STILL A NATIONAL RESIDUE IN SMALL STATE FOREIGN POLICY? DANISH FOREIGN POLICY IN AN EU CONTEXT

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INTRODUCTION

The starting-point for this paper is the issue of the conduct of foreign policy for small states within the EU. When do states act inside the EU, when do they act outside the EU, and, in some cases, do they do both? And what are the reasons for the different forms of action? This paper presents and discusses the preliminary results of empirical work on a project with the above title. The theoretical part of the paper draws on Larsen (2001, 2000).

It is interesting to ask these questions in an open way, as it is often taken for granted that small states in the EU conduct most of their foreign relations through the EU - or at least that the EU is crucial for the conduct of small members’ foreign policy. The background for this is the widespread perception amongst observers and practitioners that the EU provides unique access to the scene of world politics for small member states through the sharing of information and participation in procedures and policies that expand the scope of their foreign policy.

The focus in this study is the substance of small-state and EU foreign policy rather than procedures. This is a different angle from central work in the field which has tended to focus (partly, if not totally) on procedures and processes rather than policy substance in relation to the question of the relationship between Member States’ foreign policy and the EU. A central work in the field by Ben Tonra thus presents some interesting and significant conclusions in this field on the subject of the actors’ (Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands) views on the importance of the CFSP and its procedures (Tonra, 2001). The point of interest in this paper is in which parts of national foreign policy that are conducted through the EU and which parts are not. This perspective is, in its nature, complementary to the work on procedures. But it also has the potential of challenging some of the procedural findings (which stress the binding and very comprehensive character of EU procedures in foreign policy), if it is found that substantial parts of national foreign policy are conducted outside the framework of the EU (or only partly within the EU framework), even if actors generally continue to consider EU’s procedures as binding and comprehensive. In general the paper contributes to the debate on Europeanization of national foreign policies through a study of the Europeanization of foreign policy context. In a wider sense, the paper is part of the broader discussion about Europeanization of national policies and polities.

The primary level of analysis is therefore the EU member states and their foreign policies. This is not because I am hostile to the view which is widespread within studies of EU foreign policy: That EU foreign policy and member state foreign policy is one foreign policy system and cannot be separated in
an analysis of foreign policy (see for example White(2001:40)). Rather, I argue that this perspective focuses on the procedural/decision-making dimension and that it is interesting to examine in terms of foreign policy substance to what extent small-state foreign policy is exclusively or almost exclusively conducted within or through the EU. This may give a feel for the 'extension of the EU foreign policy system' as compared with other systems of foreign policy (here the national ones) when looked at from the angle of the states.

The point of departure in my paper, therefore, also holds the assumption (which is then opened to empirical enquiry) that we can still study national foreign policy substance and the way it is conducted, that it is still a separable analytical category even in the context of the EU. A transformation of national foreign policy is not taken for granted but, rather, subjected to empirical study. The central question is asked from perspective of the member states, but this does not mean that the answer will necessarily confirm the relevance of this perspective. What it does mean is that there are sufficient indications of national actorness within the EU context for this perspective not to be deemed irrelevant a priori. The findings have potential implications for the question of the balance between national foreign policy and EU foreign policy. A transformation of national foreign policy is not taken for granted in that it is not a given that the balance, when looking at foreign policy substance in different policy areas, is on the side of the EU. A crucial motivation for the project is the aim to cast light on the question of whether the national foreign policies of small member states have been transformed by the EU. Here this is being approached through studying the balance between EU and national foreign policy in different policy areas.

The paper takes as its empirical point of departure a study of Danish foreign policy. In the case of Denmark, the main question in the paper is a challenging question because the EU plays an important role in the general and dominant foreign policy discourses. The EU is presented as the cornerstone of Danish foreign policy in official Danish documents. The question is whether this is reflected across foreign policy areas and, if not, why not? Is there one foreign policy line (where the official description is suitable) or are there, rather, a range of foreign policy lines where the balance between conduct of national foreign policy within EU and national foreign policy outside the EU differs. Empirically the paper looks at 3 areas of foreign policy: Development, policy towards Africa and policy towards Latin America.

In my paper, focus is on the importance of foreign policy *substance* rather than *procedure*, by asking whether and to what extent the substance of national foreign policy is conducted within or without the EU and whether the EU can be said to have constitutive effects (See Larsen (2001) for an argument for this perspective as well as a discussion of other approaches to the relationship between states and organisations and a discussion of the literature on the EU within this field).

The aim of the research project is 1) to examine to what degree Danish foreign policy takes place outside the EU by focusing on foreign policy substance and the role of different organisations in Danish foreign policy; 2) suggest a conceptual framework within which this can be studied; 3) evaluate the
implications for the study of Danish foreign policy: a transformed Danish foreign policy within the EU? 4) reflect on this framework in the light of the results: the general value of the knowledge produced by the research.

In the paper I will present preliminary empirical findings applying a framework which draws on constructivism (that is points one and two). Constructivism has been chosen as the main approach as it asks challenging questions about the impact of organisational membership on states. However, the actual empirical study is open with respect to whether or how such features are identified. I will first give a brief outline of the constructivist approach to the study of the impact of international organisations on member states. I then go on to describe the analytical framework focusing on the question of whether Danish foreign policy is conducted inside or outside the EU, whether there are constitutive effects of the participation in EU foreign policy and the background for this. I then outline some methodological concerns in relation to empirical studies. I finally present the preliminary results of the case studies which include studies of development policy, policy towards Africa and policy towards Latin America.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The approach taken to the impact of membership of international organisations on member states is constructivist/poststructuralist. This has some bearings on how the relationship between state and international organisation is described. It also has consequences for what kind of questions can be asked about the relationship between states and international organisations in concrete empirical studies. However, whether or not the answers to these challenging questions confirm basic constructivist points is an empirical question:

A central concept in constructivism, is the framework of meaning within which states’ and other units’ actions take place. A general constructivist approach to the relationship between states and international organisations maintains that states’ interest formation is also shaped by norms and values at the international level. The international context, including membership of organisations, will, it is argued, always to some extent be constitutive for states’ understandings. This problematique is relevant in relation to states’ participation in all organisations, but in particular for small states since they can be expected to contribute less to the formation of international frameworks of meaning and policies and hence the constitutive effect on their views is likely to be more marked. International organisations, in other words, are not just seen as regulating states’ foreign policy behaviour; they also contribute to constituting states’ preferences and the derived interests (for a concrete analysis of the impact of norms

1 What I mean by this is not that the issue of whether social reality is social construction is an empirical question. What I mean is rather that some of the IR specific questions in relation to constructivism are kept open for empirical inquiry (for example the question of whether the states’ preferences or language are changed as a result of participation in particular organisations).
in different international contexts on constituting states’ preferences see Finnemore(1996)). In the Danish case, a dominant ‘four cornerstone understanding’ was the dominant foreign policy understanding during the Cold War. According to this discourse, Danish foreign policy should be conducted in four organisational contexts (NATO, the EC, Nordic Cooperation and the UN) where there were clear limits to what could be discussed and promoted within each context (see for example Larsen, 2000). This structuring of Danish foreign policy (to the extent that this influences policy practice) can be assumed from this perspective of this approach not only to have had behavioral but also constitutive effects on Danish foreign policy preferences and values. However, the policy spread between four organisational contexts, arguably, did not challenge the traditional state model with its closed national preference formation drastically as there was not one single overarching organisational framework through which which national foreign policy conducted.

It is important on this point to note that even if we draw on an constructivist approach, the aim of the bargaining state actors may still be seen as furthering national interests. But these interests may, to varying extents, be formed and shaped by the EU organisational context. This does not mean, however, that there is no national ‘raw material’ (in the terms of Wendt, 1994) out of which national positions are formed: at a general theoretical level, drawing on Wendt (1999,1994), we can say that the states’ participation in the EU policy process may affect the states’ social identity, but only to a lesser extent the states’ corporate identity. Corporate identity refers to the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute an actor individually whereas social identity² are sets of meaning that actors attribute to themselves while taking the perspective of others, that is the perspective of a social object (Wendt, 1999:ch.5; 1994:385). If the social identity is defined in this interaction, it is endogenously defined (as opposed to outside the interaction, exogenously). Along the lines of Wendt (1999:234), a change in a state’s social identity will not necessarily lead to a change in the states’ corporate identity which is much more resilient. While states’ social identity might therefore be affected by participation in European foreign policy cooperation through internalisation of EU conceptions, the states’ corporate identity might remain much less affected. The states, in other words, may well continue to see themselves as autonomous units with identities and interests³. Along the same lines, the EU is arguably predominantly seen as a supplement or as a support for the states, not as a new sovereign subject taking over from them (Wæver, 1995). However, empirical work should be open to the possibility that (possibly in specific policy areas) states corporate identity might also be affected.

