

From nation state to member state: Europeanization and Enlargement¹

John K. Glenn

Council for European Studies

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*Abstract: This paper analyzes EU enlargement to explore the impact of membership in the European Union on nation states. Due to the relatively rapid process of adjustment to the demands of membership specified by the *acquis communautaire*, the current wave of enlargement offers a striking view into the future of European integration. This paper seeks to bridge the literatures on Europeanization, which analyzes national factors to explain variation in the impact of EU policies, and on enlargement, which has largely focused on technical aspects of inter-governmental bargaining. Using recent data on accession negotiations, the paper analyzes changes in applicants' national policies and institutions, highlighting the demands created by the EU's regional policies. The paper finds that enlargement creates pressures for convergence as a result of conditionality which requires that countries adopt EU policies and institutions prior to membership.*

Introduction

On December 14, 2002 the European Union (EU) announced that it would expand its membership from fifteen to twenty-five countries, welcoming eight East European countries previously under the sphere of Soviet influence, as well as Cyprus and Malta. The current enlargement will re-draw the political boundaries on the European continent, alter decision-making procedures within the EU, and expand the common market to new economies, many of which have only recently made the transformation from central planning. Despite its enormous relevance, enlargement remains poorly understood, as the scholarly literature has tended to focus on case studies of single countries or issues or policy-centered analyses. This paper seeks to link the growing enlargement literature with the debates on Europeanization, which analyzes the impact of the European Union

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upon its member states. I argue that, due to the relatively rapid process of adjustment to EU demands by applicant countries, enlargement offers a striking view into the essence and future of the European integration project, the transformation of nation states into member states.

Using data from the EU's regular reports on progress towards accession, the paper compares and analyzes the impact of accession negotiations upon twelve applicant countries, focusing on the demands of the chapter on regional policy in terms of territorial re-organization, new legislation, institutions and policies. In spite of the EU's intention to conduct accession negotiations on the principle of differentiation, the paper finds that enlargement creates pressures for convergence as a result of the requirement that countries adopt EU policies and institutions prior to membership.

Europeanization and Enlargement

Research on enlargement has largely focused on the policy aspects of accession and as a result been seen largely of interest to specialists of Eastern Europe.² I will argue that the widespread emphasis on the unprecedented challenges posed by the current enlargement obscure the potential for insights from past enlargements and current member states. Rather, enlargement offers insight into the central question for the European Union – what is the impact of membership upon nation states? Recent literature on the “Europeanization” of current member states, for example, asks similar questions and suggests that there may be theoretical insights to be drawn from both

fields. This literature argues that membership in the EU has led to the transformation of nation-states from autonomous actors in the international sphere to embedded actors within regional networks of exchange (Meny, Muller and Quermonne, 1996). At the same time, however, scholars have analyzed variation across issue areas and member states in the impact of EU policies in light of past domestic policy legacies and the organization of domestic interest groups (Cowles et al, 2001; Duina, 1999). This suggests that nation-states are not simply losing autonomy in a zero-sum fashion. Rather, they are entering what some have called a multi-level polity whereby sovereignty over particular arenas is shared at different levels of governance (Marks et al., 1996, Sandholz and Stone Sweet, 1998).

In this paper, I analyze the “Europeanization” of applicant countries by focusing on adaptations of national institutions and policies to meet the requirements of membership and, ultimately, to receive new direct funds from the EU as full members. The EU exerts its influence through the principle of conditionality, by which, on the basis of the Treaty on European Union Article 49, “any European state which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union.” These principles are defined as “liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.” Enlargement is a formal intergovernmental process between the governments of applicant countries and the EU’s Council of Ministers, in consultation with the European Commission and European Parliament. At each point in the process, the EU must approve an applicant country’s progress in a wide range of changes to align its institutions and policies with those of the EU. Countries wishing to

² See Bokova and Houbtchev, 2001, Grabbe, 1999, Hanousek and Lizal, 2001, Hausner and Marody, 2000, Mayhew, 1996. Recent efforts to address this problem include Jacoby, 2002, Schimmelfennig and

become members of the EU must first submit a formal application to the Council of Ministers, which then requests an opinion from the European Commission regarding the readiness of an applicant for membership. If a positive opinion is given by the Commission and adopted by the Council, an accession conference is convened and negotiations are begun with representatives of the governments of applicant countries, the Council and the Commission. In cases where a country is not fully prepared to meet these obligations, an agreement upon transitional periods for adjustments to European law. Finally, the European parliament votes on an agreement for membership, which must be approved by an absolute majority, and the agreement must be ratified by all current member states, as well as applicant countries themselves. The ratification process may include public referenda, parliamentary ratification or both, depending on the countries involved.

More concretely, the EU identified three criteria for membership at its summit in Copenhagen in 1993: (1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for minorities; (2) the existence of a fully functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and (3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. The third criteria constitutes the framework for negotiations for membership, which has been codified as the body of EU laws known as the *acquis communautaire*. The *acquis* is composed of thirty-one chapters on substantive issues from the free movement of goods to culture and audio-visual policy, each of which must be opened, negotiated and closed

by each applicant country before membership can proceed. (See Table 1 for a list of the chapters of the *acquis*.)

Despite the lure of the benefits of membership and a similar process for joining, there is considerable variation in the efforts by applicant countries to meet the EU's requirements. Vachudova (2002) analyzes the likelihood of countries meeting the pre-conditions to begin membership negotiations and finds that, while all applicant countries declared EU membership their top foreign policy goal, governing coalitions varied in the translation of this goal into policy, so that liberal coalitions in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland aligned their policies with the EU but nationalist coalitions in countries like Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania frequently failed to do so (see also Mattli and Plumper, 2002). The focus of this article, however, is not why do countries seek to join the EU, but what are the consequences of the enlargement process upon prospective members?

