EU Challenges to Domestic Politics: A Regional Nationalist Response

Carolyn Marie Dudek
Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY 11549
e-mail: psccmd@hofstra.edu

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Abstract: The following examines the extent to which European Union (EU) institutions and policies have affected resource distribution between center and periphery within Member States. As resource distribution changes, so does the politicization of regional nationalist parties. The way that nationalist parties include the EU in their party program, however, is dependent upon the perceived type of influence the EU has upon their region and the political goals of the party itself. Two Mediterranean regions in Spain, Galicia and Catalonia, as well as one non-Mediterranean region, Scotland, are examined to see empirically how the EU affects political territorial dynamics. Although the discussion is a preliminary examination it does suggest the need to perhaps examine EU policies which later become political inputs within Member States. Moreover, the discussion indicates that it may be fruitful to utilize old models of the nation-state to understand how domestic politics have been transformed through European integration.

In 1996 ten thousand irate Gallego farmers protested the Galician regional government in reaction to European Union (EU) milk quota policy. In response, the Galician national party, the Bloque Nacionalista Galega (BNG), vocalized its opposition to these European imposed policies. On the other hand, the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) member of the Scottish Parliament, Alex Salmond proposes the vision of Scotland as a "modern state independent in the European Union" (Salmond, 2000). Jordi Pujol, the leader of the Catalan nationalist party, Convergència i Unió (CiU) became one of the founding fathers of the Committee of the Regions and also entered Catalonia into a much talked about cross-national regional association the Four Motors1.

In the past few decades we have witnessed two seemingly opposing movements throughout Europe: 1) deeper and wider European integration, 2) a re-emergence of regional nationalist sentiment along with the devolution of policy responsibility to sub-national levels (e.g. Spain, Italy, Belgium and Great Britain). In what way-if any-has European integration shaped the political dynamics within regions, among regions and between regions and their corresponding national government? Has the EU influenced the politicization of regional nationalist political parties? More specifically, how has the EU as an additional institution and source of

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1 The four motors is a cross state borders association among Catalonia, Lombardy, Rhône-Alps and Baden-Württemberg
economic and political resources affected the political strategies of regional nationalist parties?

More traditional writings regarding territorial politics were conceived within the context of the nation-state where its boundaries were strictly defined. The focus of such studies attempted to explain the creation of the nation-state as based upon the distribution of resources between central and peripheral territories. Center-periphery theory attempted to explain the relationship within and between territories within the same state. In particular, such theory was used to explain why there are variations in territorial power structures. Center-periphery theory provided a useful tool to examine regionalism (sub-national issues) and the possible roots of regional nationalism.

With greater European integration, however, it seems a new dynamic has been added to the resource exchange between center and periphery which affects the politics within regions and the politicization of regional identities. No longer can we examine European countries as impermeable closed systems. Furthermore, EU integration has made Member State borders much more permeable as EU policies directly affect domestic politics. Thus, the EU has introduced a new component within domestic politics and has possibly altered the distribution of resources within Member States.

In the context of the EU, one of the most commonly applied models to understand the relation between regional, national and supranational governance is the multi-level governance model. The model suggests that “authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government—sub-national, national and supranational” (Hooghe and Marks, 2001:2; Marks et. al., 1996). National sovereignty has thus been eroded due to the actions of EU institutions and the collective nature of bargaining at the EU level. The multi-level governance model is built upon functionalist assumptions, focusing predominantly on processes and bargaining among these interconnected arenas. Such assumptions, however, tend to exclude politics itself and the relationship among formal institutions and between institutions and citizens. Marks and Hooghe (2001) assert that one of the repercussions of multi-level governance is that “states have lost control over individuals in their respective territories” and that as a result “state sovereignty has become an object of popular contention—the outcome of which is uncertain” (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 2, 29).
Theodore Lowi (1964, 1970, 1972) in his work, implicitly suggests another way to perhaps address how the interaction of various levels of governments have affected accountability and democratic quality of polities in Europe. He states that "policies determine politics" (Lowi, 1972: 299). This assertion suggests that we need to abandon the strictly process oriented approach to political phenomena and to examine political outcomes that later become political inputs. One of the central duties of government is coercion and one form of coercion is policy making and implementation (Lowi, 1964, 1970, 1972). Policy making at the EU level is a way for the supra-national government to control and regulate various policy sectors. As the EU increases its policy-making role, new interests are emerging within countries in response to EU policies. According to Lowi (1972), we can better understand political patterns if we understand the policies motivating them. Thus, rather than focusing on bargaining and processes among levels of government, which the multi-level governance model emphasizes, it may be more advantageous to study how EU policies as well as institutions affect resource distribution between the center and periphery.

Does the EU create a new external resource or constraint for regional actors? In what way has European integration transformed the distribution of resources within member states and transformed the center-periphery model? Scholars of European integration have come to many different conclusions regarding how integration would affect territorial politics. For instance, neo-functionalist theories suggested that further European integration would affect interests and identities in a way, which would cause a shift in allegiance to the European polity (Haas 1958; Marcussen et. al. 1999). Marcussen, et. al., however, demonstrate that this has not been the case with some national identities. On the other hand, intergovernmentalists asserted that since the nation-state controls the process of integration so too will the nation-state steer “interest formation and aggregation to take place at the national level” (Bartolini, 1999b). Thus, European integration would have no affect on national (or perhaps regional) identities. In an integrated Europe, however, we have witnessed a change in territorial politics, and the cultural and political dynamics associated with territory (Le Galès, 1998; Rokkan, 1993; Keating, 1998).

Europeanization seen as both a process and effect is an ongoing and ever changing phenomenon. Maria Green Cowles, et al define Europeanization in part as, “an evolution of new layers of politics that interact with older ones” (Green Cowles,
et. al, 2000: 2). One of the interesting changes in the European polity that has occurred is the growing gap between where policies are made and the politics of those policies. Specifically, I am referring to how EU policies directly impact domestic politics and evoke domestic reaction, yet the policies themselves are created elsewhere. Many EU policies such as regional development policy and Common Agricultural Policy provide direct aid to regions within Member States and sometimes bypass the central government. Regional governments have even become active in the European political arena either through lobbying efforts or via the Committee of the Regions.

It appears that the EU is dismantling territorially oriented conditions such as the political, economic and social boundaries that once existed between nation-states. For example, removal of tariffs, the free movements of goods, labor and capital, and regulation and deregulation at the European level have presented challenges to the traditional construction and configuration of nation-states. As borders are broken down the “center” (e.g. national governments) plays a lesser role protecting its territory from external political, economic and cultural shocks (Keating and Loughlin, 1997; Storper 1997; Cooke and Morgan, 1998). European integration does not necessarily mean a disintegration of the center, but rather that the role of the center as the dominant source of resources and protection from external influences is significantly changed. As the role of the center changes it seems that the relationship between center and periphery also changes accordingly.