This issue is, in principle, similar with respect to states’ participation in any international organisation or indeed any institutional context. The question is if there is any particular reason for assuming that there

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² In Wendt(1994) the term ‘social identity’ is used for the states’ identity when taking the perspective of others whereas Wendt(1999) uses the term ‘collective identity’ (see Wendt, 1999:242).

³Wendt uses considerable energy arguing for viewing the state as a unitary actor (Wendt, 1999:ch.5). This has, i.a., been criticized by Weldes (1996).
may be effects of the states’ participation in the EU and in particular EU foreign policy that challenge traditional features of states’ foreign policy status qualitatively - either by constituting a comprehensive frame within which most elements of national foreign policies are conducted (thus creating a shell around the shell!) or by having constitutive effects on national foreign policy. One central argument for the EU being different from other international organisations, is that the foreign policy making in the EU must be seen in the context of a process of political and economic integration. Through the general integration process, the autonomy (or sovereignty) of the member states has been compromised in favour of common institutions operating within a legal system antecedent to that of the member states themselves (Tonra, 2001:4).

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The primary interest of the framework is the extent to which the substance of Danish foreign policy is conducted within the EU framework, unilaterally or with other organisations. This is seen as a focus which is complementary to the studies which focus on procedures in relation to the EU. The frame also looks at the extent to which EU foreign policy substance can be seen as constitutive of Danish foreign policy substance, in other words whether Danish foreign policy uses EU concepts and language and whether there is an ‘import’ of EU policy stances in areas where there was little in the way of a concrete Danish policy prior to the involvement in the EU.

When applying this framework, the various issues in Danish foreign policy are categorised according to where Danish foreign policy is conducted through the EU and where it is not. The question asked, then, is whether Denmark in a given issue-area takes part in foreign policy cooperation in the EU, in other fora, in the EU or acts on a unilateral basis. The assumption is that the less foreign policy that is conducted outside the EU - i.e. the lesser the extent of Denmark’s non-EU related foreign policy activity - the more constitutive the policies of the EU are likely to be, and the more endogenous national interest formation will be to foreign policy formation in the EU. However, it cannot automatically be assumed to be so. National preferences might still be developed exogenously so that the impact of EU foreign policy on national foreign policy is primarily behavioural even if there is little policy outside the EU. The framework thus gives rise to general hypotheses which will have to be examined concretely.

Drawing on Wendt (1992: 423; Smith, 1999: ch.1) two criteria for whether foreign policy preferences are exogenous can suggested: 1) preferences are primarily shaped by domestic factors, and

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4 One alternative direct way of approaching the questions is to look directly at the policy areas in which Denmark is engaged in terms of whether they are endogenous or exogenous and see how the various foreign policy issues fit into this. One could argue that the relevant categories in this case would be constituted, partly constituted and not constituted. The argument here is that the proposed framework may serve as a point of departure for establishing such categories.
preferences change slowly. A full examination of which foreign policy issues within a policy area were endogenous/exogenous according to Wendt's two criteria would, of course necessitate very detailed and extensive analysis across time periods. But at least the first element, the presence of a domestic constituency which limits and shapes foreign policy preferences, can be looked at in an analysis which does not cover a long time span.

An assumption in the framework is that if a country is not engaged in a particular geographical or functional field (for example due to a lack of resources or of historical/cultural links), EU policy may loom large since this is the central framework through which the substance of national foreign policy is defined. If, on the contrary, a state is engaged in a field, maybe through an active domestic constituency, a vague EU framework will only be one out of many fora and be one out of many constitutive sources at the most general level.

In relation to the issue of endogenous/exogenous, the much broader issue of the impact of language and discourse should also be included (Wendt does not focus on the language dimension of meaning and change. He seems to assume that meaning can be read off the language which has a transparent character). Is the discourse of a Member State used in relation to particular policy issues an EU discourse (in which case the EU context can be seen as constitutive) or, rather, a national discourse? And are more than one discourse present in a particular foreign policy area. The categorisation below does not go into the issues mentioned here in detail. The categories are, in other words, only a starting point for more detailed analysis in different policy areas. We will then draw on the criteria suggested by Wendt (in particular his first element) and the issue of the language used in relation to the specific policy cases.

It is an empirical question what the relationship is between EU foreign policy and national foreign policy across policy areas for a given country. There may be policy areas where the EU has very little impact on national foreign policy. Either because the EU has very little in the way of policy and because policy is very general and does not really restrict or constitute, or because the policy line is the result of the lowest common denominator where basic state positions do not change significantly as a result of EU policy. There can on this background, then, be said to be three broad categories of small-state foreign policy in an EU context: Policy areas where is no national foreign policy outside the EU, Policy areas where there is foreign policy outside the EU, and areas where is no EU policy and therefore only policy outside the EU. These 3 categories constitute the analytical framework for analysing the role of the different organisations in different policy areas of Danish foreign policy. Danish foreign policy will be analysed in 3 cases which will be described in more detail below. This very rough categorisation gives an indication of the areas in which constitutive aspects of EU policy are most likely. The EU's constitutive effects is more likely in the first category and unlikely in the last.

1) Contexts where there is no Danish foreign policy outside the EU context. Here, Danish foreign policy is primarily conducted within and by the EU. Danish foreign policy action takes place within the limits set by the EU framework. The EU may then be strongly constitutive of Danish policy in the sense that
Danish foreign policy understandings are shaped endogenously in the EU context. In a broader sense, it is possible that the discourse drawn on in formulating Danish policy stances is an EU discourse. Whether Danish foreign policy is, in this EU context, shaped exogenously or endogenously is, however, also in this case an empirical question. In principle, there could be a situation where there is no residue, but where interest formation is still predominantly exogenous (which may correspond to saying that the EU is an instrument for coordination between the states which constrains or gives possibilities for furthering policies generated by the domestic constituencies).

2) **Contexts where Danish foreign policy is partly conducted through the EU.** Danish foreign policy may not only be conducted through the EU but may also be conducted in and through other fora. This means that other institutional contexts may contribute to constituting Danish foreign policy preferences. Alternatively, the situation could be one in which Denmark brings up issues where it is most favourable for instrumental reasons based on nationally based discourses. The question is whether the EU plays a role as one forum amongst other fora, and whether in these cases EU stances are exogenous or endogenous to Danish foreign policy-making (a question which is addressed i.a. by focusing on the criteria of Wendt and the language used in Danish and EU foreign policy).

3) **Contexts where Danish foreign policy is not conducted in an EU context.** This may be due to the EU not having a policy line in this field or it may be because EU policy is so broadly formulated that it does not amount to a constraint or shaping force on policy. The policy area might simply be kept out of the EU context by important state-and institutional actors.

Central to the issue of whether Danish foreign policy in conducted within, partly within, or outside the EU context in the light of what has been outlined above are the following questions a) whether the EU can be said to have a policy and how specific it is, b) whether there is a national Danish constituency in the area, a marked policy interest or capacity. If there is a comprehensive EU policy in an area, but little national (Danish) policy interest or capacity, there is likely to be less of a residue in this area (almost by definition). If, on the contrary, there is little in the way of an EU policy line, but a significant Danish policy interest, there is likely to be a policy outside the EU. If there is comprehensive EU policy and a significant Danish policy interest, there is likely to be an active Danish policy within the EU and possibly also in other fora. The aim of the empirical analysis is therefore:

1) To identify which parts of Danish foreign policy belong in which of the three categories identified above (no residue outside the EU, a partial residue, no EU policy). It will then ask whether the EU has a clear and comprehensive policy, and whether there is a strong national constituency within this field of policy 2) In relation to the two first categories (no residue, a partial residue) to examine whether the language drawn on in Danish foreign policy can be said to draw on EU discourses/policies or whether EU discourses/policies are only partially drawn on (or not at all).

The overall aim of the empirical analysis of these questions in concrete cases is to promote a qualified assessment of the overall balance between EU foreign policy and Danish policy across policy areas.
The first question serves as the point of departure. This is addressed by looking at cases in the form of five policy areas, Development, Africa, Latin America, Mediterranean, Europe (although I only deal with findings about the three first in this paper). The reason this choice of areas (apart from the obvious one that some kind of choice is necessary for practical reasons) is that it contains areas far away from Europe, an area in Europe’s periphery and Europe itself. Development is a functional area contrary to the other areas which are geographical.

