TERRITORIAL POLITICS AND THE STUDY OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION

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INTRODUCTION: REGIONS, REGIONALISM AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENT

Much work has been done on European regional policy and its implications for European integration. However, there has been little on what the rich literature on territorial politics could offer to the study of European integration. This is not to suggest that it has been entirely ignored, just that there is much untapped wealth which could help further our understanding of the processes involved in European integration and the nature of decision-making in the European Union.¹ This paper considers two branches of this literature. First, it is suggested that the rise of regionalism and regionalist movements developed within national states² might tell us something about the process of European integration. Second, it is suggested that the literature on intergovernmentalism within territorial politics (as distinct from the quite different school of intergovernmentalism within the study of international relations) offers further insights into the study of the European Union.

An exploration of the explanations for the rise of regionalism at the sub-national level in Europe offers insights of value to the study of European integration. The factors inhibiting and promoting the process of integration and disintegration of national states also helps get round the 'n of 1' problem identified by some scholars (Caporaso and Keeler 1995). While the European Union may be viewed as sui generis this does not necessarily mean that the conceptual tools required to study it or the models and theories applicable must be developed from new.

One aspect of territorial intergovernmentalism is the notion that the 'centre' is an ambiguous and often contentious concept. This is certainly true in discussions of the EU but it is equally true when looking at individual national states. Particular reference is made to the United Kingdom in this discussion not because it is typical or in any way representative but because of its atypicality. There are few national states in Europe which are as centralized as the UK. If the UK has an ambiguous centre then that can probably be fairly safely assumed to be the case elsewhere in liberal democratic Europe. It will be argued that the EU is also a 'differentiated polity' which requires to cater for distinctiveness within its borders. This has been achieved in a number of ways - through responses to pressures from below, through centrally directed policies and/or through the creation of new layers of government and administrative structures. In many respects, the question of how to relations between different levels of government in the EU parallels long-standing debates and issues which have been pursued about territorial politics and the national state.

First, however, it is necessary to unpack the term 'region'. There are at least three meanings associated with it of relevance to this paper. As a term in political sociology, regionalism refers to the emergence of movements articulating demands in a specific territory, whether for greater resources or for political power for the region. Regional policies are policies, emanating from government at the centre, which are designed to cater for the distinctive needs of different territories and remove economic disparities. These have traditionally
involved economic assistance in the form of 'spatial Keynesianism' (McAleavey 1995: 13). As a term in public administration, regional government and administration refer to sub-state levels of government and administration ranging from the constituent units of a federation through local government to the field administration of government at the centre. A distinction should be made between decentralization and deconcentration. Decentralization, as Smith noted, 'refers to the territorial distribution of power. It is concerned with the extent to which power and authority are dispersed through the geographical hierarchy of the state, and the institutions and processes through which such dispersal occurs' (Smith 1985: 1). Deconcentration leaves the centre in charge and 'is frequently employed to reduce the forces of localism and enforce uniformity in decision-making across the country, unlike political decentralization which is designed to reflect the unique characteristics, problems and needs of different regions and localities.' (Ibid.: 9) It should be stressed that decentralization and deconcentration are ideal types.

I. REGIONALISM

Regionalism is a bottom-up phenomenon whereas regional policy, regional government and administration generally emanate from above. There is a complex relationship between each of these. There are a variety of explanations for the rise of regionalism in Europe. In outlining some of these, it is possible to identify some potential common sources of regionalism and European integration. Essentially, the study of regionalism is the study of the processes which lead to political integration or political disintegration. Deutsch noted that similar factors could lead to either outcome as actors seek out the most appropriate level of government (Deutsch 1966: 85).

