SCANDINAVIAN SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE:
THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE WEU AND NATO

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1. INTRODUCTION

This paper analyses the evolving nature of Scandinavian security and intelligence in the era after the Second World War. The argument is made that in this era Scandinavia was so strategically placed that a great deal of intelligence activity occurred in the region. This activity was mainly Soviet related and somewhat divided as a consequence of Finland and Sweden being officially neutral and Denmark and Norway being members of NATO. However, it is pointed out that behind the scenes the neutral states assisted the Scandinavian NATO members and other NATO nations in intelligence matters. The argument is then made that many recent developments have markedly changed the situation in Scandinavia. These developments include the break up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the entry of Sweden and Finland into the European Union, the rise of more varied forms of terrorism, and the rise of a broader definition of the concept of security - one that includes such matters as transnational crime and economic security. Finally, it is argued that these changes have affected the intelligence agencies of the Scandinavian nations in ways that open up the possibility of closer and more open cooperation between them, between them and the Baltic States, and between them and the security elements of the European Union, the Western European Union (WEU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

2. THE SCANDINAVIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Relatively little is publicly known about the Scandinavian security and intelligence agencies. Even a standard listing of the world's intelligence agencies, the Intelweb list, is clearly incomplete for the Nordic countries. It indicates that three of the nations maintain military
intelligence services. These are the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS), Norwegian Military Intelligence (NMI), and the Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Agency (MUST). Sweden is currently reorganising its military intelligence structure and it is reported that by July 1st 1998 a joint Intelligence and Security Centre of the Armed Forces (FMUSC) will be created in Uppsala under the command of the Chief of the Air Force (Swedish Armed Forces, 1996:1). Finland is not listed by the Intelweb list as having a military intelligence service.

The Intelweb agency list indicates that non-military intelligence is dealt with by several differing agencies. In Denmark it lists the Danish Civil Security Service (DCSS) and the Danish Police Intelligence Services. For Sweden it lists the Security Police (SAPO). No equivalent agencies are mentioned for Norway or Finland. However, in Norway there is the Norwegian Police Security Service (POT) and in Finland there is the Security Police.

Signals intelligence has been an important component of Scandinavian intelligence activities. The Intelweb list of agencies names only one signals intelligence agency, the Finnish Communications Experience Facility (VKL). However, in Sweden there is the National Defence Radio Institute (FRA) which is its signals intelligence unit (SOU, 1994:16), and Norway and Denmark have signals intelligence capability.

The Scandinavian security and intelligence agencies are relatively modest in size compared with many other nations. The Norwegian Police Security Service, for example, has a strength of 160 at it's Oslo headquarters (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway Daily 244/96:1), and the Norwegian Armed Forces Intelligence Service has an annual budget of 387,748 million NOK or
about 1.5% of the total defence budget (Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 1996:23). However relative to the size of populations of the nations the Scandinavian countries invest proportionately to many other nations. Moreover, for small nations, they maintain a wide range of military intelligence, signals intelligence and civilian intelligence capabilities.

Although this paper deals with the post war era it is worth noting that historically the Scandinavian intelligence services have had a continuing focus on the Soviet Union dating back to the 1917 revolution. It should also be noted that for a time much activity also related to Nazi Germany. This, of course, is not surprising given the strategic location of Scandinavia. In the case of Finland the activities of state police (Valpo) and the secret police (Etsivakeskus) were primarily aimed at the Soviet Union starting immediately after the 1917 revolution. There are reported to have been close links between these agencies and White Russian immigrants and British agents such as the famous Sidney Reilly and Sir Paul Dukes. However, the White Russians had been thoroughly infiltrated by the Soviets. Beginning in the late 1930's there began to be some cooperation with the Germans on intelligence matters. After the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1939 there was considerable cooperation between the Finns and the Germans, including between Finnish and German military intelligence and between the Valpo and the Gestapo. At the end of the Second World War Finnish military intelligence fled to Sweden with their files and apparently a group of Finnish officers defected to the U.S. Army. The American OSS office in Sweden received in November 1944 about 1,500 pages of Soviet codes, including intelligence codes, from the Finnish intelligence service (Ranelagh, 1986:71) After the war the Americans are reported to have helped
in the formation of a new intelligence service and the secret police were renamed the Protection Police (Suojelupoliisi) (Deacon, 1988: 28&29).

