they are going to have to finance it." The importance of attempting to influence regulatory policy at the EU-level becomes obvious as McPherson states:

The European Union must facilitate a competitive structure for the farming industry, and this structure translates into fewer regulations. The vast majority of farm regulations come from the European Union. We're [Scottish farmers] told what to produce, how to produce it, and virtually where we can plant it. We believe that there is too much dictation from Europe. But, since we are so highly regulated, Europe must pay for that privilege, because they get their way.

McPherson, who worked in the Scottish Office for "umpteen years," made the transition from the Scottish Office to the NFUS because she felt that the power to influence policy would largely move away from the Scottish Office once devolution was implemented. Devolution, in her words, "is a huge opportunity" for the NFUS to
influence how EU policies are implemented in Scotland, since it is the view of the NFUS and other interests that those policies that are left to the discretion of the EU member-states are devolved items under devolution. For instance, any CAP or structural funds that are allocated to Scotland from the EU are distributed in Scotland by the Scottish Parliament, and not the UK government, as was the case prior to 1999. Regarding the impact that devolution was going to have upon the NFUS's lobbying strategy, McPherson was quick to note that "the Scottish Parliament gives us a huge opportunity for lobbying, its going to change the way government works."

Interviewees, such as McPherson, were optimistic that the new committee structure in the Scottish Parliament would allow interests greater access to policy-makers. Proposed legislation in the Scottish Parliament must go through the Parliament's committee structure, allowing interested groups to address the MSPs and consult with the MSPs prior to a final vote on the floor of the Parliament. McPherson noted that the NFUS plan was to play a key role in this committee process, serving as expert witnesses to the MSPs and their respective committees.

The NFUS was making a number of personnel changes in order the take advantage of the greater access afforded to them by the Scottish Parliament's committee system. In addition to McPherson's move from the Scottish Office to become the Communications Director at the NFUS, five new employees were joining the NFUS due to the implementation of devolution. To distribute news and information regarding the work of the Scottish Parliament throughout the 108 NFUS branches, the NFUS hired three new field representatives plus a supervisor. These field representatives work as liaisons between NFUS members and the central office in Inglisston. In turn, the central office then communicates information gathered from the various branches to the "Parliamentary Advisor."

For the purposes of this research, it is the role of the "Parliamentary Advisor" that is most interesting. Hired to serve as the "doorway to the Parliament," the Parliamentary Advisor (PA) hired by the NFUS is an expert in Scottish agriculture and serves as the chief conduit for information flowing from the field offices to the MSPs,

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6 A euphemistic term used by the NFUS for their main lobbyist in the Scottish Parliament. Scottish interests, like many interests, prefer not to use the verb lobbying or the noun lobbyist.
and vice versa. The PA utilizes the press to influence MSPs and Scottish public opinion, hoping to shape the agricultural agenda in the Scottish Parliament through a variety of means. In addition to representing the NFUS, the PA's expertise in agriculture has been utilized by other farming groups in Scotland. At the time of the interview with McPherson, the NFUS's PA was subcontracted to lobby on behalf of the Scottish Quality Beef and Lamb Association, the Scottish Pig Industry Initiative, and the Scottish Beef and Livestock Commission.

Prior to devolution, McPherson estimated that the executive officers of the NFUS made direct representation at Westminster only about once a year. McPherson felt that the implementation of devolution would cause the NFUS's lobbying efforts in London to "drop off" even further once the Scottish Parliament began operations in July 1999. Given euro-regulations coming down from Brussels that are now implemented at the Scottish level, and the fact that a number of agricultural issues once administered in Scotland from London have been devolved to the Scottish Parliament, there are only a few issues concerning agriculture in Scotland that are decided in London. Of those issues that have not been devolved, such as fuel and taxation issues, the NFUS works closely with the NFU headquarters in London to represent their interests. McPherson noted that the England NFU does most of the lobbying at Westminster, targeting favorites such as the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Treasury, and various select committees - particularly those dealing with agriculture.