The origins of some sub-state nationalist and regionalist movements were found to be the same as those of the mass parties in the nineteenth century, if not earlier (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 120). The rise of nationalism amongst Scots, Basques and Catalans in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, has been seen as the 'most recent step in a process that has been unfolding since the late eighteenth century' (Connor 1977: 27). In Belgium the process of forming the Belgian state and modernising impulses behind this, played their part in fomenting Flemish and Walloon identities (De Schryver 1981; Vos 1993). Though the first and second world wars resulted in a greater sense of Belgian identity, territorial management and ethnicity was a recurring issue in Belgium. In some cases, the origins of contemporary problems are to be found in the untidy efforts at state-building before the first world war. Regions straddling borders between states or which changed the state they were part of during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries left their mark. Examples are found in the South Tyrol and Northern Ireland. Another wave of regionalism emerged in the after 1945 in the context of rapid economic change and centralisation in states. In a few cases, however, movements are quite new and have few, if any historical lineage (Ibid.: 136). In Italy, for example, the city and it surrounds and not the region was traditionally the focus of local identity in the North and Centre (Lytelton 1996).
The fact that different regionalist movements become politically salient around the same time may be explained either by some common structural change affecting different states or it may be explained by a domino effect (Lijphart 1977: 63). The role of modern communications allows regionalists to know what is happening elsewhere and to learn and copy from others. While much emphasis has been placed on the contexts in which regionalist movements have developed, less attention has been paid to the role of political leadership. The ability to take advantage of a 'structure of political opportunities' (Eisinger 1973) may explain why some regionalist movements are more successful than others even if the context appears equally favourable. The role of intellectuals in providing a political focus for a movement (Smith 1971, 1982) and leaders in developing a political organisation will have some significance (McAllister 1981). These explanations are within the broad school of resource mobilization theory of social movement research (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Jenkins 1983).

Rokkan and Urwin identified four components of peripheral identity: myth, symbol, history and institutions (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 67). This could apply to other identities including national identity and supranational identity. The importance of myths is the fact that they are believed and inform political behaviour, not whether they are based in fact or fantasy (Edelman 1985 [1967]). Symbols such as flags have proved important throughout history for all kinds of collective identities, not only the great variety of territorial identities which existed or have existed. Before any regional movement can hope to assert itself with any hope of success, there needs to be a sense of common identity. This might be invented or some obscure past event may be resurrected or re-interpreted to provide an historical authenticity and legitimacy to a sense of identity.

A cultural base is a prerequisite for any regionalist movement. That together with an economic catalyst provides a base for mobilization (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 139). Language is generally seen as most important in consolidating national identity (Keating 1996: 9). The cultural base may be invented, contrived or revived but some degree of coherence will be required before people within a territory, even representing a minority, can hope to mobilise politically. In some cases, activists have consciously sought to revive a sense of common identity through cultural activities, reviving or creating symbols and challenging negative stereotypes (Mitchell 1996: 26-30). Cultural revivals may have had no overt political connotations but it is not always possible to divorce politics from culture and the latter may spill-over and affect politics whether desired or otherwise.

A problem in the study of regionalism is whether it should be seen as an independent or dependent variable or even taken as given and primordial. Birch argued that in social and political affairs 'very few variables are truly independent' but that 'loyalties and attachments themselves persist over very long periods of time, largely irrespective of other factors' (Birch 1978: 333). He maintains that it 'makes more sense to treat ethnic and cultural loyalties as
given than it does to make the common assumption that they are dependent variables, to be explained in terms of political discrimination, economic exploitation, relative deprivation, and so forth.' (Ibid.: 334) It is not necessary to share this view to acknowledge the force of the argument that many latent regionalist identities are well grounded requiring only to be mobilized. However, an alternative view is that a collective identity, of any kind, is contingent on circumstances. What might be at issue is whether an identity precedes or comes after the establishment of a polity (see discussion on state formation and national building below). But though they may be 'imagined communities' as Anderson described national identity (Anderson 1991), regional identities are no less real as sociological phenomenon. Understanding the origins of these movements, however, does not explain why they become politically significant when they do. A variety of explanations for the mobilization of the regions has been proposed. One way of looking at regionalism is to see it as the revival of something which was temporarily sidelined politically rather than as a new wholly new phenomena (Liiphart 1977: 60-1).

Modernisation and Diffusion Theories

Over the post-war period, regional and sub-state nationalist movements have emerged or developed with varying degrees of support across western Europe. This phenomenon challenged orthodox views of the nature of politics in western liberal democracies. The process of modernisation - usually taken to mean the combination of urbanisation, industrialization, and secularization - was expected to eradicate or at least diminish the importance of territorial identities below the level of the state (Rokkan 1970). Modernization was thought likely to result in the diffusion. The continued existence of minority languages and cultures such as Welsh and Gaelic were thought to have no impact of the integrity of the state in the 1950s. Deutsch maintained that cultural minorities were of 'minor importance' (Deutsch et. al. 1969: 159). Some scholars even suggested that the world was leading 'toward an ultimate integration of societies' even potentially to world government (Black 1966: 155, 174). Others still, argued that the process of modernisation was irreversible (Huntington 1971: 289-290). Not all scholars subscribed to the view that there was an ineluctable process towards ever greater integration. Hoffmann argued that the nation state, as he called it, was far from redundant (Hoffmann 1966). The rise of regionalism was a challenge to the established orthodoxy. It represented, according to Lipset, the 'most dramatic form of resistance to modernizing trends in post-industrial society has been the re-emergence of ethnic or linguistic nationalism in many countries' (Lipset 1981: 472). Lumping together often very disparate movements, Lipset saw these as anti-modern in their support for the dispersal of factories to various regions 'rather than concentration in efficient large units' and their support for the revival of folklore (Lipset 1981: 474).

