Debating Democracy in the European Union
- Four Concurrent Paradigms

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Abstract:
This paper seeks to explain the apparent lack of progress in the debate about democracy in the European Union. It will be argued that a number of different paradigms exist within the literature that are failing to communicate effectively with each other. The paper will open by presenting some of the methodological problems faced by researchers, followed by a discussion of analytical and operational definitions of the term "the democratic deficit". On the basis of these discussions, four paradigms within the literature on democracy in the EU will be identified:
One paradigm (the Efficiency Paradigm) asks to which extent output can satisfy legitimacy requirements. A second paradigm -- the Vertical Democracy Paradigm -- is pre-occupied with links between the EU and national levels of government, whereas a third paradigm, the Horizontal Democracy Paradigm, discusses how greater democracy can be ensured via changes in the division of powers between EU institutions. Finally, the Socio-Psychological Paradigm debates what the lack of a European demos means for the future of the EU.
The paper will show how these four paradigms exist alongside each other and that real dialogue exists only within each debate, hence the term 'paradigm.' It will be concluded that it is time to introduce greater, real communication between the four paradigms in order to achieve a productive debate. Some questions - such as from where it is intended, and could realistically be expected, that the EU should derive its legitimacy - need to be addressed before others of a more institutional nature can be settled in a meaningful way.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, the issue of democracy in the European Union (the EU) has been receiving increased attention. Questions have been raised about the democratic legitimacy of governance and decision-making structures in the EU and of the integration process itself. However, despite a substantial amount of research, the issues that are being discussed 10 years or so into the debate have not changed much and communication between scholars has not improved. For instance, the term ‘the democratic deficit’ has been used for so long, by so many and with so many different interpretations that it is hard to see how the term can have a specific meaning. Considering the fact that a European Convention is currently ongoing with the aim of making recommendations for EU reform by 2004, this is not an ideal situation. Particularly, given the fact that the academic work on policy seems to have progressed to a far higher extent, which means that the debate about democratic legitimacy is lagging behind the debate about efficiency. This paper attempts to offer an explanation for this lack of progress by identifying a number of different paradigms within the literature that – despite internal progress - are failing to communicate effectively with each other.

The paper is organised in four sections. After the general introduction, Section Two will provide a description of the debate and its origins, discuss central methodological problems (particularly the problems caused by contested concepts) and the term “the democratic deficit”. These discussions provide the necessary background for Section Three which is the core of the paper in that it identifies the four paradigms all operating under the “EU democracy heading”:

The first paradigm can be labelled ‘the efficiency paradigm’ because it discusses to which extent output can satisfy legitimacy requirements. Its main object of study is policy. The second paradigm, on the other hand, focuses on the governing. This can
be labelled 'the vertical democracy paradigm' because it studies the link between the EU and national levels of government. The third paradigm also studies the governing but with the focus on power relations between EU institutions. This paradigm can be called 'the horizontal democracy paradigm' because it debates how redistribution of powers at EU level can contribute to ensuring greater democracy. Finally, 'the sociopsychological paradigm' asks what the lack of a European people means for the future democratisation of the EU. The paper will show how the different paradigms, which are concerned with different aspects of democracy and/or of the EU itself, are taking place alongside each other, sometimes giving the false impression that communication is ongoing between them. However, it will be argued that real dialogue exists only within each debate, hence the term 'paradigm'.

In Section Four, it will be concluded that until the situation evolves into one of 'normal science', the debate about democracy in the EU will continue to lead everywhere and nowhere at the same time. One way out of the stalemate will be suggested, i.e. that some questions (such as from where it is intended, and could realistically be expected, that the EU should derive its legitimacy) need to be settled before others of a more institutional nature can be handled in a meaningful way.

2. THE DEBATE

The academic debate about democracy in the EU has a number of particular characteristics: First of all, it is interdisciplinary. Not only in the sense that scholars from various disciplines address the issue but also in the sense that there is a rather high degree of communication between the various disciplines, these being mainly law, political science/international relations, economics and sociology. The broadness of the debate ensures a wider perspective although it also means that approaches vary not only between scholars but also between disciplines. The danger is that with the many different angles, even within individual disciplines, the debate becomes unproductive because theorists are all preoccupied with the areas that they have identified as the 'problem'. So not only does disagreement exist about potential solutions but these
disagreements are intensified by the fact that the ‘problem’ has not been clearly identified.

Lord (1998, 11) uses an analogy by Donald Puchala to describe this problem: A group of blind men approach and touch an elephant in order to find out what it is. Each person investigates a different part and therefore they all come to different conclusions.¹ According to Lord, this analogy pretty much describes current research into the EU’s alleged democratic deficit. Not only do scholars define the deficit differently but the result of looking at isolated parts often becomes that what one theorist would consider a reasonable solution to a particular problem, would worsen the problem as identified by another scholar.

Another problem is that the EU democracy debate is relatively new and still in the process of developing a common frame of reference. Prior to 1992, it was generally held that the EU derived its legitimacy from the democratic character of its member states. (Majone, 1998, 12) which was justified in “the principle that a body that is composed of legitimate governments is itself legitimate” (Lord and Beetham, 2001, 444). The Maastricht ratification crisis in 1992 contributed to changing this,² as did increasing concerns about the planned deepening to include social, monetary, foreign and regulatory policy reins (Moravcsik, 1998, 42). As a result, there is not yet consensus as regards even commonly used terminology. The most clear-cut example of this is the term ‘the democratic deficit’ which is applied to the EU by a number of scholars despite the fact that no unanimity exists as to what the deficit entails (Lord, 2001, 642), leading one scholar to deem the term ‘meaningless’ (Hix, 1998, 19). Furthermore, not all scholars subscribe to the view that the EU actually has a democratic deficit arguing that the assumption that the EU has a democratic deficit stems from a tendency amongst scholars to compare the EU to an abstract perfect model of democracy rather than empirical studies of the workings of political systems. (See Moravcsik, 2002, 621).

