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"RUSSIA AND EUROPE: BALANCING COOPERATION WITH INTEGRATION"

ABSTRACT
The fall of communism in Central/Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in much optimism about security and stability in Europe and, indeed, world-wide. A ‘New World Order’ was proclaimed, but soon territorial fragmentation and ethnic conflicts in Europe’s eastern/southern lands overshadowed the emergence of a new European order, and the Russian Federation, due to its political and economic instability, became the primary focus of concern for most European countries. The aim of this paper is to illustrate the two most important European features since the end of the Cold War - cooperation and integration - in regard to the Federation, and to address the still unresolved question of how Russia can eventually be accommodated within Europe. Particular emphasis is placed on Europe’s security architecture, namely the EU, WEU, and NATO and the prospect of eastward expansion, as well as on developments in the OSCE which is the only pan-European security body at the moment. It is argued that the elements of Western-Russian integration and cooperation in these institutions will significantly contribute to the emergence of a new European order, and perhaps even determine its structure.

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Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgment, for a limited time; as in one Battell, or one Warre. For though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous endeavor against a forraign enemy; yet afterwards when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for an enemy, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a Warre amongst themselves. (Hobbes, Leviathan)

1. Introduction

Due to the changes which have taken place during the past eight years we can now claim to have a new world, a new Europe, but certainly neither a new world nor a new European order. Although the threat from the East has vanished, a threat in the East remains. As much as in the post-war years ‘the German question’ was at the center of international concern, now it seems to be an open ‘Russian question’. Vice-President Al Gore recently noted that

‘before us is a rare, and, perhaps, unique chance to help foster a Russia which we no longer regard as an ideological foe, but as a friend and partner. History is rife with ‘might have beens’, and President Clinton and I believe it would be absolutely criminal to pass up this opportunity’ (Gore, 1995).

But how can the West foster this new, semi-democratic Russia in a new European security structure?

Two features soon emerged after the end of the Cold War - greater (West-) European integration and a cooperative strategy with former communist countries in order to strengthen European security. Both NATO and the WEU have agreed that a European security and defense identity and the European pillar of NATO should be the same, and it is widely assumed that new

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1 I wish to thank Dr. C. Jeffery and Dr. A. Hyde-Price for their constructive comments on the first draft of this paper.
members of the WEU must become members of NATO. Because the EU will expand, NATO will have to enlarge also, and the NATO Enlargement Study itself actually touched upon the sensitive ‘who’ question by noting that ‘the Alliance views its own enlargement and that of the EU as mutually supportive and parallel processes which together will make a significant contribution to strengthening Europe’s security structure’. However, it was realized that the Russian Federation could not be easily integrated into any West European security framework. Only one possibility remained - cooperation.

The aim of this paper is to illustrate the objectives sought through cooperation and integration in regard to Russia, and second, to point out the elements of cooperation and integration, which will shape, if not determine, the future of a new European security architecture. The former Yugoslavia, where Russian troops are successfully participating in the Implementation Force (IFOR, now Stabilization Force, SFOR), was chosen as a case study on elements of cooperation and integration between the West and Russia, because this cooperation under the NATO framework has proven successful and vital for the Bosnian peace effort, and hence European stability.

2. Objectives of Cooperation and Integration: Securing Europe

The initial euphoria following the end of the Cold War - described by many as the ‘New World Order’ and the ‘End of History’ - was soon overshadowed by reemerging nationalism and civil war in Europe. History returned, and the new world lacked order. The challenge became how to prevent the fragmentation of security and the subsequent renationalization of security policies in conditions where there is no single existential threat to Europe and how an undivided, democratic, and peaceful Europe could be established for the first time in the continent’s history.

A cooperative approach emerged, and was embodied in existing complementary and mutually reinforcing institutions, including European and transatlantic organizations, multilateral
and bilateral undertakings, and various forms of regional and subregional cooperation. The foundation of a new European security system was designed to be mutual reassurance, not mutual deterrence. The 1990 Charter of Paris, along with the landmark treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) foresaw a Euro-Atlantic space where armed forces were limited and their movements monitored; where relations would be 'founded on respect and cooperation' and a 'new quality' of security relations would recognize that 'the security of every participating state is inseparably linked to that of all the others' (Hurlbut, 1995). The feature of such a cooperative security approach was functional integration, under which security tasks would be performed by an integrated and inclusive multinational network of personnel wherever possible. These tasks ranged from conducting on-site inspections to undertaking peacekeeping operations.

As a result, a situation of 'complex interdependence', where societies are connected via multiple channels, i.e. interstate, transgovernmental and transnational relations (Keohane and Nye, 1977, pp 25-28), reduced the prevalent emphasis on military security. Europe seemed to be moving towards the formation of a security community, based on NATO and the CSCE, in the Deutschian sense. He argued that forming a pluralistic security community² rested primarily on compatible values among decision-makers, mutual predictability of behavior, and mutual responsiveness (Deutsch and Burrell, 1957).