The impact of negotiating membership:

In this paper, I analyze the consequences of pre-accession negotiations in terms of changes in domestic institutions and policies made by applicant countries. In part because of their contemporary nature, there has been little analysis of the results of these negotiations. Currently there are twelve countries that have opened negotiations for membership. These include ten countries formerly part of the Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), Cyprus and Malta. Accession negotiations began for half of the countries in 1998 and for the other half in 2000. While many of these countries faced similar political

and economic challenges after the fall of communism, there is considerable variation in conditions for accession. The largest of these countries is Poland with 38 million people, roughly the size of Spain, and the smallest is Slovenia, with only 2 million people. In 2000, the GDP per capita in purchasing power in candidate countries ranged from 82% of the EU average in Cyprus to 24% in Bulgaria.³ While some countries such as Slovenia have very small agricultural sectors, others like Poland have larger agricultural sectors than most current EU members. Some countries like Estonia have lower tariffs in certain areas than the EU and would have to raise them for membership, while others like Poland fear the lower tariffs on certain goods would eliminate their competitiveness in the European markets.

I analyze the pre-accession negotiations to adjudicate among arguments concerning the impact of the economic opportunities of enlargement. The European Commission in 1998 “recommended to conduct accession negotiations through a differentiated approach taking account of the progress made by each candidate.”⁴ Negotiations are intended to be a technical process in which agreements are made on the basis of transparent criteria concerning approximation of the *acquis*, rather than by criteria such as the political importance of a particular country or threats by candidate countries that the technical criteria are too demanding. This section of the paper considers whether the pre-accession negotiations reflect these principles of differentiation, asking whether there been convergence among applicant countries. Using data from the EU’s regular reports on each candidate country’s progress towards accession, the paper focuses on three aspects of the negotiations: the sequence of

³ Eurostat News Release. 2001. “GDP up by 5% in Candidate Countries in 2000,” No. 87/2001, pg. 2.

⁴ [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm#From cooperation to accession.](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm#From%20cooperation%20to%20accession)

openings and closings of chapters of the *acquis*, the duration of negotiation for each chapter of the *acquis*, and patterns in those chapters for which transition periods were agreed.⁵ I explore patterns across the timing when countries were invited to begin negotiations: the first six countries in 1998 (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) and the second six countries in 2000 (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia).

Sequence of openings and closings: If enlargement were conducted on a case by case basis which proceeds where countries are prepared to open negotiations, we might expect differences in the sequence of chapters opened by each country, reflecting differences in national political and economic situations. When we look at the openings of chapters in applicant countries, however, we see that for those countries invited to begin negotiations in 1998 they have followed an identical sequence, opening the same chapters in 1998, 1999, and 2000.

Table 2a HERE

Similarities in the sequence of openings might be explained by the practical demands of organizing the vastly complex process of enlargement, for which the EU had to set a similar structure for negotiations across countries. Despite the tremendous differences between Poland and Slovenia, for example, one might postulate that the first group of countries shared similarities that could enable them to follow the same sequence. It is striking however that the countries in the second group followed an

⁵ For the European Commission's opinions and regular reports on progress towards accession, as well as other Commission documents related to enlargement, see www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/.

almost identical sequence of chapter openings as well, with only Malta opening the transport chapter later than other countries.

Table 2b HERE

Bulgaria and Romania are exceptions and have not been considered serious candidates for the current wave of enlargement. While this indicates a measure of differentiation among countries, the similarities in sequence across the ten other countries in both groups suggests that negotiation chapters were not opened on a differentiated basis in light of each country's situation but rather followed a schedule set by the EU. Notably, Table 2b indicates that many chapters were opened more quickly than in the first wave. For example, the Czech Republic opened eight chapters in its first year of negotiations, whereas Slovakia opened fifteen. While the sequence of openings alone cannot explain this difference, the data is consistent with the argument that the EU set the agenda for negotiations across the applicant countries, not that the countries in the second group were more prepared for negotiations than those in the first group. Across both groups, the chapters that will determine the direct funds for new members were opened last, including agriculture, competition, and regional policy.

Similarly, one might ask, do we also see similarities in the patterns of closing negotiating chapters? If we look at the closings of chapters, there is some variation across countries in timing.

Tables 3a and 3b HERE

In the first group, all countries but Cyprus closed the same three chapters in 1998. In the second and third years, although similar chapters are closed in all countries, modest variation appears. Some of these differences clearly reflect the varying demands of particular chapters upon countries, so that land-locked countries like the Czech Republic and Hungary close the chapter on fisheries before Estonia and Poland. Others are less clear and may reflect differences in the concerns and domestic situations of applicant countries, as I will discuss further below.

Strikingly, the pace of closings is much faster in the second wave than the first, so that by the end of 2001 Latvia and Lithuania had closed more chapters than Estonia, which began negotiations two years earlier. Some chapters were closed in the same year across the two groups, despite their having been opened years apart. For example, the chapter on foreign and security policy was opened among the first chapters in 1998 in the first group of countries and in 2000 for the second group of countries, and closed among all of them in 2000. Although the sequence does not permit an explanation for this, it suggests that the EU sought to close the chapter for all applicant countries at the same time. Similarly, across both groups, the chapters associated with EU funds for new members remain open at the time of writing and will be the last ones to be negotiated as part of an overall solution for all applicant countries.