¹ The analogy was originally used to describe the study of the European Union whereas Lord uses it to describe “the study of the so-called deficit” (Lord, 1998, 11).
² The Danish rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht and the “surprise” result of the French referendum put an end to the notion of public ‘permissive consensus’ that had so far been taken for granted by
The Problem of Contested Concepts

The EU

All of the above issues are related to another problem, namely the lack of a common perception of the 'European Union'. There is no agreement as to what kind of entity the EU is, let alone should be. This is important because – unsurprisingly - there is a link between the label on a political system (e.g. state or international organisation) and requirements for its democratic standards. Consequently, any discussion about democracy in the EU is bound to be even more complex than a discussion about democracy in a nation-state: In a debate about democracy within, say, France or Sweden, there would at least be an intersubjective understanding of 'France' or 'Sweden' because most people would consent to classifying the two as 'states' thereby providing a frame of reference for the object of the discussion. This is no longer the case if 'France' or 'Sweden' is replaced by the 'European Union' which despite its actual existence has no conceptual ideal to measure itself against. And although no actual democracy ever measures up to the standards set for an ideal democracy (Dahl, 1989, 84), in a state there would be some sort of common idea of what the ideal should be, making it comparatively easier to identify and evaluate shortcomings. The EU democracy debate is more complex because it concerns the development of the polity type as well as the specific case of the EU at the same time. Thus, the democracy debate is hard to separate from the structural EU debate because all proposals on how to increase democracy will in a way be prescriptions for the design of the system. Of course, uncertainties about democracy are not specific to the EU. However, it would appear – at least for the moment – that public trust in the EU is suffering to a far higher degree than that of the regimes of the European nation states at

the elite. Although whether this was really more a case of 'benevolent indifference' remains an open question. (See Brok, 2001, 31).

3 Of course, classifying Sweden and France as states is by no means equivalent to having answered the question of what constitutes a state, only that whatever a state is, Sweden and France are both examples of one.

4 The EU is an objet politique non-identifié (Schmitter, 2000, 344).

5 "Arguments about Europe's democratic deficit are really arguments about the nature and ultimate goals of the integration process" (Majone, 1998, 5).

6 See Pharr et al. (2000).
least as regards the ‘mainstream political public’ by which I mean the part of public opinion which is not separatist or anti-system in one way or another. This may be related to the fact that the EU is a relatively new regime (compared to nation states) which can only derive legitimacy from legal sources (efficiency and democracy). In contrast, domestic regimes may tend to derive part of their legitimacy from tradition, which is why even well known peculiarities regarding representation or participation (such as for instance The House of Lords in the UK and the banning of certain political parties in a number of European countries) are accepted relatively benevolently by national publics. This is not to say that legal and traditional legitimacy are on equal footing in national systems, only that there may be an element of tradition (history) present which allows for shortcomings in domestic systems, an acceptance which does not translate to the EU polity.

Democracy

Anyone who sets out to measure democracy is, of course, asking for trouble because of the lack of a universally accepted definition of the concept ‘democracy’ – most notably at the operational level. However, this is precisely the reason why such investigations are necessary. The inherent elasticity of ‘democracy’ as a concept gives rise to a need for regular evaluations (particularly in times of regime transformation) because otherwise there is always a risk that the term can be continuously stretched to cover a wide range of fancy regimes which in a worst case scenario could result in ‘democracy’ being diluted to the extent that it becomes completely meaningless. Or as Lord puts it – slightly more elegantly: “The notion that there is no universally ap-

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7 Even if we accept the claim that faith in national political systems has declined, it is still a minority of people who question the rights to exist of the polity itself (the nation state). In fact, loss of faith in a political system does not have to correlate with loss of belief in the polity at all. On the contrary. However, because the EU is a relatively new polity, loss of faith in its political system causes a doubt in the right to exist of the polity itself and indeed the reality of the existence of the polity in the first place.

8 It is true that many nation-states are relatively new (some even newer than the EU). However, the EU is not only a new example of a type of polity, it is a new polity type.

9 Weber distinguishes between legal, traditional or charismatic legitimacy: “There are three pure types of legitimate authority: The validity of their claim to legitimacy may be based on: 1. Rational grounds – resting on a belief in the ‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority). 2. Traditional grounds – resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the status of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority); or finally 3. Charismatic authority – resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority). (Weber, 1964, 328).
appropriate approach to democratic politics should not, however, be taken as opening the door to an extreme relativism in which anything will do” (Lord, 1998, 15).

On the other hand, the term ‘democracy’ is not so ambiguous that scholars do not share at least some lowest common denominators as to what constitutes a democracy. In fact, it is assumed here that mainstream scholars would be able to agree on a set of lowest common denominators for a democratic system. This is a similar rationale to the one followed by Collier and Levitsky in their ‘minimal definitions’ of democracies where they “deliberately focus on the smallest possible number of attributes that are still seen as producing a viable definition.” (Collier and Levitsky, 1996, 6). The figure below should illustrate this way of thinking.

**Fig. 1: Democracy as an absolute as well as a relative variable**

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Less democratic  More democratic

← ------------------ →

Non-

democracy | Democracy

Lowest common denominators
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In addition to being an absolute variable, democracy can be measured on a continuum. Thus, a system is not only seen as either democratic or not but also as *more or less* democratic. The lowest common denominators for a democracy would therefore be just to the right of the black vertical line in the figure. All democracies qualified to cluster to the right of this line will be more or less democratic depending on the other elements of democracy chosen *in addition* to the lowest common denominators.

A suggestion as to what such lowest common denominators could be will follow after completion of the methodological discussion.

As has been demonstrated, we are dealing here with two equally ambiguous terms, namely democracy and the EU. However, going back to the headline ‘democracy in the European Union’, in the context of this particular discussion, even the relatively harmless preposition ‘in’ needs some clarification. The reason being that it could be
argued that for investigations into EU democracy to be complete, the term 'democracy in the EU' should cover all aspects of democracy in the EU. Not only those pertaining specifically to EU institutions and decision-making (horizontal democracy) but also the former combined with domestic processes at national or regional level (vertical democracy) since these are all part of the multilevel governance system to which the EU populace is subjected. An account of these arguments will be provided in the description of the vertical democracy paradigm.