In the case of Sweden it's intelligence services have also had the Soviet Union and Russia as their main focus ever since the 1917 revolution. However, as with Finland, Sweden had a considerable interest in Germany during the Nazi period. In the Second World War Swedish intelligence was called the Combined Intelligence Bureau and although some members of the service were pro-German the person in charge of all foreign intelligence and the interception service was a Colonel Bjoernstierna who was pro British. He secretly cooperated with a Captain Henry Denham, the British naval attache in Stockholm (Deacon, 1988: 55&56).

The activities of the Nordic intelligence agencies during the Second World War and the pre war period can now be reconstructed to some degree from documents released to the public in the general course of events. However, it is another matter for the post war period. Much of the knowledge of the post war situation has come about because of revelations made public as the consequence of public inquiries resulting from difficulties or scandals. Most recently in Sweden it was as a consequence of the appointment of a Commission on Neutrality Policy which released a most informative report in 1994 (Commission on Neutrality Policy, SOU:1994). This revealed that after the Second World War "general intelligence was managed by Section 2 of the Defence Staff. A special unit, the so-called T-Office, tasked with the non-official collection of intelligence, was subordinate to the head of section" (SOU, 1994:16). There was also another agency, the B-Bureau, dealing with security intelligence. In 1961 a new agency, the Information Bureau (IB) was formed
by merging the T-Office and the B-Bureau. The very existence of the IB was only revealed in 1973 when a journalist, Peter Bratt, wrote a series of articles in a leftist paper *Folket i Bild/Kulturfront*. There were some subsequent articles as well and Bratt indicates (Bratt, 1987) that they were all written with the aid of an informant from the IB. This caused a great fuss which included Bratt and others being jailed, various investigations being undertaken (four of them by a Parliament somewhat upset at not being informed of the existence of the IB) a restructuring of the organisation, and a government ordinance with instructions for a new special committee to control the service (SFS, 1976:498). One of the investigations produced a document that contained significant information about the history of Swedish intelligence up to 1976 (SOU, 1976:19). At the same time an East German magazine asserted that the IB was cooperating with the intelligence service of NATO and Israel (Deacon, 1988:56).

Over the years there have been some efforts to bring the Swedish Security Police under increased political scrutiny and control. In 1979 some individual MP's made some suggestions for greater control of the security police but the permanent parliamentary committee on judicial matters rejected them (JuU, 1979/80:3). However, the subject reappeared in public debate several times thereafter. In the autumn of 1987 and in the wake of accusations against SAPO's methods used in investigating the 1986 assassination of the Prime Minister, Olaf Palme, the government undertook a full review of the Security Police headed by Carl Lidbom, Sweden's ambassador to France (Sweden, 1987). The resulting report charged that the SAPO routinely violated the civil rights of citizens and acted outside the bounds of democratic controls. After the report was released the head
of the secret police, Sune Sandstrom, resigned and the force was reorganised (Globe and Mail, 12 April 1989).

Another example of some information about the Nordic intelligence agencies becoming public as a consequence of scandal is the controversy in Norway that led to appointment in 1994 of a Parliamentary inquiry, popularly referred to as the Lund Commission after it's chairman Ketil Lund (Norway: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996). Events surrounding the activities of the Lund Commission and to the hearings based upon the Commission's 1,185 page report held by the Storting's Standing Committee on Scrutiny and the Constitution led to further controversy. This included the dismissal of a Minister (Grete Faremo), the resignation of a head of the Security Police (Hans Olav Ostgaard), accusations that former Prime Minister Gro Harlem Bruntland (among many others) took insufficient care to control the secret services, and an ongoing fuss concerning the investigation of one of the members of the Lund Commission (Mr Berge Furre) by the secret services in what some said to be an attempt to discredit both him and the work of the Commission.