Length of negotiations for each chapter: In light of patterns of closings, one might suggest that the sequence reflects the nature of the demands of the chapters themselves. Enlargement could be seen, as the EU often argues, as a technical process which proceeds from simple to more demanding chapters. If this were true, we would

expect that the length of negotiations for chapters of the *acquis* should be brief at the outset and increase across subsequent chapters.

Tables 4, 5, and 6 HERE

The data for the three countries in the tables however do not indicate the linear relationship one might have expected. Poland, as the largest country, shows long negotiations for chapters in each year. Comparing the Czech Republic and Slovakia, countries with a similar past but invited to begin negotiations at different times, one sees overall shorter negotiations in Slovakia but again, no clear pattern of shorter durations with the initial chapters opened with increasing length. Competition policy, for example, was opened in the first group of chapters in Slovakia and remains open in most countries.

Table 7 highlights the average length of negotiations by chapter across countries. While negotiations for the chapters on science and research and education and training lasted only one month in all countries, there is considerable variation across the other twenty-nine chapters.

Table 7 HERE

As noted earlier, some chapters were opened at different times across group of countries but closed at the same time (common foreign and security policy), and some chapters reflect natural differences in applicant countries, such as fisheries. Others suggest differences in efforts to alter the terms of the negotiating position of the EU, so that some

countries may have simply accepted the EU's proposal concerning the free movement of capital and negotiated for six months (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia), while others negotiated hard for separate deals to reflect their own concerns and negotiated for thirty months (Poland). Other differences appear to be particular to applicant countries. For example, while most applicant countries face challenges in the field of domestic media which previously had been controlled by the state regime, the chapter on culture and audio-visual policy was closed after sixteen months by the Czech Republic and Slovenia but remains open in Hungary due to controversy surrounding its Act on Radio and Television Broadcasting.

Patterns of transition periods: In contrast to previous enlargements when new members were granted long transition periods to adjust to EU policies, the EU has sought to minimize agreements for transition periods in the current wave of enlargement. Do we see similarities or differences in the number and content of chapters for which applicant countries negotiated transition periods? As of December 2002, the number of transition periods for countries accepted to join the EU ranged from nine in the Czech Republic and Estonia to fourteen in Poland (Tables 2a and 2b on closings also note the transition periods agreed upon by asterisks in particular chapters). It is striking that the majority of transition periods were negotiated in 2001 for a similar group of chapters: free movement of capital, of persons and of services, energy and the environment, and taxation. Transition periods in some cases (such as free movement of persons) reflects the EU's concerns about the consequences of enlargement (in this case, fears of migration). In other cases, transition periods reflect concerns of applicant countries (such as free movement of capital which pertains to the right for non-citizens to purchase land).

Transition periods negotiated between the EU and applicant countries can also be modified by bilateral agreements between current and future member states, such as the declaration by the Netherlands that it would not enforce a transition period for the free movement of persons.

Analysis of these three aspects of the pre-accession negotiations create a broad picture of patterns of change across applicant countries, suggesting significant but not complete convergence. One may ask, do these differences matter? Are they too small to be relevant or will they fade away once applicant countries are members? The answer to these questions varies by the chapter of the *acquis* (Jacoby, 2002). For some chapters, the EU requirements for compliance are relatively low (involving little new legislation or institutional adjustment), whereas for others, the demands are quite high (involving new legislative arenas and institutions). Similarly, for some chapters, the policy legacies prior to reform in applicant countries is relatively weak, whereas in others, prior laws and institutions must be significantly changed. Below, I focus on the chapter on regional policy to highlight the consequences of a policy arena in which the demands are high and where conditionality may play a significant role in the impact of the accession process.

Regional Policy and Structural Funds:

The chapter on “Regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments” highlights the opportunities for new members to receive the so-called Structural and Cohesion Funds for poorer regions which total 275 billion ECU, or 38% of the total EU budget, for 2000-06. In response to concerns of applicant countries about the possible results of joining, the EU has declared that no new member will become a net contributor

to the EU budget, and direct subsidies to new members are the means by which this will be maintained. The structure of these opportunities, however, cannot simply be explained by a balance sheet of payments to and from the EU budget. Access to these funds is conditional upon the ability of countries the administrative and programming capacity to manage such funds, as well as financial controls to monitor them and the capacity to co-finance them.

Structural funds are granted to regions within member states that meet one of three objectives: regions with a GDP per capita of less than 75% of the Community average, regions undergoing economic and social restructuring, and regions requiring assistance in education, training and employment. Cohesion funds are granted for environmental and transport projects to member states whose national GDP is less than 90% of the Community average. If new members were to receive such funds on the same principle as current members, nearly every region in every applicant country would be eligible (with the exceptions of the capital cities in some countries), although the maximum amount any member state can receive has been fixed at 4% of national GDP. In the 1990s the EU sought to assist in the applicant countries' preparation for this chapter with direct funds through a technical assistance program known as Phare and the more recent Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (or ISPA). Since 1999 ISPA has financed major environmental and transport infrastructure projects in applicant countries with an annual budget of €1,040 million.

In principle, the actual nature of administrative structures to be adopted is left to applicant countries and countries with varying sizes and degrees of regionalization should reflect those differences. The requirement of territorial re-organization demands however

that applicant countries establish regions that match the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (known as NUTS) at different levels. These structures may have the status as governments, filled through regional elections. While the *acquis* does not require that regional policy be transposed into national law, the closing the chapter necessitates at least four results: the creation of a legal basis for regional development, as well as the organizational structure, defining competencies at the different levels of government. Finally, the chapter calls for applicant countries to develop national development plans that specify the programs to be undertaken, the evaluation and monitoring systems for such programs, and their financial management.