The 'Democratic Deficit'

Analytical Considerations

Before looking at the numerous operational meanings of the term “democratic deficit”, it is worth considering its analytical implications. Obviously, the use of the word 'deficit' immediately gives a negative impression. But there are different ways in which this is interpreted, and the analytical connotations of the term will often affect the weight scholars give to the operational meanings i.e. concrete examples of democratic shortcomings in the institutional design of the EU or the integration process itself.

Wincott suggests two interpretations of the word ‘deficit’ used in this context. According to one understanding, the term “immediately suggests that there is too little democracy” whereas the other interpretation suggests “that Europe has overdrawn its democratic account, that it was ‘borrowing’ to finance current projects, against future legitimacy” (Wincott, 1998, 414). It is worth reiterating in short these two crucially different interpretations because this distinction is useful in explaining the very different reactions to the deficit.

Definition 1: Too little democracy
Definition 2: Overdrawn democracy account.

It is inferred in definition 1 that the situation is unacceptable and needs to be dealt with whereas definition 2, the idea that 'the democracy account is overdrawn for the
sake of efficiency' seems to carry an implicit acceptance of such an overdraft for the sake of 'progress'. Thus, the outcome of any analysis of democracy in the EU will, to an extent, depend to which of these interpretations the analyst subscribes.

Before looking at the alleged shortcomings of the EU system, it is useful to return to the lowest common denominator construct. As illustrated in fig. 1, it is possible to see democracy both as an absolute and as a relative variable. And although democracy is a contested concept, it will be argued that on the basis of the literature it is possible to construct a model, which outlines these lowest common denominators.

Lord offers a useful definition of common denominators of a democracy. These can be shown in a very simple graphic:

**Fig. 2: Elements of Democratic Legitimacy**

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Equal representation

Identity

Authorisation Accountability
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According to Lord, these are the tests that all democracies will have to satisfy: **Authority**: There has to be proper authorisation of leader and power relations. This is twofold. First of all, there must be a 'consent to the overall structure of the power relations (Lord, 1998, 16). This is equivalent to Weiler's category 'legitimacy as a category of formal/legal validity' (Weiler, 1998, 231), i.e. the system whereby governments get to become the governments. Secondly, the leaders themselves must be accepted as legitimate (Lord, 1998, 16).

**Accountability**: Rulers have to be accountable to the public (which in turn requires transparency) (Lord, 1998, 15).

**Representation**: Thirdly, decisions will have to be made in a manner, which is, representative of public needs and values (Lord, 1998, 15).

**Identity**: The latter presupposes a common identity because needs and values have to be shared. (Lord, 1998, 15). Scharpf describes this phenomenon as the 'essential sameness..... arising from pre-existing commonalities of history, language, culture and ethnicity'. (Scharpf, 1999, 8).
Whilst Lord’s tests are by no means beyond dispute, it will be argued here that they constitute a fair description of the lowest common denominators for a democracy. However, it would probably be reasonable to add the word “equal” in front of “representation.” In an article from 2001, Lord and Beetham do just that, stating: “Where there is political equality, the structural incentive is further honed towards tracking the needs and values of the median citizen, whose views have the unique quality of being the least average distance from those of everyone else where preferences are normally distributed” (Lord and Beetham, 2001, 454), and that “.... the Union cannot escape the need for representative institutions if it is to deliver the core attribute of democratic governance, which we take to be public control with political equality”. (Lord and Beetham, 2001, 458).

Operational Definitions

So, does the EU live up to these democratic standards? That, of course, depends who we ask. However, if we look at the isolated “deficits” pointed out by the literature, the answer is that the EU fails on all counts. As we shall see, the real question seems to be whether – or to which extent – this matters.

The most common ‘democratic deficits” identified by the literature are as follows:

- That the EP does not have sufficient influence mainly because they cannot throw out the executive,
- that decision-making processes in the Council allows executives to escape domestic public control,
- that qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council is undemocratic to outvoted publics,

10 “Throughout the process of making binding decisions, citizens ought to have an adequate opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for expressing their preferences as to the final outcome. They must have adequate and equal opportunities for placing questions on the agenda and for expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another” (Dahl, 1989, 109).

