FRANCE AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE
Part I: France’s German Policy and the Schuman Plan

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Toute politique qui ne fait pas rêver est condamnée.
CHARLES DE GAULLE

On s'engage et puis on voit.
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE

Politics is the art of the possible.
ÖTTO VON BISMARCK
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Part I: France's German Policy and the Schuman Plan

In summer 1948, France's postwar policies vis-à-vis conquered Germany were in shambles. Not only had French leaders' vision of a dismembered, prostate Germany been rejected by their partners, but the United States had responded to the emergent Cold War with an acceleration of west Germany's economic and political reconstruction. Try as they might, the French could do little to stop this push. As French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault argued to a depressed Cabinet in late May 1948, "There are moments when one has to know where to stop. If we want to act single-handedly we lose everything. In our present miserable situation we must not follow anything but the logic of our national interest" (Girault 1986, p. 61).¹

But where would that logic lead, and could French leaders follow? Alan Milward, perhaps the most influential historian of the period, argues that it led straight to Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's proposal of a new basis for Franco-German relations in a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on May 9, 1950. In ECSC, France, Germany, and other willing European nations would pool their coal and steel industries under a "supranational authority," thereby ending Franco-German enmity and making war between them impossible. The Schuman Plan, Milward asserts, "far from being a change of economic and political direction, evolved logically from the consistent pursuit of France's original domestic and foreign reconstruction aims" (1984, p. 380). This argument is seconded by the dominant school in political science studies of European institution-building, "intergovernmentalism." International institution-building, argue intergovernmentalists, flows from the rational pursuit of national government interests (Moravcsik 1991, 1993; Garrett 1991).

Yet other well-known facts of the Schuman Plan story seem to contradict this narrative. The "Schuman Plan" was actually the brainchild of a bureaucrat of domestic economic policy, Jean Monnet. Working in secret with a small team of assistants, Monnet had drawn up the ECSC plan and persuaded Schuman to adopt it as his own. In what historian William Diebold calls "one of the most singular examples of foreign policy-making in modern times," the proposal was rushed past the French government and announced to the world (Diebold 1959, p. 8). Schuman himself called it "a leap into the unknown," and not only France's partners but French politicians and diplomats were surprised (and some outraged) by this irregular launching of France's greatest initiative of

¹"Cabinet," when capitalized, refers to the Conseil des Ministres of the Fourth Republic. It was equivalent to the British Cabinet.
the postwar period (Bossuat 1992, pp. 753-754; Duchêne 1994, p. 206). A month later, French Finance Minister Maurice Petsche complained bitterly that he, Bidault (now Prime Minister), and Justice Minister René Mayer had "grave misgivings about placing French industry under a supranational authority," and regretted "M. Monnet's successful attempt to rush ministers into decisions without adequate time for reflection" (Duchêne 1994, p. 205).

Was the Schuman Plan the rational realization of French interests in a changing environment, or a bold, new interpretation of French interests? This paper poses this question as the first step in a larger project about the "social construction" of the French role in today's European Union. I argue that the Schuman Plan did reflect a reconceptualization of French interests, that I can point to what was reconceptualized, and that I can demonstrate its institutionalization historically. In the language of social science, my dependent variable is French policy towards Germany; specifically, I wish to explain the timing and content of French policy initiatives. I study two competing independent variables. The Milwardian rationalist story sees changing environmental constraints as the source of changing French policies. The "constructivist" story traces change in French policies to the introduction and institutionalization of innovative ideas.

The immediate goal of this paper is to show that only the latter adequately explains the Schuman Plan and the changes it represented in French government policies. While this is the logical first step in the "social construction of Europe," it is unfortunately far from a self-sufficient piece of that puzzle. As will be discussed below, a constructivist argument needs to demonstrate both the introduction of new ideas and their long-term effects. These long-term effects will only be displayed in the full study, covering the subsequent steps of European institution-building. This essay thus only begins the historical story of the effects of the Schuman Plan innovations.²

The larger goal of the project -- also only begun in this paper -- is the creation of a demonstrable "constructivist theory of political change." The pioneering constructivist theorists have argued that, over time, actors change how they interpret their environment and their interests. Yet constructivists have only begun to show what this actually looks like in observable political actions. This paper provides the first piece of such a demonstrable story, as well as the basic elements of its theoretical structure.

The paper has five parts. First I place my argument in the context of a brief literature review. My theoretical contribution will be to demonstrate the process of social construction in the particularly difficult arena of major, politically-focused foreign policies.

²TO ECSA PANEL MEMBERS: My presentation will summarize the rest of the study. Forgive me for subjecting you to a long, partially complete argument. Hopefully there is enough of interest in this first part to justify your time spent on it.
Second, I discuss the challenges to constructivist argument in such an arena, and how they can be overcome. The third and fourth sections (the vast bulk of the paper) recount the two major parts of the Schuman Plan episode: the former shows how the Schuman Plan broke with previous thinking in the French government, and the latter spells out the effects of this introduction of innovative ideas. Fifth, I suggest some preliminary conclusions.

I. Extending the Constructivist Literature

My goal here is to offer the strongest possible "constructivist" argument about the French proposal of the Schuman Plan. The "constructivist" research agenda in political science seeks to show how certain ways of interpreting and structuring human relations originate and proliferate, and that such interpretive frameworks causally influence behavior. Constructivists fight an unending battle with "rationalists," who assert that we need not study how interpretation mediates between actors and action; instead, we can understand most action as direct reactions to the constraints actors face.³

Constructivists have fought this battle with two kinds of demonstrable arguments.⁴ The vast majority of the constructivist literature tries to show that particular actions flow from ideas, institutional principles, or decision rules that are not objective responses to the environment. The focus here is on the causal role of previously constructed interpretations; it is not the emergence of new interpretations which is documented, but the effects of preexisting ones. Scholars have argued for the impact of ideas in NATO's creation (Weber 1992), American trade policy (Goldstein 1993), the creation of the postwar international order (Ikenberry 1993), the construction of socialist economies (Halpern 1993), changes in economic policy (Hall 1989; 1993) and the postwar movement to decolonization (Jackson 1990). Institutional norms or principles have been shown to shape domestic security policies in Japan and Germany (Katzenstein 1993), the creation of the Single European Market (Garrett and Weingast 1993), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Weber 1994).

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³This is only a methodological debate. No intelligent rationalist asserts that culture and ideas do not exist, nor does any intelligent constructivist claim that there are no actions which cannot be explained without reference to changing ideas (see below). But this methodological difference is nonetheless the most profound cleavage in contemporary political science.

⁴Two things need to be noted here. First, many of the authors cited in this paragraph would not call themselves "constructivists." They all place causal emphasis on ideas, norms, and/or institutional principles, however, which earns them this broad label. Second, the word "demonstrable" in my first sentence is significant. This is a rough review of constructivist arguments that have tried to demonstrate their claims against rationalist alternatives. I thus do not refer to much of the basic theoretical work on constructivism that does not offer empirical support [CITES Berger and Luckmann, Giddens, Ruggie, Wendt etc.].
The smaller part of the constructivist literature attempts to show social construction actually taking place. This work is concerned with the creation, proliferation, and institutionalization of new interpretations of actors' environments. Typically, actors without formal decision-making power (and so outside of the dominant interpretations) are shown to shape important decisions by creating new ideas and persuading the formally powerful to enact them. Two such bodies of scholarship are known to students of international relations: the literature on "epistemic communities" and approaches referring to "political entrepreneurs."\(^5\) In the former, networks of professional specialists are shown persuading decision-makers to act on the basis of their expert advice (E. Haas 1990; P. Haas 1992; Adler and P. Haas 1992). Cases are generally drawn from science and environmental policies, where politicians are assumed to need expert advice, providing the mechanism for the latter's influence (P. Haas 1992). The concept of "political entrepreneurs" is broader but less well specified. Acting for its own reasons, a political entrepreneur successfully proposes a new course of action to an actor with decision-making power. Such arguments originally appeared in the IR literature in the "political spillover" vocabulary of neofunctionalist thinking (E. Haas 1958), and have continued to develop most directly in the context of European institution-building, showing how the European Commission influences state actions via innovative proposals (Sandholz and Zysman 1989; Cameron 1992; Fligstein 1994; Fligstein and Brantley 1995; Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996).

But when these "political entrepreneurs" approaches step outside epistemic communities in science-related policy-making, they move on to more difficult terrain for constructivist argument. Where politicians clearly depend on expert advice to inform policy, the importance of those experts' ideas is not too difficult to demonstrate. In matters of major political decision-making in ongoing policy arenas, however, politicians are often themselves the "experts." Here political leaders will already have informed opinions and preconceived interests of their own. Why they listen to "entrepreneurs" thus becomes more problematic, and showing the latters' influence becomes more difficult. Rather than showing politicians endorsing technical ideas they could not possibly have come up with themselves, politicians must be shown changing their previous thinking due to entrepreneurial influence -- and not as rational reactions to the constraints they face.

Unfortunately, existing "political entrepreneur" arguments do not do this very well. The examples cited above show their entrepreneurial actors creating a new set of proposals,

\(^5\)Note that neither of these approaches is always concerned with social construction. Epistemic communities or political entrepreneurs can (and probably usually do) influence decision-making without provoking change in actors' interpretive frameworks; in this case their influence is simply part of a "garbage-can"-like decision-making process (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972; Kingdon 1984).
and show that those proposals are largely taken up by formal decision-makers (national governments). But little attention is given to how much these ideas reflect demonstrable change in the latters' thinking. Thus they rarely speak to the rationalist objection (common in the EU cases) that entrepreneur's proposals at most anticipate decision-makers' interests, and so have little causal impact (Moravscik 1991, 1993; Pollack 1995).  

My study of the Schuman Plan draws inspiration from this second current in constructivist thinking, showing the process of social construction itself. Its novelty lies in extending a constructivist argument onto the difficult terrain of major political decision-making in a way that will speak directly to rationalist objections. In principle, French leaders needed no advice on Franco-German relations in the postwar world; they were experts, with deeply held positions. Yet I will show that they did take such advice from Jean Monnet, and that this advice changed how some of them conceived their interests. That this happened is not a difficult thing to explain; the constructivist logic pioneered by Berger and Luckmann (1966) tells us that interests can be redefined. But showing that it happened -- such that even avowed rationalists might concur -- is a challenging task that has not yet been done effectively in this sort of context.  

II. Showing Interpretive Change  

This section discusses the abstract obstacles to demonstrating the "reconceptualization of interests" in a major-policy context, and how they can be overcome. The basic challenge in the demonstration of social construction is distinguishing between rational change in actors' behavior and what might be called interpretive change. Rational change in behavior is when actors undertake a new course of action without changing how they interpret their environment; it results from changing environmental constraints. Interpretive change occurs when new actions reflect a new interpretation of some aspect of the environment; it results from the introduction of innovative new ideas.  

These two kinds of change do not derive from opposed theoretical understandings of the world. Both clearly take place in a socially constructed setting. Much -- indeed most  

6The one exception I am aware of in political science is Martha Finnemore's excellent recent work (1996). Her cases are a step away from expert-dominated issues (the creation of science bureaucracies around the world, the institutionalization of the Geneva Conventions, and change in thinking about international development), and she provides evidence that government decision-makers in certain countries actually changed their opinions on some of these issues.  

The remarkable work of sociologist Robert Wuthnow (1988) is another exception to my generalizations.  

7My implication that the work of "epistemic communities" arguments are "easy cases" for constructivist arguments is not meant to diminish their contribution. Theirs are the first contributions which rigorously show the process of social construction in government actions.
political action is not about reinterpreting the environment, but about acting instrumentally within certain interpretations. It is precisely because of this fact that constructivists see the social construction of particular interpretations as so important. Interpretations set lasting parameters on political action. But it is crucial to recognize that they are not its only parameters. When any number of secular changes occur in actors' constraints (geologic, ecological, economic, coalitional...), actors respond with what can reasonably be explained as rational change in their behavior.

There are two steps to differentiating interpretive change in actions (between rationalities) from rational change in actions (within a rationality). First, it must be shown that a particular action does not flow from reactions to changing constraints in a manner consistent with previous courses of action. That is, the action must be shown to be more than a rational, tactical shift. In so doing, it will necessarily be shown in what way and to what degree the new action represents a departure from previous thinking. Second, the interpretive changes contained in the action must be shown to have lasting effects on the actor's behavior. Subsequent actions must be rational in terms of the new interpretation, and not the old.

How can these distinctions be made in a complex policy context, where actors have preconceived interests and face many changing constraints? We cannot evaluate whether any decision or part of a decision is "rational" in the terms of formal rational choice theory; it would be impossible to know if a choice is the best possible one, given the entire universe of possibilities. We can neither establish this universe very well, nor show that actors evaluated every alternative within it. We can only know, given good records or interviews, what they thought about the alternatives they considered aloud, and how they explained their positions.

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8A "rationality" is a particular set of interpretations of an actor's environment, comprising both end-state preferences and causal beliefs about that environment. To take a simplistic example, the belief that Germans are a permanent threat to French security combines with French preferences for a weak, controlled Germany; this was an element of the early postwar French government rationality.

9If this cannot be shown, then what seems to be "interpretive change" in a given decision-making process may simply be evidence of "garbage-can" style decision-making. On this model of decision-making, see Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972.

10For this reason, formal rationality is obviously of little use in the historical explanation of particular human actions, except perhaps at a very broad level (explaining, as Kenneth Waltz claims to do, "a very small number of very big things"; Waltz 1979). An explanation that cannot be tested is not of much use. On problems with testing rational choice theory, see Green and Shapiro 1994.

There may be normative or predictive uses of rational choice theory, of course. Russell Hardin acknowledges that formal rationality is of little use in a particular historical context: "Only in an assumed context can one sensibly be asked whether one's action was rational. To make a more complete assessment would require packing the context and much of the social history that has brought that context into one's decision calculus. No decision theorist in his right mind would attempt to do so" (Hardin, 1982, p. 14).

On the uses of formal rational choice theory in general, see Elster 1986, 199x; Coleman and Fararo 1992; MORE.
But if this information is insufficient to know whether decisions are perfectly "rational," it is enough to analyze to what extent they reflect a particular rationality. We can analyze whether actors saw their actions flowing from an extension of their previous thinking, with changes in tactics simply demanded by changing constraints, or whether they felt that they had taken on a new way of considering problems and their solutions. This requires a two-step approach. First, we set out actors' initial conceptions of action on a given issue as completely as possible, and document the constraints they perceive. This provides our point of departure. Second, we trace perceived change in those constraints and look for exposure of the actors to new, interpretively different conceptions of their situation. These are the independent variables. Variation in eventual action explainable only by the latter -- and lastingly reflected in subsequent actions -- reveals interpretive change.

If we do all of this, we will hopefully be able to highlight and document elements in actors' interpretation of their environment which have changed. But in a complex situation where actors held preconceived interests, three major problems will remain before our constructivist argument will convince skeptics. First is the fact that interpretive change will only be a partial aspect of any action -- and will often seem a minor part in terms of the immediate action in question. In major policy decision-making, new interpretations never wholly remake actors' conceptions, and usually emerge at times when changing constraints are also pointing (within existing rationality) towards policy change. Any new action will be undertaken because changing constraints call -- rationally -- for a new response. Rather than recreating many aspects of an actor's world all at once, new interpretations typically only alter certain elements, packaging responses to changing constraints in previously inconceivable ways. In other words, constructivists looking for revolutionary ideas that entirely reshape actors' worlds are bound to be disappointed.

This points to a simple objection to a constructivist argument asserting the importance of interpretive change in such a complex environment. If "ninety percent" of an action is explainable as a rational reaction to changing constraints, the objection runs, do we need to introduce all the complications of constructivism to capture the final ten percent? To foreshadow my case with an example, if French leaders had conceded on most of German recovery and begun considering cooperative frameworks for Franco-German relations, and if coal and steel issues were central to those considerations, does it matter much if Monnet's proposals put a special spin on their thinking? The simple answer is that ninety percent of an action is not an action. The suggestion that it is implies a strange idea of causality. Take a more mundane example. If I had good (rational) reasons to go to graduate school that were my main motivating factors (avoiding the job market, an eventual
career with tenure, a pleasant intellectual life with good vacations, etc.), but did not know which program to pursue and so did not apply, my "ninety percent of the action" would have no effect on anything. This does not mean that those reasons are not important for explaining the action if it is eventually taken, but in terms of historical causality they are clearly inadequate. Human beings only mobilize to take actions when they think they are "one hundred percent" motivated.\textsuperscript{11} Thus even if actors are certain of most of their thinking on a particular issue, an apparently small change in how they approach it may be the difference between action and no action at all. To foreshadow a bit more, in the Schuman Plan case, these changes concerned an appraisal of the future German threat, the British place in Europe, and supranationality. In a (rather meaningless) "percentage" breakdown of what the Schuman Plan was about, the small changes on these issues that took place in May 1950 may look almost marginal. In terms of causing the French government to act at this time and in this way, they were crucial.

This claim leads directly to the second challenge that constructivist arguments can expect in important, ongoing policy contexts. Constructivist arguments, say rationalists, are usually based on counterfactuals.\textsuperscript{12} Their claims are typically that actors did not have to interpret something in a particular way, that particular courses of action were not necessarily so obvious, and that it all could have gone very differently without the extra "ten percent" change in thinking. Counterfactuals are notoriously hard to use as evidence, and so rationalist-style arguments should be preferred for their reliance on what actually happened. But in fact, this objection is exactly wrong. Rationalist arguments are usually fundamentally dependent on counterfactuals, while (good) constructivist arguments are not. Return to the Schuman Plan. No one contests that Monnet wrote up the ECSC proposal, that he persuaded Schuman to champion it, or that Schuman himself had to persuade many very reluctant French politicians and diplomats to see the initiative through. These are historical events which we have no reason to question. My constructivist story will incorporate these events and assign them causal importance. A rationalist account of the same initiative, however, argues that if Monnet had not existed or put forward his proposal, the French would have responded to constraints in much the same way.\textsuperscript{13} In

\textsuperscript{11}For that matter, physical causality can work similarly. If you push on a boulder with ninety percent of the force necessary to overcome its inertia, you produce no effect on the external world.

\textsuperscript{12}I myself have faced this criticism since the beginning of this project, and only fairly recently realized why it is wrong. The ostensible logical rigor of rationalism has a Gramscian hold on our discipline, even on individuals of other schools.

\textsuperscript{13}Although as a historian Milward is not committed to doctrinaire rationalism by any means, he makes this argument explicitly (1984, pp. 395-396).
general, rationalist explanations discount creative ideas, leadership, and persuasion even if the actors themselves explicitly acknowledge their effects.

It will be important and helpful to engage rationalist arguments on counterfactual territory. Some counterfactuals are better than others, and there is no reason not to take up this challenge. Particularly on important, ongoing policy issues, a constructivist argument will need all the support it can get. In addition to providing evidence that the introduction of innovative ideas changed decision-makers' thinking, causing the action in question, my argument should show as well as possible that decision-makers were unlikely to come up with similar ideas on their own. But the crucial point is that in taking on rationalists on counterfactual territory, constructivists take the fight onto their opponents' home turf -- not their own.

The third challenge to constructivist arguments is less fundamental but more vexing. Simply put, interpretive change above the individual level rarely happens in a short, clean transition. Individuals may quickly be converted to a new way of thinking, but the most important changes in how a large organization views the world will usually take place only gradually. Certain parts of a government (for example) will be "converted" first; others will follow more slowly. When we put this observation together with the first challenge -- that interpretive change affects only parts of an individuals' cultural "tool kit" -- we arrive at the expectation that interpretive change in government policies may be a slow, gradual process. "Converted" individuals may continue many aspects of previous policies; the "non-converted" may work hard to maintain all aspects of previous policies.

In practical terms, this is just another reason why interpretive change will be hard to demonstrate. But if it has really happened, then we should be able to see it with careful study. A new interpretive framework will be launched by certain individuals; previous policies may continue for some time, but we should gradually see more and more actors acting according to the new rationality, and not the old.

In sum, demonstrating the process of social construction in the formation of important, ongoing policies does face a set of formidable challenges. This is undoubtedly why similar arguments have taken their cases from the technical margins of economic and political policy-making. (Again, arguments about the effects of socially-constructed ideas and institutional principles have addressed major policies, but careful studies of social construction in action have not). But these challenges are not insurmountable. Furthermore, most constructivists will share the beliefs and hopes motivating this study. Not only does new "social construction" go on even in "high politics" government policies,

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14 For several different opinions on the place of counterfactuals in social science, see Tetlock and Belkin (1996).
but it is in these most important policies that we should see its most important political effects. We just need to show them.

III. France's German Policy and the Schuman Plan

A few more specific methodological questions need to be addressed before illustrating these claims in the Schuman Plan story. Who are the actors? What methods allow us to assess whether or not their intentions derive from existing rationality in changing constraints?

The actors in question are those individuals at the top of the French foreign policy establishment who were formally responsible for or involved in the formation and implementation of France's German policy. In the French Fourth Republic, the foreign minister and his foreign policy bureaucracy were fairly autonomous from oversight by the Cabinet (the government) (Grosser 1961; Girault 1986). The most immediate actors were thus the individual foreign ministers (Georges Bidault (MRP) 1945-July 1948; Robert Schuman (MRP) July 1948-December 1952) and the top-level diplomats of the Quai d'Orsay (the French foreign ministry). Other bureaucracies involved in French policy towards Germany were the Commissariat Général au Plan (CGP), the Secretariat General for the Interministerial Committee on European Economic Cooperation (SGCI), and the Finance Ministry. Other ministers in the government were also crucial to acceptance of a major foreign policy proposal.

