EUSA Eighth Biennial International Conference, Nashville, Tennessee, March 27-29, 2003

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Panel 4G: Thursday March 27, 4.15–6pm: Turning Points in Anglo-American Relations: The “Europe Question” in the 1960s

“Uneasy Partnership: The Special Relationship and European Unity in the 1960s”

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ABSTRACT

Anglo-American approaches to European unity in the 1960s resulted in the failure of two British EEC membership bids. The paper contends that Anglo-American strategy had a major responsibility for this outcome. After the Suez crisis of 1956 Britain did not carry out a long overdue review of the special relationship and external policy generally. As a result, the UK became too dependent on Washington and virtually disqualified itself from entry to the EEC. The United States in its grand design strove misguided to create an overly dependent Europe. In particular Washington’s inept statecraft helped seal the fate of the British initiatives.
In a world of nation-states alliances are both necessary and desirable. Yet, like chocolate, one can have too much of a good thing. Alliances create interdependencies which may inhibit adaptation to new challenges. In the late 1950s and early 1960s Britain seemed supremely privileged, no other country enjoyed such an apparently warm and close relationship with the leading superpower. Paradoxically, however, partnership, far from reinforcing Britain's international position, undermined it. In particular the Nassau accord of December 1962 helped provoke General de Gaulle's January 1963 veto of Britain's EEC application.

This paper investigates Anglo-American approaches to European construction in the years 1961-67. The importance of the theme requires no emphasis. The defeat of the two British membership bids represented a reverse for the United States, which had made British entry a prime objective of its grand design. Britain's exclusion from the EEC for nearly 14 years allowed France to call the shots in European construction. To be sure, the European policies of Britain and the United States have generated a considerable literature. However, analysts have tended to focus on the individual strategies of London and Washington rather than on the interplay of the two. This paper argues that until the early 1950s Britain remained a credible world power. British interests, in the classic Churchillian metaphor, were perceived as forming three overlapping circles: Commonwealth Empire, the United States, and Europe. From the mid-1950s this balancing of interests broke down. New forces and challenges – the Suez crisis, an uncompetitive economy, decolonisation, and formation of the EEC – sapped national strength and credibility. However British leaders, instead of taking stock and redefining objectives, continued to assert a presence in the three strategic areas, with increasing
emphasis on the American alliance. As a result, the junior / senior partner relationship characteristic of the second half of the war and early postwar years became in the wake of Suez a patron-client affair. In effect Britain became a prisoner of an alliance which prevented her from making the most of limited resources and opportunities.

Grand Designs

No common integrated Anglo-American strategy towards European unity existed. American and British approaches differed in key respects. From 1947 the United States strongly endorsed the main European initiatives – the Schuman Plan and European Defense Community of 1950, European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Washington’s preference was for supranationalism. Welcoming the Rome Treaty President Dwight Eisenhower hoped that he would “live long enough to see a United States of Europe.”

In just over a decade Britain switched from bystander to predator then suitor. On the principle that integration concerned only continental Europeans, Britain responded to the Schuman plan with detached benevolence. However, as the EEC took shape in the mid-1950s London sensed a competitor and fired two torpedoes: the European Free Trade Area of 1957 and the European Free Trade Association of 1959. Next the predator became suitor, petitioning for membership in 1961 and again in 1967.

President John F Kennedy’s grand design for Europe featured four principal components: universalism of the American political model; the need for a wealthier Western Europe to share NATO defense costs; containment of the Soviet Union and West Germany; British membership of the EEC. The model of the thirteen colonies
coming together, it was hoped, would inspire European nation states. A thriving, integrated Europe, Washington calculated, as well as offering larger markets for the American economy and contributing to defense costs, might be easier to handle politically. Moreover, in the context of the Cold War a flourishing Western Europe would project the superiority of capitalism. Containment of the Soviet Union and West Germany formed a key security consideration. Economic and political integration, by Gulliverising West Germany, would enhance European and global security. Finally British membership of the EEC would give the United States a voice in Europe and help curb France and West Germany. The 1962 Trade Expansion Act aimed at lowering tariff barriers and increasing America’s business with the expanding EEC.

