New Title:

“Salvation and Villain”
The Role of “Europe” in Austrian Politics and
The Rise of Right-wing Populism

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Paper Prepared For the EUSA 8th Biennial International Conference
March 27-29, 2003 * Nashville, Tennessee

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Panel: 7E Tilting at Brussels: Anti-EU Politics in New and Candidate Members

Abstract: “Europe” played a significant role in the rise of right-wing populism in Austria, first by presenting a counter example to the Austrian model and subsequently an external threat, both of which allowed the right-wing populist Freedom Party to mobilize people and form a disparate coalition of voters. As this paper argues however, this was less a question of ideology. As principally a populist party concerned with maximizing its success at the game of elections, the FPÖ always flexibly adapted its position to take advantage of the political opportunities that presented themselves in an evolving Union and a changing Europe. However, the Freedom Party was only able to do so because its leadership, especially Jörg Haider, was keenly aware of the ambiguity in the relationship between Austria and Europe, benefitting from Austria’s historical skepticism of Western modernity, its relative isolation from Atlanticist Europe, its ambivalence toward liberal market economies, and its lack of national identity. For all parties in Austrian politics, “Europe” thus served as an escape mechanism, an instrument of political mobilization, and an image projecting either modernity or an alien threat. Most significantly, a country that had long defined itself in relation to Germany, now defines itself politically in relation to Europe
"Full membership for Austria in the European Community is absolutely essential to prevent Austria from becoming a country of beggars."
(Jörg Haider 1987 in Czernin 2000:57)

"Maastricht is the continuation of Versailles by other means."
(Jörg Haider 1994 in Czernin 2000:63)

The Role of European Integration in Austrian Politics

This paper seeks to explore the relationship between European integration and the growth of right-wing populism in Austrian politics. Having achieved notoriety far beyond Austria’s borders, the Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – FPÖ) under its former leader Jörg Haider became synonymous with the new phenomenon of right-wing populism, which was directed in large part against the process of European integration. The rise of the Austrian far-right so alarmed the other fourteen member states of the European Union that they imposed the harshest measures to date on a fellow West European nation. While much has been written about the impact of right-wing populism on European politics (Howard 2000, Mény and Surel 2002), less attention has been paid to the role of “Europe” in the development of national, specifically Austrian, right-wing politics in the 1990s.

Superficially viewed, the relationship between right-wing populist parties of the type of the FPÖ and European integration is one marked by mutual antagonism and conflict. The Union’s emphasis on the market over nationally motivated politics, the removal of borders, the integration of cultures, the loss of national sovereignty, and the erosion of local protectionist mechanisms as well as the enlightened liberalism as the preferred ideological position of European elites all represent an anathema to right-wing politicians. To the extent that their thinking is steeped in provincial or nationalist frames of reference, that they share a belief in their own cultural superiority, and that they have historically shown hostility to liberalism and pluralism, far-right activists would arguably regard “Brussels” and all that it represents as a threat. Yet, as this paper will show, the reality is rather more complicated. For one, movements like the FPÖ are parties of a new type that do not follow the conventions of the old right. The populist new right is capable of flexibly adapting its positions in light of the contingencies of modern politics. The Freedom Party for example was the first party in Austria to demand the country’s immediate and hasty accession to what was then still the European Community. Secondly, the evolution of the European Union after 1989 invariably affected the way European integration has come to be viewed from the vantage point of national politics. In no other country (with the
possible exception of Germany and Finland) was this more true than in Austria. Surrounded by four so-called transition countries, one of which, Yugoslavia, became embroiled in violent process of disintegration, the Alpine nation found itself in a unique position so that the Austrian perception of European integration cannot be separated from the momentous transformation sweeping Central and Eastern Europe. Both the reluctant “Westernization” of Austria embodied by the decline of the “Austrian model” and the desire for renewed stability in a changing Europe created conflicting political impulses so that Brussels came to be regarded both a salvation and villain. This in turn enabled parties to mobilize large numbers of voters, so that for example the Freedom Party’s shifting view on European integration was in large part motivated by a tactical calculus to tap into a new reservoir of voters frightened by political change.

**The Austrian Populist Right:**

The FPÖ is a party of a new type, whose explosive growth between 1986 and 1999, is invariably bound up with the peculiarities of the Austrian postwar model, which will be briefly discussed further below. Here, the Freedom Party’s political nature and main characteristics are to be summarized. When the FPÖ emerged in 1955, it became the political successor of the *Verband der Unabhängigen* (VdU: League of Independents), a group founded 6 year earlier that had sought to attract former Nazis and others discontented with the then existing party political choices. Most of the party’s support came from the sizeable segment of the population that still clung to the idea of Austria as a part of the German nation. In the first decade of its existence, the party was organizationally weak, and followed an explicitly nationalist agenda. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the new leadership around Chairman Friedrich Peter tried to overcome the ghetto position of the party by recruiting new members from academic groups, and by providing a more consistent and intellectually sound programmatic basis, all of which consolidated the position of the FPÖ as a small nationalist-libertarian party. From 1978 to 1979, the Freedomites pursued closer relations with the Conservatives. Subsequently, when Norbert Steger was elected head of the FPÖ, the new leadership tried to move the party toward political liberalism, and embraced a coalition offer by the Social Democrats in 1983. The participation in government met with little political success, leading to a revolt of the nationalist right and party base led by Jörg Haider, who toppled the Steger leadership in 1986. This marked a new beginning for the party, as Haider molded what used to be a marginal nationalist-libertarian party into a new political phenomenon.
Like several other of the radical political movements that have emerged in the "new politics" of post-industrial and post-Cold War Europe, the post-1986 Freedom Party is both right-wing and populist. Central to the populist label is the constant reference to the "common/little people," which are portrayed in opposition to malevolent and sinister elites or out-groups that pose danger (Pogunke 1995). The typical foes were foreigners, critical intellectuals, artists, or belonged to a class of almost cartoon-like corrupt apparatchiks and multi-salaried functionaries that operated in an incomprehensible world defined by party machines, corporatism, and the government bureaucracy. During election campaigns, Haider and other FPÖ officials routinely seized upon individual cases of wrong-doing (inaccurate billing records, generous pension provisions, etc.), claiming that this was only "the tip of an iceberg, typical of an entire system."

As is typical of populist movements, the target population on whose behalf the party purports to act is not defined in terms of specific social groupings. Instead, the "people" are portrayed as a unitary entity in the sense that the people are perceived as one and that "divisions among them are not genuine conflicts of interest [but rather the machinations of self-serving factions]" (Canovan 1981: 265). Decker (2000: 45) calls this aspect, the "centrality of the purported popular will," as a result of which, radical populism is typically antithetical to pluralist conceptions of democracy. A related ideological feature of such movements is their penchant for conspiratorial accounts of history and politics (Betz 1994, 1998; Birsl and Lösche 2001, Canovan 2002). Electoral setbacks, a negative international reputation, or even the international sanctions against Austria were thus presented by Freedomites as the result of sinister machinations and far-reaching conspiracies involving (usually) leftist interest, corrupt elites, or Jewish controlled media. The flip-side of populism's skepticism of representative democracy is its desire to expand participatory and plebiscitary decision-making processes by initiating petition drives and citizen initiatives as well as by calling for referenda. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the FPÖ initiated a series of petition drives and referenda to advance its political objectives.

Despite populism's strong communitarian element, which is one of its major internal contradictions and as such explicitly addressed in the FPÖ program, its core message is individualist by rejecting compulsory solidarity and particularistic group claims, whether these are legitimated by status (i.e., the privileges of elites), compassion (e.g., groups with special needs), or social and economic disadvantage (e.g., marginalized groups), as well as race, minority ethnicity and gender. Whether the Freedom Party sounds the alarm about "Austrian laborers squeezed" by economic internationalization or the local ethnos being
threatened by "over-foreignization," the emphasis lies on righteous individuals being subverted by certain forces (foreigners, corporations, bureaucrats, parasitic elements, political elites, etc.), whose removal would allow the former to succeed and prosper.

Both in terms of its historical tradition and ideology, the Freedom Party is also a far-right party in the sense that it represents anti-egalitarian and thus anti-Western positions founded on the belief in the natural (including biological/genetic) inequality of humans (Reinhold 1995, Eatwell 2000, Minkenberg 2000, Canovan 2002). Like other extreme right-wing parties, the FPÖ uses these concepts to advocate especially cultural and ethnic autonomy and to justify extreme measures in the name of protecting the sanctity of one's own ethnos. The party's authoritarian conception of the state is underscored by advocating law-and-order policies to deal not only with "external threats" (immigrants and asylum seekers) and criminal elements, but also with respect to critics and political opponents. Nonetheless, as a party traditionally grounded in anti-statist small business and anti-clerical circles, the Freedom Party has also embraced aspects of economic liberalism. As such, the FPÖ has opposed Austrian corporatism (by criticizing trade unionism, corporatist arrangements, and social engineering). This stance, however, has conflicted with its rising social populism, its calls for protectionist measures and the party's critique of so-called "jungle-liberalism" (Luther 1997: 296).

The primary characteristic of a far-right populist party like the Haider FPÖ is its willingness to water down and flexibly adapt ideological positions in the interest of maximizing voter appeal. What the dogmatic right may consider a betrayal of ideological principle, the populist right is willing to sacrifice in the interest of political gain. Like all populist groupings, also right-wing populism understands the fluidity and contingencies of contemporary politics and is as such prepared to reinterpret political positions and attach ideological objectives to newly surfacing popular concerns and issues.

While the Freedom Party's political and ideological agenda was once inexorably linked to Austria's "German past" and had as such only appeal to a dwindling segment of the population, Haider, after 1986, popularized erstwhile niche themes by linking them to new issues. Giving traditional right-wing objectives a certain spin, made them interesting to a wider audience and new target groups, which meant that the underlying ideological dogma had to be watered down. For example, the Freedom Party placed its focus no longer placed on the "Slavic barbarian" and "Eastern Communist menace." Instead of ethnicity and culture, the critical issues were now framed as matters of job security and quality of life (public safety, livable
neighborhoods, good schools), which were said to be threatened by Yugoslav and Turkish immigrants.

Sometimes, the ideological standpoint of the Freedom Party became so fluid that even its own functionaries could not always keep up with the shifting ideological currents and were made to feel the wrath of their leader. Haider’s purges\(^6\) of his organization, which spared neither personalities nor programmatic aspects, have become quite legendary. What had once been a decentralized elite-oriented party rooted in upper-middle class and academic circles as well as regions uniquely affected by ethnic or religious divisions, mutated into a tightly controlled organization that eventually became the largest blue-collar party in Austria.

The FPÖ is a party of new type with a postmodern character because it stands, as Anton Pelinka put it (2002: 10), beyond “class, nation, and religion.” The label “postmodernism” also applies to the unorthodox amalgam of approaches pursued by the Freedom Party. Preglau (2001: 196-200) identified these tactics as hyper-real scandalizing, “carnevalizing,” the undermining of values by the use of irony, the trivialization and dissolution of the “existing canon,” as well as the skillful exploitation of multi-layered meanings and codes.

In terms of organization, the FPÖ after 1986 became an authoritarian leadership party with top-down patterns of decision-making, including the muzzling of intra-party critics, periodic purges and the reshuffling of party personnel. During Haider’s tenure as party leader, all key members of the organization depended entirely on him and the need to have demonstrated their allegiance personally. Programmatic aspects were variable, because Haider as the leader determined the political direction informing the party sometimes via television of changes in political direction. Typical of the FPÖ’s populism is its emphasis on projecting “movement character” by constantly maintaining high levels of mobilization and quasi permanent campaigning. This resulted in a low degree of institutionalization that was reflected in the sub-ordinate role played by party decision-making bodies, little role differentiation, and the frequent rotation of personnel. At one point, Haider even tried unsuccessfully to change the party’s name to the “F-movement.”