Stefano Bartolini suggests that, Europe can provide “new spaces to political competition” (Bartolini, 1999b: 23). The importance of Europe within domestic politics has caused political parties to incorporate EU issues within their own political agenda and to adapt to the pressures and benefits Europe offers. In addition, national governments have had to cope with sub-national governments’ direct interaction within the political arena in Brussels and with cross-border regional associations. One of the more profound and noticeable changes among regional governments, due mostly to European integration, is that they are no longer purely domestic actors. As the EU transforms the role of national and regional actors, how does this in turn affect traditional center-periphery relations?

Many scholars and regional political actors refer to Brussels as an additional political arena whereby they can bypass their central government (Closa, 1995; Fraga, 1992). Bypassing the central government can possibly have two effects. One, it can
alleviate added pressures upon national governments thus, acting as a stabilizing force. Two, it may alter the relations among territories within a Member State and perhaps challenge the dominance of the central government. Although there are no systematic empirical studies regarding these two possible changes it seems, however, that it is possible to logically deduce such an influence.

Another issue that perhaps may alter politics within regions and among regions of the same state is the extent to which the drama of EU policies is played out within Member States. As alluded to earlier, the reaction toward EU policies often occur within the domestic arena. For instance, citizen protest against EU policies take place mostly at the national or regional levels (Tarrow, 1995; Rucht 2000; Imig and Tarrow, 2001, 1999; Klandermans et. al. 1999). As the politics of EU policies take place on home soil, how does this affect the internal political relations among territories? In what way, does this influence center-periphery relation?

**Center-Periphery Relations: Regional Nationalism**

One aspect of center-periphery that has been of great concern due to its sometimes destabilizing effects is the presence of regional nationalism. For example, in countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain intense regional nationalism in part contributed to fueling the fires of violence and unrest. Regional nationalism does not necessarily result in violence, but it certainly conditions the way in which center-periphery relations are conducted and what sorts of resources are utilized. In fact, the strong cultural component of regional nationalism reinforces the center-periphery divide. Deutch’s general definition identifies nationalism as:

> The demand for more power, wealth, higher status and higher moral and cultural respect for the members of its ‘own’ favored cultural, linguistic ethnic group (Deutsch, 1969:55)

Regional nationalism incorporates not only cultural aspects but also an attachment to a specific territory.

Regional nationalist political movements can have varying aspirations and political orientation. For example, in Europe most regional nationalist parties have chosen peaceful means to seek out more autonom, whereas some groups utilize violent means to achieve full separation. In addition, regional nationalist movements have many ideological underpinnings that range from being reactionery to
modernizing to merely culturally oriented with little political aspirations. It seems, however, that the EU may have affected the politicization of regional nationalist parties.

The role that the EU plays in affecting regional nationalist sentiment has certainly been of concern for not only regional but also national political elites. For instance, in Spain it was hoped that European Community membership would provide an additional outlet for regional nationalist sentiment (Closa, 1995). Spanish national elites hoped that the presence of Europe would diffuse regional pressures, especially from Catalonia. It seems, however, that the influence the EU has had upon regional nationalism has been much more complex than national elites originally thought\(^2\).

Peter Lynch in his examination of Scottish nationalism asserts that the EU has “operated as a political opportunity structure for regional nationalist parties because of its perceived ability to impact upon the constitutional status quo of existing states” (Lynch, 1996: 12). It appears, however, that the impact of the EU has been wider than merely legalistic constitutional effects. For instance, the EU and its policies have a varying effect or perceived effect upon regions (Dudek, 2001). Thus, depending on the extent to which EU policies influence a region, EU policies themselves can become part of the political dialogue within regional politics. Regional political actors, including regional nationalists, thus may have to address EU issues.

For some regions European integration has produced positive results, particularly economically. In addition, some regional nationalist parties perceive the EU as another arena where they can bypass their national government and push forward their political goals. Under such positive circumstances, regional nationalist parties have taken a pro-European position. On the other hand, the EU has adversely affected regions too. As a result, regional nationalist parties in adversely affected regions may take a more negative EU platform to distinguish them both as “defenders of the nation” and as different from traditional left/right parties which generally favor the EU. Thus, European integration and in particular the effect European policies have upon the domestic political arena have provided a new political opportunity and resource for regional nationalist parties. European integration perhaps has enabled

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\(^2\) For example, the Basque Country, governed by the Basque nationalist Party (PNV), created a regional lobbying office in Brussels. Such a lobby office presented a constitutional challenge to Spain since according to the Spanish constitution the national government was deemed sole executor of foreign affairs. Following a Constitutional Court decision, the Autonomous Communities or regional governments of Spain were granted political access, in the form of a lobby, at the European level.
regional nationalist parties to push forward their agenda and at the very least to raise awareness of the uniqueness of their region. The way in which regional nationalist parties may utilize European issues, however, may also depend on whether their party is a governing or opposition party.

Theoretical Examination of the EU and Regional Politics
Discussion of center-periphery divide:

To understand better how the EU affects the distribution of resources between center-periphery and its effect on regional nationalist party strategies we first need to understand better what the center and periphery are. According to Rokkan (in Flora 1999; Rokkan 1975), the “center” refers to a location that has predominance within 3 different categories: economics, politico-administrative activities and culture (1970). Rokkan suggests that to identify a center one may ask 3 questions:

1) Where do the key resource holders most frequently meet within the territory?
2) Where have they established arenas for deliberations, negotiations, decision-making?
3) Where do they convene for ceremonies for the affirmation of identity and where do they build monuments to symbolize this identity? (Flora, 1999:110)

To address the question of whether the EU has altered the center-periphery exchange of resources we must also ask if the EU has altered the position of the center itself. In other words, how have the answers to the above questions changed? In the traditional nation-state the centers were usually centers of trade or economic importance or national capitals. How as the EU as institutionalized in Brussels, Frankfurt, Strasbourg and Luxembourg challenged the traditional centers?

Regarding the issue of culture, or question three, the EU seems to not have played a significant role. Although there are attempts to promote a European identity among citizens it is not done in order to replace other identities, but rather to perhaps act as a modifier. There is no single language in Europe and there are actually EU programs set up to promote minority languages and exchange programs to promote a better understanding of the culture of other member states. Although the EU does not threaten the culture building of centers directly, peripheral identities may use European identity as a way to modify their own. In doing so, peripheral identities
may be able to promote a different image of them, which may be used as a resource. For instance, the Catalan identity, as promoted by the CiU, is a European identity. "Europeaness" is a way to create an image of prosperity and modernity. In so doing, they are perhaps able to distance themselves from Madrid in a cultural way.

Early scholars of European integration pointed out that the initial goals of the integration process were economic in origin which later "spilled-over" into other realms such as politics (Haas, 1958). Increasingly economic policies such as monetary, regulatory, trade, agriculture and competition policy are being handled at the European level. Thus, regarding economic legislation and decision-making much is conducted in Brussels and Frankfurt. The economic centers themselves, however, remain dispersed throughout Europe, and usually correspond to national capitals and/or other highly industrialized or important trade centers.