However, as events in Yugoslavia and elsewhere proved, the conditions that were required to build cooperation were different from those necessary to maintain it - the growing sense of community was weaker than the ties of nationalism and 'national interests' superseded communality. Stability in Europe - the absence of major war - soon became the major objective of a new European order, as opposed to a peaceful Europe - the absence of war in general. According to

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² In a pluralistic security community, separate governments retain legal independence, whereas in an amalgamated one, previously independent political units have formed a single unit with a common government.
Charles and Clifford Kupchan, such stability would result from the process of cooperation (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991).

US Vice President Gore noted, 'part of our strategy for building this new Europe calls for taking the issue out of the realm of theory ... and putting it in an immediate, very practical context' (Gore, 1995). In practical terms, NATO eastward expansion - to be achieved first through cooperation and then integration - is aimed at this goal of providing stability. It would support reform, foster in new members NATO patterns and habits of cooperation, promote good neighborly relations, extend the benefits of common defense and military transparency and security interdependence, reinforce integration, and strengthen and broaden the transatlantic partnership. Simultaneously, it is believed that EU eastward expansion would further cement these goals. Since such moves are directed only at Central European countries, Western decision-makers soon realized that they had to prevent the emergence of new barriers and divisions in Europe, notably between an enlarged EU and NATO and countries which are unable to join. This meant a deepening of the cooperative security relationship, particularly with the Russian Federation. Especially Germany hoped that putting cooperation between the EU and Russia and NATO and Russia in a semi-institutional framework would make Western/Central European integration acceptable for Russia and thus prevent any new antagonism.

Before we can discuss the implications for the overall European security structure, we first have to examine the elements of cooperation and integration between the West and the Russian Federation since the end of the Cold War, with an emphasis on EU/NATO, and the OSCE, because the former seem to be required as a basis for any European order, whereas the latter may play a subordinate, but all-inclusive supplementary role.
3. Elements of Cooperation And Integration: What is Europe?

NATO

The longest and most beneficial cooperation between the West and Russia has taken place within the NATO framework. It is no secret that there were, and continue to be, differences between the United States on the one hand, and the principal European powers on the other, concerning the lengths to which the Alliance should go in order to keep the Russians diplomatically engaged and how this should be substantially expressed (‘The Enlargement of the Alliance’, 1995, point 30). However, in the early 1990s there seemed to be no significant obstacle to closer and more intensified NATO-Russian cooperation.

At the end of 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established as a forum for consultation and cooperation on political and security issues. The aim was to give substance and meaning to the Alliance extending the arm of friendship to its former adversaries. Russia joined immediately, as did most other former communist countries. In January 1993, cooperation was further intensified when General John Shalikashvili and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev agreed that NATO representatives could participate as observers in non-conflict zones in the former Soviet Union (Kozhokin, 1993). The resulting committee called the Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping was set up under the NACC to permit the exchange of views on the full range of conceptual and practical issues posed by peacekeeping today.

However, since opening a perspective on enlargement at the Brussels summit in January 1994, NATO has simultaneously endeavored to codify a ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia, recognizing that its size and capabilities place it in a different category than those Central European nations seeking Alliance membership. Part of this ‘strategic partnership’ was to be Russia’s participation in the newly launched Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Although almost all states of the former Soviet Union joined this NATO initiative in 1994, Russia first refused to sign the
Individual Partnership Program (IPP, which is the core element of a PfP agreement between NATO and a third country) and in January 1995 canceled a combined German-Russian exercise which was arranged under the PfP ('The Enlargement of the Alliance', 1995, point 32). By not signing the PfP program right away, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev explained: 'In principle, I do not believe in using shock techniques in diplomacy. However, ... I deliberately used them to show graphically the essence of the current threat to Russia’s partnership with the West' (cited in Valki, 1996, p 462). This current threat, of course, was NATO’s eastern enlargement proposal, which continues to be opposed by almost all of Russia’s decision-making elite. A brief examination of Russia’s security concerns and expectations will follow in the next section. For the moment, suffice to say that eventually a cooperative attitude prevailed when the Federation joined the PfP in May 1995.

This cooperative approach also prevailed throughout 1995 and 1996. NATO and Russia agreed on 31 May 1995 on a bureaucratically-resonant ‘Areas for Pursuance of a Broad, Enhanced NATO-Russia Dialogue and Cooperation’, based on the ‘Summary of Conclusions’ of 22 June 1994, entailing sharing of information, political consultations, and cooperation on security-related issues such as peacekeeping (Borawski, 1996, p 383). Furthermore, since September 1995, NATO has been seeking Russian assent to a formal ‘16+1’ interaction mechanism based on a ‘Political Framework for NATO-Russia Relations’, which could take the form of a ‘Charter’ or something else below the level of a treaty, and ‘Implementation of a Broad, Enhanced Dialogue and Cooperation Between NATO and Russia’, and in September 1996 the NATO Council approved in principle a Russian suggestion that mutual liaison bureaus be opened in Belgium, the US, and Russia (OMRI, Daily Digest, 12 September 1996).