The demands of the chapter on regional policy are high for applicant countries, many of which are undergoing dramatic political, economic and legal transformations since the fall of communism in 1989. Regional policy for most applicant countries is a largely underdeveloped policy arena which has necessitated significant changes in domestic policies and institutions. Among the formerly-communist countries, sub-national regions either did not exist prior to accession negotiations or were artificial institutions under regimes dominated by central planning. In the early 1990s, after the fall of the communist regimes, regional policy remained weak as concerns about the efficiency of economic reforms focused attention on macro-economic policies and institutions. Regional disparities tended to be exacerbated by the consequences of economic restructuring in areas in which the economy was dominated by outmoded heavy industry. Further, for many in East Central Europe regional policy was perceived associated with the state interventionism of the old regime and considered suspect.

There is significant variation in the size and regional make-up of the applicant countries. Whereas the population is spread more or less evenly across the territory in Poland, Hungary and smaller countries like Estonia are dominated by their capitals, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia fall in the middle (Gorzalak, 1996, Hardy et al, 1995). Since regional policy models are defined at the European level, however, we may anticipate that potential members will seek to adopt similar policies to countries of very different sizes. Hausner and Marody describe the results of the pressures for similar regional policies as follows: “each programme speaks of the needs for air transport and airports (international ones, of course). Each is quick to point out the tourist attractions of its own region, whilst ignoring those of neighboring regions. Proposed environmental protection measures are always restricted to a single region. The problems and consequences of population shifts and migration are overlooked. Each strategy expresses a desire for its regional capital to be transformed into a thriving metropolis with no mention of, for instance, the costs that this would entail. And finally we learn that each region must also have its own academic community and university of international repute.” (2000:106)

In practice, all applicant countries have had to adopt what might be called the EU model for member states. This entailed a division of national territory into categories matching the NUTS classification system, establishment of new government bodies to coordinate the Structural Funds either through a minister or national agencies, and prepared programming, monitoring and reporting administrative structures. By December 2002, the chapter had been closed in all applicant countries but Bulgaria and Romania.

Table 8 on the length of negotiations for the chapter on regional policy for all applicant

countries suggests a bureaucratic logic similar to that discussed above whereby the EU sought to resolve the issue for all applicant countries at once, regardless of the length of negotiations.

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Table 8 HERE

Thus while the chapter was opened in April 2000 for the first group of countries and in March 2001 for the second group of countries, the chapter was closed for all but three countries in April-July of 2002 and for all the countries invited to join the EU (all but Bulgaria and Romania) by the end of 2002.

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Table 9 highlights the impact of negotiations for the chapter on regional policy upon applicant countries.

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Table 9 HERE

Cyprus was the only applicant country with prior regional structures and legislation judged largely acceptable. This must be seen as an exceptional case in light of the partition of the country and separate efforts by the EU to negotiate a resolution of the dispute. In most applicant countries, the initial screening reports by the EU in 2000 were critical of the lack of legislative and institutional framework in the area of regional policy. By 2001, as a result of the pre-accession negotiations, new regions had been established in seven countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), while four applicant countries had not yet (Estonia, Lithuania,

Malta, and Romania, although Estonia, Lithuania, and Malta closed the chapters later in 2002). Six applicant countries have established new institutions for regional policy, including new ministries, national agencies, and regional governments, while others folded regional policy into existing government institutions. All countries but Cyprus have passed or are developing new legislation and new programming strategies for regional development which are monitored and evaluated by the EU.

In many applicant countries, the creation of new regions came only slowly and often accompanied by political controversy. In Poland, the creation of new regions necessitated an extensive and politically costly territorial re-organization from the previous 49 voting districts into 16 NUTS II regions, as national parties were reluctant to cede financial and political authority to lower levels of government. In the Czech Republic, the rightist government led by Vaclav Klaus until 1996 rejected the creation of regional levels of administration as contrary to its neo-liberal economic policies. In Slovakia, regional policy was largely blocked until after the fall of the semi-authoritarian Meciar government in 1998, with regional administrations perceived by the democratic opposition and Hungarian minority as a possible counterweight to the central authorities. In smaller countries such as Slovenia, as well, new regions provoked controversy when initial plans for two regions were challenged by both the European Commission and local municipalities before it proposed to divide into three regions (Dieringer and Lindstrom, 2002). Only perhaps in Hungary and Estonia, by contrast, did new regions emerge relatively harmoniously (Brusis, 1999). Hungary is notable for the early efforts at adopting Western policy models, relatively high share of GDP devoted to regional

development, and extensive consultations between government and societal organizations around regional policy.

None of the ten countries that have closed the chapter requested transition periods, since doing so would entail delaying the receipt of structural funds. Further, each of the applicant countries have observed that nearly all regions in their country (with the some exceptions for regions containing the capital cities) should be eligible for the receipt of structural funds upon accession under Objective 1, whereby funds are allocated on the basis of a per capita GDP of less than 75% of the EU average. Although this may be true in principle, it is far from clear whether the applicant countries will be able to meet the co-financing and bureaucratic requirements of the structural funds. Many current EU member states such as Spain and Ireland do not use the entire available commitments for structural funds for similar reasons. Regions undoubtedly have differing capacities for administering these policies, especially since nearly the entire countries of many applicant countries would be eligible for such funds. Further, there is variation across applicant countries by territorial size. Whereas new regions in Poland, the largest country, may be able to serve as functional administrators of EU funds, new regions in the smallest countries like Slovenia may prove to be more cosmetic.