What prime minister Harold Macmillan and foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd called their “grand design” was a poor joke for a patch and mend attempt to keep Britain a world power. Their perception of Britain’s international role was not then the delusion that it now seems. Until the mid-1950s foreign observers had good grounds for ranking the United Kingdom a credible world power – third nuclear power and largest empire, with a global network of military bases, chairing key international bodies like the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and enjoying the highest living standard in Europe. Since 1945 the special relationship had been the main prop of British influence. But after Suez Britain seemed on the skids. In 1960 Macmillan expressed his anxieties:

“Shall we be caught between a hostile (or at least less and less friendly) America and a boastful ‘Empire of Charlemagne’ now under French but later bound to come under German control? Is this the real reason for
‘joining’ the Common Market (if we are acceptable)… It’s a grim choice.”

Yet no major reassessment took place. Macmillan affirmed a continuing role in the three circles – Europe, North America, Commonwealth. Unfortunately, however, the prioritizing of the United States in the post-Suez rush to mend fences skewed the balance of the traditional three circles. The purpose of joining the EEC was to recover lost leadership in western Europe and “prevent the Six supplanting us as the principal influence on United States policy.” But since France dominated the Six how could Britain gain access? Macmillan appealed to Kennedy in January 1961:

*De Gaulle wants the recognition of France as a Great Power, at least equal to Britain… So long as the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ domination continues, he will Not treat Britain as European, but as American-junior partner… Can what we want and what de Gaulle wants be brought into harmony? Is there a basis for a deal?”*

Almost certainly a Franco-British nuclear partnership might have offered ‘a basis for a deal’ on EEC entry but Kennedy vetoed it.

Comparing American and British intentions reveals three important differences. Firstly, the nature of integration. America favoured supranationalism; Britain preferred an intergovernmental approach and a confederal Europe. Macmillan and his advisors had no quarrel with de Gaulle’s *Europe des Patries*. Secondly, Washington wanted an integrated European defence system under American control, not national deterrents. Hence Kennedy’s opposition to Macmillan’s attempt to play the nuclear card in Britain’s EEC membership bid. Thirdly and ironically, while Britain negotiated EEC entry in the
belief that it would safeguard and strengthen the special relationship; the United States hoped that membership would dilute and transform the relationship. In the words of one top US official: “We hoped that if England went into Europe, it would take a sense of ‘special relationship’ with it, and that we would then have a ‘special relationship’ with Europe.”

Geir Lundestad stresses the benevolence of the American grand design, arguing “the United States clearly organized its ‘empire’ differently from those of other Great Powers.” To its credit the United States, unlike other empires which operated a divide and rule approach, helped promote an alternative power center. The thesis is hardly compelling. To be sure, American promotion of integration differed from the practice of other empires. But the object of the exercise was to facilitate a Pax Americana, not to encourage a rival decision-making center. Certainly Kennedy declared that the United States wanted a European partner “with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality.”

But this was promotional rhetoric, not an invitation to full partnership. And the last thing the United States wanted was an independent Third Force Europe. Yes, the United States did organize its “empire” differently but a liberal capitalist mid-twentieth century superpower waging a Cold War had to find a new face for old-fashioned imperialism.

Whitehall assessments

In 1959 Macmillan created the Future Policy Committee; with a remit to advise on British policy for the coming decade on the basis of existing assumptions. On the subject of Anglo-American relations the news was good and bad. On the credit side relations were “extremely good, we have succeeded in consolidating and extending our
position as the first ally of the United States and the coordination of policy between the two governments has never been so far reaching and satisfactory. But there were clouds on the horizon: “the Americans are basically unsympathetic to our attitude towards European integration... they blame us for standing aside... if forced to choose between the United States would tend to support the EEC rather than the Stockholm group” [European Free Trade Association EFTA]. Moreover, officials reported, West Germany and the EEC represented a real threat to the special relationship: “with the growth of her army West Germany is rapidly becoming the main military power in western Europe. She is the main economic power already... the political forces representing Catholic Europe are entrenching themselves more firmly in power; they are natural political allies for the United States”. The EEC was likely “to pull the United States away from the UK. And Germany might emerge as the natural leader of the Six”. Macmillan commented: “We must do all we can to strengthen the association between the UK and the United States and the continental countries of western Europe... all other groups were subsidiary in the last resort to the Atlantic alliance.”

