THE EUROPEANIZATION OF GOVERNANCE IN LARGER EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES

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How to remedy the democratic deficit in the EU has become the central focus of deliberations in the Constitutional Convention, as model after model of EU institutional organization has been proposed, revised, rejected, and rethought. But while everyone has been talking about how to remedy the democratic deficit at the EU level, few have been focusing on the real problem for the future of European integration: the democratic deficit at the national level.

The problem for EU member-states is that they have yet to come to terms with the impact of the EU on the traditional workings of their national democracies. Whereas all attention has been focused on the future of European integration, or the process of building a more ‘democratic’ European public sphere, it is Europeanization, or how member-states adapt their democracies to this evolving European public sphere, that holds the real key to the future.

Europeanization is not just about the changes in national policies in response to EU decisions. It is also about the changes in national democratic practices as a result of the development of the EU governance system. Equally importantly, however, it is about the challenges to national ideas about democracy in consequence of the changes in national practices as well as in policies.

The problem for EU member-states is not so much that their policies and practices have changed, despite the fact that the new EU-related practices have altered national governmental powers and authority, interest access and influence, and the politics of voting and voice. Rather, it is that national conceptions of democratic power and authority, access and influence, and vote and voice in the polity remain largely unchanged. This disjunction between the new practices and old ideas is at the root of questions raised about the legitimacy of the new patterns of governance and confusion over who is responsible or accountable for EU decisions. The political fallout from such questions can be found in the razor-thin wins and in the defeats of Treaty referenda, in the rise of the extreme right on the back of anti-immigrant sentiment, in the concerns on the left about the impact of economic neo-liberalism on social welfare, and more generally in the political disaffection that comes from the loss of trust in government and of confidence in national political leaders.

The range of problems that make up the ‘democratic deficit’ for national democracies naturally cannot be attributed to the EU alone. Other forces have also been at play, including external pressures related to globalization and internal dynamics related to modernization, corruption, and even ‘post-industrial’ values. However, because the EU has been the focal point for change in member-states, it is for obvious reasons also the focal point for concern and for the search for remedies. But no conceivable remedies at the EU level can successfully address these problems. Only national leaders and publics through national discourse and deliberation as intense or more as those currently about EU level democracy can do the job of re-evaluating their national democracies in light of Europeanization, in order to construct a new ‘democratic compromise’ in their Europeanized polities.
As it is, however, national leaders continue to project traditional visions of national democracy in their discourse while speaking as if they fully retain their traditional power and authority. In so doing, they risk being held accountable for actions for which they are no longer entirely responsible, thus contributing to citizens’ disenchantment and providing populists with grist for the mill. Were they instead to engage their citizens in deliberations about national democracy in light of the new realities, they might very well come up with new legitimizing ideas that would avoid the populist extremes while enabling a clearer and ‘truer’ assessment of the EU’s impact. Such ideas could even point to ways to remedy the national democratic deficit through new national practices more adapted to the new realities.

In what follows, I seek to lay the groundwork for any such deliberations by exploring the nature of the EU governance system and its impact on national democracies. I begin by considering the EU-related changes in member-states’ governance practices with regard to governmental power and authority, interest access and influence, and the politics of voting and voice. Such changes, I show, have been greater for some countries than others, largely due to questions of institutional ‘fit’ with the EU, and therefore pose a greater challenge to traditional ideas about democracy. Because the EU is a ‘compound’ polity, in which power, influence, and voice are diffused through multiple levels and modes of governance, countries with already ‘compound’ polities such as Germany and Italy have experienced less significant change in government practices and thereby less challenge to traditional ideas about democracy than those with more ‘simple’ polities such as France and Britain, where power, influence, and voice are more concentrated in a single level and mode of governance. ‘Fit’ in terms of policies is another matter entirely, however, and here the changes and challenges may be every bit as great in ‘compound’ polities as in more ‘simple’ ones.

All countries face the need to come up with new ideas to legitimize the new policies and practices, then, but simple polities more so than compound ones. Coming up with new legitimizing ideas, however, is more easily said than done. This is a question of discourse, which involves not only generating new ideas about the polity but also communicating them to the public.

Here, too, member-states’ institutional differences matter. But in this case, the ‘simple’ polities which have a harder time adjusting ideationally to Europeanization than ‘compound’ polities because of less institutional ‘fit’ may very well have an easier time discursively because of those self-same institutions. This is because in ‘simple’ polities, where a restricted, government elite tends to ‘coordinate’ the construction of the ideas and then to ‘communicate’ them to the public for discussion and deliberation, the public can get a clear message to consider—to accept, reject, or modify. By contrast, in ‘compound’ polities, where a much wider range of actors is involved in the ‘coordinative’ stage of discourse, the ideas communicated to the public may get lost in a cacophony of voices if there is no consensus, which will in any case take time to build.

Even greater problems affect discourse in the EU taken as a whole, however, because it is itself a doubly ‘compounded’ system, with an even greater range of national and EU-level actors involved in the ‘coordinative’ discourse and little ‘communicative’ voice of its own, since it depends upon national leaders for much of its communication to national publics. In this, however, the current Constitutional Convention provides a welcome exception, since it has
proved a forum both for the generation and communication of ideas about democracy at the EU level.

THE EUROPEANIZATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE PRACTICES

The EU has brought radical change to all national governance practices. It has affected national institutional structures regarding which branches or units of government have power and authority over what kinds of decisions; national decision-making processes regarding which interests have access and influence in policymaking at what stages of the process; and national politics regarding by whom and in what venues citizens' votes are represented and their voices expressed.

The Changes in Governance Practices

First of all, EU institutional structures have altered the traditional powers and authority of national governments. National executives have become EU level decision-makers in exchange for giving up autonomy in national decision-making. National legislatures have become transposers of EU directives at the same time they have lost traditional powers of initiative and oversight. National judiciaries have become interpreters of EU law, and subnational units, implementers of EU regulations, at the same time that they have gained in independence from the national executive.

Secondly, EU decision-making processes have impinged on traditional patterns of policy formulation and implementation. National interests have gained access and influence in an EU decision-making process which involves a much vaster array of actors in a much more complex set of interactions with many more points of entry than that of any member-state. Moreover, national administrations have been pressed into more regulatory and legalistic modes of enforcement—where the rules are applied without exception by independent regulators and judges—from approaches that often relied instead on administrative discretion, joint-regulation, or self-regulation.

Third, even EU representative politics, as embryonic as they are, have begun to modify traditional modes of participation, partisan politics, and mobilization. National electoral politics have been complicated by voting in European elections which have often become referenda on national elected officials (especially when they occur in the middle of a government’s term in office). National partisan politics have been subordinated to the national interest politics of the Council, the public interest politics of the European Parliament, and the organized interest politics of the Commission—as national ministers speak in the Council in the name of the nation rather than as the representative of the governmental majority; as members of the European Parliament speak for the general good rather than as representatives of electoral majorities; and as citizens exercise voice more effectively when lobbying in Brussels than protesting in national capitals.

Changing Governance Practices in Simple vs. Compound Polities

Complicating matters even further, however, is the fact that while all countries have experienced major EU-related changes in national practices in terms of national governmental power and
authority, interest access and influence, and the politics of voting and voice, the changes are comparatively more significant for some countries than for others. This is largely due to questions of ‘fit’ between EU governance and national government.

