Neutrality, a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Conflict Resolution: The Future of European (and Global?) Security

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Abstract
This paper addresses the potential role of the neutral, non-aligned (NNA) states of the European Union in the development of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), as well as the unique ability of the NNAs to deal with traditional conflicts and conflicts arising from non-state actors. The unique perspective and historical role of the NNAs could bring insight to the European Union's foreign policy that is lacking in traditional states, thus offering the potential for settlement and/or amelioration of grievances that lead to traditional and non-traditional conflicts both inside and outside the EU's sphere of influence. I briefly explain the evolution of the CFSP and the unique role of the NNA states in developing a CFSP. Then, the theoretical premise of the study is discussed in detail. Finally, I propose several cases for study in order to assess the potential for successful intervention under the framework of a CFSP—both in traditional and non-traditional types of violent conflicts.
Introduction

Despite the often emphasized economic beginnings and ultimate aims of the EU and many of its policies, Europe's attempt to centralize stems from the political goal of the eradication of war from the continent. Europe was plagued with almost continuous military struggle from the beginnings of modern civilization through the end of the Second World War. The first attempt at centralizing security, the Concert of Europe, failed with the outbreak of the Crimean War, which led to the subsequent conflicts that eventually culminated in World War II. In the aftermath of World War II, the realization that Europe could no longer bear the costs of such continuous bloodshed—physically or financially—led to the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Simply put, all of the economic and social consequences of unification are a by-product of the quest for stability and peace—making the Common Foreign and Security Policy an integral part of the foundation for European integration.

Why then, has the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) been so troublesome for the European Union (EU)? Security and defense are seen—both theoretically and practically—as falling entirely in the domain of the nation state. The norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity that developed with the rise of the Westphalian system still dominate the political landscape of the international arena. The attempts by the EU to incorporate the responsibility for security and defense into a supranational structure go against a well-established system of norms. It should come as

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1 See Wawro, 2000, for an overview of the military struggles from Napoleon through the outbreak of World War I.
2 Ironically, it was in the Prisoner-of-War camps that the ideas for European unification took hold and fermented (Duke 2000, 12).
no surprise then that the road towards a common foreign and security policy has been bumpy at best. The real marvel is that EU members have managed to make as much progress in this area as they have to date.

To make matters even more interesting, the concerns of the Neutral Non-Aligned (NNA) states must be taken into consideration and thus represent a special case in the debate over the CFSP deserving of individual attention. Because of the unique role that the NNA states have had historically and the perceptions of the international community with regard to these states, I propose that their inclusion in the formation of a European foreign policy will lend credibility not only to the policy itself but to the actions which follow from a common foreign policy—particularly interventionist actions. Given the nature of the concept of neutrality and the importance of perception in interpreting the concept, interventionist actions that include neutral states should be more positively received by the international community. Additionally, through case studies I intend to show that the actual foreign policy priorities of these states are different and would thus impact the initial design of a European foreign policy. Therefore, the NNAs should strive to affect the design and implementation of the CFSP; and the other members should understand the potential benefits of such involvement.

In order to build the foundation for my argument, I briefly outline the development of the CFSP. This subject has been covered at great length and with excellence elsewhere, requiring only the briefest of discussions here. If readers are unfamiliar with the development of the CFSP, they should consult one of the sources cited in this section. Also important to my argument are the concepts of security and neutrality. First, the difference between security and defense is outlined. Then the concept of neutrality is
discussed in detail, including a discussion of the role of domestic politics in the NNAs. After discussing the relevant concepts, I introduce my cases and the areas to be examined for each case in order to evaluate the proposition herein.

**Background on CFSP Development**

As mentioned above, European integration is by no means a “new” idea, and the foundation for integration is built upon the goal of eradicating interstate warfare from what has been the most violent region in history. The process of integration, however, has not always paralleled the theory. In fact, European integration usually appears more functional than elaborately planned.