After having provided an answer to the two questions, the framework asks why there is this degree of residue and this degree of constitutive effects within a given policy area. Two sets of factors are seen as central for the state of affairs within the issue area:

1)- Whether the EU in the area in case has an identifiable policy (This is a precondition for the possibility that Danish foreign policy can be influenced in the field concerned). EU policy must be considered as a given. Although DK can contribute to making the EU policy forceful and substantial, there will have to be more general backing for it to be so, probably by the great powers. Hence its character as given for small states in particular. Also EU policy is a result of a ‘negotiated order’, it will appear as a given for the individual small-state.

2)- Whether there is Danish engagement interest in this policy field including whether there is a degree of Danish domestic interest and interest groups in the field.

A central question is how to conceptualise the nature of the domestic/national realm. The assumption is that the framework of meaning within which national policy is shaped is a fundamental ‘structural’ factor in the domestic realm which shapes and constrains other forces. Other elements are also important, but can often be understood as shaped within the framework of the dominant political framework of meaning such as the amount of Danish foreign policy resources allocated (economic and administrative/diplomatic) and the concrete interests in the area of segments of the domestic environment). The dominant framework of meaning is seen as shaping and constraining action, but this is not to deny that there are constraints on meaning-based practices, emanating from historically segmented understandings or from practices of a different ontological order.

The basic framework of meaning within the domestic realm is the frame constituted by the discourses on Danish actorness in the area (meaning is, in other words, studied in terms of language and discourse). This is divided into to two sub-areas which are closely interconnected. The first sub-area is what kind of role is constructed for Denmark in the policy field concerned (assuming a possible difference across fields). As the values of foreign policy can be seen as emanating from the dominant discourse on the state/nation (Wæver, 1998; Larsen, 1997) (although the conduct of foreign policy arguably also contributes to shaping these understandings (Campbell, 1992), this can, at the most profound level, be seen as the question of whether the Danish state has a mission or role in this part of the world or functional field). The second sub-area is the nature of the construction or articulation of the relationship with the EU in the fields of foreign policy examined. If, for example, the acting subject of
policy in a given field is always articulated as ‘Denmark and the EU’, this suggests that there is little
general foreign policy that is carried out by ‘Denmark’ alone. If, on the other hand, there is never any
reference to the ‘EU’ in a given policy field, but only to ‘Denmark’ or ‘Denmark + xxx (not the EU)’,
this suggests that, in broad terms, there is a residue for Danish foreign policy outside the EU. The
analysis will have to be sensitive to the various discursive articulations of the relationship between
‘Denmark’ and ‘the EU’. Possibilities in relation to the articulation of Danish and/or EU agency in a
particular policy field might be: 1) ‘Denmark’, 2) only ‘the EU’ 3) ‘Denmark and the EU’. The latter
also includes constructions of the relationship between ‘Denmark’ and ‘the EU’, where the two agents
are not directly co-located, but the co-articulation is nevertheless identifiable from analysis of texts, for
example in the form of ‘Denmark in cooperation with its EU-partners’. This category may also
encompass instances where it is difficult to distinguish between the two actors in articulations in a
particular policy field where the identity of the actor is not clear from the text (for example through an
unclear ‘We’). It also comprises cases of polysemy where usages of ‘Denmark’ and ‘EU’ slide into
each other, 4) The ‘EU’ may be presented as an essential instrument for Denmark. Linguistically, one
would here expect constructions like ‘Denmark has through the EU’ or broader articulations of the EU
as essential for ‘Denmark’s’ foreign policy in a given field.

It is possible that the analysis will show a mixed picture where, within each policy field, there are
different articulations of the relationship between ‘DK’ and the ‘EU’. Whether and how they differ is
however also interesting. The focus of this analysis is the relationship between Denmark and the EU.
The analysis will, however, also have to be sensitive to the articulations of ‘Denmark’ with other
actors.

As in most kinds of discourse analysis in general, it is not possible to say why a particular articulation of
‘Denmark’ and ‘EU’ are used, although the analysis will point to some ‘genealogical features’. To
mention the most interesting case, there are at least three interpretations of why there might be co-
articulation of ‘Denmark’ and the ‘EU’: 1) Co-articulation of Denmark and the EU as subjects might be
an expression of a situation where the real foreign policy integration has increased in the area concerned
and the language therefore reflects the political processes, 2) Co-articulation might also be an
expression of the situation where Denmark has never been engaged in the policy area concerned and
Denmark has therefore never, to a large extent, articulated itself as a subject in this field. Denmark’s
actorness in this field is therefore inseparable from the EU. 3) The dominant Danish view within this
policy area is that Denmark needs the EU to obtain its aims and this is expressed through co-
articulation. But whatever the background for the particular usage, the Danish articulations of foreign
policy actorness must be expected to have policy implications, in other words implications, for whether
there is any residue for Danish foreign policy outside the EU and for the extent to which policies and
concepts in Danish foreign policy are different from the EU. The co-articulations are part of the
construction of the (political) world and thus have political effects. There is, thus, no useful distinction
to be made between the social power implications of co-articulations such as ‘Denmark and the
EU’ and the ‘barometer’ (reflection) understanding of this. Both produce social practices.
On the background of these considerations about the ‘external’ (the EU) and the ‘internal’ elements shaping Danish policy, one can put forward the following suggestions for what kind of categories between policy areas can be expected with respect to the residue for Danish policy vis-à-vis the EU and constitutive effects of EU policies on Danish policy:

1) EU foreign policy strongly defined, little Danish policy interest and constituency. ‘Denmark’ rarely articulated as an actor in this field. Frequent ‘Denmark and the EU’ articulations: Little residue (or few attempts to conduct policy elsewhere). Strong constitutive impact.

2) EU foreign policy weak, Danish policy interest and constituency strong. Denmark is articulated as an actor, primarily on its own or with other actors than the EU: A considerable residue (in fact it might well be that Danish attempts to raise the issue in the EU has not succeeded and that is why there the gap that gives rise to a need for using residual possibilities). Few constitutive effects.

3) If the EU has a strong and intensive policy in a field and there are articulations of Danish actorness with a well-defined policy and internal political interest (possibly together with articulations of ‘Denmark through the EU’), there is likely to be a Danish residue. Danish attempts to shape the EU frame, but also action outside the EU. If EU policy is so strong that it legally excludes separate policy (as in the case of external trade and similar areas), there will be little residue outside the EU, but an active policy within it. Constitutive effects possible, but also identifiable Danish understandings leading to particular policy interests and foci.

4) EU foreign policy weak - Danish policy interest and constituency weak. No or little Danish articulation of actorness. Plenty of residue (but no policies to use it), weak constitutive effects.

The central point here is that the residue of national (small-state) foreign policy and constitutive effects vis-à-vis EU foreign policy does not only depend on EU policy or national foreign policy but on both. Danish policy is not launched in a vacuum. Neither does EU foreign policy affect national small-state foreign policy in an uniform way. We can therefore talk about some kind of adaptation between the EU and national foreign policy leading to a particular residue for national foreign policy and constitutive effects. But the adaptation is not (as in the theories of Nikolaj Petersen or Hans Mouritzen) an automatic process resulting from given capabilities of the adapting state in a simple way. Rather, the strength of EU policy in a particular policy area and the (national) construction of actorness are the key elements.

METHODS AND DEFINITIONS

In the following I will briefly describe the methods used and the concrete way of proceeding in the empirical analysis of the 3 policy areas.

First of all, a definition of foreign policy is needed, a definition that not only defines states as foreign
policy actors, but which also retains a certain parsimony with respect to the vast number of international transactions conducted. In one of the most comprehensive books of FPA to date, Hill defines foreign policy as 'the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations' (Hill, 2002:3). The term an 'independent actor' allows the inclusion of foreign policies of actors such as the EU, whereas 'official' allows the inclusion of outputs from all parts of the government machinery of the independent actor in case (Hill, 2002:3-4). As to the substantial content of foreign policy, Hills sees the more central political aspects of this activity as actions, statements and values relating to how the actor wishes to advance its main objectives and to shape the external world (Hill, 2002:4). Moreover, foreign policy is also an attempt to hold together or control the various activities the actor is engaged in internationally, an attempt to create coherence (Hill, 2002:4-5).

Inspired by Bretherton and Vogler (1999) and their constructivist approach to actoriness, we can say that for an actor to be an international actor in a policy area, it needs to have 1) a conception of itself as an actor, 2) a particular framework of meaning within which action is taking place, 3) consistent and concrete policies 4) some kind of administrative/diplomatic apparatus to implement these policies and 5) resources and policy instruments. To be an actor in a particular area must be the same as having a policy in this field. I will therefore use these 5 elements as structuring questions when describing both the character of Denmark and the EU as an actor within a particular policy area. The presentation of the EU’s and Denmark’s policies in the areas examined will therefore follow this structure. However, for reasons of space here, the focus will be on the first three. It is important to stress that when we look at the EU’s or Denmark’s policy towards a particular area, we are not dealing with a static entity as structures of meaning are perpetually being negotiated. In the case of the EU, it should be stressed that EU foreign policy is seen as result of a 'negotiated order' resulting from the negotiations between the actors and pillars involved in EU foreign policy making (Smith, 1996). So in some sense it is a snapshot of a very dynamic and moving structure that I present.