The EU can best be characterized as a ‘compound’ polity, given governance practices which occur at multiple levels of governance—supranational, national, and subnational—in various governing modes—intergovernmental, supranational, joint-decision, or even the open method of coordination. As such, the EU has a differential impact on national politics depending upon whether they are also compound or are instead more ‘simple’ in governance practices. At the national level, we need to differentiate between countries such as Germany, Spain, Belgium, or Italy, as ‘compound’ democracies in which power and authority, access and influence, voting and voice tend to be diffused among multiple institutional structures, decision-making processes, and representative politics, and more ‘simple’ democracies such as Britain, France, or Greece, in which power and authority, access and influence, voting and voice tend to be more concentrated in a single set of structures, processes, and politics. Because the EU is itself a ‘compound’ polity, it necessarily compounds all national practices in both compound and simple national polities, and it therefore naturally leads to greater change in practices for member-states with traditionally more ‘simple’ democracies than for those with more ‘compound’ ones.

*Fit in Institutional Structures*

In countries with already compound institutional structures—federal states with a diffusion of power across differing territorial levels and branches of government—the EU’s quasi-federal structures have had comparatively less of an impact than those with more simple institutional structures—unitary states where power and authority is traditionally concentrated in the executive. In unitary states like France and Britain, the highly autonomous executives have lost a comparatively more significant amount of power and authority not only because of the shift of decision-making power upward to the EU but also because national judiciaries and regions have gained in independence from the executive as a result of their EU-related roles (as well as because of internal dynamics related to judiciary activism and devolutionary reforms). By contrast, the loss of executive autonomy has been comparatively less significant for more federal states like Germany and Italy, given that the executive has always had to share power and authority with other national and sub-national units of government.

Moreover, although the diminution in national parliaments’ legislative powers of initiative and approval has been potentially of greater significance in federal states, it too has in the end affected unitary states more. This is because in federal systems in which the executive’s primary EU legislative role stood to alter the balance in the federal division of powers to the detriment of the legislature and regions (when represented in a second house of Parliament), the legislature has negotiated a re-equilibration of powers between the two branches, as in Germany. For unitary states, no such re-equilibration could be imposed by the regions, given their lack of independent constitutionally-based powers, nor by the parliament, given its control by the executive as the majority party. The French parliament’s traditionally highly limited powers have only become more limited, despite reforms attendant upon the Maastricht Treaty. The British parliament has by comparison managed to retain its traditionally greater powers of oversight and voice, although it too has lost significant powers of initiative and approval. In Italy, a highly regionalized but technically unitary state, by contrast, the reduction in the
parliament’s powers of initiative and approval were balanced out by greater effectiveness, as the transposition of EU directives made impossible the log-rolling of the past.

The greater independence of the judiciary from the national executive has also been more consequential for unitary than federal states, although the national courts’ loss of autonomy to the European court has been more problematic for federal states. In France, where the courts have traditionally been subordinated to the executive, the courts’ increasing independence—the result of internal dynamics as much as of their empowerment as an enforcement arm of the EU—has been particularly unsettling to the executive, concerned by corruption investigations as well as more resistant with regard to the application of EU law than either Germany or Britain. In Britain, because the courts have always been more independent and the precedent-setting approach of British common law matches EU practice, the executive found it somewhat easier to accept the growing independence of the judiciary, but not the proliferation of EU-inspired laws, while the courts bristled at giving up their long-established prerogatives and have referred many fewer questions to the ECJ than France or Germany. In Germany, where the courts have always been even more independent than in Britain and the importance of law as a regulatory instrument parallels EU practice, the problem has been neither with the even greater independence of the courts nor with the proliferation of EU laws but rather with the precedence of EU law over German.

Finally, the regions’ enhanced independence from the national executive as a result of their closer linkages with the EU through regional policies, committees, and funds has so far been most significant for France, where the regions have long been subordinated to the center, and least significant for federal Germany, where the Länder already have had great independence, or regionalized Italy, where the regions have gained increasing autonomy since the 1970s. It stands to have the greatest significance for Britain, however, given the process of devolution that started in the late 1990s for Scotland and Wales and has only just begun for England with the creation of politically-constituted regions in England in 2002.

**Fit in Decision-Making Processes**

Just as the EU’s institutional structures have had a comparatively greater effect on simple polities than compound ones, so have the EU’s decision-making processes. Countries with already compound decision-making processes—corporatist policymaking in which certain ‘privileged’ interests, mainly business and labor, participate in policy formulation and implementation—have more readily adapted to the EU’s quasi-pluralist processes than countries with more simple processes—statist policymaking in which the state retains control over policy formulation and implementation. The EU’s model of relatively open access to organized interests more closely approximates the German and Italian approaches to interest intermediation, even though they allow in a more restricted range of non-governmental interests to policy formulation. It differs from the British model, where the executive mostly makes its decisions autonomously even though interests do have access through lobbying Parliament, and even more so from the French, where interests until recently have barely been allowed into the policy formulation process by a highly autonomous executive. French organized interests, as a result, have had the steepest learning curve, but once having learned, the impact has been most empowering, since French organized interests now have greater input at the EU level on decisions from which in the past they were
normally excluded at the national.\textsuperscript{13} The British, by comparison, have had much less to learn, organized interests having honed their lobbying skills in their relations with Parliament and their one-on-one negotiation skills with the bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{14} Italian interests have also had less to learn than the French with regard to the process of lobbying, but arguably more as to its content, to wit, that it is neither a political nor an influence peddling process. The Germans have had the least to learn, having been schooled in the same kind of cooperative negotiating style and committee work prevalent in the EU, as evidenced by their success in dominating standard-setting committees.\textsuperscript{15} By the same token, however, the interest intermediation process at the EU level has served to unbalance the national in certain cases—for example, by giving business greater access than labor in areas other than the social and labor policy arena\textsuperscript{16} and by undermining national business associations where large firms have a direct EU role, such as in the Transatlantic Business Dialogue.\textsuperscript{17}

The EU's closed, regulatory and legalistic process of policy implementation has also been more difficult for France and Britain to absorb than Germany. In France, EU requirements to apply the rules without exception go against traditional patterns of administrative discretion, where making exceptions was the rule as often as not, and which balanced out the lack of consultation in policy formulation with flexibility in implementation. The EU regulatory model has denied French organized interests the accommodation of the past, and has made those without access to EU policy formulation more prone to confrontation at the national or, increasingly, the EU level—such as truck-drivers and public service workers.\textsuperscript{18} Similarly, moreover, EU-mandated regulatory agencies and codified rules go against British governments' traditional preferences for self-regulatory arrangements, informal agreements, and voluntary rules, thereby leaving organized interests as well as the government to complain of the increasing rigidity and formal rules coming from the EU (even though this also has national sources). By contrast, the EU has allowed corporatist implementation processes to continue where they existed, and therefore has had little impact on Germany or Italy in those areas. In non-corporatist policy areas, however, while Germany still benefits from a reasonable 'goodness of fit' since its implementation has traditionally been regulatory or legalistic, the problems for Italy are potentially even greater than for France, since whereas France tends to derogate the rules maybe 50% of the time, Italy has traditionally done it 90% of the time.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Fit in Representative Politics}

As with the Europeanization of institutional structures and decision-making processes, so with representative politics: Countries with already compound representative politics—'consensual' systems with proportional elections, multiple parties, and two powerful legislative chambers where control may be divided between government majority and opposition—have fewer problems with the EU's quasi-consensual politics than countries with more simple politics—'majoritarian' systems with first-past-the-post elections, two main parties, and only one powerful legislative chamber controlled by the government majority.\textsuperscript{20} In Germany and Italy, the complex bargaining and arguing that goes on in the EU matches their own, and is therefore not experienced as the loss of political power which it is to Britain or France, where majoritarian politics provides for strong governments with little need to bargain consensually, since they have the power to impose.