While the NFUS is placing less of a lobbying emphasis on London, the NFUS does maintain close contact with Scottish MPs and the Secretary of State for Scotland, both of which exist after devolution. As noted above, some important issues have not been devolved to Scotland nor are they mandated from Brussels. As a result, the NFUS tries to shape the agricultural agenda at Westminster through direct contacts with the 74 Scottish MPs and Helen Liddle, the Secretary of State for Scotland. Since differences in agriculture do exist between the various regions in the United Kingdom, McPherson noted that the NFUS would not hesitate to contact London should a problem, conflict or concern arise.7

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7 In our interview McPherson noted that the variation in agricultural commodities in the various UK regions occasionally causes tension between the different branches of the NFU. For instance, she noted
Indigenous Scottish Interests

_Scotch Whisky Association_

Aside from bagpipes and tartan, few products are as closely associated with Scotland in the public mind as is scotch whisky. It is known that the Celts practiced the art of distilling in Scotland as early as the 6th Century. And, while the ingredients used to make quality single malt whisky have not changed significantly over the past 1500 years, the political and economic issues surrounding the commodity certainly have. With the Act of Union with England in 1707, whisky production was effectively driven underground to evade excessive levels of taxation placed upon whisky by the Crown. Between 1707 and 1823, distillers fought a series of bloody skirmishes with excise men charged with taxing the distillers and their craft. In 1823, the Excise Act was passed, sanctioning distilling in exchange for a fee. Though bloody skirmishes have been replaced by political conflicts, disagreements between distillers and the British government over excise taxes on the product continue to today.

Today the scotch whisky industry is a major economic player in Scotland and the UK. Scotch whisky accounts for more than 20% of the UK’s food and drink exports, and surprisingly accounts for 3% to 4% of the UK’s annual GNP (Personal interview with Hugh Morison). In Scotland, the economic impact of the industry is naturally greater. The Pathfinders to Parliament document published in 1999 states that the industry directly employs 11,900 workers in Scotland, while supporting another 47,600 jobs among suppliers of raw materials, goods, and services (Pathfinders to Parliament 1999: 27). These figures translate to 1 in 54 Scottish jobs relying on the scotch whisky industry, with this number rising to 1 in 10 when only the agricultural sector is

that the number of farmers maintaining cattle herds in England for milk as opposed to beef was about three-to-one, while just the opposite holds true in Scotland. The beef industry in England is an offshoot of the dairy industry, thus the English NFU offices are more concerned about promoting the dairy industry in London than the beef industry. In Scotland, the opposite is true, with beef producers outnumbering milk producers three-to-one. As a result, promoting beef production in Scotland is more important than promoting the dairy industry. Similar differences exist between the regions in the promotion of sheep (Wales) and cereals (mainly a concern of English farmers). Thus, while conflict is rare, the independence of the various NFU officers from the central office in London allows individual NFU offices to make representation for their own regional concerns.
considered. Accounting for over £2 billion in exports each year since 1990, scotch whisky is Scotland's largest net export.

Given the importance of whisky to the Scottish economy, it is not surprising that a number of groups designed to protect the industry have developed over the last several decades. One of these groups, and by far the largest, is the Scotch Whisky Association (SWA), which was founded in 1942 when two interest organizations merged to form the SWA. Today, the SWA promotes scotch whisky, protects its image, fights tax discrimination and trade barriers, and represents the industry's interests to the Scottish, British, EU and foreign governments. With offices in London (branch) and Edinburgh (main), the SWA's current membership represents over 95% of the scotch whisky producers in Scotland.

