Towards a Multilateral Missile Defense Regime

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INTRODUCTION

The National Intelligence Council estimates that within the next 15 years, five potentially-hostile states could have long-range missiles that threaten the United States. Russia and China have long retained this capability. A limited ballistic missile defense cannot seriously challenge these two states' arsenals. The contemporary systems discussed attempt to address the problem the United States faces from Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. These three states have developed or otherwise obtained short- to medium-range missile forces and are seeking long-range missile programs. These states arguably threaten the United States and its European and Asian allies.

But these states could also threaten Russia and even China. The prospect of a common threat lays out the possibility of a common response. A joint missile defense holds out the opportunity of reconciling American and Russian positions on this historical sticking point. A joint defense would allow the United States to defend itself against problem states, accidents, and small-scale unauthorized launches without undermining U.S.-Russian relations. Some scholars have even suggested incorporating China into such an operation to avoid the political repercussions of leaving that nation out.

This paper addresses what various types of joint missile defenses might look like. Once the threat has been agreed to, the critical question in addressing this controversy's political dimension is asking which nations should be involved. This project discusses the rewards afforded by a particular nation's inclusion and the accompanying costs. I do not intend this project to be comprehensive. Rather this paper documents the political prerequisites for a joint missile defense. If a certain joint missile defense option does not make sense politically, then there is little reason to detail such a program's fiscal costs or technical feasibility. Likewise, if certain options are politically desirable, they should be subjected to the further possibility of policy rejection from economic and technological standpoints. The political dimension is the first test a joint defense must pass in order to be considered further.

One can further question if problem states' acquisition of nuclear weapons are problematic for all members of the nuclear club. If an Iranian nuclear program undermines Chinese security, for example, China would not transfer these sensitive technologies to Iran. However, that does not seem to reflect the present reality. This is the question at the heart of this paper. How do various joint missile defense proposals serve an individual state's national interests? This question asks if cooperation is possible and worthwhile.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

Scholars view international politics through various lenses. Realists place the state as a rational unitary actor at the center of international politics. Liberals, by contrast, acknowledge the supremacy of the state's role but also highlight the importance of non-state actors. Liberals place greater emphasis on the role of sub-national groups that align with similar sub-national groups across borders and the international institutions that mitigate the realist-defined self-help anarchic system. There is neither space nor purpose to recreate this debate at any serious length here. However, there is one core difference between realists and liberals worth noting for this paper's purposes: the ability of international institutions to transcend individual national interests.

Prominent realists like Kenneth Waltz contend the international environment is anarchic. Security conscious states seek survival prior to any other goal. States are preoccupied with the possibility that a neighbor may gain disproportionately in any bilateral or multilateral agreement. This allows a potential rival to grow more powerful than the original state. The more powerful
state could later seek to intimidate or influence the former in a direct or indirect affront to its national interests or even survival. For this reason, states seek to provide for their security relative to their neighbors.³

Thermonuclear weapons when used against large population centers or large industrial or military targets are the most destructive, single-use weapons on Earth.⁴ Missiles are the most advanced delivery method for nuclear states. Therefore, realists are skeptical about the ability of a state to cooperate even with its closest allies on mitigating the effectiveness of nuclear-armed missiles, an instrument of high diplomacy. Realists hold the prospect of the United States sharing this technology with Russia or China in even greater suspicion. Missile defense technology is the military’s most sophisticated cutting edge. Realists could easily dismiss the joint option as a matter of policy, because it boosts another potential rival’s capabilities vis-à-vis the United States.

This is a valid criticism of any joint missile defense. If the reader subscribes to this perspective exclusively, subjecting joint missile defense proposals to further scrutiny is not necessary. If states cannot cooperate to secure common interests in general, the specific states described in this paper will not be able to cooperate in this specific function.

Liberal institutionalists provide a contrasting viewpoint on the relative gains problem. Scholars like Robert Keohane argue in part that states enjoy certain common interests. The process of war itself is not in a state’s interest. Aside from very real personal losses, participant states lose productive members of society, financial resources invested in the war, and possibly civilian infrastructure destroyed in the course of the war. With a few exceptions,⁵ states go to war by rationally recognizing a greater reward from victory than the estimated losses of human life and infrastructure. War is undesirable in its process, but national leaders have consistently seen it as worthwhile for some greater objective.

Nuclear war raises the stakes. Political leaders recognize that a nuclear war would virtually guarantee a large number of casualties and destroyed economic potential. This type of war pushes the stakes so high that no state has found any objective thus far great enough to strike another nuclear-armed state with nuclear weapons.⁶ With this common interest of avoiding dangerous nuclear exchanges, it is reasonable to expect that states will cooperate to facilitate their common interest of avoiding such an outcome. Realists do not deny that states share interests, but these two schools of thought differ on how they predict this commonality will bear out.

Liberal institutionalists contend that states seek to maximize their absolute gains. As rational egoists, states are less concerned with how much their neighbor benefits as long as they benefit as well. The mutually beneficial character of the common interest makes defection less likely than the realists predict. Further, institutions can prevent cheating by identifying the defector, retaliating, and guaranteeing a long-term punishment for the cheater. Cooperation is possible and holds out the prospect of great rewards.⁷

To fit within this rubric of acceptable cooperation, joint missile defense proposals must serve each participant’s national interest. Every state has an interest in avoiding nuclear war. This does not necessarily imply, however, that every state has an interest in even a theoretically perfect defense. If it was in every state’s national interest to rid the world of nuclear weapons and institutions could allow states to avoid the cheating problem, no new states would seek to go nuclear and the nuclear club would pursue total disarmament.
PRACTICAL FOUNDATIONS

The argument for a missile defense system in general is commonly reduced to a desire to defend the United States and possibly its allies from "irresponsible states" like Iran, Iraq, North Korea, or any other future enemy of the United States that seeks nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice divides the objectives for missile defenses into three parts. First, the state acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles alarms the Administration. This development constitutes putting a "bad technology in the hands of very bad people." Second, the National Security Adviser highlights the importance of defending American troops and American allies abroad. Third, the Administration wants to safeguard the country from the chance of an accidental launch.

Dr. Rice's discussion oversimplifies missile defense technologies. She does not distinguish between a strategic defense (e.g. a "National" Missile Defense system) and a theater defense against shorter-range missiles. Although they are arguably similar technologies, each defense serves distinct purposes through distinct means. Strategic missiles fly up to 18,000 miles per hour, breach the atmosphere for most of their long journey, and descend upon their targets. Short- to medium-range missiles, by contrast, fly hundreds of miles per hour and follow a distinctly different trajectory. Consequently, the technology researched, designed, and placed in the field to target short- or medium-range missile threats to American allies or troops cannot defend against an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) during most of its flight. Presenting the first two objectives (defending the American homeland and defending American troops and allies abroad) as products of a single missile defense system can misconstrue the reality of the projects.

There is one exception to this distinction — boost-phase defenses. Missile defenses can destroy enemy missiles of any range in the boost phase. All missiles must originate somewhere and accelerate either upwards towards the atmosphere's limit or more directly towards the missile's target. Starting from zero speed, these missiles gradually accelerate, making the boost phase the missile's slowest and most vulnerable stage. An American system that targets any missile being prepared for launch protects the United States, its troops and allies, and any state that could possibly be the target of that missile. This commonality of interests is where joint missile defenses face its greatest challenge and greatest opportunity.

The American landmass is large and there are many potential targets for an adversarial regime's ballistic missiles, ranging from major population centers and military targets to expensive infrastructure projects. Compared to all possible launch points covering the planet, the United States is rather small. In theory a hostile state like Iraq could build its missile force on a Caribbean island, for example, to avoid any boost-phase missile defense targeted against the Iraqi homeland. A boost-phase defense would therefore need to span the entire globe. One might thus conclude that building a defense around the United States would be more effective.

Fortunately, there are only a few states hostile the United States that are both willing and able to develop a nuclear capacity and missile delivery mechanism over the next 15 years. Policymakers can expect these states to limit their missile build-ups to their sovereign territory. First, a state with limited power like Iraq could not control its missile force in a foreign country far from its own territory. Such a move would require substantial infrastructure developments and military protection that could hardly go unnoticed by the receiving state or the international community as a whole.
Second, new nuclear states have limited nuclear material and missile technology. They would not take such a senseless risk of losing this technology by transferring it to a place far outside the state's control.

Third, missiles serve a legitimate deterrent function if they reside firmly within a state’s control. If they reside within the country's territory, they increase the credibility of use if the country is invaded and national survival is at stake. If the United States was about to overrun Iraq, for example, it is credible to expect Saddam Hussein or his military subordinates to utilize every weapon at their disposal. This use could provide immediate self-preservation, or it could be used as a last revenge against a hated enemy. Saddam or his field officers could use nuclear weapons in this scenario against invading troops or population centers in the United States, Europe, or Israel.

Finally, if a problem state exports its nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes, the problem state would not export the weapon to an unknown global location to fire the missile. The state would instead export the nuclear device directly to the final target (i.e., American cities). A missile defense could do nothing to counter this threat.

Limiting the area under a boost-phase defense must target to extremely hostile states limits the coverage required from a defense. Further limiting the boost-phase targets to states that are credibly developing nuclear technology and their means of delivery makes the prospect of a boost-phase defense much more plausible. Presently, the list of states that meet both of these criteria is limited to three: Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Compared to a launch point from anywhere on Earth, these landmasses are very small. However, it is still a daunting prospect to target every square mile of these three states (1.37 million square miles in total). This is the great challenge.

The great opportunity lays in the knowledge that a boost-phase defense serves the security interest of every potential target nation. A boost-phase defense is thus a public good and every state targeted has an incentive to cooperate. Those more at risk from missile attack such as Israel or Japan have a greater incentive to cooperate and contribute to a joint missile defense. Likewise, those with greater economic and technological resources like the United States will be expected to contribute more as well.