How do we assess whether these actors' intentions flow from a consistent rationality? The basic idea, as discussed above, is to trace whether or not changing views of desirable French actions derive from change in environmental constraints, as tactical

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15 The main figures are Hervé Alphand (Director of Economic Affairs 1945-1950), Maurice Couve de Murville (Director of Political Affairs 1945-1950), Jean Chauvel (Secretary General until December 1948), Alexandre Parodi (Secretary General 1949-1954), Jacques-Camille Paris (head of European Affairs), Pierre Baraduc (under Alphand, head of the Service for European Economic Cooperation, 1945-1950) and the Ambassadors: Henri Bonnet in Washington, René Massigli in London, and in Germany André Francois-Poncet (French High Commissioner), Armand Béard (High Commissioner Adjunct) and Jacques Tarbé de Saint Hardouin (Political Counselor to the French military representative). These are the names that come up most in historical accounts. A later version of this work will include a full chart of the Quai hierarchy.

16 The CGP, created around Monnet, was the bastion of the least traditional thinking on Germany. The SGCI -- created in June 1948, responsible directly to Premier but linked through Finances -- was also fairly progressive under the direction of Pierre-Paul Schweitzer. Finances were dominated by the Inspecteurs de finances (headed at the time by Director of External Finances Guillaume Gundey and Treasury head François Bloch-Lainé), and had a fairly traditional, conservative outlook in foreign policy.

17 These changed as governments rose and fell. The most important group of politicians for our story was the government under Bidault's premiership from October 1949-July 1950, with notably Schuman (MRP) at Foreign Affairs, Maurice Petsche (independent) at Finance and Economic Affairs, René Mayer as Jules Moch (SFIO) at Interior, René Mayer (UDSR) at Justice (Garde des Sceaux), Christian Pineau (SFIO) at Public Works and Transports, Robert Lacoste (SFIO) at Industry and Commerce. For a full list of the 18 ministers, 9 secrétaires d'Etat, and 7 sous-secrétaires d'Etat, see Elgey 1993, p. 652.
shifts within a consistent strategy. Additionally, the claim that a given rationality satisfactorily explains French actions in this way has a further implication that we can observe and trace. Assume that a conception of French goals (preferences over outcomes) can be demonstrated as shared among the above-listed actors at a particular point in time. If their shared rationality explains an action they later take as an organization, we should expect to see consensus among French decision-makers on what actions are feasible within and/or imposed by environmental constraints. That is, if the environmental context of the French government clearly made particular actions rational for that organization, and its decision-makers (who share an organizational position in the environment) can be understood as at least minimally rational, we should see them agreeing on what can or must be done. Consensus and dissensus among individuals within the organization are a tool to measure the clarity of the organization's rational imperatives.18

I can now put together the structure of a case study of French decision-making on Germany which can be used to assess the importance of rational and interpretive change in French government action. To create an analytical point of departure, I note that French leaders shared a particular consensus on the goals to be pursued vis-à-vis Germany. The causal analysis then has two parts. First, I must document how they reacted to changing constraints, tracing their evaluations of different options for action, and looking especially for consensus and dissensus among them. Second, if I find evidence that at some point in the decision-making process the interpretive basis of German policy changed, I will need to show that that interpretive change had lasting implications by tracing out its effects on subsequent French policies.

A. France's Initial German Policy (1945-early 1947)

The initial French vision for postwar Germany was uncompromisingly harsh. Politically, partial self-government would gradually be installed at the Länder level, with no more than a weak confederation at the national level. The Saar steel-producing region would be ceded to France. Economically, reparations would flow for many years to come, and German reconstruction would take place under strict supervision and limits to production. Germany's industrial heartland, the Ruhr, would be detached from the country and subject to international authority, both as a region and in the actual ownership and management of firms. Militarily, rearmament was so inconceivable that the French saw the Allied occupation continuing indefinitely in some form.

18On other logics that would imply consensus. FINISH.
French policies on domestic reconstruction were directly built on these plans for Germany. The famous Monnet Plan for modernization of the French economy assumed large German reparations of Ruhr coke, coal, and dismantled factories. As Milward summarizes after an examination of French planning,

In light of these considerations it has to be asked, in what direction the Monnet Plan and French diplomacy were marching? The answer is, if the Monnet Plan was to be fully realizable, towards permanently maintaining the Germany economy at so low a level of industrial output as to guarantee the availability for the future, not just of the 3 million tonnes of coke and 1.8 million tonnes of coking coal on which the French steel industry depended before the war, but of at least twice those quantities. Far from being based on a liberal internationalism, the Monnet Plan was based on the crudest possible expression of mercantilist principles. It was aimed at seizing German resources in order to capture German markets (1984, p. 137).

As noted above, internationalization of the Ruhr and annexation of the Saar would provide these resources in the long term, in addition to neutralizing the danger of future German competition.

Much of French relations with the United States and other European countries were also defined by France's German policy. Vis-à-vis the United States, the French hoped to simultaneously finance French modernization with dollar loans and block US support to German reconstruction. French industry would thus replace German dominance on the continent, even in their strongest sectors of steel and chemicals.19 Vis-à-vis France's European neighbors, French leaders sought above all guarantees against a German revival, and support for French claims to German resources. France's main European projects from 1945 until early 1947 were to construct a triangle of Anglo-Franco-Soviet bilateral relations against Germany, and to involve the Benelux in a customs union centered on an internationalized Ruhr (Young 1984; Bossuat 1992, pp. 81-82).20 The latter never got off the ground, as the Benelux found French plans for Germany too harsh. Paris was more successful with its treaties. De Gaulle (head of the provisional government) and Bidault (its foreign minister) signed a Franco-Soviet Treaty pledging cooperative relations in December 1944. A treaty with the British -- including a military alliance and perhaps some sort of economic cooperation -- was seen by de Gaulle, Bidault, and the Quai as the obvious complement at the time (Young, 1984, p. 8). Despite British enthusiasm, however, the French waited on negotiations to hear British positions on Germany: what did the UK think of increasingly frequent US statements against the political and economic dismantling of the enemy? (Dalloz 1992, p. 106). As the French never received the

19Cite this. Correspondence Paris-Rome.
20Bossuat summarizes this demarche as "the plan for the development of French steel through massive transfers of German coal" (85).
answers they wanted, the idea of a treaty was put on the back burner, until it returned under the brief anglophile ministry of Léon Blum (12 December 1946-16 January 1947), and a treaty was signed by Bidault (since returned to the Quai) at Dunkirk on 4 March 1947. Young notes, with support from Alphand's memoirs, "In March 1947 it was possible to see Dunkirk as completing a triangular Anglo-Franco-Soviet system in Europe directed against Germany" (Young 1984, p. 51; Alphand 1977, p. 197).21

While French leaders argued over certain issues (such as whether US aid could be sought without losing independence), the consensus on Germany was extremely strong. Where internal disagreements took place in 1946-7, the punitive, mercantilist German policy pursued actually represented the less traditional, more liberal side of the arguments (Bossuat 1992, pp. 74-80). That is, the terrain of internal conflicts was not over whether France should be gentler towards Germany, recalling the lessons of Versailles, but over whether Germany should be allowed to exist at all as a unit. Even Monnet and Quai d'Orsay Director of Economic Affairs Hervé Alphand -- friends, and the most unconventional high-level thinkers in the government -- did not differ strongly from official positions.22 More traditional thinkers, like President Vincent Auriol (SFIO) and the Gaullist diplomat Couve de Murville, thought those positions dangerously weak (Auriol, 19xx).

B. Changing Constraints and Failure of French Policy (late 1946-summer 1948)

From late 1946 to summer 1948, the French saw their German policy blocked entirely by unforeseen constraints. The immediate cause was the emergence of the Cold War. The Americans had abandoned their initial punitive plans for Germany as early as mid-1945, and as tensions with the Soviets worsened in spring 1946 they began to push actively for an accelerated west German recovery. This was partly driven by a hope to put German productive forces at the service of a general west European revival, but most directly by an emerging East-West competition for the sympathies of the Germans themselves. In March 1946 the French were warned "that continued French opposition in Berlin to the creation of any central German administrative or governmental organizations was playing directly into

21 The British rejected parallel French suggestions for broad economic cooperation. Even the Labour government in power at the time wanted "no Anglo-French five-year plans." But modest accords were reached to reschedule French debt, and periodic meetings of economic experts were agreed (Young 1984, p. 40).

22 Alphand was the main force behind both suggestions for Franco-British economic cooperation and the very anti-German customs union with the Benelux. Monnet was already talking about some sort of European federation as early as 1943, but envisioned the separate German Länder of a dismembered Germany as members (Bossuat 1992, p. 75).
the Russian hands and would no longer be tolerated by France's western allies, who would act independently of the French position" (Milward, 1984, p. 137). On 10 July 1946 Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov declared that it was the USSR's goal to revive the German economy, and that Germans should be allowed to form a central government if they so chose. The US replied with an offer to unite their occupied zone with any other, resulting in the US/UK Bizone in 1947. On 6 September 1946 US Secretary of State Byrnes went further in a speech in Stuttgart, calling for a German National Council to begin preparation of a central government (Willis 1968, p. 19; Melandri 1980, p. 70).

At the same time, French leaders began to feel more and more dependent on the US, both militarily and economically. Initial French hopes to balance between the superpowers fell apart in late 1946 and early 1947, as the Soviets dropped their earlier sympathies for French views on Germany and became more and more threatening. The decisive break came at the Moscow four-power conference in March-April 1947, where Stalin ridiculed Bidault's insistence on a "letterbox government" for Germany, and refused to support French claims to the Saar despite French gestures on the eastern borders of Germany (Daloz 1992, p. 169). Bidault returned from Moscow having decided that France's lot lay, for better or for worse, on the American side of the East-West divide (Daloz 1992; Spaak 1969; Young 1984, p. 47). The expulsion of the Communist ministers from the French government on 5 May 1947 confirmed this reorientation at home (Elgey 1993, p. 366). This watershed followed on strikes in April, which had been prompted by growing inflation and the removal of food subsidies in early 1947, and which continued and worsened through the summer (Milward 1984, pp. 15-16).

Altogether, these developments made France look to the US for economic and security help just as the Americans began pushing harder for a German revival. France's German policy was caught in the middle, but there was little the French could do besides protest. By February 1947, the Quai d'Orsay had recognized that detachment of the Ruhr from Germany was unrealizable (Bossuat 1992, p. 123). At Moscow in April 1947, Bidault did extract from the "Anglo-Saxons" an increased allocation of Ruhr coal, as well as recognition of the economic attachment of the Saar to France (ibid, p. 126). But he was unable to obtain commitments on an internationalization of the Ruhr (the French fall-back from detachment).

The coup de grâce for France's initial German policy came with the Marshall Plan in June 1947. While Bidault had requested extensive aid in spring 1947, the US proposal

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23 As a result, the British -- initially more sympathetic than the US to French ideas on Germany -- began to take a more American line. They had had a hard time financing their occupation zone (which included the Ruhr). This led them to welcome the US merger offer, and also made them favor increasing Ruhr production, so that their zone could better finance itself (Milward 1984, p. 139).
did not just aim to help its European allies. Reconstruction of the German economy was central to the new policy (Milward 1984, p. 141). On 12 July 1947, the opening day of the European conference on the allocation of Marshall aid, the Bizone commanders revised their "Level of Industry Plan" to increase steel production (from 10.7 to 11.5 million tons) and machine tool production, and downsized the list of factories to be dismantled from 1800 to 858 (Hanrieder, 21; Bossuat, 129). Harriman reported that the French had a "hysterical reaction"; Bidault warned both that the French government would fall, and that "there would be no Europe" if French reconstruction was not put before that of Germany (Dalooz 1992, p. 189; LaFeber 1967, p. 51; Milward 1984, p. 72). In the subsequent talks of the sixteen-member "Committee on European Economic Cooperation" (CEEC) on the allocation of Marshall aid, the French made it clear that their participation was conditional on satisfactory limits on German production, as well as US acceptance of an international authority for the Ruhr (Bossuat 1992, p. 284; Milward 1984, p. 74).

At secret Anglo-Franco-American talks in late August 1947, the Americans reluctantly agreed to an International Authority for the Ruhr (IAR) that would allocate Ruhr coal and steel between Germany and its neighbors -- as part of a future peace treaty. The actual shape and powers of an IAR were left to later negotiations, presumably after the expected failure of the final Four-Power conference on Germany in November-December 1947. Back in the CEEC talks in August and September, French concerns on Germany continued to frustrate US hopes for a comprehensive, truly "European" agreement on aid allocation. From the announcement of the Marshall Plan, the Americans had made clear that separate aid programs to the Old World's small, antiquated, nationalist economies would never garner Congressional approval; America would only fund the reconstruction of a larger, more liberal, integrated European economy (Melandri, 1980, pp. 87-94).

The creation of a permanent "European organization" or some sort was thus an explicit

24Bidault told Clayton in early July that if the Level of Industry agreements were revised, the sixteen-nation Paris conference on Marshall aid (which opened July 12) would fail, and "there would be no Europe" (Milward, 1984, 72).
25Alphand wrote, "France must be opposed to increased German production for obvious reasons of security" (Bossuat 1992, p. 130).
26At the Marshall aid discussions in July 1947, Hervé Alphand (head of the French delegation) declared that if anyone proposed increasing German output beyond the French "level of security," France would take "an entirely negative position." In August Bidault threatened (impotently) to resign if the Americans did not cut back planned aid to Germany (Milward, 72-73).
27Even this was not enough for the French; they only signed the three-power agreement, British documents report, "with serious hesitation" (Milward 1984, p. 75).
28Prior to 1947, US decision-makers had seen proposals for western European integration as dangerously divisive. Now that they were convinced that Europe was already divided, however, they saw it as the best way to manage "their half."
precondition for Marshall aid. But if the IAR agreement purchased French acceptance (in principle) of a Europe-wide aid program including Germany, the French CEEC delegation still refused to seriously discuss any permanent organization before a settlement on Germany. The result was general failure of the CEEC in September 1947. The CEEC's report, which the US administration had hoped would show Congress a detailed economic integration plan, was nothing more than a collection of separate (and sometimes contradictory) national plans (Milward 1984, p. 88). No real mention was made of European integration. An Appendix on Germany noted that the Europeans had disagreed, although the French managed to insert that the Ruhr should be put at the service of the whole continent, and that "the German economy must not be allowed to develop to the detriment of other European countries..." (ibid).

Thus the western showdown on Germany was set for spring 1948. The Marshall Plan depended on French participation, and France wanted guarantees on Germany before the impatient Bizone commanders constructed a west German regime on their own. Agreement became all the more urgent after the failure of the Four-Power conference in December 1947 and above all the Prague coup of February 1948. Talks began on 26 February 1948 in London, and recessed in June.

To make a long and painful story short, France lost the showdown. The already-weak French position had been worsened by the Prague coup, which pushed Bidault and Bevin to request US security guarantees in early March. On March 30 the Soviets began to close off West Berlin. For the "Anglo-Saxons," the security situation accelerated the need for German reconstruction, and they came to the conference with the goals of fusing the French zone with the Bizone and laying the groundwork for a German government (Dallos 1992, p. 190). The French, in contrast, were still opposed to trizonal fusion, and saw any real German government as dependent on a broader peace settlement (Willis 1968, p. 20). The French Cabinet approved four priorities for the negotiations on 21 February 1948: establishing the subordination of German reconstruction to that elsewhere; creating an IAR as strong as possible, with powers for the day-to-day managing of Ruhr firms; obtaining strict limits on a German military; German military production, and many industries (with most high-tech industries forbidden entirely); and "Establishment of a political regime which blocks the renaissance of a unitary and centralized Germany" (Dallos 1992, p. 191).

29The selection of free-trade zealots William Clayton (State Department Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs) and Paul Hoffman (head of the European Cooperation Administration, ECA, which directly paid out Marshall Aid) to lead this effort reinforced this thinking.
30This was true even though the head of the French delegation was Alphand -- the most pro-European and liberal high-level Quai diplomat -- and the CEEC Secretary General was Robert Marjolin, previously a protégé of Monnet at the Plan.
But from March to June, these French demands were progressively dismissed. In early March the Americans forced discussion of a trizone merger with a threat to cut off all support to the French zone (Milward 1984, p. 148). The relative priorities of German and French reconstruction were fought out in the parallel OEEC discussions, where French numbers were gradually scaled back.\(^{31}\) The US immediately ruled out IAR powers at the firm level (ibid, p. 151). An IAR run by the US, UK, France, the Benelux, and German representatives would control only allocations between domestic consumption and exports; most of the details were left until further negotiations in November 1948.\(^{32}\) Limits on German production and industries, too, were put off until fall discussions, where the "French thesis" gradually lost (Bosquet 1992, p. 668). Bidault did obtain accord on the deconcentration of German industry, but the list of factories to be dismantled for reparations was again opened for decreases. Finally, French success at blocking detailed plans for a federal government meant that the "recommendations" submitted to the Länder Ministers-President in July were entirely vague -- which gave the Germans a fairly free hand in their subsequent constitutional discussions (Willis 1968, p. 21).

The London Accords of June 1948 spelled out the failure of France's German policy, and were received in Paris as such. The Communist and Gaullist oppositions treated Bidault as a traitor, and even the other leaders of his own MRP party (including Schuman, then premier) were openly critical (Poidevin 1986b, p. 311).\(^{33}\) At the Quai, Political Director Couve de Murville made known the Gaullist opinion of Bidault's failures (Daloz 1992, p. 194). When the government fell at the end of July 1948 (most directly over domestic economic policies), Bidault's renomination to the Quai d'Orsay was universally recognized as politically impossible, despite an otherwise similar replacement government.

Yet if a bitter Bidault was scapegoated for the French failures in 1947-1948, within the government the amount and shape of the consensus on German policy basically held through this crisis. Internal debates were about whether Bidault had had to give up so much of French policy, not over whether that policy had been the right one.\(^{34}\) The period from the end of the war until 1948 was thus one of remarkable agreement, within an

\(^{31}\) Numbers.

\(^{32}\) US Ambassador to Britain Lewis Douglas, who led the negotiations, proposed in late February to broaden the IAR into a "European" authority covering German, French, and Benelux coal and steel industries. The idea was not even considered by the French (Milward 1984, p. 150).

\(^{33}\) Schuman and Pierre Pflimlin (Minister of Agriculture) openly criticized the London Accords, and Maurice Schumann (head of the MRP) wrote a very reserved acceptance (Daloz 1992, p. 195).

\(^{34}\) Thus Jean Chauvel, Couve de Murville, President Auriol, and the Socialist ministers argued in April 1948 that giving in to US plans for a strong Germany would provoke the Soviets, but that an initiative to the Soviets might still be possible (Girault 1986, pp. 59-60).
otherwise fragmented polity, on a vision of future Franco-German relations. The near-complete failure to implement that vision created the need for a new policy, and while they grumbled, the members of the government resigned themselves fairly quickly to the new constraints on French action. A new policy was thus in the offing. Whether it would be supported by a new vision remained to be seen.

C. The Search for a New Policy: Five Models of Europe (1947-1950)

Changing external constraints had made the realization of France's German policy impossible. Would the French respond by pursuing similar goals but shifting tactics, or would they begin to see the French place in Europe in a different light?

The London Accords were fleshed out and implemented over the next year, producing a West German state under the tutelage of a Military Security Board and a weak International Authority for the Ruhr. During this time, the French search for a new policy led to their proposal or consideration of a bewildering array of institutions as potential frameworks for intra-European relations. These can be grouped into variations on five institutional models: bilateral arrangements, continental economic organization, multilateral customs unions, continental political directorate, and sectoral cooperation. Many of these were not mutually exclusive. The actions, statements, and writings of French leaders on each of these models -- and particularly their points of consensus or dissensus as an organization -- reveal French rationality vis-à-vis Germany in the years leading up to the Schuman Plan.

i) Bilateral agreements

As noted above, bilateral pacts with the Soviets and the British against Germany were the first instruments of French policy in postwar Europe. But the Soviets soon left the list of potential partners, and the Franco-British relationship played itself out in multilateral contexts after the 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk. Neither Belgium nor the Netherlands wished to face France in a bilateral relationship (nor would they have agreed with Paris on what it should do). But between 1947 and 1950, the French did launch a major bilateral initiative with the one remaining possibility: Italy.

35 Both the anglophilic Monnet and leading Socialists (who thought of Labour leaders as natural partners) returned periodically to such ideas through 1948 (Young 1984). In March and April 1949, Monnet undertook a series of exploratory discussions with British planning board head Lord Plowden. But the British never had or showed any intention of engaging in significant institutionalized cooperation.
Discussions of a Franco-Italian treaty from 1947-1950 were consistently justified in two ways: firstly as an obstacle to "the reconquest of the Italian market by Germany," and secondly as a response to US pressures for integration (Guillen 1986). The latter initially led to a Franco-Italian project. At the Paris CEEC conference in July 1947, US pressure for integrative proposals from the Europeans was intense. The Italians, particularly eager to win American kudos, proclaimed their willingness to enter a customs union with anyone at all. Only France responded positively, prompting a series of Italian proposals for a bilateral economic union. In Paris, the economic benefits of such a union were seen as slim to none; union with the Benelux was seen as more attractive (see below). But political factors soon convinced Alphand, the Quai, and Bidault of the interest of a Franco-Italian union. In addition to making a gesture to the Americans -- who declared their support for the bilateral idea -- a union would help "constitute a Franco-Italian bloc against a reviving Germany..." (Guillen 1986, p. 144). In very bald terms, wrote French Ambassador to Italy Jacques Fouques-Duparc, the union would permit the French to entrench themselves in the northern Italian chemical and machine industries before the Germans (Guillen, 147; Bossuat, 650). Bossuat summarizes: "The union was a tool of war against Germany" (650).37

Slow, hesitant negotiations led to the signature of a very protectionist treaty on bilateral economic union on 26 March 1949.38 But by this time, and given the rather illiberal result, the US opinion had changed: now the Americans put direct pressure on the French to negotiate a broader customs union including the Benelux (who were also heavily pressured to participate) (Guillen 1986, p. 150). To the dismay of the Italians (who feared a broader union), Alphand and his team obediently engaged broader discussions of a five-member "Finebel" customs union (see below). When this fell apart in February 1950, the French and the US turned back to the bilateral agreement (faute de mieux), but a series of protocols negotiated to make it consistent with OEEC plans raised a storm of protest from French business and agriculture (Guillen 164). Shortly thereafter, the Franco-Italian union was eclipsed by the Schuman Plan. During its lifetime, only Monnet among French

36The French and Italian economies were seen as much more competitive than complementary, and Italian unemployment threatened disequilibrating labor migration in any sort of union.
37For Bidault and the other Catholic politicians of the MRP, a close relationship with Christian Democrat-led Italy was also attractive for ideological reasons. Internal justifications, however, were almost completely in this language of an anti-German alliance.
38France and Italy would replace their tariffs with a common one within one year; quotas would be gradually phased out over six to eight years; and negotiations on the harmonization of broad areas of economic legislation was scheduled for the coming two years. Numerous special clauses maintained protection in various sectors (Bossuat 1992, p. 650).
government leaders had opposed it for political reasons, arguing that it would displace more ambitious European organizations (Bossuat 1992, p. 650).\footnote{Other opposition to the treaty was motivated by business and agricultural concerns, or fears about labor migration.}

ii) A continental economic directorate? The OEEC

The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was the "permanent organization" that US leaders had insisted on as a prerequisite for Marshall aid. As it happened, the French refusal to discuss such an organization without guarantees on Germany (as well as British and Scandinavian opposition to any sort of permanent organization at all) delayed the formation of the OEEC until spring 1948. After this point, the French did what they could to obstruct the OEEC's missions of integration and liberalization, or to replace it with other multilateral frameworks.