Attention to the impact of negotiations on regional policy suggests that applicant countries may see greater convergence than current members because of the impact of conditionality (see also Brusis, 1999 and Dieringer and Lindstrom, 2002). Research on regional policy among current EU member states finds variation. At one extreme, Belgian regions deal directly with the Commission, as do some German Lander to some extent. At the other, Greece, Ireland and Portugal lack regional governments, and France

and the UK have seen increased centralization (Hooghe, 1996, Keating, 1998). For current members, some have argued that European governance influences the reorganization of member states “by modifying the opportunity structures and the rules of the game” but that this influence varies in ways that reflect the diversity of states and regions (Le Gales and Lequesne, 1998:4). For applicant countries, the impact of complying with accession negotiations, as well as the dynamic policy environment after the fall of communism in 1989, may mean that these differences will not persist.

Conclusion:

This paper highlights the impact of prospective membership upon applicant countries. At the same time, a skeptic might ask, how deep or meaningful are these changes? Even current EU members have not adopted uniform policies across the spectrum of policy arenas but participate to varying extents in a variety of cooperative agreements including the Schengen customs treaty and policy opt-outs such as monetary union. A review of the scholarly literature on the future of the state in the European Union reveals multiple accounts, from those who contrast the “strong” with the “weak” transnational thesis (Tarrow 1998) to those in the intergovernmental school of international relations who resolutely reject transnationalism (Moravcsik 1991, 1998). This argument should not be overstated. Many scholars argue that membership in the European Union has actually strengthened nation-states by creating new areas of authority in a context of global capitalism. (Mann, 1993; Milward, 1992) One must ask, in which arenas does the state relinquish sovereignty? Clearly the state has not lost all its powers as a sovereign actor, since two so-called pillars of the European Union --

Common Security and Foreign Policy and Justice and Home Affairs -- remain resolutely intergovernmental.

Given the detailed monitoring and public nature of the accession negotiations across 1998-2002, however, there is little reason to believe that applicant countries have been able to deceive the European Union with superficial changes that led to the premature closure of chapters of the *acquis*. It is too early to tell however how long-lasting these changes will be and how these new institutions will function, especially after these countries become members. Once accession negotiations are closed, the bargaining relationship between the EU and new members will change and possibilities for backsliding may emerge. Monitoring and sanctioning of the current applicant countries, however, has been built into the first years of new membership, perhaps especially in the arena of regional policy with its requirements of co-financing and programming for all funds. Should the EU perceive that countries do not continue to meet the requirements of membership, it will maintain the ability to sanction members, and this will provide an incentive to continue change.

Due to the relatively rapid adaptation to the demands of membership specified by the *acquis*, the current wave of enlargement offers a striking view into the future of nation states within the European common market. The arguments in this paper are consistent with the growing body of literature which analyzes the spread and impact of transnational models, including the literature on the rise of global culture (Meyer et al, 1997). Research on the impact of international actors upon domestic politics has argued that success is more likely when international programs are flexible for varying local

contexts and when domestic actors are invested and influence such programs (Jacoby, 2000, Mendelson and Glenn, 2002).

In this way, the paper avoids a zero-sum portrait of future of the nation-state and those that foresee its demise (Mathews, 1997). Even the adoption of regional policies can be a way for the state to rid itself of difficult and costly problems and thereby strengthen the center. Vigorous differences in models for the European Union remain among current member states. Although few dispute that EU membership has become the only feasible choice for formerly communist countries of Eastern Europe for reasons of economics and security, it is still unclear exactly what type of union they will eventually join. For some such as German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, enlargement presents an opportunity to move forward boldly to a new federal Europe based on a constitution and shared rights (Fischer, 2000). For others such as British prime minister Tony Blair, enlargement highlights the reality that the European Union is already too diverse to be based on shared political sovereignty and should remain based in common markets.

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Table 1. Negotiation Chapters of the *Aquis Communautaire*

Chapter 1:	Free movement of goods
Chapter 2:	Freedom of movement for persons
Chapter 3:	Freedom to provide services
Chapter 4:	Free movement of capital
Chapter 5:	Company law
Chapter 6:	Competition policy
Chapter 7:	Agriculture
Chapter 8:	Fisheries
Chapter 9:	Transport policy
Chapter 10:	Taxation
Chapter 11:	Economic and Monetary Union
Chapter 12:	Statistics
Chapter 13:	Social policy and employment
Chapter 14:	Energy
Chapter 15:	Industrial policy
Chapter 16:	Small and medium-sized undertakings
Chapter 17:	Science and research
Chapter 18:	Education and training
Chapter 19:	Telecommunications and information technologies
Chapter 20:	Culture and audio-visual policy
Chapter 21:	Regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments
Chapter 22:	Environment
Chapter 23:	Consumers and health protection
Chapter 24:	Co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs
Chapter 25:	Customs union
Chapter 26:	External relations
Chapter 27:	Common foreign and security policy
Chapter 28:	Financial control
Chapter 29:	Financial and budgetary provisions
Chapter 30:	Institutions
Chapter 31:	Other

Source:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/screen_en.htm

Table 2a: Opening of all chapters of the acquis across applicant countries, first wave

Country	Accession Date	Poland	Hungary	Estonia	Czech Republic	Slovenia
First Wave		March 31, 1998	March 31, 1998	March 31, 1998	March 31, 1998	March 31, 1998
Cyprus	March 31, 1998					
Competition						
Consumer / Health Protection						
Customs Union						
Econ / Monetary Union						
Energy						
Environment						
External Relations						
Fisheries						
Free - Capital						
Free - Goods						
Free - Services						
Social Policy / Employ						
Statistics						
Taxation						
Transport						
Agriculture						
Financial / Budgetary						
Financial Control						
Free - Persons						
Justice / Home Affairs						
Regional Policy						
Institutions						