3. COLD WAR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

In the Cold War era Scandinavia was divided in its approach to dealing with great power rivalry. Norway, Denmark and Iceland joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) while Sweden remained neutral and Finland became nominally neutral, but especially early on in the era, was very heavily influenced by the USSR. Sweden considered trying to avoid this division when it saw, in the late 1940's, that it was likely that Norway and Denmark would join with the
west in a military alliance. Sweden was concerned that if Norway and Denmark did join such an alliance they would inevitably have alliance bases on their territory and that it would then be highly likely that the Soviets would violate Swedish neutrality to get at those bases in the event of war (Kite, 1997:59). Thus the government of Sweden actively considered, as did Norway and Denmark, the formation of a Scandinavian defence pact in which the whole Scandinavian area would be declared neutral. The discussions, which were initiated by Sweden's Foreign Minister Osten Unden, came to an end in 1949 when it was realised that "the Norwegian and Swedish positions were too far apart to be reconciled" (Kite, 1997:60).

Despite this division among the Scandinavian nations there rapidly grew to be a fair degree of intelligence cooperation between them, and between them and the NATO powers, in the face of what was really an espionage onslaught against them all, including Finland, in the post war era. This onslaught was mounted by the Soviet Union largely because of the vital strategic location occupied by the Scandinavian nations. These nations were on the border between the west and the east, and two of them (Norway and Finland) very close to the huge concentration of Soviet military might on the Kola peninsula. Moreover, the Scandinavian nations could affect Soviet access to the North Sea and the Atlantic via the Skaggerak and the North Cape.

The Soviets placed a large number of agents in the Scandinavian region. The level of Soviet activity can be measured in part by the high number of expulsions from the Scandinavian countries. Norway, for example, expelled 47 Soviets in the Cold War era. In the late eighties the KGB alone was said to have about 100 agents in Sweden (Chronicle-Journal, 17 March 1988) and
there were at one time over 160 agents in Finland. The onslaught on the Scandinavian region was all the greater because it was also targeted by other Soviet block nations. This was often done in relatively unexpected ways. For example, many eastern European charter flights over Norway were said to be espionage missions. As a consequence in 1985 the Norwegians closed two of their NATO airfields (Bodo and Evenes) to Eastern European originating charter flights and closed Bardufoss, at the centre of a large NATO installation in northern Norway, to all civilian traffic (Globe and Mail, 2 February 1985). The degree of activity in Scandinavia on the part of the Soviet Union can also be gathered from several KGB documents that have come to light in recent years such as the letter from the KGB Resident in Copenhagen to Moscow detailing Residency priorities (Andrew and Gordievsky, 1992).

Another aspect of the Soviet onslaught was their recruitment of several notable agents from among Scandinavian nationals. An example of these is Colonel Stig Wennerstrom of the Swedish Air Force. He actively spied for the Soviets from 1948 to 1959 while serving in various capacities in Sweden, with NATO, and as the Swedish air attache in Moscow (Polmar and Allen, 1997:592). Another is Verna Gerhardsen, the wife of the Norwegian Prime Minister for much of the period between 1945 and 1965. A retired KGB officer, Bogdan Dubensky, claimed that she passed on NATO and other secrets to the KGB (Polmar and Allen, 1997:230). Another Norwegian agent of some note was Gunvor Galtung Haavik, a secretary at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry who worked as a Soviet agent for twenty seven years before a Russian working for the British, Oleg Gordievsky, came across her activities when he was in Copenhagen and warned the British Secret Intelligence
Service (Andrew and Gordievsky, 1990:474). Yet another example is Norwegian diplomat Arne Treholt whose main role for the KGB was as a supplier of classified information on NATO and Norwegian policy. His long espionage career came to an end in 1984 when he was arrested by Ornulf Tofte, deputy head of Norwegian security, while carrying sixty-six classified Foreign Ministry documents (Tofte, 1987). However, perhaps the most notorious case is that of Urho Kekkonen, the President of Finland from 1957 to 1981 (Andrew and Gordievsky, 1990:358). While he may indeed have been a collaborator or agent it has become evident that his main aim was to preserve Finnish independence.