Making a missile defense system a multilateral development could also restrict such American initiatives. The Russians at times have supported Iraq and objected to American policy in the Middle East. The Chinese have undermined the American-led containment of Iran. The South Koreans have taken exception to President Bush’s hard rhetoric towards North Korea. And, of course, a large portion of the world, including our largest and most powerful NATO allies, have taken great exception to American policy towards removing Iraq’s dictator.

Depending on the technical make-up and the nations involved in a joint defense, the American freedom of action could still be limited with a multilateral missile defense system in place if it is subject to an allied veto.

**PROBLEM STATE THREATS**

President George W. Bush announced in his 29 January 2002 State of the Union address that the “Axis of evil [is] aiming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger…. Missile defense protects America and our allies from sudden attack.” Placing important linguistic objections aside, one can discern three arguments within the President’s statement. First, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are seeking weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Second, these
developments are dangerous and threaten the United States and its allies. Third, a missile defense
can mitigate these threats. The rest of this paper analyzes these three arguments in turn.

**MISSILE CAPABILITIES**

By 2005 Iran and North Korea are expected to have an intercontinental-range ballistic
missile capability. While Iraq was expected to have developed such a capacity by 2010, although
the present military campaign has likely delayed if not eliminated this risk.  
Some argue that
North Korea's *Taepo Dong 1* missile can reach the United States already.  
Worst case estimates
claim the *Taepo Dong 1* missile already can hit the multi-billion dollar American oil fields at
Prudhoe Bay, Alaska.  
India, Pakistan, and Israel currently possess medium-range missiles that
can strike targets up to 5,000 kilometers away. The Defense Department expects these nations to
acquire long-range missiles by 2015. The later three nations for the most part have remained out
of the missile defense literature, since the Iran, Iraq, and North Korea are more likely to have a
motive to attack the United States.

North Korea could conceivably convert its *Taepo Dong 1* space launch vehicle (SLV)
into an ICBM that could carry a lighter payload like a biological or chemical weapon. North
Korea could also place an early generation nuclear warhead on the *Taepo Dong 2* missile to hit
the United States in the future.  
Iran has allegedly received assistance from Russia, making Iran
closer to achieving an intercontinental capability. Iraq has sought a long-range nuclear program
seemingly to threaten the United States. However, it still depends on foreign assistance and
surviving a coalition invasion.

The 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report changed the prominent government means of
predicting missile developments of states seeking a nuclear force. The Commission advocated a
shift from focusing on a state’s indigenous capability to develop nuclear warheads and missiles
to including the probability of nuclear and missile technology transfers.  
Although overcoming
the scientific hurdles by themselves might take problem states many years, the report argued that
states like China sold and could continue to sell sensitive technologies to one or more of these
states. This foreign assistance allowed the problem states to start surmounting difficulties with
guidance systems, high-powered rocket engines, and warheads much faster than previously
predicted.  
Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs,
testified before Congress that both Russia and China were even willing to sell countermeasures
to these budding nuclear states if the United States went forward with a unilateral missile defense
system.

Technological cooperation is not limited to technology transfers between present nuclear
states and these developing nuclear states. Kenneth Timmerman, President of the Middle East
Data Project focusing on Iran, notes that North Korea may be cooperating with Iran to advance
their missile programs. An Iranian delegation allegedly flew a plane load of advanced telemetry
equipment to North Korea shortly after North Korea’s 31 August 1999 missile test. Timmerman
concludes that Iran must have been collecting information with North Korean aid from the *Taepo
Dong 1* test.

Timmerman collected his evidence from an anonymous “top-secret intelligence source,”
making validating this claim impossible. However, the prospect for cooperation between North
Korea and one of the other two problem states exists. North Korea has already sold short-range
missile technology to other Middle Eastern states like Yemen. By contrast, cooperation between
Iran and Iraq is unlikely considering each nation’s missile program is primarily aimed at the
other and only secondarily at the United States and its allies.
The road to an intercontinental capability is long and hard. Nevertheless, the best the United States and its allies can do is to make the road longer and harder by seeking to deny these states the materials and technical assistance necessary to develop nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Even the CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin believes these states will eventually overcome these obstacles. 24 Both Saddam Hussein and Kim Jung Il have demonstrated their ability to stay in power over a long period of time and progress towards their desired missile capability. It is very possible that these states will overcome the temporary hurdles the American government and its allies have put in place to obstruct their missile developments.

Some missile defense advocates fear that the United States cannot adequately predict the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Senator Warner of the Armed Forces Committee concludes that the United States must err on the side of caution to preserve security when the threats are nuclear. Warner argues the “quick and secret” Pakistani nuclear development provides empirical support for his concern that the United States cannot accurately forecast each new nuclear state. 25

Intelligence is always a difficult business. On nuclear and missile developments, however, Senator Warner should be less skeptical. States want to test their missiles and warheads at least to insure effectiveness if not safety as well. Modern tracking devices and radiation detection instruments make these tests difficult to hide. Even closed societies like North Korea and Iraq have not been able to hide successfully their pursuit of nuclear warheads and missiles. The international community may have difficulty determining if a state has actually achieved nuclear status, but a state’s long road toward joining the nuclear club has not yet been a surprise. To cite Senator Warner’s example, it is difficult to understand how Pakistan’s highly publicized 20-year road toward a basic nuclear capacity could be viewed as either quick or secret.

It is important to remember that threats change in both directions. Libya is an example of a perceived threat that has resided. In 1986 Libya fired two Soviet built Scud-B missiles at American military installations on the Italian island of Lampedusa after an American air raid. In 1991, W. Seth Carns predicted Libya would threaten Israel, Greece, Turkey, and Italy within ten years, yet this threat has not seriously materialized. Although anonymous intelligence sources make bold comments about Libya’s threat, this country has virtually left the National Intelligence Estimate’s immediate radar screen. Just as the current problem states now overshadow Libya in Washington’s threat assessments, these threats may also subside.

**POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS**

Those favoring a missile shield attempt to prove ballistic missile threats exist or will exist in the near future. Without this threat, there is no reason to build a system to defend against a limited ballistic missile attack. Stephen Young, Deputy Director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, argues these threats do not exist and are unlikely to emerge. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Brazil and Argentina attempted to obtain nuclear weapons. Effective international diplomacy and democratic transitions persuaded the new regimes instead to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). On the continued request of its neighbors, including the United States, both nations determined it was not in their interest to nuclearize their conflict. 26

South Korea and Taiwan do not rely on nuclear weapons for their security, despite their long stand-offs against enemies with quantitatively larger armed forces. Both of these nations enjoy American security guarantees, which can provide another incentive against developing nuclear weapons. Nations like Japan also have the ability to develop nuclear weapons, but they instead decide to rely on the American nuclear umbrella. Although Iran and Iraq are unlikely to
accept American military guarantees in the near future, this may calm fears over the unknown stand-offs. Greece and Turkey are unlikely to develop their own nuclear arsenals, for example, because of the diplomatic cost of alienating their allies.

Problem states must overcome several political and economic hurdles to develop a missile program. Economically, the United States and the United Nations retain economic sanctions on North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. Although the American Congress and the UN have started to thaw some of these sanctions, all three economies remain damaged. Developing a nuclear program could easily result in stiffening international economic sanctions or bringing other political sticks to bear.\(^{29}\)

Politically, developing a missile program does not make much sense for a smaller nation. Although the expensive projects might absolutely exhaust these economies, using nuclear weapons against the United States would mark national suicide. Early-warning satellites can easily pinpoint the origin of ballistic missiles. Even one crude nuclear weapon could inflict catastrophic damage on the United States, but American retaliation would wipe out the regime that the nuclear weapon originated from.

Seventy-seven percent of 684,796 Americans polled said they supported bombing civilian targets in Afghanistan to respond to the September 11 terrorist attacks.\(^{30}\) It is unlikely that a majority of Americans would strenuously object to a large-scale response to a nuclear attack on the United States. A modified form of Cold War deterrence continues to provide security from a state's ballistic missile attack.\(^{31}\)

Considering the difficulty and expense of deploying ballistic missiles and the relative ease of developing other forms of nuclear weapons, one must wonder why ballistic missiles threats get so much attention in the United States over other means of WMD delivery. Rather than risk missile malfunctions in the launch stage, missing their intercontinental target, and assuring a large-scale retaliation, problem states could simply place a nuclear weapon on a ship in an American harbor, smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States, or utilize a host of other means. In an increasingly globalized world, national borders have become ever more porous. Arms and drugs flood into the United States. Problem states could smuggle a crude weapon into the United States with greater confidence than launching a missile from the Middle East or Northeast Asia.

Missile defense advocates reply that ballistic missiles provide international prestige. Nations develop ballistic missiles to increase their ability to influence the great powers. Ballistic missiles make these nations real threats and therefore missiles make them international players. A working missile shield can help remove some of these emerging threats from pursuing future nuclear blackmail strategies and decreases the possibility of new and unwanted international players.

**MISSILE MOTIVES**

Weapons capabilities are not necessarily threatening or illegitimate. The United States has by far the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, yet the American government views its own force as neither offensive nor illegitimate. Missile defense advocates generally find the missile capabilities of rogue regimes particularly disturbing. These "evil" regimes must be arming to threaten the United States and its allies. This perspective claims they are irresponsible and dangerous in a way established governments are not. Kim Jung Il starves his people to pay for his military machine; Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against his own citizens; and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini held innocent Americans hostage for 444 days, while dubbing the
United States the "Great Satan." These "evil" leaders have no respect for human life and would not be inhibited from striking at their hated American adversary if they could.

Proliferation optimists argue the opposite extreme. They contend that deterrence is robust, and these regimes can benefit from acquiring nuclear weapons. Kenneth Waltz posits that these states may be ruthless but they are not reckless. They have survived for many years, indicating their rational decision-making. Self-preservation remains each of these leaders' fundamental objectives. Offensively lashing out against the United States or one of its allies with a nuclear missile seriously jeopardizes the future of that leader's regime. Consequently, these leaders will only authorize a nuclear launch in response to direct aggression that threatens national survival. They use these weapons as instruments of deterrence to dissuade foreign powers like the United States from intervening in their domestic affairs.