For example, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the EU member states accepted the legitimacy of an EU arrest warrant in order to track down and arrest suspected terrorists. In Duke’s analysis of the CFSP, a functionalist argument is apparent. He argues, as only one of many examples, that “The reluctance to consider CFSP questions in the early 1990s only changed as a number of successive developments in Europe altered the context of European security” (117), and continues on to cite the breakup of the USSR, the crises in Yugoslavia, German re-unification, and the return of the importance of domestic politics to the U.S. political agenda as the primary examples. The functionalist approach is particularly appealing in that “the beneficiaries of integrative steps achieve vested positions in the system such that a return to an earlier mode of action is undesirable” (Haas 1968, xxix; cited in Duke 2000, 10).³

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³ For an interesting discussion of the importance of the status quo as a reference point, see the literature on Prospect Theory (Levy 1992; Quattrone and Tversky 1988, and Weyland 1996).
A brief historical account\(^4\) of the progress towards a CFSP begins with the establishment of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952-4. France failed to ratify the treaty because of disagreements over Germany’s role in the EDC. The Fouchet Plan (1962) followed, but was also rejected—this time as too intergovernmental. The Hague Summit (1969) formally called for a united Europe capable of dealing with all issues including security. Following the Hague Summit were the Luxembourg, Copenhagen, and London Reports (1970-1981) all of which clarify policies with regard to European Political Cooperation (EPC), which were then institutionalized by the Single European Act (SEA) (1986). Article 30 of the SEA additionally specified that members who participate in international organizations to which all EU members are not party (the UN security council, for example) are required to take into account the positions agreed to in EPC.

The Treaty on European Union (TEU) (1992) formally establishes the CFSP as the second pillar of the EU, including security as a formal part of cooperation. Finally, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) calls for the application of the CFSP to all questions of security and clarifies the procedures of the Western Europe Union (WEU).

While incremental, the progress towards a CFSP has been noticeable. With a task as daunting and as threatening to state sovereignty as the placement of defense and security in the hands of a supranational organization, patience is certainly a virtue. Therefore, while progress may accrue at a “snail’s pace,” (Duke 2000, 11) snails reach their destinations with deliberation and caution—not undesirable characteristics when discussing military and security issues.

\(^4\) The timeline is taken from Appendix 9 of Duke 2000, 353. Detailed discussions of these events are included in Duke as well as many of the sources in the bibliography.
Security and Defense—Two Distinct Components?

In his discussion of security in Southeastern Europe, Albrecht Schnabel touches on the fundamental role that security plays in every aspect of life—political and otherwise—and the need to develop mechanisms for dealing with military and non-military security issues (2001, 7). While defense is often seen as critical to the survival of the nation state, security is equally important in that it allows the nation state to thrive. As Schnabel points out, "the achievement of such basic security creates the foundation for further cooperation in political, cultural and economic spheres—cooperation that will in turn advance the chances for lasting security..."

Security in the post Cold War era has taken on a variety of meanings, ranging from threats to physical survival (such as terrorism) to environmental threats and encompassing such diverse themes as migration and human rights. The Cold War overshadowed many of these neo-traditional threats, and they have since re-entered the debates, allowing NATO and the UN to justify a variety of actions in the name of global security. Defense, on the other hand, remains clearly in the hands of the nation state. According to Duke,

The right of self defence is not only a recognized legal right, but the size and qualitative power of the armed forces with which to defend the nation state are often a source of national identity and pride. ... In spite of the fact that none of the EU Member States face a direct military threat, the idea of merging national forces ... remains premature. ... defence integration is coloured by historical suspicions, resentments, and misperceptions that have been held for fifty years or, often, longer. (2000, 5)

Clearly, participation in security arrangements and defense arrangement hold different meanings for the EU member states, particularly the NNAs. While the
NNAs may be willing to participate in Petersburg (peacekeeping) tasks, they are not as willing to associate with other obligations (Duke 2000, 6).

While the distinction between security and defense appears to be academic at first glance, it is of critical importance upon reflection. For example, the Irish interpretation of the CFSP and the acceptance thereof hinges on just such a distinction. Because security is in the realm of the EU and defense in the realm of the WEU, Ireland can accept the former without being obliged to join the latter, leaving Ireland’s neutrality tradition intact (Fanning 1996, 146). Therefore, it is with the caveat that security and defense are two very separate components of a workable CFSP, which may require a novel structural approach to building the CFSP, that I proceed to the discussion of the next concept—neutrality.

Neutrality

What is neutrality? Neutrality as a policy “can variously be either passive or active, ad hoc or de jure. It has managed to change from a rather one-dimensional concept, with a short life and an exclusive concern for security policy, to a permanent status with proactive orientation and, very often, an all embracing remit” (Cox and Mac Ginty 1996, 124). From war avoidance in specific instances to conflict avoidance in all instances, neutrality is predicated on the concept of independence of foreign policy and on territorial sovereignty. However, “the rights and duties associated with the norms of neutrality were based on tacit agreements and systems of mutual expectations. Not only were belligerents expected to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the neutral state, a number of duties were asked of the neutral. Trevor Salmon makes the
point, "that a simple pious declaration is not enough" (Cox and Mac Ginty 1996, 124). Neutral states, however, were not expected to remain defenseless and often maintained sufficient arms to protect their neutrality (125).