Jörg Haider also embodies fully the “new generation” of right-wing populist leaders, which Schedler (1996: 289) calls Homini Novi, as they seek to appeal to those population segments that have been stripped of their traditional political affiliations and loyalties in part because of the modernization of politics and society. Early on, Haider broke with the conventions of Austrian political campaigning in an effort to attract especially the young and the non-political crowd. His flashy appearance (posing in magazines, wearing trendy clothes, driving fast cars, etc.) and casual demeanor, his youthfulness, unconventional manners had made him popular especially with voters under 30. Later when he became governor of Austria’s Southern
State of Carinthia, Haider took a page from Silvio Berlusconi, by coaxing sponsors into creating a successful major league soccer club, over which he presided and which served as an advertising tool for his governorship. This and other state-sponsored entertainment venues and events, ranging from pop concerts, beach volleyball tournaments, and biker meetings to soccer games and countless local folkloric festivities, were designed to attract the “non-political crowd.” These frequently featured the governor as the host in the requisite outfit (biker jacket, beach-surfer look, medieval costume, etc.) or with the appropriate stunt (parachuting into the soccer stadium). Part narcissism, part showmanship, Haider’s notoriety, theatrics, and calculated provocations provided welcome entertainment to a voting public often bored by conventional politics.

Summing up, the programmatic looseness of the FPÖ along with its complete orientation toward its leader as well as its ability to celebrate policymaking as a political spectacle and entertainment helped the Freedomites succeed while in opposition. Despite undergoing several mutation during Haider’s chairmanship, the party consistently subscribed to the following political formula for success: (a) it scripted political processes in the sense of emphasizing emotional and confrontational aspects (“us-versus-them scenarios”); (b) it invariably always personalized political decisions (attacking especially certain personalities instead of programs and institutions); and (c) it effectively reduced complexities to stereotypical formulas and simplistic imagery (“good-versus-bad,” “we will clean house,” etc.).

Foreign Evils, Austrian Identity, and the FPÖ’s Ideological Roots

Although this paper argues that the Freedom Party’s anti-European stance is motivated primarily by tactical concerns and political expediency, ideologically motivated anti-Western and anti-internationalist sentiments are important as they influence party functionaries and many of the voters the party seeks to reach. Both Austria and Germany have historically had an ambivalent relationship to Western modernity and progress. In many ways the post-war Freedom Party was the intellectual heir to a nationalist quest of German unification in the 19th century. Sentiments from that time period are still embedded in Austrian society. These ideas date back to the age of romanticism, which had juxtaposed an idealized peaceful (nativist) nature with an (imported and alien) industrial revolution associated with social turmoil, human greed, and a soiled homeland. Koppel Pinson (1966) in his famous work Modern Germany summarized these prevailing sentiments in German romanticism as follows:
Organicism and traditionalism led romanticism to medievalism [...]. The national tradition in its purest form, uncontaminated by foreign and cosmopolitan influences, is to be found in the medieval epoch [...] "The task of politics" wrote Schlegel, "is to reestablish the constitution of the Middle Ages and to bring it to full realization." This is the foundation for the vogue of the Ständestaat, or corporate state idea of political romanticism, as well as for harking back to the pre-capitalist society as found in the romantic economics of Franz von Baader and Adam Müller. [...] German romanticism rejected all democratic ideology of popular sovereignty. Yet it developed a kind of populism, or cult of the people of its own. It saw in the common people the healthy core and reservoir of national creative energy. Its interest in folk literature and folk creations sprang from this "populism" and at the same time contributed to it. (44-47)

Already the National Socialists knew how to turn these notions to their advantage when concepts like the "soil," the "German forest" and "mother nature" denoted a quasi-spiritual realm describing the domain in which the "Volk" as a non-alienated people dwelled. In this sense, the powerful German concept of Heimat (homeland, place of origin), which lacks an appropriate English equivalent conveying the same emotional content, is a manifestation of this deeply conservative notion of an unspoiled environment that extends also to related ideas such a culture, language, and tradition. It is the very concept of "Heimat," as viewed by the radical right, that was once again under assault by the forces of internationalization and European integration. A brief quote from a speech by Haider in 1999 illustrates this very well:

"...therefore we must declare ourselves as Germans and Austrians in good days and in bad days...and we must speak out against the Brussels bureaucrats and [their attempt to create] a new rootless EU-Volk." Nordwest-Zeitung May 21, 1994

Already in the 1980s, the Freedom Party began tapping into these sentiments more broadly by operating with code words such as "natural," "healthy," and "traditional" and contrasting them with the terms "foreign," "alien," and "artificial" – as in "healthy attitudes" of average people versus the "alien views" of certain artists and intellectuals. Later these terms were increasingly applied to denote "dangers" posed by foreign influences.

When Haider indirectly warned against the de-mystified, individualist, and fully modernized world that threatened as a result of internationalization and integration, he was not merely expressing misgivings about an influx of foreigners but revived the old Austro-German fears of the soulless and cold West dominated by a rationalist logic and market imperatives:

"The concept of a 'multicultural' society has become an ideology. After the pitiful Socialist utopia of a classless ideology proved itself to be a flop, a new dogma props up to force us to be 'happy'....(Haider in The Freedom I mean 1995: 30).

[T]he multicultural society is hard fast, brutal and knows little solidarity, it is marked by
considerable inequities and knows migration winners and modernization losers, it has the tendency to drive apart groups and communities so that they lose their tries and values (Die Freiheit die ich meine, cited in Czernin 2000: 81)\]

Such sentiments were widely shared in bourgeois but also in Green and progressive circles, who were thus susceptible to the FPÖ’s message. The far-right could additionally be bated by portraying Austrian political leaders as conspiring with European elites intent on carrying out a sinister multicultural and internationalist agenda that threatened the country’s very fabric. In Haider’s own words “[t]he [economic hardship] will get worse, especially with the Eastern enlargement organized by the EU and the Austrian government” (Cerznin 2000: 91). The specter of over-foreignization, cultural decline, and social hardship became the FPÖ’s mantra in the second half of the 1990s.

What threatens [through immigration, integration and EU enlargement] is further over-foreignization. I accuse the government of wanting to create a new electorate, because it can’t trust the old one any longer (Haider in Die Presse, July 10, 1998).

As in most societies, in Austria there is a continuum between the extremist fringe and those broader parts of the mass public with illiberal and anti-democratic tendencies. This has enabled a party like the FPÖ to appeal to a large section of the political spectrum by subtly adjusting and broadening its political message. Data from studies carried out in the early 1990s suggest that the authoritarian potential in Austria was greatest (70%) among Freedomite voters, when compared with those of all other parties (SPÖ 41%, ÖVP 40%, Greens 22% -- Plasser and Ulram 1992: 46). Likewise, Freedom Party sympathizers were far less likely to reject Nazism unequivocally (32%) when contrasted with other voters (SPÖ 55%, ÖVP 61%, Greens 84%). In fact, 64% of the FPÖ electorate (Austrian average: 39%) displayed an ambivalent attitude towards Nazism, stating that the latter had both positive and negative aspects (see Plasser and Ulram 1992: 46). With respect to the dangers posed by foreigners in Austria, 65% of FPÖ voters felt that foreign nationals were the cause of economic problems for domestic workers and threatened the Austrian way of life (Austrian average: 42% -- see Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer 2000: 120). Freedom Party supporters were relatively most concerned about Austria’s EU membership – some 61% feared negative consequences compared with 49% of the public at large (ibid).

It should also be understood, however, that right-wing attitudes in Austria do not conform to a cohesive ideology, but contain a variety of diffuse authoritarian sentiments, illiberal beliefs, and prejudices
that can vary by region, age, and religious orientation. In this, the Austrian right does not differ necessarily from certain population strata in other European countries. Nonetheless, right-wing orientations also reflect the complicated past of the nation, with its roots in the multi-ethnic Habsburg empire, its ambivalent relationship with Germany, the devastation of two world wars, and the front-line position in the Cold War.

By using discourse analysis, Ruth Wodak and Bernd Matouschek (1993) have provided significant insights into the connection between national self-image and neo-racism in contemporary Austrian society. For reasons that will be become obvious further below, Austria lacks a clear national identity. This profound uncertainty concerning (if not to say ignorance of) oneself has not only heightened the Austrians’ insecurity as to who they are, thus making them feel more vulnerable, but has resulted in surrogate forms of identity. This has had important consequences for how Austrians deal with foreigners and their own past: The Austrian way of life ("Lebensart") and culture, referring to an eclectic collection of customs, values, habits, and social mores, have taken the place of a genuine national identity founded, at least in part, in historical reality. In contemporary society, one counts as Austrian if one looks a certain way, has particular preferences, and does certain things and not others. As revealed in the interviews collected by Wodak and Matouschek (1993) "people" whose "origins one can clearly tell" have little chance of ever becoming Austrian, so that their presence makes many Austrians fear "to become a stranger" in their own land. It is no coincidence therefore that the FPÖ's concept of Intergierbarkeit (ability of foreigners to fit in) found much support in the population because it defacto rules out that non-Europeans could ever become really integrated for they never seem to "look" and "act Austrian." Naturally, this notion leaves equally little room for Austria’s autochthonous minorities (Slovenes, and Croats), once they reveal their differences from the majority population.

Austria’s collective insecurity and lack of national identity require some explanation here. The complexity of the country’s history with its unresolved traumas, unrealized ambitions, and the ethnic crosspressures typical of a land exposed to multiple and competing cultural influences lie at the source of the nation’s conflicted relationship with the past and its ambiguous self-image. The construction of modern Austria with its rather exceptional political arrangements was part of a larger process, which William T. Bluhm so aptly called “building an Austrian nation” (see his book of the same title (1973).

Derived from a tiny territory called Ostarichi located along the Danube and first mentioned in 996, the term Österreich (Austria’s name in German) came to refer only to the ruling family of Habsburg (House
of Austria). The provinces retained their distinct identities while the ethnically conglomerate empire was held together by the crown, the Catholic Church, and the imperial bureaucracy. As late as 1867 there was still no official name for the non-Hungarian half of the dual monarchy in which the forebears of today’s Austrians formed a predominantly German-speaking elite minority faced with a Slavic majority that increasingly insisted on power-sharing. As Franz Mathis observes (1997: 21) “a more general feeling of belonging together, of sharing a common spirit of citizenship, of being a national entity like the French, the British or -later on- the Germans and even the Italians, was still lacking.” Facing the decline of the cohesive power of the monarchy and the rise of nationalism, intellectual elites went about creating an Austrian national identity, a process which ended abruptly with the dissolution of the empire in 1918.

While marked by strong regional identities, the country thus never underwent the normal process of consolidation and modernization as a nation state. Modern (post-1918) Austrian history has been short and rather shameful: as a result, the new political elites have looked back at the country’s long and glorious imperial legacy. Austria’s involvement with Nazi-regime also necessitated the development of an identity separate from that of Germany. The historian Günther Bischof (in Bischof and Pelinka 1997) has described this as the “Ostarichi myth.” The question of Austria’s national character was complicated further by the mixed ethnic settlement patterns and major migratory movements in the old empire. Since then, the country’s identity has been commonly defined in relation to its Germanic heritage. As a result, Austrians have considered themselves to be “anti-German,” “pro-German,” or even the “better Germans.” At times, they have celebrated and embraced the non-German aspects of Austrian culture and society,7 at others, they have rejected their non-Germanic roots, overcompensating through overt hostility to foreign influences (and their own minorities).