Legend




Table 2b: Opening of all chapters of the acquis across applicant countries, second wave

Second Wave	Latvia	Lithuania	Malta	Slovakia	Bulgaria	Romania
February 15, 2000	February 15, 2000	February 15, 2000	February 15, 2000	February 15, 2000	February 15, 2000	February 15, 2000
Company Law	Company Law	Company Law	Company Law	Company Law	Company Law	Competition
Competition	Competition	Competition	Competition	Competition	Competition	Culture / AV
Consumer / Health Protection	Consumer / Health Protection	Consumer / Health Protection	Consumer / Health Protection	Consumer / Health Protection	Consumer / Health Protection	Ed / Training
Culture / AV	Culture / AV	Culture / AV	Culture / AV	Culture / AV	Culture / AV	External Relations
Econ / Monetary Union	Econ / Monetary Union	Econ / Monetary Union	Econ / Monetary Union	Econ / Monetary Union	Econ / Monetary Union	Foreign / Security Policy
Ed / Training	Ed / Training	Ed / Training	Ed / Training	Ed / Training	Ed / Training	Science / Research
External Relations	External Relations	External Relations	External Relations	External Relations	External Relations	Sm / Med Undertakings
Fisheries	Fisheries	Fisheries	Fisheries	Fisheries	Fisheries	Statistics
Foreign / Security Policy	Foreign / Security Policy	Foreign / Security Policy	Foreign / Security Policy	Foreign / Security Policy	Foreign / Security Policy	Telecom / Info Tech
Free - Capital	Free - Capital	Free - Capital	Free - Capital	Free - Capital	Free - Capital	Company Law
Free - Services	Free - Services	Free - Services	Free - Services	Free - Services	Free - Services	Consumer / Health Protection
Industrial	Industrial	Industrial	Industrial	Industrial	Industrial	Customs Union
Science / Research	Science / Research	Science / Research	Science / Research	Science / Research	Science / Research	Fisheries
Sm / Med Undertakings	Sm / Med Undertakings	Sm / Med Undertakings	Sm / Med Undertakings	Sm / Med Undertakings	Sm / Med Undertakings	Free - Capital
Social Policy / Employ	Social Policy / Employ	Social Policy / Employ	Social Policy / Employ	Social Policy / Employ	Social Policy / Employ	Social Policy / Employ
Statistics	Statistics	Statistics	Statistics	Statistics	Statistics	Taxation
Telecom / Info Tech	Telecom / Info Tech	Telecom / Info Tech	Telecom / Info Tech	Telecom / Info Tech	Telecom / Info Tech	Transport
Transport	Transport	Transport	Transport	Transport	Transport	Financial Control
Agriculture	Agriculture	Agriculture	Agriculture	Agriculture	Agriculture	Free - Goods
Consumer / Health Protection	Consumer / Health Protection	Consumer / Health Protection	Consumer / Health Protection	Consumer / Health Protection	Consumer / Health Protection	Free - Persons
Customs Union	Customs Union	Customs Union	Customs Union	Customs Union	Customs Union	Regional Policy
Energy	Energy	Energy	Energy	Energy	Energy	Econ / Monetary Union
Environment	Environment	Environment	Environment	Environment	Environment	Environment
Financial / Budgetary	Financial / Budgetary	Financial / Budgetary	Financial / Budgetary	Financial / Budgetary	Financial / Budgetary	Justice / Home Affairs
Financial Control	Financial Control	Financial Control	Financial Control	Financial Control	Financial Control	Regional Policy
Free - Goods	Free - Goods	Free - Goods	Free - Goods	Free - Goods	Free - Goods	Energy
Free - Persons	Free - Persons	Free - Persons	Free - Persons	Free - Persons	Free - Persons	Industrial
Justice / Home Affairs	Justice / Home Affairs	Justice / Home Affairs	Justice / Home Affairs	Justice / Home Affairs	Justice / Home Affairs	Institutions
Regional Policy	Regional Policy	Regional Policy	Regional Policy	Regional Policy	Regional Policy	Agriculture
Social Policy / Employ	Social Policy / Employ	Social Policy / Employ	Social Policy / Employ	Social Policy / Employ	Social Policy / Employ	Financial / Budgetary
Taxation	Taxation	Taxation	Taxation	Taxation	Taxation	Free - Services
Telecom / Info Tech	Telecom / Info Tech	Telecom / Info Tech	Telecom / Info Tech	Telecom / Info Tech	Telecom / Info Tech	
Institutions	Institutions	Institutions	Institutions	Institutions	Institutions	

2000
2001
2002

Legend

Table 3a: Closing of all chapters of the acquis across applicant countries, first wave