Interviewed at the SWA was Hugh Morison, the Chief Executive of the SWA. Like other interests interviewed in Brussels and Edinburgh, Morison has extensive ties to Scottish politics and the Scottish Office. Prior to being appointed as CEO of the SWA in 1993, Morison served 27 years in the Scottish Office. Morison still enjoys significant access to elite policy makers in Scotland and the central Whitehall machinery in London. The SWA remained neutral during the devolution debates in the 1970s and late 1990s. It was clear from Morison that the links the SWA enjoyed at all levels of government - Edinburgh, London, and Brussels - would continue to be utilized once devolution was implemented in Scotland in the summer of 1999.

By looking at the distiller's market, it becomes apparent why the SWA's lobbying strategy is so multi-faceted and international in scope. According to Morison, about 90% of the whisky produced in Scotland is exported to areas outside of the UK. Of this amount, about 40% is exported to the EU, while the remainder goes to non-EU nations. Given that about half of all whisky produced in Scotland stays within the EU-15, the SWA expends considerable resources on lobbying governmental officials and institutions in order to promote the industry and protect its product.

Prior to devolution, the SWA spent little time lobbying Scotland. Morison noted that local councils were rarely consulted, but the Scottish Office was a regular target due to its input in the decision-making process and Morison's own ties to the office. In 1999, Morison estimated that about 65% of the SWA's lobbying efforts were targeted at the
UK-level, while 35% of their efforts focused on the EU-level. Morison was quick to note, however, that the SWA's strategy would be altered dramatically once the Scottish Parliament and its committee structure were operational.

The nature of the scotch whisky industry in Scotland requires that the SWA lobby on a number of diverse issues ranging from labeling and the environment, to international trade. However, issues involving taxation and excise duties on alcohol generally, and whisky in particular, draw the most attention from the SWA. For the most part, duties leveled on scotch whisky are determined at the UK-level, thus the SWA's emphasis was placed on Whitehall prior to devolution. Within Whitehall, Morison noted that the SWA has contacted nearly every relevant elected official and civil servant that deals with taxation issues. Morison notes that his association lobbied the Chancellor of the Exchequer whenever possible, followed by the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister for Trade and Industry, and key civil servants within these ministries. Key front bench MPs were targeted next, followed by the media and the Scottish Secretary of State. Key issues to the industry, such as excise duties and international trade, are reserved powers under devolution, thus the SWA focuses their lobbying efforts at the UK-level when these issues are at stake.

Prior to devolution, the SWA's lobbying activities at the EU-level were focused on Directorate General (DG) for External Relations (DG I), DG Industry (DG III), DG Agriculture (DG VI) and DG Taxation and Customs Union (DG XXI). Morison noted that DG XXI was particularly useful when lobbying for lower value added tax (VAT) rates in both the EU and the UK, stating that successful lobbying efforts at DG XXI and within the UK media resulted in a reduction in the UK's duty on spirits in 1995, 1996, and 1998. Another reduction was achieved in 2000.

The SWA does not maintain an office in Brussels. However, the SWA is a member of the European Confederation of Spirits Producers (CEPS, or la Confederation Europeenne des Producteurs de Spiritueux), an EU-wide interest group representing 31 spirit manufacturers from the 15 member-states of the EU, as well as observer members from nations such as Russia, Switzerland, and the Slovak Republic. In October 2001, Morison became the President of the CEPS, while remaining the Chief Executive of the SWA.
While the SWA's lobbying efforts prior to devolution were focused entirely on London and Brussels, Morison stated that his association's practices "will need to respond to how the (Scottish) Parliament's committees operate." Key issues such as taxation remain reserved to the UK government, but other vital issues such as labeling were devolved from London to Edinburgh, while the implementation of EU regulations were also devolved from London to Edinburgh. Thus, the Scottish Executive and the European Committee in the Scottish Parliament are charged with implementing regulations handed down by the EU but negotiated by UKRep.