Moreover, the EU's accentuation of interest representation over the electoral is less of a disruption of representation for a country such as Germany or Italy, in which governments also
often compromise on their political commitments to the electorate in response to the federal or regionalized powers of territorial units, the corporatist or clientelist influence of organized interests, and the strength of the opposition in the second chamber and/or regional governments. The disruption is much greater for countries such as Britain and France, where governments have not generally needed to compromise on their political commitments, given the traditional subordination of other territorial units in the unitary state, the distancing of organized interests in statist policymaking, and the weakness of the opposition in the winner-take-all electoral system. The subordination of representative politics to territorial or interest politics may therefore lead to greater disaffection on the part of British and French electorates, which have come to expect more clearly politically demarcated policies and positions, than for German or Italian electorates, which are used to more ambiguous policies and positions based on compromise. Although in Italy electoral reforms toward a more majoritarian system beginning in the early 1990s have certainly produced a clearer articulation of political positions than in the past, it is still nothing like in France or Britain.

‘Fit’ in Policies and ‘Fit’ in Polities
‘Simple’ polities, in short, have greater problems adapting to the Europeanization of its governance practices than ‘compound’ polities, mainly as a result of a lack of institutional fit. Isomorphism, or the question of ‘fit,’ however, is mainly a problem for ‘simple’ polities when we consider Europeanization, or the top-down impact of the EU’s structures, processes, politics, and policies on its member-states. European integration, as the bottom-up process of building a European space in terms of structures, processes, politics, and policies, is another matter. And here, lack of fit may have the opposite effect, as countries with ‘simple’ systems in which power is more concentrated in the executive may better be able to defend national preferences if not also to project them onto the European stage than countries with ‘compound’ systems in which power is more diffuse.

This helps explain the fact that national leaders of more ‘simple’ democracies often seek to offset the impact of Europeanization by leading European integration. Thus, in France, national leaders have often sought to impose their preferences—whether by proposing grand initiatives as part of the ‘Franco-German partnership, by maneuvering to maintain CAP subsidies for French farmers, or by insisting that Europe-based institutions such as the ECB or NATO’s southern command be led by Frenchmen. This serves the dual purpose of increasing French power in the EU while ensuring that in exchange for the loss of national autonomy comes French predominance in the EU. In the UK, by contrast, while national leaders have occasionally sought to engage in grand initiatives, as in Blair’s great leap forward on European security and defense in St. Malô in 1998, they have more often resisted the EU because they were not leading it, as in the case of Thatcher on monetary union and social policy. This too serves a dual purpose, by ensuring that the national executive retains as much national power and autonomy as it can while still participating in the EU, even though it consecrates the UK as the EU’s ‘awkward partner.’ In a country like Germany, by contrast, even when national leaders have sought to impose a preference, as in reducing its contributions, they have had great difficulty except when they were suggesting things in the context of the Franco-German partnership. In Italy, where exercising leadership domestically has itself been a near impossible task until the 1990s, national leaders have been content to follow rather than lead.
'Fit' in terms of polities, then, is a double-edged sword for simple and compound systems, since the same institutional arrangements that make for disadvantages with regard to Europeanization make for advantages in European integration. 'Fit' in terms of policies, by contrast, follows a completely different logic from 'fit' in terms of polities—that is, in terms of how EU policies affect national policies as opposed to how EU governance practices affect national government practices.

Whereas 'fit' in governance practices is the main variable in explaining the polity responses to Europeanization, 'fit' in policies is only one of a number of factors that explains policy responses to Europeanization. These factors include the problems that establish the need for change, the policy legacies that may or may not 'fit' proposed policy solutions, the policy preferences that may or may not change in light of the problems and proposed solutions, the political institutional capacity of actors to respond to the problems through new policy initiatives even if these reverse policy legacies and preferences, and the discourse which serves to enhance capacity by altering perceptions of problems and legacies and by influencing preferences. In the case of EU-related economic policies, for example, lack of fit with long-standing policies may not be at issue when policy preferences shift in response to high levels of economic vulnerability, when policy actors have the capacity to respond effectively to the problem, and when policy actors' discourses have served to enhance problem-solving capacity by influencing public perceptions of economic vulnerability and preferences in terms of policies. This was clearly the case with regard to France's 'great U-turn' in monetary policies from neo-Keynesian to monetarism in 1983 in order to stay in the European Monetary System. But although lack of fit may bring transformation, inertia is also a potential outcome where political institutional capacity for change is low, actors' preferences remain unchanged, and there is no legitimizing discourse to alter perceptions—as in Italy until the run-up to EMU in the mid 1990s.

But while there are a range of factors with regard to explaining the impact of Europeanization on national policies, there is only one main factor to consider with regard to the impact of Europeanization on national polities: whether they are simple or compound democracies.

THE CLASH OF THE NEW GOVERNANCE PRACTICES WITH TRADITIONAL IDEAS ABOUT DEMOCRACY

That national governance practices have changed in response to Europeanization, and more in simple national polities than in compound national polities, is not the main problem for EU member-state democracies. It is that their ideas about democracy generally have not changed, leaving open questions about the legitimacy of the new practices and confusion about political responsibility and accountability for the new policies—and more so in simple polities than in compound ones.

The Clash of New Practices and Old Ideas

Nation-state legitimacy is generally predicated on democratic practices that involve not only government 'by, of, and for the people'—meaning 'input' and 'output' democracy through political participation, representation, and effective government—but also what I call government with the people—meaning consultation based on interest intermediation. The
problem for EU member-state democracies is not only that the process of Europeanization alters who has power, influence, and voice and where they exercise it. It is also that the EU emphasizes government for and with the people—meaning effective government through consultation—over and above government by and of the people—or political participation and representation. And this thereby puts pressure on national representative politics, with national elected officials generally held responsible and accountable for decisions over which they have little control.

To begin with, despite the shift in the locus of power and authority from the national to the EU level, national governments are still generally held fully accountable for that which for they are no longer entirely responsible. In the context of supranational governance involving ‘output’ democracy ‘for the people,’ for example, while the European Central Bank (ECB) has taken over monetary policy from national authorities and the Stability and Growth Pact greatly limits their margin of maneuver—denying them the traditional policy instruments for macroeconomic management such as devaluation, deficit spending, debt accumulation, and reflations—national constituencies still hold national authorities solely responsible for the state of the economy. While the Commission holds Chancellor Schröder to task for risking breaching the 3% deficit criteria, the German public holds him to blame for high unemployment and the declining state of the economy.

Similar disjunctions affect the opening of interest access and influence at the EU level, or consultative democracy ‘with the people.’ Although Brussels holds the key to decision-making in increasing numbers of policy areas, national interest groups in a large number of these areas mostly still organize, pressure, and protest primarily at the national level, with relatively little transnational coordination (the notable exception is business); and they blame national authorities for policies which they have comparatively little power to alter. In immigration policy, for example, nationally-based interests organize and lobby for the most part domestically, despite the fact that since the Amsterdam Treaty decision-making has been increasingly focused on the EU level with the move of the policy area from the third pillar to the first. Even farmers, for whom one would expect that the long experience of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) would have redirected attention to Brussels, continue to focus their attention on national authorities, with surprisingly little transnational organization or even mobilization—although the unanimity rule in this arena better explains the continued national focus.