This logic lends itself to two conclusions. First, problem states will not use nuclear missiles offensively against the United States or its allies. Second, if problem states wish to simply wreak havoc on its enemies, it will pick an alternative means that avoids detection. This allows the offending problem state to kill indiscriminately while weakening the evidence linking this act to its own regime.

Thomas Schelling argues that the very nature of nuclear weapons lend themselves to be used as negative instruments; that is, instruments of deterrence, rather than as positive weapons of compellence. He contends that even the Cold War superpowers found it more difficult to make clear, offensive demands with nuclear diplomacy. The threat that an offending state will launch a nuclear strike to move forward into new territory lacks credibility and is difficult to communicate. By contrast, a state can much more easily lay a diplomatic tripwire to guarantee a nuclear response to enemy advances. It can effectively communicate and credibly enforce this threat. A state clearly expresses its preference for war in trying to block, or deter, war. This clarity is not found in new offensive demands. The expectation for a nuclear defense among those with nuclear capabilities creates a stability of expectations and deters conflict in the first place by raising the stakes to unacceptable levels.

Bipolarity allows nations to pay close attention to their primary competitor. No adversarial diplomacy could practically hope to be dealt with more carefully over a sustained period of time than the Cold War superpower nuclear diplomacy. If any state could understand its enemy's offensive nuclear threats, one would find it within this relationship. However, neither of the superpowers ever could effectively communicate these ideas to the other. Nuclear diplomacy rests on calculated threats and perceived risks. Neither superpower could ever convey these threats or inject in their enemy a perception of heightened risk linked to positive action. Neither superpower could compel the other to do something (i.e. move troops back, sell goods at more favorable prices, etc.) rather than simply not doing something like invading another country.

If the superpowers could not link positive diplomatic initiatives to nuclear threats, it is unlikely that a state of clear nuclear and conventional inferiority with fewer diplomatic contacts could effectively convey compellent nuclear threats. Kim Jung II, for example, could not credibly hint at linking a possible North Korean first strike to an American military withdrawal from the Korean peninsula. Kim as a rational actor would be deterred from going nuclear first, knowing that any missile attack would be traced back to his regime. The overwhelming American conventional and nuclear superiority credibly threaten his regime's very survival. Where deterrence is clear and credible, compellence is vague and difficult to execute.
Schelling bears out this distinction: "This is why deterrent threats are often so credible. They do not need to depend on a willingness to commit anything like suicide in face of a challenge. A response that carries some risk of war can be plausible, even reasonable, at a time when a final, ultimate decision to have a general war would be implausible or unreasonable. A country can threaten to stumble into a war even if it cannot credibly threaten to invite one."\textsuperscript{36}

All nuclear states are not equal. Acquiring nuclear weapons and their means of delivery significantly increases the power of states like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Nevertheless, they will remain distinctly inferior to the major nuclear powers in terms of military prowess and diplomatic leverage. Any military action is a process of bargaining.\textsuperscript{37} As a war progresses, all nations spend a higher cost in treasure and blood. But it is not so much the memory of those fallen as the expectation of more to fall that makes rational actors seek victory through military means or to seek peace through any means. "It is the expectation of more violence that gets the wanted behavior, if the power to hurt can get it at all."\textsuperscript{38} Even the bombing of Hiroshima – a day of arguably unprecedented pain – did not convince the Japanese to surrender. It was the expectation of dropping more atomic weapons on Japan that convinced the Emperor to surrender. Nuclear weapons simply compress a long process of hurt and bargaining into a short period of time.\textsuperscript{39}

New nuclear powers with limited capabilities do not have the same ability to strike the United States and continue to press for their demands. None of these regimes have the power necessary to strike the United States, weather the storm of a fierce retaliation, and survive to continue to champion their initial cause. An offensive first strike is an extremely difficult step to make that no actor could pick rationally. It is highly unlikely any regime would attempt such a strike from the position of extreme nuclear and conventional inferiority.

Furthermore, if an adversarial state wants to strike at the United States to kill a hated enemy, that state would use a means other than a missile. Early warning data can conclusively pinpoint the origin of the missile, inviting a response as noted above. It also gives the United States and its citizens the satisfaction of knowing exactly who the perpetrator was in order to direct its retaliation. Smuggling a nuclear device into the United States and detonating it provides a much more reliable, less expensive, and more painful means to inflict mass death, destruction, and fear upon one’s enemy. The National Intelligence Council concedes that the "reliability of delivery would be a critical factor; covert delivery methods could offer reliability advantages over a missile. Not only would a country want the warhead to reach its target, it would want to avoid an accident with a WMD warhead at the missile-launch area."\textsuperscript{40} An offending state would also want the American public guessing and second-guessing who really committed this awful crime. This denies victims closure, confidence in its retaliation, and possibly even allied support for military campaigns. If the aggressor has no political agenda beyond exporting hatred, it has no incentive to claim responsibility.

Smuggling is not a state’s only option for building an effective first strike delivery capability. A state could also utilize much cheaper cruise missiles fired from shorter ranges such as from off-shore ships. Ballistic missiles are a multi-billion dollar investment. 400 Condor missiles cost $3.2 billion plus an additional $1 billion of development costs. Cruise missiles are an easier technology to master, cheaper to develop and produce, and even provide benefits for small aircraft technology.\textsuperscript{41} If a state just wants to kill or intimidate Americans, that state would not need a ballistic missile capacity.

Despite recognizing these alternative threats, the National Intelligence Estimate argues that alternative means of delivery that avoid a missile defense’s reach, “do not provide the same
prestige and degree of deterrence or coercive diplomacy associated with long-range missiles.\textsuperscript{42} Deterring foreign attack does not offensively threaten American interests. Indeed, it is a stabilizing function, attempting to perpetuate present territorial positions. The National Intelligence Estimate does not explain how one of these problem states might use nuclear weapons to coerce, or compel, the United States or its allies into submission on any range of issues. Nuclear weapons are not effective instruments of compellence.

CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin sets forth the basic rationale for the government’s position. “But here is a key point: the U.S. Intelligence Community does not have the luxury of viewing these two threats – ballistic missiles vs. other means of delivery – as an either/or proposition. They must each be monitored, deterred, and defended against through different mechanisms, for the reality is that they both exist.”\textsuperscript{43} However, if these threats were genuinely offensive, one could not justify large expenditures on missile defense technology and the accompanying diplomatic difficulties without at least presenting a feasible means to counter threats posed by America’s porous borders. Otherwise, the United States and its potential partners risk building an expensive, technologically impressive, and ultimately worthless system.

A more sophisticated view of this threat perception argues that these problem states do not necessarily want to strike the United States out of vengeance. Rather these states seek this missile capability to undermine American options in the region. The United States would find it more difficult to threaten to use “overwhelming force” against a country that holds nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{44} The North Korean nuclear status (as well as its significant conventional forces in artillery range of Seoul) gives Kim diplomatic leverage. In his nuclear brinkmanship with the United States, he knows that military first strikes against his country are not a reasonable course of action for the Americans or South Koreans. Put simply, the threat posed by the problem states’ missiles would surmount any “less-than-vital” American or allied interest in such a military operation.\textsuperscript{45} As McLaughlin notes, the mere possibility of nuclear use would “complicate American decision-making in a crisis, and could – as a form of blackmail – prevent us from coming to the aid of our friends and allies.”\textsuperscript{46}

The American military dominates the skies. American air power, equipped with precision guided munitions can destroy much of an adversary’s heavy artillery. While terrain can mitigate the effectiveness of such campaigns, this advantage lends the Americans a way to defeat their enemy with an extremely disproportionate number of casualties. Nevertheless, the military position of the North Koreans makes the risk of an American first strike high and its probability low. North Korean nuclear acquisition and its continued nuclear production makes enemy first strikes even more difficult.

Consequently, nuclear states like North Korea wield even more power in their regions. North Korea might seek to intimidate South Korea or Japan in times of crisis. Iraq may have developed a bolder foreign policy in the Middle East if allowed to develop a nuclear capacity. Armed with nuclear weapons, Saddam may feel the United States would not organize another coalition against his next round of aggression. Missile developments can undermine American power projection capabilities by negating the effectiveness of its conventional forces.

Missile capabilities also provide a political and psychological threat. The Defense Department warns that, “Not only were they [problem states’ missiles] a direct threat to U.S. forces and interests overseas, they also gave their owners significant potential psychological and political leverage. With a few Scud missiles, Saddam Hussein was able to threaten the integrity of the allied coalition and to preoccupy thousands of allied ground, sea, and air troops, even to this day.”\textsuperscript{47} If an adversary holds missiles capable of reaching the United States, risk-averse
American policymakers and citizens may be less supportive of responding to real regional threats. They will be afraid of an unlikely but unimaginable homeland threat. Fear is a strong weapon for a small state to wield over a global power. Even an imperfect missile defense might allow leaders to assuage this fear and thereby gain political support to protect the greater risk to American regional interests. There is value in even a false security blanket if there really is no monster in the closet.

Problem states are more likely to suffer a deterrence failure than a more sophisticated adversary like Russia or China. First, problem states may have a more sensitive trigger finger in times of crisis than adversarial regimes with a larger nuclear stockpile. These regimes are more susceptible to a disarming first strike. 48 Israel destroyed Iraq's budding nuclear capacity in 1981. 49 The United States tried to destroy Iraqi nuclear development sites during the Gulf War. 50 These small regimes could credibly fear that the United States may try to eradicate its nuclear capacity in a time of crisis. Further, these regimes may see such action as a precursor to military operations intended to destroy the regime entirely.