At the CEEC of fall 1947, the Americans had "firmly expected...the European conference to give birth to a permanent European organization which would bring together the Western European countries into a close economic association [which would be]...a stepping-stone towards some form of political integration" (Milward, 1984, p. 70). The CEEC had done nothing of the sort, thanks to Franco-British control of its five-member Executive Committee.\footnote{This Executive Committee had been insisted upon by the French and British, who saw it expressly as their instrument to control the discussion of Marshall aid. Its members were senior civil servants (Alphand for the French) rather than ministers as the US had hoped. The Secretary General (Marjolin) was delegated his powers by the Executive Committee. All major decisions were taken by the full 16-member Council. The Netherlands, Italy, and Norway joined the British and the French on the Executive Committee. Milward 1984, pp. 55-56.} Now, as the CEEC reconvened on 15 March 1948, the Americans were intent on making a more powerful, supranational OEEC, with ministers meeting frequently in a broader committee, and with a Secretary General of political weight and independent powers (ibid, p. 173). The French, it turned out, were also now ready to consider a stronger organization. A strong, independent secretariat would lead European reconstruction most efficiently, argued Alphand (Young 1984, p. 88).\footnote{Bossuat and Mayne note that French proposals in the first days of talks also included the idea of majority voting on OEEC plans (Bossuat 1992, p. 193; Mayne 19xx, p. 126). This is very hard to square with the general French attitude before and after March 1948 against a strong OEEC. Milward makes no mention of it, presenting the negotiations as dominated by Anglo-French cooperation against US proposals of supranationality. The French were clearly willing to consider a stronger OEEC secretariat than the British, but they were also more willing to make grandiose statements to please the Americans. My conclusion is that this partially reflects real French flexibility on the "supranationality" issue in this context, but that it also must contain a tactical move (particularly the suggestion on majority voting) to please the US, with the French delegation knowing full well the Britain and the Scandinavians would not accept it.} But the British convinced the French to drop this plan in the first days of talks, partly through simple
threats of a veto, and partly through persuasion and emphasis of common Anglo-French leadership. In the end, the only concession to US plans was the individual chosen as chairman of the Council: the super-Europeanist, pro-American Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak. Otherwise the CEEC format was basically reproduced. Additionally, the French absolutely refused to accept any German representation at the opening ministerial meeting in April 1948. "German technical advice is not needed," said Alphand to the Americans, "and German politicians are not wanted" (Milward 1984, p. 178).

The Americans kept trying, however. Major attempts were made to use the leverage of aid allocations in summer-fall 1948 and fall 1949 to force the Europeans to "supranationalize" the OEEC. Yet in both rounds of discussions, Anglo-French leadership managed to water down or dismiss American proposals for a powerful "Director-General" (ibid, pp. 183-195; Bossuat 1992, p. 619). Schuman -- Foreign Minister since July 1948 -- played a direct role in emasculating the last American attempt in December 1949 (Milward 1984, p. 194). For the French, this did not reflect unwillingness to engage in significant economic cooperation (as it did for the British). In early 1949, in an attempt to reconcile Franco-British differences over OEEC plans in meetings in London, Finance Minister Petsche, Alphand, and Monnet very seriously proposed extensive OEEC planning and policy consultations (Bossuat 1992, p. 634-647). But these French conceptions had none of the supranationality or liberalism of US ideas; they were anti-competitive, dirigiste plans for national economic specializations within a strictly intergovernmental framework (to be dominated by London and Paris). The British saw this as no more attractive than the US version, and the failure of this brief French flirtation with a grand OEEC policy pushed the Quai d'Orsay back towards more traditional options.

But still US decision-makers did not give up. As the last battle for a supranational OEEC took place in fall 1949, a new American strategy for integration emerged. The idea of integrated European economic policies under Anglo-French leadership and a powerful OEEC was fading. In particular, the circumstances surrounding the drastic devaluation of sterling on 18 September 1949 led the Americans to admit that they could not force the British to accept, let alone lead, the construction of a supranational European economic unit. Instead, fast liberalization of trade and payments would now be America's goal,
with the functionalist hope that such steps would lead to a "central commercial authority" and even monetary union by 1951 (!) (Milward 1984, p. 296). On 31 October 1949, in a much-anticipated speech, ECA chief Paul Hoffman announced the new policy and demanded substantial trade liberalization by early 1950. Liberalization proposals for smaller groups of countries within the OEEC would be welcomed too, as long as they would outpace general liberalization.

Despite hesitations from France and several other countries, this new push produced the OEEC's first and only successes. US pressure was such that the OEEC Council quickly agreed to remove quotas on 50% of private imports by December 15, 1949. To US satisfaction, the British seemed ready to lead (if hesitantly) in this direction. The French, however, scrambled to put together their "Finebel" five-power customs union proposals (see below) as an alternative. But in the OEEC story this was only an aside; the Finebel talks failed in February 1950, and about the same time the British warmed to further US ideas about accompanying quota liberalization with a "mini-IMF" payments scheme among OEEC countries. (Bossuat 1992, p. 725; Milward 1984, p. 328). In March 1950, serious discussions of a "European Payments Union" (EPU) began. The most intense negotiations would take place in June 1950, producing an August agreement that Milward terms "one of the pillars of the post-war economic settlement" (ibid, p. 328). Quota reductions continued in 1950, and the EPU functioned well from the start.

Overall, the OEEC model is most interesting in highlighting what France would not accept in postwar Europe. French OEEC participation was contingent on limits on German reconstruction. French leaders refused any supranational role over their own aid, and hotly protested ECA increases in the German allocation. At least at one point, in winter-spring 1949, the French strongly considered extensive economic cooperation with Britain, and possibly even the entire OEEC; but French leaders saw such cooperation as necessarily intergovernmental and profoundly illiberal. Finally, whenever possible, French decision-makers proposed smaller multilateral frameworks for European reconstruction, hoping to sidestep American insistence on broad economic liberalization.

to stop forcing the British to participate in European integration (ibid, p. 295). Their agreement on the devaluation, however, did require the British to participate in general OEEC trade liberalization.

44The ECA's Planning Group, under the leadership of Robert Bissell since early 1949, drew up in summer 1949 extensive plans and a schedule for progression to the creation of a European central bank. None of this was ever seriously discussed, although rumours of these grandiose American ideas did push Europeans to consider the more moderate American proposals (Milward 1984, pp. 283-287).
iii) Multilateral customs and payments unions

The Quai d'Orsay first proposed a multilateral economic union between France and the Benelux in 1944. But the latter (particularly the Dutch), for whom Germany was traditionally the largest trading partner, rejected the French vision of an economic union built on the plunder of a dismembered German economy (Bossuat 1992, pp. 81-82). When the idea of a Franco-Italian-Benelux customs union was resurrected from 1947-1950 as the French alternative to US plans for OEEC, it ultimately died over the same problem. The French were ultimately unwilling to accord Germany the positive role in a multilateral arrangement which the Benelux demanded.

Explicit French calls for a multilateral customs union first reappeared in immediate response to American dissatisfaction with the initial discussions of the CEEC in summer 1947. On 10 September 1947, US representatives Clayton and Douglas expressed tremendous dissatisfaction at the complete absence of ideas about customs unions or payments systems in the initial CEEC report. Alphand immediately decided to attempt to expand the Franco-Italian union already in discussion, hoping the US pressure would convince the Benelux (and possibly even the British) to join.45 Informal discussions proceeded over the next several months. The Benelux, however, objected to French ideas about putting the Ruhr at the service of a union; Belgian diplomats asserted that "France, through her proposals for economic union, is pursuing her traditional policy of seeking a disguised formula for Anschluss" (Guillen 1986, p. 147). British Foreign Minister Bevin played with the idea of economic cooperation, but eventually decided against it (as had the rest of the British government long before) (Young 1984, pp. 82-84; Bossuat 1992, p. 178-181). The Prague coup of February 1948 then diverted attention to security issues, and the already-weak customs union idea was put aside in favor of expansion of the Franco-British Dunkirk Treaty to the Benelux, forming the "Brussels Pact" on 17 March 1948.46 This Pact would practically disappear within NATO a year later.

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45While the French earned American kudos for this initiative, one French diplomat noted that the French proposal was inspired by "the desire to flatter the superficial and purely theoretical views of certain American leaders, principally Mr. Clayton" (Bossuat 1992, p. 163).

46French leaders were divided on whether the Brussels Pact should also take on economic cooperation. Quai Secretary General Jean Chauvel and London Ambassador René Massigli, who led the Pact negotiations, believed the Pact could serve as the core of the emergent Marshall aid organization; others voices at the Quai argued that the military Pact should be distinct from economic cooperation, and that the US would not approve of an "inner five" at the forthcoming OEEC negotiations (Bossuat 1992, p. 192; Young 1984, p. 84). Benelux support for the former argument led to insertion of a vague clause on economic cooperation, but British support of the latter kept it from any realization.

To everyone's surprise, the British actually called a meeting on the basis of the economic clause in April 1948 to consider ways of dealing with French balance-of-payments difficulties. But no agreement was in reach, and now the Belgians and Dutch worried about undercutting the OEEC (Bossuat 1992, p. 184).
The customs union idea next appeared in spring 1949. Weak enthusiasm for the Franco-Italian union treaty (signed 26 March 1949) drove the Quai to suggest that expansion to the Benelux might lessen domestic opposition (Guillen 1986, p. 149). Furthermore, Franco-Belgian payments difficulties in early 1949 had led Guinney at the Finance Ministry to suggest the same (Bossuat 1992, p. 708). Most importantly, the US now disliked the Franco-Italian union, and was preparing to launch its new offensive on broad OEEC liberalization. US pressure brought the Benelux to the table as well (ibid, p. 710).

Under Guinney's leadership, a surprisingly ambitious French proposal was submitted to the Belgians in May 1949. This sought to develop the modest First Agreement on Multilateral Monetary Compensation of November 1947 (a Franco-Italian-Belgium payments accord) into a full payments union, with convertibility and free-floating exchange rates; to harmonize major industrial sectors as quotas were gradually removed; to create a European investment bank to ease industrial adjustment; and even to eventually develop a joint agricultural policy (ibid, p. 709; Milward 1984, p. 311). The political organization would be strictly intergovernmental. Harriman instantly liked this plan, and said (as Milward notes, "unwisely") that the US would strongly support it (Milward 1984, p. 301). French plans were much encouraged by Harriman's announcement, in June 1949, that $150 million of the 1949-1950 Marshall appropriation could go directly to support faster pockets of liberalization within the OEEC (ibid).

But over fall and winter 1949-1950, the customs union plans -- now baptised "Finebel" -- fell apart. American support weakened as their push for OEEC liberalization increased, and the British worked to undermine the talks. Finebel really died, however, over the question of German participation. The French never showed any sign of accepting West German participation, except in the distant future. Yet the Dutch posed German participation as a precondition for their own, and the Belgians gradually came to agree. Furthermore, British participation was also demanded by the Hague, and the Benelux wanted a more liberal framework, without harmonized industrial policies or an investment bank. Milward notes, "The French negotiators were thus left facing the stark reality that if Finebel were to solve their future problem with West Germany it would only do so in a much more uncontrolled and liberal framework that they wished to contemplate" (ibid, p.

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47The more ambitious parts of this proposal -- particularly on harmonization of industrial sectors and a common agricultural policy -- are mentioned only by Milward, and not in the more recent, comprehensive, and French-focused Bossuat. I am tempted to believe that they were not serious parts of these discussions, and that Milward's emphasis on them is more evidence of his consistently backward-looking account (which tries to present later ECSC and EEC developments as foreseeable even long before the actors themselves foresaw them). Nonetheless I mention them in the text to make my opponent's argument as strong as possible.
US support also waned in light of France's rejection of German participation and because Finebel exhibited no supranationality whatsoever; in December Alphand was told Finebel would not receive the extra $150 million (ibid).

But most directly, French enthusiasm for their own project decreased over the course of fall 1949. Ironically, this evolution derived partially from American exhortations to Paris to take on the leadership of European integration with (in George Kennan's words) "generosity and imagination" (Bossuat 1992, p. 698). At the September 15-19 meeting of the occupying powers, Secretary of State Dean Acheson told Schuman that the French should propose a German policy for the Three by their next meeting, in May 1950 (Duchêne 1994, p. 190). Coupled with French exclusion from the Anglo-American-Canadian deal on British devaluation in early September, these remarks were interpreted by the French as a threat, not encouragement. On 22 September American Ambassador David Bruce was called in by premier Henri Queuille, who feared an Anglo-Saxon disengagement from the continent which would leave France to face Germany alone. Acheson also felt the need to send Schuman a telegram reassuring him that the US had no such intentions (Melandri 1980, p. 226; Bossuat 1992, pp. 698-703). The French were only slightly reassured, and began to reweigh the dangers of promoting a customs union without British participation.

The arguments within the French government for and against Finebel came down to a two-day meeting of the Conseil des Ministres on January 11-12 1950. Finance Minister Petsche led the fight for a Finebel; behind him were the financial bureaucrats (Guinédy, Schweitzer) as well as the heads of Economic Affairs (Alphand) and the Service de coopération économique (Baraduc). Their main arguments presented Finebel as the only way to avoid broad liberalization in the OEEC, and the best way to "obstruct, through the constitution of a solid five-power bloc, the refound dynamism of the German economy" (Guillen 1986, p. 156). Yet even within Baraduc's Service there was profound disagreement; critics pointed out the dangers of tying France to the high unemployment economies of Belgium and Italy (let alone Germany at some distant date), as well as of competition with countries with lower wages and hiring costs (ibid, p. 157). These concerns were shared by the Labor Ministry. The Political Directorate at the Quai (run by Couve de Murville, and tied tightly to Massigli in London) opposed Finebel for its rupture

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48 Many historians present these remarks as a major piece of the puzzle leading the French to the Schuman Plan (for example, Milward 1984, p. 390-392). This claim is heavily tainted by a backward reading of history. The French themselves simply did not draw the lesson that they should launch a major initiative without the British. Furthermore, US signals in this direction were entirely ambiguous, as they were accompanied by the push for OEEC liberalization (which very clearly included Britain). In April 1950, ECA leaders would tell the French that any extended international version of the Ruhr Authority was not favored by the Americans, since it would likely be a cartel-like body (Milward 1984, p. 388).
with Britain. Among the other ministers, Minister of Industry Robert Lacoste (SFIO) feared the eventual danger of German competition too much to accept Finebel, and Agriculture Minister Pierre Pflimlin (MRP) opposed Finebel because it was with French agricultural competitors rather than the major markets of Britain and Germany (ibid, p. 158). Schuman, finally, wavered but favored pressing for a moderate version of OEEC liberalization (Milward 1984, p.315). Overall, the ministers' meeting was inconclusive, and expert meetings about Finebel continued hesistantly. Yet news of French disagreements spread, and British warnings in February that Finebel would cause a break in Franco-British relations further weakened its chances. It died definitively when the British proposal of 8 March 1950 on a European Payments Union deblocked the OEEC discussions, and French attention turned in that direction (Poidevin 1986, p. 237).

Multilateral economic cooperation below the OEEC level was dead for the time being. As Milward summarizes, "What made it unworkable was the insistence that West Germany be included from the outset and the parallel insistence within the OEEC on a programme of trade liberalization which cut the ground from under the French proposals for a coordinated and managed sectoral integration to cope with the German problem" (Milward 1984, p. 314). The consistent French vision of an intergovernmental economic bloc against the Germans was not acceptable to her continental partners or Britain.\textsuperscript{49}

\textit{iv) A continental political union? The Council of Europe}

The "Council of Europe" formed by ten countries on 5 May 1949 was yet another proposal which emerged from France's German policy.\textsuperscript{50} It was the most "Europeanist" of French initiatives, but also the least concrete; the major economic histories hardly even address it. While the most "federalist" French politicians had immense hopes for the Council, in the more sober terms of government policy it was a symbolic gesture aimed at defusing a resurgence of German nationalism by incorporating West Germany into a cooperative European framework. For my purposes, the Council episode highlights important aspects of French thinking on a framework for relations between France, Germany, and Britain.

The chain of events leading to the Council of Europe began with the final initiative of Georges Bidault's career as foreign minister. At a meeting of the Brussels Pact Consultative Council in July 1948, Bidault proposed the creation of a "European assembly"

\textsuperscript{49}Milward concludes, "France was not ready to lower her tariffs or reduce her non-tariff trade controls against Germany, much less accept the political consequences at home of the participation of West Germany in Finebel" (1984, p. 312).

\textsuperscript{50}The original ten members were France, Britain, the three Benelux, Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.
and an "economic and customs union" between, at the very least, the five Brussels Pact members. He drew explicit inspiration from the May 1948 Hague Conference on European union, which he had enthusiastically attended.

Massigli and others note that Bidault knew full well that the British would dislike these ideas, and call this was a last-ditch attempt to persuade Europeanist premier Paul Ramadier (Radical) to save Bidault's position at the Quai d'Orsay (precarious since the announcement of the hated London Accords on Germany in June) (Massigli 1978, p. 145; Dalloz 1992, p. 200). And indeed, the British hated the idea, and the Dutch were very reticent. Nor did Bidault retain his post when the Ramadier government fell, before he had even returned from the Brussels Pact meeting. Robert Schuman (MRP) took his place, and would hold it through 1952.

Nonetheless, support was voiced by the Italians, the Belgians, and the US. Thus the new French government decided on 18 August to take up Bidault's idea, but opted to drop "economic union" and pursue only an Assembly. Furthermore, said the resultant French memo, the Assembly "will have no legislative or executive powers," serving instead as a consultative body with the mission of proposing European initiatives. Desires to please the US figured prominently in discussions in the Cabinet (Bitsch 1986, p. 166). The search for a new German policy was the most fundamental motivation, however; a 7 October 1948 note from Alphand's Economic Affairs summarized that it was "essential to present to the German political imagination a continental system in which Germany has its part and role" (ibid, p. 170). The creators of this policy -- Director of European Affairs Jacques-Camille Paris, Alphand, and Schuman -- saw a high-profile European Assembly as the framework for German acceptance of their place in the new Europe.

In tandem with the Belgians, the French submitted their memo to the Brussels Pact's next meeting in early September. They proposed that a conference of 75 non-governmental politicians (on the implicit model of a Constitutional Assembly) should meet as soon as possible to draw up plans. Yet the British accepted neither a non-governmental organization nor a non-governmental conference to create any organization. In October, however, Bevin counter-proposed a permanent organization in which ministers would meet once per year. In late October, the French dropped their insistence on a non-governmental conference, and it was agreed that an 18-member committee (chosen by the governments)

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51Bidault had his speech transmitted immediately to the Quai d'Orsay, with abnormal instructions that it be sent to the premier and the president immediately as well. Young notes that a week before, Bidault had told British Ambassador in Paris Oliver Harvey that such a proposal was forthcoming; but "he added that he knew these were unrealistic ideas but that premier Ramadier insisted on proposing them" (Young 1984, p. 110). The idea of the proposal was entirely Bidault's, however, with no awareness or preparation at all within the Quai d'Orsay (Massigli 1978, p. 152).
would meet in November to discuss both the UK's intergovernmental proposal and the French ideas for an Assembly.

From its first meeting on 26 November 1948 until late January, the committee unsuccessfully looked for a compromise between the British plan for ministerial meetings and French arguments for a consultative assembly of non-governmental delegates. The impasse ended in late January, when Schuman decided "to reach a positive, concrete result at any price" (Bitsch 1986, p. 191). At the 28 January meeting of the Brussels Pact Consultative Council, he finally convinced Bevin to accept the creation of an assembly. Bevin even volunteered Strasbourg as the new organization's location. But this assembly, Schuman conceded, would have its agenda controlled by a Council of Ministers, imposing the British ideas on the French model. Furthermore, the assembly would be barred from discussing economic issues covered by the OEEC, or security issues covered by the gestating Atlantic Alliance, and each government could select its delegates as it wished. Lastly, French hopes for an ambitious title ("European Parliament" or something like it) lost out to the British "Council of Europe."