The SWA's intended strategy for the Scottish Parliament and Executive was clear at the time that Morison was interviewed: utilize the Scottish Executive and the Parliament's committee structure to promote and protect the interests of whisky producers in Scotland. Within the committee structure, Morison noted that the SWA would target the Transport and the Environment Committee, the Finance Committee, Rural Development Committee, and the European Committee. Within the Scottish Executive, the SWA would target many ministers whom Morison worked with in the Scottish Office prior to moving over to the SWA. These ministers would include the Minister for Education, Europe and External Affairs, the Minister for Finance and Local Government, the Minister for Environment and Rural Development, as well as the First Minister himself. Given the responsibilities devolved to the Scottish Parliament and Executive, Morison felt that the SWA's activities at the Scottish Office would "drop off significantly." Morison did also anticipate that the SWA would use Scotland House, the Scottish Executive's office in Brussels, to promote the industry.

According to Morison, the SWA planned to use its contacts with the Scottish Executive and the Scottish Parliament to influence devolved issues as well. Devolved issues impacting upon the industry include business rates and fiscal issues, legislation on regulations involving product labeling, product standards, safety and liability, the environment, and health policy and social aspects of Scottish life as it applies to the consumption of alcohol (Scotch Whisky Association 1999: 5). The SWA was particularly against the "2p on the pound" legislation supported during the 1997 referendum that allows the Scottish Parliament to alter the base tax rate in the UK by plus/minus 2 pence. A change in the tax rate could raise the price of a bottle of whisky in
Scotland, something the SWA clearly opposes. The SWA also looked to the Scottish Parliament and the Executive to protect shortcuts in the distilling and to protect the purity of the product and the definition of scotch whisky (ibid. 1999: 6).

Based on my interview with Morison, and with other interviewees who commented on the SWA's inclusive lobbying strategy, it is accurate to argue that the SWA looks to influence policy formulation at all levels of government. Although Morison was hesitant to state that there existed a "Westminster bypass" for the SWA, the growing importance of Brussels to the whisky industry is obvious given the SWA's links to Scotland House and Morison's recent assumption of the Presidency of the CEPS. Though key issues affecting the Scotch whisky industry are reserved powers, the SWA is clearly trying to influence euro regulations that are implemented at the Scottish level and aggressively lobbies those DGs in Brussels that can promote and protect the industry while influencing British ministries and policy-makers in London. As stated recently by Morison:

[Representation in Europe through the] CEPS is absolutely crucial to the European spirits industry. Thirty-one members speaking with one voice, carry far more weight than individual countries or members campaigning alone. Trade barriers, tax discrimination, and over-burdensome regulation affect Schnapps and Vodka as well as Scotch, so there are many common causes where it benefits the whole industry to stand together in Europe (www.scotchwhisky.org.uk/bbwchief.htm).

The Church of Scotland

Religion has always played an important role in Scottish politics. The Roman Catholic Church can claim the most enduring association with Scottish history, but King Henry VIII's 1534 Act of Supremacy which transferred papal supremacy over the English Church to the Crown and the Reformation in Scotland which began in 1560 undermined its dominant position. Although the modern-day Presbyterian Church of Scotland can locate its origins to the events of 1560, it was 1689 before the Church of Scotland, most commonly called the Kirk, emerged in its Presbyterian form. 

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8 The origins of the term "Kirk", meaning "church", can be traced to the Anglo-Saxon root *circe*. Circe was the goddess-daughter of Helios, the Greek goddess sun deity whose name was written and pronounced
Law established the Presbyterian Church of Scotland by an act passed by the Scottish Parliament. From 1689 forward, the Kirk was established as the Church of Scotland, or the sanctioned state religion of Scotland. The negotiated Act of Union with England in 1707 allowed the Kirk to remain the official church of Scotland, though the English and Scottish thrones were united in that year and the separate Scottish Parliament abolished. Thus, while Scotland and England became one administrative unit known as Great Britain, institutions such as the Kirk, the legal system, and the educational framework that were indigenous to Scotland were allowed to persist. As Scotland developed following the Union, an active civil society continued to develop and influence politicians in Scotland and throughout Great Britain.