Nevertheless, Moscow’s statements of opposition to NATO enlargement have ranged from concerns about the threat to Russia’s security and Russia’s place in Europe to suggestions that
enlargement would harm reform or lead to internal political instability in the Federation. On the other hand, many key Russian political leaders have recently placed more emphasis on the cooperative aspect in NATO-Russian relations. For example, Yabloko leader Grigorii Yavlinskii argued in January 1997 that Russia’s long-term strategic interest lies in partnership and cooperation with the West, and that NATO enlargement is a distraction from the long-term convergence of interests between Russia and the West (Rutland, February 1997). It seems that both the West and Russia have come to the conclusion that NATO enlargement will take place regardless, and that it will evolve in a European security environment in which there is no current threat of large-scale conventional aggression and where such a threat would take years to develop. A February 1997 report to Congress also confirmed that

‘while many Russian leaders have expressed opposition to NATO enlargement, this initiative can serve Russia’s own long-term security interests by fostering stability to its west ... Parallel to NATO enlargement, the United States have proposed a series of initiatives, including a NATO-Russia Charter and a permanent consultative mechanism, in order to ensure that Russia plays an active part in efforts to build a new Europe even as NATO enlargement proceeds’ (‘Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications’, 1997).

Perhaps in order to give an incentive to the Federation to more readily accept NATO expansion, in May 1996 at the Vienna Conference reviewing the CFE Treaty, a concession was made to Russia by giving it until May 1999 to fulfill its obligation regarding armaments in the regions of St. Petersburg and the North Caucasus (‘The Eastern Dimension of European Security’, 1996, point 28), precisely the two areas that have attracted the most interest and controversy in recent years.

At a summit in Madrid this coming July, NATO’s sixteen heads of state and government will invite specific states from among the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe - most likely Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary - to start accession talks to join the Alliance. At the XIIIth NATO Workshop, Polish Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz asked a very interesting question:
'But would not the exclusion of the Baltic states during the first stage of enlargement be an indirect acknowledgment that NATO enlargement is - at least to some extent - directed against Russia? And would the Baltic governments be able to explain to their people that in one case NATO enlargement to Russia's borders is seen as an enlargement of the zone of stability in Europe but in another case a move that unnecessarily irritates or provokes Russia?' (Cimoszewicz, 1996).

How this issue - Baltic EU and NATO membership - will finally be resolved remains unclear, but for the moment, as Javier Solana notes, 'the fact that our proposals for intensifying the NATO-Russia relationship are being examined carefully and with interest gives us cause for optimism' (Solana, 1996).

OSCE

The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, renamed in January 1994 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE) represented for Russia not only the honorable tradition of 'Helsinki Group' dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, but also the promise of belonging to the West, of civilization, and demonstrating Russian might, a place where Russia could take its rightful place as a European and global power, alongside the US and the major European powers. It was therefore not surprising that the Federation continuously stressed the CSCE and then the OSCE as the primary body of a pan-European security structure. On 23 June 1994, Russia proposed that the OSCE 'co-ordinate' the activities of NATO, CIS, WEU and other regional organizations; that the NACC become the 'universal mechanism for military and political cooperation functioning in close contact with the OSCE; and an 'Executive Committee' of ten permanent rotating participating states (Borawski, 1996, p 384).

This proposal was further developed at the December 1994 OSCE summit and culminated into a 'Security Model Study'. The agreed starting-point would be the so-called comprehensive concept of security, acknowledging not only military, but also human rights and economic
conditions as central to the security of participating states (Munro, 1995, p 252). However, this holistic approach received attention only after Russia’s refusal to sign the IPP. On 23 March 1996, these ideas were put forward anew in the context of a discussion proposed by Russia, on an OSCE ‘Security Model’ for the twenty-first century, which included a ‘European Security Charter’ to give security guarantees, thus moving the OSCE beyond cooperative security alone (Borawski, 1996, p 384).

On the face of it, the OSCE has had a successful track record in overcoming divisions and promoting integration in Europe, none the least due to the fact that all European countries including the states of the former Soviet Union are members of the organization (with the exception of Yugoslavia). The first mission to Nagorno-Karabakh was successful and enjoyed Russian support (‘Minsk Group’), subsequent missions to Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, the Crimea, Estonia, and Latvia followed (as well as other missions to Bosnia, and recently to Albania), and in Chechnya the Federation accepted for the first time direct intervention by the international community in an internal conflict. Partly as a result, the Congress Report also supports a stronger OSCE as an essential element of the new and evolving transatlantic community.