From February to May this compromise was negotiated formally. One major question was the modalities of German participation. Even though the French had launched the Council as an eventual framework for German reintegration into Europe, they saw participation by central German authorities as a question for the future. In January, J.C. Paris's progressive Direction d'Europe wrote that "it seems obvious that it is impossible to give Germany, from the outset, a position in the Union equal to France or Britain" (Poidevin 1986, p. 225). As late as the end of February 1949, the French government envisioned the German Länder joining the Council separately; Schuman preferred this to the eventual membership of a German central government because the Länder would be (in Schuman's words) much "less preoccupied with centralizing ideas" (Bitsche 1986, p. 194). This was soon ruled out in the simultaneous negotiations on the revision of the Allied occupation, however. The question of German membership would be revisited after the creation of a German government in the fall.52 But even after the

52 In April, the three occupying powers had finally agreed on the new Occupation Statute that would take effect upon the creation of a German government. Here the French had obtained much of what they desired: the High Commission of the occupiers (which would replace the military governments) reserved powers over "disarmament and demilitarization, certain trade regulations, foreign affairs, controls over foreign trade and exchange, displaced persons, security of the Allied forces, occupation costs, respect for the federal and Land constitutions, and international controls to avoid increasing financial dependence on foreign aid" (Willis 1968, p. 30).
creation of the German government in September 1949, the French did not see German adhesion as immediately desirable.\textsuperscript{53} The signature on 5 May 1949 of the treaty creating the Council of Europe provoked some disappointment and some hope in the French government. For Schuman, J.C. Paris, and Alphand, not to mention the Europeanist contingent outside the government, the hoped-for "psychological shock" in favor of European unity had not been produced.\textsuperscript{54} But an assembly had been created, and Schuman insisted he was optimistic that it would be the point of departure for future integration (ibid, p. 197). Most importantly, writes Bitsche, Franco-British cooperation had been preserved: "...it was clear that France wished to avoid a rupture with Britain on this question even given major differences. Was it not necessary that the two countries show solidarity to balance against a Germany 'who is already becoming an ally' and who could 'quickly become a rival and perhaps a master'?...Thus the entente between Paris and London seemed indispensable to the project. Even if it cost so many concessions, it was the necessary prerequisite for the success of the enterprise" (ibid, p. 198).\textsuperscript{55}

At the consultative assembly's first session in fall 1949, even the British sent a very distinguished delegation of powerful politicians.\textsuperscript{56} A great many proposals were made to extend the Assembly's agenda (notably to allow it to discuss OEEC affairs) and to link it to other bodies, such as committees of the Brussels Pact. Yet in the November 1949 meeting of the Council of Ministers (of the Council of Europe) even Schuman voted against these suggestions. This was partly to avoid annoying the Americans, who did not want to complicate the OEEC, and partly because he had lost patience with the large Council of Europe format (Massigli 1978, p. 179). The Council of Europe had begun its steady slide into obscurity.

\textsuperscript{53} Even the federalist Paul Reynaud, one of the French members of the Council of Ministers assembly, said at its first session in fall 1949 that "the presence of Germany here would not settle anything..." (Willis 1968, p. 58). The official government position, as set out by Schuman in July 1949, was that Germany could only become a full member of the Council when it had recuperated all of its sovereignty; until then, any German government could only become an "associate member" (Poidevin 1986b, p. 323).

\textsuperscript{54} These are the words of the French liberal Europeanist Paul Reynaud, who participated in the 18-member committee which prepared the Council agreement; while none of the Quai diplomats were as given as Reynaud to a strongly supranational, federalist vocabulary, J.C. Paris and Alphand saw a symbolic gesture to the Germans as the main point of the Assembly (Bitsch 1986, p. 185).

\textsuperscript{55} The internal quotes are from a telegram from Jacques Tarbé de Saint-Hardouin, head French political counselor in Germany, to the Quai, 30 November 1948. My translation of Bitsche's quote replaces the present tense (usually used in French historical accounts) with the past.

\textsuperscript{56} The British delegation included Labour leaders Herbert Morrison, Hugh Dalton, and Ronald McKay, and Conservatives Winston Churchill, Harold Macmillan, and David Maxwell Fyfe (Massigli p. 170).
v) *Sectoral institutions? Coal, Steel, and the IAR*

Ideas about international management of particular economic sectors had been present (vaguely) in early postwar French discussions, and continued to play a central role in French thinking on economic integration. With one exception, however, a lack of enthusiasm for sectoral cooperation elsewhere in Europe limited such French ideas to exploratory proposals.\(^57\) That one exception was coal and steel. But in coal and steel, it was the French government who rejected truly international arrangements -- until May 1950.

During the second World War, "combined boards" located in Washington had allocated various basic goods among the allies. In 1945, Alphand and others at the Quai proposed maintaining similar arrangements in peacetime (Duroselle 1986, p. 207). The US and the UK, however, saw such abrogations of liberal trade as justified only by war. Nonetheless, this aspect of French thinking on economic cooperation was strengthened in the creation and implementation of the Monnet Plan, which developed domestic sectoral planning to new heights. The most ambitious French proposals for broad economic cooperation -- in the OEEC in early 1949, and in the Finebel context in spring 1949 -- were based on sector-by-sector harmonization.\(^58\) Yet except for the Italians, no one in Europe (or, certainly, in Washington) approved of France's sectoral way of thinking.

Even for the "Anglo-Saxons," however, coal was the major exception. Carefully managed allocation of this precious resource was an acknowledged necessity in postwar Europe. Despite the creation of a "European Coal Organization" in 1945 under UN auspices, in practice most coal was under the control of the British military occupation of the Ruhr (Milward 1984, p. 139).\(^59\) The French were thus entirely dependent on the British and Americans for desperately needed coal imports.\(^60\) This was the most immediate reason why French policy turned to focus on the sectoral organization of coal. The larger reason, of course, was that French coal dependence on the British military government

\(^57\) The one other possible exception is agriculture, although no proposals were politically significant enough to be mentioned in any of the histories of the period which are not on that particular subject. I have looked at but do not currently have the major book on agriculture: Gilbert Noel (1988). *Du pool vert à la politique agricole commune, tentatives de communautés agricoles européennes entre 1945 et 1957.* Paris: Economica.

\(^58\) This was true even though Monnet's influence over foreign economic policy had significantly diminished since a French turn towards less inflationist domestic economic policies in summer 1948; this was a victory of the traditionally-minded *Inspecteurs de Finance* (mostly in the Finance Ministry) over Monnet's planners (Girault 1986). But even the former conceived of much international economic cooperation in sectoral terms.

\(^59\) The ECO never established much authority, and it faded (but did not die) as the Cold War undercut most UN organizations (Milward 1984, p. 139).

\(^60\) Some numbers on French coal needs.
would eventually become dependence on Germany, unless French control over the Saar and Ruhr was secured. The Saar was the smaller and simpler of the two; by December 1946 the US and UK had recognized French economic annexation (although certainly not political annexation). The Ruhr remained.

Early French thinking on the coal sector was pointedly not about economic cooperation, but about organizing lasting French control over German coal and coke. Particularly in the long term, French leaders saw keeping Germany from limiting domestic use of its coal and coke as at least as important as securing French access to it. The first comprehensive French plan for a "Ruhr Authority" emerged in February 1947, exactly when French leaders reached the conclusion that detachment of the Ruhr from Germany was not politically feasible. Coal and steel firms would be under Allied ownership and oversight but mostly German management, all under some sort of international political body (Diebold 1959, pp. 30-31). US Secretary of State Marshall seemed to vaguely accept these general ideas at the time, assuming a Four-Power peace treaty was possible (Milward 1984, pp. 139-140). But as that peace treaty became less and less likely (as we have seen) American leaders found tight control of west Germany less and less acceptable. In July 1947 the Bizone commanders raised Ruhr production levels without consulting French. In August 1947, the French managed to leverage their blockage of CEEC proceedings to obtain American accord on a future "International Authority of the Ruhr." Again, this IAR would be international not in its geographical scope, but in giving a board of US, British, French and Benelux representatives the power to allocate Ruhr coal and steel. A US suggestion to extend the IAR to French and Benelux coal and steel was dismissed by French negotiators without a thought (Milward 1984, p. 150).

But French hopes for a powerful IAR, like their other plans, were mostly frustrated by the Americans. In March 1948 the US ruled out firm-level international control; the IAR would only allocate aggregate Ruhr production between domestic and international consumption. At that point, the French still had hopes that the IAR would oversee the transfer of ownership and initial appointment of trustees of Ruhr firms. But on the day before the final IAR negotiations were to begin in November 1948, the Bizone commanders announced that ownership would be decided by the future German government. This infamous "Law No. 75" provoked a storm of French protest; Schuman told the relevant ambassadors to declare all unilateral decisions of the Bizone "null and void" (Bossuat 1992, p. 663; Poidevin 1986a, p. 224). Milward notes, "the next stage of the London conference looked as though it might never begin" (1984, p. 153). After this, the Americans became somewhat more conciliatory. To calm French fears, Marshall flew to Paris. In the face of Schuman's "very emotional" demands for strong IAR powers,
Marshall offered the French participation on the Coal and Steel Boards of the Bizone -- the real decision-making bodies for the Ruhr (Bossuat 1992, p. 663). This gave the French more control in the immediate future, but this would only last as long as the occupation. In the IAR negotiations that followed, US negotiators allowed that French security concerns were reasonable, but maintained that fears of German economic competition were not. For the former, the US proposed a three-power Military Security Board within the Atlantic Alliance which would outlive the occupation, overseeing German military organization and related industries. Furthermore, the IAR could supervise industrial concentration and ensure that no Nazis returned to power in Ruhr firms. Otherwise, however, the IAR agreed upon in December 1948 was a very weak body. Its allocations of coal and steel had to conform to OEEC reconstruction plans.\(^6\) Furthermore, while the French understood that the much more considerable powers of the Bizone Coal and Steel Boards would eventually be transferred to the IAR, US leaders never understood the vague wording of the IAR agreement in this way (ibid, p. 161; Bossuat 1992, p. 666).

Still, American concessions were enough that Alphand (the head French negotiator) held a triumphant press conference on 28 December 1948, announcing French successes in limiting German power (Bossuat 1992, p. 665). Bossuat summarizes, "The French acceptance of the December 1948 accords was not in the name of a new conception of relations with Germany, nor of the unity of Europe, but because they brought the French limited but real satisfaction on German controls" (ibid, p. 666).

On 28 April 1949 the IAR agreement was signed. The next six months would see the failure of the French attempt to transfer the Coal and Steel Board powers to the IAR. That attempt began in the final negotiations of the Petersberg Accords which constituted the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1949. The Americans insisted, however, that these powers should go to the Allied High Commission (which the US representative dominated more than the IAR) (Milward 1984, p. 388). In response, over winter 1949-50 the Quai put together proposals for giving the IAR some of the High Commission's powers on industrial management (notably decartelization). These proposals were targeted for the foreign ministers' conference in May 1950 -- where they were entirely overshadowed by another French proposal.

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\(^6\)Three months later, the US government unilaterally rewrote the first OEEC plan because the Europeans had cut aid to Germany (Milward 1984, p. 161). See above on OEEC.
D. The Rationality of French Policies 1945-1950

What "rationality" of France's German policy, then, do these actions and statements sketch for us? The rationale animating French diplomacy vis-à-vis Germany and Europe between 1947 and 1950 can be summarized in three interrelated propositions. First, the desired future French place in Europe had a zero-sum relationship with German political and economic power. Domestically, French modernization was partly built on reparations of German coal and industry. The Treaty of Dunkirk, the Franco-Italian economic union, and the IAR were all created to hold down Germany or balance against it; the Brussels Pact and Finebel arose from other pressures (Soviet and American) but were seen by French decision-makers as supporting these goals.62 (Finebel failed because a version of it which supported these goals could not be found). The same is true of French action in the OEEC, where the major French aims were to obtain aid while blocking German reconstruction. Second, Britain played a key role in all of French plans for Europe. Britain was seen as the crucial ally with which France could balance Germany in Europe. Beyond the Dunkirk Treaty, this was displayed most clearly in the failures of Finebel and the Council of Europe. A central reason why French decision-makers lost enthusiasm for Finebel was that it risked strengthening Britain's detachment from the continent -- which would leave the French as the only major power facing Germany. Though the Council of Europe was largely conceived as a conciliatory gesture to German opinion, French leaders thought such a gesture was necessarily a Franco-British one. Third, some French leaders did not reject supranational institutions as did the British, but they only considered them in particular settings. While only American pressure brought some French decision-makers slowly to the idea of supranationality, they did consider supranational delegations of power in the broad settings of the OEEC and the Council of Europe. In these frameworks, weak supranationality was valuable as a symbolic commitment to unity, and could facilitate technical agreements. But in smaller settings such as Finebel or the Franco-Italian union (let alone the crucial IAR) supranationality never came up.

With the exception of a small circle around Jean Monnet, all three of these principles dominated French decision-makers' thinking until the announcement of the Schuman Plan. Although the men in the government had accepted the political rebirth of Germany by spring 1950, most French leaders' view of the basically zero-sum relationship with Germany had changed little. In January-March 1950, the last arguments for the dying

62 Bossuat writes: "The customs union and the Brussels Pact were two aspects of the same French policy: to realize the unity of Europe in the framework of a constraining -- if not supranational -- formula under Franco-British direction. Why? To better control Germany..." (1992, p. 188).
Franco-Italian treaty were that it would prevent a Germano-Italian economic axis, and Finebel died because the French could not accept trade liberalization with Germany. Meanwhile, the French continued to push for stronger powers for the IAR, and continued to fight aid to Germany in the OEEC. A new series of protocols to tie the Saar more tightly to France were negotiated in February-March 1950, leading to bitter Franco-German recriminations. When FRG Chancellor Adenauer had the audacity to suggest a "Franco-German union" in March and April 1950, he received no response from the mistrustful French (Willis 1968, pp. 70-78). A more cooperative vision of Franco-German relations was gestating in J.C. Paris's Direction d'Europe at the Quai, in consultation with Monnet at the Plan (see below). But elsewhere -- even in Alphand's Economic Affairs -- the only Franco-German cooperation envisaged was with a Germany with partial sovereignty and limited industry, in a vague continental framework, with British and US presence and supportive guarantees. The proposal favored to begin this "integration" of Germany into Europe was the weak Council of Europe -- and even there, German membership was only seen as a future step!

On Britain, despite all of the British vetos of European organizations, no one in the French government (except Monnet) thought significant integration with Germany possible without British participation in spring 1950. Alphand himself -- personally detested by the British, and the major force behind the UK-less Finebel -- proclaimed on April 29, 1950 that any sort of integration with Germany but without Britain was impossible (Duchène, 1994, p. 189). Ambassador to London René Massigli, who was very influential at the Quai, argued loudly for patience with the British (Massigli, 1978; Guillen, 1986, p. 157). The Labour government survived the February 1950 elections with only a very reduced majority, prompting speculation of a turn towards the Conservatives' more pro-European policy and supporting Massigli's arguments (Massigli 1978, p. 182). Premier Bidault, while very critical of British obstruction of integration by early 1950, still saw his "Great Power" France as oriented first and foremost towards high-level cooperation with Britain and the US, as reflected in his personal initiative of 16 April 1950 for high-level security and economic cooperation between France, Britain and the US (Daloz, 303).

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63 Massigli writes in his memoirs, "In these first months of 1950, there was absolutely no reason...to worry about, or even be impatient with, the difficulties resulting from the differences between "continental" and British reasoning... In any case, solutions had to be found which could only result from compromise" (Massigli, 19xx, p. 183).

64 Bidault was prime minister at the time. His initiative received little response from the UK or the US, but was very badly received in France. He had not consulted Foreign Minister Schuman or the Quai, and the speech was seen as dismissive of hopes for European integration. Fellow MRP politician R. Bichet noted, "Some exploited Bidault's speech at Lyon saying: 'Europe is dead before having lived..." (Daloz, 1992, p. 305).
The traditional thinkers at the top of the Quai hierarchy -- Maurice Couve de Murville, Alexandre Parodi, Jacques Dumaine -- resolutely opposed integration without Britain (Duchêne 1994, p. 206; Bossuat 1992, p. 753). American Ambassador to Paris David Bruce -- a friend of Monnet -- wrote on April 25, 1950,

(1) ...there will be no real European integration without whole-hearted participation by the UK, (2) the UK will not whole-heartedly participate... (3) ergo, there will be no purely European integration.... Instead we [the US] should advocate... an Atlantic Treaty Community" (Duchêne 1994, p. 189).

On supranationality, finally, while French calls for it multiplied at the Council of Europe, few (if any) French decision-makers had a clear idea of what this meant in organizational terms. For the most part, it simply meant that real, weighty decisions would be made in some international setting -- but in that setting, they usually pictured a collection of governmental representatives making them. Within the government, the creation of supranational institutions who were not composed of governmental representatives was not a major issue.

E. A New Policy Emerges

The first signs of a different way of thinking about Franco-German relations appeared within Monnet’s Commissariat Général au Plan in fall 1948. Monnet himself prioritized cooperation or integration with Britain at the time, but in light of the French failures of summer 1948 he initiated studies of new options in German policy (Duchêne 1994, pp. 186-187; Bossuat 1992, p. 655). These brought the first suggestions in policy-making circles that associations with Germany should be a central part of broader discussions of European union.65 Such thinking then spilled over from the Plan to the Direction d’Europe at the Quai (ibid, p. 656). An oft-cited memo of 5 January 1949 went very far in the direction of ECSC:

The French government has arrived at the conviction that the guarantees that it seeks can only be validly obtained by somehow associating Germany in a broader framework, that of Europe. Ruhr steel will not be German steel, but a part of European steel. France will be associated, in the same way as Germany, in the direction of this steel cartel. She will thus have her word to say, better than by the means of international controls, in questions of the German steel industry. It is by a voluntary abdication of one part of the sovereignty of states, by an association of the interests of

65Monnet actually made this kind of very vague argument as early as 1943 in Algiers. But he had proposed and done so many other things since then, including participating without complaint in much of the anti-German policies before 1948, that this can only be understood as brainstorming. Fall 1948 was the first time that he (or anyone in the French government) began to discuss putting Franco-German cooperation at the center of a near-term policy proposal.
these states that France believes it possible, in thus tying down Germany, to be assured of the security guarantee she seeks... German economic power will become a support rather than a menace... Politically, a Germany associated to Europe by contractual links respecting her interests will not have the temptation to undertake adventures (Duroselle 1986, p. 209).

Such thinking was rare, as we have seen, outside of the Direction d'Europe, except for hesitant sympathies in Alphand's Economic Affairs and from Schuman personally (Poidevin 1986a). Bossuat calls this memo the "position maximaliste" (p. 658). But even for Schuman and the Direction d'Europe, three major differences separated this exploratory thinking and the ECSC plan they would endorse a year later. First, they saw the path to a hypothetical steel cartel as distant, and as passing first through broader European integration. The memo above was written as a justification for the Council of Europe, which itself was only a powerless forum for the suggestion of "real" steps in integration -- and even there, both Schuman and the Direction d'Europe wished to postpone German membership. Second, relatedly, this thinking pictured France facing Germany with Britain at her side; the same memo above goes on to note that to avoid German dominance in integration, "The sole way to protect ourselves is through a close alliance, in the European union, of the British and French peoples." Third, the supranationality that the French championed for the broader OEEC and Council of Europe was absent from this smaller picture. While they never reached the stage of explicit plans, these vague mentions of a European steel cartel at the Quai suggested standard intergovernmental agencies.66

Nevertheless, there were signs that Schuman and a small number of Quai diplomats were beginning to think differently from their compatriots. Bossuat writes "There were thus truly two French policies for Germany by fall 1948. Which one would win? This debate...was first in the heads of certain men, first at the Plan, then at the Quai, above all for Robert Schuman" (p. 658). But if Schuman and a few of his bureaucrats were turning in this direction, they had little idea how to proceed, or in what terms to justify a cooperative Franco-German policy to their hostile colleagues. In late spring 1950, the suggestions Schuman received through the Quai hierarchy seemed to

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66 A 1 May 1950 note from the Service de coopération économique (under Alphand's Direction des affaires économiques et financières) to the Direction d'Europe noted recent discussion at the Council of Europe of "European companies" -- public boards for the regulation and allocation of international trade in Europe, of which one for coal and steel had been suggested as a first step. The memo notes that, while the French government supports the economic management and specialization implied, it would have to be careful to sound such ideas out with the Americans, who might see such companies as "an attempt to resurrect cartels under an international cloak." It goes on to recommend that the most that can be done at the moment is to ask the French Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Jacques-Camille Paris (previous head of the Direction d'Europe), to "float" the idea "before international opinion, in order to create a current of opinion which would permit the French OEEC delegation to obtain a study on the subject." "Note: compagnies européennes," MAE, Série DE-CE, vol. 577, 1 May 1950.
him (in the words of his personal staff member Robert Mischlich) "inspired by a tradition of mistrust and to have little chance of changing the course of events" (Duchêne 1994, p. 199).

How Jean Monnet managed to turn this hesitant new thinking into the centerpiece of France's German policy is the best known part of this story. Monnet himself had only arrived at the idea that Franco-German relations could proceed without Britain after a final personal attempt to persuade the British in February 1950. In March 1950, while on vacation in the Alps, Monnet came up with the principles of a plan. In April he developed the plan with the assistance of law professor Paul Reuter and Plan technical experts Pierre Uri and Etienne Hirsch (Duchêne 1994, p. 200). While the French knew the ECA to be opposed to cartel-like arrangements on coal and steel, Monnet felt he personally could obtain American support through his contacts (notably his close friendships with TITLE George Ball and High American Commissioner in Germany James McCloy) (Bossuat 1992, pp. 742-3). The first draft of the project took form around 16-17 April; on April 20 Monnet sent a draft to Bernard Clappier, head of Schuman's cabinet. After a week with no response, Monnet passed a draft to Pierre-Louis Falaize, head of Prime Minister Bidault's cabinet. Bidault either never read it or thought (as he maintains in his memoirs) that it was not immediately à l'ordre du jour (Daloz 1992, p. 306; Bidault 1965). On April 28, however, Clappier responded that Schuman was interested. Over the next weekend Schuman studied and decided to propose the plan, although apparently Monnet still had to persuade him to accept its supranational aspects (Gerbet 1986, p. 222). On May 3 Schuman mentioned the idea very vaguely in a government Cabinet meeting. In the next few days, Monnet and Hirsch contacted Justice Minister René Mayer (Radical) and Defense Minister René Pleven (UDSR), and obtained their support. On May 7 Schuman informed Acheson, who has passing through Paris; while at first the US Secretary called the idea "the most horrible cartel I've ever seen," he was soon won over by the political aspects of the plan (Wall 1989, p. 278). On May 8 Adenauer was informed by private messenger. On May 9, the plan was revealed to the government. Despite Bidault's uncertainty and opposition from President Auriol, Schuman, Mayer, and Pleven pushed it through. Hours later, Schuman announced the plan to the world.