The ambivalence of Austria’s Germanic character contained in the Ostarichi myth was compounded by a new mythology created after World War II. The new political elites constructed a victim mythology (“Austria as Hitler’s first victim”) and simultaneously portrayed the country as a natural bridge-builder between East and West. Both moves were expedient in light of the new geopolitical realities but did little to mend Austria’s fragmented identity. There was also no international pressure put on Austrians to redeem themselves for their complicity in Hitler’s war of aggression and the Holocaust. Correspondingly, scholars have pointed to the “wide gap between reality [historical fact] and self-assessment in Austria” (Wischenbart 1994: 77).8
Instead of a cohesive national identity which unequivocally clarified who Austrians were, for what historical record the country had to account, and what institutions defined it, the existing mythologies allowed all sorts of escape mechanisms. One could conveniently choose to let Austrian history end before 1938, or start in 1945. As a neutral country perched between the blocs, Austria could be Western when it mattered, that is in terms of lifestyle and economic prosperity, but critical of Western capitalism, modernism, and technological progressivism when that was preferable.

The Austrian Postwar Model and the International Context:

Dating back to the days of the Habsburg Empire, Austrian politics had been dominated by two, respectively three hostile politics camps and their subcultures (Christian-Conservatives, Social Democrats, German- Nationalist). Political and societal fragmentation remained the central insurmountable problem of Austrian democracy prior to World War II, to which the political elites, after the experience of Nazi rule as well as the trauma of war and occupation, responded by constructing a model of national cohesion. Whereas the country between the wars had been a “centrifugal democracy” (Nick and Pelinka 1984: 101) with a fragmented society and conflict-oriented elites, postwar Austria became the epitome of a consociational democracy.

Yet, despite inter-elite cooperation, permanent “congruent cleavages” persisted in the population at large (Lijphard 1968:1-15; 1977 1-24) requiring a complex set of institutions to ensure cooperation. The central pillars of Austria’s consensus democracy therefore were (a) the collaboration of the two equally powerful and political camps of Social Democrats (SPÖ) and Christian Conservatives (Austrian People’s Party – ÖVP) as well as (b) the cooperation between labor and capital. Austria thus became the textbook case of a consensus polity: Under a system known as Proporz [proportionality], positions in virtually all public and quasi-public institutions (e.g., all levels of public bureaucracy, banks, utilities, schools, state media, the executive boards of public companies, etc.) were divided proportionally between the two political camps according to the parties’ respective territorial and electoral strengths. Austria’s “Proporzdemokratie” (Lehmbruch 1967), thus, became the system which not only ensured inter-elite cooperation but also reinforced the hegemony of the two major parties in all areas of public life. The large membership and political strength of Austria’s parties were in part attributable to the elaborate patronage system associated with Proporz.
The country's fabled social partnership, a version of social corporatism under which all social and economic interests were internalized and resolved through consensus measures, was a further pillar of the Austrian model. Mechanisms such as *Personalunion* (having the same person head different institutions to establish interdependencies) and rule of *Clubzwang* (forcing MPs to vote the party line) were all part of the many formal and informal arrangements designed to reduce contest and conflict. Above all, the Austrian consensus model imposed a normative orientation in the sense that compromise and collaboration became the only legitimate *modus operandi*. Political conflict and unrestrained competition were seen as inciting divisiveness that needed to be eliminated and marginalized. Politicians like Jörg Haider, who showed little respect for these conventions, found themselves politically isolated. In general, the FPÖ was forced to stay outside the national consociational framework as it remained a political latecomer to the political scene. Later, this fact would prove to be an invaluable asset when Haider launched his campaign against the cronyism and corruption that, he argued, was rampant in the *Proporzsystem*.

Along with the consensus model, also the concept of permanent neutrality in international affairs (Schlesinger 1972) became a firm part of the emerging national self-image (Reiterer 1988, Bruckmüller 1994). Despite its status as a Western democracy, Austria, as was mentioned above, had always adopted an ambivalent position toward the West, greeting typically Western traits such as capitalism, individual competition, and political liberalism with considerable skepticism. Neutrality was not merely the result of political expedience in a complicated geopolitical environment after 1945 but corresponded to the collective national sense that Austria belonged to nobody's camp. When Austria's foremost postwar political leader, Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, once suggested that "Austria [was] a place where the clocks ticked at a different pace" he did not merely engage self-serving campaign rhetoric but reflected the prevailing Austrian belief that the country's political and economic organization stood apart from the rest of Europe. In terms of national pride for example, Austrians topped a list of 11 other European countries surveyed in 1990, including the UK, France, Switzerland, Spain, and Poland (Plässer and Ulram 1994: 225). More importantly, the Austrian population felt consistently less "European" and less likely to have a shared European identity than that of most other counties including Switzerland, which is itself often accused of isolationist tendencies. When rating a nation's "European consciousness," comparative analyses of EC members and nonmembers ranked Austria among the last of fourteen nations. In a bilateral comparison with Switzerland, only 5% of Austrians felt more "European" than "national" in contrast to 10% of Swiss respondents (Plässer
and Ulram 1994: 223). Particularly surprising was the fact that younger Austrians exhibited virtually the same attitudinal pattern as their older compatriots.

The nation's insular identity, respectively its self-image as an "island of blessed people" (a term coined by Pope Paul VI in 1971) was reenforced after World War II by the relative geographic isolation from the West (after all, Vienna lies some 150 miles east of Prague) and by the fact that the age-old ties to the East had fallen victim to the Cold War. Moreover, Austria's rapid economic recovery and soaring prosperity as well as the superior economic performance (relying on Austro-Keynesianism) during the global economic crisis of the 1970s confirmed to many citizens the superiority of the country's socio-political model. Within a decade, however, the Austrian consensus system and the major political institutions that had supported it found themselves in a severe crisis of legitimacy. Simultaneously, the country's elites, fearing decreasing economic competitiveness, launched a headlong rush into the newly formed European single market. The growing collective self-doubt and uncertainty heightened by the sudden collapse of Communism and the subsequent momentous transformation of Austria's geopolitical environment provided the context in which the populist right began a relentless drive for political power. In this period "Europe" was first a "friend," because it promised delivery from the corset of Proporz and Corporatism, and then a "foe," because it was seen as threatening ethnic, cultural, and economic autonomy.

Austria's Road to "Europe"11

The Soviet veto of Austria's bid for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 meant that the Alpine nation would instead join the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The Moscow Memorandum and subsequent State Treaty in 1955 had obligated Austria to maintain a policy of permanent neutrality. While trying to coordinate its customs and trade policy closely with that of the Common Market, Austrian commitments to the European Community had never gone beyond two free trade agreements concluded in 1972. Under the Social Democratic Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, Austrian foreign policy emerged from the Soviet shadow and became bolder and more globally oriented, so that its practice of passive neutrality gave way to a period of active engagement. Despite the country's avowed neutrality and often critical stance toward the US, Austria, nonetheless, used official and unofficial channels to remain a close and useful partner to the West, acting on many occasions as an effective go-between when the situation demanded it. Only after Kreisky's resignation in 1983 did Austria return from this comprehensive policy
position to more of a West European focus. Starting in 1984, Vienna began pushing for closer ties between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Community. This corresponded to an overall shift away from active neutrality toward political realism by pursuing a policy more commensurate with Austria’s true capabilities and immediate (mainly economic) interests. One principal reason for this development was the change in the international environment, constraining Austria’s room to maneuver compared to the 1970s. The flare-up of the Cold War and an increasingly aggressive stance of the Reagan Administration vis-à-vis Communism made Austria’s policy of neutrality suspect, not to mention Vienna’s cozy economic relations with neighboring East Bloc countries and the government’s support for leftist movements in Latin America and elsewhere. More generally, it was increasingly clear that the relationship between the two military blocs was becoming lopsided in favor of the West. Worse for Austria was the fact that it had its strongest ties with the “old guard” but few official connections with reform movements, regime critics, and political newcomers. To the extent that reformers in the Eastern Bloc wanted to reach out to the West, they turned directly to the centers of Western power, thus bypassing Austria, which had always regarded itself as a somewhat exclusive “bridge” between East and West. In the emerging dichotomous world where one was either a member of the Western “club” or otherwise classified as a lesser nation (or worse yet, an international pariah), Austria found itself strangely at odds with international developments. Unlike Switzerland and Sweden, the Alpine nation did not have the global presence of powerful domestic corporations that could serve as a linkage between the domestic and international environment. It was under these circumstances that Austria’s political leaders initiated a rapprochement with the West.

The process of political reorientation was strengthened when in 1986 the Conservatives (ÖVP), who had traditionally favored a more explicitly pro-Western agenda, became part of the government. In the following years, the implications of the Single European Act for the Austrian economy gradually dawned on Austria’s business community and their political allies in the ÖVP (Karlohefer and Talos 1996). The new Social Democratic-Conservative coalition government under the reform-oriented Chancellor Franz Vranitzky (SPÖ) and the decidedly Euro-phile Foreign Minister Alois Mock (ÖVP) eventually made Austria’s integration into the Single Market a national priority. Nevertheless, the government had to overcome strong opposition from labor groups, farmers, environmentalists, and even from members of the government itself. In fact, the price for the support of Social Partners was to provide them with a seat at the negotiating table, thus prompting briefly a renaissance of Austro-Corporatism in the 1990s (Heinisch 1999, 2000).
Given Austria’s traditional standoffishness in matters of Western integration, its headlong rush into the European Union after 1988 was nothing short of bewildering. Interestingly, the membership question neither surfaced in the 1986 election, nor was mentioned in the 1987 coalition agreement between two government parties. It was also not a subject in the important cabinet decisions of December that year or even the following February. An American scholar writing for Universities Field Staff International from Vienna, reported on the hurried process toward EC membership as follows:

With each passing week in the winter of 1987-88, an Austrian application for membership, which had seemed a remote prospect as recently as the end of 1986, seemed likelier and might come sooner than the turn of the decade. (Dennison Rusinow *UFSI Reports* 1987).

Indeed, barely one year later in 1989, the issue had acquired such urgency that the government applied for full membership.

While Austrians at the time did favor modernization and felt political and economic reforms were due, there was no indication in the media that the EC was either high on people’s minds or treated as a pressing national goal. To the extent there was public support, it was based on very scant information so that people were generally unaware of the tradeoff and consequences involved. As unusual as the rush with which Austria plunged into this process, was the application itself. Attached to it was a lengthy list of reservations and exceptions making it seem it was the European Community that wanted to join Austria. Each of the three applications contained a reservation concerning Austria’s neutrality, which became the subject of prolonged negotiations. Moreover, Austria initially insisted on the following additional conditions: Austria’s federal character had to remain intact, the economic competition in the Single Market was not to affect Austria’s social system, the domestic environmental standards and the “offensive environmental policy” would have to be maintained, “nationwide family farming” was to be protected, and the lingering dispute over international transit traffic through Austria would need to be resolved outside the accession framework (Schneider 1994: 5). The conditions outlined in the application, the haste with the decision was taken, and the short prior debate largely without involving the public (Kitzmüller 1994) betray a mind set according to which Austria had not only neglected to reflect on its own role in the New Europe, but had also not fully considered what kind of “Europe” the country was so anxious to join (Schneider 1994). In the entire process, Austrian policymakers had focused nearly exclusively on a narrow set of economic issues as if nothing else was going to be affected. Indeed, the European Community communicated its concerns through Willy de
Clercq, EC Commissioners for External Affairs, who kept reminding Vienna in this context that “that there could be no integration à la carte” and that there was going to be “no full integration in a club in which one is not a member.” (Rusinow 1987: 8).

Predictably, most of the debate in Austria focused on the “full and comprehensive participation in the internal market” [Volle Teilnahme am Binnenmarkt], which was the standard phrase used by the politicians at the time (Rusinow 1987: 2). Full membership was more like an afterthought, because Austria wanted to avoid what it called “satellitization,” that is a situation in which the nation was bound by rules over which it had no control. The complete focus on the economy (and the question of neutrality) excluded the myriad of other facets that membership in an evolving supranational system of governance entailed. Austria clung to the illusion that it could selectively import a series of economic remedies to mend the nation’s perceived structural deficiencies, but would otherwise remain largely as it was. From this perspective, accession became tantamount to acquiring an economic fix.¹⁵

The central point here is that there was no discernable popular groundswell, no immediate economic necessity, and no pervasive desire to change the status of neutrality in favor of a new security arrangement. There was, however, the recognition on the part of the political elites at the time that Austria had to transform its economic model in the long run to remain internationally competitive. This entailed also the realization that Austria’s ability to regenerate and reform itself was limited, in part precisely because the Austrian model was constructed to guarantee stability and continuity. What the country needed was nothing short of a paradigm shift that could only come from without. Exposing the country to the logic of the internal European market created a political fait accompli and imposed new sets of rules so that certain political battles otherwise unavoidable in a self-directed reform simply did not have to be fought.