Politico-administrative capacities have also been partially reallocated to the European level. Deliberations, negotiations and decision-making certainly do take place in Brussels, etc., however, many of those deliberations are held among EU officials as well as representatives of the national governments. Most often regional actors are left out of the process due to the constitutional restraints within member states. Thus, it seems that the EU has not significantly altered the politico-administrative position of traditional centers; however, the EU arena does present a possible alternative to the national centers.

The European level and its subsequent policies in many ways set the parameters for how certain policy sectors are handled at the national and sub-national levels. On the other hand, although some administration and oversight emanates from Brussels, most implementation and oversight responsibility falls upon the shoulders of national and sub-national political actors. In this way, Europe does not completely usurp the role of traditional national centers.

**Periphery**

Of course, the center can only be defined in relation to a periphery. From Rokkan’s (1975; in Flora, 1999) work we can distinguish two kinds of peripheries horizontal and vertical. Horizontal peripheries refer to “a geographic periphery whereby; outlying areas are controlled by the center” (Flora, 1999:14). On the other hand, vertical peripheries involve people themselves. Space in this way is
a system of interactions within which the center consists of a set of key decision makers while the periphery is composed of those sets of participants in this interaction system who have the least influence upon the central groups and upon making of decisions (Flora, 1999:114).

Basically Flora suggests that Rokkan’s framework of peripheries included three traits: distance, dependence and difference.

**Distance:** located at some distance from the center (s) and transactions with the center (s) involve transaction costs

**Dependence:** dependent on the center(s) in one of the three behavioral domains:

1) political decision-making
2) cultural standardization
3) economic life

**Difference:** some sense of a separate identification (Flora, 1999: 115)

Within the European context what become the peripheries? It seems that in most instances those territories and actors which were considered the center remain the center and those areas that were considered of the periphery in the closed boundaries of the nation-state find their periphery status even intensified (Keating, 1999; Dudek, 2001). Center-periphery relations throughout Europe and within member states is analogous to fractals in that their status as a center or periphery become recapitulated with European integration. Of course, what is considered a periphery or a center depends where you are looking.

If one is looking at the European level as a whole, it seems that national capitals within the nation-state context are centers, but may find their status as a center lessened. It appears that this is dependent upon the extent to which a certain country is able to influence the European political arena. For example, the political actors from the nation-state center of Berlin have perhaps more influence regarding matters of the Euro-zone, whereas a center like Lisbon has lesser influence.

In addition, if one examines the European stage as a whole or even within the member states it can also be observed that the center-periphery relations within traditionally bounded territories become reinforced (Dudek 1999). For instance, in economic arenas, areas that in the past were considered centers of trade etc. continue to have their predominant position, whereas those areas that remained outside of trade routes often continue their lesser status. The French have coined a term that captures
this effect: the blue banana. The blue banana, or the areas rich in intra-European trade extends from London and curves like a banana shape through Germany and ends in the regions of northern Italy. Although more of a pedagogical instrument, the concept of the blue banana does point out that Europe does affect center-periphery relations as nation-state borders become more permeable.

European policies themselves have even reinforced in some ways the importance of territoriality and peripheries. Although EU policies attempt to break down barriers among member states they have tended to strengthen the importance of territory at the sub-national level (Sharpe, 1993; Kohler-Koch, 1995). For example, the EU has implemented a regional economic development program based upon territorially defined regions. To implement such policy member states with or without federal/regional structures have had to implement an administrative capacity to execute projects. For example, even in Portugal, which historically has been a unitary state we have witnessed the emergence of regions in response to EU regional funds implementation. Although the Portuguese regions are rather weak political actors, this change points to the EU’s ability to influence the administrative structures of peripheries. Even Poland, a candidate for EU accession, has created regional governments in anticipation of EU accession and the accompaniment of structural funds.

European development policy is not the only EU policy that has had a territorial effect. Regulatory policy has also had an effect on regional economic development and regional government capacity (Dudek, 2001). In this way, the EU has influenced the strengthening or weakening of the peripheral economic or politico-administrative nature of territories in relation to national or European centers. In this way, we can see the EU as either providing resources or constraints upon peripheries.

Another way to characterize a periphery is a political opportunity (Flora, 1999). A political opportunity in this sense is the spatial area where individuals can find many different possibilities of action (p115). Such political opportunities are dependent upon the particular socio-politico and economic conditions of the periphery and the periphery’s socio-political relations with the center. In particular, center-periphery or center-center relationships take on their specific character according to

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3 Flora actually terms political opportunity as an opportunity structure. I have chosen to utilize the term political opportunity as to not confuse this concept with the vast social movements literature that discusses opportunity structures, which evokes a different conceptualization.
the types of transactions that occur and particularly the kinds of resources each holds or the extent to which resources shape these transactions. If we take into consideration the EU as another actor within the center-periphery dynamic, how does this additional resource/constraint affect the configuration of center-periphery relations and the opening of political opportunities? In particular, how does the introduction of the EU affect how sub-national regions and their respective regional nationalist parties deal with the new resource structure the EU may present?

Resources include many tangible and intangible sorts. For example, RAW Rhodes (1983) suggests various kinds of resources such as monetary, constitutional/legal, access to public-decision making, information, and organizational infrastructure to achieve goals directly rather than depending on intermediaries. The EU presents a whole new source for various kinds of resources and simultaneously affects the resource exchanges between centers and peripheries within member states. In utilizing RAW Rhodes examples of resources we shall examine resources that are more relevant to the EU. Thus, we shall examine, monetary, institutional (which is similar to Rhodes organizational category), and legitimacy (which is similar to the constitutional/legal category).

**EU Provided Monetary Resources for Central and Regional Governments**

Within the traditional nation-state peripheries were dependent upon central government transfers. These transfers were directed to regional coffers for various reasons such as to co-opt regional elites, provide money for economic development, or to subsidize failing economies. Similarly, the EU provides monetary assistance to regions. One of the main monetary resources the EU provides for both central and regional governments are structural and cohesion funds. Cohesion funds are allocated directly to national budgets whereas structural funds are disbursed in part directly to regions or filtered through the national government (this depends greatly upon the constitutional construct of regional and national competencies).

Particularly in the context of structural funds, the EU does have a transfer payment mechanism similar to those found at the nation level. It is important to note, however, that the way some countries organize these funds depends greatly upon legal and constitutional structures as well as the informal relations between central and regional governments. For example, in Spain the various Autonomous Communities'
officials meet with their corresponding national leaders and through a negotiating process the regional plan for Spain is created and subsequently presented in Brussels. Thus, the regional level is still dependent upon national officials to represent their interests at the European level. Also, many of the projects using structural funds, at least in the case of Spain, is decided at the national level and then distributed to the ACs to be implemented. In this way, the center is able to maintain its predominant role in fiscal relations with the regional level. On the other hand, there are some smaller funds that regions and even municipalities can request from the EU directly.