Neutrality should be viewed as an elastic concept and is further unique in that its definition depends in large part on perception. In other words, neutrality is in the eye of the beholder. As the international security arena is changed from one of polarizing alliances to a more fluid arrangement, the concept of neutrality will undoubtedly be altered by the course of global politics. For example, give the activist role that Denmark has played in many peacekeeping operations and its recent joining of the "coalition of the willing," either Denmark’s neutral status or the concept itself will have to change.

Given the above discussion of neutrality, who are the real neutrals? Switzerland, Austria, Holland, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Ireland have all adopted neutrality at some point in the twentieth century (Cox and Mac Ginty 1996, 122). Switzerland, Holland, and Norway are not members of the EU, and can thus be excluded from consideration herein. Belgium, as a member of the WEU, cannot be regarded as a neutral in the post-cold war era, leaving Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Ireland as possible cases. Of these five, Denmark is the only member of NATO. Denmark represents a special case in that it has been actively engaged in a security alliance, contributed significantly to various U.N. peacekeeping missions, supported NATO missions with personnel and equipment, all with the support of its political parties and public. However, the Danish public would not approve the Maastricht treaty until the opt-out clause for defense was included (see Petersen 1996 for a study of Danish foreign

5 One such approach that seems potentially viable is the Fourth Pillar plan embraced by Tony Blair, which separates security and defense thus allowing states to opt out of one pillar and still participate in the other.
policy in the post cold war environment). Because of this interesting juxtaposition of activism and guarded neutrality, Denmark makes a useful inclusion in this study.

Sweden, Finland, and Ireland still maintain positions of non-alignment and neutrality, yet actively participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Finland represents a special relationship with the Baltic states, which in turn represent the future of European enlargement. The contrast between Denmark, which has all but abandoned its neutral status, and the remaining EU neutrals should serve as a useful test of the proposition that neutrality makes these states different (both in their actions and in the way in which they are perceived) and that their difference would positively impact both the development and ultimate implementation of a European common foreign policy. Therefore, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Ireland are the cases chosen for evaluation.

The Cases

For each of the cases, I intend to examine several elements relevant to my argument. First, the stated foreign policy priorities of each case will be analyzed and compared among the cases and to the priorities of other EU members. Second, for each case I will elaborate the status of neutrality and discuss it in comparison with the other cases. Part of the task of examining neutrality will involve international perceptions about each case as well as stated positions regarding neutrality ad non-alignment. Then, I will look at past instances of intervention in violent conflicts in order to determine whether the status of neutrality impacts the acceptance of the interventionist actions and the outcome of the conflict.

Finland

Finland's policy of neutrality is derived from the period directly following the Second World War and is outlined in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between itself and the USSR (Slovenia 2003). The treaty forbids each from joining a military alliance against the other and the use of Finish territory to launch attacks on the USSR (Ibid.). Finland's neutrality is not rooted in international law, rather it is a case of enforced neutrality by the USSR (Ibid.)—underscoring the importance of Finland with regards to the EU’s eastward expansion.

Sweden

Sweden still maintains a policy of neutrality, yet is actively engaged in UN peacekeeping efforts around the globe, contributing the first UN mediator to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 1948 (Sweden 2003). Since then, Sweden has ranked “among the countries that have trained and contributed the largest number of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. It has supplied more than 70,000 people to UN operations since 1948, when the first observer mission was established. Since then, 96 Swedish brigadier generals, colonels, lieutenant-colonels etc. have been in charge of 107 UN battalions” (Sweden 2003). Nonetheless, Sweden accepted EU membership based in part on the ambiguity of the CFSP and remains firmly committed to a policy of non-alignment/neutrality.

However, Sweden has made some concessions regarding a CFSP. According to official statements, “Sweden's traditional military non-alignment policy establishes clear limits to its cooperation in the defense field. It supports and would like to participate in the development of joint European peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts” (Sweden
2003). Additionally, Sweden has not taken an immutable stance on the issue of security cooperation. Rather, “Sweden is adapting to the realities of post-Cold War Europe. Closer co-operation with other European states in the field of foreign and security policy is not being ruled out for the future” (Sweden 2003).