A closer examination of Russia’s actions in regard to the OSCE’s activities, however, presents another picture - one of a maximum of model, but perhaps a minimum of cooperation. As early as December 1993, Russia declined to permit free access of CSCE missions to Russian ‘peacekeeping’ facilities in Moldova and Georgia, and proclaimed CSCE demands for monitoring of such operations in exchange for international support to be interference in legitimate Russian affairs (Hurlbut, 1995). Furthermore, Russia is perceived to have undermined an OSCE role in the Chechnya disaster - the Federation became only responsive to the threat of the withdrawal of the EU’s interim trade agreement which led to the mission being established in the first place - and has competed with the OSCE in finding a settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, Hurlbut
concludes, 'Russia has turned to the OSCE with hopes of legitimizing its aspirations for power and its activities in the region, as well as easing the financial burden of playing the regional policeman' (Hurlbut, 1995).

In short, Russia has cooperated with the OSCE almost exclusively when it was soley in its own interest, an argument supported by the fact that Russian officials have once again undermined OSCE activities - they objected to the OSCE granting some US$ 600,000 in technical aid for the January 1997 Chechnya elections, claiming that the organization is interfering in Russia's internal affairs and violating Russia law, which prohibits the foreign funding of elections (OMRI, Daily Digest, 23 January 1997. The Chechen electoral commission refused aid from its Russian counterpart). Nevertheless, at the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in Helsinki, both presidents 'underscored their commitment to enhance the operational capacity of the OSCE as the only framework for European security cooperation providing for full and equal participation of all states' (Joint US-Russian Statement on European Security', Helsinki summit, 1997).

EU/WEU

Cooperation between the West and Russia is also taken place within the framework of the EU and the WEU. A broad partnership agreement was signed in June 1994 and followed up in July by an interim trade accord which grants Russia 'most favored nation' status and recognizes it as a 'transition economy' rather than a planned economy. Under its provisions, EU import quotas will be eliminated by 1998, except for textiles, steel, and nuclear fuel, and free trade talks are to begin after 1998. The interim trade agreement was frozen by the EU in January 1995 due to Chechnya and then reactivated in April 1995 after the opening of the OSCE mission in Grozny. The agreement seems to be essential for the Russia economy, because, according to Russian television, the EU is Russia's

3 The Helsinki summit was held on 20-21 March 1997. Five joint statements were signed: on European security, on parameters of future reductions in nuclear forces, concerning the ABM missile treaty, on chemical weapons, and on US-Russian economic initiatives.
largest trading partner, accounting for 37 percent of foreign trade (OMRI, Daily Digest, 18 July 1995), and under the agreement it is more difficult for the EU to levy anti-dumping tariffs against relatively cheap Russian imports.

However, there is renewed disagreement because in December 1996, Russia passed a new law imposing taxes on individuals and vehicles entering or leaving its territory (except CIS citizens) to help finance its border guards. EU Commission spokesman Nico Wegter stated that the new measure violates the spirit of the EU’s interim agreement with Russia (OMRI, Daily Digest, 12 December 1996). Nevertheless, cooperation continues. The EU and the US are helping to train experts in Western methods of accounting for the nuclear material used to build atomic weapons at the Russian Methodological and Training Center at Obninsk near Moscow, and the Federation received a grant of ECU 900 million under the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program to facilitate economic restructuring and to set up business training programs.

Russia-WEU cooperation, on the other hand, is proceeding much slower. This can in part be attributed to internal difficulties within the Union - the Political Committee of the Assembly of the WEU itself noted that ‘...the Assembly of WEU finds itself in a state of uncertainty, not to mention deadlock, as regards the stance WEU should take [in regard to relations with the EU]’ ('Organizing Security in Europe: Political Aspects', 1996, point I). In a subsequent report, the Committee displayed its disappointment that ‘the planned WEU cooperation with the Russian Federation in the specific areas proposed by the Assembly has so far not been taken any further’ ('The Eastern Dimension of European Security', 1996, point XIII), but it also made clear to Russian authorities that early ratification of the START II Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty will facilitate more

\[START\ II\ has\ already\ been\ ratified\ by\ the\ US\ Congress,\ but\ was\ held\ up\ in\ the\ Russian\ Duma.\ Yeltsin\ promised\ at\ the\ summit\ that\ he\ would\ urge\ the\ Duma\ to\ ratify\ START\ II,\ following\ which\ START\ III\ discussions\ will\ take\ place.\]
intensive cooperation between the WEU and Russia in all areas of mutual interest ("The Eastern Dimension of European Security", 1996, point 10).