In the case of Denmark I will also look at the domestic environment and its engagement in the policy area in case (reference to the area by government in parliament, questions in parliament, NGOs and business interests involved in the area) and whether there are indications of constitutive effects as a result of participation in EU policy making.

It is only the conclusions to the empirical case studies that are presented here, and there are therefore few references to the source material used to reach the conclusions presented here. The conclusions take the form of answers to two questions: 1) Is Danish policy conducted outside, partly outside, or within the EU framework in this field of policy? 2) Are there signs of constitutive effects on Danish foreign policy from participation in EU foreign policy-making in the field examined. Subsequently an attempt is made to explain this state of affairs (the answers to the two questions) within this field of policy. This is done by drawing on the framework presented above for explaining when a particular degree of residue and the presence of constitutive effects are likely.

POLICY AREAS
I. Development Policy

1. Inside or outside the EU?

There is a very significant scope for Danish aid policy outside the EU on the basis of only 5-6% of total Danish aid being allocated via the Community. This is not same for all EU Member States. In the case of Greece, for example, the aid given via the Community is almost the total of all Greek resources allocated to development. So in the case of Greece, the residue can be expected to be much less significant. In this field of policy, Denmark in many contexts acts bilaterally or through other organisations - the UNDP and the UN’s special agencies in particular. Within the multilateral development contexts Denmark acts alone, with other ad hoc groupings and with the other Nordic countries; but rarely with the EU.

In bilateral aid contexts the residue varies very considerably. In relation to the 20 development countries that are selected for substantial long-term Danish aid (here referred to as PSL), there is a considerable scope for Danish action outside the EU. At the level of aid to individual countries (bilateral aid), there is sometimes EU coordination (the EU’s record is uneven across countries). However, in most contexts where Denmark gives bilateral aid to a developing country, local donor coordination is more significant under the auspices of the UNDP framework, the World Bank or with selected donor countries than within the EU framework. There is little evidence of particularly close coordination between Danish bilateral aid to the PSL countries and the aid of the Commission to these countries. The coordination takes as a point of departure that Denmark demands that the local Danish embassy is allowed to comment on the Commission’s strategy paper for the country in case (Interview in Danish MFA, Danida Annual report). In some cases there is also loose local exchange of information amongst EU Member States about the Community projects (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000b:17).

There is thus a scope for Danish policy in both multilateral and many bilateral contexts - in particular with regard to the PSL countries, but also, to a lesser extent, towards the countries that receive the more modest "transitional aid".

However, there are also contexts where there is little scope for Danish policy outside the EU. This is in fact the case when it comes to development aid to most of the 140 countries globally to which the Community is a donor and Denmark is not a bilateral donor. The only possibility for Danish influence on development within one of these countries is through affecting Community policy and programmes. Towards most of these 140 countries there is thus no residue outside the EU given the present means allocated to Danish development aid and their distribution. Danish development efforts towards these countries almost exclusively has to go through the Community’s aid policies. Denmark does attempt to influence the Commission’s development strategies for these countries by including general Danish development aims (poverty orientation, concern for women, democracy, the environment, prevention of HIV/AIDS, prevention of violent conflicts, young people and children as a resource). However, Denmark does not attempt to influence the individual Community aid project in these countries.
due to a shortage of administrative resources.

Denmark does attempt to shape Community development policy, and indications (and the MFA self-understanding) is that the Danish preferences and values have contributed to shaping the Community aid policy. The new formulations in the TEU in 1991 about development bore a striking resemblance to Danish principles in this field (Olsen, 1995). However, as far as the overall balance between Denmark and the EU/the Community in this field of policy is concerned, Denmark is fully satisfied with the formulations in the treaty about the complementary nature of national and EC aid. Denmark does not want exclusive Community/Union competence in this field. But there is no wish for a fundamentally different balance between EC and Danish aid efforts. However, it would be happy to see a slightly higher Danish contribution to the Community aid budget (from constituting 5-6 % of the Danish aid budget to about 10%). This is seen as useful for instrumental reasons, as such a general increase in contributions to the EU development aid would contribute to raise other EU countries’ contributions in the field of development and thus bringing them closer to the 1 % guideline of the UN.

The overall assessment must be that there is very considerable scope for Danish development policy vis-à-vis the EU in many contexts. Danish development policy is not only conducted through the EU.

2. Constitutive effects?

There is a significant degree of common language between the EU and Denmark. The basic Danish development discourse can (very simplified) be said to be organised in three layers, where the first layer is the most profound and least malleable: 1) Fight against poverty (poverty understood in a broad sense) (the deepest level) 2) which should take into account the environment, the gender aspect and democracy and human rights (the so-called 'cross-cutting concerns', the second level), 3) To this can be added new substantial areas of high priority (HIV; prevention of violent conflicts; young people and children), the third and most malleable and changeable level. In 2001 with the start of a new government and the occurrence of 11 September, new areas of high priority were added to this third level: business development and the fight against terrorism (Udenrigsministeriet, 2002:14).

In the EU documents (the joint declaration on Development by the Commission and the Council from November 2000 for example) the following discursive figure can be found, where the first level is seen as the most profound and the cross-cutting concerns are placed as third level concepts: 1) poverty, 2) 6 concerns: the link between trade and development, regional integration and cooperation, support for macro-economic policies and promotion of equitable access to social services, transport, food security and sustainable rural development, and enhanced institutional capacity building, 3) 5 cross-cutting/horizontal concerns human rights, rights of women, children, the environment, conflict prevention). Many of the same terms are thus used in Danish and EU development discourse, although their internal organisation, and the chains of equivalence that organise them, differ (with the important exception of the fight against poverty which remains the foundation). At a lower and more concrete
level than the general level of discourse outlined above, there is also an overlap in many concepts.

However, there are few indications of a strong constitutive effect of EU language on the language of Danish development policy. If anything, there are indications of the influence of Danish development concepts on the EU/EC's development policies. There are not many indications that the EU language here has affected the language used in relation to Danish development aid. In fact the chronological factor, that many of the principles in EU development aid were present and formulated in the Danish context before the formulation in the EU document analysed in 2000, points to the opposite effect. This is the case with three of the cross-cutting concerns (gender, environment, democracy/human rights) which could be found in Danish development strategies from 1987/88. Conflict prevention which found its way into EU policy in the 1990s, also seems to be found in the Danish language roughly at the same time. Specifically about the basic aim of Community aid, the fight against poverty. Denmark is in many analyses seen as one of the actors in producing the language about EC/EU development which was used in the first formulations about development in the TEU in 1991! (see for example Olsen, 1995). The repeated stressing of compatibility between EU development aims and Danish development aims in the Danida annual reports (Udenrigsministeriet, 1999, 2000a) also points to EU incorporation of (i.e) Danish aims rather than a subtle interaction of meaning. This is also (not surprisingly) the view of the Danish MFA (Interviews Danish MFA).

The basic conceptual figure behind Danish development aid can therefore not be seen to come from the EU. However, there may be scope for other concepts to find their way into the Danish language in relation to development - if not into the general Danish conceptual figure outlined.

Work on Danish development policy have judged that the main import of concepts into Danish development policy comes from the international development agenda, from UN organisations including the World Bank and from selected donors (Olsen, 2002a:14-15). Concepts that were incorporated into Danish development policy in the 1990's were also present on the international agenda. This was the case with concepts such as 'environmental concerns', 'human rights', 'democracy' and 'conflict prevention'. The change from the project approach to development in the first part of the 1990s to the sector-wide approach was also not without parallels at the international level (Olsen, 2002b:32-32; Olsen, 2002a:14-15). Some of these concepts were brought into the language of Danish development policy on the initiative of the aid administration (Olsen, 2002b:32-33). Other concepts have been incorporated as a result of pressure from the Folketing which has itself been influenced by international debates and debates within the UN. This has, for example, been the case with the inclusion of concepts such as 'rural development', 'women', 'environment', and 'human rights'. (Olsen, 2002a:17). Also from the 1994 Danish development strategy onwards it had become part of practice to include inputs from many parts of Danish society (in Danida material referred to as the 'resource base') in the drafting of general development strategies and country strategies. Some concepts were thus also included as a result of pressure from NGOs (Olsen, 2002a:16; Olsen, 2002b:32-33). As to the general conceptual frame for Danish development policy, there are, then, few indications of the incorporation of EU concepts or, to be precise, concepts that were unique to the EU, into the language of Danish
development policy. Olsen has concluded that 'Europeanisation [of the development administration] probably manifested itself most clearly through the demand for coordination with the other EU countries which meant a range of new tasks beside the already existing ones' (Olsen, 2002b:32-33, author's translation).