By mid-1960 Macmillan had decided to put EEC membership on the agenda. He posed two specific questions to senior advisers: “how will the development of the Six affect our relationship with the United States and our influence in the rest of the world? What would be the attitude of the United States to our joining the EEC?” The replies were unequivocal. Staying aloof would “inevitably encourage the United States to pay increasing importance to the views of the Community”, by joining “we should not only improve our position with the United States but in some degree be able to act as an intermediary between the United States and the Community”.
First Application, 1961-3

Did the United States influence Britain’s decision in 1961 to apply for membership – or more accurately to enquire about the terms and conditions of membership? Not in any direct sense. The British knew that an application would please the United States and this awareness contributed to the decision but there was no direct or indirect pressure. The Eisenhower administration, fearful of diluting the EEC, had not gone out of its way to encourage a British application. When Macmillan informed Kennedy of the British application in April 1961 the President welcomed the news and the administration moved into top gear. Secretary Dean Rusk declared “we have... for the first time stated to the British that if they should make a decision to take part... we would support them”.

Support came at a price. There was no automatic endorsement of the British position. Support was “applicable only to a possible future British position which must satisfy the Six and us that it involves a UK commitment to a movement toward European integration which involves not only static treaty obligations but a long-term evolutionary political process”. There was a second American condition – Britain should negotiate for its own entry only, not for EFTA allies. In short EFTA would be broken up. The administration followed a double line: publicly adopting a low profile and disclaiming involvement, privately lobbying quite energetically. For example ambassador David Bruce in London, anticipating British procrastination, was anxious to give a push in the right direction. The April 1961 Algerian insurrection seemed to offer an opportunity. After consulting Jean Monnet, author of the Schuman Plan and founder of the Action
Committee for a United States of Europe, Bruce asked Kennedy to urge Macmillan to issue an immediate statement of UK desire to join the Six: "this could be construed as generous, lofty proceeding, indicative of faith in future stability of continent, and associating British in time of dire difficulty with continental concerns".12

Meanwhile Macmillan, faced with skeptical colleagues, played the American and Commonwealth cards. At the first Cabinet discussion of membership on 26 April 1961 Macmillan emphasized that there was no American support for a Sixes and Sevens (EEC-EFTA) agreement. The long-term future of the special relationship was at stake. Separate EEC development without Britain "might mean that the Six would come to exercise greater influence than the UK, both with the United States and possibly with some of the independent countries of the Commonwealth… the UK as the bridge between Europe and North America had the opportunity to take an initiative … to do nothing risked older Commonwealth members turning to the USA and new world groupings developing".13 President Kennedy, reported the premier, would speak to de Gaulle during a Paris visit in early June and find out if the French would cooperate. Further moves would depend upon a favourable response from de Gaulle. On 6 June the Cabinet was told that Kennedy believed de Gaulle "had no particular wish to see the UK join the Six".14 Notwithstanding the unfavorable response Macmillan forged ahead, ignoring the condition he had set on 26 April.

British leaders, with American encouragement, believed that joining the EEC would strengthen the special relationship. White House assurances in early April 1961 that EEC membership would reinforce Anglo-American ties swayed Macmillan. The truth however was that the administration viewed British membership as an opportunity
to redefine and dilute the alliance. "Once the political entity that emerges in Western Europe is assembled", declared a State Department scope paper in December 1961, "we can discuss the desirability and details of transforming American-British special arrangements into an American-EEC cooperation".\textsuperscript{15} National Security Council (NSC) policy was to persuade the British "to phase out of the nuclear deterrent business".