Second, these regimes think the United States wants to destroy them absolutely. Faced with eminent total war, these regimes may resort to striking first. Militaries gain the upper hand by striking first. Catching one's opponent off-guard and on the ground allows the aggressor to destroy military equipment before it can be fortified and used against the aggressor. This lesson has been learned nowhere better than in the Middle East, where the various Arab-Israeli wars gave significant initial advantage to the state that struck first. A desperate small state which sees national survival as inevitably lost may not be restricted by rational deterrence calculations. This raises the risk of nuclear first strike against American troops and allies. 51

Third, problem states could easily reason that the United States would not respond to a chemical or biological attack with nuclear weapons. Considering its vast conventional superiority and the difficulty of breaking the nuclear taboo, problem states may reason that utilizing Weapons of Mass Destruction may enhance their security. This allows them to escalate violence and utilize chemically- and biologically-armed ballistic missiles against American and allied troops and population centers. 52

It is politically advantageous to claim evil regimes threaten American security with the world's most deadly weapons. Taken as a thirty-second campaign commercial, it is difficult to object to defending the country in this way. Baker Spring, an outspoken missile defense advocate at the Heritage Foundation, simply criticizes denying the United States a certain military protection: "Long-range ballistic missiles are the only category of weapons the U.S. has chosen not to defend itself against." 53 Any reader of this paper should not be deceived by this simple claim. The acquisition of nuclear warheads and their means of delivery by adversarial states does not directly and credibly threaten the American homeland. However, it does confine American freedom of action abroad. This capability limits the president's ability to use "overwhelming force" against one of these states. It lessens the ability of the American government to intimidate or threaten foreign powers. It forces replacing generals with diplomats. A missile defense system seeks to preserve a greater role for the military in American coercive diplomacy.

**TERRORIST MISSILE THREATS**

Terrorists threaten American troops, allies, and citizens. They can inflict massive damage and pain and effectively hide from retaliation. Even the world's most ruthless regimes cannot think of overtly attacking the United States and avoiding retaliation. This ability to avoid retaliation makes terrorists especially dangerous and difficult to deter.
On June 25, 1996 terrorists believed to be linked to Osama bin Laden bombed the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 and injuring hundreds of American servicemen.\textsuperscript{54} Terrorists have struck at Israeli citizens throughout the state’s existence. On September 11, 2001, terrorists carried out the most egregious external assault on the American homeland in the country’s history. There should be no doubt that terrorists credibly threaten American troops, allies, and even the homeland. In short, terrorists threaten national security.

Terrorists may even be able to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction. They may try to develop and utilize chemical, biological, radiological, or even nuclear devices against the United States. Former Defense Secretary William Cohen notes, “Nuclear or biological weapons in the hands of terrorists or rogue states constitute the greatest single danger to American security — indeed, world security—and a threat that is becoming increasingly less remote.”\textsuperscript{55}

Although terrorists may be extremely dangerous and threaten national security, they do not pose a missile threat to the United States. President Bush claimed that the “case [is] stronger today [for a missile defense] than on September 10.”\textsuperscript{56} This argument is politically useful but without real merit. Terrorism necessitates a coherent, national response, but a missile defense of any type does not address this threat.

Missiles provide territory-controlling state actors a means to deter invasion. Missiles are a fast and efficient means for a state to guarantee a devastating return blow for aggression that threatens a regime’s survival. Any group that wants to first-strike an open society like the United States does not need this sophisticated technology. Dedicated terrorists can detonate a nuclear device at the target, providing a more reliable delivery vehicle than a crude ballistic missile. Ballistic missiles are difficult and expensive to procure and deploy. It is unlikely that a terrorist group could (and highly unlikely that a terrorist group would) attempt to develop a missile capability.

Terrorists lack the financial resources necessary to construct a ballistic missile. High estimates of Osama bin Laden’s personal wealth place the world’s most famous terrorist’s personal wealth at $300 million. Adding in even significant alternative funding means still would fall far short of the billions required to build an ICBM. Even short-range ballistic missiles fall outside the realistic budget outlays of even the most well-financed terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{57}

Assuming terrorists could raise enough money to acquire a short-range ballistic missile, they are unlikely to make this investment. The risk of being discovered and losing this massive investment far outweighs any perceived return on this investment. Terrorists recognize they can inflict more pain, destruction, and fear by spending their resources on more firepower rather than more sophisticated delivery methods. The September 11\textsuperscript{th} hijackers used box cutters and routine civilian flights to grab the world’s attention. Terrorists do not seek impressive means; they seek destructive displays.

Terrorists also do not control territory as states do. It would be exceedingly difficult for any sub-national group to build, test, and launch a ballistic missile without the state finding out. If a state sanctions these terrorist missile activities, then that state falls under the logic drawn out previously. If a state does not sanction the terrorists’ missile development, then the state will expose the project. Domestic or international pressure and actions can destroy the missile project well before it becomes a real threat.

Policymakers must make difficult decisions on policy trade-offs everyday. The National Intelligence Estimate must assess various national security threats in relation to other threats to distribute financial, military, and intellectual resources within a limited budget. The threat posed
to the United States, its troops, and its allies by terrorists' ballistic missiles is so remote that it does not justify missile defense expenditures.

RUSSIA

Russian objections have led many missile defense analysts to conclude that the United States should not build a unilateral system. They fear the Russian reaction could significantly undermine the original purpose of the technology. President Clinton's Defense Secretary William Perry argued, "Any actions that the United States takes to stop the spread of weapons can easily be nullified if Russia, for example, decides to sell its technology, weapons, or fissile material." Russia "may be at some point torn between their security interests and the need to earn hard currency." The United States must carefully recognize Russian interests and arguments in evaluating any serious missile defense technology.

Russian President Vladimir Putin supports building a missile defense system with the United States. Including Russia in a multilateral missile defense regime avoids the diplomatic fallout from the world's second largest nuclear state. It also adds a significant opportunity to build a more comprehensive intercept capability. With Russian support the objectives of the system must rise as well. The Russians have little interest in protecting the American homeland from problem states' missiles. A joint missile defense would need to protect the United States, Russia, and each of their respective allies and troops in the field. It would require sharing sensitive data and technology in a bold show of cooperation. An issue that created such discord during the Cold War and beyond could become one of the greatest long-standing cooperative frameworks between the former superpowers.

In February 2001 Putin proposed building a joint missile defense with NATO. Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton also exchanged political rhetoric on the possibility of a joint defense, but neither state seriously discussed the possibility of a joint defense against strategic missiles. Since Putin's suggestion, however, the prospect for a joint defense has gained popularity in Russia. The country still needs hard currency. A joint defense lays out the possibility of lucrative orders for Russian military contractors. Vladimir Lukin, former Russian Ambassador to the United States noted, "If they [the Americans] build it [a missile defense] alone and without us, that would be bad. If they build it together with Europe, us, and China, this would not be bad at all, as long as we agree on common parameters." The Russians are willing to cooperate if the Americans help pay Russian contractors to facilitate the construction of the mutual defense. The unresolved question in this vague proposal is whether the Russians are willing to seriously contribute to a joint defense operation, including donating their present technology or investing their own resources into a joint operation.

President Bush apparently saw some real prospect in the Russian proposal. On May 2, 2001 Bush promised to consult Russia before moving forward on a missile defense system. More importantly, he stopped using "national" before "missile defense," holding out the possibility of a joint defense. He noted that "perhaps one day we can even cooperate in a joint [missile] defense program" with Russia. President Clinton's Defense Secretary William Cohen replied to an earlier Russian suggestion of a joint missile defense by wisely noting the devil is always in the details. The rest of this section bear out what those details might entail.

PROBLEM STATES – THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

Putin agrees Iran, Iraq, and North Korea present some sort of missile threat. Although his position has fluctuated, Cohen noted, "There has been a significant change in the attitude or understanding on the part of the Russians. Just a few weeks ago, their official position was that there was no threat, that it was largely being exaggerated... [The] Russian president now
believes there is a threat, and he has proposed an alternative to a NMD program of the United States). The Russians agree there is a threat but disagree about where the threat is aimed. Putin holds that these states pose a medium-range threat, while the Americans fear they are seeking a long-range strike capability. This difference of perception is rooted in each state’s bias. The United States is more concerned with its homeland, finding threats to North America more disturbing than threats to Russia. Likewise, the Russians see threats directed at them more disconcerting and find the more geographically removed Americans as a less threatened target.

The Russians have good reason to suspect the problem states may target their country. First, Russia is geographically closer to the countries in question. Where the problem states could not reliably strike American cities, they could more easily launch against Russian population centers. North Korea could threaten Vladivostok with its 700,000 Russians and critical Asian port. Vladivostok is less than 400 miles from North Korea, while Prudhoe Bay, Alaska is 3,600 miles away, Hawaii is 4,500 miles, and major population centers on the West coast are almost 6,000 miles from North Korea. Iran or Iraq could threaten the Russian oil port at Novorossiysk or even Moscow itself. Moscow is only 1,300 miles from northern Iran and 1,600 miles from northern Iraq. Novorossiysk is even closer. Washington, DC is over 6,000 miles away from both states.

The closer Russian targets are significantly easier to strike. Developing a long-range capacity is not simply an issue of building more powerful rocket engines. The problem states face significant technical hurdles in launching missiles into space that descend upon North American population centers on the other side of the globe. The Russians reasonably conclude these states are more likely to target Russian population and economic centers.

Further, the Russians suffer from a historical preoccupation with defense. Washington, DC has not been invaded by a state’s military force since the War of 1812. Three major military campaigns in the last century and a half, by contrast, have approached or captured Moscow. The last invasion of Russia took twenty seven million Russian military and civilian lives. Americans cannot relate to a loss of this magnitude in the way Russians can. Understandably, the Russians are preoccupied with defending their nation. These experiences have been written into their national consciousness and policymakers must defend carefully the nation’s security.