Most problematic are the politics of voting and voice. Representative politics at the national level, organized along the left/right cleavage, as ‘input’ democracy ‘by the people,’ suffers under Europeanization. This is because national governments, elected on a political platform at the national level, must speak and act at the EU level as representatives of national territorial units or even national organized interests about policies which, once passed, they then must speak for and act on at the national level in their capacity as political representatives. The result is that they are therefore held accountable not only for that for which they may be not be entirely responsible but also for that to which they may not be politically committed.

Electoral politics also suffers. National elections tend to be focused on substantive policy issues that increasingly can only be fully addressed at the EU level, such as immigration, food safety, environment, or economic growth, while European Parliamentary elections tend to focus on
more general polity issues that can only be resolved by nationally-based actors, such as how to reform EU institutions. The result, as Peter Mair argues, is that voters have voice over questions that don’t count at the level at which they voice them. This runs the risk of depoliticization, as decisions are seen to be made by the government and bureaucracy, and decreasing citizen engagement in traditional politics, with a concomitant turn to identity politics, issue politics, and even extremist politics.31

Contentious politics, which can be understood as a kind of democracy ‘with the people’ when the regular consultation process breaks down, confronts similar difficulties. This is because protests against EU policies tend to target national officials who are accountable for policy implementation but can do little to accommodate the protesters’ concerns, as in the case of the French and Italian truckers’ protests against EU-mandated deregulation, while protests focused on more local issues may find more response from EU officials than national ones, as in the case of the ‘euro-strikes’ against the closing of French car manufacturer Renault’s Belgian plant.32

**The Clash of New Practices and Old Ideas in Simple vs. Compound Systems**

While member-states generally experience a clash between the new practices and traditional ideas about democracy, the clash is much greater for simple polities than more compound ones. This is because compound polities tend already to have ideas about democratic legitimacy that better match the compounded governance practices of the EU than the ideas prevalent in more simple polities.

**The Clash in Ideas about Institutional Structures**

The EU-related compounding of institutional structures largely reinforces the underlying assumptions in compound polities such as Germany that democracy is best served by the dispersion of government power and authority, such that citizens’ rights are protected from government excess through checks and balances resulting from the vertical and horizontal division of powers. By contrast, it challenges the underlying assumptions in more simple polities such as France and Britain that democracy is best served by the concentration of government power and authority both vertically and horizontally, such that the government has the sole responsibility as well as the capacity to respond to citizens’ wants and needs effectively.33 In Italy, it reinforces the assumptions underlying the increasingly regionalized practices that promote the dispersion of power and authority, even as it challenges what is still in principle a unitary state.

For France, the EU-related compounding of its institutional structures runs counter to the country’s Jacobin philosophical foundations that concentrate power and authority in the ‘one and indivisible’ Republican State. Democratic legitimacy has traditionally been based in a unitary state and embodied in an autonomous executive with no obligation to any other authorities, whether other national branches of government or subnational units of ‘administration,’ let alone other national governments. Moreover, even today, this unitary idea of the French state remains, even though French ideas about how much European integration is compatible with the unitary state have evolved—from President de Gaulle’s insistence on a "Europe of nations" to President Mitterrand’s vision of a France increasingly conjoined with a more federal Europe to President Chirac and former Prime Minister Jospin’s consensus on Europe as a ‘federation of nation-states.’ What is more, the unitary ideal persists despite not
only the changes resulting from the Europeanization of institutional structures but also the
decentralization reforms beginning in the 1980s that gave more power and resources to
subnational governments and a measure of autonomy to Corsica.

In Britain, the EU-related compounding of institutional structures has not been quite as great a
challenge to national ideas as for France, mainly because British ideas about the institutional
balance of power and authority has long been somewhat more compounded than those of France.
But although the executive has never been as unitary as the French—given the historical
evolution of the power of the monarchy, which has since the Magna Carta been tempered by the
growing power of Parliament, a certain modicum of local autonomy (until the late 1970s), as
well as in recent times by a more independent judiciary—this has in no way made Britain more
receptive to the Europeanization of its institutional structures. Much the contrary, since any
increase in the vertical division of powers in favor of subnational authorities through subsidiarity
has been the bête noire of Conservative governments under Thatcher and Major. And although
Blair’s recent devolutionary reforms suggest a willingness to give up centuries-old ideas about
the unitary state and government by an autonomous, central executive, this has been more in
response to subnational pressure for local autonomy, in particular Northern Ireland and to a
lesser extent Scotland, than supranational pressures from the EU (with the exception, perhaps, of
the devolution of the English regions).

Neither Germany nor Italy has had the same ideational problems as France or Britain with regard
to the compounding of their institutional structures, given that they were already highly
compounded. The further compounding of Germany’s federal system sits well with a centuries-
long history in which the regions have been relatively strong and autonomous and a shorter
postwar history in which the different branches and units of the national government have also
been strong and autonomous. Only the Bundesbank’s subordination to the ECB can be
characterized as a major disruption to German ideas about the appropriate organization of the
federal state—but this was in fact of concern less because of the loss of institutional power per se
but because of what the Bundesbank symbolized for the nation as the protector of economic
stability. The compounding of Italy’s regionalized system also fits with a long history of strong
regions and a recent history of devolutionary reforms, with ideas about the state moving from a
unitary notion to a more divided one, and challenges coming more from internal questions
related to the demands of the Northern League rather than externally from the EU.

The Clash in Ideas about Decision-Making Processes
Similarly, the EU-related compounding of decision-making bolsters Germany’s view that
government responds most effectively to citizens’ wants and needs by being open to a
multiplicity of inputs from intermediate interests through its multiple centers of power via
government with the people. By contrast, the EU undermines the views of Britain, and even
more those of France, that the executive, as the primary center of power, ensures its citizens
against governmental excess by being closed to interest intermediation.

In the policy formulation process, the EU’s quasi-pluralist approach clashes in principle with
statist systems’ foundational concepts of democratic participation and representation. In France,
involving organized interests in policy formulation by way of pluralist processes ‘with the
people’ offends French ideas prevalent since the Revolution that have viewed any such interest
intermediation as illegitimate, since the State is to be the sole representative of the people, to act
in the name of the collective will for the collective good. In Britain, interest intermediation interferes with notions of parliamentary sovereignty as embodied in the executive who represents ‘the Crown in parliament’—although parliamentary lobbying is acceptable so long as the government keeps its distance. 34 In practice, though, while British interest involvement in EU level pluralism raises few real questions of legitimacy since interests have always had some voice in national policymaking, French interests’ experience of EU level pluralism can raise questions about the legitimacy of national decision-making principles that deny them access and voice in national policy formulation processes, especially when these involve EU-related policies. French businesses’ experience is a case in point. 35

In the implementation process, moreover, the EU’s regulatory model—wherein derogation of the rules is illegal and statutory rules rather than voluntary self-governing agreements are the norm—clashes with both countries’ flexible implementation processes. For France, the EU’s regulatory model, by disallowing the state’s accommodation of interests ‘with the people’ in implementation, not only denies minority interests voice in the entire statist policymaking process, but also leaves them no option other than confrontation—as in the case of the truck drivers and public service workers. 36 For Britain, the problem is rather with the statutory rules that, by abrogating organized interests’ voluntary self-regulatory arrangements, increase the scope and rigidity of the public sphere and thereby encroach on the private sphere which governments see as their duty to protect. 37

For compound polities, there is less clash in ideas about policy formulation, given that interests are expected to have access, although not in exactly the same way. In Germany, although organized interests have generally adjusted readily to EU level interest intermediation, the EU process has served to undermine corporatist ideals of government with the people, by tipping the balance in favor of business in EU level negotiations. By the same token, however, it has expanded the number of interests heard. In policy implementation, however, whereas there is little clash in ideas in Germany, given that where its enforcement is not corporatist, it is regulatory or legalistic, this is not the case in Italy. Here, not being able to make exceptions to the rules in non-corporatist areas may lead to even greater potential problems of democratic legitimacy as democracy with the people is abrogated than in France. What is more, because business, labor, and subnational units all have access to European policymaking via national as well as European channels, they have not felt cut out of the policy process in the way that many French interests have or that Italian interests are likely to, once they implement the rules.