The importance of the EU and the relative low priority given to the WEU regarding Western-Russian cooperation may explain why Russia has not raised the same objections to EU enlargement or indeed to the development of the WEU, although the West has made clear that the adaptation and enlargement of the European Union and NATO are mutually supportive initiatives, because ‘they both contribute to the overall effort to erase outdated Cold War lines and to build a peaceful, undivided and democratic Europe’ ("Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications", 1997). On the other hand, the Russian leadership may believe that the enlargement of the EU and the WEU will be much more difficult to achieve and perhaps not materialize until well into the next millennium, given the current uncertainties facing the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Other Areas of Cooperation and Integration

There are other areas of cooperation as well. Russia participates in political discussions in the G-7 meetings, which will become the ‘Summit of the 8’ in Denver this year\(^5\), and has practical ties with the WTO, the OECD, and ASEAN. Bilateral US-Russia cooperation has also intensified. The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, established in April 1993, has become an important mechanism for collaborative bilateral efforts to lower barriers to trade and investment while launching joint efforts to harness new technologies, explore space, protect the environment, and address Russia’s pressing public health and agricultural needs. At the direction of the US President, the Defense and Energy Departments have also intensified their cooperative programs with Russia and other new

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\(^5\) This term may only be used for the Denver summit. It is likely that the ‘Summit of the 8’ will be applied to future meetings as well, but it is equally possible that, as a compromise, the next ‘G-7’ summit will be held in Moscow.
independent states to enhance the security of nuclear material. Moreover, on 28 February 1996, Russia joined the Council of Europe as the 39th member, after the application was held up due to events in Chechnya.

Nevertheless, the most outstanding example of cooperation and integration between the West and Russia can be found in Bosnia under a NATO framework.

**Case Study: Former Yugoslavia - Practical Cooperation and Informal Integration**

Although Western and Russian responses to the genocide in the former Yugoslavia were slow, confusing, and contradictory in the first years of the conflict, as early as December 1992 Russian officials were briefed on NATO plans to enforce the UN no-fly zone. Since then, they have been regularly informed on NATO planning for air and other operations and were also kept closely informed during NATO air operations to guard the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Gregory Schulte, the Director of the Bosnia Task Force in Brussels, notes that ‘close contact did not, however, guarantee agreement. On a number of occasions, the Russian government expressed its concern that NATO air-strikes favored one party to the conflict’ (Schulte, 1997, p 32).

The Russian Federation is also a member of the five Contact Group countries, working in collaboration with the US, Britain, Germany, and France who attempted to find a solution to the Yugoslav crisis. However, during the Dayton peace talks, only one Russian negotiator was present, and the Federation’s leadership complained that it had little input in the final General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFA). IFOR, consisting of troops from over 30 countries, which was authorized by the UN to monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the GFA, took control of the UN Peace Forces on 20 December 1995. Although developing the basis for Russian participation was difficult, arrangements were finally agreed whereby the Russian contingent was placed under the operational control of the Supreme Allied
Command in Europe (SACEUR) through General Shevstov serving as SACEUR’s deputy for Russian forces and under the command of General George Joulwan. These arrangements were extended to SFOR in December 1996. Although Boris Yeltsin can countermand any order given, after notification by Shevstov and after consultations with the Russian Security Council - in an emergency situation probably a significant obstacle to swift action - such a situation has not yet arisen. According to Schulte, this can be linked to the fact that ‘there is a clear desire to demonstrate that the Russian military, despite domestic problems, is capable of operating effectively alongside the professional and well-trained armies of the West’ and that a considerable communality of views exists about the purpose and conduct of the IFOR and SFOR operations (Schulte, 1997, p 33).

NATO-Russia cooperation has worked well in IFOR where Russian forces were integrated in the overall NATO military structure in Bosnia. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Affanaievsky also sees in IFOR an important example of cooperation, and the Congress Report confirmed that ‘the success of NATO-Russia cooperation in the IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia foreshadows the ongoing contribution that US-Russian and NATO-Russian cooperation can make to European security’ (Borawski, 1996, p 386; ‘Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications’, 1997).

4. Russian Priorities: East or West of Europe?

Vyacheslav Nikonov, Chairman of the International Security and Arms Control Sub-Committee of the State Duma, recently confirmed the opinion of many experts that ‘at present, there is no national consensus on foreign policy in the Russian Federation’ (‘The Democratic Transformation of Russia: Challenges From Without’, 1994). However, the following section will illustrate that a minimum consensus does exists in Russia’s political elite and its population.
Starting with Gorbachev's perestroika, most Russian leaders and the majority of the population have been convinced that, as democratization proceeded, Russia would be successfully integrated into the community of civilized countries united by the 'West' concept, and that this would bring economic and political advantages and strengthen security. However, all these hopes have proven to be a vain illusion. According to a Special Report submitted on behalf of the Working Group on the New European Security Order, the reasons for the rather unfavorable early trends in relations between Russia and the West are to be found in the economic and military weakening of Russia, giving other countries no incentive for cooperation; the inability of Russian leaders to create a better climate for international cooperation; internal problems of the Western states themselves, which generate a desire to distance themselves from problems calling for political will and material outlay; and the revival of the idea of an external Russian threat ('The Democratic Transformation of Russia: Challenges From Without', 1994, point 7). Moreover, perestroika, glasnost, and the collapse of the Soviet Union created a sense of chaos within Russia - a national interest had to be developed, and it was evident from the beginning that threats to the Federation were more of an internal character rather than external.