As to the question of the incorporation of stances and concepts into areas of development politics where Denmark has had no policy previously, the Communities’ development aid to the more than 100 countries to which Denmark does not give any aid, seems like a candidate in point. However, looked at in more detail, one does not get the impression of strong constitutive effects on Danish development policy. Denmark’s development administration is only involved in the Commission’s activities outside the countries that receive Danish aid at a very general level. Denmark comments on the general lines in the Commission’s draft plans for the country in case with the aim of bringing in Danish development principles. But it does not comment on the individual projects within the Commission’s country strategy. This is, to a large extent, due to lack of resources, a shortage which also means that the administration does not have sufficient resources to read and judge the material about concrete Community projects in these countries. Denmark’s engagement within the countries that only receive Commission aid and not Danish aid is therefore very general and (as in the case of Africa see below), there can be said to be limits to the possible incorporation of policy stances and language, as Denmark’s substantial engagement here is limited and there is no particularly operational incorporation of views. There are thus, paradoxically, also limits to constitutive effects through capacity. The Community’s aid policy towards the countries that do not receive Danish aid will, of course, still be something that Denmark is part of formally. But it does not mean a full Danish development engagement on the basis of common EU concepts in the more than 100 countries that only receive EC aid. There is very a significant difference of engagement between PSL countries and the rest. This also indicates that Denmark has not expanded its mental developmental horizon or ambition dramatically as part of the wider development efforts in the EU. EU policy in this field is not a new platform for policy that Denmark can be an active player in. So while, in principle, Denmark has gained access to a much expanded range of development activities, this influence is not used in full but only to affect general values in the development plans for the countries to which Denmark does not give bilateral aid.

3) Why this state of affairs?

On the basis of the general model outlined above for when we would expect a Danish policy outside the EU and when we would not and when we would expect constitutive effects, we should look at the character of the EU frame and the Danish domestic politics in this issue area including the way Denmark is articulated as an actor in this field and how the relationship to the EU is articulated:

a. The EU frame: The Community frame within the field of development can be said to be strong due to the amount of resources available (the Community is the 5th biggest global donor) and the number of countries covered (about 140). The EU as a whole cannot be characterised as strong as its combined
resources spent on development would lead one to believe. There is not a particularly good coordination between Member States development policies and Community policies. And the Commission’s running of the individual projects has from many sides received criticism.

b. The background of Danish policy: Denmark is a strong actor due to the resources spent which makes it one of the 10 biggest donors in the world and (until Government cuts this year) the world’s biggest donor in relative terms with more than 1% of BNP spent on development aid. There are strong domestic political forces which support this role. These are relatively strongly involved compared with other areas of foreign affairs. This is based on a dominant Danish political discourse according to which Denmark is a great power with a sense of moral duty. In the following I will explain this discourse in more detail:

First of all, it can be argued that the specific aims of development policy reflect the self-understanding of the society in question. The ‘other’ or the one who is to be ‘developed’ is constructed as ‘undeveloped’ with reference to the features that the undeveloped countries do not yet have (which are the features of Danish society). These desirable features are for example expressed in the ‘cross-cutting’ concerns in Danish development policy or, more fundamentally, in the aim of alleviating poverty in a broad sense.

Secondly, Denmark, on the basis of what is seen to be a good society (not history or national interests) views as a good state which has a moral insight that makes DK a moral great power. This is also to some extent based on an anti-power approach to IR (although this has somewhat changed after the Cold War). It is these basic elements that have legitimised an active development policy (although it could in principle also work via its example). ‘Denmark’ is articulated as a moral, solidary subject distinguished from states (and IO’s) that give less or lower quality aid. Denmark is clearly presented as a subject in the field of development and a capable state (Due, 2001). This has important implications for the way the EU is articulated.

The analysis shows that the articulation of the EU (and other organisations) in relation to agency in Danish development policy varies significantly according to the context. In the context of development as a part of a political and economic whole or the general political and economic aspects of development, the EU is in official Danish political contexts mentioned as an essential instrument for Danish policy in order to make Danish views heard and to make a difference in the international contexts of importance for the developing countries. The most common construction in general texts is that Denmark uses the EU to promote its own views or make a difference through the EU. The EU is in general contexts presented as the primary forum for Danish influence (where the UN is seen more as a political and normative framework). However, although the EU is articulated as having this important role for (general) Danish development policy, a close identification in the form of ‘Denmark and the EU,...’ is rarely if ever found. The EU is constructed as an essential instrument for Danish policy, but not as an equal subject. The stressing of the EU as important for the political and economical context of Danish development policy is a feature that is increasingly found in the new millennium: ” Denmark will
work actively to ensure that the ongoing strengthening of the ...CFSP is translated into a common, progressive EU line in international organisations.” (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000a:100; See also Udenrigsministeriet, 2000a:3, minister’s preface; Udenrigsministeriet, 1994)

A different role and agency for the EU is constructed when the context is development in more narrow terms and in relation to the Community’s aid. As to the Community’s aid, the location of the EU is as something to be influenced by Danish values and policy aims rather than an essential frame for Danish development policy. It is an object of policy more than an instrument for policy (“Denmark will also support the current efforts being made to improve and make more efficient the quality of EC assistance, the objectives of which correspond closely to the central principles underlying Denmark’s development policy. This will take place through participation in the forming of the EU’s general policy in this field and also through active involvement in the recipient countries” (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000b:100, see also p.99). When the context is EU aid, the expression ‘Denmark and the EU’ is rarely found, although there are instances of the two being articulated as one actor, or language which makes it difficult to distinguish between the two, in the material of the Danish MFA in new Millennium (Petersen, 2001:25; Udenrigsministeriet, 2002:19). In fact, when the reference in official material is to the EU aid, a clear distinction between Denmark and EU aid is often made by clearly making reference to how much Denmark contributes to the Community’s aid budget (see various sections on the EU aid in the Annual reports about development from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

In relation to references to concrete bilateral development aid or to action in multilateral development organisations, the most common is that Denmark is presented as the acting subject without any reference to other actions or institutions (in Annual reports from DANIDA). When there is reference to other actors or institutions, it is more common to find that Danish agency is co-located with the agency of other international actors (including states) than the EU or as taking place within the framework of other organisations than the EU. Concerning the co-articulation of agency, the reference is mostly to the UN and its special agencies and the World Bank. Frequent references are “Denmark and the other donors”, “Denmark and the UNDP”, “Denmark and the World Bank” or “Denmark and (one or more of) the Nordic countries”. When the EU is mentioned in relation to multilateral aid it is often mentioned last (Udenrigsministeriet, 1995:41,44; Udenrigsministeriet, 1996:94,96; Udenrigsministeriet, 1998:79, 86; Udenrigsministeriet, 1999:105; Udenrigsministeriet, 2002:123).

However, in the new millennium, a greater degree of references to the EU including co-articulation of agency in relation to concrete bilateral development policy and actions within (UN) development organisations can be found, for example, “Denmark and the EU” or “Denmark and the Commission”, but they are not frequent. And often there is direct criticism of the EU’s development policy. (Udenrigsministeriet (2000a:76, 87, 96, 106, 131).

There are in other words, two discourses in play: one that sees the EU as an essential actor and instrument for Danish development policy at the general political-economic and security level through which Denmark acts. Here the blurring of Denmark and the EU as actors can often be found, although
the stress is often on how important the EU is for Denmark as an acting subject. It is assumed that the EU is a crucial stepping-stone to world influence. This is drawn on in political language when the context is more political matters (for example in relation to normative matters within the UN). However, there is rarely a close co-articulation of agency. This first discourse dominates in most general development policy contexts and shapes practices here.

There is also another discourse which is dominant in more narrow bilateral and multilateral development contexts. Here the EU is presented as an object (one among many) of Danish policy with Denmark as the acting subject. Denmark has to act with other donors to ensure efficiency, Denmark is part of an international community where the UN is the overarching frame, but Denmark is not equated with the others or with the frame. Denmark is presented as an active actor with significant views to contribute and in relation to development as a “foregangsland” (Roughly translated: pioneer country setting an example) and “leading” in this field (Udenrigsministeriet, 1996:46-47; Udenrigsministeriet, 1997:48; Udenrigsministeriet, 1998:5,7,26,30; Udenrigsministeriet, 1999:8,10; Udenrigsministeriet, 2000a:5,16,72;Udenrigsministeriet, (2001a:46, 101;Udenrigsministeriet, 2002:106; Petersen, 1999:25). This shapes practices within the narrow field of bilateral and multilateral development aid. In relation to most areas of development as they are outlined in the annual report of Danida since the end of the Cold War, the acting subject is mostly Denmark and the approach is therefore the second “development” discourse. This is both the case in relation to Danish policy in the UN’s development agencies and in the concrete description of development activities with regard to horizontal and geographical areas (the latter primarily Denmark’s relations to the countries that receive Danish aid).