11 By adding “equal” to “representation” we have now – substantially – changed the definition of democracy. An example of an operational consequence of this is that “network governance” becomes less legitimate because although networks are examples of representation they do not provide equal representation. In fact, quite the contrary. “Networks are sectional interests with needs and motivations of their own. Access to them is governed by ownership of resources, not by possession of an opinion worthy of equal consideration”.. (Lord and Beetham, 2001, 455).
• that the EP is not legitimate,
• that the Commission is an unelected agenda setter and as such has far too much power,
• that there is too much delegation of authority to experts and bureaucrats\textsuperscript{12},
• that the European Court of Justice has continuously expanded its own powers
• that extensive lobbying perverts equal representation,
• that the integration process itself is at times illegitimate,
• that the decision-making process is too remote from the European publics, and finally
• that there is no such thing as a EU people (and that consequently there can be no EU democracy other than one, which derives its legitimacy entirely from the member states).\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} In the European Union the largely bureaucratic decision-making process of the experts in Brussels offers an example of the type of democratic deficit caused by the shift away from national decision-making bodies to interstate committees of government representatives" (Habermas, 2000, 52).
\textsuperscript{13} Another area of concern has been put forward: the alleged failure of the EU to ensure adequate social rights. One recent example of this critique is an article from 1997, in which Annabel Kiernan argues that due to globalisation (which in her interpretation seems to equate 'increased market competition') European governments have felt forced to create "post welfare-state" economies which have resulted in the removal of certain social rights and the acceleration of social exclusion to an extent that makes Kiernan ask the question of whether 'we have seen the end of the social contract' (Kiernan, 1997, 323). In essence, Kiernan's argument is about inclusion and her main point seems to be that - although the EU provides certain rights for workers - these rights are not extended to all citizens (because not all citizens work) and, therefore, the weakest are excluded from the benefits of the EU although not from the setbacks of the nation state. This, she argues, undermines the EU's democratic legitimacy. Kiernan's argument is based on two assumptions: 1. That states have ceased to protect citizens and 2. that social rights are an essential part of the social contract and that regimes, therefore, derive part of their legitimacy from some sort of social delivery. Although it is generally accepted that there has been a rollback of the welfare state in the 1990s this is not the equivalent of states not protecting their citizens. Also, that social rights should be an essential part of the social contract is far from indisputable. To liberals, the social contract is mainly about protecting negative rights whereas the absence of certain positive rights does not necessarily mean that a system is not democratic. From a liberal perspective social rights could even make a system less democratic as many liberals would hold that the social rights of one individual would serve to violate the more important liberal rights of another individual thereby making the system in question less rather than more democratic (See Berlin, 1958). Therefore, the importance subscribed to negative versus positive rights in a political system cannot be used as a yardstick to measure degrees of democracy or a distinction between a democracy and a non-democracy but only to determine which kind of democracy the system is, i.e. an ideal type liberal democracy or an ideal type social democracy. Thus, arguments about social rights are not included in the 'lowest common denominator definition' as described above. Having said this, one of the preconditions of democracy is that citizens are equipped to do their bit for the process. "... to know what it wants, or what is best, the people must be enlightened, at least to some degree." (Dahl, 1989, 111) Therefore, to an extent, it could be argued that democracies must make available not only transparency but also the education and training of its citizens so that they are ready to take on what is essentially their responsibility of government. "No one would dispute the fact that it is a lawgiver's prime duty to arrange for the education of the young. In states where this is not
When scanning this list, two things are clear: More or less every part of the EU is represented in one or more of the deficits. Secondly, some of the deficits are contradictory. Most notably, the deficit, which says that the EP has too little power, cannot coexist with a deficit, which argues that there is no EU-wide demos. Thus, there is no such thing as "a" democratic deficit (unless by that phrase one means the "sum of deficits") but a range of possible deficits of which some may not be considered deficits by everybody. In fact, the latter would be logically impossible precisely because of the obvious contradictions between some of the "deficits". Finally, the weight analysts put on these deficits is likely to be connected to his/her analytical interpretation of the word deficit used in a democracy context.

3. FOUR PARADIGMS

The above should be sufficient to show that the literature is far from reaching consensus on the definition of the democratic deficit and thus even further from consensus regarding appropriate solutions. There is not even consensus on whether or not the EU actually has a problem as far as democracy is concerned. On the other hand, things are not so diffuse that the debate is just one big melting pot where anything is thrown in without any kind of order. In fact, it is possible to identify at least four paradigms within the literature, each with their own research community, research question and focus.

As will hopefully become clear, the paradigms are not division of scholars into four groupings. Rather they are divisions of foci into four groupings. Thus, scholars are often members of more than one paradigm. This is consistent with Kuhn's usage of the word: "Usually, individual scientists, particularly the ablest, will belong to several such groups either simultaneously or in succession" (Kuhn, 1996, 178).

done the quality of the constitution suffers" (Aristotle, 1992, 452). The issue is addressed in by Moravcsik (2002, pp. 617-18) who argues that in any case libertarians characterise the EU as a social democratic project (Moravcsik, 2002, 617, footnote). For these reasons, this paper will not include the social argument in the lowest common denominator definition.
This means that to an extent, frequently used terms and concepts mean the same within the each paradigm. For instance, the term “democratic deficit” will mean something different under the vertical paradigm (loss of democratic control via the EU), the horizontal paradigm (e.g. the EP has too little power if an analogy to domestic systems is applied), the efficiency paradigm (effective governance can supply some of the legitimacy lost on the input side) and the socio-psychological paradigm (democratic deficit exists because there is no demos). Under each paradigm, far from all scholars subscribe to the fact that there is a democratic deficit in the EU. What scholars under each paradigm do have in common is their definition of such a deficit.

Under each paradigm, normal science is carried out, however, the overall investigations into the research area of democracy in the EU, can still be characterised as a pre-paradigmatic situation.

*The Efficiency Paradigm*

This paradigm derives from the second of the two analytical interpretations of the democratic deficit as described above, i.e. the overdraft analogy. Because under a given set of circumstances (permission granted from the bank), being overdrawn is quite acceptable. In other words, by using this analogy, authors can diminish any intuitively felt significance of lack of democracy. This raises the well-known question of whether there is ‘room’ within the concept of democracy to temporarily suspend democratic legitimacy in order to achieve effectiveness.

There are two objects of discussion under the efficiency paradigm. The first applies to the *existence of the EU*, the other to the *policy-making process* in the EU. However, the arguments are based on a pretty similar logic. And in both cases, the primary object of study is *policy* (including policy-making where the policy-outcome is intended to serve partly as provider of momentum to integration).

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14 "A paradigm is what the members of a scientific community share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm." (Kuhn, 1996, 170).
The argument is partly founded in the well known thesis, that European integration is a response to exogenous factors (such as globalisation and interdependence) and that regardless of its shortcomings on the input-side, the EU is a good thing for the European peoples because of the increased capabilities it offers those who have chosen to pool their sovereignty and resources. Furthermore, democracy is also enhanced because with the EU acting for them, at least the publics have a greater "say" in what happens in the world than they would have had without the EU even with "flawless" national democracies.\(^{15}\) This is the part of the argument that applies to the existence of the EU (and thus also the legitimacy of the integration process itself).