"Pending such a re-examination of the US-UK special relation", wrote Rusk, "it is of the utmost importance to avoid any actions to expand the relationship".\textsuperscript{16} However the British had to be safely in the EEC bag before serious talk could begin: "Macmillan and his group have made the decision about moving toward the continent, but they keep looking back at the US-UK relationship. Any indication at this critical moment that the United Kingdom might be left alone in Europe could provoke a reaction so adverse as to jeopardize British pursuit of the present negotiations with the Common Market".

At first sight the Polaris agreement negotiated at Nassau in December 1962 extending the life of Britain's nuclear deterrent seemed to contradict Washington's wish to end the deterrent. However Polaris was a replacement for the cancelled Skybolt missile negotiated with Eisenhower in 1960. Macmillan argued that the United States had a moral commitment to supply Britain with a viable deterrent. This argument weighed with Kennedy. But the key consideration in American decision-making was Macmillan's political plight. Sending the premier away empty-handed carried a high risk. The premier might be replaced by a Labour government or by a right wing Conservative cabinet. Britain's EEC entry could then be blocked or delayed. Washington also feared pushing Macmillan into a nuclear deal with the French. Ironically, in bailing out Macmillan Kennedy scuppered Britain's membership bid.
Nassau sent de Gaulle "into a tremendously violent temper" in which he denounced the British for "betraying Europe...no longer worthy of being considered a free country". Was it Nassau that decided him to block British entry? There is no certainty. The record suggests that de Gaulle was opposed from the outset to British entry but required a plausible pretext and Nassau provided it. But whatever De Gaulle’s intentions Nassau represented a badly timed, clumsy exercise in Anglo-American statecraft.

How did London and Washington perceive the progress of the Brussels talks? Did they confide in each other? Pascaline Winand characterizes the American outlook in 1961-1962 as one of "boundless optimism". American perceptions were in fact more nuanced than Winand suggests. However, broadly speaking British pessimism on the outcome of the talks contrasted with American optimism. As early as 2 May 1961 before the announcement of the British application the British ambassador to the United States Sir Harold Caccia expressed "considerable doubt that the French would have the UK on any terms". Yet George Ball, Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, disagreed; "it was a question of the scope of a settlement and the extent of derogations, and if satisfaction could be gotten on these, the French would probably not be an obstacle".

Were the talks doomed before they started? Wolfram Kaiser contends that Macmillan’s failure in the spring of 1961 to secure American agreement to a trilateral nuclear deal meant, "In Macmillan’s own logic the EEC application which at this stage had not yet even been agreed by the Cabinet was already practically dead". This is much too sweeping a judgement since it does not take account of Macmillan’s own changing perceptions of the chances of success. After the summit with De Gaulle at Champs in June 1962 he assured the Queen that "the danger of France opposing a
resolute veto to our application has now been avoided, at least for the time being". In a letter to Lord Privy Seal Ted Heath, leading Britain's delegation in Brussels, the premier wrote on 7 August 1962: "I only hope that your efforts will ultimately meet with success. I cannot help feeling that they will do so".21

The British did not take the Americans completely into their confidence until quite late in the day. In February 1962 Rusk cabled Bruce for information: "we have feeling that UK-Six negotiations are marking time despite British insistence that they must complete process by the end of the summer".22 Bruce cited "nervousness of British negotiators over ambiguity of de Gaulle's attitude" but considered the odds were 6 to 5 in favour of success.23 The Foreign Office did not keep the State Department fully posted on developments. For example, no hint seems to have reached Bruce of Paris ambassador Sir Pierson Dixon's judgment of May 1962 that "de Gaulle has now definitely excluded us".24 Macmillan had found his meeting with de Gaulle at Birchebrooke in December 1961 "discouraging" but "saw no reason to tell the Americans".25 Understandably, the British did not want leaks and so kept their own counsel. When British negotiators confided in the Americans it was to vent their feelings about French behaviour. Sir Eric Roll, deputy head of the UK Brussels delegation, describing himself as "negotiator relieving himself" lambasted the French for "their petty and shortsighted attitude".26 Reassurance for Washington came in mid-September 1962 when two top French officials, Olivier Wormser, director of economic and financial affairs at the foreign ministry, and Bernard Clappier, director of external economic relations at the economic affairs ministry, "both felt successful conclusion of the negotiation now in sight...
agreement in substance would be reached by end of the year... it would take another six months to draft treaty”.