In summary, we can say that the characteristics of EU policy within the field of development and the articulation of “Denmark” within that same field constitutes the framework within which the degree of scope for Danish policy vis-à-vis the EU and the presence of constitutive effects can be understood. The strong articulation of Danish actorness, bound up with moral purpose and the projection of central domestic values, combined with its considerable resources, explains why there is considerable scope for Danish policy outside the EU context. Denmark not a small state in the field of development, neither in its self-understanding or in its means. And as this exceptionalism in development distinguishes it from others who contribute less – or less qualified aid - the Commission is not the natural partner for Denmark in this field. This is expressed in the lack of co-articulation with the EU in narrow development contexts. However, Denmark clearly works from the assumption that the EU is important in this field, and attempts to influence EU policies. But in narrow development contexts “Denmark” is the subject and the ‘EU’ the object. This also points to why there are few constitutive effects of EU policies to be found on Danish policy. At the same time, Denmark is not able to fully exploit the increased room for manoeuvre for development activities in a whole range of countries provided by the Community’s aid to almost all developing countries in the world. There is not the capacity for a detailed engagement in all of these countries.

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II. Policy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa

1. Inside or outside the EU?

In Danish policy towards Africa there is scope for Danish policy vis-à-vis the EU with regard to certain countries whereas there is much less towards others. The level of activity, level of detail and organisations through which Danish policy towards Africa is conducted, depends on in which category a country is placed. Countries can be divided into four rough groups:

1) the 10 African countries that are amongst the 18-20 countries selected for Danish development aid (Benin, Burkina Faso, Egypt (the only one that is not ACP), Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia). These countries frequently receive aid that amounts to rather high percentages of the countries’ BNP. Denmark, in these cases, sometimes ranks amongst the 5 most important donors with amounts of aid that are not negligible compared with the ex. colonial powers. For this group of countries there is a relatively strong local diplomatic presence, often intensive contacts to many parts of national governments and a strong interest in the political development of the country. There is a significant domestic Danish interest in these countries from political parties, business organisations, NGOs and parts of the academic community. A dictator taking over in one of these countries will lead to domestic pressure for the adjustment or withdrawal of Danish aid. Danish policy within the EU is active. For this group of countries, the EU is an important frame and instrument for Danish policy, but not the only one. Denmark takes part actively in shaping EU policies towards these countries. But Denmark can also carry out relatively significant policy moves on its own, that is on a bilateral basis (for example cutting off aid to Eritrea as a result of the political developments here in 2001 - a move that was not uniformly followed by similar action by other member states). There is a Danish policy with relatively detailed ambitions. Towards these countries, Denmark also acts through other groupings than the EU, for example through the like-minded group (UK, NL, DK, Nordic countries), with US (as in relation to the weapons embargo towards Sierra Leone), or with the other Nordic countries. Denmark also acts through the UN. However, when Denmark is not a member of the Security Council, the primary political forum is the Human Rights Commission where there is also EU coordination. So here the UN is used through the EU (to the extent that EU agreement is found here which is not always the case. For example, Denmark voted with the US in a resolution against China in 1997).

General Danish policy towards this group of countries can be said to be ‘over and above the EU’ in that Danish stances are not only promoted via the EU and in that Denmark does not always adapt to the meridian positions in the EU (for this term see Nuttall, 1992:314). But the EU is the main political multilateral forum for more general political questions (where the policy elements that relate more narrowly to aid policy are also coordinated in the UN). The EU is seen as an important frame which moderates the influence of the former colonial powers in Africa (interview FMA). The UN as a forum for furthering Danish views (in the form of the General Assembly) is seen as too general to be
operational in relation to day to day political issues in Africa and as only dealing with very serious and acute crises. The Human Rights Commission is also seen as difficult to use because of its broad membership and because of its restricted meeting period (Interview Danish MFA). In both fora there is also EU coordination in most cases.

2) Countries that have previously received aid from Denmark, which owe money to DK or which have been PSL countries (Malawi, Sudan, Eritrea, Niger, Zimbabwe). This group also contains countries which at present receive other kinds of aid than the PSL including so-called transitional aid (for example South Africa, RDC, Niger, Lesotho, Angola, Rwanda, and Cameroun), or which participate in peacekeeping efforts (Eritrea, SADC countries). For the latter category, some countries only receive relative minor amounts of aid whereas others receive amounts that are close to those received by the PSL (See Udenrigsministeriet, 2002:171). In these countries Denmark does not have a diplomatic representation (with the exception of South Africa) but still attempt to follow the political developments there.

3) Countries that are considered of general political interest. This is the case with Nigeria. Here Denmark also follows political developments and formulates policy stances.

Towards the countries in group 2) and 3) there is less of a scope outside the EU than in the first group.

4) The rest of the countries in Africa (about half of the countries on the continent). In these countries there is no Danish representation and no bilateral political activity. To the extent that Denmark takes part in discussions about these countries in international fora at all (including the EU), Danish positions are based on ‘general Danish humanist interests’ (interview MFA). There is rarely participation in international discussions about operational decisions. The political stances that the EU takes will often be primarily as expressions of Danish policy (see also below).

The scope for Danish policy towards Africa outside the EU thus varies from the first group of countries where there is a political residue (in spite of the EU being the primary operational multilateral forum for political questions) to the latter where there is hardly any residue for action outside the EU under the existing circumstances. The strongest alternative source of EU action in the first case is arguably individual action rather than other multilateral contexts. But other partners and organisations are also used. Although Denmark supports subregional African organisations such as SADC economically and strongly supports political organisations on the African continent, the political relations in these contexts are mainly conducted through the EU. The same is the case for relations to Africa as a whole.

Denmark supports a more efficient EU presence in Africa and, during the Danish presidency in 2002, a proposal was put forward for strengthening the EU’s ability to act in Africa. The essence of the Danish discussion paper was that the consistency between the pillars should be enhanced, more consistency in policy views sought, and the ability to produce policy responses adapted more to gradual changes in political conditions. This can be seen as an expression of a wish to see the EU being able to play a
stronger role in Africa through enhancing its functioning (although without institutional changes).

2. Constitutive effects?

I will now analytically distinguish between the question of the use of common language between the EU and Denmark and the question of the incorporation of stances and concepts into areas of development politics where Denmark has previously had no policy.

There is no official Danish political strategy on Africa as an entity in contrast to the case of the EU (where there are common positions on human rights, conflict prevention and ‘blood’ diamonds in Africa). Rather, the general Danish principles which dominate in the field of development are also articulated in relation to countries and policies in Africa shaped by the fact that Danish development aid has for a very long time been concentrated in Africa. The general political principles (as in the case of the EU) focus on promoting development, affecting the internal conditions in African countries and furthering stability and mechanisms of conflict resolution on the continent. While the two latter principles are in Danish political discourse often linked to furthering the first - development - they are also articulated as principles that are important in their own right. In many cases a link is also made between the three concepts. However, the role of stability and peace is clearly emphasised more strongly as basic at the entry into the 21st century (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000c:5, 14).

There are strong similarities between the discourse and concepts in the EU’s and in Denmark’s policies towards Africa. However, in parallel to the considerations about the field of development above, it is difficult to point to general concepts or elements of language that have been incorporated from the EU context. This is because many of these have been present in the Danish or international contexts at the same time as they have been taken up by the EU, making the question of the origins of the concepts difficult to answer clearly.

Where you can perhaps talk about a constitutive effect arising from the EU context is in the EU’s focus (in some contexts) on Africa as a whole continent and as a political entity (as in the Cairo declaration) rather than as a range of individual countries with problems related to development. As mentioned, it is difficult to find an official Danish policy on Africa as a whole. But within the EU, Denmark has been actively furthering strategies towards the whole continent, for example in the form of a proposal during its presidency in 1993 (Larsen, 2000:51). So although this has not been reflected in the form of a Danish ‘Africa policy’, it is an example of a language in which Denmark engages in the EU context and which does not have a clear ‘Danish’ equivalent. It is also significant that Danish political relations with Africa as a whole and the regional organisations in Africa are conducted through the EU.