One of the main constraints that the EU has placed upon national political leaders and their traditional role as brokers of transfer payments are the Maastricht treaty’s convergence criteria. Specifically, the convergence criteria placed restrictions upon public spending and thus there are fewer funds for transfer payments. Thereby, political elites at the center and periphery cannot utilize the standard games of party politics whereby both regional and national elites bargain between one another to determine the allocation of national budgets (Bartolini, 1999b). Thus, Europe’s budgetary restrictions upon member states place constraints upon the traditional centers’ control over transfer payments, which in the past were an important monetary and political resource, that constituted and shaped relations between central and peripheral actors.

The creation of a monetary union, the Euro zone, also provides a new backdrop to center-periphery relations. A single currency and the economic buffer of other member states make the possibility of secession more plausible. For instance, the Scottish National Party has pushed forward a platform of an independent Scotland within an integrated Europe. This has only been more recently a plausible party strategy with the creation of the single currency and the single market. In this way, Scotland could enjoy the benefits of existing within a larger economic and monetary framework without necessarily having British rule.

**Cultural Resources of the EU**

As mentioned earlier, the EU has not become a cultural center. The EU, however, has become an external source influencing regional identities. Regional identities have often been used as a counter to the center’s attempt to consolidate a dominant identity. Michael Mann aptly points out that the nation-state has never
completed its solidification and that human societies consist of "multiple, overlapping, intersecting networks of interaction" (Mann, 1998: 185). Cultural identities at both the center and peripheries have been instrumentally utilized within political space to further several goals. For instance, a common culture has been used as a community building mechanism to either bring individuals into the center or to differentiate peripheries from the center. Many authors attempt to deal with the issue of identity and its relation to politics, especially within center-periphery literature (Deutsch, 1969). For this particular study we are most interested in how the EU has affected the political strategizing of peripheral identities.

Identities are often formed within the context of one identity in relation to another. Thus, there is not only a "we" that involves the similarities existent within a group, but also the notion of the "other" or those that are different from the group (Conior, 1978; Hobsbawm, 1990). In the context of an integrated Europe, as mentioned earlier, Europe as an identity has not yet encroached upon the dominant identities of the member states or in other words the dominant identity of the traditional centers within the traditional nation-state. It has been shown that it is possible to possess multiple identities among European, national and regional identities.

In the context of regional nationalist parties it is apparent that European identity has been utilized in either positive or negative ways to promote certain political strategies. The way in which Europe is used in the definition of a regional identity, however, seems to be causally related to the way in which the EU affects a particular region. If EU policies positively affect a region then the regional identity incorporates "Europe" as part of or as a modifier to their identity. Conversely, regions that are negatively affected tend to pose "Europe" as an outsider or "other" that infringes upon the well being of the region. The choice of which strategies are chosen also depends on the dynamics of the regional and national political arenas.

Thus, with the introduction of European integration we are witnessing a variation in the formation of peripheral identities that include "Europe" within its formulation. In particular, regional nationalist parties tend to utilize European identity as part of their political strategy to either differentiate themselves from national political parties in their region or to distinguish themselves from the center's

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4 In addition, the EU itself does promote regional identities via its minority language programs whereby money is allocated to programs to support non-national languages.
cultural or political domination. The inclusion of Europe within the formulation of peripheral identities does not necessarily threaten central national identities, but it does allow regions to strategically place their own identities within a broader context which may give them more political weight and acceptability.

For example, many regional identities are no longer merely conservative, reactionary types that place themselves within the confines of the nation-state, seeking the highly improbable success of secession. Today we can find new forms of regional identities, which reflect modernizing and industrializing trends within regions that do not necessarily seek secession, but rather more autonomy to adapt to the global economy (Keating, 1996). The incorporation of "Europe" as part of a regional identity has seemingly helped these identities to appear more progressive and dynamic, which may possibly aid these regions to export their identity in a more positive light to entice foreign capital investment. In Catalonia the Convergència i Unió (CiU) is the nationalist party that has predominated the political stage of the region. The CiU is associated with projecting a European and modernizing image. To be Catalan, is also to be European and outward looking. Catalan identity is not mutually exclusive from a European identity, but rather Europeaness enhances the Catalan creation of a modernizing outward looking identity (Keating, 1999).

The European Union and the emergence of a European identity, although not threatening to the identities of the traditional centers (national level identities), do provide an intangible resource for peripheries and particularly for regional nationalist parties. Since EU policies affect the everyday lives of citizens regional elites need to include European issues and ideas as they relate to their region’s constituency. Inclusion of European issues, however, does not mean that regional elites will be incapable of still presenting a uniquely regional perspective and at the same time preserve their regional identity.

Institutional Resources of the EU in Center-Periphery Relations

The European Union not only provides cultural and monetary sorts of resources that can affect center-periphery relations; it also provides certain institutional resources. Institutions referred to here are the formal structures of the EU that can enhance or diminish center and periphery’s strengths in relation to one
another. For instance, as mentioned earlier, the Spanish government thought that EU membership would be a positive force for Spain since it would mean that the institutions of the EU could be another outlet for regional nationalist discontent, rather than emphasizing all their focus upon Madrid (Closa, 1995). Although such an idea existed in principle, in practice peripheries have utilized European institutions in very different ways.

Created under the Maastricht treaty, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) is the only European formal institution that specifically addresses the territorial sub-national level. Via this institution sub-national governments representing peripheries could find an outlet to voice their grievances. The CoR, however, is a rather weak European institution. It mostly plays an advisory role and has no final say in EU legislation. The role of the CoR is more symbolic in nature. Essentially, the CoR represents the EU’s recognition of sub-national governments, but does not expressly empower these above the concerns of member states. Thus, I suggest that the CoR, as of yet, does not constitute a resource for peripheries to threaten the predominance of the national governments’ central importance within EU institutions. The CoR’s symbolic role does focus more attention upon regional issues within the European arena, but does not alter center-periphery resource distribution.

One of the more profound affects of the EU as institutionalized in Brussels is the change in sub-national governments’ role within the international realm. In the past, sub-national governments representing peripheries or centers contained their political activity within the domestic realm. In the context of an integrated Europe, political actors within peripheries have found a new arena: the international and specifically European. For instance, many regional governments such as the Spanish ACs and German Länder have set up lobbying offices in Brussels. These offices are maintained to gather information about the EU so that regions can adapt to EU directives, to pressure officials within the EU arena, and to make their region’s goals and concerns heard in Brussels.

As an indirect response to EU institutions and policies regions have also created trans-border regional associations. For example, the Atlantic Arc, Mediterranean Arc, and the Four Motors have emerged, in part, as a reaction to and an extension of European integration. The increase in such regional associations suggests that regions have found it necessary to engage in cross border regional
dialogues to improve their peripheral conditions, to promote economic development and other sorts of goals associated with territories that are outside of the center.