This preoccupation with defense led the Soviets to deploy the world’s first anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow. The Soviet Galosh system still operates around Moscow today. The Russians genuinely fear these problem states may threaten their cities’ security. A democratic state is further vulnerable to low-risk threats on major population centers. With a nuclear missile capability, these states can threaten Russian cities without first fighting through Russian territory. Democratic leaders in Russia’s young democracy cannot accept such risks easily. In democratic societies, war ceases to be an clash between governments and becomes a more casualty-sensitive conflict between nations. Making the people hurt no longer is senseless. It has direct political consequences. Missiles threaten Russia as they threaten the United States.

Nevertheless, these diverging threat viewpoints complement one another and actually facilitate a joint missile defense. The United States has an interest in protecting its homeland; Russia has the same interest in protecting its homeland. If both countries think that a missile launched from Iran, Iraq, or North Korea is headed towards its own country, then both will have an immediate interest in not allowing that missile to fly. Both nations will want to shoot down the missile in the boost phase before it flies towards either country. Both states have a common
interest in preventing problem states from acquiring nuclear technology and their means of
delivery as well as defending against this threat to preserve their freedom of action in the Middle
East and Northeast Asia.

**Cooperative Opportunities**

Common interests hold out the possibility of cooperation. However, the specific problem
of how these states could go forward with cooperative efforts still remains. The two states could
use the International Space Station as a useful precedent.70 The United States, Russia, and
fourteen other states combined their individual technology, resources, and experiences into a
cooperative venture that aids each of the participants' interests.71 In theory, a joint missile
defense system could likewise combine Russian and American technology and experiences to
mitigate a common threat. The Americans might expect the Russians to pay part of the bill. As
virtually all peacetime alliances demonstrate, one can expect exact budget figures to be a source
of disagreement between the states.

Such cooperation also allows Putin the political cover necessary to dismantle Russia's
aging nuclear arsenal. Putin can credibly argue that the missile defense protects Russian security
interests while a smaller nuclear arsenal still protects the Russian position on the world stage.72

Specifically, Russian technology adds to an American missile defense effort. Edward
Luttwak, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, cites the need for
launch point intercepts by a space-based system. The Russians can contribute to this type of
system. "The Russians maintain a significant capability in terms of boosters and basic tools of a
space-based system that would fit technically within a cooperative framework."73 The United
States could buy Russian S-300 Zenith surface-to-air missiles, or Russia could deploy this
technology as its contribution to the collective defense. These missiles could conceivably help
protect both Russia and America's European allies.74

Russia has previously distributed this technology to former Soviet states and NATO
members alike. In 1999 Russia sold the interceptors to Armenia and Greece to guard against
hostile long-range aircraft threats.75 Of course, aircraft is significantly easier to intercept than
much faster and smaller ballistic missiles.76 As an intercontinental defense, the S-300 would be
almost completely ineffective. As a theater defense, however, the technology may be able to be
modified to challenge short- to medium-range ballistic missiles that fly lower trajectories at
slower speeds.

This Russian technology could help defend American troops and allies abroad. The
United States could cooperate with Russia, the Europeans, and Israel on a joint theater defense to
negate the Iranian and Iraqi threats. The Americans, Russians, South Koreans, and Japanese
could form a missile defense regime to challenge North Korean missile threats. More partners in
a missile defense complicate interests and deployments. This problem is discussed later in the
paper. The important point to notice is the centrality of Russia in any missile defense scheme.
They have the technology and motive to effectively cooperate in a joint missile defense with the
United States and its allies.

The United States could also help Russia rebuild its air defense radars, share early
warning data, and continue joint theater missile defense exercises.77 Russia is not starting from
scratch. It enjoys the human and technical expertise necessary to engage productively in missile
defense developments. The country lacks the necessary financial resources to combine these
elements into a mutually advantageous defense. American cooperation can help overcome this
hurdle to both nations' security benefit.
The United States has the upper hand in any joint missile defense discussion. The Americans have more financial resources, power, and technical capabilities. Russian help would add to a distinctively American system; Russian aid would not dominate a joint missile defense. In the process of bargaining contribution and force structures, the United States may seek to impose related demands on the Russians.

Unofficially, the Americans have already conditioned missile defense cooperation with Russia on Moscow's halting its support for Iraq and selling advanced weaponry to Syria and Libya. The Russians quietly contend this is a stabilizing function in a multi-polar world. The Americans view this as an affront to American interests and a destabilizing function in a unipolar world. Continued Russian arms sales to those states that the United States wants to target with a missile defense system would likely erode all American domestic political support for a joint missile defense system with Russia. The United States and Russia must recognize their diverging strategic preferences and moderate their behavior in order for the mutual advantages of a joint missile defense to be realized. There are many reasons this cooperation could politically fail, but only one very good reason it should not.

The U.S.-Russian joint theater missile defense exercises provide tangible evidence for the possibility of effective missile defense cooperation. The former superpowers engaged in a joint theater missile defense exercise "to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary for cooperative TMD operations in the event that Russian and U.S. forces are deployed against a common enemy." They participated in a 12-day command post exercise (CPX) at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado, involving approximately 32 Russian and 80 U.S. officials. CPX tried to integrate Russian S-300 Zenith intercepts with American Patriot missile defense systems. Joint TMD exercises began in 1996. CPX is the third exercise.

The Russians withdrew from planning talks on CPX for one year following NATO's 1999 bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. This demonstrates the political volatility of joint operations. They provide a means to fuse American and Russian common interests, but they can also unravel when unrelated incidents drive a wedge between the two states.

CHINA

China has long objected to American strategic and theater missile defenses. Even a limited strategic defense could negate China's nuclear deterrent. Armed with only 75-100 de-alerted ballistic missiles, the United States would have the technological capacity to strike China and shoot down a Chinese retaliation. This capacity would hinder Chinese prospects for effective nuclear diplomacy. A state growing in economic and conventional military power would find itself a virtually non-nuclear state vis-à-vis the United States.

Consequently, during a time when the former superpowers are seeking means to dismantle and destroy portions of their nuclear arsenals, China is building more nuclear weapons. Forecasting the extent of such a build-up is often difficult and only generally accurate. Current estimates place the progress of Chinese developments by 2015 at 162-290 ballistic missiles.

These numbers do not reflect the maximum number of missiles and warheads the Chinese could reasonably produce. They instead reflect the anticipated number of missiles and warheads the Chinese could reasonably place into a basing scheme. Considering the prominence of the People's Liberation Army in Chinese politics and the country's historical preference for land-based missiles, China will likely continue its investment in an ICBM force over sea-based missiles or long-range bombers. The Chinese may dedicate some resources to a blue-water navy to intimidate those with rival claims on Spratly Island oil and South China Seas shipping
lanes. Such a capacity might also intimidate Japan or even Taiwan, but the Chinese could not hope to seriously match the American naval supremacy in the near term.

The Chinese can produce more warheads and missiles than they can reasonably deploy; this fact threatens American interests. China can sell these technologies as complete nuclear sets to states like North Korea or Iran. The Chinese do not have to stop at merely selling these states instructions for building their own missiles and warheads. The Chinese can sell them the technology itself. China has a \textquotedblleft long history of selling missiles to Iran\textquotedblright\textsuperscript{85} and North Korea.\textsuperscript{86}

China does not have the same national interests as the United States. China wants to enhance its economic position, protect its security and freedom of action, and reassert its authority over Taiwan. It tries to balance relations with the United States as the world's largest economy and military power with its other national interests that can clash with American values and policy objectives. Leaders cannot separate military developments from economic relations. Fusing these realms provides one of the few American levers over Chinese decision-making. Nevertheless, the Chinese view their security needs as very important and have begun a nuclear build-up.

China has also taken more advanced steps to negate a clear American nuclear advantage. A Pentagon report released on November 2, 1998 warned, \textquotedblleft China is said to be acquiring a variety of foreign technologies which could be used to develop an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability.\textquotedblright\textsuperscript{87} Where the United States has researched and hoped to deploy a missile defense for decades, the Chinese are developing a means to circumvent this defense. China sees a missile defense as aimed against its nuclear deterrent, not merely against the American-defined \textquotedblleft problem states.\textquotedblright\textsuperscript{88} Anti-satellite technology allows the Chinese to preserve the deterrent value of their missile force in the face of a threatening American development.

The Chinese also object to theater missile defenses. Ambassador Li Changhe called for immediate negotiations on a treaty to ban all missile defenses, including American Patriots. He labeled missile defenses an attempt to start \textquotedblleft a new arms race.\textquotedblright\textsuperscript{89} The Chinese rely on their missile force for critical political objectives. Since most of the Chinese military is concentrated in the army, the state has a difficult time projecting its military power over rival island nations. The Chinese navy and air force can attempt to intimidate islands like Japan and Taiwan, but China's missile force most effectively threatens these nations.\textsuperscript{90}

The Taiwan issue has been a long-standing sticking point in U.S.-Sino relations. When President Clinton approved Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui travel visa to speak at Cornell University's graduation, the event received high-level Chinese criticism and relations soured.\textsuperscript{91} The People's Republic insists Taiwan is a \textquotedblleft renegade province\textquotedblright that should be fully reunited with the mainland. China tries to influence Taiwanese politics by reminding the island about the mainland's military potential. The lacking Chinese amphibious assault capability prevents the mainland from translating its immense army into a threatening force. American-built Taiwanese F-16s keep the mainland from assaulting the island through the manned skies. Therefore, the Chinese rely on their short-range missile force to intimidate the island. The Chinese short-range M-9 missile is one of its few means to intimidate Taiwan militarily.\textsuperscript{92} Any missile defense that negates this Chinese leverage runs counter to Chinese national interests.

\textit{THE GREAT WALL}

Russia has objected the most strenuously and received the most attention in regard to American missile defense plans. However, Russia conceivably can be incorporated into a joint defense. It has a mutual interest in negating the missile threat posed by Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. China does not share this national interest. China has and likely will continue to arm Iran
and North Korea. Chinese aid was instrumental in Pakistan’s push to join the nuclear club. The People’s Republic sees itself as having an interest in those states going nuclear.