The 1993 Russian Military Doctrine identifies 'local wars and conflicts' and internal threats as the main problems to Russian security (Valki, 1996, p 451). The political and ethnic conflicts in the newly independent states and bloody wars close to Russian frontiers - in Tajikistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, which threatened to spill over into Russian territory, caused refugee problems, and complicated economic links - supported this fact. Although some influential Russian leaders stretched the concept of security beyond the traditional military factors, such as Yavlinskii who stated that 'there is not a military threat in Europe any more', and suggested that the real challenges lie in the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, the spread of terrorism, and ecological catastrophes like Chernobyl (cited in Rutland, January 1997), other paragraphs of the
Doctrine also identify as an external military danger the ‘expansion of military blocks and alliances to the detriment of Russian Federation’s military security interests’ (Valki, 1996, p 452). These paragraphs, of course, are directly aimed at the proposed NATO expansion.

Already in September 1993, Boris Yeltsin drew attention to the fact that the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany prohibited the stationing of foreign troops in the former East Germany, thus ruling out any possibility of expansion of the NATO area to the east (Lutz and Rotfeld, 1994, pp 37-38). Moscow argued that the best way to ensure Russia will not pose a threat is either to let it join NATO or to dismantle it. However, since it became increasingly clear that neither would be a realistic option, when the prospect of NATO enlargement was announced in January 1994, such statements soon evolved into proposals that both NATO and Russia provide joint security guarantees to reassure Central/Eastern Europe and then to arguments that NATO should transform itself into a new, all-European organization where all states would have a voice and which would be specifically styled to support collective security. Finally realizing that expansion would go ahead despite Russian opposition, Moscow began to aim for a NATO-Russia document, preferably a legally binding treaty, a demand designed to prevent the Alliance changing its policy at a later date, and possibly to delay the expansion because such a treaty would require ratification by the parliaments of all sixteen NATO members. However, at the Helsinki summit, Boris Yeltsin, although still calling NATO eastward expansion a serious mistake, agreed to a document on NATO-Russian relations, to be negotiated by Foreign Minister Yevgenii Primakov and Javier Solana and signed before the Madrid summit. It will not have treaty status, but Yeltsin and Clinton ‘... believe that this document indeed is binding for NATO, for Russia, [and] for all states whose leaders sign this document’ (‘Clinton/Yeltsin Joint Press Conference’, Helsinki summit, 1997).6

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6 NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana is also expected to initial the document. Boris Yeltsin will then send it to the Duma for ratification, but he acknowledged that ratification by all 16 NATO member’s parliaments would unnecessarily prolong an agreement beyond the Madrid summit.
The reason for Russian opposition to NATO enlargement is quite clear: it seems to be very concerned that if the Alliance creeps eastward, US influence and capacity for peacekeeping interventions may eventually also extend into Russia’s ‘near abroad’, and especially into the Ukraine and Moldova, and the Caucasus which are important territories for Russia - the former due to a significant Russian minority, the latter due to vast oil reserves and transportation routes. However, the reasons most often cited by Russian officials are that expansion would draw new lines across the continent; that expansion represents a psychological humiliation of the former empire; and that the population would not understand - Defense Minister Radionov stated in November 1996 that although NATO presents no threat to Russia, millions of Russian still believe so (OMRI, Daily Digest, 20 November 1996). But a recent opinion poll suggests that this is no longer the case. A January 1997 VCIOM poll indicates the following: 50% oppose admission of former Soviet republics into NATO (20% undecided, 17% indifferent); only 41% oppose admission of former Warsaw pact members into NATO (22% undecided, 22% indifferent); 22% favor cooperation with NATO; and 8% would like Russia to join the Alliance (OMRI, Daily Digest, 17 and 21 January 1997). Millions of Russians do oppose an enlargement of the Alliance, but this is not the majority of the population. A more potent base of opposition can be found - the Russian military which has regained considerable influence in Russian politics. Had there not been a military intervention in 1993, President Yeltsin would not have won over his opponents, and since then the price he is paying for the obtained support is increasingly going up: the growth in armaments orders by the government, the rhetoric vis-à-vis the ‘near abroad’, and the strong language of power politics towards the Baltic states and the Central European nations. The question now becomes if not enlargement, what does Russia want?

7Of course, one has to keep in mind the inaccuracy and sometimes propagandistic value of Russian opinion polls.
The Federation is generally not opposed to EU and WEU enlargement, and some Russian officials even favor such moves. In regard to European security, however, John Borawski points out that 'the lack of Russian objection to Central European states joining the EU, and thus conceivably its defense arm, the WEU alliance, certainly tells us something about the credibility Russia attaches to an independent European defense outside the Alliance' (Borawski, 1996, p 389).