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67In talks with Planning Board head Lord Plowden, Monnet's "key point" was that "If the resurgence of a hostile Germany were to be avoided, the UK and France should have not only a common economic but a common political policy.... Neither country has really thought out... policy towards Germany and...little time was left.... He returned to this theme again and again (Plowden's words in Duchene 1994, p. 189).
F. The New Policy

In what way did the Schuman Plan represent "a leap into the unknown"? How did it "break the deadlock"? (Willis 1968). Why was it a "salutary shock," a "new chapter" in Franco-German relations? (Bossuat 1992; Berard 1977). Why was British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin livid with surprise and outrage when he learned of the plan? Why did Paul Hoffman write, "Mr. Robert Schuman has gone further than any American would have thought possible at this time"? Why, in Milward's words, did Schuman's proposal display his personal "courage to seize the moment and translate into reality a complexity of vague interrelationships, suggestions and ideas which the fearfulness of others had left trembling on the brink of actuality"? (1984, p. 396).

The idea for a European Coal and Steel Community broke with each of the principles of the previous French rationality highlighted above. The new agreement between France and Germany would be the first to proceed on terms of equality. Furthermore, it would open the French economy in two sectors where Germany had large advantages, in addition to lower wages. Economically, the rationale was anything but zero-sum; nor could the fundamental use of this economic proposal to create a political alliance be called zero-sum. On top of this, France was offering to bind itself to Germany in a way that was clearly unacceptable to Britain.68 Precisely because Schuman now saw the Franco-German relationship in non-zero-sum terms, France no longer had to be bolstered directly by powerful allies in her relations with Germany. The same change of perspective made Schuman's enthusiasm for supranationality applicable to the Franco-German relationship, as it had not been before. Previously the French government had approved of supranationality in broad fora with British participation, safety in numbers, and a German role deferred to the future. Now Schuman portrayed supranationality as the method to strengthen the non-zero-sum character of Franco-German relations, ensuring an impartial facilitator of agreements in their newfound "common interest."

Thus the Schuman Plan did reflect important aspects of interpretive change. But while this different framework for France's German policy had become a French government proposal on May 9, 1950, it had not yet become the framework for that entire policy. Nor was it even close to being accepted as "the right policy" within the government. For Monnet's idea was not simply an idea that other French decision-makers

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68 Historians agree that Monnet, Schuman, and their few collaborators hoped very much that Britain would join the coal and steel pool, but they thought this unlikely and were decided to go forward in any case (Milward PAGES; Bossuat PAGES; Poidevin PAGES).
showed no signs of coming up with themselves. It was an idea that most of them questioned even after its proposal, and some actively opposed.

G. The Internal Battles of 1950-1951

In the months following Schuman’s proposal, an indirect battle was fought within the French government. Having obtained hesitant government approval on May 9, 1950, Schuman and Monnet set off to implement their plan as quickly as possible. But at the same time, harsh criticism and even secret countermoves emerged from the Quai d’Orsay and other ministries. Several powerful ministers and much of the foreign policy bureaucracy were outraged by Schuman’s initiative, both for its substance and for being bypassed in the process that produced it.

The main bones of contention were linked: British participation and supranationality. In inviting European governments to negotiations to create a coal and steel pool, Schuman set out that all participants must accept the principle of supranationality as the point of departure. This was Monnet’s idea, designed to keep the British from watering down the ECSC idea as they had the Council of Europe. In the difficult discussions with the British which ensued (May 15-June 3), Schuman himself seemed ready at several points to concede this in order to secure British participation (Massigli, 1978, p. 208). But while the anglophile Monnet spent the first week after the announcement trying to convince the British to participate, he refused to budge on the precondition of supranationality, and persuaded Schuman to show similar resolve (Duchene, 1994, p. 208). Ultimately the British refused to negotiate with any preconditions, and on June 3 Schuman and Monnet decided to move on without them.

By this time, the hostile ministers and Quai diplomats were frothing at the mouth. Within the Quai, Secretary-General Alexandre Parodi and Political Director Maurice Couve de Murville (the two highest-ranking civil servants in the ministry, directly below Schuman in the hierarchy) did not hide their opposition to the Plan.69 They were supported by Jacques Dumaines, Director of Protocol, and René Massigli, the influential Ambassador to Britain. All saw “Britain as France’s irreplaceable partner against Germany... [and] tended to regard community with Germany as suicidal or a betrayal of France’s great-power perogatives” (Duchene 1994, p. 206). Nor did any see supranationality as clearly desirable, let alone worth a rupture with London. In mid-June Massigli offered his resignation along with an appeal for patience with the British, but Schuman rejected both

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69Jean Chauvel, Parodi’s recent predecessor, was of the same mind (Chauvel, 19xx, p. 268).
(Massigli, 1978, pp. 212-3). On June 12, Schuman persuaded an interministerial committee to allow Monnet to head and select the French delegation to negotiations. The foreign ministry would thus continue to be bypassed.

With initial support from Ministers Mayer and Pleven, and very tentative support from Prime Minister Bidault, Schuman similarly ignored opposition from other ministers. The chief opponents were Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs Maurice Petsche and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Robert Buron, along with their services. As with the Quai, the economic bureaucracy most feared the break with Britain, and disliked supranationality. Alexandre Kojève, Directeur of External Economic Relations at the Finance Ministry, argued that the coal and steel pool idea should be taken up in the OEEC, and that the supranational "High Authority" should be replaced by an intergovernmental European Investment Bank (Bossuaut 1992, p. 752).70 Olivier Wormser, who had just replaced Alphand at the Quai, supported Kojève's position (Bossuaut 1988, p. 322). Petsche and Buron also saw a coal and steel pool as potentially dangerous for French industry (Massigli, p. 214, note 1). Trade liberalization within the OEEC was only now finally moving forward, they argued; why turn now to a dangerous union with Germany in a different framework? On June 10 a bitter Petsche met secretly with the British Chancellor, Stafford Cripps. Claiming to act with Prime Minister Bidault's approval, he proposed a "common front of partisans of international cooperation in the OEEC" to reorient the Schuman Plan (Bossuat, p. 753; Warner 19xx, pp 271-272). Petsche also proposed that they work out a more modest proposal (his specific idea was "to pool the production of tractors or aircraft") to offer when Monnet's scheme fell apart (Lynch 1988, p. 123). But Cripps' reply was evasive, and the action was already elsewhere. Monnet and representatives of the FRG, Italy, and the Benelux had already agreed to begin negotiations on June 20.

Only slightly more successful opposition came from Guy Mollet, the head of the Socialist party (SFIO). Mollet and other Socialists, such as President Vincent Auriol, shared concerns about British participation.71 But Mollet also worried that the Schuman Plan threatened to rival and undercut the Council of Europe, for which he (and many others) still had great hopes (Bossuaut 1992, p. 758). To Monnet and Schuman, and later in a Council of Europe speech, Mollet argued for a single intergovernmental -- explicitly not

70 The Finance Ministry was historically located on the Rue de Rivoli, in a wing of the Louvre. It is now on the Quai Bercy.

71 Mollet would later support ECSC, but initially saw it as "little more than a scheme to shore up a decadent German and French capitalism and affront the British Labour Party" (Racine 1954, p. 52, cited in Haas 1958, p. 116). When the Anglo-French rupture had become clear in early June, the SFIO Directing Council voted to condemn the foreign minister's decision to move ahead without the British (Bossuaut 1992, p. 752).
supranational -- organization, created within the Council of Europe, to oversee all other European organizations. A coal and steel pool could presumably be subordinate to this. Bidault apparently expressed some support for this idea (ibid). Monnet, who knew that ratification of an eventual ECSC treaty would depend on SFIO support, personally undertook to persuade Mollet and Bidault of the importance of isolating ECSC from more diffuse institutions. As a tiny concession, it was agreed that ECSC would make a yearly report to the Council of Europe's Assembly.

By early fall 1950, the conflict within the French government over British participation was over, if far from forgotten or forgiven. While Massigli continued to try to bring the British into the Schuman Plan discussions through July, his and Petsche's efforts eventually fizzled. The British were simply not interested in an ambitious ECSC, and Monnet and Schuman jealously protected the ambitious atmosphere of their talks. A few British politicians (notably Harold MacMillan and David Eccles) made a last-ditch effort at reconciliation in August, suggesting that the proposed High Authority be controlled by a ministerial subcommittee of the Council of Europe. Warned off by Monnet, Schuman never considered the idea (Massigli 1978, p. 223). It was now clear that if ECSC was created, the British might only join at a later date, if ever.\textsuperscript{72}

But now it began to look as if the creation of ECSC might be in doubt, even given the Schuman/Monnet control over the government position. Monnet might be able to sidestep the government, but he would need government and party support to ratify the eventual treaty, and unexpectedly aggressive bargaining by the Germans threatened to make that impossible. The first phase of discussions, from June until August, had produced general agreement on ECSC's institutional structure. Initiative and day-to-day decision-making lay with an independent High Authority; major decisions would be approved by a Council of Ministers by majority vote; a Common Assembly would advise and control the High Authority; and a Court of Justice would adjudicate conflicts. Equal treatment for all governments -- meaning Germany -- was agreed as a basic principle. But after the August holiday, the discussions turned away from institutional principles, and towards the future organization of coal and steel. At the same time, both the economic and political climate of Franco-German relations worsened.

This degradation of Franco-German relations was partially the result of a major environmental change which undercut much of the basis for bargaining over ECSC. The sudden outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 altered both the political climate and the rhythm of the European economies. In general, the war vastly strengthened the

\textsuperscript{72}On the consequences of this rupture from a British point of view, see Edmund Dell (1995), whose telling title is \textit{The Schuman Plan and the British Abdication of Leadership in Europe}. 
Germans' bargaining position. Washington feared that a Soviet attack in Europe was imminent, and American pressure intensified to allow the FRG full economic and military sovereignty. Also, European governments reacted by stockpiling raw materials and increasing steel orders; the previous oversupply of steel in France suddenly became a shortage. One of the few appeals of ECSC for French industry -- as a cartel to handle overproduction -- thus evaporated (Poidevin 1988, p. 107). Worst (in the Schuman Plan context), the coal shortage reached new proportions, and the international allocation of coke and coal became a more touchy problem than ever.

The newly empowered Adenauer and his negotiators now sought to test how far the new French commitment to equal treatment would go. Monnet suddenly faced a surprisingly unhelpful German delegation in the Schuman Plan talks. The German offensive extended also to the IAR, and to the Allied High Commission -- both fora in which necessary corollaries to an ECSC treaty had to be worked out. In September and October 1950, the Germans loudly attacked all aspects of their special situation: the IAR, deconcentration / decartellization plans, control of international trade, limits on steel production, and even disarmament and the Military Security Board. Much of the attack was presented in the context of the Schuman Plan talks; Adenauer, Erhard, and Hallstein argued that these earlier controls were inconsistent with the announced goal of making Germany an equal partner in Europe.

With one major exception, Monnet gave in on all of the Germans' major demands within ECSC. He recognized the contradictions between ECSC and older French policies; as he wrote to Schuman in late September, "there is much truth in Mr. Erhard's arguments" (Bossuat 1992, p. 769). In addition to accepting the German demand that ECSC would permit no price discrimination, Monnet also failed to obtain a central French goal in return: movement within ECSC towards the equalization of wages and employer costs (Griffiths 1988, pp. 40-43). Both points preserved the Ruhr's cost advantages. Even on the exception where Monnet countered the German offensive -- deconcentration / decartellization -- the result was a compromise rather than a victory from the French perspective.

Deconcentration / decartellization had quickly become the central battle. During summer 1950, the Allied High Commission was trying to implement their Law 27 of May 16, 1950 on this issue, which was the trizonal replacement of the bizone's Law 75.

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73 Deconcentration was the process of breaking up large firms into smaller ones, depriving the former of market control. Decartellization, in this case, referred both to reorganizing the monopolistic organizations which managed the Ruhr (see footnote XX below) and destroying vertical links between coal and steel producers.

74 The French High Commissioner, François-Poncet, had initially opposed Law 27 because it continued the Law 75 decision that ownership of German firms (though not concentration and cartels) was up to the FRG
27 edicted the breakup of the monopolistic organizations for managing and selling Ruhr coal and steel, as well as the dissolution of the actual firms into smaller units.\textsuperscript{75} German opposition kept the law from being implemented during the summer, until the High Commission ordered the immediate break-up of the six major steel producers on September 21, 1950. Ruhr mining was to be reorganized into no less than 54 companies, and coal-steel links were to be severed (Gillingham 1991, p. 257). Thus the deconcentration/decartelization conflict came to a head just as the Schuman Plan negotiations broached similar issues. The German government, working closely with the Ruhr firms, protested loudly (to the point of flat refusal to implement the September 21 decision). They forwarded smaller numbers for the result of deconcentration, and argued for the preservation of both the Ruhr organizations (DKVB, DKV) and considerable coal-steel links.\textsuperscript{76} Adenauer even threatened to recall the German delegation from the Paris talks (ibid). The Schuman Plan discussions, too, became "uncomfortable, and even worrisome" (Bossuat 1992, p. 770).

These conflicts had not been resolved when the IAR fight worsened as well. In November, the Allied representatives outvoted the Germans to raise the quantity of exported coal. Despite vitriolic German criticisms, they refused to revisit this decision until February. By this time the coal shortage had grown worse; while the IAR forced Germany to export almost 6 million tons of coal and coke at low prices, the Germans now had to import large amounts of expensive American coal to keep their economy running (Willis 1968, p. 111).

Despite these pressures, Monnet's ECSC talks managed to move forward. This was possible since ECSC's provisions did not directly address the immediate conflicts on deconcentration and coal allocation. It also meant, however, that the draft of the treaty that was agreed by early December was still not close to being signed. The shape and mechanisms of ECSC were known, but it remained to be seen whether Paris and Bonn could agree on the IAR and deconcentration resolutions which would have to precede the ECSC treaty's entry into force. In addition, ECSC's implications for the Saar had not been settled.

government. He put a "suspensive veto" on the former, marking France's opposition to the clause but allowing the deconcentration plans to go forward after one month (Willis 19xx, p. 118).

\textsuperscript{75}The Deutsche Kohlenhergauleitung (DKBL) was essentially a management cartel, and the Deutsche Kohlen Verkauf (DKV) was the sole seller of Ruhr coal. Both were to be broken into several less powerful organizations. The thirteen coal firms were to be divided into 28, with similar numbers for steel firms; the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, for example, which now produced 40% of German steel, was broken into ten firms (Bossuat 1992, p. 768).

\textsuperscript{76}The German proposal called for seventeen steel companies and coal-steel links including 25% of the coal industry; they offered no suggestions on the number of coal companies (Gillingham 1991, p. 258).
At this dangerous moment, Monnet began sounding out members of the French government and their services about the draft treaty -- the first discussion of the treaty with the government since June (Duchene 1994, p. 218). The government was not particularly enthusiastic. René Mayer (Justice), Petsche (Finance), Guy Mollet (responsible for the Council of Europe), Edgar Faure (Budget), Robert Buron (Economic Affairs), Jean Marie Louvel (Industry and Trade), Paul Bacon (Labor and Social Security) and Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury (Secretary of State to the Prime Minister) all expressed mistrust of the supranational powers of the High Authority. Bourgès-Maunoury went so far as to say that the High Authority's powers were hugely excessive, surpassing "those accorded to national governments in democratic countries, even in wartime" (Griffiths 1988, p. 71). Mayer, one of Schuman's earliest supporters, warned that the IAR should not be sacrificed to permit ECSC, and presented a list of objections which he noted were "aimed at reducing the risks implied in a transfer of sovereignty to an indispensable minimum" (ibid). Guy Mollet, another committed "Europeanist," insisted that ECSC's Council of Ministers be able to overrule any High Authority decision by a two-thirds vote. Petsche, Buron, and Faure showed concern that France might be outvoted in the Council of Ministers. The economic ministers also disliked the anti-cartel provisions, which might threaten the organization of French coal and steel (Gillingham 1991, p. 273). Monnet's replies now emphasized, in the context of the coal shortage, that ECSC was the only long-term way to secure French access to Ruhr coke and coal. He did not budge on the distribution of powers in ECSC. Apparently his letters were enough to forestall any serious opposition at this point.

Nonetheless, early 1951 was the Schuman Plan's darkest hour. This was ironic, considering that the treaty had been almost fully negotiated in December. Franco-German recriminations on IAR coal distribution, deconcentration, and the Saar echoed across the Rhine. The campaign by French coal and steel interests against ECSC had come into full swing around November 1950, and now crescendoed. Nor had the Bidault government's initially hesitant support for Schuman been strengthened under its successor ministries of Queuille and Pleven. Important members of the government still had doubts. Even Bidault himself secretly sought to open a channel of discussion directly with Adenauer, around the overly Europeanist Foreign Minister (Berard 1977, p. 319).

The governments' doubts had changed somewhat in focus, however. Internal battles no longer centered on British participation or rival schemes in the broader framework of the OEEC or Council of Europe; Schuman and Monnet had won that fight. Neither the OEEC or the Council of Europe had ceased to exist, and in fact OEEC had a very successful summer in 1950, creating the EPU and making substantial progress in
quota elimination on private trade. But neither forum was now advanced to seriously rival ECSC as an immediate "solution" to the "German problem" in French policy.77 In the near term, close Franco-German cooperation was either going to take place in ECSC, or not at all.

Doubts and criticisms within the government now concerned the modalities of ECSC and related accords -- the High Authority's powers, German deconcentration, and the fate of the IAR and the Saar. As noted above, Monnet and Schuman brushed off worries about supranationality. Of the other issues, only deconcentration of German industry was a goal which could be translated as consistent with the new principles of Schuman's policy. The quasi-free trade language of ECSC could at least be presented as implying the breakup of the Ruhr oligopolies. The transition to "equality" did not rule out one-time actions to weaken the dominant, cartelized Ruhr.78 The IAR and French control of the Saar, on the other hand, clearly contradicted ECSC's ambitions for Franco-German relations. Thus Monnet and Schuman fought hard for deconcentration/decartellization, and hoped that it would be enough of a link to old policies to maintain the hesitant acceptance of the government and the centrist political parties. The IAR, meanwhile, was sacrificed on the altar of ECSC, and the Saar partially so.

In December 1950 Monnet put forward a deconcentration proposal to the Allied High Commission, moderating slightly the edicts of Law 27. He did so in coordination with the American Commissioner, his friend McCloy. McCloy delivered American support for the proposal, although he pushed Monnet to permit more coal-steel links than the French desired (Bossuat 1992, p. 770). Yet still Adenauer balked. Worse, the Ruhr firms now began to act just as Schuman's opponents feared. In January 1951 they raised the export price of coke. They also began to openly flaunt the IAR rulings on coal production and export, complaining that the decisions did not respect the principle of "equitable distribution" of the IAR agreement (ibid, p. 777). At the end of the year, the Schuman Plan discussions were suspended. They could go no further without agreements on deconcentration and the IAR.

77As discussed below, at this point this certainly did not mean that other frameworks for Franco-German relations had been forgotten or dismissed by ECSC's critics. But ECSC had come too far in negotiations and public opinion for rival plans to be presented; those who still feared Germany and prioritized Franco-British partnership had to hide their time. [REWORK?]

78While French coal and steel were not exactly perfectly competitive markets, they were dwarfed by German producers. Even after deconcentration in 1952, with the largest German steel firm (the Vereinigte Stahlwerke) divided into thirteen firms, all seven of the ECSC plants producing over one million tons per year were German (Duchene 1994, p. 218).

More importantly for the logical feasibility of the French push for deconcentration, German coal and steel were the only privately-owned such firms in Europe, excluding Belgium, which had already wrung out special consideration. Thus Monnet could word proposals for anti-cartel ECSC powers in the language of "equality" while specifically targeting German firms (Gillingham 1991, p. 268).
Monnet, expressing threats to Hallstein and fears to Schuman that ECSC was seriously threatened, now brought out the previous French policies to sacrifice. Personally, Monnet had planned to sacrifice them for some time. He had hinted to the Germans in November 1950 that ECSC would mean the end of the IAR, but had held back on declaring this formally (Bérard 1977, p. 357; Bossuat 1992, p. 770). Now, in January 1951, he promised in the name of the occupying powers that the IAR would disappear gradually as ECSC began to function. Meanwhile, the Americans put enormous pressure on Adenauer to agree to accept the December proposal on deconcentration. This was not immediately successful, dragging on through February 1951. A further concession was made when the IAR agreed to decrease the allocation of German coal to export by 550,000 tons on February 3, but the Germans showed little gratitude (Willis 1968, p. 111). On February 22, a French diplomat reported that McCloy was "more or less certain of failure in the Schuman Plan because of the Germans..." (Duchene 1994, p. 218).