Wessels argues that the relationship between democratic and efficiency legitimacy is inter-related, and that consequently at certain points in time one will have to be sacrificed in favour of the other:

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\text{We assume, however (though this is heavily disputed), that given the externalities of most public policies there is a trade-off between effectiveness and democratic participation and control. (Wessels, 1996, 58).}
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As regards the EU, Wessels argues that:

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\text{A horizontally and vertically interwoven, multilevel set of actors and structures cannot provide for the same degree of transparency and participation as witnessed in national frameworks. New categories are required not only for scientific research, but also of perception by the average citizen and the political public. \[\ldots\] As the institutional setting of the EU does not correspond entirely to national models and realities, i.e. its character can be regarded as 'sui generis', it should not surprise the observer that democratic legitimacy is not to be found in familiar terms. \[\ldots\] Our mixed polity called the EU is not the ideal but a highly practicable and thus 'optimal' form of government. It combines several levels of governance and a wide range of actors, thus creating a complex}
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\(^{15}\) A country's economic life, physical environment, national security, and survival are highly, and probably increasingly, dependent on actors and actions that are outside the country's boundaries and not directly subject to its government. Thus the members of the demos cannot employ their national government, and much less their local governments, to exercise direct control over external actors whose decisions bear critically on their lives. \[\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\] Just as the rise of the national state reduced the capacity of local residents to exercise control over matters of vital importance to them by means of their local governments, so the proliferation of transnational activities and decisions reduces the capacity of citizens of a country to exercise control over matters vitally important to them by means of their national government. To that extent, the governments of countries are becoming local governments. (Dahl, 1989, 319).
and highly differentiated entity which can be regarded as a solution to the problems of modern Western European welfare and service states. (Wessels, 1996, 69).

Most defenders of democracy would probably agree that the Athenian model of direct democracy is no longer realistic and that representative democracy really is the only workable solution. Thus, it is true that in general, it must be assumed that there is a trade-off between effective and democratic decision-making. In fact, representation itself is a sign of this. However, since it is perfectly possible to think of both regimes and examples of policy-making that are neither efficient, nor democratic, the universality of this interrelationship must be questioned. In fact, it has been argued that in some democracies, there is no trade off at all between efficiency and democracy.\(^\text{16}\) Finally, if a policy is made which is deemed efficient but not hugely democratic, the question can always be raised whether the decision-makers are really acting as guardians rather than representatives:

Carried to the extreme, the insistence that substantive results take precedence over process becomes a flaky antidemocratic justification for guardianship, and "substantive democracy" becomes a deceptive label for what is in fact a dictatorship. (Dahl, 1989, 163).

This is what Habermas describes as converting functional arguments into normative ones (Habermas, 1998, 166).

The governments of Malaysia, Taiwan, and China appeal to a 'priority' of social and cultural basic rights in an effort to justify the violations against basic legal and political rights of which the West accuses them. These dictatorships consider themselves authorized by the 'right to social development' — apparently understood as a collective right — to postpone the realization of liberal rights and rights of political participation until their countries have attained a level of economic development that allows them to satisfy the basic material needs of the population equally. For a population in misery, they claim, legal equality and freedom of opinion are not so relevant as the prospect of better living conditions. (Habermas, 1998, 166).

\(^\text{16}\) "... contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is no trade-off at all between governing effectiveness and high-quality democracy — and hence no difficult decisions to be made on giving priority to one or the other objective. (Lijphart, 1999, 302).
To sum up, the efficiency paradigm deals with classical dilemmas in democratic theory: How shall we place the balance between efficiency and democracy, should this balance be the same in any polity and at all times (more specifically, should familiar democratic standards apply to the EU), and how do we ensure that efficient governance does not become an elite-driven guardianship or even dictatorship?

The Vertical Democracy Paradigm

The second paradigm focuses on the governing, i.e. member state and EU institutions and the relationship between national and EU levels of government. This paradigm analyses the various levels of governance to which the populations are subjected and the relationship between these levels, primarily the link between EU and domestic institutions (although other levels such as subnational governance and globalisation are sometimes mentioned).

The connection between EU and domestic democracies can be interpreted in two ways. In the first interpretation, domestic decision-making processes are seen as contributors to the total input legitimacy of EU decision-making (vertical democracy). First of all, there is the crucially important argument made by intergovernmentalists that the EU is still mainly legitimised via the democratic accountability of national governments (Moravcsik, 2002, 619). Thus, the EU does not really have a democratic deficit, and the notion that it does can largely be attributed to the tendency amongst scholars to analyse the EU in ideal and isolated terms (Moravcsik, 2002, 605). Furthermore, although they operate far from perfectly, some member states have adopted checks and balances designed to ensure that their national executives do not exceed their mandate at EU level, more specifically, during negotiations in the Council. Such measures for parliamentary monitoring of the executive exist in Denmark, the UK, Holland and France (Lord, 1998, 54). These bodies are designed to contribute vertically to legitimising EU decisions as far as the national

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17 For the sake of good order, it is important to note that Moravcsik's claim that the EU is legitimate rests on a number of factors: "Constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via national governments, and the increasing powers of the European Parliament are sufficient to ensure that EU policy-making is, in nearly all cases, clean, transparent, effective and potentially responsive to the demands of European citizens" (Moravcsik, 2002, 605).
publics are concerned. So, in this way these domestic processes arguably contribute to maintaining democratic governance for the publics in question.

The second interpretation of the link between national and EU democracy is not quite this optimistic. According to this school of thought, European integration has affected many aspects of national democratic processes leading some theorists to suggest that European integration perverts national democracy because elements in the European Union, particularly the Council of Ministers and 'Comitology' allows actors within national executives to escape democratic controls (Wincott, 1998; Mancini, 1998).

Wincott argues that:

".. aspects of the organisation of the European Union, particularly the Council of Ministers and 'Comitology' allows actors within national executives to escape those democratic controls that still exist domestically (Wincott, 1998, 418).