But in early November came word that all was far from well. Ted Heath, apprehensive “over the slow and ... unsatisfactory progress... not certain that the cat could be put back in the bag”., solicited American intervention directly with Walter Hallstein, President of the European Commission, Robert Marjolin, Vice-President, and Jean Monnet. Monnet proved unhelpful, telling Washington that the Macmillan government might “wish to maintain a hard-nosed position in Brussels pending the outcome of by-elections.”. American policy-makers went into overdrive. Ball conferred with US envoys in western Europe. They recommended talking to Macmillan and Heath “with a view to proposing to the British lines of attack that might improve their posture”. Heath repeated his request for help, suggesting that Ball “soften up Hallstein to play a more constructive role”. John W. Tuthill, ambassador to the European Communities, proposed an “informal but working alliance” between the UK, United States and Brussels Commission. Hallstein was won over and welcomed the idea of an American channel of communication between the Commission and the British.

Cleverly the French kept both the Americans and the British guessing about their ultimate intentions. While concerned about the snail’s pace Washington remained confident in December that the talks would be completed. On 16 December Tuthill reported, “We continue to believe that on balance outlook remains favourable.”. In early January on the eve of De Gaulle’s veto French foreign minister Maurice Couve de Murville reassured Ball and Heath that despite press rumours of a veto “the way was still open for British entry”. Although the State Department does not appear to have
conducted a post-mortem on the negotiations, Tuthill in Brussels censured the British whose “principal strategic failure has been … inability either to convince good Europeans that UK entry so essential to European integration… as to justify major concessions on EEC principles, or to convince the Six governments that UK room for manoeuvre is so limited domestically that six must make some retreat… many have felt that UK fought too long and too hard for essentially untenable positions”.34

Unsurprisingly, the British Treasury, the lead Whitehall department in the talks, reflecting on the failure, criticized the United States. It drew the obvious conclusion that Kennedy by making British membership a main element in his grand design “served to increase de Gaulle’s resistance to our entry”. The Americans in wanting the talks to succeed had not always been tactful in the way they made known their attitude and “on certain subjects, notably on our obligations to our fellow members of EFTA, the attitude of the US government was “consistently unhelpful”.

De Gaulle’s 14 January 1963 veto compelled London and Washington to review policies. For a week or so hope lingered that the Five would resist France. The rejection of two prime American goals: UK entry and a multilateral force (MLF) shocked and angered American officials. After talking to various French ministers before the veto the ambassador in Paris Charles Bohlen concluded that the general “would leave the door open”.36 Yet the administration avoided public criticism of France, venting its anger on the Germans. Kennedy was said to have given the German ambassador “a very rough time”.37 Talking to Macmillan on the telephone Kennedy was guarded; Macmillan: “I think this man has gone completely crazy… he wants to be cock on a small dunghill instead of having two cocks on a larger one”. Kennedy: “Yes, yes that’s very sound, I
suppose from his point of view” 38 The policy reviews in London and Washington were conducted separately and independently. Washington reaffirmed its grand design. However the main thrust of Macmillan’s strategy had been EEC membership and the policy was “in ruins” 39 After a short, sharp war of words, Macmillan and his successor Alec Douglas-Home slowly started to rebuild bridges with France. The advent of a Labour government from October 1964 did not immediately bring new initiatives. Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon-Walker declared “we must base our policy on the alliance with the United States” 40