Recent Chinese history suggests the country’s leaders are calculating, rational statesmen seeking to maximize Chinese gains and minimize costs. The country fits nicely into realism’s precepts. China has used its power to balance its rivals against one another and maximize its own position on the world stage. China most vividly demonstrated its willingness to play the realpolitik game in the 1970s. While the Nixon Administration “played the China card,” Chairman Mao Tse-tung played both the Soviet and American cards. Mao allowed his nation’s alignment to shift between the superpower poles to maximize China’s international leverage. China won the American “One China” policy, relegating Taiwan to only a quasi-state, after Sino-Soviet relations had already soured.

China has gained clout in the Post-Cold War era. With Soviet influence disappearing and Chinese economic potential rising, China’s power has reached greater proportions. China has continued to play the realpolitik game, pitting regional enemies against one another and making the American presence in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East more difficult. In the Asia-Pacific, China is the largest emerging economy and military power. But Japan still dominates the economic sphere and South Korea is also an economic force. Japan could remilitarize or even go nuclear to match its military clout with its economic power. The two Koreas could unite, bringing together South Korean economic power with North Korean military power. Such a scenario would threaten China’s power projection capabilities and direct security interests. China would not be able to dominate the region and claim global status. Rather it would have to fight for regional authority while the United States and Europe ran global state affairs.

China wants to keep regional rivals from threatening its power. Transferring sensitive missile technology to North Korea aids the Chinese endeavor. The North Korean missile program is not only directed at South Korea. The short-range missile program and conventional artillery could effectively damage South Korea. The medium-range missile program threatens Japan and American troops. A long-range program could threaten the United States in the future. When China actively enhances North Korea’s missile capability, it helps balance Japanese and American power in the region.

When North Korea threatens Japan, the island nation must direct its limited military capabilities toward North Korea or expand its military capabilities. Both serve Chinese interests. Since World War II, Japan has limited its military build-up to a constitutionally questionable Self-Defense Force. Although some regional rivals have criticized the force as exceeding that which the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance allows, the Japanese could not hope to direct its energies against both China and North Korea in its present form. China arming North Korea allows China to bolster its bargaining position in the region.

If the Japanese sought to respond to the North Korean threat by remilitarizing, the Chinese would also win. First, this move would seriously weaken the American position in the Asia-Pacific by removing the cornerstone of the American presence there, the Security Alliance. The Americans would lose legitimacy as the invited protectors of the peace. The United States Navy would lose critical bases in Japan and would have to at least partially withdraw from the region. The Japanese move would invite every Asian power to develop some military capacity. These states remember World War II too vividly to allow this move to be seen as peaceful. The Chinese would become the likely regional leader in this new balancing game. Japan would become the aggressor and the United States would simply be seen as ineffective if not worse.
The Japanese recognize the problems associated with rearmament. The first scenario is more likely. However, the important point is both options enhance the Chinese position (or at least can be viewed as such by the Chinese). This makes the American national interest of restricting North Korean missile capabilities incompatible with Chinese interests.

North Korean long-range missile developments undermine American power in the region. If the North Koreans master the Taepo Dong 2 technology, they may be able to restrict American freedom of action in the region. This helps the Chinese balance American power by threatening the sole superpower with a well-placed proxy.

China can also enhance its power by supporting allies to its west. With the world’s largest population and a continued push towards industrialization, China demands large quantities of energy. This makes Central Asia and the Middle East important regions for China as well. In August 2000 China sent “tens of thousands” of soldiers to Sudan amid international criticism to protect their oil interests from Sudan’s brutal civil war. China has also proposed an eastward pipeline from the Caspian oil basin. Most significantly, the Chinese have developed ties with Iran.

China has an obvious interest in Iranian oil. However, China’s interests in the Middle East run deeper. Just as in the Asia-Pacific, China wants to balance against American power. China sees itself as reemerging as a world power and recognizes its diplomatic capacity will be defined in part by its economic and military power relative to other world powers. The most notable world power for the foreseeable future will remain the United States; the most strategic regions in the foreseeable future for a world power to control will be the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific. These are the two largest growing population bases in the world, providing both large markets and large military potential. They hover over important, centuries old trade routes and sit on immense oil reserves.

Transferring missile technology to Iran and Pakistan enhances Chinese goodwill with these states. Transfers to Iran threaten the American position in the Middle East. Short- to medium-range missiles threaten American troops and allies. Long-range missiles threaten the American homeland. Short- to medium-range missiles threaten American freedom of action in the strategic region. Long-range missiles distract American political attention from resolving pressing disputes in the Middle East. The United States could be placed in a position of having to decide between jeopardizing American cities and abandoning American allies in the region. This could decrease the reliability of the American protector role in the region. China would seek to fill this void as an emerging global power that could develop friendly ties with states like Iran and Saudi Arabia at the same time.

Where problem states friendly to China threaten American interests, they heighten Chinese power. These states are problems from the American perspective but catalysts for change from the Chinese viewpoint. Transferring nuclear and missile technology to these states is not an irrational choice by Beijing. The regime is not cash-starved or lacking real control over its nuclear and missile technology like in the former Soviet Union. The Chinese government has actively condoned the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction as serving its national interests.

**Implications for Missile Defenses**

This makes China a poor candidate for membership in an American-led missile defense regime. If emerging nuclear states do not threaten a country, that country does not have a legitimate interest in the region. Indeed, the only reason for Chinese participation would be to undermine the regime altogether.
But suppose this argument is wrong. Even if China had an interest in negating problem state missile threats, China still would not be a productive partner in a missile defense regime. China gains its military leverage over Taiwan and Japan through its missile force. A multilateral regime could undermine that leverage. In a time of crisis, Japan or Taiwan would exert tremendous pressure on the United States to defect from any political safeguards China would insist upon in the multilateral regime’s charter. Any mobile component of the American contribution would threaten Chinese missiles. Upgraded Aegis cruisers and modified Boeing 747s with attached Airborne Lasers could move to nullify the Chinese threat. This capability alone would undermine Chinese threats and loosen its ability to utilize coercive diplomacy. China would fear any missile defense aimed at North Korea would also be aimed at them. Chinese inclusion in the regime would not necessarily assuage these fears. Any defense in the East Asian theater that excluded Japan from its protection would ultimately fail. It would still allow North Korea to influence American decisions and jeopardize the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance.

Furthermore, China does not offer any particular technological aid. The Russians have spent decades maintaining a missile defense around Moscow and developing relevant technologies like the S-300 Zenith interceptors. China has only recently sought to move past its small, countervalue nuclear force. The only reason for including China in the regime is to try to keep the country from undermining its central purpose. China could transfer more nuclear and missile technology to the problem states to saturate or otherwise beat any defense. Unfortunately, inviting China to join a missile defense regime does not address this problem. China would have little productive reason to join the regime in the first place.

China is the greatest obstacle in the face of a joint missile defense. An American missile defense threatens China; a joint missile defense encircles it. China would be the only U.N. Security Council member excluded from the regime. China would likely reply in the same way that it would reply to an American unilateral defense. This response simply would be more presentable as a reaction to political encirclement.

Chinese objections and accompanying proliferation make a missile defense of any type a difficult to sustain. The United States must successfully negotiate a permanent end to Chinese proliferation if a joint missile defense can succeed. Considering Chinese national interests starkly contrast American objectives, such negotiations are unlikely to bear fruit. However, it also indicates that Chinese proliferation is inevitable, raising the likelihood of problem state nuclear acquisition. Further proliferation may occur after a joint missile defense has been established and future scholars may attribute this to the defense system. This may be a partial explanation, but today’s proliferation indicates that China has a more basic interest in spreading these weapons to selected states.

EUROPE AND JAPAN

The United States maintains its closest military ties to the NATO members, Israel, and Japan. Any joint missile defense effort that includes Russia to any significant degree will include the European allies. Any joint missile defense effort that includes China will include Japan. The United States could never vow to cooperatively protect Russia without including the friendly landmass wedged between the former superpowers. Likewise, the United States could not short change the U.S.-Japan joint missile defense projects for greater cooperation with China. Therefore, European and Japanese perspectives are critical in evaluating the possibility of a U.S.-Russian or U.S.-Russian-Chinese defense. Japanese cooperation is beneficial even without Chinese inclusion as evaluated here.
EUROPE

Every major NATO ally has voiced its objection to unilateral American attempts at strategic missile defenses sometime in the alliance's history. Europeans voiced their concern when the United States started to try to make itself invulnerable to Soviet missile threats. They worried that the United States could retreat into a Fortress America, leaving the Europeans to deal with the Red Army alone. Conversely, others feared that the Americans might take greater nuclear chances, knowing only European cities would be at risk.

Over a decade after the Cold War's conclusion, the Europeans still criticize missile defenses. European editorials widely label the defense a space militarization effort. On both sides of the Atlantic, one finds avid critics of missile defense. However, in the United States one also finds some supporters of the idea, including the nation's president and a large number of congressmen.

If the United States includes Russia and the NATO allies in its missile defense plans, then the Europeans may start to accept missile defenses. Although skeptics still point to technical complications and high costs, a joint defense removes the largest diplomatic objection to a missile defense— the negative Russian reaction and associated arms control implications. If the Russians do not respond to a missile defense by thwarting arms control efforts, a joint missile defense may provide Europe more security from Middle Eastern missile threats at an acceptable cost. European targets are easier to threaten with a developing missile force, because Europe is much closer to the Middle East than the United States.

In July 2000 German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder announced he would lobby for Russia's involvement in a multilateral missile defense regime at NATO headquarters. Putin's proposal includes extending this security umbrella over Europe. The European and American security interests are closely related. The NATO allies have an interest in negating the threat posed by problem states. Even if NATO or the European states themselves refrain from participating in military campaigns or enacting policies that anger problem states in the Middle East, these regimes may still target Europe. If Saddam Hussein cannot directly threaten North America, because the Iraqi missile program has not reached sufficient range, he may target NATO military bases or even European population centers. In 1986 Muammar Qadhafi responded to American air raids by launching missiles at American troops in Italy. Europe can get dragged into America's fight.