This Austrian escapism of sorts had two specific shortcomings. One was the lack of public debate prior to accession about Austria’s role in the European project. The other was the emphasis on economics and neutrality to the exclusion of all other aspects, all of which helped create false political expectations and skewed Austria’s subsequent political discourse about Europe. The consequences of economic integration and internationalization as well as the fiscal changes required to meet the Maastricht criteria were not fully understood by the public. This created conditions that enabled the Austrian populist right to mobilize segments of the public against modernization and Brussels. When later 14 EU member states imposed bilateral sanctions on the country in 2000, many Austrians were surprised to find out that they had in fact
joined a community of values and that the perceived violation of such carried the risk of punishment.

Accession thus required a psychological departure from Austria's cherished self-imposed isolation and permanent neutrality. When asked in 1990 to choose between neutrality and EC membership, Austrians overwhelmingly (82%) favored the former. After more than three decades, neutrality had become a political "sacred cow" evoking a strong emotional attachment. Even in 1993, one year prior to the referendum on accession, 68% of respondents still preferred neutrality to EU membership if the two political objectives should turn out to be incompatible (Plasser and Ulram 1994: 237). In their analysis of orientations toward European integration, Plasser and Ulram concluded that Austrians felt "cognitively overwhelmed" when faced with the question of membership (ibid.: 220). The picture that emerged was neither one of outright rejection nor that of calculated interest-based support but showed a conflicted disposition, signaling ambivalence, affective judgment, and profound uncertainty.16

Austria formally applied for membership on July 17, 1989, expecting to be admitted early in the 1990s. While most EC member states and the European Commission adopted generally a favorable view of Austria's accession, in part, because the country was seen as a financial net-contributor, the application came at an awkward time. The EC's decision to proceed with the Maastricht process and French concerns about a possible Germanic (and neutral) bloc of new accession states meant that the Alpine republic would join later than expected.17 As a result, Austria along with Finland and Sweden began formal negotiations about membership in Brussels in February 1993, which were concluded by March 1994. The unexpected delay of Austria's accession however allowed some of the Europe-wide anti-EU backlash to spill over into Austria. The fallout from the Maastricht ratification process in Denmark (vetoing initially the European Union Treaty) and France (ratifying it by the narrowest of margins) as well as the Swiss no-vote on EU membership eroded much of the domestic Austrian support for European integration. Both the Green party and the Freedom Party remained bitterly opposed to Austria's accession. Aside from the general concerns about the country's high social and environmental standards, including its tight regulation of Alpine transit traffic, another major source of frustration was the lingering European recession after 1992.

After the polls had been too close to call for months, in February 1994 the momentum began to shift in favor of the EU supporters. This was mainly due to the massive information campaign by the government, the Social Partners and most media. In their eagerness to ensure Austria's accession, the pro-EU campaigners raised expectations about the economic benefits of membership that, while not unreasonable in the long term,
could not be met overnight. Following the public’s overwhelming approval of Austria’s entry into the EU, all parties except the FPÖ supported the subsequent parliamentary ratification of the accession treaty — the Greens changed their negative position after the referendum. Among those Austrians who voted “no,” topics such as “agriculture,” (23%) “the environment” (20%) and “neutrality” (15%) were the most frequently cited specific reasons for their objection (Plasser and Ulram 1994).

Facing predictions according to which Austria would fail to meet the so-called Maastricht convergence criteria, the government negotiated and implemented a series of painful austerity programs, dubbed Sparpaket I, II. Clever timing and support by the Social Partners ensured that the measures were not put into effect until after the EU referendum in 1994 so that their full impact and subsequent political cost were not felt until one to two years later. Nonetheless, the combination of increased social need, rising levels of economic competition, and declining resources intensified both latent xenophobic feelings and material concerns. Summing up, these were hardly ideal circumstances under which Austrians would warm up to the idea of tearing down borders and opening up markets. Moreover, voters reacted with anger to a situation in which they were first promised major economic benefits from accession and subsequently confronted with a series of social cutbacks in the name of EU membership. Euro-phoria gave way to disillusionment soon after the referendum.

Summing up, despite its small size, precarious geopolitical location, and dependence on trade, Austria had remained internationally somewhat detached. Nonetheless, it had developed political, economic and social coping mechanisms that worked well until the 1980s. Subsequently, a series extraordinary political and economic challenges overwhelmed many of these mechanisms and placed an unprecedented strain on Austria’s institutions of governance.

The Austrian Right, Europe, and Austrian Xenophobia.

Initially, the Austrian Freedom Party was not hostile to the idea of Austria’s participation in the process of European Integration. Far from it, under Haider’s leadership, the FPÖ was the first Austrian party to demand explicitly the country’s immediate EC membership, chiding the government for its tardiness (Czermin 2000:57). The Freedom Party’s initial love affair with Europe had both ideological and practical reasons. To the extent that the Austrian left, along with organized labor, had been skeptical of both the Atlanticist and deregulatory aspects of European integration, a party of the libertarian right like the FPÖ in
the 1980s naturally welcomed this change in political direction. It allowed the Freedonites to satisfy their traditional core business clientele and those parts of the bourgeoisie that had abhorred Austria’s close ties to international socialist causes from Nicaragua to the Middle East. A rapprochement with Western Europe represented first and foremost an ideological return to what the FPÖ’s party program calls “[christliches] Abendland” (Christian Civilization — Programm/FPÖ 1999: 113) denoting a concept that stands in opposition to both the Slavic, then still Communist, Eastern half of the continent and all the non-Christian world. In practical terms, becoming a part of the EC’s single market initiative also promised salvation from Austria’s corporatist state and over-regulated economy, favorite targets of the Haider FPÖ. In fact, by being outsiders of the Austrian model, the Freedonites were the only political grouping that could most credibly demand immediate and unqualified membership, as they did not have to be concerned about the negative impact of accession on client groups and organized interests. Moreover, as long as European integration was confined to Western and Southern Europe and as long as the Iron Curtain represented a impenetrable border to the East, the Austrian right saw little connection between EC membership and the so called Ausländerproblem (problem with foreigners). If anything, Austria would once again be more closely tied to Germany and ideologically more firmly positioned in the West, where the anti-Communist Austrian right always wanted the nation to be. Likewise, the FPÖ, consistently advocating NATO membership, had frequently criticized the Social Democratic government for its explicit policy of neutrality and its persistent efforts to establish close neighborly relations with the Communist East.

This situation changed rapidly in the wake of 1989. The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe not only brought with it the prospect of a common Europe with the “dreaded” and economically poor Slavic neighbors, but the evolution of the European Community into the European Union represented a much more far-reaching political integration beyond the more narrow deregulatory goals of the 1980s. As subsequently more and more countries in Europe were governed by Social Democratic parties, the FPÖ viewed the European project increasingly as a process dominated by a left-leaning elite both in the major European capitals and Brussels, whose perceived goal was the obliteration of national cultural autonomy. To the extend that the Austrian left increasingly embraced European integration, the Austrian far-right grew more and more hostile. While on an ideological level, the latter reacted with alarm to what it regarded as ideological homogenization, on a practical political level, the economic fall-out from (seemingly EU mandated) social cut-backs and greater competition opened for the FPÖ a lucrative new political front in its fight against
Social Democratic-Conservative government. No single issue proved more potent and better suited for attracting and mobilizing new voters than that of foreigners.

Since the 1960s, Austria, like Germany, had relied on foreign laborers (Gastarbeiter) to help reduce cost in certain sectors of the labor market and keep consumer prices lower than forecast. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the availability of a pool of highly skilled but relatively cheap labor in the immediate vicinity allowed Austrian companies to move low-value added production across the border while retaining high-value added manufacturing in Austria. Generally speaking, this development opened important opportunities for the country, especially in the eastern provinces, as they became once again attractive locations for investment and as Austrian companies quickly began to play a leading role in Eastern Europe. Yet, the impact of these developments on the workforce was uneven, negatively affecting laborers with low skills, and generally perceived as having a depressing effect on wage levels overall. Competing with an East European labor pool in which wages averaged between 20% and 40% of those in the Alpine nation, fueled strong resentment in Austria at the time. Moreover, there was the erroneous but widespread impression that many of the social cutbacks of the early 1990s were the result of the welfare system burdened by the influx of poorer foreigners.

This problem was compounded by a sharp increase of non-labor related migrants fleeing the war in Yugoslavia as well as political violence and economic hardship in the rest of Eastern Europe and beyond. Initially, Austria’s customs and immigration officials were overwhelmed by the large number of asylum seekers, refugees, and labor migrants that crossed what was essentially an unguarded 1200 kilometer long border after the barbed-wired fences of the Iron Curtain had been dismantled in 1989. According to officials statistics, the number of foreign residents in Austria in 1991 reached nearly 520,000 of whom about 263,000 had employment (Census 1991 in Wils and Fasemann 1994: 342). About 200,000 resident aliens had come from (former) Yugoslavia and some 57,000 from Turkey. By 1993, the number of legal foreign residents rose to 625,000 including some 74,000 Bosnian refugees. Estimates for the number of illegal aliens present in Austria at the time varied widely, but credible accounts suggested that the true figure was somewhere around 200,000 (Wills and Fasemann 1994: 344). In short, the total foreign population was somewhere in excess of 750,000 and thus close to 10% of the population, which was one of the highest ratios in Europe. The situation was especially difficult in Eastern Austria, as it was compounded by illegal cross-border day-laborers from neighboring Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Between 1989 and 1992 the number of labor
migrants increased from 153,000 to 259,000 or 8.8% of total workforce. In Vienna, a city of 1.6 million, their numbers reached the 100,000 threshold in 1991. According to estimates by the Austrian labor inspection office in 1992 the numbers of illegal workers and non-registered daily commuters from Eastern Europe ranged from 25,000 to 30,000 for the Vienna region alone (BfWuS 1992).

Aside from the magnitude of foreign immigration, the problem was compounded by a lack of acceptance on the part of many Austrians as well as restrictive integration and naturalization procedures, preventing foreigners from becoming citizens and “merging” with the native population. Instead, they were often channeled into certain urban ghettos, resulting locally in high concentrations. Such clusters reinforced a perception among Austrians that the number of foreigners was actually higher than had been the case.

After becoming a member of the EU and the Schengen Agreement, the country became additionally responsible for securing the eastern border of a large European space with unrestricted movement. Rapid advances in the professionalization and technological sophistication of Austria’s security forces resulted in an increase in apprehension rates, so that in 2000 for example Austrian border patrols picked up nearly 35,000 illegal immigrants (Profil April 30, 2001: 135). Austria’s geographic location as a European cross-roads for migrants combined with daily news reports about the apprehension of asylum seekers and illegal aliens ensured that the question of foreigners remained a hot button issue in domestic politics throughout the 1990s.

As in other places of the world where much wealthier and much poorer economies intersect, the combination of push and pull factors produced undesirable side effects. These ranged from a rise in illegal immigration and smuggling to an increase in violent crimes, particularly in Vienna. Money laundering and organized crime posed special problems for the Austrian authorities, who had been less experienced in handing such matters. Although Vienna remained nonetheless one of the safest capital cities in Europe, the popular press painted a dark picture of the metropolis, portraying it as being in the grip of violent street gangs, (“Romanian”) burglary rings, the Russian Mafia, and (“African”) drug dealers. Not surprisingly, Eurobarometer surveys found Austrians to be less tolerant of foreign nationals than the citizens of other EU member states.21 This includes also Austrian attitudes toward their fellow EU citizens, as these opinions were generally more negative than anywhere else in the Union.