Next came a French concession on the Saar. In January, Schuman had still maintained that the Saar should sign the ECSC treaty as a separate entity, forcing German recognition of its distinct sovereignty. This position was ferociously defended by the Gaullist Saar governor, Gilbert Grandval. In early March, after discussions with Monnet, Schuman decided instead that France would sign for the Saar, as its immediate administrator.79 A few weeks later, Grandval submitted his resignation along with a vitriolic denunciation of the recent changes in France’s German policy. Schuman wished to accept the resignation, but was overruled by Auriol, Bidault, and Petsche in the French Cabinet (Poidevin 1988, p. 109).80

Finally, the March 7 announcement of the so-called "little revision" of the Occupation Statute for Germany helped break the stalemate. While the Germans complained that the discussions of ECSC and German rearmament (see below) had led them to expect more freedom than this brought, the change was substantial. The Federal Republic was now permitted to create a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to engage in diplomatic relations with other countries. The High Commission could no longer review German legislation before its promulgation; its decartelization powers would be passed to the government as soon as the latter passed satisfactory legislation; and numerous limits on industrial production were either raised or abolished, including the 11.1 million ton steel

79It may seem strange that having France sign for the Saar was more acceptable to the Germans than having the Saar sign separately. The former was preferable because it only implied recognition of the immediate, de facto state of affairs (French administration).
80Auriol, one of the most anti-German members of the French leadership, wrote in his journal that he had defended Grandval because he maintained "an excellent policy in Saarland and it is thanks to him that we still have the Saar and that the Sarrois are more and more won over to the French" (Auriol 19xx, p. 183, cited in Poidevin 1988, p. 109).
ceiling. Along with this agreement the French agreed to evacuate a further section of the port of Kehl (Willis 1968, p. 108).

Combined with enormous American pressure on the Germans, all these concessions brought Adenauer to the table. On March 14, he accepted the McCloy/Monnet plan on deconcentration. The French in turn formally accepted this compromise, which was a step away from their previous formal position; as French High Commissioner Francois-Poncet wrote to Adenauer, "The High Commission, like you, is of the opinion that the existence of the Schuman Plan makes possible the treatment of these problems in a wider perspective that was otherwise possible. On the assumption that the Schuman Plan will enter into force, the High Commission considers liberal solutions justified" (Willis 1968, p. 120). Five days later the ECSC treaty was initialled. In the following weeks, despite lobbying by Grandval, a side-agreement on the Saar certified that ECSC in no way prejudged a Saar settlement. Behind the ambiguous facade, this was a clear relaxation of previous French insistence that the Saar was non-negotiable.81 Another side-agreement formalized Monnet's commitment on the disappearance of the IAR, as well as the lifting of any limits on German steel production once the treaty entered into force. The treaty was signed on April 18, 1951.

Now Monnet and Schuman had to sell this agreement, founded on a remarkable series of concessions to remarkably aggressive Germans, to the French parliament. Success was by no means a foregone conclusion. As my study takes the perspective of French decision-makers in the government, however, I will only briefly summarize the ratification process. We have seen that besides Schuman, all the members of the government had serious misgivings about ECSC. Nonetheless, by April 1951, it was clear that at least Schuman's MRP and Guy Mollet's Socialists (SFIO) would support ratification.82 The Communists and the Gaullists were absolutely opposed. Success would turn on the votes of the Center parties (the Union Démocratique et Sociale de la Résistance (UDSR) and the Radical groupings) and the Center-Right (Républicains Indépendants and several Peasant Parties).

Schuman and Monnet went to work.83 To nationalist skeptics (the majority) they argued mainly that only ECSC could guarantee both French access to German coke and

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81 The Germans had suspected that the French saw ECSC as a way to disguise the annexation of the Saar by covering the issue with European institutions. The exchange of letters was designed to convince Adenauer that this was not the case (Massigli 19xx, p. 277).
82 Not without considerable misgivings. For example, Bonnefous (UDSR) "declared that he had not turned to the Schuman Plan because it would solve the Franco-German problem, an approach that would be doomed from the start, but because the Council of Europe had failed" (Willis 1968, p. 100).
83 NEED TO GET for this: H. Ehrmann, "The French Trade Associations and the Ratification of the Schuman Plan," World Politics July 1954. emphasis on methods used by proponents to secure passage.
deconcentration of German industry. Presenting ECSC as an improvement on the IAR, Schuman noted that the latter had become incapable of performing its mission and needed to be replaced (Poidvin 1988, p. 111). To Europeanist-leaning skeptics -- partisans of the Council of Europe and strong Anglophiles -- they argued that ECSC was the only remaining path towards "real" integration, and that Britain would be closely associated with ECSC and any subsequent steps among the Six.

Meanwhile, the Germans were not helping Schuman's cause. In July 1951, they again balked at some of the deconcentration plans, and Adenauer demanded German participation in the Allied High Commission's Control Groups overseeing deconcentration. The French had the impression that Adenauer was reneging on the March 1951 agreement. While steel deconcentration then began to progress in late 1951, there was little sign of cooperation on coal (particularly the liquidation of the DKV) as the French ratification date neared (Gillingham 1991, p. 304; Bossuat 1992, p. 782). The Federal Republic and the Ruhr seemed uninterested in helping the ratification process in Paris.

Nonetheless, Schuman and Monnet proved able to convince enough members of the divided Center and Center-Right parties. The UDSR (Edouard Bonnefous, René Pleven, François Mitterrand) and the Radicals (René Mayer, Edouard Herriot, Edouard Daladier, Maurice Faure, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, Pierre Mendès-France, Henri Queuille, Edgar Faure) eventually overcame certain skeptics in their ranks and supported the treaty (with the exception of Mendès-France) (Grosser 1961, pp. 128-130). Some of these votes were blatantly purchased, however, by Schuman's acceptance of a harsher policy in Tunisia (Bjoel 1966, p. 175). The Independent Republicans remained split between liberal proponents of Europe (Paul Reynaud, André Mutter) and nationalist defenders of French industry (Pierre André, Louis Marin, François Valentin, General Aumeran) (ibid, pp. 187-205). Many of the Peasant Party votes were rallied by hopes for the discussions of a European "green pool" or agricultural community which had followed the May 9 proposal (see below). The outcome remained in doubt up to the vote on December 13, when the "expected opposition of the Independent Republicans and Peasants failed to materialize" (Willis 1968, p. 102). ECSC was ratified by votes of 376 to 240 (21 abstentions) in the Assembly and 177 to 3 (92 abstentions) in the Senate.

By June 1952, all the ECSC members had ratified the treaty. On July 25, 1952, a foreign ministers conference fought out the last major details of the High Authority's organization and location, and on August 10 the Authority came into existence in Luxembourg. Jean Monnet became its president, proclaiming the creation of "Europe's first government" (Duchêne 1994, p. 235).
Monnet, Schuman, their small group of collaborators, and Monnet's American friends had succeeded at hijacking France's German policy. First they had ignored opposition within the government, or quieted it into reluctant acceptance with persuasive arguments. Then, despite steadily conceding away previous French policies to aggressive German grabs at the "equality" Schuman promised, they had sold the final scheme to hesitant parliamentarians as the only remaining way for France to codify acceptable relations with Germany. Schuman's proposal reflected anything but a consensual response to France's environmental constraints. Yet it endured long enough, won over enough key individuals, and built up enough momentum in negotiations to crowd out other options.

This is an important historical story of which little is explainable in terms of the fixed rationality of French policy-makers. But I have not yet shown how this is a story of social construction. It may simply be an extraordinary episode in which decision-making was bizarrely hijacked by a few men. In order to demonstrate that these changes ultimately led to a lasting restructuring of France's German policy (and more), I still need to demonstrate the institutionalization and effects of this innovative step. Only my full three-case study will do this thoroughly. The next section provides the dénouement of the Schuman Plan's immediate effects, and sets the stage for the engrenage of its larger historical significance.

IV. France's Hesitant New Europe, 1950-1954

In what way did the Schuman Plan and ECSC reorient subsequent French policies? In a world where "interpretive change" can reconstruct the basic parameters on political action -- the world, I argue, that we and French decision-makers inhabit -- we might expect that ECSC's skeptics and opponents were quickly won over, and that French policy-making after 1952 clearly reflected its new European calling. Indeed, most histories and theories of European institution-building present ECSC as the starting point of a process that led logically (or even "automatically") to today's European Union. Having shown that the ECSC starting-point reflected new interpretations of French government interests, I should be able to rest easy.

Unfortunately, the process of social construction is rarely so simple. With occasional individual exceptions, people do not radically change their thinking on particular points, even given exposure to well-presented new ideas. Especially on important political issues, decision-makers accept significantly new policies only with considerable and enduring hesitation. Endorsing new, potentially unpopular policies with unforeseeable effects usually reflects a "bet" rather than "conversion"; initial policy changes are typically
the beginning of a slow process of reinterpretation rather than its end. Furthermore, politicians almost always have a straightforward interest -- both electorally, and to maintain the respect of subordinates within government organizations -- in at least seeming consistent. Previous policies may persist to demonstrate the links to new ones, or to "hedge the bet" of the latter. All this sums to mean that even the proponents of a new policy may not believe deeply in it. Add in the truly undecided or initially hostile members of a government, and the expectation of quick and easy "conversion" of a major government policy becomes weak indeed. When innovative ideas are successfully introduced into government policies, they may have to wait a long time before being embedded as part of the conceptual basis of further government decisions. Their success in so doing will depend on the endurance of effects of initial policy changes (such as hard-to-alter institutional results), the persistent actions of "believers," and changes in constraints in the interim.

Thus it was with French policies and the Schuman Plan. While Monnet's ideas were accepted hesitantly by enough of the government to carry through to ECSC, many decision-makers continued to hesitate about the appropriate framework for France's German and European policies. Germany's strength was still very feared, Britain's absence from ECSC was much regretted, and most French leaders liked "supranationality" less and less the more they knew about it. Nonetheless, they had chosen to bind France into a fifty-year institutional relationship in ECSC. This had three immediate effects. First, the Schuman Plan provided a new model for international cooperation in Europe that could be imitated outside of coal and steel. Second, it changed the French government's constraints -- legally, and politically, in the expectations of their international interlocutors. French actions to limit Germany or cooperate with Britain would provoke different reactions than they had before May 1950. Third, and more mundanely, ECSC created a new framework in which regular meetings and discussions took place. Whether those meetings where amicable or conflictual, "the Six" now existed, and had to deal with each other.

These, in fact, were the only immediate effects of Monnet's ideas. The thinking of most French decision-makers did not display a clear "conversion" to the ECSC vision of a small supranational Europe centered on Franco-German cooperation. Instead, the years from 1950-1954 were above all a time of schism and hesitation in France's German and European policies. The ECSC model inspired several French initiatives, notably in defense, agriculture, and health policy, but all were undermined by ambiguous support from the French government itself. Nor did ECSC itself become much more popular in the French government. Consideration of other frameworks for European cooperation revived
and continued. Nonetheless, the Schuman Plan had created a path for future French policy to follow. Most French policies stumbled in that direction, but without any confidence.

But the fact that the French government was now turned in this direction, engaged in new institutional interactions in and around ECSC, was the immediate legacy of the Schuman Plan. This section surveys this hesitant legacy. It looks first at the extensions of ECSC thinking in other French actions, and second at French government behavior within the ECSC institutions. Considered alone, all this information highlights is the important, if mitigated, consequences of the Schuman Plan on French foreign policy from 1950-1954. Considered in connection with the following chapter -- "France's Trade Policy and the Treaties of Rome" -- it begins the story of how the Schuman Plan's short-term legacy was embedded as the long-term framework for France's national interest.

A. French Policies and the ECSC Model

In the year following Schuman's proposal, the French government proposed or considered several institutional plans directly inspired by the ECSC model. By far the most important was the European Defense Community (EDC), but significant attention was also given to an agricultural "green pool," a "European Health Community" (the "white pool"), and a "transports pool." While EDC produced a signed treaty, it and these other imitations were even less accepted in the French government than ECSC, and all failed. The pro-ECSC forces of Schuman and Monnet did not again succeed at imposing a series of decisions over the uncertainty or opposition of the rest of the government. As Alphand's replacement as Quai Director of Economic and Financial Affairs, Olivier Wormser, wrote in May 1954, "Green pool, transports pool, white pool, so many domains where we made ambitious proposals and where we lacked firm intentions, a sense of the real, cohesion in our doctrine. Disoriented, our partners in the community of Six no longer follow us" (Bossuat 1992, p. 792). Three months later he could have added EDC -- which died in the French Assembly on 30 August 1954 -- to the list.

Yet if the French government could not decide whether to extend ECSC's logic to further institutions, that logic still dominated what proactive policy-making went on in Paris from 1950-1954. Partisans of a supranational Europe of Six anchored on Franco-German partnership remained a minority in the government. But the success of ECSC and the lack of coherent alternatives allowed their vision to survive through several difficult years.

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84Wormser himself was no great "Europeanist."
The European Defense Community

The European Defense Community was both the greatest triumph and greatest failure of ECSC's immediate legacy. EDC came close to installing a European Army, administered by European "Commissioners," under an umbrella of intergovernmental political cooperation in an attached "European Political Community." Its participants were to be the ECSC Six, and its immediate creator was Jean Monnet.

EDC emerged, over the opposition or hesitance of much of the government, as the French reaction to American demands for the rearment of Germany following the outbreak of the Korean War in summer 1950. In July 1950, US leaders decided that German rearment was immediately necessary in some form. Initially, French leaders were unanimous in completely rejecting German rearment in any form. Even Schuman, though championing Franco-German "equality" in the developing ECSC negotiations, was horrified at the idea of rebuilding a German military. Along with Finance Minister Petsche and the new Prime Minister, René Pleven, he presented the US with a plan for an American-funded expansion of French forces as an alternative (Wall 1989, pp. 279-283). The Quai d'Orsay also proposed to create a central NATO command structure with common funding, capped by an "international executive committee" with the US, the UK, and France as permanent members.

But the US was not interested in this reprise of Bidault's "High Atlantic Council" idea, nor was the expansion of the French army credible at a time when French forces were mostly in Indochina. By early August, the State Department and the Pentagon had agreed that German units would be integrated into a common European force within NATO. Secretary of State Dean Acheson would make this demand officially at the three-power Foreign Ministers' meeting in mid-September, by which time he was prepared to force the issue if the French did not quickly give in (ibid, pp. 281-3).

At the Foreign Ministers' meeting in New York, and at the meeting of the Atlantic Council which followed immediately on September 16, Schuman was entirely isolated in rejecting the US position. Even the British, who had initially joined the French in opposing US calls for rearment, now deserted them -- a move that provoked much bitterness in Paris (Massigli 1978, pp. 250-1). During the Atlantic Council meeting,

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85 The Bidault ministry had fallen on June 24 over domestic issues [what exactly?], and was replaced on July 7 by Pleven's government. Pleven, like Bidault, was a member of the MRP; the main change between the two was the introduction of five Socialist ministers.

86 Even the very anglophone Massigli himself greatly resented this switch. He says it was partly done out of spite and revenge for Schuman's presentation of the Schuman Plan without consulting London (pp. 248-9).
however, Schuman received a memo from Monnet. France had no choice, he wrote, but to broaden the Schuman Plan idea to defense; otherwise German rearmament in a national framework could only be briefly delayed. While still in New York, Schuman and Alphand decided that Monnet was right (Duchene 1994, pp. 228-9). A "European Defense Community" was the only way to make German rearmament acceptable.

In early September, Monnet had already put his circle of advisors to work on a European defense plan. At the same time that he sent his memo to Schuman, Monnet approached Prime Minister Pleven -- who happened to have been Monnet's assistant in interwar financial negotiations. Pleven was not enthusiastic, but Monnet convinced him that a "European Army" was now France's best option. While the unknowing Petsche and Minister of Defense Jules Moch continued to fight in negotiations for US aid and against any German role, Pleven resolved to propose Monnet's plan (Wall 1989, p. 288). Exploratory discussions with Americans in Paris were not encouraging -- they saw the idea as no more than a French attempt to delay rearmament -- but Pleven decided to go ahead anyway. On October 21 he presented it to the French Cabinet, who were either opposed, unenthusiastic, or reluctantly supportive (Schuman, Mayer) (Clesse 1989, p. 31). Before the French Assembly on October 25, Pleven called for the creation of a European Army run by a European Minister of Defense under a Council of Ministers, with a joint command and common budget and arms procurement. Small German units within this structure would be the only German military, while other countries would integrate only a part of their national forces. Negotiations would only begin after the ECSC treaty had been signed. An Assembly resolution endorsed the plan by 343 to 220 (Duchene 1994, p. 229).

Yet the "Pleven Plan," as Monnet's second proposal came to be known, did not receive the international welcome accorded the Schuman Plan. The Germans -- accorded "equality" on May 9 -- complained that the French now sought to institutionalize unequal relations in defense. Worse, the Americans soon made clear that the French proposal was unacceptable. It would take too long to create and would not work militarily. (French military officers agreed on the latter point). Only Luxembourg and Belgium expressed weak interest (Wall 1989, p. 289).

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87 It is important to note that even Monnet was not wildly enthusiastic about this idea. He saw it as "at best premature" in the progress of European cooperation (Duchene 1994, p. 229). But American pressure, he felt, left France little choice.
88 In the meantime, Charles Bohlen (number two at the US embassy) was asked not to inform Petsche and Moch of Pleven's plans (Wall 1989, p. 288).
89 The Germans also objected to the stipulation that the ECSC treaty had to be signed before negotiations could begin.
But the French were not willing to give in. Alphand led talks with the Americans during November 1950, and achieved an initial compromise at the end of the month. France would accept the principle of German rearmament, including German "combat teams" of 5000-6000 men, retreating from the demand that German units not exceed the battalion level (800-1200 men). The US would not undercut French efforts to negotiate a "European Army" plan, provided that it remained in the NATO framework. Monnet's influence with the US High Commissioner McCloy and American ambassador David Bruce were instrumental in reaching this compromise (Duchene 1994, pp. 230-1).

The result was the creation of two parallel negotiations in early 1951. The Atlantic Council assigned priority to talks at the Allied High Commission in Germany, discussing the creation of a German national force without a general staff, to be commanded by Americans in NATO. At the same time, talks on a "European Defense Community" began in Paris under Alphand's chairmanship, between France, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg.90 The US, the UK, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and initially the Netherlands participated as observers.

These competing lines of negotiation offered little hope of ending the Franco-American impasse. In the Petersburg discussions, the Americans and Germans raced well ahead of what the French would accept. By June 1951, they had produced a report recommending the creation of twelve German divisions, of which three armored, in four army corps totalling 250,000 men, as well as a 600-plane airforce and a naval patrol force, all under American command in NATO. The French refused to accept the report (Clesse 1989, p. 39). Meanwhile, in Paris the Germans refused to accept French proposals that all the corps of the "European Army" comprise "combat teams" of different nationalities -- the point of which was to minimize the number of Germans in any corps. Adenauer's delegates insisted that the army should be made up of national corps (ibid). By March the Paris negotiations had already stalled.

Then, in summer 1951, first the Americans and then the French became more flexible. By early June, David Bruce and McCloy had been persuaded that the US must somehow accept French ideas. According to Monnet, it was only his lunch with President Eisenhower in Paris on June 21 that marked the change in the American position (Monnet 1978, p. 419-421). Eisenhower was convinced of the desirability and feasibility of a "European Army," and so the discussions switched to the French track (Duchene 1994, pp. 231-2). Adenauer was "stupified" when informed of the American switch, but had little

90Despite disliking the French proposal and clearly preferring the American NATO track, Adenauer agreed to participate. As occupiers, the French held a veto in the High Commission negotiations in any case. See Clesse 1989, pp. 36-7.
choice but to respect it (Clesse 1989, p. 44). From the French side, the margin of maneuver for Alphand, Schuman and Pleven increased when the June 17 French elections and a subsequent ministerial crisis removed the anti-German Socialist ministers (above all the virulently Germanophobe Minister of Defense, Jules Moch) from Pleven's government.

Now there was some hope of progress. With Eisenhower behind the project, disagreements between the potential participants became the main obstacles. The issues of contention were familiar from the Schuman Plan discussions. France and Germany fought over the extent and modalities of German rearmament. France and Germany argued together, however, for a supranational arrangement rather than the intergovernmental suggestions of the Benelux. Particularly for the Dutch, intergovernmental institutions were important because they held out the possibility of an eventual British membership. The same sentiment remained widespread at the Quai d'Orsay, but Schuman and Alphand (and Monnet, this time further behind the scenes) managed to keep control of the official French position (Massig 1978, pp. 262-3).

Although the principle of "equality" had been agreed as a point of departure for the re-energized negotiations in July, Schuman and his delegation sought to balance the concessions made therein by side-agreements with the US and the UK. These assurances were sought at the Petersburg, where the negotiations on German rearmament had now become negotiations of the end of the Occupation Statute which would accompany the creation of EDC. Schuman hoped for limits on the numbers of German soldiers and arms production, recognition of the Saar's economic union with France, and an "Anglo-Saxon" guarantee that Germany could never leave EDC (Clesse 1989, pp. 51-2).

The eventual agreement, pressed by the US to conclusion in December 1951 and January 1952, was a compromise all around. The limits on German arms production were presented as a unilateral German declaration, and made consistent with "equality" by the argument that as the "forward zone" of Western defense the FRG should produce no warships, fighter planes, or chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Adenauer again refused to address the Saar settlement, and the US and UK offered no new guarantees beyond those in the Atlantic Pact of 1949. The British agreed to cooperate closely with EDC at every stage of its development, although not any more than they would have in the broader NATO framework. Institutionally, while EDC reproduced the ECSC's main institutions (a High Authority -- here called the "Commissariat" -- a Council of Ministers, a Court, and an Assembly) and even shared the ECSC's Assembly and Court, it was much less supranational. The Council of Ministers would basically control the Commissariat. To please Euro-federalists, this was presented only as the "provisional organization," to be further developed into a more federal structure (a "European Political Community") which
the Assembly was invited to study (Clesse 1989, pp. 60-62). The fifty-year treaty was signed in Paris on 27 May 1952, the day after the signature of the treaty ending the occupation of West Germany. The latter gave Bonn full control of its internal and external affairs, with reservations on the stationing of Allied forces, Berlin, and any eventual peace settlement.