The essence of Wincott's argument is that due to the complex decision-making process within the European Union's dual executive, and the fact that the Council can pass binding laws at EU level, governments escape domestic control thereby spreading the democratic deficit to national systems. This position is somehow supported by Schmitter who argues that there is a risk that the 'shift of functions to and the increase in supranational authority of the EU' has contributed to a decline in legitimacy of domestic democracy because it calls into question whether national officials are still capable of responding to the demands of their citizenry. According to Schmitter, this "combined with the reputation of EU institutions as having a lack of accountability could mean that democracy in Europe as a whole is in crisis (it is clear that the strength of this argument will vary between different member states depending on national systems)". (Pollack, et al. 2000, 2). Although Moravcsik agrees that proof of a decline of parliaments exists in domestic European politics, he main-

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18 For instance, in Denmark the European Affairs Committee consists of members of parliament who must be consulted by ministers before they attend Councils in Brussels. The minister must obtain a mandate for negotiation. This means that a majority of the Committee members must not be opposed to the minister's position as regards a given proposal on the Council's agenda. (The EU Information Centre of the Folketing, 2003, 2).
tains that in most cases this has nothing to do with the European Union and that the EU executive continues to derive its powers via the Council (Pollack, 2000, 8). But this raises another question, namely whether the governments have sufficient legitimacy. Not according to Dehousse who argues that European integration has favoured national executives and the judiciary and that parliaments have lost ground which cannot possibly be compensated for via the granting of increased power to the European Parliament (Dehousse, 1998, 53). Like Wincott, Dehousse subscribes to the argument that executives have escaped national parliamentary control due to the complexity of decision-making at the European level. Not to mention the fact that many Council decisions are actually taken by COREPER and therefore never get to the democratically elected representatives. (Dehousse, 1998, 43).

Thus, the vertical democracy paradigm analyses the link between EU and domestic political processes. And in short, the three positions held are 1) that the EU has neither contributed nor damaged democracy, that the EU has weakened democracy and that the EU has strengthened democracy.

**The Horizontal Democracy Paradigm**

To those who credit the EP with sufficient legitimacy (and this is far from all), the alleged loss of national parliamentary control can be compensated for by increasing the powers of the EP. Such a step then becomes a matter under the horizontal democracy paradigm because it invariably increases the powers of the EP, relative to the other EU institutions. However, the traditional argument under the horizontal democracy paradigm, also known as the “conventional definition” of the democratic deficit (Wincott, 1998, 414) holds that the EP has insufficient powers, because it does not hold the executive to account. This argument is based on an analogy to the nation-states and classical division of powers. And the central question under the horizontal democracy is whether or not it is appropriate to apply this analogy to the EU. For those who think so, increasing the powers of the EP is one way of increasing the EU’s democratic legitimacy. Not least if this would mean a decrease in the powers of the European Commission which is often seen as illegitimate because of its formal monopoly on agenda setting. Because commissioners are appointed rather
than elected, its members have been accused of having a ‘large democratic deficit’ (Peters, 1999, 99). Peters argues that ‘if the EU is to become a genuine political entity better mechanisms of popular and political accountability need to be articulated for the Commission’ and suggests that the president should appoint the Commissioners (1999, 100). This is backed by Lord who argues that

The notion that we do not need to worry too much about the democratic credentials of the proposing body (the Commission) so long as those who make the final decisions (the Council) have received some kind of democratic consent seriously understates the importance of agenda-setting as an independent source of political power (Lord, 1998, 26).

Hix proposes a transformation of the EU system into a partly presidential one with an electoral college of MPs and MEPs electing the president of the Commission. This way the electorate will have somebody to ‘throw out’ (Hix, 1998, 35). As much as Hix’s solution raises a number of new questions, it does – to a degree – address the “conventional problem” that the EP cannot throw out the executive. Normally, this has been regarded as a particular problem in relation to the Commission because most scholars have agreed that the Council brought democratic legitimacy with them ‘from home’. However, Lord offers a range of reasons why the Council cannot be adequately authorised through its parts (Lord, 27ff):

the practice of extensive policy delegation within the Council itself to a European level technocracy of permanent representatives and working parties of civil servants; bargaining norms that actually require member governments to show flexibility in their preferences, to justify their positions to one another, and to adjust them if found wanting; the substitution of problem-solving bargaining style – in which the aim is to reach a viable solution for the whole – for a strategic one in which the main goal is to decide on distribution between the parts; extensive opportunities for policy learning at the European level itself, including the probability that governments will only complete their preference formation once they have had the opportunity to articulate their positions and

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19 Dahl defines agenda setting as “the part of the process during which matters are selected on which decisions are to be made (including a decision not to decide the matter)”. (Dahl, 1989, 197). And in the context of the EU, agenda-setting equates a key determinant of ‘who gets what’ out of the political system and an instrument of political manipulation – especially in those conditions that prevail in the EU (multidimensional political choice).” (Lord, 1998, 27).

20 Such as how he intends to make the supranationalism-sceptic European populace accept such a system.
cope with tricky problems of preference interdependence (where it is impossible for any one actor to know what is rational until the wants of the others are also known). And finally, according to Lord, underlying all of the above is the knowledge of each government that it is engaged in a ‘repeat game’ and would like to be seen as a reliable partner. (Lord, 1998).

These arguments all work against the notion that the EU’s executive should be legitimised through the Council alone (Lord, 1998, 27).

Gradually, treaty amendments have been implemented to reduce the relatively deficit of the legislature vs. executive, most recently the extension of the co-decision procedure21 (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997). The EP now has an effective veto over new legislation (in the first pillar) although still little influence in the ‘intergovernmental pillars’ 2 and 3.

The literature has at least two contradictory reactions to these changes: 1) ‘The Democratic Deficit has been reduced but not enough’ (Peters, 1992, 90; Dehousse, 1997, 46) and 2) The democratic deficit has increased because the European Parliament is not the true source of legitimacy in the EU system (Dinan, 1999, 269).