Yet another aspect of the Soviet onslaught was the constant testing of the defence preparedness of the Scandinavian NATO nations and of Swedish neutrality. The latter occurred in the form of submarine incursions into Swedish waters (Leitenberg, 1987) and the landing of Spetnaz units on several parts of the eastern Swedish coastline. The purpose of the landings has never been made absolutely clear. They may have been for reconnaissance, to test Swedish neutrality or preparedness, or they may have been to practice landings that would have taken place in wartime. The intent in wartime probably being to push quickly through Sweden to secure short overland routes to the Norwegian coast. The frequency of the submarine incursions is said to have reached a peak in 1984 when there 20 such incidents reported (Lloyd, 1994:180). Chapman Pincher states that "there have been 150 landings by Soviet reconnaissance parties along areas of the Swedish coast from Haparanda in the north to Malmo in the south since 1962" (Pincher, 1985). The Soviets used conventional submarines, mini submarines, and bottom crawling submarines.
One minisubmarine is said to have penetrated right into Stockholm’s inner harbour (McCormick, 1990). Only once were the Soviets embarrassed by these incursions. That was in 1981 when a Whiskey-2 class submarine got stuck on the sea bed near the Swedish naval base at Karlskrona. It might be noted that even the NATO powers occasionally tested Swedish and Finnish neutrality. For example it has been asserted that the the Swedish air defence network was sometimes targeted in that "the West Germans fly closer to Swedish airspace than the Swedes would like and are regularly intercepted by Swedish fighters" (Richelson, 1988:148).

Relatively little has been revealed publicly concerning countersubversion in Scandinavia in the Cold War period. However from what has come to light it is fairly evident that each of the Nordic nations has undertaken domestic espionage over the years against initially left-wing groups and now others. For example, in 1996 in Norway a 1,200 page government report known as Document 15 was declassified. The document revealed widespread domestic espionage from the late 1940's into the 1980's and it is estimated that there are over 49,000 dossiers (IWR Daily Update, 13 May 1996). In Denmark a report by a Professor Vagn Greve of the University of Copenhagen is said to have indicated that information about 40,000 students at the University of Copenhagen was illegally passed on to the Danish Police Intelligence Services (IWR Daily Update, 6 April 1995).

Despite the differences between the Nordic nations in their reaction to the great power rivalry they did tend to cooperate with each other and with NATO and the western powers during the Cold War. Clearly the Norwegians and the Danes were part of the western alliance structure so
it is really only the level of cooperation of Sweden and Finland that came as something of a surprise when matters were revealed after the end of the Cold War - although the revelation in 1995 that Danish Prime Minister Hans Christian Hansen in 1957 had secretly given the US permission to deploy nuclear weapons in Greenland despite official promises that the Nordic countries would not accept nuclear weapons also caused a stir (Globe and Mail, 30 June 1995). The western links with Finland were fewer than with Sweden and less is publicly known about them.

In the area of signals intelligence it is evident that there was cooperation among the Scandinavian nations and between them and NATO. Swedish SIGINT "was mostly geared towards the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union" (SOU 1994:11, p. 131) and was probably more important to NATO and the US in the early years of the Cold War than the later years when there could be a greater reliance on high flying US aircraft and satellites. That Swedish SIGINT was conducted in cooperation with the Americans was revealed when details came out concerning the shooting down of a Swedish DC3 over the Baltic while it was on a SIGINT mission using American equipment (Hagelin, 1986:22). In addition the Commission on Neutrality Policy stated that "at the end of the 1940's FRA [the National Defence Radio Institute] collaborated closely with Denmark and Norway [NATO members] on signals intelligence. Collaboration with certain states also took place in the following decades" (SOU1994:11, p.17).

It is also clear that Swedish intelligence cooperated more broadly than just on SIGINT matters with the intelligence agencies of other Nordic and NATO nations. The Commission on Neutrality Policy revealed as much and indicated that cooperation with Sweden was desired by the
west largely because "Sweden was in an excellent geographical position to gather certain types of intelligence from the Western Soviet Union" (SOU 1994:11, p. 132). The Commission also pointed out that cooperation was desired by Sweden because "by collaborating with other states in the field of intelligence, Sweden was privy to information the gathering of which required special resources, etc. that we were lacking" (SOU1994:11, p. 132).

The Commission also revealed that there was fairly close links in terms of specifically defence intelligence for it states that "an exchange of intelligence occurred between the International Department of the Defence Staff and all the military services of Norway, Denmark, the UK, and the United States" (SOU1994:11, p. 133). Stig Hadenius summed up the situation by stating "it has emerged that Swedish and western intelligence services cooperated in ways hardly reconcilable with strict neutrality. During the post-war period, Sweden also developed close ties with NATO countries, especially the United States, in virtually all fields" (Hadenius, 1997:162).