The Europeans may agree a risk exists, but they generally disagree on the extent of that risk. European governments are more comfortable with the risk posed by Middle Eastern problem states. They do not see their military installations or population centers as greatly threatened by Baghdad or Tehran. Consequently, national governments will be reluctant to contribute significant resources to a joint missile defense operation. Indeed, the current Atlantic divide over the Iraq war shows how many significant Europeans states view threats differently.

A U.S.-Russian boost-phase missile defense protects Europe at no substantial added cost. European states recognize this fact and will likely undercontribute or not contribute at all. American pressure may convince a state like Great Britain to contribute some technical and financial resources, but the European capitals will expect the United States to bear most of the burden. The Atlantic Alliance's half century history suggests even when the Europeans recognize a common foe as more threatening to Europe, the Europeans still rely on the United States to provide most of the security. There is little reason to believe this project will be any different.
The southern European states like Spain and Italy have been traditionally more apprehensive at explicitly defending against certain Arab regimes even though they are the most threatened. These states must balance security fears with desires to maintain close commercial relations with the Arab world. Brandishing Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq as enemies may weaken ties between Italy as its Arab trading partners, although Latin Europe has supported the American position against Saddam Hussein. The Europeans do not enjoy all the luxuries that North America’s relative isolation provides. They live much closer to and trade with a region far removed geographically from the United States. American congressmen can call for hardline policies against these regimes relatively easily. The southern European states must walk a finer line.\textsuperscript{102}

Although political rhetoric and substantive policy actions suggest the United States is much more predisposed toward a missile defense than the Europeans, there is some hope that European support for a missile defense may rise in the near future. Along with German Chancellor Schroeder’s push for a NATO-Russian missile defense, Germany has been seeking a more assertive role for itself in Europe. France and Germany have spearheaded efforts to establish the Europeans Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).\textsuperscript{103} If the push succeeds, this army will attempt primarily to stabilize all corners of the European continent. It will also seek recognition as a real military force, capable of matching a modern army’s procedures and technology. Building an effective missile defense grants the force this prestige.

This decision would not be irrational. A European army can more effectively threaten to use force and not have to use that force if it gains credibility as a modern, substantial army. Armies do not even need to be strong to deter. They need to be viewed as strong to promote enough fear to deter conflict. An army with advanced technology promotes fear and respect for its power.

Therefore, the Europeans may develop a reason to develop their own missile defense. The American-led system should be compatible with an European system. This can help prevent rifts in the NATO alliance by making the ESDP’s defensive and deterrent effort complementary to, rather than in place of, NATO operations.\textsuperscript{104}

\textit{JAPAN}

"Whether because of traditional regional animosities, North Korea’s belligerence, or because United States forces are based there to defend Japan under the terms of the U.S.-Japan Treaty, Japan is vulnerable to attack by ballistic missiles."\textsuperscript{105} The United States and Japan share a common ballistic missile threat. Both have a certain domestic constituency supporting a threat response. Japan argues that its home island is the most likely target for North Korean missiles. The United States is overly concerned with threats to North America. Both nations consider themselves the priority target of North Korean missiles.

While the United States currently resides outside of the North Korean missile range, Japan does not. The 1998 Taepo Dong 1 missile test indicated that North Korea could launch a missile at least as far as would be necessary to hit Japan. The test did not demonstrate that North Korea could deliver an accurate missile that would reach its target. Nevertheless, the Japanese understandably reacted to this new information. The “failed launch of the North Korean Taepo Dong 1 Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)/Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) that crossed over Japanese territory in August 1998 had a ‘Sputnik-like’ effect on Japan's Cabinet.”\textsuperscript{106} Japanese public opinion shifted to demand a greater indigenous defensive role to protect Japanese cities.
The critical American military presence in Japan makes both Japan and American troops threatened by the same medium-range ballistic missile threat. Both nations can cooperate beyond a boost-phase defense. They have a similar interest in protecting the Japanese island with a variety of means. The United States and Japan should cooperate in mid-course phase and terminal phase defenses to defend this theater.

The United States and Japan have already begun to cooperate on a joint theater missile defense. The two nations have cooperated on low-altitude theater defenses that protect Japan from a few missiles. This defense would not cover Taiwan or be able to defend realistically against a Chinese first strike on Japan. Japan currently deploys Patriot land-based anti-missile systems and Aegis Standard sea-based interceptors. The cooperation has proceeded successfully, setting a positive precedent for future missile defense cooperation.

After the 1998 North Korean Taepo Dong 1 test, Tokyo "announced plans to develop a four-satellite constellation of high-resolution observation satellites: two optical satellites, capable of 1-meter resolution, and two radar imaging satellites with one to three-meter resolution. In early 1999 the Mitsubishi Electric Corporation was awarded a government contract to start designing the new high-resolution imaging satellites. Current plans call for launching the first new imaging satellites in 2003." Japan has enjoyed a strong proclivity toward technological advances, especially in satellite technology. However, the Japanese Constitution has restricted these satellites to purely civilian uses. The newly ordered Japanese satellites provide a military use, frightening Japan's neighbors. Kim Holmes, an advocate of the Japanese missile defense system at the Heritage Foundation, explains that these new "geo-stationary missile launch-detection satellites over Japan would detect launches from China, North Korea, and Russia." That very capability is what threatens Japan's regional neighbors. Asian states remember clearly the legacy of World War II and are wary of Japanese military rearmament. The Chinese, for example, voiced concern that further joint missile defense operations and high-technology military advances may be Japan's first step toward an offensive military capability. Japan may seek to match its military power with its economic power, they argue.

China injects the largest stumbling block into further U.S.-Japanese missile defense cooperation. "The Chinese have expressed a willingness to accept lower-tier TMD deployment that protects U.S. bases. But China opposes the development and deployment of upper-tier TMD systems, especially sea-based versions, which could be employed to protect Taiwan." The Chinese want to block any further missile defense advances that might negate its ability to intimidate Taiwan. With every improvement in the effectiveness of an Asian theater's missile defense system, the Chinese lose a portion of the effectiveness of their nuclear deterrent and coercive diplomacy capabilities. They may resort to further enhancing their own nuclear and missile capability or increasing missile transfers to North Korea.

Missile defense advocates claim that the Chinese could easily overwhelm a missile defense employed to defend Taiwan, so the Chinese should not feel threatened by a system in place. However, a joint U.S.-Japan defense that may protect Taiwan brings American technology into this dispute between China and Taiwan. "Further, a sea-based Japanese TMD might also be used to protect Taiwan in the event of a military confrontation between Taiwan and mainland China, despite China's ability to overwhelm Taiwan with sheer numbers of missiles. The inclusion of Japan (and by extension the United States) in any cross-strait conflict dramatically raises the strategic stakes." A U.S.-Japan high-altitude theater defense increases the diplomatic deterrent capability of Taiwan, angering the Chinese.
The United States and Japan should not develop the most effective missile defense technology possible. A purely technological attempt to solve this problem will inevitably backfire to create a larger problem than originally posed. The United States and Japan should continue to deploy land- and sea-based low-altitude theater defenses and develop boost-phase defenses. The allies could also seek immobile land-based high-altitude defenses that could not move to threaten Chinese missile launch sites or trajectories. Although the Northeast Asian topography lends itself to a sea-based defense, international politics makes a less effective land-based high-altitude defense like THAAD more attractive than the Navy Theaterwide defense.\textsuperscript{113}

Japanese domestic constraints also pose challenges to further cooperation on a joint missile defense system. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution prohibits the government from participating in a collective defense. Dual-use satellite technology may lie on the fringes of constitutional action, but fully participating in a joint missile defense system requires modifying this constitutional stance. Although Japanese domestic opinion at times supports a constitutional amendment,\textsuperscript{114} Japan’s neighbors fear this would destabilize the region and force other nations to build up their own security forces.\textsuperscript{115} Japan’s neighbors could easily perceive a constitutional amendment as the first significant step toward Japanese remilitarization.

Japan’s constitutional stance also affects military spending. The Diet, Japan’s parliament, presents a set defense budget that would not allow for expensive military projects like a joint missile defense. Any new defense spending directly trades-off with other projects. A joint theater missile defense system would cost Japan approximately $15 billion. This would either require Japan to loosen the financial strings on military spending, risking a negative Asian reaction, or it would require Japan to cut other valuable projects like the FS-X aircraft project.\textsuperscript{116}

Joint U.S.-Japan theater defenses provide great opportunities for cooperation. Besides a NATO defense, the U.S.-Japan cooperation faces the least number of cooperative obstacles. The China problem provides the greatest diplomatic obstacle, which can be mitigated by not developing a missile defense system capable of intervening in Chinese threats or military actions against Taiwan. The United States has spent billion of dollars protecting Japan under the auspices of the Security Alliance. The greatest threat to Japanese security, and by extension to American troops in Japan, presently comes from ballistic missile threats from North Korea. The United States should continue to serve as Japan’s effective protector. If the United States ceases to protect the island effectively, one should not be surprised if Japanese rearmament follows.

CONCLUSION

A modern missile defense regime can satisfy the political prerequisite to policy acceptance. This regime should bear out the responsibilities of each country to serve the collective interest. Cooperation should take the form of data sharing, technology sharing, and financial burdensharing.

DATA SHARING

States that own military satellites can identify missile launch points by the distinctive rocket plume created as the boosters propel the ballistic missile upward. This data can immediately and reliably identify where a ballistic missile’s flight originated. However, not all states have this technical capacity. They may only have satellite data from a partial satellite constellation, rely on foreign satellite information, or have no national satellite data at all.