Summing up, for the Austrian far-right and its xenophobe supporters the issue of foreigners and European integration became ever more intertwined on both an ideological and practical level. Ideologically,
the EU represented a liberal and multicultural project, while on a practical level, the EU’s enormous market and open space attracted an unprecedented influx of people from places as far away as China and Afghanistan. Moreover, the prospect of further immigration and enhanced economic competition as a consequence of enlargement further nourished these fears.

The Freedom Party in the 1990s and beyond

Initially after Jörg Haider had taken over Freedom Party in 1986, it entered what may be termed its “rebel phase.” That is, the FPÖ was not yet trying to appeal to underprivileged strata threatened by economic change but rather aimed its message at mainstream Austrians. The idea was to convince the public that the average Austrian was sustaining a corrupt and wasteful system that catered exclusively to the special interests of political insiders, labor functionaries, and bureaucrats. The FPÖ’s central message was therefore one of middle class empowerment by promising to return control back to the people. This promise of breaking the mold resonated strongly with the small business owners frustrated by the regulatory burdens, as it did with the teacher whose job may have been reserved for a political protege; and it appealed naturally to the tax payer whose social security contributions had just been raised again amidst yet another scandal involving an official with multiple incomes and excessive benefits. As a result, it was the segment of protest voters that dominated in the FPÖ’s constituency until the early 1990s. These were much more often male than female, and tended to come from a middle-class background (cf. Table 1).

<Table 1 about here>

Because the Freedom Party adapted to new circumstances and changed its message to appeal to new voter groups, it usually exceeded the “natural” growth limits that political experts had kept predicting. Yet, the FPÖ was always careful to maintain sufficient continuity so as not to alienate its old supporters. Haider and others in the party must have realized in the late 1980s that remaining a middle-class protest party in combination with pan-German nationalist overtones would not suffice in the long run to attract more than 10% or 15% of the electorate -- the FPÖ’s appeal to centrist and middle-class Austrians was bound to remain limited because Freedomite tactics and political theatrics alienated many better educated and mainstream voters and never worked well with women. From the party’s perspective, its best chances for further growth lay in the cities, particularly in Vienna, and in the major industrial areas, previously the bastions of Austrian Social Democracy. Especially the unskilled and semi-skilled workers and the urban underclass were
vulnerable to greater international competition. Moreover, urban dwellers were most directly exposed to the influx of foreigners. Accordingly, the FPÖ began advocating positions of social protectionism and warning against the sell-out of Austrian businesses to foreign interests. This change in the FPÖ strategy coincided with an increasingly technocratic orientation of the SPÖ, which had gradually opened itself toward (upwardly mobile) middle-class Austrians. In addition, party identification, loyalty, and parental milieu no longer tied voters to a particular political camp as in times past. All of this had contributed to a de-activation of former and potential Social Democratic voters (Heinis 2002).

Starting around 1990, the party’s focus thus shifted, making foreigners and external threats increasingly the center-piece of Freedomite strategy. It aimed at Austrians fearful of change and concerned about their social and physical security. Even in this new orientation of the FPÖ, two distinct stages in the party’s evolution are discernable. In the “social populist phase,” lasting approximately from 1990 to 1996, external influences and foreigners were presented mainly as a cause of economic hardship (competition for jobs) and a danger to personal safety (foreign drug dealers, etc.). In this period the FPÖ was trying hard to recruit modernization losers and benefit from a public backlash against foreign immigration. In what may be labeled, the FPÖ’s “anti-internationalist phase” (1996-2002), anti-internationalism became much broader in scope, as the party began to attack not only specific European Union institutions and individual European politicians but entire neighboring countries such as Slovenia and the Czech Republic for issues unrelated to economic questions. It is in this period that the Freedomites began raising more general question about the impact of Europe on Austrian culture and ethnicity, implying that if integration continued Austrians would become strangers in their own land. Although aspects of all of the FPÖ’s phases always existed alongside one another, each stage is characterized by a shift in strategy and political emphasis.

The change in the FPÖ’s political orientation manifested itself first in a poster campaign for the 1990 national elections that was especially designed to appeal to the xenophobic sentiments of Viennese voters. By targeting for the first time specifically urban blue-collar voters, the FPÖ’s campaign theme foreshadowed what was to come in the years ahead. The slogan “Vienna must not become Chicago,” implicitly connecting the rising levels of immigration with an eight percent jump in the crime rate, provoked outrage by the other political parties and even prompted criticism from among the Freedomites themselves.

Following a series of internal purges, in which Haider rid himself of both the last remaining liberals in the FPÖ but also of pan-Germanic nationalists, all internal restraints were removed. Having a free hand
to operate, he launched his campaign against Austria’s accession to the EU. In typically populist fashion, Freedom Party officials alleged that, after membership, Austria would have to import of “blood-based chocolate,” transfer its gold reserves to Brussels, and be forced to pipe its precious Alpine water to Spain. Jörg Haider even accused the Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky of being part of a Brussels-controlled conspiracy of Freemasons (for an overview of these and other allegations see Luif 1995: 319).

The FPÖ favored a version of the European Community that represented explicitly a “christlich-abendländische Werte-Gemeinschaft” [community of Christian cultural values] (Programm/FPÖ 1999: 115). To the extent that the EU fell short of this notion, the Freedom Party began attacking European Union leaders and their Austrian supporters, which were portrayed as a “sinister elites” intent on importing foreign elements, defiling the Austrian nation, and “imposing an alien cultural agenda (Programm/FPÖ 1999: 115 and 112).

The major FPÖ initiative in this phase of its evolution was to orchestrate a campaign against foreigners in Austria and to link immigration with European integration. In correspondence with the party’s program, which stated unequivocally that “Austria was not a country of immigration” and that “multicultural experiments” were to be “rejected,” the FPÖ launched its Austria First Initiative in 1993 [a national petition drive aimed at changing the government’s policy toward foreign immigration]. Despite initially widespread support for the FPÖ’s Austria First initiative,22 a determined counter campaign by the other political parities along with immigrant rights groups, culminating in the largest political gathering in postwar Austrian history, dealt an unexpected blow to the FPÖ’s anti-foreigner crusade.23 This was the first setback for the Haider-FPÖ in years, forcing the party to reevaluate its tactics. Another blow came when on June 12, 1994, 66.34% of Austrians opted for European Union membership in a national plebiscite (Haider then claimed to oppose membership not on principle but argued that the terms of accession were unfavorable).

The Freedom Party, however, recovered quickly, capturing 22.5% of the votes in national elections held that same year. With this success it claimed the biggest electoral triumph for a third party since the beginning of the Republic. To achieve this victory, Haider’s strategy of abandoning the party’s one-time goal of economic liberalism in favor of advocating social protections and campaigning against international threats had paid off. Social protectionism became an increasingly crucial issue as the government planned a series of budgetary measures to bring Austria in line with the fiscal and monetary criteria required to qualify for the European single currency. Apart from working class Austrians, also small business groups
had been wary of heightened international competition, fearing foreign takeovers and business closures. Seizing on news stories at the time about the so-called “selling out of Austria” [Ausverkauf Österreichs], the FPÖ argued that its mission was that of “an advocate on behalf of the little people” [Eintreten für die kleinen Leute] in order to “represent Austrian interests vis-a-vis the European Union” (Plasser and Ulram 2000:227). When, for example, an international tire manufacturer near Vienna announced to relocate its production to the Czech Republic, Haider made a highly visible appearance at a solidarity rally outside the factory gates. Claiming to express the economic concerns of the “man in the street,” Haider went on record stating that “European [Union cohesion] funds cannot mean that the lazy Southern countries are subsidized at the expense of the hard labor of our citizens” (Haider 1994 in Czernin 2000:62) or that “Austrian [EU] membership fees will disappear...in the pockets of Italian Mafiosi or corrupt Greek mayors (Haider 1994 in Czernin 2000:61).

In the mid-1990s Austrian politics entered a crucial period in which several developments were coming to head. Slowing economic growth, rising unemployment, and the discourse on social retrenchment in conjunction with meeting the Maastricht criteria took a toll on the government coalition. Massive resistance by the labor unions and the SPÖ’s political base to the austerity measures meant that for the first time the popular Social Democratic Chancellor and his course were politically vulnerable. Taking advantage of the SPÖ’s predicament, the People’s Party pulled out of the coalition, triggering unscheduled elections in December 1995. Liberated from its Conservative coalition partner, the Social Democrats quickly recovered by waging an intense bread-and-butter campaign with populist overtones and sweeping promises of social protections (“your pensions will be safe with us”). The media dubbed the elections of that year as the battle for the “little man” and pollsters emphasized that the outcome would turn on how certain sub-groups of voters reacted to the budgetary crisis and the general political situation (Plasser, Seeber, Ulram 2000). Many of these were especially hostile to foreign immigrants whom they viewed as economic and social competitors. Others were so-called “law-and-order types,” usually medium-income pensioners and skilled workers, of whom many were convinced that the Austrian system was “rotten,” crime was rampant, and “decent people” were routinely defrauded by corrupt politicians, Brussels, foreigners and other “sinister forces” (Plasser, Seeber, Ulram 2000). Another important segment were the so-called modernization losers, which included typically unemployed men and women under thirty, skilled workers in unskilled occupations, and employed males with net incomes of less than ATS 10,000 ($700). In what became known as Austria’s
"winter of discontent" in 1995, the FPÖ and SPÖ waged an intense political battle for these groups. In the end, the Social Democrats achieved a surprising victory, although most pundits had written off the Chancellor and his party. For the first time since 1979, the SPÖ had gained votes, increasing its overall share of the electorate from 34.9% to 38.1%, while the FPÖ failed to make any gains, essentially retaining its 22% share.

The message of the electorate was clear and summed up in editorials that talked about the Austrians' "fear of change" (Profil, 19 December 1995). In opinion polls, 56% of voters identified the "budget deficit and taxes" and 30% mentioned "social justice and concern for the underprivileged" as their first priority (IMAS-poll quoted in Wirtschaftswoche 20 November 1995). Welfare abuse (15%) and political scandals (15%) seemed to matter far less. When respondents were asked to rank specific election issues, maintaining the social system ranked second (pension system) and fourth (welfare state), while post-materialist concerns had dropped to sixth (citizen rights) and 11th (environment). It reflected the conservative and status-quo orientation of an electorate confronted with bewildering political and economic changes. To the extent that the Conservatives, the Greens, and the Freedom Party had, each in their own way, campaigned for political change, they were punished.

As the voters turned to the institutions such as the Social Partnership and the one political party, the SPÖ, that promised continuity and stability, the Freedom Party had learned two principal lessons and once again adapted its strategy. First, Haider realized that he could not compete directly with the SPÖ on social policy because, by virtue of being in government, the latter could more convincingly promise to safeguard social security. Secondly, there was a growing conservative tendency in the public aimed at maintaining the Austrian way of life, of which the consensus model represented an important aspect. As a result, the Freedom Party temporarily abandoned its calls for radical change and increasingly championed Austria's specific cultural heritage and uniqueness. By embracing Austro-patriotism, it tapped effectively into a traditionalist resurgence in which a desire to "cultivate Austrian achievements, "return to the roots" and "back to nature" promised an escape from the accelerated process of modernization brought about by Austria's rapid insertion into the European market. In sharp contrast to its erstwhile preoccupation with Germanic nationalism and anti-clericalism, when Haider had called the concept of Austrian nationhood (as distinct from the German nation) an "ideological miscarriage," the FPÖ now embraced a new kind of Austro-patriotism and even reached out to the conservative elements in the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.
Safeguarding the country's environment and its "natural resources" became the logical extension of the FPÖ's new policy priorities — plans to sell "Austrian" spring water to Italy, for example, became a Freedomite rallying cry. In short, the new cultural conservatism was less the flag-waving sort of patriotism but rather one in which the Schnitzel was seen as being threatened by the Hamburger and the Shish-Kabob. Accordingly, immigrants were no longer viewed only as potential criminals and economic competitors but more broadly as a threat to the fabric of Austrian society in general. Haider's infamous statement about the looming "Überfremdung" [over-foreignization] captured this sense among parts of the public. It was a small step for him to link the fear of foreigners to the issue of EU enlargement when he argued "[w]hat threatens is the possibility of further over-foreignization through Eastern Enlargement" (Haider in Die Presse July 10, 1998).