But if the proponents of the ECSC model had shown again their ability to control the voice of the French government in international negotiations, this time they would not prove able to engage their government on their European path. In Adenauer's words to a French diplomat, the French negotiators (Alphand, Francois-Poncet, and above them Pleven and Schuman) had shown a remarkably "progressive spirit" despite the "inconceivable mistrust of the Quai d'Orsay" -- but now they faced more powerful opponents in the Assemblée Nationale (Berard 1977, p. 389). Parliamentary support for EDC was weak, and was weakening even before its signature. The Pinay government which signed the treaties, though strongly "Europeanist," decided to wait before submitting them for ratification.

This proved a major mistake, as time decreased rather than increased EDC's popularity. The warm welcome accorded the plan by German veterans groups encouraged opposition from the very anti-German Socialists, in addition to the Communists and Gaullists (Willis 1968, pp). The French military thought the plan a logistical nightmare. Furthermore, the number of French troops in Indochina continued to grow, shrinking those available for France's planned EDC contingent; inevitably, German troops would outnumber the French in EDC's early years. The Korean War panic decreased, too, weakening the immediacy of EDC. The atmosphere of hope following Stalin's death in spring 1953 would weaken it still further.

At the end of 1952, the Pinay government fell when it showed signs of bringing EDC to a vote. René Mayer formed a new government, but his coalition depended on a small group of independent Gaullists. In addition to their own opposition to EDC, their presence meant that Schuman was replaced by Bidault at the Quai d'Orsay. Bidault had never truly supported EDC, and his thinking was close to the Gaullists on the subject (Dalloz 1992, pp. xx). The Mayer government now set a series of "preconditions" for French acceptance of EDC, recalling the original French demands of a Saar settlement, closer British association, US guarantees, and several new "interpretations" of the treaty (Duchene 1994, p. 253). In addition, the Socialists made the superposition of a European popular assembly over EDC a condition for their support. The EDC members had little choice but to renegotiate. Talks from September 1953 to March 1954 made EDC weaker and still more intergovernmental. An additional treaty for a weak "European Political
Community" was drawn up to please the Socialists, but the French and Benelux governments were unwilling to consider it as more than a project for the future.

Disagreement on EDC broadened among the French ministers, first in the Mayer government, and then further in the following ministry of Joseph Laniel (Radical). This was not solely because both ministries marked a shift to the Right, bringing anti-European Radicals and Independents together with pro-European Radicals and the MRP leadership. In addition, the hesitators of the earlier governments which had pushed EDC now made more explicit their hesitation to ratify it. For a few individuals, hesitation had changed to opposition: President Vincent Auriol had stopped supporting the treaty as early as late 1951, and his Socialist colleague Jules Moch (who had begun the negotiations as Minister of Defense) refused to accept division-size German units (Auriol 19xx, v, p. 596). René Pleven, whose proposal had led to EDC, now found it "indesirable," but felt forced to continue fighting for it (Massigli 1978, p. 322). For others, either a pro-France resolution of the ongoing Saar talks (Bidault, Maurice Schumann, MRP) or closer British association (Edgar Faure, Radical) were preconditions for ratification; or EDC's supranationality (weak though it was) was unappealing (Antoine Pinay).91 Despite US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' threat in December 1953 of an "agonizing reappraisal" of US policy in Europe were EDC to fail, only the most Europeanist of French politicians could bring themselves to endorse the treaty. Prime Minister Joseph Laniel personified this dilemma: torn between the Europeanist counsels of fellow radical Paul Reynaud and the thinly-veiled nationalism of his Foreign Minister, Bidault, he sought only to delay a vote (Massigli 1978, pp. 381-2).

It was the fall of Dien Bien Phu in Indochina in May 1954 that broke the impasse. The Laniel government fell, and Pierre Mendès-France (Radical) came to power in June 1954, with a popular mandate to liquidate the foreign policy disasters of his predecessors. "PMF" had never been a strong Europeanist, and saw Franco-British partnership as the policy most consistent with French grandeur.92 After dealing with Indochina, he tried to advance a further series of EDC "protocols," basically extending all the previous French demands. But these were rejected by the other member governments. The tension

91If the ECSC settlement in April 1951 had included an opening in French policies to Saar settlements short of a Franco-Saar "economie union," the more liberal French policies it implied (like much of the rest of the "ECSC logic") had not been widely accepted in the French government. By 1953, the resultant incoherence reached its height in Franco-German negotiations on the Saar, with Grandval still fighting for the most mercantilist solution, Maurice Schumann and Pierre-Henri Tietgen negotiating a medium-hard line for Bidault and the Quai (but with little coherence between them), and the partisans of EDC (including some Quai diplomats, like Francois Valéry in Economic and Financial Affairs) arguing for a soft-line, "European solution" of some sort. No agreement was reached until 1955.
92As Mendès-France would declare after the EDC vote, "the axiom of French policy must be to stick to Great Britain" (Duchene 1994, p. 255).
mounted; Adenauer declared that if EDC failed, the creation of a German army would be inevitable. Mendès-France ignored him, and forwarded the treaty to the Assembly without taking a governmental position on the vote. By 319 to 264 the Assembly voted to shelve the treaty, amid much bitterness, on 30 August 1954.

To those in the governing coalition who had accepted the implications of ECSC for France's place in Europe, this became known as "the crime of August 30." France had refused a huge opportunity to organize both Europe's defense and continental intergovernmental relations so as to assure peaceful cooperation, as well as French leadership. Now German rearmament would take place uncontrolled, and the United States would dominate Europe's institutions. For those who did not accept ECSC's logic, France had been saved from sacrificing her military independence for the sake of ineffective controls on German rearmament. Without a British presence, unstable France would have been unable to prevent German hegemony over "little Europe." Supranational institutions would have been an additional cost rather than the benefit which balanced German remilitarization.

While the latter group held the extremes of the French political spectrum, the centrist majority that had governed since 1945 was split between the two. The SFIO, UDSR, Radicals, and Independents were all profoundly divided. Diplomats and bureaucrats did not make so clear their personal positions (with a few exceptions), but the ministries too were divided. In the Quai, except for the German specialists in the Direction d'Europe and a handful of Europe specialists in Economic and Financial Affairs (notably François Valéry), most high-level diplomats were "now openly against the EDC and all supranational schemes" (Duchene 1994, p. 253).

More than any other issue in the early 1950s, EDC demonstrated that even within groups that otherwise shared ideological commitments and positions in the political arena (within parties, within ministries), there were now at least two broadly different ways to envision France's "interests" in Europe. The proponents of the Schuman Plan had succeeded at introducing the newer of these visions of Europe, and had almost succeeded at extending it through the change in constraints provoked by the Korean War. But when applied to the realm of defense, ECSC's logic was seen as more than the marginal step away from traditional French policies taken in coal and steel. For many French decision-makers schooled in the two wars -- and even many of those who had drawn Europeanist conclusions from those conflicts -- EDC moved too far too quickly away from their previous thinking.

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93 Give breakdown of votes: SFIO 53 against, 50 for. Etc etc.
The "Green Pool": A European Agricultural Community

While neither the proposals for a "European Agricultural Community" nor those for a "European Health Community" registered on the same political order of magnitude as EDC, both reproduced its conflicts between alternative interpretations of French government interests.

Postwar French agricultural policy did not turn in the direction of international cooperation until 1948. The disastrous harvest of 1947, and serious unrest among farmers, led to the prioritization of agricultural development in the Monnet Plan. High targets were set for exports.

In order to meet these goals, French Minister of Agriculture Pierre Pflimlin (MRP) tried from 1948-1950 to get the OEEC and then the Council of Europe to discuss the organization of European agriculture markets. Pflimlin's main ideas (continued by his friend Gabriel Valay, who replaced him as Minister from 1 December 1949 to 2 July 1950, whereupon Pflimlin returned) centered on a network of bilateral guarantees and specialization agreements in the OEEC framework (Noel 1988, p. 128). They were similar to simultaneous French proposals for industrial trade in the OEEC and Finebel, although still less multilateral and more protectionist. But the British in particular were uninterested in specialization, suggesting instead the unconditional liberalization of agricultural markets.94 No serious intergovernmental discussions had taken place as of spring 1950.

"It was into this situation," Milward writes, "that Schuman's proposals for the Coal, Iron, and Steel Community erupted with dramatic effect" (1992, p. 290). Agricultural trade was the one area where French decision-makers were anxious for arrangements including Germany, the closest major agricultural importer. Pflimlin had earlier argued against Finebel because it included neither Germany nor the UK, the two major potential markets for French agricultural exports. Now that a diplomatic framework for such proposals existed, Pflimlin and his collaborators could pursue the cartel-like management of European agriculture which they envisioned.

In late May and early June 1950, Pflimlin and Valay tried to persuade Monnet to link a "European Agricultural Community" to the Schuman Plan, without success. On 15 June, they succeeded at passing a national assembly resolution calling for an international agricultural conference; Pflimlin suggested a High-Authority-like common executive body (Milward 1992, pp. 290-1). At this point, Pflimlin's proposals began to encounter

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94The UK was a major agricultural importer, and its own producers were relatively efficient. See Milward 1992, pp. 250-1.
resistance rather than support from French agricultural groups. They had welcomed Pflimlin's earlier calls for specialization and cartel-like arrangements; but a supranational high authority was another thing entirely (Noel 1988, pp. 131-9). There was no functional need, they argued, for major new institutions.\footnote{The differences between Pflimlin and the agricultural groups were quite purely institutional. They agreed on the maintenance of national protection in agriculture. He did not see an Agricultural Community as a free-trade association; in a written version of his ideas for the Cabinet he noted that "as a general rule," France should import only those products in which the French Union (France and its overseas territories) was in deficit. Note of 15 June 1950, cited in Milward 1992, p. 291, note 99.}

Nonetheless, Pflimlin moved forward, with the support of a strongly Europeanist group of bureaucrats in his ministry. He was encouraged by the active support of Dutch Agriculture Minister Sicco Mansholt, who was working on similar ideas (Noel 1988, pp. 153-161). After a series of discussions in the Council of Europe, Pflimlin prepared to officially propose his "European Agricultural Community" to the French Cabinet on 22 August 1950. But before he could do so, he was warned off by Monnet. The Commissaire au Plan "begged" Pflimlin to delay his proposal, which might complicate the ECSC negotiations (Milward 1992, pp. 292-3). The Agriculture Minister duly toned down his suggestions into a longer-horizon presentation to the government in September, calling for the study of integration in four major commodity groups, such that proposals could be made after the end of the ECSC negotiations.\footnote{Wheat, sugar, dairy products, and wine.} In October, however, he made another proposal to the government. Within a complex and vague mess of suggestions for several "European Commodity Boards" which should somehow be linked to the OEEC, the Community idea remained the core: after a transition period, European agriculture would be governed by "an institutional organization analogous in its structure and working rules to the High Authority [for coal and steel]" (ibid, pp. 293-4).

Here as in other sectors, this Europeanist proposal met with what Milward calls "a cacophony of disharmonies." Guy Mollet opposed supranational institutions on the grounds that they would distance the United Kingdom, and called for discussions in the Council of Europe (which was his ministerial responsibility); Finance Minister Petsche insisted that the OEEC was the only appropriate framework for such discussions; and the powerful farmers' association, the Fédération nationale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles (FNSEA) declared itself opposed to any arrangement limited to the Six (Milward 1992, p. 294).

Pflimlin's Europeanist allies -- Schuman and Monnet above all -- were favorable in principle, but still counseled Pflimlin to wait. But another ardent Europeanist -- Sicco Mansholt -- sent envoys to Pflimlin in November 1950, and encouraged him to push
forward. In the meantime, his proposals were referred to an interministerial committee which included all of the conflicting points of view. Without the help of a push from the Europeanists in the French government, Pflimlin was only able to secure a rather strange compromise from this body in January 1951. France would call for an international agricultural conference, as he wanted. Yet invitations would go not just to the Six, but to all sixteen members of the OECE. To mark the Europeanist spirit of the enterprise (as well as its indecision), the invitations would be issued through the Council of Europe (Noel 1988, p. 148-9).

These invitations were not issued until the end of March 1951, when the ECSC deal had been secured. But to further confuse their intent for Council of Europe and OECE members, an accompanying government memo took a clear position in favor of new supranational institutions modeled on ECSC (ibid, p. 151).

Other governments' reactions came back slowly over summer and fall 1951, and showed little enthusiasm. Either they rejected the French suggestions of supranationality (Britain, Ireland, Switzerland, the Scandinavians) or they had little or no interest in agricultural organization on any international scale (Germany, Italy) (ibid, pp. 241-6). Only the Dutch, under Mansholt, accepted enthusiastically. On top of this, Pflimlin was replaced as Minister of Agriculture in August 1951 by Paul Antier (Parti Paysan), who showed little enthusiasm for European adventures. But Antier was replaced in November 1951 by the more internationally-minded Camille Laurens (Parti Paysan), and Pflimlin (who now held the Ministry of Commerce and External Economic Relations), with Mansholt's help, was able to push him to action.

In February 1952, Laurens proposed that the "preparatory conference" to which the OECE members had invited a year before be held on 25 March 1952 in Paris. Both he and Mansholt shuttled around the European capitals to encourage attendance. While none of the other governments expressed clear support for the standing French ideas about a supranational Agricultural Community, all but Portugal eventually accepted to attend.

The only result of the "preparatory conference" was agreement to set up an "interim working group" to study the issues and prepare a second conference for early 1953. This

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97 The meeting between Pflimlin's and Mansholt's officials in Paris conflicted with the recent French government decisions not to act in this direction; nor did Mansholt have any such mandate. Milward thus writes that "It is difficult to see this meeting other than as a conspiracy against their own governments by the two ministers and their close officials" (1992, p. 297).
98 Although the Dutch presented the unwelcome suggestion that the US and Canada might also be invited (Milward 1992, p. 297).
99 Monnet attempted to have only the Six be invited for negotiations, with other countries invited to observe and eventually associate themselves with whatever the Six came up with; but given the agricultural associations' opposition to the Six, Laurens retained the wider framework. Letter, Jean Monnet au Ministre d'Etat chargé du Conseil de l'Europe, 30 January 1952. MAE, série DE-CE, vol. 524.
group and its three subgroups ("Products," "General Economic Problems," and "Institutional Questions"), began work in the late spring and met sporadically until the end of 1952. Their reports, submitted in December 1952, basically summarized the different options available; given their purely technical competence, they could do no more (Noel 1988, pp. 282-3).

But Mansholt, at least, had not given up. In November 1952 he invited Laurens to the Hague to discuss a common position for the second conference. There they signed a protocol stating that the purpose of the second conference, beyond accepting the studies, should be to draw up plans for a supranational agricultural authority for the Six. This authority, though "noticeably different" from ECSC's executive, would be modeled on it (Milward 1992, pp. 302-3). The foreign and agricultural ministers of the Six would meet before the larger conference to discuss these ideas.

In between November and the planned March conference, Mansholt attempted to convince the other members of the Six to accept the protocol as the basis for negotiations. He had little success. The Italians and Germans were frankly hostile, the Belgians indifferent. The Six agreed to meet prior to to larger conference, but that was all. Worse, the French ministerial crisis of January 1953, while preserving Laurens at Agriculture, replaced Schuman with Bidault at the Quai. Though an MRP compatriot of Pfimlin and Schuman, Bidault was turning against EDC, and wanted no more supranational schemes. The French government itself rejected the Laurens-Mansholt protocol in February. The meeting of the Six on 14 March 1953 was rendered meaningless, and little more was accomplished at the full conference from 16-20 March.

Although working groups continued to discuss agricultural integration through July 1954 (at which time the subject was officially referred to the OEEC, where it dwindled away in committees), the "European Agricultural Community" was dead by spring 1953. The whole adventure had been explicitly inspired by the Schuman Plan, but this imitation was its weakness on all counts. Anti-supranationalists and Anglophiles were gathering force by 1953, spurred on by EDC. Perhaps more fatally, the Schuman Plan and EDC crowded out Europeanist support for an agricultural High Authority; Schuman, Monnet, and their allies did not think they could afford to launch serious offensives in yet another realm before ECSC was solidly established and EDC was at least ratified. The "Green Pool" thus only straggled on because of the Europeanist fervor of Mansholt, Pfimlin, and bureaucrats in the French Ministry of Agriculture -- a group capable of (weakly) calling conferences, but not of engendering any real movement by governments.
The "White Pool": A European Health Community

To the extent that international cooperation in health policy took place in Europe in the early postwar period, it did so in the global frameworks of the World Health Organization and various committees appended to the United Nations.

On 24 September 1952, French Minister of Public Health Paul Ribeyre (Radical) proposed a "European Health Community" to the French Cabinet.100 "With a few changes," Ribeyre said in an interview published in October, "the organization adopted by the European Coal and Steel Community will serve as a model." This "white pool" would cover trade in pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, integration of medical research, harmonization of standards, and would plan and coordinate investment among the participating states.101

Ribeyre's proposal was welcomed by Foreign Minister Schuman, and the government approved his suggestion to invite OEEC members to a ministerial conference on the subject in December 1952.102 The decision to turn to the OEEC framework was the result of a compromise very similar to that worked out simultaneously on the "green pool" conference. In early November, however, Ribeyre received a very discouraging letter from Minister of Industry and Commerce Jean-Marie Louvel (Radical). It would be impossible to legally distinguish health-related chemical products from other chemicals, he wrote; a single batch of chemicals may be produced for multiple uses. Furthermore, the chemicals used in pharmaceuticals change with research. A "health community" would thus be forced to integrate the entire chemical industry -- which French industries could not risk. The same kind of problem would occur in electrical medical equipment. The upcoming conference, then, should discuss only the harmonization of standards and research collaboration.103 Louvel's critiques were seconded by representatives of the chemical, pharmaceutical, and medical equipment industries.104

The plan was thus already the subject of conflict within the government when the conference was held in Paris on 12-13 December 1952. Such conflict sharpened when

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100 The immediate timing of the proposal was apparently prompted by a desire to make proposals along these lines before the Italian government, which was considering similar ideas, thus garnering the diplomatic credit and leadership for France. See "Rapport de réunion de la chambre de commerce de Dijon," 4 May 1953. MAE, DE-CE 581.
103 Letter, Jean-Marie Louvel to Paul Ribeyre, 8 November 1952. MAE, série DE-CE, vol. 524, dossier "pool blanc."
104 For the most complete criticism by industry representatives, see infra note 101.
Ribeyre, working with a group of pro-European aides in the Health Ministry, presented the French conference position as strongly supportive of supranational institutions. The supranational draft project Ribeyre circulated drew harsh criticism from the Quai; Olivier Wormser not only noted that its over-enthusiastic Europeanism was inconsistent with the government's more moderate official position, but criticized it for internal inconsistencies, grammatical errors and general sloppiness.\textsuperscript{105}

The conference, meanwhile, had only produced various resolutions for the study of cooperation in health. When the Poinot government fell in January, Ribeyre moved to the Ministry of Commerce, and was replaced by André Boutemy (independent). Under Boutemy -- who was seconded by the dissident Gaullist Pierre Couinaud as \textit{Secrétaire d'État à la santé publique} -- the European plans received a much lower priority. An OEEC group of experts was convened, however, with the intention of reporting at the end of March.

At this point, however, the failure of the European Agricultural Conference dealt a deadly blow to hopes for European progress in health. No one wanted to attempt to launch a new European project after the agricultural debacle, and with pressure increasing on EDC. The Quai diplomats were unwilling to push such ideas, the economic ministries thought them not in France's interest, and most Europeanists did not want anything to burden the EDC process. Despite all this, a last attempt was made to revive the proposals when the very Europeanist Paul Coste-Floret (MRP) became Health Minister in the Laniel government in June 1953. But Bidault (still at the Quai) quickly put an end to it. In an August letter to Coste-Floret, the Foreign Minister wrote that the economic side of the project was unworkable and should be eliminated, and that its reference to a supranational framework was simply setting up another failure for "Europe."\textsuperscript{106} Instead, Bidault argued, France should propose modest measures of health coordination in the Council of Europe. Coste-Floret reluctantly agreed, though he complained that this cut down the proposals to the same level as the coordination already undertaken in the World Health Organization.\textsuperscript{107} Health issues were duly discussed in the Council of Europe in December 1953.\textsuperscript{108} Further cooperation was episodically mentioned within the health administrations during 1954, but then disappeared.


\textsuperscript{106}\textit{Letter}, Bidault to Coste-Floret, 4 August 1953. MAE, DE-CE vol. 581.

\textsuperscript{107}\textit{Letter}, Coste-Floret to Bidault, 9 August 1953, MAE, DE-CE vol. 581.

\textsuperscript{108}\textit{"Note,"} 17 December 1953, MAE, DE-CE vol. 581.
The "Transports Pool"

[THIS SECTION UNFINISHED. In brief, French proposals were also made in 1952-3 for a "European Transports Pool," either extending ECSC or creating a new forum and organization for transports. But the OEEC had already seen a fair amount of discussion and study of transports, and when a conference much like the Agriculture and Health conferences was called in October 1953, the discussions stayed firmly within the OEEC framework. Europeanist attempts to create a smaller, stronger group centered on the Six (with the addition of Switzerland and Great Britain) failed. At the October 1953 meeting, the "Conference of European Transport Ministers" was created, and has continued to meet annually since that date. It remains a very modest, functional organization. Since the EC has moved into transports policy, it has disappeared from political awareness (and actually never registered very strongly there in any case).]