One explanation was that increased communication and contact with people beyond the region was thought to produce a reaction against assimilation rather than facilitate it (Lipset 1981: 474). A number of other explanations emerged
and critiques offered of the existing orthodoxy. In particular, the modernisation thesis was re-examined especially that associated with the work of Karl Deutsch. Critics noted that though the general message from the modernisation thesis was that assimilation would occur, there were warnings in Deutsch's own writings that regional nationalism could revive. Some writers challenged Deutsch's conclusions but noted that his work was more sophisticated than many interpretations had inferred (Connor 1994: 30; Lijphart 1977: 48). The relationship between modernisation and assimilation was complex: in some circumstances modernisation could lead to assimilation, in others it could have the opposite effect while in others yet there might be no relationship between the two (Enloe 1973). Deutsch had argued that rapid social mobilisation may 'promote the consolidation of states whose people already share the same language, culture, and major social institutions; while the same process may tend to strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life' (Deutsch 1961: 501 in Connor 1994: 32). If the rate of assimilation was too great, people would be forced into contact with others as workers, customers and neighbours:

Linguistically and culturally, then, members of each group are outsiders for the other. Yet technological and economic processes are forcing them together, into acute recognition of their differences and their common, mutual experience of strangeness, and more conspicuous differentiation and conflict may occur. (Deutsch 1966: 126)

This was not dissimilar to the view that increases in 'social communication and mobilisation tend to increase cultural awareness and to exacerbate inter-ethnic conflict' (Connor 1994: 36 emphasis in original). Amongst Bretons, the sense of ethnic identity 'grew sharper as contacts and communications increased between Brittany and the rest of France' (Berger 1972: 170). Similarly, the Basque nationalist movement gained strength despite 'many of the changes associated with modernisation', including economic integration with the rest of Spain, extensive use of the mass media, the provision of centrally controlled education, broadcasting with a strong centralist bias (Da Silva 1975: 249-250). It could no longer be sustained that urbanization, industrialisation and secularization would 'automatically pulverize communal identities below those attaching to the national state' (Young 1976: 10). Some argued that there are different stages in the process of modernisation and that this was important in understanding the rise of ethnic politics and sub-state nationalism. Initially, modernisation might encourage the merger of local identities but assimilation may be subsequently strongly resisted (Lijphart 1977: 48). The timing, it was suggested, was less significant than the pace of change.

As Deutsch had noted, the prospect of conflict would increase with dramatically increased volume and range of contacts (Deutsch 1954: 33). The gradual increase of social communication might bring about integration, but a rapid increase in social communication could have the opposite effect. For some, the second world war marked a change in this respect in Europe, with the pace of change and communication between groups increasing. Prior to the war, modernisation did not bring about the level of contacts which appeared
threatening to local cultures: 'Brittany's culture appeared safe from French encroachment, Edinburgh felt remote and isolated from London, most Walloons and Flemings seldom came into contact (including artificial contact through media such as television) with members of the other groups' (Connor 1994: 38). A qualitative change occurred, or was perceived, with quantitative increases in intergroup contacts after the second world war. This conformed less with Deutsch's notion of 'nationalism and social communication' (Deutsch 1953, 1966) and more with Connor's notion of 'nationalism and unsocial communication' (Connor 1977: 29). A similar point was made in the context of discussions of new states, that an 'integrative revolution' may occur in the first stage of modernisation but this does not so much do away ethnocentrism, 'it merely modernises it' (Geertz 1963: 154). Though describing a wholly different kind of polity, these ideas offer interesting insights about the process of integration and the nature of regionalist movements whether at the sub-national, national state or supranational level: insights and hypotheses which might usefully be tested in relation to the study of European integration.