Second Bid, 1966-7

Once bitten, twice shy. American policy-makers were determined to keep their distance from British approaches to Europe and to do nothing “publicly to reinforce the appearance of special ties”. For a while Washington adhered to this hands off approach, refusing a British request in January 1964 for support for its European policy: “we feel UK interests best defended by a combination of UK and Benelux, Italy and Germany” 41 Other reasons dictated caution. In 1964-65 important policy differences surfaced. Secretary Rusk, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, Under-Secretary Ball and McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, endorsed the grand design but disagreed on the handling of France. Rusk found French behaviour “outrageous” and believed “we are required to engage in a public debate against them”. Ball, Bundy and McNamara were more inclined to roll with the punch and avoid public exchanges. Below them two senior officials, ambassador Bruce and William Tyler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, advocated taking the foot off the
accelerator and leaving it to the Europeans to work out how they proposed to organize themselves. They took issue with a group of colleagues and middle rank officials “determined to make the Europeans do what is good for them... governed by an attitude of rigid hostility to the French, paternalistic domination of the Germans” and convinced that “if Uncle Sam plays the firm nanny the British can be forced out of the independent nuclear business”. 42

In London mounting economic and political pressures pushed Prime Minister Harold Wilson towards a new membership bid. Britain was mired in deep economic and financial crisis, culminating in the sterling crisis of July 1966. Across the Channel the EEC was an economic success story. The Commonwealth in which Wilson took great pride was shaken and divided by the Rhodesian UDI in 1965. Entering the EEC might re-energise the British economy and stave off devaluation. A new bid, even if unsuccessful, would deprive the Conservatives of a powerful weapon in the next general election. Saving the special relationship strengthened the case for entry. Although by the mid-1960s Britain was locked into the American embrace by a double dependence, military and economic, the future for Anglo-American relations looked bleak. In February 1967 the State Department considered that “The so-called Anglo-American special relationship is now little more than sentimental terminology”. 43 Foreign Secretary George Brown warned the Cabinet on 30 April 1967 “that the United States was paying increased regard to West Germany – West Germany’s influence on the United States would more or less replace our own”. 44

The temptation to be a backseat driver proved too strong for the Americans. Ball, the indefatigable salesman of integration, made the most of his last months in office.
Speaking at Chatham House in July 1965 he recommended that the UK should apply without conditions and surrender her nuclear deterrent. Then Ball put his foot in it. American willingness to bail out sterling was a wasting asset: "It was now up to the Six to take on a larger share of the support of sterling." Thus Ball supplied ammunition for France's current thesis that admitting the UK with its financial and economic problems would be a liability. The Six had no wish to bail out sterling and the financial problem provided the chief public justification for the French vetoes of May and November 1967. President Lyndon B Johnson while distancing himself from Ball's remarks told Wilson that he would like Britain "to maintain the momentum for eventual British membership of the EEC". It was not enough just to wait for de Gaulle to disappear. By February 1967 Ball's advocacy of a UK application without conditions had become State Department policy: "Britain must accept everything done under the Treaty of Rome". The United States also nudged Britain along by making it clear that the North Atlantic Free Trade Area option (NAFTA), which was being canvassed in Whitehall as an alternative to the EEC, did not have its support.

Responding to the 1967 Wilson bid de Gaulle changed tactics. Instead of allowing talks to get under way and then applying slow strangulation terminating in a veto the general applied a velvet veto immediately in May, followed for good measure by a full formal veto in November. Wilson in talks with de Gaulle on 18 June, anniversary of the battle of Waterloo, stressed that he was his own man, not Johnson's vassal. This was a phony show of independence for the record. Wilson had first squared matters with Johnson, alerting him "that we might have to make a number of tactical statements and gestures that might seem a bit non-American or even anti-American for the purpose of
proving our Europeanism". The Americans were assured that the decision of July 1967
to withdraw from east of Suez had not been taken to please the Europeans.\(^{48}\)