4. POST COLD WAR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

With the end of the Cold War the Scandinavian intelligence services faced much the same range of problems that confronted all the intelligence agencies of most European nations at that time. At first it seemed as if they would have a far lesser role and would likely, at worst, have to battle threats to their very existence or, at best, fight off budgetary cut backs. However, it gradually became clear that the Russians were still active in Scandinavia and that there were a myriad of other threats that had to be contended with, primarily in the form of terrorism, transnational crime, and economic espionage.
It quite rapidly became evident that the successor agency to the KGB, the SVR (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki), was continuing to undertake operations against the Scandinavian nations, although on a reduced scale. Denmark experienced continued Russian espionage activity and a Danish counterintelligence official is stated to have reported in May 1992 that "Spies from Russia and the other states of the CIS are still operational in the country... (and) involved in military and industrial spying" (Waller, 1994:147). In March 1992 the Danes expelled an SVR agent, Sergie Konrad (Urban, 1996:224). Also in 1992 Sweden's security chief, Mats Borjesson, complained of continued Russian espionage and even told a newspaper that "his service would not help Russia to stem illegal proliferation of nuclear weapons until it ceased espionage activities against his country" (Waller, 1994:147). The Swedish military is also said to have reported "continued covert incursions into its coastal waters by Russian mini-submarines that crawl along the ocean floor on treads" (Waller, 1994:147). Russia, or at least the SVR, is not particularly shy about the fact that it continues espionage activities against the Scandinavian nations. This is indicated by the SVR chief, Colonel Yurii Kobaladze, putting a commentary in Izvestiya on why Russia needed to gather intelligence "which followed a translation of an article in the Stockholm newspaper Svenska Dageblat on continued Russian spying in Sweden" (Waller, 1994: 271). Norway has also experienced continued Russian espionage and early on in the post Cold War period expelled eight Russian diplomats as a consequence of the defection of Mikhail Butkov to the United Kingdom via Oslo (Vancouver Sun, 1991). In 1992 Norway declared Viktor Fedik persona non grata because he
was identified as the GRU station chief apparently as the result of information thought to have come from MI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service (Urban, 1996:224).

Although the Russians are still the most active intelligence operators within Scandinavia it is clear that other nations operate there as well. For example, the Investigation Bureau (Chosa Kyoku) of the Department of Foreign Affairs of Japan is said to engage in collection operations in Sweden (Richelson, 1988:253). In addition it is alleged that several other nations conduct economic espionage in all of the Scandinavian nations. Even the South Africans were active in Scandinavia until the end of apartheid.

Since the end of the Cold War the Scandinavian nations share with many other nations a heightened concern about international terrorism. However, they themselves have not experienced a great deal of terrorism recently and are unlikely to do so in the immediate future. Nevertheless, the Scandinavian nations have experienced some terrorism in the past, largely during the Cold War era, and may do so again. According to the 1989 Lidbom report on SAPO (Globe and Mail, 12 April 1989), the Scandinavian nations have been, and probably still are, regarded as safe havens and rest or planning areas for terrorist operations carried out elsewhere. Intelligence agencies in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway link with the intelligence services of many other nations, including those of Israel, via the KILO-WATT group, the main focus of which is Arab terrorism (Richelson, 1988:231). The most famous cases of terrorist connected violence in Scandinavia are perhaps a Mossad operation in Lillehammer in 1973 and the assassination of the Swedish Prime Minister, Olaf Palme, in Stockholm in 1986. The Lillehammer incident was a botched Israeli operation. A
group of 16 Mossad agents shot a man they believed to be Ali Hassan Salameh (of Munich fame) but who turned out to be an innocent Moroccan immigrant waiter, Ahmed Bouchiki. The Norwegians captured six of the group and imprisoned them to varying terms for murder (Black and Morris, 1992:276). The assassination of Palme remains a mystery about which there is considerable controversy with the latest twist being the accusation made in 1996 by Eugene de Kock, the former head of a South African security police hit squad, that Craig Williamson, a South African spy who penetrated anti-apartheid groups outside South Africa, organised the act. Swedish journalists had alleged some years before that Williamson had an intelligence network in Stockholm at the time of Palme's death (Globe and Mail, 28 September 1996).