One can perceive the role of regional governments at the European level as a means to by-pass the national level and to use the European level as a counterbalance against the national center. How successful regions actually are via forming regional associations and creating lobbying offices in Brussels remains to be seen. It is clear, however, that political actors in the peripheries perceive such associations as warranted in the context of European integration.

Legitimacy as a Resource and Political Opportunity

One of the critiques of the EU is its democratic deficit. Such critiques tend to focus on the absence of directly elected officials in the two most influential institutions: the European Commission and the Council of Ministers. Although the Maastricht treaty attempted to empower the European Parliament, the only directly elected body, many critics suggest that the change is not sufficient to remedy the deficit.

The democratic deficit in the context of Rokkan’s center-periphery theory suggests that the EU is not a system building center. System building refers to the creation of a sense of legitimacy and values. Within a bounded territory to maintain its predominance the center was to provide a legitimizing role. Additionally, within the peripheries themselves local leaders also needed to provide a system building function to maintain their predominant position within the region. According to Shils (1975) the more “territorially dispersed the institutional system is the less likelihood of an intense affirmation of the central value system” (p10). Although Shils’ theorization of center-periphery relations was made within the context of the traditional nation-state, this prediction does give us some idea of how the possible new center of the EU may affect traditional center-periphery relations.

The democratic deficit at the EU level has not only proven to be a hurdle for system building at the EU level, but it has also adversely affected the system building capacity of centers within the traditional nation-state. Specifically, since many matters are now decided at the European level domestic actors no longer perform certain functions that in the past were legitimacy building activities such as providing
large transfer payments or subsidies to failing industries (Keating and Loughlin 1997; Bartolini, 1999b).

In this way, the EU has adversely affected the system building role traditional centers once performed within domestic politics. Moreover, the pivotal role of centers has been transformed in such a way to produce new stresses and nuances within the relations between centers and peripheries as the EU is changing the centers’ past monopoly of system building and providing new resources for peripheral/regional actors.

In particular, the lack of a system building function at the European level has shown itself to be problematic for the system building functions at both the national (center) and regional (periphery) institutions. The EU and its policies in particular have affected the legitimacy of both national and regional governments (Bartolini, 1999a, 1999b; Morlino, 1999). Essentially, EU policies have placed constraints upon the policy-making of regional and national governments. Consequently, governments have become less able to provide certain “goods” they were able to provide in the past. European policies contribute an additional problem since citizen discontent of EU policies tend to be aimed at more proximate levels of government, either the national or regional levels (Tarrow, 1995; Rucht 2000; Imig and Tarrow, 2001, 1999; Klandermans et. al. 1999). As a result, added pressures are placed upon national and regional governments. Consequently, since national and regional actors often are unable to change EU policies this can threaten their legitimacy as citizens expect government performance.

As a result, the political arena is significantly affected as EU issues condition citizens’ attitudes towards their regional and national governments. In some instances this change in citizens’ opinions can open an opportunity structure within the party system to allow parties to increase their electoral support by posturing themselves in relation to how EU policies impact their territory. Concretely, I suggest that regional nationalist parties, in some instances, have been able to take advantage of citizen attitudes toward the EU and to strategically differentiate themselves from national level parties. This is particularly true in instances when EU policies have had a different effect upon a specific region as compared to its impact upon the Member State as a whole. Under such conditions a regional party can distinguish itself from the national level parties within the region.
In the context of legitimacy, EU policies have presented a whole new dynamic that places into question not only the democratic legitimacy of the EU, but regional governments as well. It seems that it has become more difficult for citizens to hold public officials responsible for policy-making at the European level accountable for their actions. Accountability is one of the basic requirements of democracy. As policy formulation becomes further removed from citizens (e.g. at the European level) does this affect regional level politics and if so, what role can regional nationalist parties play? Does the European policy-making process and reactions to those policies within an integrated Europe provide a resource and political opportunity for regional nationalist parties? Have EU policies and the subsequent reaction to these policies altered the resource distribution between center and periphery?

**Democracy in Europe—The “Gap”**

Thomas Lancaster (1999) suggests that representation is central to the creation and maintenance of system legitimacy. He suggests that representation involves the relationship “between individuals or groups to government decision makers” (p.61). Moreover, representation contains two components: 1) electoral representation which allows people to choose political agents i.e. via regularly held competitive elections, and 2) the accountability of public agents. Within the Euro-polity the representational function in the form of accountability has become altered.

Within an integrated Europe, we find a disjuncture or physical “gap” between where EU policies are made and where representation concerning those policies takes place. Both Sidney Tarrow (1995, and Imig and Tarrow, 2001) and Dieter Rucht (2000) suggest that the response to EU policies does not necessarily entail political mobilization in Brussels. In essence, citizen representation concerning EU policies often takes place at various levels of government within member states. For example, Rucht (2000) points out that “EU politics, institutions and policies that become —relative to national ones—increasingly an addressee and/or target of political and social groups, regardless of whether this action is carried out by sub-national, national or transnational actors.” Similarly, Tarrow (1995) states that “groups —like the Spanish fisherman and French farmers —weak at the supra-national level, with substantial at home-peripheral protest becomes the functional equivalent of European interest representation (p.243). This gap presents certain problems to the democratic nature of the Euro-policy-making polity.
Individuals or groups hold more proximate governments accountable for policies formulated in far-off Brussels. This is of particular concern to local and regional governments since they do not have decision-making competencies at the European level. In addition, these pressures can become problematic since they potentially can jeopardize the legitimacy of lower levels of governments. Who should be held accountable becomes difficult as perceptions and convenient domestic mobilization structures dictate the system.

If we examine EU policies, the democratic deficit and lack of system building capacity arises from the disjuncture between where policies are made and who is held responsible. The gap between where policy is made and where the politics of those policies takes place is problematic. As a result citizens seek a way to cope with the effects of the EU and their discontent with their national government. In this way, a new political space has been created that allows parties that are either regional or ideologically unique from national level parties to gain more support. EU policies and the subsequent reaction to those policies possibly have created a political opportunity for less traditional parties to gain voter support and public attention.

Domestically oriented citizen reaction to EU policies is of concern because it potentially can place extra pressures upon regional and national governments. As EU policies provide stimulus for citizen protest and demands; these policies also possibly affect state legitimacy and emphasize the importance of territoriality in politics. As EU policies affect specific territories in different ways, so too does this differentially affect the resources of peripheries and subsequently the conditions of center-periphery relations. Additionally, the impact of EU policies can influence the extent to which new political spaces within the political arena may be created.