The European Union offered a lucrative target also because of a series of conflicts between Vienna and Brussels as several uniquely Austrian arrangements had run afoul of European Union regulations. From unilaterally restricting transalpine road traffic to Austria's cherished anonymous bank accounts, Brussels pressured the country to comply with its treaty obligations (Heinisch 1999). This was something that outraged many Austrians.

Confronted with the same economic and budgetary problems as before election, the new "old" Social Democratic-Conservative coalition government had little choice but to implement the planned austerity program. Many voters regarded this as betrayal on the part of SPÖ and reacted accordingly. In both the elections to the EU Parliament and the Vienna state elections in 1996, the Freedom Party achieved impressive triumphs foreshadowing its electoral success three years later in 1999. When voters were asked about their motives, 62% mentioned the austerity program, 33% the EU, and 34% the "problem with foreigners" as the major reasons for their political preference. In fact, xenophobia and fear of the outside world became an increasingly decisive factor in the voters' decision to support the FPÖ. By 1999 the percentage of the electorate that regarded the question of foreigners as central had risen from 7% in 1990 to 40% in 1999 (Plasser and Ulram 2000: 229)

The success of the Freedom Party's campaign against foreigners and "Europe" was also the result of political opportunities that arose from the governments' handling of these political issues. In terms of trying to regulate immigration, the coalition government was internally divided, not only between Social Democrats and Conservatives but the splits occurred within the various parties, pitting factions against each
other. To the public it appeared increasingly that the Freedomites were *de facto* setting the agenda to which a vacillating government reacted by first playing down the problem and then tightening the immigration policy (for a more detailed analysis see Wolfgruber 1994, Heinisch 2002). Eventually, the Conservatives broke ranks with the SPÖ by making an explicit connection between immigrants and public safety ("preventing the importation of political, religious, and racial conflict potentials"). Feeling squeezed between the SPÖ and the FPÖ, the Conservatives sought to take credit for getting the government to curb the number of asylum seekers. Gradually, the debate shifted from the management and regulation of migrant flows to the prevention and reduction of immigration. Strategically, this was to be a colossal blunder, because the FPÖ’s consistent position of “zero-tolerance” of foreign immigration was always more convincing to the public than the coalition’s more nuanced approach (see Palme 2000: 254).

Another structural problem of Austria’s coalition government was that, in terms of policy preferences, both parties had converged on European integration. As the Social Democrats became more market-oriented and “European” in the 1980s, abandoning many of its economic positions of the 1970s, it began competing more directly with the ÖVP. This made it difficult for the Conservatives to distinguish themselves sufficiently and maintain a distinct political profile within the government coalition, which not only undermined the electoral position for the ÖVP but caused increasing friction between the coalition partners. The government’s embrace of European integration and the transformation of the SPÖ and the labor union leadership from EU skeptics into supporters of integration committed both major parties to endorsing an ever expanding European agenda, which moved quickly from “participating in the European market” to monetary union, and subsequently to Austria’s role in a European defense and security initiative. Since both the SPÖ and the ÖVP were out-competing one another as to which party was the more “European,” Euro-skeptics turned in large numbers to the FPÖ, the most nationalist and consistently anti-European of all the Austrian parties.

An associated effect was the perceived increase in “insider politics.” The complex nature and potential political cost of many of the issues confronting the government required an extraordinary amount of back-room deal making. The often difficult negotiations between the two awkward coalition partners made the political decision making process even more elite-driven than usual. Frequently, legislation was passed in the form of so-called package deals (*Pakete*), such as the Austerity Packages I, II [*Sparpakte I, II*] and the Family Policy Package [*Familienpaket*], which consisted of delicately crafted sets of measures balancing
ideological preferences and linking tradeoffs and compromises. Following the closed-door debates where compromises were made in secrecy and side-payments were arranged quietly, the government orchestrated political information campaigns that were essentially marketing offensives designed to win over the skeptical public. Scarcely a substitute for meaningful public debate, the government was roundly criticized by the opposition, especially the FPÖ, for ignoring voter sentiments. Time and again, people were reminded of the sweeping economic promises the government had made before the referendum on EU membership, only to find out afterwards that drastic belt-tightening was necessary to meet the EU’s monetary convergence criteria.

In the run-up to 1999 national elections, the government’s fortunes, specifically the chances of Social Democrats, seemed to have improved as the country had emerged from the difficulties of the mid-1990s. As the FPÖ was plagued by internal problems, the SPÖ hoped to take advantage of a good economy and decided on an issue-oriented campaign, where polls signaled that it had certain advantages. However the Freedomites and the Conservatives unexpectedly succeed in turning the elections into a question about “political change” and personalities – two aspects in which the SPÖ had weaknesses (Müller 2000). To the extent that issues did play a role, they dealt with foreigners and European integration, specifically with European Union enlargement. These were topics however on which the Social Democrats found themselves divided and on the defensive, but that were key strengths of the FPÖ (Plasser, Ulram and Sommer 2000).

Among organized labor there was great apprehension about enlargement, so that Haider’s vow to oppose what he called the EU’s “unchecked” expansion into Eastern Europe [ungebremste Osterweiterung] found a sympathetic reception among Austrian workers. It is no coincidence therefore that in the 1999 elections, the FPÖ surpassed the Social Democrats as Austria’s largest blue-collar workers’ party.

The outcome of the 1999 elections, especially the triumph of the FPÖ, and the unprecedented political changes that followed from them have been analyzed extensively and need not be revisited here (e.g., Plasser, Ulram and Sommer 2000, Heinisch 2002). The emergence of three nearly equally strong parties in Austria ended the preeminence of Social Democrats and Conservatives and thus broke mold of Austrian postwar politics. Although “Europe” and the fear of “foreigners” were not the only factors in accounting for this momentous change and the rise of right-wing populism, but they were necessary conditions, whose importance cannot be overstated. The issue of “Europe” continued to overshadow Austrian politics in dramatic ways after 1999, when the participation of the FPÖ in the new government resulted in near
worldwide condemnation and Austria’s international isolation.

As the measures imposed on Austria by the 14 EU member states have been the subject of much scholarship (Schneider 2000, Pernthaler, Peter and Peter Hilpold 2000, Heinisch 2002), it should only be pointed out here that in 2000 “Europe” and Austria’s relationship to its partners became the *causa prima* in Austrian politics. Initially, the coalition enjoyed considerable public support due to the cohesive effect of the sanctions. While Austrians rallied behind the ÖVP and FPÖ, the opposition found it difficult to criticize the coalition without being labeled unpatriotic. Undeterred by international criticism, the FPÖ leader undertook time and again actions to heighten international concerns about the democratic nature of the FPÖ and its impact on European politics. For example, barely two weeks after the general elections in Austria, Haider participated in a campaign event in Vicenza, Italy, which had been organized by Umberto Bossi and his separatist Northern League. In this context, the Italian news media reported that, along with Bossi, the FPÖ leader railed against “Brussels” (*Der Standard* October 18, 1999). Haider had long been toying with the idea of creating a pan-European platform of right-wing parties against the European Union in its present form. To this effect, the Freedomites had had extensive contacts with like-minded parties across Europe, especially in Italy and Belgium. These efforts culminated in July 2002 in a now infamous meeting that Haider arranged with other right-wing extremist leaders in his home state. The talks were attended by Filip de Winter and Frank Vanhecke of the Vlaams Blok as well as Mario Borghesia, a former Euro-MP of Italy’s *Lega Nord*, who discussed proposals for a far-right list for the European Parliamentary elections in July 2004.

As much as “Europe” had served as a source of FPÖ cohesion and voter mobilization, it also sealed Haider’s fate as Freedomite party leader. A post-election image making tour by Haider through various European capitals went disastrously wrong. Moreover, his international notoriety seriously threatened his party’s political aspirations in government. This experience convinced Haider that it might be better to vacate the post of party leader and withdraw to his home state of Carinthia where he was the elected governor. From there he continued to dominate his party but, as history would show, with decreasing effectiveness (Heinisch forthcoming in *West European Politics*).

Despite a written pro-EU commitment, on which the ÖVP had insisted prior to forming a coalition with the FPÖ, the Freedomites’ continued aversion to European integration was evident in their constant criticism of the European Union once they entered government. The FPÖ took every opportunity to criticize Brussels and the European Union, ranging from its handling of the mad cow (BSE) and foot and mouth
disease to rulings against Austria on transit traffic and anonymous savings accounts. High-ranking party members routinely attacked EU officials, specifically the Commissioner on enlargement, Günter Verheugen (referring to him as a “coward” -- *derStandard-online* April 14, 2002), and the Austrian EU Agriculture Commissioner, Franz Fischler (calling him a “traitor” -- *derStandard-online* April 08, 2002).

In the context of EU-expansion, the Freedom Party continually bought up new issues and made certain demands designed to raise Austria’s political leverage while slowing down the enlargement process. FPÖ government officials insisted that “enlargement must cost less” and announced that Austrian contributions between 2004 and 2006 would be lower than demanded by the European Commission (*derStandard-online* September 2, 2002). As a precondition for EU accession, Freedomite (but also some Conservative) politicians demanded specifically that the Czech Republic rescind the “Beneš Decrees” and Slovenia the so-called “AVNOJ Mandates” to redress the grievances of ethnic Germans expelled after 1945. At times even leading members of the Conservative Party converged on the FPÖ’s line of argumentation by taking aim at Prague and Ljubljana – in 2000 and 2001, Austria’s bilateral relations with these two neighbors reached a nadir. The campaign by right-wing politicians in Austria fed on popular anti-Slavic sentiments, exacerbating latent negative attitudes in the population about the enlargement process. The conflict with Ljubljana was aggravated also by the fact that Haider was the Governor of Carinthia – Austria’s border state with Slovenia – that had a history of tension with the local Slovene minority. The relations between Vienna and Prague were additionally overshadowed by Austrian demands that a large (Soviet type) nuclear reactor near the Czech town of Temelin be dismantled. In the absence of relevant EU regulations and having invested several hundred million dollars as well as 13 years of construction, the Czech Republic sternly rejected those demands. Bilateral relations were also strained by Czech support for the international sanctions against the government in Vienna so that the Temelin issue became a lightning rod for the collective frustrations Austrians felt about their treatment at the hands of their European neighbors. Border boycotts, demonstrations, and fiery speeches by politicians, formed the climax of a wave of anti-Czech protests. The FPÖ was quick to exploit the situation by launching a petition drive supported by the major Austrian tabloid *Kronenzeitung*. The aim was to make Austrian approval to Czech accession dependent on shutting down the plant.

For the most part, however, the ÖVP sought to reign in the Freedomites on this and related issues. Nonetheless, the tension between the two coalition parties over Europe was an ever increasing strain
on the government. When the Freedom Party stated unequivocally that it intended to organize a referendum on the question of enlargement, ÖVP Chancellor Schüssel rejected the idea in an uncharacteristically sharp rebuke. To the extent that the FPÖ’s poor overall political performance resulted in a string of electoral defeats in regional elections and declining poll numbers, the campaign against EU-enlargement became an ever more important source of FPÖ cohesion and mobilization. It was the only policy area where the party could effectively distinguish itself from its coalition partner, which otherwise dominated the policymaking process and received most of the credit for the successes of the government. The FPÖ’s stance on Europe was also the one policy area left that allowed the party to appeal to its diverse coalition of voters, uniting modernization losers, right-wingers, welfare chauvinists, blue-collar workers and cultural traditionalist. This was all the more important as many of these groups alienated by the liberal reforms undertaken by the government had begun to turn away from the FPÖ.