The Clash in Ideas about Representative Politics
Finally, the EU-related compounding of representative politics sustains the German and Italian acceptance of political compromise among the plethora of elected authorities open to organized interest intermediation. By contrast, it weakens the British and French expectation of clear political leadership by a single executive, acting solely in the name of the voters.

In simple democracies, legitimacy is focused on the executive—as the political representative of the people, elected by the people, and governing for the people—which means that the government alone is seen as politically responsible and accountable. For France, the executive embodies the one and indivisible ‘Republican state,’ as the political representative of the people who is to act without obligation to other authorities and without intermediation by organized interests, charged to protect citizens’ political rights based on the ‘universal rights of man’ if not
also to project them throughout the rest of the world. In consequence, Europeanization means that national democratic legitimacy can always be called into question, since the loss of executive autonomy is necessarily a dilution of government responsibility and accountability. In Britain, where the executive is seen as the representative of ‘parliamentary sovereignty,’ the potential challenges to legitimacy are even greater, since any EU-related loss of parliamentary sovereignty can also be seen as an attack on the ‘historically established rights of Englishmen.’

In compound democracies, by contrast, whether the EU, Germany, or Italy, legitimacy rides on the functioning of the system as a whole, as responsibility and accountability are both diffuse, given the numbers of actors that can be seen to be representatives of the people, elected by the people, governing for the people, and/or representing interests that are part of the consultations with the people. In consequence, democratic legitimacy is generally not in question despite the shift in power and authority resulting from Europeanization unless the people lose trust in the system as a whole. For Italy, such a loss of trust was the case for much of the postwar period until the 1990s with regard to national government but not the EU, which it saw as the rescue of the nation-state.

*The Clash in Ideas about Policies vs. Ideas about Polities*

While the lack of fit between new governance practices and old tend to challenge traditional ideas about democracy more in simple polities than compound policies, any lack of fit between new policies and old ones may be every bit as disruptive for compound systems as for simple ones where the policy goes against core norms, organizing principles, and values of the economy and society—that is, against the economic and social rights which also underpin democratic legitimacy in advanced industrialized democracies. Thus, the Danes and the Swedes hesitate to join the European Monetary Union because of its potential impact on the social-democratic welfare state. The French resist liberalization of their ‘services publics’ or public infrastructural services because it undermines the welfare state responsibilities of the ‘Republican State.’ And the Germans contest the Competition Directorate’s demands for change in the low-cost lending practices of the regional savings and loan banks because of their role in the German social market economy. In all of these cases, lack of fit in policies raises questions for democratic legitimacy as significant as in the case of a lack of fit in polities.

Questions about legitimacy naturally come up where EU-related policies oppose strong national interests or beliefs. This is when protests about incursions on national sovereignty arise—for example, by the French in 1989 when the Competition Directorate-General refused to allow a major acquisition by a French firm (by Aerospatiale of de Havilland); and by the Germans in the mid 1990s when the Competition Directorate disallowed an economic development loan by a regional government (by Saxony to Volkswagen for a plant in East Germany). This is also when national executives may provoke the equivalent of constitutional crises at the EU level—as with the UK on mad cow disease and France on agricultural concessions in the Uruguay Round.

The problem with these policy-related questions of legitimacy, which are the equivalent of constitutional crises for the EU, is that their resolution does not necessarily tend to consecrate the EU’s overall legitimacy, as would any successfully resolved constitutional crisis within a nation-state. This is because within the nation-state, the citizens always have a chance to rally support for change in rules—even those by delegated authorities—in the ideal-typical way of ‘input’
democracy 'by the people,' by voting one government out and another in. No such thing is possible at the EU level, because of the lack of any EU-wide electoral politics and the fact that rules voted in the past which are the basis for decisions today are not likely to change, given the difficulties of 'positive integration' because of diverging member-state preferences and the power of 'negative integration.' The result therefore may instead be a further erosion of national legitimacy and moves to 'throw the bastards out' at the national level, unless national politicians manage to convince the public that they are in fact making a good faith effort to fight the policy at the EU level while moderating its impact at the national level—which has often meant buying off the most affected interests, as the French government did with regard to their farmers in the Uruguay Round and as the British government did by gaining EU recompense for their farmers in the mad cow crisis.40

A lack of fit in policies, in short, can lead to legitimacy problems for the polity as great as a lack of fit in governance practices. The main difference, however, is that whereas policy questions are of necessity always debated and deliberated in the process of adaptation, politics questions are for the most part passed over without comment, mainly because the changes in national practices are a spillover from EU governance practices which themselves are not the subject of debate. And this is the main problem for national democracies.

THE MAIN PROBLEM: NEW PRACTICES, OLD IDEAS, LITTLE DISCOURSE

The main problem for national democracies in the process of Europeanization is that while national actors have been representing national constituencies in new ways at the EU level, they have not only not generated new ideas to legitimize the new practices, they have often persisted in speaking about Europeanization as if the old ideas about democracy still applied. As a result, their discourse has failed as a set of ideas both cognitively to explain the logic and necessity of changes in national institutional structures, decision-making, and representative politics and normatively to persuade of their appropriateness in terms of questions of democratic responsibility, accountability, and legitimacy.41 Again, however, the problems are more pronounced for countries with traditionally more simple systems of representation such as France and Britain than for those with more compounded systems such as Germany

The Lack of New Ideas about Democracy in the Discourse

The problem here, however, is that mainstream national leaders have mostly been loathe to broach the topic of national democracy, seeing it as a Pandora’s box. They have tended to pass over the changes in national practices in silence and to downplay any perceived impact on national sovereignty, identity, and citizenship. In the postwar period, the 'permissive consensus' that allowed political elites to build the EU largely outside the public eye was buoyed by national discourses that in most countries presented further European integration as enhancing national sovereignty, with positive effects on identity and citizenship. Any problems with democracy, moreover, have been focused on the EU rather than the national level.