As alluded to earlier, new political opportunities for regional nationalist parties have emerged due to the EU's affect upon legitimacy. The idea of legitimacy and what creates legitimacy has changed over time and has perhaps changed in the face of European integration and the reallocation of policy competencies to the supra-national level. What is legitimacy based upon? Bartolini (1999a) points out that we can categorize legitimacy in two ways: procedural legitimacy and performance legitimacy. Procedural legitimacy refers to the actual process itself of implementing and creating policies, whereas performance legitimacy refers to citizen acceptance and expectations of the goods government provides.
When the nation-state expanded its policy domain into welfare programs the state's legitimacy became increasingly more dependent on what services it provided. Therefore, the state's legitimacy became dependent on performance and less so on procedure. With European integration, increasingly more areas of policy-making once the responsibilities of the state are being allocated to the European level. Thus, as policy areas, once the responsibility of the state, are allocated to the European level the state needs to turn to other ways to maintain legitimacy since it is no longer responsible for all the government goods provided. Bartolini (1999a) even suggests that the state may have to retreat to symbolic ways of obtaining legitimacy such as those that exist within cultural and politico-administrative spheres.

In addition, state performance legitimacy is further affected in the context of territorial politics. Within a global economy the ability of states to manage their own territories is becoming increasingly more difficult (Keating, 1996; 1998; Storper, 1997). Theories of global economics suggest that territory and especially regions are an important element to facilitate adaptation to a global economy (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Storper, 1997, Keating 1996). EU policies, however, can constrain the policy-making capacity of regions, thereby decreasing the policy options available to bring about regional economic development. Thus, the EU can act not only as a resource for peripheries, but also a constraint. Such constraints, however, can act as a political resource for regional nationalist parties as they strategize to create a political space among national level parties that support the EU.

How Does the EU induced “Gap” along with changes in State Legitimacy and Territoriality Affect Regional Nationalism?

Michael Keating (1996) suggests that due to the changes associated with the global economy and European integration minority nationalism “takes on a new significance since they are able to give meaning to place and re-constitute social and political relations within places” (p.47). As mentioned earlier, European integration and its subsequent policies have created a political opportunity structure for regional nationalist parties. All political parties have found it necessary to include EU issues within their own political platform. Regional nationalist parties have been able to incorporate EU policies into their agenda in a way to distinguish themselves from national parties or to open the possibility of more autonomy for the region within an
integrated Europe. In actuality, it even has become strategically necessary for regional nationalist parties to position themselves in relation to European policies to push forward their nationalist agenda in the interest of their region either in relation to the central government or in relation to Europe or to both.

I hypothesize that the way that regional nationalist parties actually incorporate EU issues into their political agendas, however, depends upon: 1) the type of party they are (e.g. conservative, modernizing, technocratic, cultural, separatist) 2) what their political goals are (e.g. electoral ambition at the national or regional level; separatist or seeking more autonomy, to maintain its position as the regional governing party or to pursue greater electoral support as an opposition party) 3) how the EU has affected their regional conditions.

Understanding Regional Nationalism in an Integrated Europe

There is a tendency in the literature to lump all nationalist parties together into a single category and to make the leap between cultural identity and the politicization of those identities. For example, the Lega Nord in Italy does not represent a specific physical territory and there is not a single identifiable culture of the “North”. Another example, is the Autonomous Community of Aragon which has been declared a “nation”, however, it is questionable what sort of separate culture Aragonese is. Thus for this cursory examination I have chosen regional nationalist parties that have a specific cultural component (e.g. linguistic, historical institutional distinction) and an established territorial base.

According to Rokkan’s (1970) theory of political cleavages, regional nationalist parties emerged from the center-periphery divide within nation-state borders. Tensions between pressures for centralization and decentralization and the attempt of the “center” to incorporate the peripheries created this cleavage. Thus, periphery movements were a response to the dependent structures of power and resource distribution emanating from the center.

When we discuss the issue of center-periphery in the context of an integrated Europe it goes beyond the traditional nation-state context of the center-periphery cleavage. One must keep in mind however, that some territories may have more than one center. For example, Catalonia has historically been a competitive force in contrast to Madrid with its strong textile and export industry and entrepreneurial bourgeoisie. In the context within an integrated Europe Catalonia also is a “central”
region since it is located on the Mediterranean and its political orientation toward Europe has given it a privileged position within the European arena.

To understand better the specific experience of different regional nationalist parties let us examine the main nationalist parties within Catalonia, Galicia and Scotland. I have chosen these three regions because their regional nationalism is based on specific territories and a unique regional culture. In addition, these cases present interesting examples of how regional nationalist parties incorporate EU issues into their political agenda in relation to how the EU and its policies are perceived. For example, the Catalan nationalist party, the CiU, has a pro-European position, the Gallego nationalist party, the BNG, has an anti-European position and the Scottish national party, the SNP, once had an anti-European position which has been modified to be quite positive toward the EU. Why have these parties chosen a particular stance in relation to Europe, what has the incorporation of EU issues into its political agenda done to their electoral success? The following is a preliminary and cursory examination of these three cases. At this point we may not answer all these questions, but perhaps begin to get an idea of what sorts of changes are taking place.

**Catalonia and the Convergència i Unió**

The Convergència i Unió (CiU) is the governing regional nationalist party in Catalonia. Catalonia is an economically strong region in Spain and has prospered from its industries and its export oriented trade. Throughout history, Catalonia and particularly its capital, Barcelona, has been another “center” within Spain and has often competed with Madrid for predominance in Spain. The region’s strong business class became a driving force within the nationalist movement. Catalan became the language of the business class and the nationalist political party was formed around a political platform to protect the Catalan business elite. Thus, Catalan nationalism emerged from the right of the political spectrum.

During the transition to democracy Catalan elites played a decisive role in pushing forward the creation of the ACs. The actual powers of the ACs, however, are an open-ended issue. Powers set forth within both the national and AC constitutions are quite vague. Thus, the CiU has taken on the task to push decentralization within

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5 It would be fruitful to examine other regions throughout Europe, however, the scope of this paper is to provide merely a preliminary discussion and examination.
Spain to its limits. The CiU is not a separatist party, but rather seeks greater autonomy within Spain. Keating (1996) points out that

...there is a general acceptance across the political spectrum, except the far right, of the principle of Catalan self-determination. Catalonia’s relationship with Spain is seen as a compact, freely entered into by both sides but which requires continued assent to remain valid....It means that autonomy is not seen as something conceded by Madrid, but rather as a right, with the modalities to be negotiated (p.127).

The CiU, a moderate nationalist and Christian Democratic party, has been able to dominate Catalonia since the first AC elections in 1980. Not only has the CiU sought power at the AC level but also at the national level. Under the final years of Felipe Gonzalez’s government, through the first term of Jose Maria Aznar’s government (till March 2000), the CiU has maintained a strong role in national politics as a key member of an informal coalition government.