Key to the development of civil society in Scotland has been the Church of Scotland, which from 1707 forward has viewed itself as the "voice of Scotland" (Kellas 1984: 178). Kellas notes that prior to the re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, the Kirk's General Assembly was the nearest thing in Scotland to a representative body (ibid. 1984: 178). The General Assembly of the Kirk, which comprises 850 commissioners made up of ministers, elders, and members of the Presbyterian Diaconate, meet once a year in Edinburgh to establish and vote on laws to determine how the Kirk will operate from year-to-year. Many of these Commissioners are active in Scotland's civil society, thus their religious convictions carry over into their social and business relationships. The governing structure of the Kirk encourages the participation of different commissioners in the annual meeting each year. As a result, agenda items discussed at the General Assembly meetings vary annually. Given this variety, it is rare for the Kirk to be without an official position on issues that arise in Scottish society as a whole.

The Kirk has been influential in Scottish politics for a number of reasons. First, as the official Church of Scotland, the Kirk enjoys a constitutional status within Scotland. The Queen or the Lord High Commissioner represents the Crown at annual General Assembly meetings, and while, unlike the Church of England the Kirk does not hold seats

as Kirke. Thus, the word "church" is known in Scotland as kirk, and with the Church of Scotland the largest religious denomination in Scotland, kirk has become synonymous with the Church of Scotland. Interestingly, the Scottish Parliament currently meets in the Kirk's General Assembly building as a new parliamentary building is under construction in Edinburgh.
in the House of Lords or receive much in the way of revenues from the government, an official status does give the Kirk great access to policy-makers. Second, the sheer size of the Kirk, which in 2001 was about 600,000 adult members, makes the Kirk and its followers and important political constituency. Finally, members of the Kirk have played an active role in Scottish politics, whether power resides at Whitehall or Westminster. William Ross, who served as the Secretary of State for Scotland from 1964 to 1970, and again from 1974 to 1976, was active in the Kirk. Today, a number of Scotland's MPs and MSPs are members of the Kirk.

Given this background, the Kirk has frequently played a role in lobbying government on particular issues and in influencing the policy process. Kellas notes that the Kirk has lobbied the Westminster government on issues ranging from EEC membership, to liquor licensing and divorce (ibid. 1984: 179), with more recent works attesting to the Kirk's active lobbying efforts in London in particular policy areas (see Hassan 1999: 133; Brown et. al. 1996: 64). In terms of devolution, the Kirk is on record for supporting devolution early in the debate, with the first positive statements on devolution having been pronounced by the General Assembly in 1963. By the time the Labour government was fully committed to devolution in the mid-1970s, the Kirk had supported the creation of a Scottish legislative body for more than a decade. From 1979 to the ultimate establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, the Kirk's support for devolution and the Scottish Parliament was well entrenched into the policies of the Church.

Prior to devolution, the Kirk lobbied the central government and members of the Prime Minister's cabinet. Most frequently, efforts were aimed at the Scottish Office and its leader, the Secretary of State for Scotland. The successful referendum on devolution held September 11, 1997, however, had an immediate impact upon the way that the Kirk would go about making representations. In that month, the Kirk began preparing for the new institutions that would result from the devolution legislation by appointing the Reverend Graham K. Blount as the Kirk's first Scottish Parliamentary Officer. Reverend Blount's charter from the Action of Churches Together in Scotland (ACTS)\(^\text{10}\) was the

\(^{10}\) ACTS was founded in 1990 and focuses on bringing different church denominations in Scotland together for collective action, including lobbying. Member churches include the Church of Scotland, the
establishment of an ecumenical office designed to represent member-religions to the Scottish Parliament and identify points of access in the new institutions created by the Scotland Bill that would exist for the Kirk. The Scottish Churches Parliamentary Office (SCPO), headed by Blount, was established in January 1999.