As previously noted, Russia favors the OSCE as a pan-European security body. Such an all-inclusive structure has been one aspect of Soviet and then Russian foreign policy that has remained remarkably constant. Soviet proposals for a European security conference or treaty had begun with Foreign Minister Molotov in 1954. The common thread continued through Helsinki and the CSCE through Gorbachev's 'common European home', and to the proposed 'Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century'. However, the 'common European home' as well as the 'Security Model' remain on the drawing board.

Nevertheless, one thing is certain - Russia is in the process of developing its national interest, which probably will be pursued in a less assertive manner then during the Cold War. Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has stressed several times that Russia is committed to peace and security in Europe, and Radionov recently stated that Moscow does not plan to set up a new military bloc even if the Alliance expands despite Russian objections (Egglestone, 1996; OMRI, Daily Digest, 17 January 1997). According to James Sherr, a Russian national interest, however vague, was already evident in the country's actions in the former Yugoslavia. He argues that the Federation wanted cooperation with the West (in return for financial aid), to reaffirm its influence in the region, and to counter nationalism at home (Sherr, 1995, p 5). How this national interest will eventually be defined and pursued is, however, still unclear.

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8 Although on 15 March 1996, a resolution was adopted by the State Duma to annul the agreement to disband the Soviet Union. The resolution is not legally binding, because such a decision can only be taken by the Federation Council.
6. Prospects of Future Cooperation And Integration: Europe in the Balance

At the moment, Europe is experiencing both cooperation and integration. Regarding Russia, however, integration into any Western organization will proceed very slowly, if at all. Whether the Federation will eventually be able to join NATO has been, prudently, left open. Some say never, whereas others ask why not - with a parallel sometimes drawn between post-World War II Germany and post-Cold War Russia. In essence, Russia does not even require the Alliance for its security, and whether any NATO country would be prepared to patrol, for example, the Sino-Russian border seems most doubtful, and it is equally doubtful whether Moscow is really interested in assuming the obligations and responsibilities of NATO membership, including the requirement to subordinate Russia to a consensus rule. At the moment, it is probable that, in the face of US implacability, Primakov will decide to fold his hand, and go for the CFE treaty option and a ‘Charter’ as a face-saving compromise, and the best deal that Russia can obtain between now and July. On the other hand, he could still decide to take an uncooperative stance, in which case NATO expansion would go ahead without any new agreements with Russia. In this respect, we can not completely rule out the danger that the desired cooperative balance may degenerate into a new antagonistic form. What can be ruled out, however, is Russia as a NATO member in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the Federation will have to live with a minimum of military allies, while simultaneously being concerned about other alliances that increase their membership. From the point of view of domestic political arrangements this plays into the hands of the nationalists rather than favoring the supporters of the Western integrationist line, an argument which is supported by some members of the US Congress such as David Obey (D-Wisconsin) who stated that the US will

‘run a grave risk that future Russian nationalists under worse economic and political conditions than we have in Russia today will be able to exploit any Russian government decision to accept a movement east of the military borders of NATO’ (cited in Foley, 1997).³

³ However, there is still overwhelming support for NATO expansion in Congress.
Also, an additional danger is on the horizon. According to Stephen Walt, the greater the level of institutionalization within an alliance, the more likely it is to endure despite an extensive change in the array of external threats (Walt, 1997, pp 164-166), which may be the theoretical rationale behind NACC, PfP, and enlargement. However, he also notes that

'... an aging alliance may appear robust and healthy so long as its formal institutions continue to operate, even if the basic rationale for the agreement is crumbling ... The danger, of course, is that the alliance may be dead long before anyone notices, and the discovery of the corps may come at a very inconvenient moment' (Walt, 1997, p 167).

His sober and cautious statement deserves attention, especially in light of the early NATO experience in Bosnia.

Russia's integration into the EU and the WEU seems equally remote. It is not only the country's size and population, but also the danger of full economic collapse and the possibility of a return to an imperialistic and totalitarian rule that makes EU and WEU integration unlikely in the coming years.

Cooperation, on the other hand, seems to be the only alternative for securing a Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It could be based upon the following. The OSCE, although paralyzed by consensus rule and its structural incapability of serving as the primary security institution of a future European security system, could play a similar positive role in terms of providing cooperative support for European and Eurasian-Atlantic balance as the CSCE did in serving as a cooperative mediator between the two alliances of the old European order. Under the two principal strategies to secure peace - collective security and democratization - the EU, as a civil power, offers largely instruments and forms of cooperation which aim at democratization through welfare development and political involvement. Hence, EU-Russian cooperation in itself may prove to be a security gain because it will contribute to a more prosperous, and hence more stable Russian economy and democracy. Even though an eventually enlarged NATO would not become a substitute for a new
European order, if for no other reason than for its inability to fully integrate Russia, everything seems to suggest that only institutionalized cooperation between Russia and NATO can provide the linchpin of such an order. Madeleine Albright also confirmed at the Helsinki summit that ‘the NATO-Russia Charter will be the centerpiece of this cooperation in Europe ...’ (‘Briefing by Albright, Berger, Summers on Summit’, Helsinki summit, 1997). Cooperation under IFOR and SFOR has already been successful, and the West and Russia could build upon this experience. Reason for optimism is Rodionov’s statement that Russia would continue cooperating with NATO in Bosnia and other areas regardless of whether the alliance went ahead with expansion (San Diego Daily Transcript, 26 September 1996), and at the Helsinki summit Yeltsin agreed that ‘the relationship between the United States and Russia and the benefits of cooperation between NATO and Russia are too important to be jeopardized’ (‘Clinton/Yeltsin Joint Press Conference’, Helsinki summit, 1997).