As with many other nations the Scandinavian ones face an increasing threat from transnational criminal organisations of various kinds. Many groups are known to be active in the region, ranging from elements of what is know as the Russian mafia to biker gangs. Also as with many other nations, these problems are increasing coming within the purview of the security police and intelligence agencies. This is because of the usefulness of the assets possessed by intelligence agencies, because of the increasing involvement of other nations intelligence agencies in this area, and because the extent and type of activities of these transnational criminal organisations have become so extensive and corrosive. They so severely threaten the institutions of a civil society that they are rightly regarded as a legitimate threat to the security of the state.

The most dramatic recent events in the transnational criminal organisation category have related to the turf war that is being fought between Nordic branches of the Hells Angels, the
Bandidos and the Outlaws throughout Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. This is just part of a Europe-wide battle for control of the drugs market. However, it is not just drug related for a European Union report issued in February 1996 said that the biker gangs in Denmark are thought to run most organised crime of all kinds (HNN, 30 March 1996). Many deaths have occurred but the Nordic struggle achieved worldwide notoriety largely because of the nature of the conflict. On March 10th 1996 deadly gunfights with automatic weapons took place between the Hell's Angels and Bandidos in both Kastrup airport in Copenhagen and Fornebu airport in Oslo. Thousands of passengers had to be herded into protected areas. In October 1996 an anti-tank missile attack on the Hells Angels clubhouse in Copenhagen killed two people and early in 1997 an anti-tank missile hit a Danish police cellblock in Koege just southwest of Copenhagen and injured one of several Bandidos members being held there. Some 12 anti-tank missiles were stolen from a military weapons store in Sweden in February 1994 (HNN, 6 October 1996). The governments of the Nordic nations have begun to take concerted action on this front and after an appeal for assistance to the newly formed Europol by the Danish government, Europol has agreed to coordinate intelligence about the biker gangs across the continent (CJ Europe Online, no date) The Danes have even cooperated with the Americans to the extent of having the FBI open an office in Copenhagen to help Danish officials combat organised crime (Denmark Times, no date)

5. THE CHANGING SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT

With the end of the Cold War the security environment within which the Scandinavian intelligence agencies operate began to change significantly. There were three major elements to
this change. These were the collapse of the Soviet regime, the revival of the concept of a broader Scandinavian, and even Baltic, defense and security area, and the closer linkage of Scandinavia to the wider European context.

With the demise of the USSR, the intelligence threat it posed to Scandinavia has significantly diminished. While Russia continues to mount operations against the Scandinavian nations, as was just observed, its capabilities are much reduced. The activities of the former eastern European and Baltic intelligence services against Scandinavia have virtually ceased. Unfortunately, as was also just observed, this lessening of one threat has been accompanied by the rise of many others.

The end of the Cold War opened up the possibility of much closer and more open cooperation than that which already existed between the Scandinavian nations. Most of them have clearly stated that they intend to use the opportunity to strengthen cooperation between themselves. Finland is clearly steadily emerging from the shadow of Russia, and able to develop ever closer links with its Nordic neighbours - as Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen "there are new prospects opening for Finnish-Swedish security policy cooperation" (Lipponen, 1997). Sweden has made it clear that it "intends to strengthen its cooperation with the other Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway" (Swedish Institute, 1996:1). The opposition Moderate Party "has even proposed that Sweden should develop a military partnership with its Nordic neighbours Finland, Denmark and Norway in readiness for Sweden's eventual entry into NATO" (Wired From Sweden, 1997a). Norway is concerned that the end of the Cold War might lessen the saliency of far
northern Europe to the security concerns of the wider Europe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995:3) and that its non-membership in the EU might mean that its views might not be listened to properly as the EU and the WEU develop a closer defence relationship. Thus Norway regards Nordic cooperation not only as beneficial in and of itself but beneficial because it will give Norway an ear within the EU and WEU organisations and help ensure that their view is made known (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994:3).