Country	Date	Chapters
Czech	Mar 31, 1998	Consumer / Health Protection Ecom / Monetary Union Fisheries Free - Goods Industrial Statistics Telecom / Info Tech Customs Union External Relations Foreign / Security Policy Company Law Culture / AV Energy * Environment * Financial Control Free - Capital * Free - Persons * Free - Services * Justice / Home Affairs Social policy / Employ Taxation * Regional Policy Agriculture Competition Financial / Budgetary Institutions Transport
Cyprus	Mar 31, 1998	Consumer / Health Protection Ecom / Monetary Union Fisheries Free - Goods Industrial Statistics Telecom / Info Tech Customs Union External Relations Foreign / Security Policy Company Law Culture / AV Energy * Environment * Financial Control Free - Capital * Free - Persons * Free - Services * Justice / Home Affairs Social policy / Employ Taxation * Regional Policy Agriculture Competition Financial / Budgetary Institutions Transport
Estonia	Mar 31, 1998	Consumer / Health Protection Ecom / Monetary Union Fisheries Industrial Statistics Telecom / Info Tech Company Law Culture / AV External Relations Fisheries Foreign / Security Policy Free - Capital Free - Goods Social policy / Employ Competition Environment * Financial Control Free - Services * Customs Union Free - Persons * Institutions Justice / Home Affairs Regional Policy Taxation * Transport * Agriculture Competition Financial / Budgetary Energy Financial / Budgetary
Hungary	Mar 31, 1998	Consumer / Health Protection Ecom / Monetary Union Fisheries Industrial Statistics Energy External Relations Financial Control Foreign / Security Policy Social policy / Employ * Telecom / Info Tech Company Law Customs Union * Environment * Free - Capital * Free - Goods Free - Persons * Free - Services * Justice / Home Affairs Taxation * Transport * Agriculture Competition Culture / AV Financial / Budgetary Institutions Regional Policy
Poland	Mar 31, 1998	Consumer / Health Protection Ecom / Monetary Union Fisheries External Relations Industrial Statistics Telecom / Info Tech Culture / AV Financial Control Foreign / Security Policy Free - Services * Company Law Customs Union Energy * Environment * Free - Goods * Free - Persons * Social policy / Employ * Fisheries * Free - Capital * Institutions Taxation * Transport * Agriculture Competition Financial / Budgetary Justice / Home Affairs Regional Policy
Slovenia	Mar 31, 1998	Consumer / Health Protection Ecom / Monetary Union Fisheries Industrial Statistics Telecom / Info Tech Company Law Financial Control Foreign / Security Policy Free - Services * Social policy / Employ * Competition Culture / AV Customs Union Energy * Environment * External Relations Free - Capital Free - Goods * Free - Persons * Justice / Home Affairs Taxation * Transport Institutions Agriculture Financial / Budgetary Regional Policy

Legend
 1999
 2000
 2001
 2002

* transitional arrangement

Table 3b: Closing of all chapters of the acquis across applicant countries, second wave

Country	Date	Chapters
Second Wave		
Latvia	Feb 15, 2000	Consumer / Health Protection Econ / Monetary Union Ed / Training External Relations Foreign / Security Policy Industrial Science / Research Sm / Med Undertakings Statistics Company Law Competition Culture / AV Customs Union Econ / Monetary Union Environment* Financial Control Fisheries* Free - Capital Free - Goods Free - Persons* Free - Services* Social policy / Employ* Telecom / Info Tech Energy*
Slovakia	Feb 15, 2000	Consumer / Health Protection Culture / AV Ed / Training External Relations Fisheries Foreign / Security Policy Industrial Science / Research Sm / Med Undertakings Statistics Company Law Customs Union Econ / Monetary Union Energy* Environment* Financial Control Free - Capital* Free - Goods* Free - Persons* Free - Services* Social policy / Employ* Transport* Fisheries* Institutions Justice / Home Affairs Regional Policy Taxation*
Malta	Feb 15, 2000	Company Law Consumer / Health Protection Culture / AV Econ / Monetary Union Ed / Training External Relations Foreign / Security Policy Industrial Science / Research Sm / Med Undertakings Statistics Company Law Competition Customs Union Econ / Monetary Union Environment* Financial Control Fisheries Free - Capital Free - Goods* Free - Persons* Free - Services* Social policy / Employ* Transport* Fisheries* Institutions Justice / Home Affairs Regional Policy Agriculture Competition Customs Union* Financial / Budgetary Taxation
Lithuania	Feb 15, 2000	Culture / AV Ed / Training External Relations Foreign / Security Policy Industrial Science / Research Sm / Med Undertakings Statistics Company Law Competition Consumer / Health Protection Customs Union Econ / Monetary Union Environment* Financial Control Fisheries Free - Capital Free - Goods* Free - Persons* Free - Services* Social policy / Employ Telecom / Info Tech Transport* Energy*
Bulgaria	Feb 15, 2000	Consumer / Health Protection Culture / AV Ed / Training External Relations Foreign / Security Policy Science / Research Sm / Med Undertakings Statistics Company Law Fisheries Free - Capital* Free - Services* Industrial Telecom / Info Tech* Customs Union Econ / Monetary Union Financial Control Free - Goods Free - Persons* Institutions Social policy / Employ* Taxation* Energy*
Romania	Feb 15, 2000	Ed / Training External Relations Foreign / Security Policy Science / Research Sm / Med Undertakings Statistics Company Law Consumer / Health Protection Fisheries Econ / Monetary Union Industrial Institutions Social policy / Employ Telecom / Info Tech Culture / AV Customs Union