What should be avoided, however, is the deploiring of the East-West security debate exclusively on the grounds of NATO expansion in which persisting fundamental differences between NATO and Russia are not only preventing any substantial progress from being made but are also making it difficult to reach agreement on the definition of Russia’s role in the Euro-Atlantic security framework - a conclusion also reached by the Political Committee of the Assembly of the WEU (‘The Eastern Dimension of European Security’, 1996, point V). No single organization can handle all the security problems - economic, political, societal, environmental, and military - and in an era of transition such as the present one, we must allow ourselves to have a variety of institutional options. If cooperation proves successful, a ‘Europe with various patterns of integration’ - member states would have a joint role in specific areas of action while in others they would be free to progress more quickly, or, on the contrary, to abstain from participation in any action or be only partly involved - may be possible. This is currently being practiced in Albania
where eight states - Italy, Greece, Turkey, Austria, Rumania, France, Spain, and Denmark - are contributing to a troop deployment of 6,000 soldiers to protect humanitarian aid shipments and convoys. The operation is led by Italy, which is clearly most interested in contributing to stability in the Balkan country in order to avoid a refugee crisis.

Therefore, by the beginning of the next millennium, Russia may be incorporated, although not integrated, in a Europe based on collective security arrangements through the OSCE as well as on institutionalized cooperation with the NATO alliance and the WEU. But a security community, pluralistic or amalgamated in the Deutschian sense, will be difficult to establish, because, as Walt argues,

'... an alliance is not a collective security agreement. A collective security arrangement is an inclusive institution: it commits the members to oppose any act of aggression, even one committed by its members. By contrast, alliances are exclusive institutions: they entail a commitment to support the other members against states outside the community. Although members of an alliance may also be part of a collective security organization and may engage in other forms of security cooperation, failure to keep these concepts distinct can lead to misleading analyses and muddy policy-making.' (Walt, 1997, p 158).

Although an OSCE-based integrative collective security system, combined with a cooperative, institutionalized NATO-Russia relationship are most likely to emerge simultaneously, they must, and will, function separately, albeit supportively in a new European security architecture.

7. Conclusion

To summarize, we can safely say that integration is, and looks likely to remain, the principle by which the new European order will be organized. What this means for the countries on the periphery of Europe is, however, increasingly unclear. Huntington-like fears of clashing civilizations may become self-fulfilling prophecies if Europe becomes synonymous with the civilized world. Therefore, elements of cooperation with non-integrated states must be established, and the primary attention will have to be the Russian Federation with its 'near abroad'. In response, in Europe and in
the Eurasian-Atlantic area, overlapping integrative and cooperative systems of balance are slowly emerging. This balance must be used flexibly, reacting to each specific situation separately. Precisely because individual nations have different interests in various parts of the continent, it is necessary to avoid any one institution becoming the sole focus of European policy. However, this new European security architecture will not evolve according to a single ‘master design’. It will emerge gradually through a process of trial and error rather than through the implementation of model-based approaches.

For the moment, it seems that such a structure will, and perhaps must evolve around the upcoming NATO-Russia Charter. Both sides are clearly in favor of increased cooperation in the framework of the Alliance, which is underscored by the fact that there are specific deadlines and timetables for NATO expansion, but not for other security bodies. Close cooperation between NATO and Russia would help lock in the patterns of trust, close collaboration and transparency that accompanied the end of the Cold War. NATO-Russia cooperation in IFOR and SFOR has not only proven that joint efforts will increase the possibility of a stable Europe, but also that Russia and the West can pursue similar goals through common action in the name of ‘Europe’. Nevertheless, this process has to be supplemented by other areas of cooperation. The OSCE, although occasionally ‘hijacked’ by Russia, is serving as an all inclusive pan-European security body which aids conflict prevention and management. EU-Russia cooperation, although still in its infancy, will eventually provide more support, be it financially or politically, to the Federation’s democratic and economic reform process. The WEU, the Council of Europe, the OECD, the ‘Summit of the 8’ as well as other bodies are further underscoring this cooperative approach. And although Russia’s integration in NATO and the EU/WEU is not on the agenda, cooperation may ensure that the Federation will find its rightful place in our new Europe. Then, and only then, can Russia be fully integrated in the Western institutions which have benefited Europe for the many decades of the Cold War.
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