In relation to the political relations to the countries in Africa towards which Denmark has some relations (1-3 above), it is difficult to find indications of constitutive effects on Danish policies and
understandings. The practitioners (maybe not surprisingly) deny that there any significant cases of Danish language and policy being changed, particularly in relation to the PSL, although the EU is considered a very useful framework for action. According to practitioners, no important edges have been cut off Danish policy positions (interview, MFA).

As to the question of incorporation of stances, there are strong candidates for Danish incorporation of policy stances and language towards countries in Africa where Denmark has traditionally not had any specific policy line or bilateral contacts. As argued above, this amounts to more than half of the countries in Africa. The interesting question is how Denmark draws on the EU positions towards these countries in the (rare) situations where Denmark is forced to pronounce itself on one of these countries in a context which is not formally an EU context.

The preliminary indications here (based on interviews in the MFA) suggest that the presence of EU positions towards these countries (where Denmark does not have any bilateral contacts) to which Denmark is formally party, does not lead to a strong degree of internalisation of these stances and the language that accompanies them. If Denmark is asked to pronounce itself on one of these countries (for example because an NGO asks a question about the situation in this country), the reference to the substance and language of EU policies will not be introduced by the formulation ‘Denmark believes that...’. Such a formulation would suggest that Denmark had internalised the EU’s position as part of its understanding of world politics. This is the formulation that is used in the case of countries with which Denmark has bilateral contacts and a well-defined policy line. Rather, the official formulation used in the case of countries with which Denmark does not have any bilateral contacts will be ‘Denmark supports the EU’s declaration on......’ (interview Danish MFA). In this way, Denmark is distanced from the EU’s stances, indicating that they are not internalised as part of ‘Danish’ policies.

This leads to one immediate conclusion and reflection of a more general character on the background of the policy towards Africa. The immediate conclusion seems to be that if there is a constitutive effect of Denmark’s participation in the EU’s policies towards African countries where Denmark has not previously been strongly engaged, this does not take the simple form of the agent ‘Denmark’ speaking the EU’s discourse unreflectively. It is maybe the case that policy stances rather than discourse is incorporated. Moreover, the common argument that Danish/small-state participation in the EU’s foreign policy has widened the scope of Danish foreign policy may be correct in that Denmark formally is party to decisions relating to countries or regions where it has had no such engagement before (as in the case of many of the African countries). But it does not seem that Denmark taken onboard substantial views and an active stance towards these countries.

It is possible that the case of Danish policy towards Africa is special. This will be looked into in relation to other policy areas later in this paper.

3. Why this state of affairs?
The overall picture is one where there is a clear scope for Danish policy outside the EU in Africa with regard to the PSL and, to a lesser extent, countries that receive other kinds of Danish aid. There is scope for unilateral Danish action. The EU is not the only frame of action; in some cases the EU is even used in an ad hoc way, but it can generally be characterised as the most important operational multilateral political framework towards Africa for Denmark. At the same time there are few indications of constitutive effects on Danish policy arising from participation in EU policies in Africa, although there are indications that this may be the case in relation to policies towards many of the non-aid receiving countries. Let's look at the EU background and the Danish internal background for this.

a) EU framework: EU policy towards Africa must be said to be strong and intense. Many legal CFSP instruments are used and declarations issued. Perhaps most importantly, there are very strong economic means at the disposal of EU policies through the Cotonou agreement (and bilateral aid). There is EU involvement in many crises and cases of conflict resolution (inter alia by special representatives). The old colonial powers are engaged in this policy. However, there are also weaknesses one of which is that it allows parallel national action. There are also problems of acting at all levels with necessary graduation, as EU foreign policy does not function as smoothly as state foreign policy. Another is the lack of consistency between the institutional pillars within the EU.

b) Danish policy and its background: Denmark is a relatively strong political actor in Africa with regard to the countries that receive Danish aid, the PSL in particular (which leaves about 50% of countries in Africa where there is negligible Danish political interest). In the PSL countries there are considerable economic means and diplomatic resources at the disposal of Danish policy, and Danish political interests in the countries in question. There is also domestic interest, linked to the existence of strong groupings in Danish politics supporting development (although very recent trends might modify this picture).

The foundation of this Danish policy line is a dominant discourse which constructs ‘Denmark’ as an actor with moral responsibilities and obligations in Africa parallel to the discourse on development. If there is no specific Danish conception of Danish actorness towards Africa as such, the general moral obligation to support development in the dominant discourse on development combined with what is seen as enormous development problems and problems of stability in Africa, makes ‘Denmark’ an actor with a moral obligation in Africa. Africa has for a long time been constructed as an object to be developed. Denmark is in most contexts articulated within this discourse as the acting subject. Even in the field of security, Denmark is articulated as an actor in Africa, although it needs to use other multilateral organisations (Udenrigsministeriet, 2000c:11). Denmark is not understood as a small power in Africa. On this background it is not surprising that there are articulations of combined ‘Denmark and the EU’ actorness in relation to policy towards Africa (See for example Pedersen, 2001:25; Trøjborg in the Folketing, 26 October 2000). But, when the EU is mentioned, it is mostly positioned as a very important tool for ‘Denmark’ rather than two identical or joint actors. The most common general use in relation to political and broader economic issues with relation to Africa is that the EU is described as important, central or essential actor in relation to Africa (see for example Development Minister
The presence of these two elements (EU policy relatively strong, DK policy relatively strong with resources and domestic backing based on a discourse of actoriness in Africa) in the general analytical scheme can serve as a background for understanding both the Danish political scope vis-à-vis the EU and the active use of the EU. Although the EU policy is relatively fleshed out (as EU policies go), Denmark still has a (substantial) scope, both for unilateral action and other kind of bilateral action. The central discourse on actoriness and moral obligation in Africa is the background of the scope of Danish policy in Africa. Yet the strong policy of the EU, makes it a necessary and maybe the most important tool for Danish policy in Africa. This accounts for both the policy scope and the use of the EU as the most important multilateral context. This is expressed in the EU’s role in the discourse as something that is not fully “into” Denmark in Africa, but something that is mostly articulated as an instrument. Within the dominant discourse in Denmark, Denmark is understood as a great power in Africa.

4) The model and constitutive effects:

This situation means that we would not expect a huge amount of constitutive effects in relation to PSL and other aid-related or special interest countries. But interestingly, the limits on DK’s size does still impose limits. In the (more than half of) African countries where DK has little engagement, the EU line does not leave much scope for Danish policy and hence open up for constitutive effects. There is, in other words, a very mixed level of Danish engagement in Africa which gives rise to different possibilities for constitutive effects. As shown above, there does, however, seem to be limits to the internalisation of EU concepts and values even in the African countries where Denmark has little engagement. However, the EU declarations on `non-interest- countries´ can certainly be said to be said to be constitutive of policy. When it is no more than that it might, paradoxically have something to do with Denmark’s after all limited diplomatic/administrative ressources - even in Africa.

III. Policy Towards Latin America

1) Inside or outside the EU?

There is little scope for Danish policy towards Latin America outside the EU when it comes to general political and economic policy positions. Clear Danish stances in bilateral relations with Latin American countries are concentrated on the PSL countries (Bolivia and Nicaragua) and Guatemala and its peace process. Other countries towards which Danish polical stances can be found are the rich Mercosur countries, Chile and Mexico, but the EU appears as the primary framework within which these stances are promoted. Danish policy appears more as implementation within the EU political/economic
framework and, at the bilateral level, focused on trade and exports. The primary bilateral efforts can arguably be characterised as trade promotion rather than diplomacy.

For other LA countries or regional LA groupings than the ones mentioned above, the EU is the framework through which Danish policy is conducted, as there are no expressions of unilateral Danish stances with regard to these countries or groups or expressions of policy in bilateral contexts. The only context in which other organisations are frameworks for Danish action in relation to operational policy in LA, is in the field of development aid. Here there is some use of other organisations than the EU.

In summary, there is some political residue outside the EU in relation to the two PSL countries, Bolivia and Nicaragua, and towards Guatemala. But outside this context, the EU seems to be the frame within which general economic and political stances are formulated and, consequently, Denmark’s policy conducted.

2. Constitutive effects?

The structure in the presentation of Denmark’s bilateral relationship with Latin America in official documents very much follows the structures in the EU’s agreements with the region (which are divided into politics, economics/trade and development). This points to (but does not in itself provide documentation for) the existence of Danish internalisation of the EU’s approach to the region.

It is striking how, in the information booklet material from the Danish Foreign Ministry on Latin America (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b), the central documents provided in annexes are the EU’s political and economic agreements with the region rather than Danish policy documents (the Danish documents published have a much more technical/export related character). This suggest that there is no alternative Danish conceptual framework or supplementary framework as far as the general political and economic principles are concerned. The EU’s conceptual structure for the region is the Danish one.