Despite the relentless campaign against foreigners and international threats (EU-enlargement, Temelin, etc.) as well as a series of anti-Semitic remarks by Haider and other FPÖ officials, the Freedomites suffered a major political defeat in the Vienna State elections in March 2001. The divisive and racist campaign tactics used, once again invited international scrutiny, reminding many voters of the politically contentious period of the previous year when the country had faced nearly worldwide criticism. The Freedomites dropped by 7 percentage points to 20%. As the FPÖ had clearly overreached itself, the Vienna election showed the limits of the populist strategy. Anti-internationalist rhetoric lifted the FPÖ’s standing in the polls in the initial phase of the campaign but ultimately could no longer patch up the growing rift within the party between neoliberal reformers in the national government and the right-wing populist base. The Freedomites would ultimately be unable to resolve this internal conflict. The Vienna elections were also important in that they represented a set-back for Haider and his faction in the party, which in turn strengthened the hand of the national leadership around Riess-Passer as she began a slow process of political emancipation.

The inexperience of the Freedom Party in government, their lack of competent policymakers and experts (half of its cabinet members needed to be replaced within two years) allowed the ÖVP to outmaneuver its Freedomite coalition partner in virtually all policy areas (see Heinisch forthcoming in West European Politics). With respect to EU enlargement and Temelin, the Conservatives appeared to support
the rhetoric of the Freedomites, while one ÖVP cabinet minister along with the tacit approval of the EU Commission had worked out an agreement with the Czech government that no longer demanded the dismantling of the plant. The FPÖ’s only course of action was to break ranks and publicly call for a veto of Czech accession, which again served to highlight the extremist position of the Freedomites. The Freedomites faced the added difficulty of remaining internationally isolated even after the sanctions had ended, robbing them of valuable public relations. When for example the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder visited his Austrian counterpart briefly, the Austrian Vice-Chancellor Susanne Riess-Passer was not even invited to the luncheon and the photo-op.

By summer 2002 the latent internal divisions between different FPÖ factions over the political direction of the party had turned into open conflict, notably between a group of hardcore ideologues close to Haider and the more moderate national Freedomite leadership in the government 37 – see Luther (2003) for a detailed analysis. As Haider tried one more time to impose his will on the party, the FPÖ leadership resigned, which in turn caused the Conservative Chancellor Schüssel to end the coalition and call for new elections. Sensing political defeat, Haider refused to take over the chairmanship the party and opted to remain governor. Faced with a catastrophic decline in public approval and imminent elections, the immediate instinct of the new interim party leader Mathias Reichold was to mobilize the party faithful by reviving the veto option with respect to Czech accession – “it is about Austria’s vital interests...the veto card remains up our sleeve” (derStandard-online September 26, 2002). The FPÖ subsequently launched an initiative in the Austrian Parliament to connect the vote on enlargement with the Czech stance on the Beneš Decrees and Temelin, which was rejected by the ÖVP. In a last major effort in the run-up to the elections held in November, the Freedomites sought broaden their attack on the EU once again by presenting a catalogue of old and new demands ranging from the Stability Pact and Common Agriculture Policy to changing the EU’s transit policy. The FPÖ also called for a reduction in Austria’s financial contributions to the Union. As the FPÖ went through yet another leadership crisis, replacing Reichhold with Social Affairs Minister Herbert Haupt, the party’s credibility declined even further. As a result, the anti-EU campaign failed to resonate with the public. Not only did individuals like Reichhold and Haupt lack the charisma and rhetorical ability of Jörg Haider to deliver such a political message credibly, the FPÖ increasingly realized that its long-term survival could only be assured by remaining a part of a future government. The only realistic coalition partner were
the Conservatives, which, as Chancellor Schüssel put it, were “one hundred percent in favor of enlargement” (derStandard-online, October 22, 2002), and thus could not be alienated completely. Moreover, polls indicated that 62% of Austrians supported EU enlargement, most notably Green and Conservative sympathizers (derStandard-online October 24, 2002).

Brushing aside FPÖ criticism, the ÖVP now unequivocally endorsed EU-enlargement. Both at the informal Brussels summit in October 2002 and the Copenhagen Council, Austria was represented by two Conservatives, the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister, which preempted the FPÖ from playing any role. In the end, the attempt to mobilized voters against Europe did not succeed. The Freedomites’ image of being a chaos party, its track record of incompetence and discord as well as Haider’s unpredictable personality had damaged the party’s image with voters beyond repair. The general elections of November 24, 2002 yielded an overwhelming success for Chancellor Schüssel’s ÖVP, as the People’s Party achieved 42.3% representing a 15.4% increase compared to 1999. This was the biggest gain in votes and parliamentary seats of any Austrian party in postwar history. Meanwhile, the Freedomites lost more than half their voters, dropping from 27% to 10%. After less than three years in public office, the FPÖ was back to where it had started with Haider in 1986, when it had polled 9.6%. Although the opposition parties of Social Democrats (36.5%+/3.6) and Greens (9.5%+/2.7) made modest gains, they fell far short of their expectations and must be considered clear losers as well. Even in Haider’s home state of Carinthia, where he was still governor, his party dropped from first (39%) to third place (24%). The trend was confirmed by local elections in March 2003. For the first time in a national campaign, the FPÖ had overreached itself and the elections of fall 2002 clearly showed the limits of an “anti-Europe” strategy. What is more, the FPÖ’s campaign did not succeed despite Austria’s failure to make headway with Brussels on several of the policy issues, such as transit traffic and Temelin, that mattered most to the public. It seemed that at last the country had reconciled itself with its place in Europe.

Conclusion

Based on a conceptual distinction between the old extreme right and the populist far-right, this paper argued that, by being willing to sacrifice ideological principle in the interest of voter maximization, the latter groups substantially adjust their political message to fit changing circumstances. The Austrian Freedom Party
under Jörg Haider had perfected this approach, excelling at the "game of elections" (Mair 2002: 83) by moving through no less than three distinct phases with vastly different political priorities. In no political issue was this more evident than with respect to "Europe," which the party first regarded as "friend" an later as "villain." For the Austrian populist far-right when it still defined itself as a middle-class protest party the European Community represented an escape from the corset of leftist-dominated corporatism and liberal internationalism by bringing Austria into the fold of what it perceived as a market-oriented, pro-Western, and Christian-cultural bulwark against the Communist and Slavic East. For this reason, the FPÖ became the first Austrian party to advocate open EC and NATO membership. As the international environment changed in the wake of 1989 and the Freedomites had reached their growth limits as a middle-class anti-system party, new growth opportunities presented themselves by seeking to appeal to the urban under-classes, blue-collar workers, and modernization losers. To the extent that Austria's internationalization represented by the integration into the European Union and Single Market as well as by the influx of foreign immigrants was now perceived as a threat to the country's welfare state, cultural autonomy, and national identity, Haider's Freedom Party was only too eager to take up this cause. In the early 1990s therefore, it objected to Austria's accession to the EU and began a relentless crusade against foreigners in Austria. Initially, the thrust of Freedomite campaign was directed at the specific negative consequences of immigration (competition for jobs, declining educational standards, rising crimes rates, etc.) and EU-membership (sell out of Austrian business, loss of national autonomy, high cost, painful austerity measures, etc.). Later when this strategy had reached the limits of its usefulness in the 1995 elections, the populist right re-tooled once again to broaden its scope of anti-internationalism by taking aim at EU-enlargement, "out-of control Brussels elites," and even entire countries (Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia). The radical right was not the only party to use "Europe" as an instrument of political mobilization and recruitment. Especially the Conservatives regarded EC/EU-membership as a defining characteristic of their party and a way to effectively distinguish themselves from their Social Democratic coalition partner. To the extent that the Austrian left mutated from Euro-skeptics to Euro-philes, the two major Austrian parties began competing in this issue area, using it as a way to project modernity and progress. The SPÖ's change in this regard politically orphaned large numbers of erstwhile voters among the urban working class, making it susceptible to the FPÖ's anti-internationalism.

"Europe" thus played a significant role in the rise of right-wing populism in Austria, first by
presenting a counter example to the Austrian model and subsequently an external threat, both of which allowed the FPÖ to mobilize people and form a disparate coalition of voters. The ideological flexibility of the Freedomites as fundamentally a populist party enabled it to take advantage of the political opportunities that presented themselves in a changing Europe. However, the Freedom Party was only able to do so because its leadership, especially Jörg Haider, was keenly aware of the ambiguity in the relationship between Austria and Europe. In short, the Freedomites did not themselves create the conditions for their success but benefitted from Austria historical skepticism of Western modernity, its relative isolation from Atlanticist Europe, its ambivalence toward liberal market economies, and its lack of national identity. The profound uncertainty many Austrians felt about themselves as a nation and their history in combination with the prevailing status quo orientation necessarily exacerbated latent fears of change, resulting in a resurgence of traditionalism and cultural conservatism. Time and again, Haider tailored his message to appeal to the zeitgeist that was reflected even in the statements of FPÖ critics such as “I don’t like Haider but much of what he says is correct,” which became commonplace. For those who supported him politically, the specter of over- foreignization seemed a genuine threat.

Austrian elites too, regarded accession to the EU as a panacea from existing structural economic problems but did not trust the public to follow along. A meaningful public debate and national dialogue about the consequences of membership were thus supplanted by what was at best a lopsided information campaign and at its worst an advertising blitz. The complexity of accession negotiations, the enormity of domestic changes required, the need to keep the Social Partners on board, and the awkward relationship between the two government parties did not make for a very transparent decision-making process. This indirectly played into the hands of the Freedom Party which painted a grim picture of sinister elites conspiring to sell out the “Heimat” and replace the “Volk” with a new multicultural electorate.

In the final analysis, the role of “Europe” in Austrian politics served as an escape mechanism, an instrument of political mobilization and an image projecting either modernity or an alien threat. A country that had long defined itself in relation to Germany, now defines itself politically in relation to Europe. It was this process and its consequences that above all else that has shaped Austrian politics in the last decade.

That the current decline of the Austrian populist right is neither complete nor irreversible is evident in the fact that it recently became once again (albeit in a diminished junior role) partner in a coalition
government with the Conservatives. In Austria as in other countries, acts of historical revisionism, an explicit law-and-order stance, xenophobic campaigns, and anti-European posturing continue to appeal to an important share of the voter spectrum, which is guided by, what Newell (2000: 483) calls, “the growth of a right-wing version of post-materialism based on moral traditionalism and on citizen’s concerns about identity and physical security.” As long as these conditions continue to exist in a Europe undergoing its current transformation, far-right populist parties will find voters.

Endnotes

1. Former members of the NSDAP were temporarily barred from voting in Austria immediately after the war. Upon readmission many of them supported the VdU and later the Freedom Party.

2. The latter label was rejected by many scholars as too vague to be conceptually meaningful (Kitschelt 1995: 49). Instead, terms like “extreme” or “radical” have been preferred. Along with Frank Decker (2000), I argue that the “populist” characteristics of these parties not only capture the novelty of this political phenomenon but account also for their relative success and staying power when in opposition.

3. In a survey conducted by the American Jewish Committee (Gallup-Institute 1995), 41% of FPÖ supporters felt that in the past Jews had wielded too much influence in world affairs (Austrian average: 27%), 36% preferred not to live next a Jewish neighbor (Austrian average: 24%), and 28% saw Jews as having too much influence in Austria (Austrian average: 17%).

4. The Freedomites hoped to overcome the tension between nationalism and personal freedom by applying Hayek’s principle of liberty not only to individuals but also to national communities, conceiving them as free to choose who they are, what influences they welcome, and whom they allow to become members.