The CiU and its dynamic leader Jordi Pujol have placed the CiU well within the context of an integrated Europe, as Spanish and as a member of the EU. The CiU has a strong outward looking platform seeing the identity of the Catalans as European. Michael Keating (1996) asserts that Pujol has strongly emphasized European and international spheres, thus “reviving the Catalan tradition of playing in multiple political arenas” (p. 123). The CiU has promoted dynamic relations not only within the institutional framework of the EU, but also with other strong European regions. Since 1989 the Catalans have been members of the trans-Pyrrenean Euroregion composed of Catalonia, Languedoc-Roussillon and the Midi-Pyrénées. More importantly, the Catalans are members of an association called the “four motors,” composed of Catalonia, Lombardy, Rhône-Alps and Baden-Württemberg. What is key to understand about this association is that it is comprised of regions that have relatively strong regional autonomy. Since these regions have competencies their institutional experience promotes the creation of an organization seeking to obtain regional aspirations.

From the point of view of the CiU and generally for the region of Catalonia, Spain’s membership to the EU has been beneficial to the region’s economy. The opening of economic borders and the removal of barriers to trade have proven to be a very positive aspect of the EU for the industries of Catalonia. In particular, Catalonia since the late 60’s (during the apertura) has had strong industries and an export oriented economy that makes membership in the EU with its open European market beneficial.
Catalonia is a very unique region of Spain since it is quite modernized and its capital Barcelona has oriented itself toward a very modern European image. For example, the 1992 Olympic games gave Barcelona an opportunity to demonstrate a Catalan/European contemporary image. Barcelona has become a very cosmopolitan European center of high fashion, multi-national corporations and banking. Thus, the image of Europe and the image that the CiU wants to project are synonymous. In addition, the European institutional arena and European policies have been favorable for Catalonia since they promote the export oriented economies. Moreover, Jordi Pujol, the president of Catalonia, is a well-known figure in Brussels; therefore, the Catalan government, guided under the direction of the CiU, has learned to utilize the European arena to its benefit.

Thus, if we think of how European institutions and their subsequent policies have affected the political agenda of the CiU, and the resources available to the region, it is clear that what is good for Europe is synonymous with what is good for Catalonia. Europe, generally conceived, does not threaten the Catalan identity. Just the opposite, Europe enhances and forms in part the notion of Catalonia. In addition, since European policies are generally favorable for the Catalans, there is little citizen pressure upon the regional government to rectify negative European policies. Therefore, the CiU’s niche within the political arena is based on its ability to successfully work with Europe, which for the voting population is favorable. It is important not to underestimate the CiU’s importance within the Catalan electorate and as an alternative option from the Castillian national parties. The domestic conditions within Spain and Catalonia have certainly given the CiU a favorable position to win elections, however, it seems that European issues and how the CiU has dealt with them has certainly re-enforced the CiU’s popularity.

In this way, European integration has provided new resources for Catalonia and the CiU. EU policies regarding economic concerns such as trade have been very beneficial for Catalonia and it appears have allowed Catalonia to become less dependent on the resources of the central government. Regarding cultural resources, Europe has provided an additional outlet to promote the Catalan identity and to further distinguish it in a positive way from Castille.

Bloque Nacionalista Galega
Galicia has had a very different experience within an integrated Europe. Galicia is an underdeveloped region, which falls within the Objective 1 category of the European structural funds. Geographic conditions of Galicia, such as its mountains and peripheral location within Spain have contributed to Galicia’s disadvantaged economic position. Within an integrated Europe Galicia’s peripheral position is even further reinforced. Not only is Galicia geographically within the periphery of Europe it has also been placed in an even more precarious position due to the enforcement of EU agricultural and fishing policies.

Galicia predominantly is an agricultural region whose important sectors are fishing and dairy production. As part of Spain’s accession, both milk and fishing quotas were implemented. These EU quotas have adversely affected the economy of Galicia (Dudek, 2001; 1999). Although, Galicia is a recipient of regional development funds, which have been used to improve infrastructure and to improve the standard of living of agricultural workers this has not changed the economic standing of Galicia (Dudek, 2001). Thus, the effect of EU policies upon Galicia has had a mixed effect, but mostly negative.

Since the first AC elections the Partido Popular (PP)\(^7\) has dominated the region. Galicia, having its own language and culture also has a regional nationalist party called the Bloque Nacionalista Galega (BNG). The BNG, although composed of a coalition stretching the gambit of the political spectrum, tends to be perceived as a left leaning party. The platform of the BNG is based heavily on Galician cultural preservation and upon an anti-clientelism platform. In particular, the major rhetoric of the BNG is its disapproval of the PP’s usage of clientelism to preserve its predominant position. The region of Galicia has a long tradition of clientelism and not only the PP is the perpetrator of such political practice (Dudek, 1999, 2003).

The platform of the BNG not only includes anti-clientelism, but also anti-EU sentiment. BNG members see the Spanish State as the major actor in the EU and they also perceive the Spanish State as not representing the specific interests of Galicia. EU induced fishing and milk quotas along with EU restrictions on subsidies to boat construction are the major sources of the BNG’s anti-EU fervor. According to the party program of the BNG, one of its goals is to have a renewed fishing fleet and to

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\(^6\) Objective 1 regions are those regions that are less than 75% of the European average.

\(^7\) Between 1987-1989 a coalition government controlled Galicia, but scandals pushed this government out of power and the PP has dominated ever since.
have participation in the decisions of the EU regarding fishing policy. Both of these demands are unlikely since the Spanish government thus far has not included the Gallegos in representation regarding EU fishing policy within the Council of Ministers. Not to mention, EU institutions do not have formal mechanisms for regions to participate directly in decision making. In addition, EU restrictions on subsidies to boat construction, to promote competition, has adversely affected the ship building industry, thus leaving it unable to refurbish the underdeveloped nature of the Gallego fishing fleet.

The BNG not only has a negative view of EU institutions and its policies it also sees problems with how the Xunta, and specifically the PP, have utilized the EU arena and EU moneys. For example, members of the BNG suggest that the Fundación Galicia-Europa, Galicia’s “mini-embassy” in Brussels, is merely a way for the PP and its leader Manuel Fraga to employ his clients (in Dudek, 1999; 2003). In addition, the BNG claims that EU structural funds are spent in a clientelistic and thus inefficient and ineffective manner. It has been demonstrated that the Xunta, which is PP controlled, has utilized questionable means of distributing funds (Corbacho, 1995; Dudek, 1999, 2003).

Thus, the BNG views EU structural policy as a means of reinforcing the PP’s predominant position in the region. Particularly, the BNG raises discontent not because these funds are not welcome or needed, but because these funds provide the PP with extra resources and avenues to fuel their patronage networks. Moreover, the BNG, does not see the EU as a way to circumvent the central government, but rather as a way to reinforce the central government’s predominance. In particular, since the EU’s decision making structure is strongly premised upon the representation of national governments it sees Madrid as the main actor within the European political arena. Thus, the BNG perceives the interests of Galicia to be put aside within the Spanish EU agenda, which is similar to how the Spanish government is perceived to act domestically; not advocating Galician interests.