This is because there are a number of reasons why the EP may lack legitimacy:

- Participation in European elections is relatively low. In the 1999 election, average turnout was 49.8 per cent ranging nationally from 91.0 in Belgium to 24.0 in the UK (Nugent, 2000, 1; Decker, 2002, 261).
- EU elections are often more about national issues (Anderson & Goodman, 1999, 27; Nugent, 2000, 1, Decker, 2002, 261)
- National electorates consider EU elections ‘second order’.
- That the ratio of MEPs is not proportional to the size of the populations in the member states.

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21 "Not only did the Amsterdam Treaty greatly increase the scope of co-decision by extending its coverage to most of what had hitherto been covered by the cooperation procedure but also it revised the third reading stage so that should the Council and Parliament fail to agree on a joint text in the conciliation committee, the Council may no longer (as it could under the original version of co-decision) act unilaterally by going back to the common position it had agreed upon before the conciliation procedure and adopt the act by qualified majority". (Dinan, 1999, 286).
• The non-existence of a European demos also known as the socio-psychological dimension of the EU’s democratic deficit. (Chryssochoou et al., 1998, 114).

Thus, because the conventional definition is based on an analogy to nation state division of powers, it may be that the wrong analogy has been used. If this is the case, this could mean that increasing the EP’s powers would in fact reduce the democratic legitimacy of the union. Especially, if the European electorate continue to ignore the EP elections or if a demos refuses to develop. It is the latter of these arguments that is investigated by the fourth paradigm.

The Socio-Psychological Paradigm

In the final paradigm, the primary focus is the governed rather than the governing. (The governed being the citizens of those nation-states that are members, or about to become members of the EU).22 Going back to the elements of democratic legitimacy graphic, what is essentially being questioned here is the element of the authority-part which deals with the ‘consent to the overall structure of the power relations’ otherwise known as ‘legitimacy as a category of formal/legal validity’ (see fig. 2, p. 8). In other words, it is not the leaders in person that are being questioned but their role or even the right to exist of that role. This is because in order to be legitimate such a role needs authority given by ‘a people’.

The point of departure is that democracy simply cannot exists without a people, or put another way, if there is no collective self, there can be no collective self-determination.23 Thus, it is logically impossible to imagine a democracy without a demos. However, it is not logically impossible to imagine a polity without a demos. In fact, it could be argued that the EU is a polity with no demos but with a number of demoi (Chryssochoou, 2001). This does not mean that the EU cannot be democratic, but it does limit the range of options held by those in charge of the institutional (re)design, in particular any statehood ambitions that EU reformers may or may not have.

22 The citizens of applicant countries can be seen as being at least semi-governed by the EU because of the conditions that they have to satisfy prior to membership, such for instance standards for economic performance or the Copenhagen criteria.
Democracy does not exist in a vacuum. It is premised on the existence of a polity with members — the demos — by whom and for whom democratic discourse with its many variants take place. The authority and legitimacy of a majority to compel a minority exists only within political boundaries defined by a demos. Simply put, if there is not demos, there can be no democracy. (Weiler, 1998, 237). 

Lord agrees to a certain extent arguing that no primordial European identity exists on which the EU can draw (Lord, 1998, 114). However, the fact that there is no European identity as such does not mean that there is nothing to build on:

“Although it is most unlikely that the Union could function as an ethno-cultural unit, it could conceivably construct a demos around shared civic values.” (Lord, 1998, 321).

Similarly, Scharpf argues that:

Within established nation-states, where the sociocultural preconditions of collective identity are more or less taken for granted, these considerations might seem more or less academic. For the European Union, however, they explain the concern over a ‘democratic deficit’ that persists, and even increases though the competencies of the European Parliament have been significantly enlarged by the Single European Act and by the institutional changes adopted in Maastricht and Amsterdam. Given the historical, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and institutional diversity of its member states, there is no question that the Union is very far from having achieved the ‘thick’ collective identity that we have come to take for granted in national democracies — and in its absence, institutional reforms will not greatly increase the input-oriented legitimacy of decisions taken by majority rule. (Scharpf, 1999, 9)

The point is that institutional engineering may not suffice to fix this problem:

Although one might presume that in a democracy any horizontal trust among citizens is unnecessary as there are institutions (rights, courts, power-limiting checks and balances) which — if need be — protect ‘me’ against evil and unreasonable actions of my fellow citizens. But this would be an overly optimistic misconception.

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23 See Weiler et al. 1995 for a thorough discussion of the no demos-thesis.
24 For the sake of good order, it is important to note that Weiler does not advocate the creation of an EU-wide demos.
Because these institutions themselves are only as reliable to the extent that they have clearly become a respectable certainty for 'everyone else'. If they enjoy this respectability, they create the trust, which binds people together, who are otherwise strangers. (Offe, 2000, 10).

And this is precisely the problems that faces the EU:

"The democratic problem of the EU consists in the fact that the supranational characteristics of its institutional system find no response at its social base, namely from parties and voters" (Decker, 2002, 261).

Without these social structures, even fair and open elections (to the EP) will not be sufficient as elections will only work as a legitimising force if

they are embedded in a wider context of societal and political structures and practices, including checks and balances among different branches and levels of government, enforceable guarantees of free communication and association, and the de facto existence of a wide range of intermediary associations, competitive political parties and inquisitive and credible media of mass communication. (Scharpf, 1999, 14).

Furthermore, even if all these "intermediary associations" were to be put in place (maybe in the shape of the formalisation of European-wide parties, which is in itself a long shot), this may not even be sufficient because even if a system can be seen to have all the technical characteristics of a democracy it may still lack legitimacy. (Decker, 2002, 263).

Obviously, the natural question to ask at this stage is whether it would be possible to create such a demos, as surely, if an EU people came into being the socio-psychological problem would be solved. However, new problems might be created. For one, such an "artificial" system may even pose new dangers both to the integration project but also in general:

For unless a coherent identity presides over the process of European integration, the process will, sooner or later, lead to disorder. The habits and attitudes required to sustain new European institutions depend, finally, upon some shared beliefs (Siedentorp, 2000, 189).
To sum up, although there seems to be a consensus within the paradigm that there is no such thing as a European demos at present, the debate is raging over whether 1) it would be possible to create a demos and 2) whether or not such a development would be desirable.