The months between the ‘velvet veto’ of May and the final veto in November
1967 had an unreal air. In joint meetings British and American officials went through the
motions of believing in the application while knowing that the chances of de Gaulle
changing his mind were virtually nil. At a meeting of senior advisers on 2 June 1967
both sides talked as though the bid was alive and well.. Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke
Trend "was not as pessimistic as some over de Gaulle’s negative remarks at his last press
conference". Describing the application as "simple and clean" Rusk declared that it
would be harder to resist than the first.\(^{49}\) But de Gaulle at his May press conference had
already vetoed talks. To dispel any lingering doubt the Secretary General of the French
foreign ministry Herve Alphand confirmed to Washington that the general’s remarks
were meant as a rejection. Why did the British, with American support, persist in a futile
enterprise? Quite simply, \textit{faute de mieux}. Since there were no fallback plans leaving the
application on the table had the advantage of throwing France on the defensive while
demonstrating to her EEC partners Britain ‘s seriousness. At home Wilson by keeping
the EEC ball in play kept the initiative over the Conservative opposition.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Britain and the United States failed to achieve their European goals. Washington
made British entry a primary objective of its European policy. Yet even before the
announcement of a second British bid American policy-makers seemed to be losing
heart. Troubles at home and abroad -- a weakening dollar, the civil rights movement, the
Vampire-like effect of Vietnam, de Gaulle’s assertion of a European Europe, all created disappointment and disillusionment. Feelings erupted at the National Security Council meeting on 3 May 1967. Treasury Secretary Fowler complained: “France is trying to expel us completely from Europe or at least to diminish our power there”. The Vice-President: “Europeans have rejected the world after the loss of their colonies. They resent US power”.

Support for British entry misfired because it sprang from a flawed design, namely the assumption that Europeans could be corralled and directed as the United States wished.

The failure of the two British bids flowed from fundamental policy contradictions. Ted Heath identified one of them in March 1962: “what alarms me more than anything else is that, at the same time as we are trying to negotiate our entry into the EEC -- in which we have all too few cards to play -- we are carrying out political policies which are anathema to the two most important members of the Community”.

Heath instanced the partnership with the United States to prevent France from developing nuclear defence and the tendency to negotiate away German interests in order to appease Russia in Berlin. More importantly, the rapid contraction of British power from the mid-1950s called for a comprehensive reappraisal of national interests and aspirations. This was not carried out. The fatal misjudgement of the Macmillan and Wilson governments was to believe that American, Commonwealth, and European interests could all be kept in play. The consequence by the end of 1967 was a weakened Anglo-American alliance and exclusion from the EEC. Thus an overstretched power failed to do justice to any of its interests. By striving too hard to sustain the special relationship Britain sacrificed her European ambitions.
Endnotes

1 Quoted, Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997 (Oxford, 1998), 7


4 Quoted, Horne, Macmillan, 285

5 Frank Costigliola, “Kennedy, the European Allies and the failure to consult”, Political Science Quarterly, 110 1, 95, 111

6 Lundestad, 3

7 Lundestad, 166

8 Public Record Office (PRO), Cab 134/1935

9 PRO, Cab 134/1929

10 PRO, Cab 129/101

11 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1961-1963, XIII, 5

12 John F. Kennedy, National Security Files, Bruce to Rusk, 26 April 1961

13 PRO, Cab 128/35

14 PRO, Cab 128/35

15 FRUS, XIII, 1050

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19 FRUS, XIII, 12
20 Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans (London 1996), 165
22 JFK, NSF, February 16, 1962
23 JFK, NSF, June 13, 1962
24 Lamb, 166
25 Macmillan Diary, Bodleian Library Oxford, MS Macmillan dep.d.48
26 JFK, NSF, April 4, 1962
27 JFK, NSF, September 15, 1962
28 FRUS, XIII, 122
29 FRUS, XIII, JFK, NSF, 8 November, 1962
30 FRUS, XIII, 138
31 FRUS, XIII, 139
32 JFK, NSF, December 16, 1962
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36 FRUS, XIII, 142
37 PRO, Prem 11/4523
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39 Horne, Macmillan, 447
40 John W. Young, Britain and European Unity (London 1992), 86

41 FRUS, 1964-1968, XIII, 9

42 FRUS 1964-68, XIII, 76, 105

43 Price 128/42

44 FRUS 1964-68, XIII, 65

45 PRO, Prem 13/907

46 PRO, Prem 13/907

47 PRO, Prem 13/1478

48 PRO, Prem 13/1906

49 FRUS, 1964-68, XIII, 579

50 FRUS, 1964-68, XIII, 540

51 Lamb, 164