Both the PP and the Socialist party, the PSOE (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español*) have very pro-European stances. Prior to the 1996 elections the PSOE was the main opposition party. The 1996 AC elections, however, changed the PSOE’s position and the BNG became the second largest party and they have even been able

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8 The Committee of the Regions plays merely an advisor role and there is no guarantee that the Gallego voice specifically will be represented within this body.
to gain seats within the national parliament. It appears that the BNG's main election aspirations are at the AC level. The lack of success in the most recent 2001 elections, however, suggests that the BNG is still unable to compete with the PP's political entrenchment in the region. It seems, however, that the BNG's anti-European position has provided irate farmers and fisherman another voting option that some opted for as demonstrated in the 1996 and 2001 elections. The BNG has been able perhaps to find a niche within the voting population since it is distinct from the other two main parties regarding the important issue of Europe, although they have been unable to unseat the governing PP.

The Scottish National Party

The Scottish National Party (SNP) is one of the few regional nationalist parties with separatist aspirations. The SNP has a center-left political orientation that has led the mobilization of Scottish nationalism since the early 1960's. In the 1960's and 1970's the SNP had a negative view of the European Community. This hostility was related to the exclusion of a Scottish voice within the British bargaining for entrance into the EU. There was a feeling that the economic interests of Scotland would not be taken into consideration. Thus, the SNP viewed the European Community as a "centralist and elitist organization" with little concern for democracy and participation (Lynch, 1996:30).

With these negative feelings, the SNP used a political strategy to piggy back anti-European sentiment in Scotland with anti-British feelings. Peter Lynch (1996) points out that this provided some political opportunities for the party as the British government continued to waiver on the issue of joining Europe. However, the SNP began to realize that perhaps the European Community could provide the economic and security aspects of government that would eventually lead to a larger political federation (Lynch, 1996). Thus, the SNP pushed to have a Scottish Council created to defend Scottish economic interests within the negotiating process. However, the British opposed the idea of a Scottish Council.

In 1975 the British government held a referendum for membership into the European Community. The SNP used this opportunity to increase their own support by presenting the referendum as a choice between Scottish independence or

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9 The italicized word is my own addition.
“continued representation within European institutions as a province of Britain” (Lynch, 1996:33). In this way, the SNP could pull support away from the major parties and at the same time show a difference between Scottish opinion and the rest of Britain.

Following the referendum, the SNP began to take a rather different position. The change in attitude was strongly linked to European regional development policy. The SNP began to realize that they could obtain funds for their citizens and that there were other mechanisms within Brussels for economic advancements. In addition, the SNP gradually began to see Europe as an economic support system that could insulate Scotland from the disruptive effects of secession.

One of the major contentions of the SNP was the adverse affect of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In 1984, the European Community began to address the problems of CAP and the overproduction of milk products in the Community. The SNP thus came out with a new platform:

...many of the fears that the Common Market would become a new superstate have been eased by experience. Far from becoming a new European despotism where bureaucracy triumphed over national rights, the enlarging of the Community in recent years has diluted some of the dangers of centralism. The bigger is gets, the looser it becomes (cited in Lynch, 1996: 39)

An important policy area for Scotland is fishing. Within the context of Europe the British government has often allowed the Scottish Office representation in the Council of Ministers regarding this specific sector. Although the Scottish Office, in the eyes of the SNP, is still British rule, it does suppose that eventually with the emergence of the Scottish parliament the Scots could have direct representation in such matters as the German Länder do. In this way it could be seen as a precursor to direct Scottish participation in EU policy-making for sectors important to the region.

Preliminary Conclusions

In the case of the CiU it seems that European institutions and policies have improved the conditions of the major interests the party represents, industry and export sectors. Therefore, negative mobilization regarding EU policies has not been a problem and has not threatened the legitimacy of the Catalan government. In addition EU policies have improved the general well being of the region of Catalonia. Thus, to
be European continues to be part of Catalan identity. In this way, the politicization of the Catalan identity via the CiU has remained pro-European and outward looking. The CiU has been able to present the EU as a way to improve their own region and to push forward their goal of more autonomy from Madrid.

On the other hand, the BNG has had a very different outlook toward the EU. European policies have had a negative impact upon the regional economy of Galicia, particularly in the milk and fishing sectors. In addition, EU regional development policy in the form of development funds has strengthened the position of the PP, which in the eyes of the BNG, hurts the Galician nation. The BNG views the PP as a national party, which uses clientelism to maintain its position at the expense of the interests of the Gallegos.

In addition, in response to EU policies there have been many mobilized interests such as that of Galician farmers and fishers. Such protest has opened a political opportunity structure for the BNG, since both the PP and PSOE have a pro-European platform. How has the mobilization of these interests in reaction to EU policies affected Gallego identity? In the past, Gallego identity has been based upon ideas of "historic debt", being the poor man of Spain and similar type notions that portray Galicia as a victim of the Spanish state and its location.

It seems that Europeanization has reinforced this identity. At the same time, it has provided a political opportunity for the BNG to gain greater voter support since in the past they were perceived as a threat to the agricultural sector with their leftist image. Thus, the political identity as filtered through the BNG's political platform is an identity that is truly Gallego, outside of Europe, however, desiring to be inside of Europe, but the Spanish State prohibits this. Moreover, the BNG has taken advantage of the effect of EU policies on Galicia by orienting their political position as unique to that of the PP or PSOE.

The SNP in the beginning followed a position similar to that of the Gallegos. They thought European integration would threaten the interests of Scotland. However, they differ from the BNG, because they mainly perceived European integration as a threat to the aspiration of Scottish separatism. Since the goal of the SNP is specifically separatist this added a different dimension to understanding their negative view of Europe.

Later, the SNP found a new political space within the EU. The negative effects of EU policies such as CAP began to lessen and the Scots became recipients of
development funds, which allowed the SNP to strengthen their own position as they began to give benefits to their constituents. Thus, those interests that were initially hurt by European membership began to find their condition improving. The change in the Scottish constituencies’ opinion of the EU thus, allowed the notion of European integration to be acceptable within a Scottish identity. However, this differs from the Catalan identity, which is seen as both European and Catalan. It seems that the Scottish identity is not European, but does not perceive it as a threat to their identity and as a possible opportunity structure to realizing a separate Scotland. Europeanization’s effect upon the political identity of Scotland as it is vocalized by the SNP is the idea of a Scotland, unique in its own right, able to survive in its “pure form” within an integrated Europe.

Although the above is a rather cursory examination of specific cases it does suggest that European integration has had varying degrees of success in altering resource distribution between centers and peripheries. It seems that regarding legitimacy and economic concerns the EU has had the most impact upon resource distribution within Member States. The extent and direction of the impact between the EU and resource distribution, however, depends upon whether the EU has had a positive or negative impact upon a region. In addition, how regional nationalist parties incorporate the EU in their political agenda depends on whether the EU is seen as a new fount of resources. Although this paper does not lead us to any definitive answer, it does suggest the need to examine EU institutions and EU policies, which may fundamentally alter resource distribution within Member States, thus changing the logic of traditional center-periphery relations.
Bibliography