The table below sums up the paradigms:
Fig. 3: Four concurrent paradigms analysing democracy in the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm</th>
<th>The efficiency paradigm</th>
<th>The vertical democracy paradigm</th>
<th>The horizontal democracy paradigm</th>
<th>The Socio-psychological paradigm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main object of analysis</td>
<td>Policy (including integration process)</td>
<td>The governing</td>
<td>The governing</td>
<td>The governed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>What is the relationship between democracy and efficiency in the EU?</td>
<td>What is the relationship between EU and member states’ domestic political processes and how does this affect democracy?</td>
<td>What institutional measures should be taken at EU level in order to fix the democratic deficit?</td>
<td>What does the present lack of a European people mean for the democratisation of the EU?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-paradigmatic debate</td>
<td>One argument goes that efficiency and democracy are interrelated so that a high degree of output will increase overall legitimacy despite affecting democracy negatively. Others deny this and argue that a high output necessitates a high input in order for governance to be democratic.</td>
<td>Some argue that the democratic legitimacy is ensured via the Council. Others argue that the EU has negatively affected democracy within member states.</td>
<td>Within the paradigm authors debate how institutional change at EU level can improve democracy (assuming that it can). The debate is essentially about the future design of the EU system and the division of powers between EU’s institutions.</td>
<td>One argument goes that the EU can never be democratic without a demos, the counter argument being that the EU should not attempt to develop a demos (this could be downright risky) but stick to its present multiple demi scenario.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rather than a division of scholars into sub-groupings, this table divides the main dilemmas of the debate into sub-groupings. The table must be thought of as an abstract illustration and in real life some scholars take part in more than one of the four debates. But although scholars can move between debates, the debates themselves cannot communicate with each other. For instance, it is pointless to discuss the potential democratic benefits of an increase in the powers of the EP (an argument under the horizontal paradigm) with somebody who believes that the EU has no demos (an argument under the socio-psychological paradigm). However, a discussion – say between Moravcsik and Wincott - as to the relationship between EU and member state governance works because both are analysing the same relationship although they reach different conclusions. Using Kuhn’s terminology (1996), this is a situation of “normal science” whereas the relationship between the four debates resembles that of a “pre-paradigmatic situation”.

At this point it is worth reconsidering Lord’s use of the analogy about the blind men and the elephant. Not only are the blind men investigating different parts of the elephant. To make matters worse, each blind man (researcher) sets out with their own presuppositions, methods, experiences and research questions which make them all see things differently (for lack of a better expression). This means that even two people investigating similar areas will be likely to arrive at different conclusions. And finally, the yardstick that they are using – i.e. their standards for measurement – are also different resulting in what Lord describes as a “kind of double blind men and elephants problem whereby different commentators analyse “a selective part of the institutions of European integration according to selective definitions of democracy” (Lord, 2001, 643). Thus, when reapplying the analogy to the EU democracy debate,
even those who identify the same parts are likely to arrive at different descriptions due to their different points of departure.

The good news is that a paradigm - dominated by one of the four but probably incorporating all - is likely to develop. This is in the nature of paradigms. There are already signs that this may be happening, such as the existence of 'beliefs' shared by more or less all scholars. Sentiments such as "democracy consists of a certain amount of legitimacy and a certain amount of efficiency", "the EU is not a state, nor an international organisation", "a demos is a prerequisite for democracy" are all "truths" to which a large number of scholars (although not all) subscribe. However, as has hopefully been shown, this is likely to be a long process.

4. Concluding Comments

The idea of a pre-paradigmatic situation is that paradigms compete until a so-called scientific revolution takes place and a situation of normal science arises during which researchers work with a set of common tools, methods, and terminology. This does not mean that there are no competing theories. But it means that scholars within the specific research community are working within the same frame of reference, that they share some 'metaphysical ideas' and that they 'speak the same language'. As this paper has shown, such a situation has yet to arise when it comes to the debate about democracy in the European Union.

There is a large amount of research being carried out into every topic one can think of, from allocation of seats in the EP and votes in the Council to the 'fairness' of

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25 "Consider the next type of component in the disciplinary matrix...... I have in mind shared commitments to such beliefs as: heat is the kinetic energy of the constituent parts of bodies; all perceptible phenomena are due to the interaction of qualitatively neutral atoms in the void, or, alternatively, to matter and force, or to fields. ...... Though the strength of group commitments varies, with nontrivial consequences, along the spectrum from heuristic to ontological models, all models have similar functions. Among other things they supply the group with preferred or permissible analogies or metaphors. By doing so they help to determine what will be accepted as an explanation and as a puzzle-solution; conversely they assist in the determination of the roster of unsolved puzzles and in the evaluation of the importance of each. Note, however, that members of scientific communities may not have to share even heuristic models, though they usually do so. (Kuhn, 1964, 184)."
QMV. But an overall research strategy or common ‘paradigm’ has not yet been established. Of course, detailed analyses of aspects of European integration are important, as are discussions about institutional design and decision-making processes. But in a debate, which is essentially about the construction of a new polity, it makes no sense to look at selected parts in isolation. At worst, this can contribute to a skewed dialogue where the big picture is clouded by small visions of procedures and institutions whose questionable social basis is simply neglected.

The question that must follow from the above is whether it is simply too early to make drastic decisions about the EU and its democratic future (although one could argue that making no such decisions is in itself a decision). It is the belief of this paper that EU reform – although probably highly necessary due to endogenous factors such as enlargement and exogenous variables such as a changing security environment – should not be made hastily. Some questions (such as from where it is intended, and could realistically be expected, that the EU should derive its legitimacy) need to be settled before others of a more institutional nature can be debated, and eventually settled, in a meaningful way.
References


http://www.nd.edu/~kellogg/


http://www.eu-oplysningendk/denmark/pub/