**Denmark**

As discussed above, Denmark, as a member of NATO, is not non-aligned. The Danish political elite and the public have also been largely supportive of efforts to enhance security and promote democracy and human rights, and Denmark has contributed troops to NATO efforts. Denmark’s defense policy is self described as “once neutral and cautious; today ... active and outward-looking” (Royal Danish Ministry 2003). Despite this activist foreign policy, Danes are often ranked at the top of the list of the most trustworthy people and often chosen as neutral arbitrators of conflict. In fact, Denmark contributes more per capita manpower to UN peacekeeping operations than any other UN member and is actively participating in almost every current UN peacekeeping mission. As shown in figure 1 below, Denmark is involved in operations within and outside of Europe.

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6 “Danish participation quickly reached a magnitude which...made Denmark the relatively most important contributor to peacekeeping in former Yugoslavia” (Petersen 1996, 181).
Figure 1: Danish Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2002

Despite an active foreign policy agenda, Denmark still maintains a sense of neutrality and reservations about full participation in the EU and its organizations. One example of the potency of Danish hesitancy is the opt-out clause. The opt-out clause allows Denmark to “stay outside the defence policy dimension on condition that she does not interfere in its further development” (Petersen 1996, 190). It was this exception that allowed the second referendum on EU membership to pass in May 1993. Obviously, there is some validity to Danish claims of neutrality—if not non-alignment; but does the international community make the same distinction? I hope to determine how changes in Denmark’s foreign policy have impacted the opinions of other members of the international community. Has Denmark’s active participation in UN operations, in NATO, and in the current alliance with the United States against Iraq affected the perception as the Danes as neutral arbitrators? If there has been any impact, do we see the same degree of change in the other “non-aligned” cases?
Ireland

Irish neutrality is rooted in Ireland’s drive for independence and represents nothing less than the sovereignty of the Republic of Ireland. Irish neutrality during the Second World War is cited as “the outward and visible sign of absolute sovereignty…the mark of independence” (Moynihan 1980, cited in Fanning 1996, 139). However, Ireland has always expressed an international willingness to participate in EU based defense agreements, refusing NATO membership based only on the partitioning by Great Britain (Fanning 1996, 140-2). The international rhetoric of Ireland’s prime ministers has left no doubt as to the willingness of the Irish elite to participate in defense and security. Consider the following statement from Sean Lemass (Prime Minister of Ireland) in 1962 when he declared:

that a military commitment will be an inevitable consequence of our joining the Common Market and ultimately we would be prepared to yield even the technical label of neutrality. We are prepared to go into this integrated Europe without any reservation as to how far this will take us in the field of foreign policy and defence. (Salmon 1989, cited in Fanning 1996, 143)

Irish prime ministers followed the same tact and rarely mentioned neutrality in their speeches (143). However, the elite can be duplicitous and often speak with a “very different voice to domestic audiences” (144). Fanning’s discussions of the nature of Irish politics underscores the usefulness of Putnam’s theory of two-level games (discussed in detail below). Ireland is included in the case studies as a neutral according to its actions and at times, its words.

Is Neutrality Compatible with the Goal of European Integration?

“The accession of three EFTA countries on 1 January 1995 posed a number of issues with regard to NATO, but made little difference to the CFSP since Title V is,
supposedly, not incompatible with neutrality" (Duke 2000, 274). Additionally, if neutrality is based on the premise of non-alignment, then the assumption is that there is a hostile bloc against whom one can align. In the post Cold War era, that assumption can easily be called into question. The functionalist approach would not rule out a shift in the meaning of neutrality that could incorporate a collective defense.

As things stand, however, the NNAs clearly place the responsibility for defense in the nation-state. Consider Table 1 below:

**Table 1: Decision-making Responsibility in the EU**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you think decisions should be made by the national government or jointly within the EU for the following issues?</th>
<th>Defense</th>
<th>Humanitarian Aid</th>
<th>Foreign Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nat.</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Nat.</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany*</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. K.</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU15</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A majority of those surveyed in all of the NNAs clearly place responsibility for defense in the hands of their national governments while at the same time granting leeway to the EU for foreign policy decision making and, for the most part, humanitarian
aid decisions. The three major powers, however, grant far more leeway to the EU in all areas including defense (with the exception of the U.K. on defense). The survey results underscore two important points that are central to the development of the thesis of this paper. First, the NNAs are different and deserving of analysis with regard to the issues of security and defense integration. Second, public opinion in the NNAs will make the enhancement of a CFSP under the current EU structure very difficult, suggesting that the solution to the problem of CFSP acceptance may be structural. At minimum, neutrality will not suffer at the expense of integration when one-third of the EU members consider themselves to be neutral. The development of a CFSP might, however.