In all the countries and towards all the regional groupings where DK does not have embassies and links, the constitutive effects of EU policies are potentially great (an issue that has yet to be explored).

3) Why this state of affairs?

The situation to be accounted for is, then, that there is hardly any political scope for Denmark outside the EU with the exception of the PSL countries/Guatemala context. No other organisations are used or there are no significant unilateral/bilateral stances on general political matters. We will now discuss why:

a) EU frame: The EU policy is comprehensive and developed, in particular in the general economic
field. The EU has links to all countries in the region of both a political and, in particular, economic character. Many political declarations are issued towards both internal and external problems in LA, including human rights (but no other CFSP instruments have been used to date apart from the political dialogues in connection with the general agreements). However, the EU policy towards Latin America cannot be described as developed and comprehensive as the Cotonou/ Lomé framework. In Africa the EU is a stronger actor (and less challenged by the US). The EU's links to LA are of a more recent origin than links towards Africa. There are weaker colonial links than in the case of Africa. There is no direct EU involvement in crises in LA contrary to Africa. The EU's economic resources not as influential in Latin America as they are in Africa (due to African economic weakness), although pr. capita EU aid to LA is the highest given to any region by the EU. Compared with Africa, there is more of a reciprocal interregional strategic interest in the relationship.

b) Danish policy background: Latin America has not been a significant political region for Denmark historically. In Danish foreign policy there is little sense of a Danish mission or role in the region apart from furthering trade. The furthering of Danish values in Latin America are presented as a very general project rather than a specific obligation. However, Denmark does articulate itself as an actor with a mission in relation to development issues in Latin America. But this mission does not extend to the continent as whole, not least because the economic resources (aid) allocated to Latin America are restricted compared to those allocated to Africa. There is also little domestic Danish interest in LA, although there are signs that it may be increasing (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b). There are frequent contexts in which the acting subject is constructed as 'Denmark and the EU' or equivalent constructions rather than 'Denmark'. This is, in fact, the most common articulation in general political and economic contexts.

The Danish preferences promoted within the EU appear to be the general Danish views on trade and human rights. The Danish impact on the EU frame through proactive action has mostly, it seems, been on EU development issues in LA (Udenrigsministeriet, 2001b).

The presence of these two elements (a relatively comprehensive and strong EU policy, if not as strong as towards Africa. A Danish policy which is not based on a special mission in LA, although interest has increased in relation to trade, with frequent co-articulation of Denmark and the EU as actors) can serve to understand the little Danish residue towards LA outside the EU and hence the limited scope of Danish bilateral relations outside the PSL countries. The EU is such a prominent framework for Danish policy because there is no significant Danish political engagement or articulation of Danish actoriness in relation to the Latin American continent which could lead to political pressures for a more unilateral policy or use of other fora or partners. The EU thus becomes the obvious and automatic provider, and coordinator of policy stances. This situation (little scope for policy outside the EU) can be expected to lead to constitutive effects, as also indicated above.

There does not seem to be any particular Danish policy attempts or expressions of a desire to develop the EU frame. It appears as a positive given rather than as an independent aim. There are no examples
of complaints about the efficiency of the EU frame as in the case of Africa. This gives the impression of limited Danish activism in promoting EU presence in Latin America as a separate point. It is a given that DK is very happy with the EU role in relation to the EU, but that is as far as it goes.

CONCLUSION

This paper has first outlined a model for analysing when Danish foreign policy is conducted mainly within the EU and why this is the case within particular policy areas. The model focuses whether policy is conducted outside, partly withinor within the EU and possible constitutive effects. The degree of scope for national policy vis-à-vis the EU and constitutive influence of EU policies within a given policy area was seen as depending on the comprehensiveness, strength and intensity of the EU framework combined with the articulation of Danish political actoriness in the policy area. The framework was used to analyse 3 policy areas.

The empirical analyses showed a considerable variation across the policy areas examined. In the field of development there was very considerable scope outside the EU - in particular with regard to development activities narrowly defined. There were very few indications of constitutive effects from participation in the EU. In the case of the policy towards Africa, there was also a significant scope for policies outside the EU. However, the EU was the most important operational multilateral forum for Danish policy. There were few indications of constitutive effects, although the focus on Africa as a whole was seen as a policy focus that Denmark was mainly engaged in in the EU context. However, the identification of a scope for foreign policy action outside the EU in both policy areas has to be qualified quite considerably as the findings do not apply to the policy areas a whole. Both within development and policy towards Africa, there are geographical areas where Denmark is hardly engaged at all and where the most concrete Danish policy stances will be the ones that are established through the EU’s engagement. Here there is clearly a constitutive effect as far as policy is concerned. At the same time it is interesting to note that Denmark’s formal participation in EU foreign policy towards these geographical areas (in the case of Africa) does not seem to have let to a recognisable interest in these regions let alone an internalisation of EU language or policy stances within the Danish political/administrative environment.

In the case of Latin America, there was a much less of a residue for Danish policy outside the EU than in the fields of development and policy towards Africa. It was only towards the few (2-3) countries that receive Danish development aid in Latin America that examples of significant bilateral political activity could be found. For the rest, the EU’s agreements with Latin America remained the central frameworks for Denmark’s foreign policy towards the region with little in the way of other multilateral let alone bilateral possibilities. Bilateral Danish policy in Latin America generally focuses on trade and not politics. The presentation of relations with LA in official Danish material seems to follow the concepts and structure in the EU’s agreements with the region.
The basic feature behind the existence of a scope for Danish policy vis-à-vis the EU seems to be an articulation of Danish political actorness within a policy area and the economic and diplomatic resources that flow from this. Even when EU policy is relatively strong as it is in Africa, there is still a scope if Denmark articulates strong actorness including a moral obligation in the area. And in the case of development, the considerable resources used by the Community in this field does not exclude a significant Danish residue. But the opposite is also true: When the EU has an identifiable policy line, LA and Denmark does not articulate a strong actorness and role/mission in the area, the EU becomes the primary and defining framework for Danish policy in the policy area. Here it characteristic that the actors in policies towards the region are often in the Danish political context articulated as "Denmark and the EU" or other formulations that make the identity of the acting subject unclear. In contexts where there is more of a scope for Danish policy but where the EU is articulated as an important actor, the articulations in official Danish foreign policy texts often take the form of "Denmark through the EU" or similar formulations which suggest that the EU is an instrument for Danish policy rather than a joint subject.

The 3 policy areas examined in the case of Denmark indicate that in terms of substance, the role of the EU’s for small state foreign policy differ from area to area. A crucial factor in defining whether there might be an identifiable small state foreign policy outside the EU depends on the understandings of actorness within the different policy areas and differences in this respect between policy areas affect the foreign policy scope outside the EU and the likelihood of constitutive effects from participation in EU foreign policy. In some policy areas the actor is articulated as "Denmark and the EU" (which suggest a small residue for national foreign policy) whereas in others the state (in this case "Denmark") is still articulated as the acting subject. In some policy areas, we both find articulations of national actorness and of "national actorness + EU" or even "national actorness through the EU". If there is no articulation of national actorness in a policy area, a strong EU policy is likely to be the most concrete expression of national foreign policy.

The few policy areas examined in relation to Danish foreign policy indicate that the existence of a scope for national (small-state) foreign policy and constitutive effects vis-à-vis EU foreign policy do not depend on EU policy or national foreign policy but on both. EU foreign policy does in other words not affect national small-state foreign policy in an uniform way. And it is therefore (on the basis of the case examined here) too much of a simplification to say that small EU Member States’ foreign policy is conducted through the EU.

It can of course be argued that both the country examined and the policy areas analysed are not typical for small states in the EU or for policy areas. This might be right. Denmark is not an uninteresting case in that it is often described as reticent towards European integration. If we had found strong effects on Danish foreign policy substance from participating in the EU across all policy areas it would therefore have been an interesting finding of general value. However, if anything, the conclusions point in the opposite direction. And it is possible that Denmark articulates more actorness outside the EU than other small states within the EU. In any case, studies involving more small states in the EU would be
valuable. The present paper has only studied one country across policy areas. However, the framework seems to have been useful in pointing to differences between policy areas, and ways to study this, rather than just dealing with an assumed general policy line.

As to the cases examined, it is quite possible that these are not (taken as a whole) a typical sample. In the field of development and in policy towards Africa, it is possible that we are looking at the areas where there is the most marked articulations of Danish actorness without the EU. Denmark has more resources at its disposal in the field of development and towards Africa than towards many other parts of the world. It is possible that most policy areas look more like the policy towards Latin America than the field of development or policy towards Africa. It will be necessary to look into more policy areas to get a broader picture.

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