In France, for example, European integration was presented as an extension of national sovereignty through the country’s leadership in Europe and an expansion of political citizenship based on the universal rights of man, serving to renew the country’s ‘grandeur’ and to continue
its 'mission civilisatrice' begun with the Revolution. In Italy, European integration instead constituted a reinforcement of sovereignty through the rescue of the nation-state, a guarantor of political rights, and an embellishment of national identity.\textsuperscript{42} In Germany, where neither sovereignty nor citizenship were seen as issues, Europe comprised the basis for the new German identity, as a way to turn the page on the country's past. Only in Britain was the discourse on European integration seriously split. On the one (losing) side were those who saw integration as a threat to parliamentary sovereignty, to the 'historically-established rights of Englishmen,' and to an identity constructed with Europe as 'the other;' on the other (winning) side were those who side-stepped such issues entirely by emphasizing the economic benefits.\textsuperscript{43}

Most telling perhaps is the fact that even with the current Constitutional initiative, national leaders’ proposals generally project national visions of democracy onto the EU. Thus, the German proposal that launched the Constitutional debate was particularly federal, with a 'European Federation' to consist of a second chamber with powers like those of Germany’s Bundesrat, and a 'European constituent treaty' much like the German Basic Law which would set out EU level competencies while leaving everything else to the member-states.\textsuperscript{44} The French counter-proposal was for a 'union of nation-states' in place of a federation that would do nothing to threaten the unitary nature of the French state, with a constitution that would be no more than a simplification of the treaties, with no second chamber, and no competencies that would increase the powers of the regions to the detriment of the center.\textsuperscript{45} The British offering, finally, rejected not only the idea of a federation but also that of a constitution—in line with their own lack of a written constitution—suggesting instead a charter of non-binding competencies and a second chamber similar to the House of Lords in its political powers of review.\textsuperscript{46}

In national discourse, moreover, in all countries but the UK, national politicians continue to talk as if the EU has had little impact on national governance practices or the polity—despite the obvious policy changes. In France, for example, national leaders still speak as if the state were unitary, despite the federalizing trends related not only to the EU but also to internal reforms, as in the case of Corsica. They continue to insist that they remain a leader in Europe, despite the faltering of the Franco-German partnership and, most importantly, the fact that France has followed much more than led in the 1990s, and sometimes quite reluctantly, as in the liberalization of the public services industries, which they loudly opposed,\textsuperscript{47} or in the change in immigration policy, which they implemented without any nod to its EU genesis.\textsuperscript{48} The problem with ignoring the impact of Europeanization while emphasizing their leadership role is that they risk being held accountable for actions for which they are not fully responsible.\textsuperscript{49}

Britain has the opposite problem. National leaders have tended to highlight the impact of the EU on national governance practices: under Thatcher in highly polemical diatribes against overly ambitious integration plans that challenge national sovereignty and excess regulations that reduce the private sphere while rigidifying the public sphere, under Major in a quieter, but equally negative discourse. Under Blair, by contrast, there has largely been silence, in particular over possible entry into the eurozone, which has been portrayed as a strictly economic problem—leaving Fleet Street to continue the negative polity discourse. The result is that the public has been made maximally aware of the drawbacks to Europeanization and few of the benefits, such that any government that moves toward greater integration risks being seen as responsible for undermining British democracy.
Neither Germany nor Italy have problems as serious as those of France and Britain with regard to the changes in governance practices, given their better fit with the EU as compound democracies. Thus, the discourse of national leaders has been uniformly positive in terms of its national impact, with the Italians arguably even more positive, and any potentially negative impact downplayed. For Italy, the problems will come when it is forced to implement the rules. For Germany, they will come when EU policies are seen to challenge the practices of its social market economy (of which the savings and loan decision was a foretaste), because these are seen as fundamentals with regard to citizens’ economic and social rights.

Policy issues are of course as different from polity issues in the discourse as they are in terms of ideas, and are not distinguishable in terms of compound vs. simple polities. On policy issues, the EU has frequently been used as a blame-shifting device in the discourse of all countries, to argue that policy change is necessary because required by the EU. However, although sometimes the EU’s pressure is portrayed as unwelcome in the discourse—as in the British government’s periodic complaints about the burdens of more statutory rules for business or in the French government’s resistance to deregulation of public services industries—other times it has taken a more positive cast—as in Germany with regard to electricity deregulation—or even serves as inspiration for deep-seated national policy change, most notably in Italy and Greece, where appeals to national pride in meeting the challenges of EMU enhanced domestic capacity to make the far-reaching financial and pension reforms necessary to accession to EMU.

On polity issues, in any event, national leaders’ discourses have tended to stick with traditional visions of national democracy and to project these onto the EU, despite the increasingly significant EU-related changes to the workings of national democracies in terms of power and authority, access and influence, vote and voice. Given this, it should come as no surprise that national referenda on EU Treaties in the 1990s have become the fora for highly charged and often divisive debates about the impact of the EU on national democracy, e.g., the French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which was barely won; the Danish referendum on Maastricht which failed the first time around, passed the second time only in view of an opt-out, and failed again in the vote on joining the euro in 2001; and finally the Irish referendum on the Treaty of Nice in 2002 which passed only the second time around.

It is also no wonder that the extremes on both sides of the political spectrum have managed to exploit the issues for their own electoral purposes. This has been most dramatic in the case of the rise of parties of the extreme right even in some of the traditionally most tolerant countries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, in addition to France, Belgium, and Austria, where right-wing populists fan the flames of anti-immigrant sentiment as they appeal to nationalist and anti-EU values. The extreme right’s relatively high scores in recent elections are testimony to the malaise felt by national populations in a situation in which their leaders have spoken eloquently about the economic benefits of European integration without saying much about its appropriateness in terms of national democracy. The problems on the left are equally significant, as increasing concerns about the impact of economic liberalization on the postwar economic order and of European monetary integration on the welfare state play themselves out in the disillusionment of the left’s electorate. This has been evident in the electoral defeats of the left-leaning coalitions that had dominated Europe in the late 1990s, but was brought home most vividly in the French presidential election of 2002, where the front-running Socialist candidate and sitting Prime Minister Jospin came in third, after the extreme right candidate Le Pen and the
sitting President Chirac, mainly because his constituency voted for a slew of candidates to the left of him.

Indications of the political problems are also found in the surveys, opinion polls, and electoral studies that show that citizens’ trust in national governments as well as in EU institutions is down, while general cynicism about national leaders is rampant and voter apathy, evident in higher and higher rates of abstentionism, is up.\textsuperscript{52} Although the decline in confidence in public institutions and erosion in support for politicians is a phenomenon affecting all advanced industrialized countries, mainly related to performance, and shows as great a variation among EU member-states as non-EU countries,\textsuperscript{53} this general decline is compounded for the EU member-states by the addition of the EU level of governance. Studies find a growing distrust among respondents in national governments’ ability to ameliorate their situation but an even greater distrust in EU institutions.\textsuperscript{54} Moreover, political participation, as judged by levels of abstention in national legislative elections, increased significantly from the mid 1980s to the late 1990s, although more in countries like France and the UK (up by 14% and 16% respectively from reasonably high levels of 22% and 25%) than in Germany and Italy (both up by around 7% from relatively low levels of around 11%).\textsuperscript{55}

The reasons for the erosion of citizen confidence combine concerns with specifically national performance problems, whether resulting from external forces such as international economic interdependence\textsuperscript{56} or from internal sources such as political corruption,\textsuperscript{57} with those that spill over from EU level decision-making. EU-related national performance problems may come not only from the plethora of ‘market-making’ policies resulting from ‘negative integration,’ that is, from the liberalizing decisions that follow from the Treaties that member-states must implement. They may also come from the paucity of ‘market-correcting’ policies resulting from ‘positive integration’ in areas where member-states cannot agree because policy preferences diverge greatly—such as in the employment and social welfare arenas—which leave member-states largely to cope on their own.\textsuperscript{58} Add these policy-related performance problems to the polity problems associated with the changes in national governance practices, and the malaise of the citizenry is easy to understand.