The SCPO is ecumenical in its membership, but the Kirk was clearly the driving force behind its establishment. Blount had worked in the Kirk prior to his reassignment to the SCPO, and it was clear from interviews that the Kirk drove the SCPO initiative. This should not come as a surprise, for the Kirk and other Scottish churches played a significant role in the devolution debate and the ultimate establishment of the Scottish Parliament. As a result, while the SCPO had barely been established for three months at the time of my interview with Blount, the Kirk had been laying the groundwork for such an office for several decades.

The SCPO was created to "build a fruitful relationship with the new Parliament" (Personal interview with Blount). The CSPO was established to allow member churches to "engage effectively in the new political process, translate their commitment to the welfare of Scotland into parliamentary debate, and contribute the range and depth of their experience, and their faith reflection on that, to the decision-making process" (SCPO Publication, 1999: 1). To accomplish these goals, the SCPO provides briefings to the churches and to parliamentarians on issues that are deemed particularly relevant to religious life in Scotland. Issues such as homelessness, poverty and social inclusion, and agriculture and land reform were at the top of the SCPO's agenda according to Blount in March 1999.

In the run-up to the election for the Scottish Parliament in 1999, Blount met with all the major parties, and the SCPO held informational meetings for prospective MSPs. In addition, through ACTS, the SCPO participates in the Civic Forum established in March 1999. The Civic Forum is a new body established to promote civic participation in the development of policy and legislation for the Scottish Parliament. Funded by the Scottish Executive, it acts as a gateway to the Parliament and its Committees while

Congregational Federation, the Methodist Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Salvation Army, Scottish Congregational Church, Scottish Episcopal Church, the Society of Friends (Quakers), United Free Church, the United Reformed Church, the Associated Presbyterian Church, Baptist Union, and the Free Church of Scotland.
"building links between the people of Scotland and the Scottish Parliament and between different parts of civic society" (www.clmorrison2.netanswers.org.uk). The Scottish Civic Forum is often asked by the Scottish Executive to hold public forums on issues that will have an impact upon the Scottish citizenry and should thus be addressed by the Executive and Parliament. Debated issues range from the future of Scotland in Europe to passenger rail services.

In addition to holding parliamentary briefings, contacting political parties, and participating in the Scottish Civic Forum, Blount noted that it would likely be a common practice for his office to contact MSPs, or for MSPs to contact him, for information on the key churches that operate in Scottish society. As noted earlier in this paper, the quest for good information is ongoing, and Blount said that he could imagine an MSP contacting his office for information as this was his experience in the preparation for Parliamentary elections to be held in May 1999. The ecumenical nature of the SCPO is a guarantee to MSPs that issues that are vital to thousands of churchgoers - and voters - in Scotland are represented by the SCPO.

Much like the Scottish Trades Union Congress, the SCPO and the Kirk utilize their massive membership at the grassroots level to influence the policy process. Blount noted in our conversation that individual parishes in the Kirk frequently have very active political organizations that hold forums on political issues and have members who participate in council politics. The SCPO utilizes these networks to pressure local parties and MSPs. For example, the SCPO published and distributed to parishioners a brochure with questions for prospective MSPs regarding homelessness, poverty, and land reform. Churches were then encouraged by the SCPO to arrange "husting" meetings with all the MSP candidates for a particular constituency. Armed with the SCPO's questions, prospective candidates would face questions that would raise awareness regarding these issues that were important to Scottish churches. It was hoped that this awareness would be carried over to the Parliament once the newly elected MSPs took their seats in July 1999.