The United States made space-based missile warning systems’ data available during Gulf War to NATO and Gulf coalition partners. The United States and its future missile defense allies could cooperatively share and institutionalize missile-related data dissemination. Presently, if Iraq launched a ballistic missile at a European city, for example, American, Russian, and
European satellites would show the Iraqi origin. The West and Russia would confidently know where this weapon was launched.

This does not imply that states without access to early warning satellite data would believe the Western accusation. Iraq could deny launching the missile. Tenuously friendly states like Yemen and Pakistan may find Iraqi claims of a Western conspiracy to scapegoat the Iraqis plausible. Either the populations at large or leaders seeking to justify a certain foreign policy stance could demand further investigation, while the West prepares to retaliate. Any military action could lose popular support in the Middle East from regimes and populaces alike that remain less than fully confident in Western accusations.

The American response to the September 11 attacks demonstrates this point. A survey of 9,924 residents in nine Muslim countries showed only 18% of those polled believed Arabs hijacked those four planes.\textsuperscript{117} Although many have criticized the precision of these survey results,\textsuperscript{118} the larger point remains that many people in these nations did not believe American accounts identifying the hijackers. Being right is not enough. The United States must communicate in a credible means all information on missile launches.

A multilateral regime can offer a degree of greater legitimacy to claims of launches if the technology works on a consistent basis. Channeling early warning data directly to the multilateral institution and its partner countries allows members to gain confidence in the reliability of this system. It could immediately identify missile tests and build confidence in the truth presented in this data. If an aggressor ever did attempt a first strike, the multilateral regime’s identifying the aggressor would at least hold greater credibility than the United States or even a collection of allied states making this conclusion alone.

Greater international credibility of this data enhances deterrence. Deterrence only works if the rational aggressor knows that any first strike will be met with retaliation. A global coalition aimed at punishing or eliminating the aggressor risks a greater cost than a unilateral response. Confidently identifying the aggressor to each potential coalition participant’s satisfaction increases the likelihood of a more widespread condemnation and response. Sharing early warning data raises the stakes of missile aggression.\textsuperscript{119}

\section*{PARTNERSHIP}

The states actively involved in a missile defense operation must share the common objective of lessening or even nullifying a target nation’s budding ballistic missile arsenal. Regional powers would be ineffective outside of their sphere of power. The United States should engage the cooperation of the NATO allies, Russia, Israel, Japan, and South Korea.

Cooperating with the NATO allies should be the easiest structural task. They have enjoyed a long record of cooperative military exercises and planning with each other and the United States. Iran and Iraq pose a direct ballistic missile threat to Europe. Germany and France have articulated an interest in protecting European cities with a European missile defense. The European Security and Defense Policy can develop its own midcourse and terminal phase defenses that only guard Europe. The United States can help these projects by sharing information and technology. However, the United States does not have an explicit interest in funding this project.

The United States can more cooperatively work with Europe in regard to boost-phase defenses. Although the United States would likely bear most of the financial burden, the Europeans could conceivably dedicate some financial or scientific resources to the project. At the very least, the Europeans should pledge their diplomatic support and provide greater international legitimacy to negating Middle Eastern threats.
Israel can provide a similar function. The United States and Israel have already cooperated on low-altitude theater missile defenses. American Patriot anti-missile systems tried to intercept Iraqi Scud missiles that targeted Israeli cities during the Gulf War. Israel has also enjoyed American support for its Arrow missile defense system. Israel has a real interest in negating hostile missile threats. Israel could help provide technical support to this project from the knowledge they have gained from operating Arrow. Since Israel is already the largest recipient of American foreign aid, Congress is unlikely to expect this state to contribute financially to the system. However, Israeli support can provide a form of moral legitimacy to the project. Those that view protecting Israel as partially an obligation of the United States or European powers may come to support more pointedly a boost-phase defense against Iran and Iraq.

Russia has an interest in negating the Iranian threat to its cities. Russia lacks financial resources to contribute to this project, but it does offer a distinct technical capability. The Russians developed their missile defense technology independent of American aid. Where European, Japanese, and Israeli theater defenses are more compatible with the American systems, they offer the United States less to learn from. Sensitive data or technology sharing between the United States and Russia could mutually advance both nations’ capacity to intercept missiles. Further, the present Russian technology can be directly employed to challenge productively the Iranian threat.

The Russian defense technology can also be used to target North Korean threats to eastern Russia and American troops and allies. Both states again have a common interest and opportunity to destroy any missile launched from North Korea.

Japan should be invited to join the regime in a more limited form. Presently, the United States and Japan are developing low-altitude theater missile defenses to protect the island’s citizens and American troops. The two countries should continue to develop this technology. The two states should not develop a high-altitude defense that could potentially threaten Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan. The Chinese are far too sensitive on the Taiwan issue to accept such a defense. The Chinese can undercut a threatening missile defense force by transferring more ballistic missile technology.

The United States should also seek Japanese financial and satellite cooperation. The Japanese fear North Korea more than the Europeans fear Iran and Iraq. The Taepo Dong 1 test in 1998 rallied Japanese public support for a missile defense. The United States should expect a larger portion of the Asian theater’s defense budget to come from Japan than the United States should expect from the Europeans. The Japanese also own an impressive constellation of satellites. Although the nation has only recently embarked on building military satellites, the multilateral regime can gain from Japanese cooperation in this field.

Finally, the United States would need to enlist South Korean support. North Korea is surrounded by South Korea, China, and water. China is unreliable to dispute North Korean missiles. A sea-based defense provides mobility that could threaten Chinese missiles. Consequently, the last politically acceptable option for a land-based defense is one stationed in South Korea.

South Koreans mildly oppose missile defenses, because they see it as ineffective at protecting their country against the North Korean threat. “One-third of Seoul’s population could be destroyed by North Korean artillery just north of the DMZ, and massive North Korean short-range missiles would swamp [U.S.] Patriot [missile defense], or any other missile defense.” The United States should not expect financial or even technical cooperation from South Korea.
The South Koreans would contribute a critical geographical location. South Korea has provided a platform for American military bases for a half century to protect South Korean independence and to serve American interests in the region. The United States can pressure effectively the South Koreans into accepting the missile defense technology if necessary.

Seoul has little rational reason to object to the boost-phase defense. Although the South Koreans may conclude that the missile defense site itself could become North Korea’s first target, this is not likely. The North Koreans today are not the Soviets at the height of the nuclear arms race. They do not have spare missiles and warheads to target missile defense systems before a calculated first strike. The North Koreans have a limited and inaccurate missile capacity. Armed with only a handful of ballistic missiles by the time of a future launch, North Korea is likely to target Seoul, Tokyo, or American military bases directly. Further, this argument assumes that the missile defense system would attract North Korean missiles that otherwise might go elsewhere. This is wishful thinking on the part of the South Koreans. If North Korea ever attacks, it will begin with South Korea with or without a missile defense in place.

Among the present nuclear powers, the United States should exclude India, Pakistan, and China from the joint missile defense operations. India and Pakistan are not yet even in their nuclear infancy; they are nuclear newborns. They are not credibly threatened by Iran, Iraq, or North Korea and have no real interest in participating. They also have little to offer the regime in terms of technology or finances. There is no basis for a cooperative relationship on missile defense technology. China also does not have a common interest in negating these threats. While a joint missile defense must be carefully orchestrated not to antagonize China, it also should not transfer sensitive data and technology to a state that has aligned itself with Iran and North Korea.

A joint missile defense could endanger nonproliferation regimes or it could effectively enhance deterrence. If policymakers closely evaluate each potential participant’s national interests and potential contributions, the system could provide greater security through cooperation.

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1 The National Intelligence Council’s report assumes the government of Saddam Hussein. As time of final review, the regime was still officially in power with a highly uncertain future.
2 National Intelligence Council. “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015” (September 1999), available online at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/nie/nie99msl.html#toc7. This data excludes India, Pakistan, and Israel who are expected to have long-range ballistic missiles by 2015. These three states all currently possess Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles.
5 Dan Reiter highlights how only three wars in modern history can be attributed to preemptive strikes. Reiter, Dan. “Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen,” International Security 20 (Fall 1995), pp. 5-34.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 National Intelligence Council Op. Cit., p. online. The possibility of the rise of other hostile threats to the United States or the fall of these regimes hostile to the United States is discussed later in the paper.
12 Landmass area data was taken from Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook 2001. Available online at 2.2 million square kilometers: Iraq -- 437,072 sq km; Iran -- 1,648 million sq km; North Korea -- 120,540 sq km.
19 Young Op. Cit., p. 53. Clearly, this matter continues to be debated in the international press, academia, and the highest levels of government. This paper cannot seriously address this controversy. At last revision, however, there had yet to be evidence that Iraq currently possesses nuclear weapons.

27 Timmerman again cites an anonymous intelligence source as noting, “We are seeing a revived effort by Libya, which is receiving assistance from North Korea, China, and now Iran, to build a missile capable of reaching NATO bases in Europe with a nuclear warhead.”
29 Ibid., pp. 35-37.
32 This final justification might suggest Iran should not be grouped with the other two states on the basis of its hostility towards the West since Iranian democratization and tentative progress in American-Iranian relations.
37 Ibid., p. 16.
38 Ibid., p. 3.
39 Ibid., p. 17-20.
44 Cohen, William S. DoD News Briefing 7 June 2000. Available online at

60 Ibid., p. 15.
63 Ibid., p. speech.
65 Although the attack on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 can rightfully be declared a first strike on Washington, it was not a part of a sustained military campaign in the traditional sense.
69 Ibid., p. 29.
71 Boeing. "ISS Background and Goals," (Chicago, IL: The Boeing Company, 2002). Available online at
80 Ibid., p. lexis.
83 The Chinese missile count and warhead count will remain the same for the foreseeable future. Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs explained, "We [the CIA] expect Chinese MIRVing of a future mobile missile would be many years off." Cited in Walpole Op. Cit., p. web.