Putnam’s Two-level Games

In order to discuss the potential impact that the NNAs may have on foreign policy, European security, and possibly global security, we must first understand the nature of the barriers that these states must overcome because of their status as neutrals. Yet again, these states stand apart from their neighbors in the degree and passion of public opposition to international entanglements, even in the form of regional agreements.

Although the interplay between domestic and international arenas is recognized as having an important impact on policy, often the domestic constituency is seen as irrelevant. When Cox and Mac Ginty state that “In effect, neutrality can be increasingly regarded as an empty, irrelevant policy option” they fail to consider Level II politics. Essentially, neutrality plays an important domestic role regardless of its (perceived) impotence on the international stage. It is precisely the importance of domestic politics
that needs to be considered in an analysis of the future of a CFSP for the EU. Foreign policy has for too long been considered an elite process. As Duke observes:

The French and Danish referenda not only illustrated the extent to which elites were out of touch with their publics, but posed the logical corollary that, having ignored public opinion for so long, elites had little idea of how much policy legitimacy was needed to make further integration publicly acceptable. This observation applies with more force to foreign and security policy since, more than other aspects of integration, it has historically been ‘a private club, operated by diplomats for diplomats, and some of the same ambience has persisted to this day’. (2000, 119)

International relations theory has a long tradition of ignoring domestic politics—a tradition that has regularly been questioned by scholars (see for example Rosenau 1969, Allison 1971, Keohane and Nye 1977, Katzenstein 1976), but not until Putnam’s (1988) parsimonious and elegant treatment did the notion of the interplay between domestic forces and international negotiation gain more widespread acceptance. Essentially, “the two-level approach recognizes that central decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously” (Putnam 1988, 460), which in itself is not groundbreaking. The contribution by Putnam is his detailed explanation of the structure of decision-making games and the interplay between the international and domestic levels (Levels I and II, respectively). Putnam’s discussions of win-sets and their use in negotiations sheds much needed light on what decision makers have known all along—domestic situations are not irrelevant to bargaining in international negotiations.

Putnam recognizes that the literature on European integration that preceded his work was sensitive to the domestic factors affecting negotiation\(^7\), and gives particular credit to Haas for emphasizing the role of interest groups and parties on decision-making (431). It was, Putnam claims, the focus on integration rather than policy making that led

\(^7\) Putnam cites Deutsch 1957 and Haas 1958.
this literature to a premature end. The two-level game framework focuses on the
negotiation process rather than the development of supranational institutions and thus
avoids becoming irrelevant when integration does not proceed at full speed. Putnam’s
framework, therefore, serves as a potentially fruitful lens through which to study the
acceptance (or not) of a CFSP for the EU—particularly for the NNAs whose
representatives face considerable domestic opposition to EU defense. Their acceptance
of and involvement in EU foreign policy is critical to the success of the EU in
international politics.

Conclusions

The involvement of the NNAs in the development and implementation of a
Common Foreign and Security Policy could impact the construction and implementation
of the policy in a positive manner, making the policy less aggressive and more acceptable
to the international community. The NNAs have different priorities, different
international relationships, and are perceived more favorably in the international
community. Therefore, they will enhance the acceptability of actions taken on behalf of
the EU under the guise of a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

It is important to address the future of the CFSP for several reasons. First,
security threats have taken on many new faces since the end of the Cold War, and the
attacks of September 11, 2001, clearly demonstrated the need for a strong EU in the
foreign policy arena. That need became even more apparent with the growing divide
between Europe’s power players (and between the public and the elite in some cases)
over the actions of the United States in Iraq. Until the EU enjoys foreign policy
coherence, Europe cannot realize its full potential in international politics. Second, the
situation in Europe’s “near abroad” is likely to remain a concern for some time. A strong Europe benefits not only Europe, but the U.S. and Russia also. An EU that can respond to crises militarily as well as financially not only ameliorates the burden carried by the U.S., but also enhances the prospect for regionally feasible policies. Finally, the CFSP is the foundation and capstone of European integration. All of the economic and social consequences of unification are a by-product of the quest for security and peace—making the CFSP the foundation for European integration. Solid support for the CFSP would go a long way towards ensuring peace in Europe—making all of the goals of integration possible and making the CFSP the capstone of European integration.
Bibliography and Selected Sources for Further Reading


InternationalReports.net. 2003. “Denmark.”