Legend
 1999
 2000
 2001
 2002
 * transitional arrangement

Table 4: Duration of chapter negotiations, Czech Republic

		No. of Months							
1998 Common foreign and security policy	1998 First half	- 24							
Company law	1998 12	31							T
Culture and audio-visual policy	1998 10	32							
Education and training	1998 Second hal Oct 98	- 1							
Industrial policy	1998 Second hal First half 99	- 6							
Science and research	1998 Second hal Oct 98	- 1							
Small and medium-sized undertakings	1998 10	1							
Telecommunications and information technologies	1998 10	7							
1999 Competition policy	1999 05	42							T
Consumers and health protection	1999 04	2							
Customs union	1999 05	- 14							
Economic and Monetary Union	1999 First half	- 6							
Energy	1999 Second hal Second half 01 *	- 24							T
Environment	1999 12	19							T
External relations	1999 First half	- 12							
Fisheries	1999 04	2							
Free movement of capital	1999 Autumn	- 18							T
Free movement of goods	1999 06	7							
Freedom to provide services	1999 07	21							
Social policy and employment	1999 09	21							
Statistics	1999 03	4							
Taxation	1999 11	28							T
Transport policy	1999 11	37							T
2000 Agriculture	2000 06	30							
Co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs	2000 05	20							
Financial and budgetary provisions	2000 First half	- 33							
Financial control	2000 First half	- 18							
Freedom of movement for persons	2000 05	18							T
Regional policy	2000 04	25							
2002 Institutions	2002 First half	- 9							T

T transitional arrangement

Table 5: Duration of chapter negotiations, Slovakia



T transitional arrangement

Table 6: Duration of chapter negotiations, Poland

	No. of Months	6	12	18	24	30	36	42
1998 Common foreign and security policy	First half 1998 - First half 2000 (approx. 24 months)	-24						
Company law	Dec 1998 - Dec 2001 (37 months)	37						T
Culture and audio-visual policy	Nov 1998 - Dec 2000 (26 months)	26						
Education and training	Second half 1998 - Oct 98 (approx. 1 month)	-1						
Industrial policy	Second half 1998 - First half 99 (approx. 6 months)	-6						
Science and research	Second half 1998 - Oct 98 (approx. 1 month)	-1						
Small and medium-sized undertakings	Oct 1998 - November 1998 (1 month)	1						
Telecommunications and information technologies	Oct 1998 - May 1999 (7 months)	7						T
1999 Competition policy	May 1999 - Dec 02	43						T
Consumers and health protection	Apr 1999 - May 1999 (1 month)	1						
Customs union	May 1999 - First half 01 (approx. 26 months)	-26						
Economic and Monetary Union	First half 1999 - End 1999 (approx. 6 months)	-6						
Energy	Second half 1999 - Second half 2001 (approx. 24 months)	-24						T
Environment	Dec 1999 - Oct 2001 * (23 months)	23						T
External relations	First half 1999 - Second half 1999 (approx. 6 months)	-6						
Fisheries	Apr 1999 - June 01 * (39 months)	39						T
Free movement of capital	Autumn 1999 - Mar 02 * (approx. 30 months)	30						T
Free movement of goods	Jun 1999 - Mar 2001 * (22 months)	22						T
Freedom to provide services	Jul 1999 - Nov 00 * (17 months)	17						T
Social policy and employment	Sep 1999 - Mar 01 * (19 months)	19						T
Statistics	Mar 1999 - Jun 1999 (3 months)	3						
Taxation	Nov 1999 - Mar 02 * (29 months)	29						T
Transport policy	Nov 1999 - June 02 * (32 months)	32						T
2000 Agriculture	Jun 2000 - Dec 02	30						T
Co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs	May 2000 - July 30, 2002	27						
Financial and budgetary provisions	First half 2000 - Dec 02	-33						
Financial control	First half 2000 - First half 2000 (approx. 1 month)	-1						
Freedom of movement for persons	May 2000 - Dec 01 * (19 months)	19						T
Regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments	Apr 2000 - Oct 2002	30						T
2002 Institutions	First half 2002 - First half 2002 (approx. 1 month)	-1						T

T transitional arrangement

f

Table 9: Length of negotiations for all countries, chapter on regional policy

	Apr 00	Jul 00	Oct 00	Jan 01	Apr 01	Jul 01	Oct 01	Jan 02	Apr 02	Jul 02	Oct 02	Jan 03	Apr 03
First Wave													
Cyprus	Apr 00 - Apr 02												
Czech Republic	Apr 00 - Apr 02												
Estonia	Apr 00 - June 02												
Hungary	Apr 00 - July 02												
Poland	Apr 00 - Oct 02												
Slovenia	Apr 00 - June 02												
Second Wave													
Latvia	Apr 01 - Apr 02												
Lithuania	Apr 01 - Apr 02												
Malta	Apr 01 - Apr 02												
Slovakia	Apr 01 - Apr 02												
Bulgaria													
Romania													

9

Table 10: EU Evaluation of Applicant Countries, Chapter on Regional Policy

	New Legislation	New Institutions	New Territories	Programming
<i>First Wave</i>				
Cyprus	Prior sufficient	No, Planning Bureau	Prior	Strategic Development Plan
Czech Republic	November, 2000	Yes, Regional Councils	Yes	National Development Plan
Estonia	April, 2001	No, Min. of Finance	Provisional	Provisional
Hungary	October, 1999	No, Min. of Economic Affairs	Yes	Nat. Dev. Plan
Poland	May, 2000	Yes, Min. of Reg. Dev	Yes	Nat. Strategy for Reg Dev
Slovenia	May/June, 1999	Yes, Nat. Agency for Reg. Dev	Yes	Delayed
<i>Second Wave</i>				
Latvia	Not yet sufficient	No, Min. of Finance	Yes	Provisional
Lithuania	July, 2000	Yes, Dept of Reg Dev	No	Preliminary
Malta	Limited	Yes, Reg. Policy Directorate	No	Preliminary
Slovakia	October, 2001	Yes, Min. of Construction and Reg Dev	Yes	Nat. Dev. Plan
Bulgaria	Not yet	Min. of Reg. Dev and Public Works	Yes	Preliminary
Romania	Not yet	Unclear	No	Preliminary