Not only are there now greater possibilities for Nordic cooperation but there are also greater possibilities for pan-Baltic cooperation (Archer, 1997). Even Norway, which geographically speaking is not strictly a Baltic country, has stated that the Baltic countries "occupy an area which must be regarded as one of immediate interest to Norway" and in 1995 concluded some bilateral defence agreements with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (Ministry of Defence, 1995:7). Moreover the Norwegian Ministry of Defence has stated that "in line with the emphasis placed by Norway on the development of security policy in the Baltic area, the ministry of Defence has advocated an increase in Norway's research efforts in this area" (Ministry of Defence, 1995:7). In 1995 the Danish Minister of Defence, Hans Haekkerup, stated that "Denmark has decided that it can make a more effective contribution by focusing its limited resources on cooperation in the Baltic area" (Haekkerup, 1995). Jaako Blomberg, the Under-Secretary of State in the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has indicated that "a key security policy issue of the recent past and near future, of special significance to Finland is the development of security relationships in the Baltic region" (Blomberg, 1995).
Hints of these possibilities can be observed in the Danish-German initiative of the formation of a Council of Baltic Sea States, and in the fact that the Nordic-Polish brigade deployed in IFOR in 1996 contained contributions from the Baltic states as part of the Danish battalion. The Nordic nations have a special interest in working with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to ensure democratic and economic development and even with northwestern Russia and other Baltic states such as Poland. Clearly if closer cooperation does come about to a significant degree the operations of the Nordic intelligence services will be markedly changed in terms of targetting and information sharing. In fact information sharing may well extend to many areas not long ago regarded as the enemy.

With the end of the Cold War the Nordic nations have become even more integral parts of the wider Europe. The most notable illustration of this was the entry of Finland and Sweden into the European Union on January 1st 1991. In part because of the lesser need in the post Cold War era for strict neutrality these two nations now participate in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union and they are also linking with other security institutions in Europe, most recently, in 1995, Finland and Sweden acquired observer status in the Western European Union (WEU), in addition to their earlier membership in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Council of Europe. Membership in the WEU allows the two nations insight into the work of the organisation but it does not mean that they become embroiled in any military committments. Moreover Sweden seems has been said to be "slipping ever nearer to NATO membership" with its increasing connections to that organisation, which have
even included participation in NATO exercises (Wired from Sweden, 1997b). However, at the same time Sweden has voiced strong concern about the proposals, mainly from France and supported by Germany, Spain and Italy, to strengthen the European Union's military status by merging it with the WEU. Sweden is an observer at the WEU "but has made it clear full membership would be incompatible with its policy of military non-alignment" (Wired From Sweden, 1997c). Finland seems to be in exactly the same position as Sweden in that it seems to be drifting towards NATO, it has already had one round of talks with NATO (Daily News, 1997a), while at the same time opposing a merger of the EU and the WEU (Daily News, 1997b). In fact Finland and Sweden have combined to propose that rather than merge the EU and WEU should cooperate in crisis management" (Daily News, 1997c). This call reflects a recent and growing interest in closer bilateral security cooperation between Sweden and Finland (Daily News, 1997d).

However, within the context of the WEU there is the possibility that the Nordic nations may become involved in the efforts to achieve the "Europeanisation" of intelligence that are evident in the publication of a report entitled A European Intelligence Policy (WEU, 1996a) and the report entitled WEU and Helios 2 (WEU, 1996b). The first of these asserts that despite the natural reticence to cooperate extensively in the area of intelligence "as member states of the European Union move towards a common foreign and security policy, they will need a common intelligence policy in order to be able to identify risks and threats to their common interests" (WEU, 1996:5). This pan-European view is not something likely to be provided by NATO as it has no real
intelligence capacity of its own, only that of its member states, and the intelligence NATO utilises heavily emphasises military intelligence, and mainly military intelligence related just to the former Soviet block. However, it would be necessary to avoid overlap between the intelligence aspects of NATO and the WEU. In this context a dialogue between the WEU and NATO on intelligence has begun for the WEU Planning Cell for intelligence recently met with the NATO Intelligence Board.

6. CONCLUSION

The environment for the Scandinavian intelligence agencies is changing very rapidly. Not only has the threat from the historic major enemy diminished significantly (and thereby many former targets and dangers) but the "soft" security concerns such as economic espionage and transnational crime have risen in importance. Moreover, there are much greater opportunities for, and possible need for, wider cooperation on intelligence matters within the Nordic and Baltic regions. In addition there are also greater opportunities and needs in the even wider context of the European Union, WEU and NATO. It will be interesting to observe how, and how well, the Scandinavian intelligence agencies react to these vast changes in the years ahead.
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