With the death of EDC and the gradual disappearance of the various supranational "pool" proposals, opponents of the Schuman Plan logic breathed a sigh of relief. This perverse way of conceiving French interests was seemingly defeated. The French government would no longer make its own sacrifice of sovereignty the bizarre prerequisite for creating international institutions. Nor would it seek to bind itself organically to untrustworthy Germany. Instead, it would play its proper role as a European Power alongside Great Britain -- a more worthy and reliable partner.

Yet if they had lost the battles to extend their "little Europe," Monnet, Schuman and their following had the European Coal and Steel Community to show for their efforts. It too was the subject of controversy, but (considering the EDC battle) of a remarkably tame sort.

B. The French Government and ECSC

In the three years following the April 1951 signing of the ECSC treaty, French decision-makers retained very divided views of the new institutions. All but the isolated advocates of supranationality around Schuman bridled at the powers of the new High Authority, and French dealings with the other member-governments displayed little of Schuman's hoped-for "fusion of interests." Crucially, however, the French government complied with ECSC through its first difficult years. Even its initial opponents in the government sought French advantage within ECSC's rules and procedures, and not outside of them. This was true
even though ECSC quickly and completely failed to limit the expansion and even the reconcentration of German coal and steel.

The Germans did not make it easy for skeptical French decision-makers to accept ECSC. Adenauer and Hallstein became no less aggressive after the treaty deal in March-April 1951. As mentioned above, the Germans challenged the coal decartelization deal as early as July 1951. Here they took advantage of lingering conflict within the French government; the Ministry of Industry and its representative on the Allied Coal Control Group (GCC), Parizot, opposed the agreed dismantling of the German coal cartel (DKV). Speaking directly for French coal interests, Parizot argued that German coal would be more easily controlled through a single organization, and (less explicitly) that the DKV breakdown posed a threatening precedent to the cartelized Charbonnages de France (Bossuat 1992, pp. 780-1). Hallstein seized this opportunity to protest the lack of German representation on the GCC. Despite unflinching insistence by the Allied High Commission, the Germans used this pretext to stall coal decartelization for a full year. Along the way Adenauer added demands that the largest remaining German steel producer, Thyssen, be permitted vertical links to coal after its breakup, and that a holding company be allowed to form between elements of the immense old Vereinigte Stahlwerke. In reply, the French OEEC delegation blocked German plans for US-aided investments in steel (ibid, p. 783). But as the July 1952 Foreign Ministers' conference scheduled to set up ECSC approached, Schuman and Monnet decided to cut a deal. The final agreement of 10 July 1952 basically accepted Adenauer's demands -- consolidating, with a few more concessions to the FRG, the original deal of March 1951.

The next major battle developed in February 1953 -- three days before the scheduled opening of the common market for coal, iron ore, and scrap -- over steel taxes. The recently implemented French valued added tax (VAT -- a new invention at the time) applied at very different rates to French steel exports and German steel imports in the French market, effectively raising Ruhr steel prices from 9% below French prices to 2% above them in both national markets (Gillingham 1991, p. 345). The Germans protested hotly, and Economics Minister Erhard walked out of a Council of Ministers meeting. Bonn insisted that this system of taxation at the destination should be replaced by that of taxation at the origin -- which the French then claimed would give a huge tax advantage to the Ruhr. Three months later, after two delays in the opening of the common steel market, an international panel of economists found in favor of the French position (Duchene 1994, p. 243).109 Yet after a conciliatory statement from the German government, French steel

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109 The panel was chaired by the Dutch Nobel laureate Jan Tinbergen, and included a Belgian and an Englishman. Their reasoning was that taxation at the origin could only function without massive trade
producers kindly raised their prices together, erasing their own VAT advantage. Behind-the-scenes cartel relations had reached a compromise when the governments could not, and the governments dropped the issue entirely (Gillingham 1991, p. 346).

This pattern of initially harsh intergovernmental conflict followed by surprisingly conciliatory and cooperative resolutions "on the ground" was repeated across most of ECSC's issues. Most of the Community's early French opponents -- whether in industry or in the bureaucracy -- soon perceived that ECSC was not as threatening as they had believed. The first governmental appraisals of ECSC's functioning, in mid-1953, were weakly positive. The Ministry of Industry, which had opposed ECSC but then received the primary responsibility for French policy within it, found that the feared failures of French firms had not materialized. In a report to the government, the Ministry of Industry concluded that the results were so far "neither positive nor negative," but it concluded that the institutions must now be supported. The Direction of Economic and Financial Affairs at the Quai (at whose head Alphand had been replaced by the more traditionally-minded Olivier Wormser) seconded this opinion. Both services noted that neither the hoped-for loans for industry nor lower prices for consumers had yet resulted, and deconcentration had not taken place as planned; but both supported the treaties (Bossuat 1992, p. 793-4).

Conflicts continued to erupt between the French and German governments within ECSC -- on the methods and freedom of steel pricing, taxes on special steels, regulating the cartelized scrap market, through rates for train transport, and others -- but the bargaining was always successfully resolved in compromises. In relations with the High Authority, too, the French government sought to avoid or misinterpret its obligations as much as possible, but ultimately accepted decisions where the Authority had the legal right to impose them. This was true even after Jean-Marie Louvel was replaced as Minister of Industry by Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury (who had violently criticized the planned Authority's powers in late 1950 as exceeding "those accorded to national governments in democratic countries, even in wartime"), and even when the Gaullist Henri Ulver replaced Bourgès-Maunoury under Mendès-France (Haas 1958, pp. 266-7). Even Ulver argued

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110 After describing in detail the French government's efforts to sidestep the spirit of ECSC agreements, Haas notes, "It must be stressed nevertheless that advocacy of interest group and government policy in ECSC organs has remained strictly within the framework of legal obligations contained in the Treaty. Temptations to depart from these strictures have been consistently rejected by Cabinet members in their tussles with parliamentary interpellations. Gaulists thus have demanded that the French government assert itself in controlling directly the budgetary dispositions of ECSC organs and that French power in ECSC be used to enforce unflinchingly the continued deconcentration of Ruhr industries. Radical and Conservative deputies have urged the compulsory coordination of investments to hinder the development of German continuous strip mills, as well as demanding exemptions for specific French plants from common market
against ECSC's parliamentary detractors that the Community placed new constraints -- legal and political -- on the French government which could not be ignored.\textsuperscript{111}

French government respect of ECSC was perhaps most surprising in light of the Community's failure to prevent reconcentration in the Ruhr. Monnet had made deconcentration the major French demand in the ECSC negotiations, and many of ECSC's government and parliamentary supporters had made clear that they accepted French competition only with a deconcentrated Ruhr. In December 1952, Robert Schuman explained again to the Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee that it was the High Authority's responsibility to protect what earlier deconcentration had achieved (Duchene 1994, p. 249). Yet from 1952-1954, Monnet's High Authority found its hands tied by the EDC debate. Adenauer warned Monnet that any strong actions against German industry would endanger EDC's ratification in the German parliament (ibid). Thanks to continuing German voices within the High Authority and German pressure from without, this reluctance to enforce deconcentration never diminished. Nor did the French government fight hard for such enforcement, though it offered constant minor complaints on the subject. In the first half of 1954, the French Ministry of Industry and its German counterparts reached an agreement on fairly high levels below which mergers needed no ECSC approval (Spierenberg and Poidevin 1994, p. 168).\textsuperscript{112} But even above these levels, not a single merger was rejected by the High Authority from 1954-1958 (Diebold 1959, pp. xx). In June 1954, one of the first mergers approved under the negotiated regulations allowed the steelmaker Mannesmann to purchase a coal mine and engineering plant, thus virtually reconstituting one of the pre-war Konzerne. At the end of 1954, with little French protest, the High Authority announced specifically that mergers were to be judged solely on the basis of efficiency and competition noted in the Treaty; no reference would be made to the preceding Allied decisions on deconcentration (Duchene 1994, p. 249).

This lax policy quickly produced the results the French had supposedly feared. A major reconcentration movement was already visible in Germany by 1954 (Cois 1955). Of the twenty-four German steel firms which emerged from deconcentration, mergers had made sixteen firms by the end of 1956. The eight major pre-war Konzerne were all recognizably reconstituted. By 1957, they controlled 79% of Ruhr pig iron production,

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\textsuperscript{111}See the exchange in the Assemblée Nationale on August 28, 1954, reprinted in \textit{Annales des Mines}, vol. 144, numéro spéciale 1955, pp. 116-125. Alerte to this source by Haas.

\textsuperscript{112}The Germans had wanted still higher levels, the High Authority very low levels, and the French were in the middle. The eventual agreement, on the high end, provided for no review of mergers resulting in producers of less than 1.2 million tons of steel, pig iron, or coke, 4 million tons of ore, 900,000 tons of rolled products, or 100,000 tons of special steels (Haas 1958, pp. 81-2).
75% of steel, 60% of rolled steel, and 33% of coal (Gillingham 1991, p. 355). German steel production, bankrolled by huge government grants which contravened the treaty as much as the French web of subsidies, increased by 55% from 1952-1957; in France the increase was only 40%, and from a lower initial level (ibid, p. 357).113

In terms of behavior within the ECSC institutions, then, the French government respected the obligations created by Monnet and Schuman. Despite the fact that ECSC actually provided few of the hoped-for obstacles to a German economic revival, and despite the evolution of government ministries towards the anti-Europeanist Right, Paris acted within the treaties. Haas concludes:

Paris, after protesting and seeking the implementation of the French viewpoint, always yielded in the final analysis.... Looking over the five years of common market and the extent of necessary French adjustment to the new rules, in terms of the divergence of French economic practices from the norms laid down in the Treaty, the degree of loyalty to supranationalism is far greater than a catalogue of initial protests and obstruction would show (1958, p. 268).

Haas's central point, that the French government ultimately worked within the ECSC institutions in surprisingly good faith, is incontrovertable. But were these actions evidence of "loyalty to supranationalism," or simply of recognition of the legal-political constraints which ECSC set on French government actions? In surveying the agonies and deaths of French policies imitating ECSC, I have noted that hostility to supranationalism in the government grew rather than diminished after 1952. Many of those who had hesitantly accepted Schuman's proposal -- whether politicians like Georges Bidault, or fonctionnaires like Olivier Wormser -- resolutely opposed any other supranational adventures by 1954. Within ECSC, too, Monnet's constant reminders of his Authority's supranational status provoked much resentment in Paris, particularly among those politicians and the upper-level diplomats who had been bypassed in the ECSC proposal and negotiation (Massigli 19xx). Like the death of EDC, Monnet's surprise resignation from the High Authority in November 1954 -- in protest of PMF's nationalist foreign policy -- provoked very divergent reactions. A majority of the government displayed ill-concealed delight; the European minority expressed deep regret.

But if "supranationality" per se was defended only by a handful of believers in the government, ECSC's less idealistic novelties were more broadly accepted as part of France's political landscape. "The Six" now existed as a framework for French government action. Many opposed it, for the very reasons that this kind of "little Europe" of continental cooperation based on Franco-German partnership had not existed in

113 check this figure.
governments' considerations before Schuman's innovative proposal: it risked German
dominance; it broke with the Franco-British *entente cordiale*; and from its very birth, it was
tainted with dangerously idealistic supranational thinking that ignored France's "real"
interests. Yet even those government decision-makers who disliked "little Europe" found
themselves forced -- by the limited successes of their Europeanist compatriots -- to consider
how French interests could be pursued within its framework.

For thanks to ECSC and EDC, "the Six" was the framework within which the
majority of French government thinking on Europe, positive or negative, took place in the
early 1950s. Various ministers and high-level civil servants of the Six met constantly from
summer 1950 on. The ECSC Council of Ministers held 28 sessions in the first three-and-
a-half years of the institutions' operation (to December 1955). Add to this the series of
negotiations and conferences around EDC, meetings on the proposed "European Political
Community," several meetings of the Six either in preparation for or in the margins of
larger conferences (on the "Green Pool," at meetings of the Council of Europe), and the bi-
or trilateral communications necessary to arrange these meetings, and it becomes clear that
the ministers themselves were in extremely frequent contact. Lower-level preparations and
consultations never stopped; at no time from 1950 through 1954 were the Six not
discussing items of major immediate importance to all the governments.

Did this mean that French decision-makers were somehow being "socialized" into a
conception of their interests based on the Six? The evidence does not support such a
statement. In 1954, mainstream French decision-makers were more deeply divided than
ever on how to conceive their government's interests. The OEEC and even the Council of
Europe were still strong competitors for the supranational Six. These facts did mean two
things, however. First, the Schuman Plan had successfully created a new set of legal and
political constraints on French government action. Even the less or anti-Europeanist
decision-makers felt compelled to respect these commitments when representing their
government. They were not unbreakable constraints -- ECSC was not, in any objective
sense, of existential importance to the French government -- but they successfully
restrained even those who resented them. They represented political "sunk costs," and
even though they were marginal changes, they facilitated certain subsequent actions and
complicated others. Second, and more abstractly, those constraints illustrated a model of
European intergovernmental relations with relatively clear implications for potential French
actions; and action within those constraints forced French decision-makers to contemplate
those implications. Again, in 1954 they were deeply divided in their reactions. Most of
them did not wish to extend the Schuman Plan model. But crucially for future
developments -- as the next chapters will show -- that model was now institutionalized. It
could not easily disappear from the drawing boards. It was not yet even close to being embedded as the basic framework for French policy in Europe, but that path was now open.

V. Conclusions: Political Change and the Politics of Ideas

A. The Empirical Story

In empirical terms, what has this account demonstrated? This story supports three claims. First, I have shown that the Schuman Plan's organizational vision of Europe introduced a new conceptualization of French government interests. Jean Monnet created this vision and introduced it into French policy; no other figure had both the inclination and the political access to do so. Robert Schuman and his collaborators took up the vision and built policies around it, as it offered a set of arguments and solutions that responded well to French pressures and opportunities in 1950. To say that it "responded well" to the French situation in 1950, however, does not mean that we can explain Schuman's choices as "rational" -- unless we are ready to maintain that he and Monnet were somehow "more rational" than their compatriots who fought ECSC and its related policies. This story is about the politics of ideas, not rationality. In a situation of great uncertainty and pressure, some French decision-makers placed their bets on a marginally but crucially new interpretation of their governments' interests. Others within the same parties and bureaucracies were unwilling to do so. The difference between the two groups was decided by individual values and choices.

We know what followed; we read the histories of the victors today, in which today's Europe flows from the Schuman Plan's brave "leap into the unknown." But I have also shown that from 1950 to 1954, Schuman's new interpretation of French interests was badly battered by French decision-makers who still refused to accept it. Once the new vision was introduced, its proponents had to fight a classic political battle to institutionalize, protect, and extend it. Two interrelated factors shaped this battle: the extent to which the new vision could be extended without radically contradicting older thinking, and shifts in the relative political resources of the different visions' proponents. On the former, recall from section II that interpretive change occurs marginally and gradually. Under uncertainty, actors may place relatively small bets on new strategies, but they will rarely undertake untried strategies given enormous stakes.114 While a strong majority of French

114This idea is supported by the now-considerable literature on frames of reference and risk aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, etc etc.). To put the same statement in other terms, actors may accept a certain amount of "cognitive dissonance" under conditions of pressure and uncertainty, but a great deal of dissonance will drive them back to a familiar cognitive framework (Festinger 1957, etc etc.).
politicians were ultimately willing to make the ECSC "bet," the extension of a similar bet to EDC was too much for all but the most convinced Europeanists. The issue of resources is simpler: changes in constraints between 1950 and 1954 made the advocates of certain bets better able to call the shots. While Schuman held the Quai d'Orsay, and while Monnet could put his American allies at the service of his policies, the ascendant European vision dominated French policy-making. Yet changes in constraints soon undercut their control of French policy. Externally, the worsening war in Indochina and hints of East-West détente sapped at EDC. Internally, electoral swings bolstered the anti-European Right. By 1954, the Schuman Plan proponents had pushed for too large a bet in EDC, and secular changes had cut their resources from under them. Their ability to advance their interpretation of French interests was, for the moment, eclipsed.

Thirdly, I have shown that despite losing the battle of ideas in 1954, the partisans of Europe had successfully left an institutional legacy that might help them in the next battle. In concrete terms (but of secondary importance in the Schuman Plan's legacy), the European Coal and Steel Community itself had at least not proven a bad bet -- despite achieving almost none of its original goals. It had not had the dire consequences its opponents predicted for either French industry or the power of the French government. Indeed, in 1955 ECSC would enter into a boom period which would quiet many of its earlier detractors. In more abstract terms, and more importantly, ECSC and the imitations it inspired had created both a working notion of Franco-German partnership and "the Six" as a framework for that partnership. As Gillingham concludes his study,

The Schuman Plan failed to provide an adequate framework for supranational government, did little to harmonize economic conditions, and by no means set in motion an inexorable process of unification, but it ended the competitive bids for heavy industry domination that had wrecked every previous large-scale attempt to reorganize the Continent since 1918, led to Westintegration and Franco-German partnership, and resulted in the creation of a new political entity, Europe (1991, p. 364).

Whether the French government would decide to further embed itself and its policies in this "new political entity" was unforeseeable in 1954. It seemed very unlikely. But the important conclusion of this first step in "France and the Social Construction of Europe" is that the innovative ideas and political leadership of a small group of men had made that decision a possibility. The next chapter will relate how that possibility became reality.

B. Political Change and Constructivist Theory

What elements of a "demonstrable constructivist theory of political change" does this first step of my story provide? Any useful theory of political change must include three
elements: the sources of change, the openings for those sources (why previous continuity can be altered), and why, in turn, the new changes become elements of subsequent continuity. This first chapter of "France and the Social Construction of Europe" focuses mostly on the former two elements, only hinting at how the third will be developed in the rest of the study.

As set out crudely in the introduction, a constructivist theory of political change presents new ideas as the sources of change. Note that this in no way excludes other sources of change; natural disasters and economic cycles may also be powerful sources of change. The theory simply proposes to explain and show how particular significant political changes derive from the introduction of new ideas.

Where new ideas come from is, conveniently, below the level of my theoretical questions. Certain individuals are more creative than others. To turn to the biological metaphors that underlie much of political theory, new ideas are like genetic mutations. I can understand the process of political "evolution" without a detailed understanding of the "mutations" that drive it. The important point is that the source of change is, in fact, a separate mechanism from the "requirements" of the objective environment. New ideas do not appear in direct functional response to constraints and incentives. Very few French decision-makers were ready to accept the Schuman Plan, let alone come up with it themselves.

This metaphor begs the question of what "selects" among new ideas as potential sources of political change. This is the second element of a theory of change, explaining the openings for disruptions in previous continuity. My answer comprises two notions: crisis, and organizational access. Crisis is often presented as the precursor to change. It is fundamentally a rationalistic, objective idea; when strategies stop functioning as actors wish them to function, they search for new policies. This means that, on a very general level, the selection of new policy ideas is rational; actors begin searching for any ideas that seem (to them) to be capable of solving their crisis. But in most complex situations, this basic rationality sets only very broad parameters on the search. Within those parameters, new policy possibilities emerge according to an unforeseeable "mutation" process. A government's adoption of a particular solution depends thus on the appearance of new ideas, and their organizational access to figures in decision-making positions. (Sometimes, of course, the top decision-makers may come up with new ideas themselves -- but this seems rare). Thus the nature of a policy crisis selects new ideas according to very broad rational criteria (i.e., France needed some kind of new policy on its relationship with Germany in 1948), and the organizational access of individuals and their ideas selects much
more closely. A final selection depends on the personal ideas of top decision-makers, which choose between the ideas that come before them.

How, finally, does my developing theory explain the consolidation or institutionalization of new ideas? This is the third, and most interesting and difficult, element of a theory of political change. How is change translated into continuity? For a certain (and probably small) number of individuals within a government, the adoption of a new policy idea by a prominent decision-maker may actually "convert" them to that idea. This will typically only happen with the individuals who were closest to accepting new ideas anyway, leaving undisturbed the calculations of individuals who are thinking in other directions, or who conservatively wish to somehow defend the status quo (generally by far the largest group). But if and when the advocates of the new idea manage to achieve some concrete official commitment to its tenets -- such as initiating negotiations, or even signing agreements with international interlocutors in the name of the government -- the calculations of the "unconverted" will begin to change. Even if they remain opposed to the interpretive policy changes of the new ideas, the "sunk costs" faced by their government will have been altered. International expectations have now been created, and these interlocutors may be unaware (or deliberately misinformed) of the lack of consensus within the government. This does not mean that the dissenters will now support the new policy out of devotion to the official "word" of their government. It simply means that marginal barriers have been raised to retracting the new ideas, and marginal incentives have been raised to accepting to work within them. Over time, these events draw out a process that might be called the "rational adjustment to interpretive change" among the dissenters. Many decision-makers would not have proposed or championed the new policy in question, but they gradually adjust to it after losing the initial battle of policy choice. If the "sunk costs" are considerable -- as in the breakdown of Franco-British relations, the popular valorization of the new Franco-German partnership, and commitments "on the ground" in the organization of coal and steel that all followed from the Schuman proposal -- the dissenters may even find that their own favored strategies have changed a great deal.

On the broadest level, the process of political change thus described is neither "rational" nor "irrational." In a world of ambiguous and complex constraints, objective rationality is largely indeterminate, and political decisions must be made by drawing on some coherent set of ideas about how that world should be organized. The process does, however, construct what might be called "a rationality" over time. A series of decisions

115 There is much more to be said about "organizational access" and new ideas. I mean to develop this with reference to the organization theory literature on how various kinds of organizations are able to change (or not). I think this point may be crucial in explaining, for example, why certain rigid states (the Soviet Union) may be unable to incorporate new ideas and change.
inspired by similar organizational ideas will gradually create sunk costs which affect all actors within a government, even if they rebel personally at those inspiring ideas. From a situation in which many courses of action might have been "rational" from various perspectives, the parameters of one path are thus progressively strengthened, until even individuals with enduringly different values will prefer that path for subsequent steps. This is the full story that "France and the Social Construction of Europe" will tell.
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