The democratic deficit, in short, is as much if not more of a problem at the national level than at the European. And it will remain a problem so as long as national leaders and citizens in each and every one of the member-states do not start reevaluating what they mean by national democracy today, even before they decide how to democratize the EU for tomorrow. The EU is no longer an elite project supported by a ‘permissive consensus.’ But it is not yet a peoples’ project grounded in a ‘democratic consensus.’

But how to build such a democratic consensus? For this, we need to the interactive dimension of discourse in European democracy at both EU and national levels, and which also differs in simple and compound polities.

**The Europeanization of Discourse**

The problem with regard to Europeanization is not just that countries hold to old ideas that do not reflect the new practices. It is also that the new EU governance practices have generated new patterns of discourse, and that these have also affected the discursive patterns of interaction in
‘simple’ and ‘compound’ polities, where differences in discursive patterns follow from differences in governance practices. Interestingly enough, however, whereas policy issues generate greater discursive problems for ‘simple’ polities than for ‘compound’ polities, polity issues are more problematic for compound polities’ discursive patterns.

**National Discursive Patterns**

In order to get a sense of the significance of the EU-related compounding of national discursive patterns, we first have to look at the national level of discursive interactions at both the coordinative stage of policy construction and at the communicative stage of public discussion and deliberation. At the national level, polity issues are generally bundled together with policy issues, with legitimacy in question when new policies challenge long-held values or generate new practices at odds with long-standing ones.

At the coordinative stage of discourse, the principal interlocutors are policy actors representing different branches and levels of government who construct a proposed policy program with input from organized interests and other interested parties (e.g., experts, public figures, think tanks) who may be part of the coordinative discourse itself and/or contribute to it as generators of ideas within discursive policy communities—such as ‘epistemic communities’ united on the basis of shared ideas or advocacy coalitions made up of many such discourse coalitions vying for attention and power. At the communicative stage of discourse, by contrast, the key interlocutors are the political actors representing the electorate (aided by spin doctors, campaign managers, government spokespersons, and the like) who present the policies developed in the context of the coordinative discourse for discussion and deliberation with the public made up of citizens as well as organized interests and other interested parties—who in this context are members of more informed publics or ‘policy forums’ along with opinion leaders, the media, opposition parties, spokespeople for social movements, and so forth.

In countries with more simple discursive patterns such as France and Britain, the coordinative discourse tends to be comparatively thin, since a restricted set of policy actors tends to construct policies with little direct input from the organized interests in discursive policy communities (see Figure 1). The communicative discourse tends instead to be quite elaborate, since this is where political actors seek to legitimize to the public the policies generated by the restricted policy elite, and where organized interests along with other interested parties have their say. Here, problems may arise from the fact that the absence of extensive deliberation at the coordinative stage of discourse makes protest (in words, in votes, or in the streets) the only recourse for a public dissatisfied with policies announced at the communicative stage. But the typical government response either to persist with the discourse and the policy unchanged in the face of confrontation or to withdraw it without any further public discussion both leave democratic legitimacy in doubt. The early Thatcher years in Britain before the economic reforms took bold and the Juppé public sector welfare reforms in 1995 in France which contributed to the right’s defeat in the 1997 elections are both cases in point.

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**Figure 1 about here**
In countries with more compounded discursive patterns, such as Germany and Italy, by contrast, the coordinative discourse tends to be much more elaborate, since a much wider range of policy actors tends to reach agreement on policies with direct input from a wider range of organized interests (see Figure 2). The communicative discourse to the general public tends instead to be much thinner, since legitimization has been focused in the coordinative sphere where organized interests and other interested parties have already had their say. Here, the problems arise from the fact that the absence of extensive communicative discourse may leave the public with little orienting or legitimizing information beyond what they may have received as members of organized interests. This may not be a serious problem for democratic legitimacy where the coordinative discourse is inclusive and transparent. But it may be where certain groups remain marginalized (typically immigrants, the unemployed, and women) or where the deliberations are carried out entirely behind closed doors, with little communication to policy elites’ own constituent members or openness to public scrutiny. What is more, the communicative discourse is essential where the coordinative discourse breaks down, in order to reframe the terms of the debate—evident in the successful, successive efforts by Italian Prime Ministers Amato and Dini to institute pension reforms as well as in German Chancellor Schröder’s failed attempts to liberalize the ‘social market economy’ in the face of stalemate between business and unions.62

But the communicative discourse is especially needed—and often lacking—when policy issues touch on polity issues that have not been adequately addressed within a given policy arena (for example, because they may divide the governing coalition or organized interests). The absence of a communicative discourse here can leave the field open to exploitation by the extreme right—as it has on questions of immigration, foreigners, and law and order in a number of compounded polities in Continental Europe. This was the case of Austria—where the problem was structural, since deliberation at the coordinative stage of discourse was neither inclusive nor transparent—and of the Netherlands—where it was strategic, because mainstream policy and political actors chose not to confront the issues (Schmidt n/a). But of course, this can also be a problem in simple representation systems, where political leaders fail to address issues of concern to the electorate—as would appear to be the case in France in the defeat of Prime Minister Jospin in the first round of the May 2002 presidential election.

Figure 2 about here

The EU-Related Compounding of National Discursive Patterns
In the EU, discursive patterns of representation are more compounded still. While the EU coordinative discourse has an extremely wide range of policy actors involved, as organized interests along with other interested parties discuss and deliberate with supranational EU policy actors and national actors acting in a supranational capacity, the EU communicative discourse has very few political actors capable of speaking for the EU as a whole, let alone a general European public to listen or deliberate, given the lack of a common European language, European media, credible EU-level political parties, and European public opinion, let alone European citizenry or directly elected President. In consequence, while the EU benefits from the most elaborate of coordinative discourses, with European policy ideas generated through a complex discursive process with a plethora of actors, it suffers from the thinnest of communicative discourses, with European policy ideas conveyed mostly by national political
actors in national contexts. As such, it has had a differential impact on countries with simple and compounded discursive patterns (see Figure 3).

Figure 3 about here

In simple polities, Europeanization has fundamentally altered the discursive patterns at the coordinative stage of discourse related to who speaks to whom about what where, as national organized interests and others in discursive policy communities kept outside the national coordinative discourse find themselves inside the EU one—in which they may or may not act as partners of national political actors. This has clearly affected the coordinative discursive process of simple polities for all EU related issues. At the same time, moreover, it complicates the communicative task of political actors in their national representative capacity, since they must legitimize policies to the general public for which they may have had comparatively little input and to which they may not be politically committed. Moreover, they are not generally aided by the national organized interests with input at the EU level, since these are often weak intermediaries at the national level, given their traditional lack of input or standing in national policymaking. As a result, they cannot do what organized interests do in compound systems to pick up the slack in the communicative discourse by acting as credible communicators to their own constituencies within the coordinative discursive context. It goes without saying that where national organized interests are not present at the EU level and policies go against their wishes, the problems for political leaders’ communicative discourse are even greater.

However, the traditionally strong communicative voice of national leaders, in the absence of any EU level communicative discourse, can be a boon if and when national political leaders take advantage of this. They can, for example, make no mention of the EU-inspiration for policy change, legitimizing such policies in purely national polity terms, as in the case of French immigration policy. Moreover, were they to decide to embrace the changes in national practices with a full communicative discourse of legitimization, they would be able to speak clearly and in one voice, with all their traditional authority, to seek to change the public’s traditional ideas about democracy. This could even entail coming up with new governance practices to make up for the national level ‘democratic deficits’ resulting from Europeanization.