The CPSO does not utilize contract lobbyists, nor does it maintain a lobbying presence in London. Prior to devolution, the Kirk occasionally approached the Scottish Office and the Secretary of State for Scotland, and vice versa, when particular legislation
was being debated within the Prime Minister's Cabinet or at Westminster. Post-1999, however, the SCPO has little contact with the Scottish Office due to the few administrative responsibilities still held by the Office following devolution. When the Kirk wishes to lobby on reserved issues not devolved to Scotland, such as social security or defense issues (the Kirk has been a long-time advocate of nuclear disarmament), it will most often approach Scottish MPs (Personal interview). On occasion, Blount noted that the SCPO and the Kirk would utilize concordants that exist between the Scottish Executive and the British Executive, or the Scottish Parliament and Westminster, though access to the former was predicted to be somewhat limited. The charter of the SCPO does not include representing Scottish churches in London.\(^{11}\)

The SCPO does not make representation directly to the EU. However, the Kirk does maintain a presence in Brussels and subscribes to the services of the Conferences of European Churches (CEC). Founded in the 1950s, the CEC is a regional ecumenical organization that links in action 123 churches and 25 associated organizations in all the countries of Europe. Headquartered in Geneva, the CEC maintains offices in Brussels and Strasbourg to be in close proximity to the EU Commission, and the EU Parliament and European Court of Justice, respectively. The Kirk is also a member of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC), though the WARC is much more limited than the CEC in terms of lobbying.

The institutional changes brought on by devolution in Scotland present both opportunities and challenges to the SCPO. The openness of the Parliament, designed with a committee structure to ensure meaningful consultation between the MSPs and civil society at the early stages of the legislative process was seen by Blount as a great opportunity for the SCPO to have an input in the policy process. Blount was encouraged by the reception that the SCPO received at the husting meetings and briefings held for prospective MSPs, and believed that the transparency of the policy process would allow

\(^{11}\) On the rare occasion the Kirk will approach the UK government to encourage particular perspectives on issues debated at the EU level. When this occurs, the Kirk will usually use contacts within the Scottish Office and the Scottish Secretary of State. For instance, the Kirk used the Scottish Office in 1997 to encourage the UK government to transfer the lead UK-role in negotiating the UK’s EU position on matters pertaining to fishing to the Scottish Office, since the fishing industry is of greater importance to the Scottish economy than it is to other countries of the UK. Other examples exist, but such lobbying has dropped off dramatically since devolution and the establishment of Scotland House in Brussels (Source: www.churchofscotland.org.uk).
MSPs to hear all sides of debates. Gaining access to the process, Blount felt, would not be an issue.

At issue, however, was Blount's concern that access for the Kirk would be diminished due to the fact that the Scottish Parliament would likely be more secular in its orientation. For several hundred years the Kirk was recognized as the official Church of Scotland. As a result, it was natural for the Scottish Office to call on the Kirk whenever issues merited such a response. In our interview, Blount drew an interesting parallel between the Kirk in Scotland and the Catholic Church in Poland. Both churches were instrumental in the push for constitutional reforms, and both churches could be victims of their own success. The Catholic Church's support of the Solidarity movement in Poland eventually marginalized the Church as a player in Polish politics. Blount was trying to avoid this from happening to the Kirk and the churches who subscribe to the SCPO's services by developing ways that churches could become engaged in the policy process despite the move toward secularism in Scotland. As Blount concluded, "the Church must redefine their role or have it redefined for them, our office was created to assure that the former is the case" (Interview).

An argument could be made that the Kirk has used the "Westminster bypass" to press their issues in Brussels. Based on interviews with Blount and the Rev. Dr. Finlay Macdonald of the Church of Scotland, it appears that there has been a renewed emphasis since devolution with lobbying in Brussels. Clearly, the Kirk is looking to influence EU policies through other church-supported interest groups and placed personnel. In addition to their membership in the CEC and the WARC, the Kirk participates in the Ecumenical Forum of European Christian Women and supports a staff position in the CEC's Church and Society Commission (CSC) in Brussels to monitor development in the EU and feed information into the Kirk's networks. The CSC also maintains contact with MEPs and promotes dialogue between the Church and the institutions of the EU. Though there are rare occasions that the Kirk will lobby the UK government to encourage a particular perspective on EU issues negotiated by the UKRep, such contact is rare due to the UK's closer integration into the European Union.