6. The purges began with the removal of most members of the old party elite, especially the representatives of the liberal wing soon after Haider’s ascent to power in 1986. Then in 1992 alone, after removing both liberals and old-guard far-right nationalists (including several of Haider’s own mentors), the Freedom Party went through two federal deputy party leaders, one federal party executive, five regional party leaders, and a large number of candidates and functionaries at the regional and local level, all of whom had attracted the ire of the party leader. In the “rebellious” State of Salzburg, hundreds of elected party officials were thrown out of the organization. In 1998, Haider achieved even more complete control over the party when he demanded that party officials sign a pledge of conduct and loyalty.

7. Such as their “Bohemian” (Czech) cuisine, their Hungarian music, their Italian joie de vivre, and the contributions of Jewish intellectuals.

8. Even the idea that most Austrians were part of a “nonpolitical Kulturnation based on a common language, history, and ethnicity was equated [by the political elites] with Nazism, and the rejection of the
concept of an Austrian nation was regarded as right-wing extremism" (Riedlberger 1998: 28). Although "at least half of the population" (ibid) did not share this view, there was still never a comprehensive campaign aimed at public education or at least a national debate about the question of Austrian national identity. Instead, a "hastily devised de-Nazification policy...failed to distinguish between mere party members and real war criminals" (ibid).


10. Performance-Index (1975-87) = \( \text{economic growth} \times 100 \) 
    \( \text{inflation rate} + \text{unemployment rate} \)
    Austria =25.6; Switzerland=31.2; FRG=19.4; US=18.9; UK=10.4 (Knapp 1990)


12. The Minister of Agriculture, Josef Riegler, of the Conservative Party.

13. Instead, the 1987 SPÖ-ÖVP agreement outlining the agenda of the new government referred to European integration only in rather vague terms:
    One of the principal barriers to Austrian economic development is the smallness of the internal market. The Federal Government will ensure through consistent efforts toward integration and internationalization that Austrian enterprises can participate in the dynamic of the great European market and technology programs of the EC and that existing and threatening discrimination will be removed...Participation in the further development of the process of European integration is of central importance to Austria.... In contact with its EFTA-partners, Austria must therefore seek far-reaching participation in the further process of European integration. *Arbeitsübereinkommen* (Jan. 16, 1987: 3).

14. Initially, the EU opposed these reservations conveying its opinion to Austria officially in an *avis* issued on July 31, 1991. Brussels feared that Austria’s neutral status could conflict with article I(8)2 of the European Union Treaty requiring unanimity for a resolution on joint action related to the common defense policy. Austria’s neutrality also threatened plans concerning the integration of the West European Union (WEU) into the EU. In long negotiations with Brussels, Austria subsequently reduced the concept of neutrality to the “military core” (Hausmaninger 1998: 84), which the EU eventually accepted in 1994.

15. Austria was not a "sinking ship" in need of rescue, nor was there a pervasive popular desire, as in Portugal, Spain, and many countries in Eastern Europe that membership in the EC should bring economic relieve, enhance prosperity, and confer added prestige. However, within the overall successful Austrian economy, very competitive and rather weak sectors existed side by side. Massive infusions of capital and rescue packages could not save most of the country's heavy industry, which had been in a state of accelerated decline since the 1970s. Of the remaining industrial production, too much was still devoted to basic manufacturing, which would not be able to survive stiffer competition without significant upgrading. Just as there was an emerging critical need for new investments, chronic budget deficits and the lack of Austrian venture capitalists made the national economy even more dependent on capital imports. Austria’s geopolitical position and changes in the international markets threatened to direct international investment flows away from the country. Moreover, the development of the new communication technologies and lower barriers to capital transfers made it easier for Austrian capital to

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flow out of the country, adding to the shortage. Another structural problem was posed by the public service sector characterized by fairly low levels of productivity and high cost, which had a progressively negative impact on the rest of the economy. Along with the notoriously inefficient nationalized industry and the public sector as such, there was a second, semi-public economy involving banks, insurance companies, utilities, health care providers, housing associations, transportation and construction companies, and other quasi-public firms and institutions. Many of these had Proportion-based (politically appointed) managements, depended on public subsidies, and operated in a protected environment. Moreover, Austria’s export quota was comparatively small and the country was without question struggling behind. The situation was compounded by relatively low levels of technological innovation as measured by expenditures on research and development, patents filed, and joint ventures between industry and academia. Further problems consisted of Austria’s relatively high prices for most major consumer goods, affecting purchasing power and economic living standards. This and the generally status-quo orientation of the population, made Austrians on average lag behind on most indicators of innovation (adoption of new technologies), mobility, and self-reliance, which suggested that the country was not well-prepared for the new international economy.

16. More than 70% of Austrians, for instance, feared that EC membership would result in an increased influx of foreigners, but not, as one might expect, from EC-countries but rather from Eastern Europe and the Balkans (Plasser and Ulram 1994: 215). Austrians for example expected overwhelmingly that EU membership would have negative effects on the environment, the situation with foreigners, the quality of products, and neutrality. However, respondents felt equally strongly that joining the EU would boost the economy, lower consumer prices, and enhance Austria’s overall security. The ambivalence continued all the way up to the referendum in 1994.

17. At the time, Paris felt that the inclusion of a Germanic bloc consisting of an enlarged Germany along with Austria and Scandinavia would erode France’s leadership position inside the EC/EU. Similarly, the Southern member states feared that a Northern enlargement would weaken the influence of the poorer countries in the EC/EU. Generally however, the prospect of having to absorb a bloc of neutral countries initially prompted fears that the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) might be at risk. Faced with uncertainty about the EC’s own future in the wake of geopolitical change, the Commission along with France in particular took the position that “deepening,” meaning further integration, had to come before a “widening” of the Community (Luif 1995: 176).

18. Slogans suggested for example that people would almost immediately save substantial amounts every month on their grocery bills. This was complemented by a campaign in various supermarkets that featured “low EU prices” in the weeks leading up to the referendum.

19. The burgeoning Greens were also political outsiders. However as a movement of the left concerned especially with the ecological implications of European free market policies, it had a far more skeptical view of the EC.

20. Particularly, the increase in trade and cross-border traffic promised to be a boon for Austrian businesses. These companies, which typically had a weak international presence, could use their regional expertise to establish footholds in Eastern Europe and become important players in these emerging markets. Both the small size of these economies and the relatively moderate cost of doing business in that region, made Eastern Europe an ideal area of operation for Austria’s mid-size industries. Its firms not only topped the list of investors in neighboring Hungary, Slovenia, and Slovakia but also accounted for 8% of the total foreign investment in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Beuss 1998: 27).
21. Fewer Austrians (Aus: 75%/ EU 15: 81) than citizens in other EU member states (except for Greece) claimed not to be "not disturbed" by the "presence of people of another nationality" (Eurobarometer 53 2000: Fig. 7.5).

22. According to a Gallup Poll, some 1.6 million Austrian signaled support for the FPÖ initiative (Riedlsperger 1998: 36).

23. With 416,532 signatures (8.87%) in support of the initiative, even the FPÖ had to admit that it had failed in its goal. It was especially significant that in Vienna, where foreigners were much more highly concentrated than in the rest of the country, the initiative mobilized less than half (8.87%) of former FPÖ voters.

24. Typically, these were male workers and retirees with Social Democratic background, plagued by fears of sliding into poverty. Another important voter group were younger workers as well as lower level white-collar employees and public sector workers, who were not affiliated with any party but believed strongly in the state as the primary provider of social care ("welfare chauvinists").

25. The huge popularity of organic farming along with the revival of village traditions centered on smaller life-worlds stood in marked contrast to the economies of scale that European integration was seeking to realize.

26. You know as well as I, that the Austrian nation is a miscarriage, an ideological miscarriage, because belonging to a people is one thing, belonging to a state is another....if somebody is free to consider himself a Slovene-Austrian..., then it must be possible to consider oneself a German-Austrian. And this is what we have formulated in our program. (Trans. by author, ORF- Inlandsreport, August 18, 1988).

27. Chapter III of the FPÖ's program is titled "Austria First" no longer emphasized Austria's allegiance to the German nation and cultural sphere but endorsed an explicit "Österreichpatriotismus" [Austrian Patriotism] (Programm/FPÖ 1999: 108), from which the program derived a number of principles such as protecting Austria's cultural heritage, environment, and regional identities.

28. The Freedom Party even went as far as to qualify itself as the "natural partner" of the Christian Churches. Its concern clearly lay with the preservation of the values, moral foundations, and traditions of the "Abendland" [Christian Civilization], which required a "Christianity that defends its values" (Programm/FPÖ 1999: 113). Correspondingly, the party argued that several major threats to Christian society existed that warranted "vigilance."

29. In the elections to the EU Parliament, the SPÖ suffered a major setback (29.1%), yielding for the first time in a national vote three equally strong parties (Conservatives: 29.7%; FPÖ: 27%).

30. The 1996 Vienna elections dealt the Grand Coalition yet another blow when the Social Democrats fell below 40% (- 8.7%) for the first time in the "Red city" and the Conservatives declined to 15% while the FPÖ soared to 27.9% (+5.4%).

31. By 1997, the FPÖ already dominated the issue of foreigners among voters. By contrast, their confidence in the SPÖ (16%) and ÖVP (10%) to deal with immigration plummeted to all time lows (Confidence in FPÖ vs. government's ability (1995): 33% vs. 30%/(1999) 38% vs. 26% -- Müller 2000: 38). Of all issues areas that were typically considered a Freedomite strength (political transparency, law and order, social policy competence, bureaucratic reform) the topic of "foreigners and immigration" was
by far the most effective for the FPÖ (Müller 2000: 40).

32. Wherever he went, the FPÖ leader was greeted by demonstrations and nagging questions about his Nazi connections. The images of loud protests, Haider's defensiveness, and his awkward statements (comparing himself to Tony Blair in London) reinforced the negative international impression and introduced him even to a wider audience. His notorious lack of self-control then got the better of him and in response to a question about Israel, Haider suggested that the “Israelis should sweep in front of their own door,” implying they should worry about their own dirty business. See Profil October 18, 1999: 42.

33. Even Party Chairman and Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel and Deputy Chair Andreas Khol demanded that Prague repeal the Beneš Decrees and pay restitution as precondition for accession (derstandard-online October 1, 2002).

34. Especially the FPÖ was forced to pay a heavy political price for unpopular reforms in four elections in a row (-4.7% in the Chamber of Labor elections, -4.7% in Styria, -1.9% in Burgenland, -7.7% in Vienna – three of Austria’s nine provinces).

35. Although the Freedomites recovered somewhat in opinion polls in the fall of 2001, in terms of voter approval, they were for the most part clearly trailing (between 23%-25%) both the Social Democrats (34%-35%) and their Conservative coalition partner (26%-29%) (OGM/Market in Preglau 2002).

36. The FPÖ added to the anti-Semitic rhetoric by hinting that the SPÖ’s campaign was managed from the “East Coast,” a code term alluding to Jewish influence.

37. Formally the conflict was over whether the government was right to postpone its planned tax reform to finance disaster relief after the catastrophic floods (which Haider adamantly opposed). This however was only the latest in a series of conflicts about the FPÖ’s political course between Party Chairwomen Susanne Riess-Passer and Jörg Haider. Aggravated by Haider’s visits to Saddam Hussein, his meeting with other far-right leaders and an attempt to take over the party again, the clash between the two leading personalities in the party became an open conflict in which each side tried to mobilize its faction within the organization.
Bibliographic References


Falkner, Gerda (1993). “Sozialpartnerschaftliche Politikmuster und Europäische Integration.” In


### Table 1: Social Demographic Profile of FPÖ Voter, 1986-1999 (%)

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<th>'95</th>
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Source: Plasser and Ulram 2000: 232