For example, in France, national leaders, instead of continuing to reiterate the fictions of a unitary state and an all-powerful executive, could seek to cast the new realities of their Europeanized polity in a positive light, rather than ignoring them. Thus, they could note that the EU-related increase in the horizontal and vertical division of powers through more independent courts and subnational authorities acts as a check on national executive power while the EU-related increase in policymaking access and enforcement ensures greater interest participation in policy formulation at the EU level and greater equality and predictability in policy implementation at the national level because the derogation of the rules is no longer allowed. What is more, they could even do more to bring organized interests into the national policy formulation process, to overcome the problems related to the loss of flexibility in policy implementation. This has already begun to happen with regard to some purely national problems, as both the Jospin and Raffarin governments have been appointing expert commissions to lead public deliberations on the most divisive polity issues and seeking
concertation with the social partners on the most divisive work-related issues. But these are minimal measures when one considers the vast array of areas that could benefit from greater interest involvement in policy formulation—in particular those related to EU policies.

In Britain, similarly, national leaders, instead of either railing against the EU’s incursions on sovereignty (as in the Thatcher years) or falling totally silent on the EU’s impact on the polity (as today), could also put the new Europeanized realities in more positive light. Thus, they could note that the growing horizontal and vertical division of powers acts as a check on a political system which has been called an “elected dictatorship” while the EU also ensures greater interest participation in policy formulation at the EU level and greater equality and predictability in policy implementation because laws rather than voluntary agreements are involved. Unlike the French, however, the British can find no answer to the loss of flexibility on this score, other than perhaps to seek to keep Brussels from enacting more rules and regulations—or from doing it themselves, since internal reforms are as much if not more of a cause of the increase in the rigidity of the British system than EU-related reforms.

In compound polities, by contrast, the impact of the EU on national discursive interactions has not been as significant as in simple polities because the EU level coordinative discourse tends to bring in the same actors in the same relationship as at the national level, while political actors’ communicative task is less onerous with regard to policy changes since national organized interests as well as subnational authorities have been fully part of EU level discursive interactions. Here, problems will arise mainly where policies violate national ideas about the role of government in the economy and other deeply held values (e.g., about the environment)—but then, the general poverty of the communicative discourse may raise major red flags for the public. This was the case with the euro in Germany, and may become increasingly true in areas that challenge the country’s economic model, while for Italy it may occur when, as noted earlier, the country is pushed to implement policies thoroughly. Moreover, where the EU challenges national democratic ideas or practices, public discussion and deliberation through the kind of ‘deliberative democracy’ that Habermas has consistently called for is very difficult, given the range of voices speaking at the same time and seeking to be heard, without any one having any more of an authoritative voice than any others. Reaching a consensus in the context may therefore be quite long and difficult compared to any simple polity.

For both Britain and France, then, the challenge is to change ideas about the polity, but the strong communicative discourse is there to make that a possibility, were leaders willing to engage in the discourse. For Germany and Italy, it is a good thing that the polity issues are not as serious, since they would have a much harder time projecting a successful communicative discourse. Policy issues that challenge deep-seated values, however, do need addressing—and this is where potential problems lie.

**CONCLUSION**

So far, national leaders have generally failed to engage in any kind of communicative discourse that would have engaged the public in deliberations on the changes in the traditional workings of their national democracies in light of Europeanization. The national forums set up to provide input to the Convention on EU constitutional reform in 2001-2002 were a golden opportunity to
take stock of those changes in national democracies. But national leaders did not use that opportunity—the national forums garnered little attention or participation in most member-states. Another opportunity will come if and when national referenda and parliamentary debates are held on a new Constitutional Treaty. But will national leaders take advantage of this new opportunity to engage the citizenry in deliberations about their own national democracies rather than focusing solely on the new architecture of the European Union? The future not only of national democracies but also of the EU may be at stake.
Figure 1: *The Flow of Ideas and Discourse in Simple National Polities* (solid arrows show direction of ideas and discourse, dotted arrows show feedback, overlap shows where some actors may operate in both spheres).
Figure 2: *The Flow of Ideas and Discourse in National Compound Polities* (solid arrows show direction of ideas and discourse, dotted arrows show feedback, overlap shows where some actors may operate in both spheres).
Figure 3: *The Flow of Ideas and Discourse in EU Compound Polities* (solid arrows show direction of ideas and discourse, dotted arrows show feedback, overlap shows where some actors may operate in both spheres).
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FOOTNOTES

1 Gabel 2001; van der Eijk and Franklin 1996.
2 Schmidt 1999b. On the difficulties of building party politics at the EU level, see: Ladrech 1999; Mair 1995.
3 See Imig and Tarrow 2001; Goetz and Hix 2001.
4 For an extensive definition, see Leslie (2001, p. 217), who defines ‘compound polity’ as an entity that is relatively highly institutionalized which makes authoritative decisions at different levels with clearly demarcated boundaries, but which is generally in chronic conflict.
5 Although Jeffrey Anderson finds little statistically significant change in the effects of Europeanization on national structures, processes and politics on Lipjhart’s scale in either compound or simple polities, quantitative measures do not necessarily get at the qualitative differences. After all, institutional structures may not appear to have changed even when their content has.
7 Saalfeld 1996
8 Rizzuto 1996
9 Norton 1996b
10 See Stone 1992
11 Conant 2001
12 See Schmidt 1999b.
18 Schmidt 1999b, 2001
19 See Schmidt 1999b.
20 I use Lijphart’s (1984) distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies.
21 George 1990
22 For works focused on ‘goodness of fit’ see: Cowles, Caporaso, and Risse (2001); Börzel and Risse (2000); Héritier (2000).
24 See Schmidt (2002a, 2002c) on the full range of factors, including discourse.
25 See the discussion in Schmidt 2002a, Chap. 2)
27 To what degree they reward or punish parties in power on the basis of economic performance is another matter, depending upon a complicated range of factors. See discussions in Clark and Hallerberg 2000; Gabel 2001; Palmer and Whitten (forthcoming).
28 Imig and Tarrow 2001a.
30 Klandermans et al. 2001.
31 Mair 2001.
32 Imig and Tarrow 2001b; Schmidt 2002a, p. 284.
33 Schmidt 2001
Schmidt 2002b
Schmidt 1996.
See Schmidt 1999b; 2001
Schmidt 2002b.
This says nothing about the substantive content of EU policies, however, which may violate
national preferences in compounded systems as readily as in simple systems.
See, for example, Ferrera and Gualmini 1999.
Jacques Chirac, speech to the Bundestag, June 27, 2000.
Geddes and Guiraudon 2002
See Schmidt 2002b.
See on the public services industries, see: Thatcher 2000; Eising and Jabko 2002; Hérétier et
al. 2001.
Klingemann and Fuchs (1995); Klingemann 1999; Dalton 1999; Pharr and Putnam 2000;
Newton and Norris 2000.
Whereas in 1998, a slim relative majority in eight EU member-states still trusted their national
governments (47% vs. 46% who did not) but not the EU Commission (39% vs. 46%), in 2000,
absolute majorities distrusted both national governments (53% vs. 45% who continued to trust)
and the Commission (57% vs. 35%)Louis Harris-Le Monde poll, discussed in: Reynié and
Cautrès 2001, pp. 243-244.
Idea Data Base, discussed in Bréchon 2002, p. 103.
Scharpf 2000b.
Della Porta (2000)
Haas and Adler 1992; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993.
Rein and Schön 1991.
Schmidt 2002a.
Schmidt 2000a, 2002a.