Devolution has made lobbying at Westminster less important for religious groups such as the Kirk and the SCPO. The SCPO does not utilize contacts in Brussels to make
representations, but it is clear that both the Kirk and the SCPO planned on using the newly created Scottish Parliament and Scottish Executive to make representations. Both the SCPO and the Kirk were active participants in the 1999 Scottish parliamentary elections by sponsoring candidate hastings and promoting their platforms to prospective MSPs. Subsequently, based on information available at each organization’s website, both the Kirk and the SCPO utilize the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive in post-devolution Scotland to make representations.

While at first glance the comparison between Scotch whisky and religion appears to be nonsensical, it is hoped that the case-study approach utilized here demonstrates that devolution and increased European integration has made two very differing indigenous interests in Scotland rethink their approach to making representations. Both interests are trying to market their "product" in an international setting, and both have traditionally enjoyed access to policy makers within the central UK government. Clearly, the SWA must still lobby in London on those reserved issues that impact upon their industry. However, lobbying operations in London are being reduced due to devolution and the larger role that the EU now plays in agricultural issues throughout Europe. Similarly, while the Kirk, for all intents and purposes, has functioned independent of the UK government since 1707, it frequently made representations in London prior to devolution regarding social policies. In post-devolutionary Scotland, the Kirk has backed away from these tried and true practices, and now lobbies almost exclusively in Edinburgh and Brussels. Both organizations, it would appear, have changed their lobbying practices in order to take advantage of the institutional and procedural reforms brought on by devolution to Scotland and Britain’s closer integration into the European Union.

Conclusions

Devolution and increased European integration for the UK were cornerstones of the 1997 Labour campaign that brought Tony Blair and his Labour party to power. Although attempts to provide Scotland, and other regions of the UK, with degrees of legislative autonomy have existed in various forms since the 19th Century, only the current Labour government has successfully carried out its mandate to reform the constitutional structure of the UK.
The focus of this paper has been on the way varied interests in Scottish are responding to these constitutional reforms and institutional changes. Most notably, it has argued that devolution and increased European integration have fundamentally altered the lobbying behavior of Scottish interest groups. Through the use of case studies, support has been found for the argument that lobbying activities for Scottish interests are influenced by institutional changes that are the result of devolution, and that lobbying strategies for Scottish interests are influenced by changes that have come about due to the United Kingdom's greater integration into the European Union. Related to these findings, this research has found in general terms that making representations in London for Scottish interests is becoming less important, while lobbying in Brussels and Edinburgh is becoming increasingly important. Likewise, though lobbying in London remains important for Scottish interests such as the SWA concerned with reserved powers, the constitutional changes brought on by the Blair government have made it less likely that Scottish interests can effectively be constrained by mechanisms and institutions of the central government by denying them access to the policy process and its key players.

Implicit throughout this paper has been the argument that European integration and devolution are intricately intertwined when examining the Scottish lobby in contemporary Britain. An important consequence of European integration has been the multiplication of supranational channels for subnational political activity. At the same time, devolution has created new institutions in Scotland, and thus new points of access at the subnational and supranational levels for Scottish interests. Greater British participation in the EU has forced Scottish interests to learn how to represent themselves at both the national and EU levels, with these interests increasingly looking to the EU to influence the UKRep and the UK's policy positions as they pertain to the EU. The Scottish Parliament and Executive are following this lead, also seeking to influence EU policy before it is debated and subsequently implemented throughout the regions of the EU.

This paper has argued that devolution and increased European integration have fundamentally altered the way that Scottish interests, indigenous to Scotland or branches of a larger UK organization, make representations. Devolution and increased European
integration have strengthened the capacity of Scottish interests to represent their concerns while creating new obligations for themselves and their members.
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