There were other criticisms of modernisation and diffusion theories. It was suggested that they were value-laden and often appeared to 'attempt to show how the 'backward' nations of the Third World can aspire to the more advanced social systems of the West' (Keating 1988: 4). Diffusion theory was also criticised for being uni-directional. Political development was seen as an 'irreversible process leading to ever-higher planes of social organisation'. It was assumed that the process of integration would take place within and across the politically defined state though it was equally possible for integration to occur at a higher or lower territorial level. Another failing was they did not take adequate account of political calculation for/within the process of political integration. Political elites will consciously attempt to create common a value system and create a sense of national identity (Keating 1988: 4).

**External Support Framework and Economic Explanations**

Another explanation of regionalism views the early post-war period as one of consensus and affluence which gave way from the 1960s to a period of economic and political turbulence. Regionalist movements were a part of the cause or a consequence (or both) of this turbulence. During the age of affluence (Lane 1965) the only threat to the integrity of West European states appeared to come from outside the state. The end of this period, signalled by rising unemployment, inflation and industrial relations troubles, caused difficulties for governments. Pressures from non-territorial interests were seen to threaten the integrity of states as governments had to face problems of 'ungovernability' and 'overload' (King 1975; Rose 1980). Regionalist pressures were deemed by some commentators, at least before the mid-1970s, to be less significant than the pressures from sectional interest groups: 'Warring sectional barons may in the long term create a more deadly anarchy than the warring territorial barons of King Stephen's time' (Seton-Watson 1971: 13). This relates closely to another explanation for the rise of regionalism. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods international financial system in 1971 and the economic crises precipitated by
the oil price rises in 1973 and 1979 'severely reduced the ability of government to pursue an effective regional policy for political objectives' (Urwin 1994: 9). Alternative identities and polities - supranational or regional - might have appeared more attractive during this period. On the other hand, they might have been less attractive, deemed unknown and risky in insecure times.

The perceived failure of the centre to cope with these pressures, especially when states defined their role to include meeting economic and welfare needs of their people, eroded their legitimacy in the eyes of those affected by economic bad times. If the state set itself up as the guarantor of full employment and welfare services, failure in this respect might affect the loyalty its citizens felt towards it. The rise of 'new social movements' linked to the 'penetration of the state into previously private areas of life... represent a reaction to certain modernization processes in late capitalist societies' (McAdam et. al. 1988: 701). In addition, government policies would not necessarily have the same impact across the state. Some people and some regions would benefit more or less than others whether policy was deliberately designed with this in mind or not. The interventionist state could provoke jealousy and resentments between regions. It was much easier to tackle such problems during periods of economic growth when the state's resources were growing and poorer people and regions could be appeased through special provisions such as regional policies. This became more difficult during recessions.

The rise of 'new social movements' has been linked to the development of new values. The most notable work on this has been done by Inglehart (1977). This might be seen as the source of support for both regionalism and supranationalism. Part of the change involved a 'changing sense of identity' with 'profoundly important consequences for Western politics, for it increases the potential support for a supra-national European Community that in time may bring an end to the nation-state as we know it in Western Europe' (Ibid.:322). This obviously directly contradicts the materialist explanations.

Other explanations focusing on economic conditions include theories of 'relative deprivation', 'uneven economic development' and 'internal colonialism'. Relative deprivation could refer to economic, cultural, political deprivation or some mixture of these. The basic idea has been described as 'deceptively simple: persons may feel that they are deprived of some desired state or thing, in comparison with some standard, or with the real or imagined condition of other people' (Williams 1975: 355). Brooks argued that 'social mobility in the context of a widespread sense of deprivation' yielded support for Scottish nationalism (Brooks 1973: 267). Uneven economic development is derived from Marxist analysis. Gramsci's analysis of the economic development of the Italian Mezzogiorno (Gramsci 1957) and Nairn's of Scotland (Nairn 1974, 1981) suggested that ethnic minorities, in Southern Italy and Scotland, suffered from the uneven development of capitalism. Nationalism in these areas was seen as the frustrated reaction of the middle classes and bourgeoisie who felt left out of the process of economic development evident elsewhere in the state. These groups might attempt to mobilize other classes in pursuit of their goal (Nairn 1974: 64).
explanation is similar to internal colonialism. Internal colonialism is a theory derived from third world development studies, especially Latin America. Peripheries are believed to be dependent and exploited by the centre. The theory has been applied to the Britain (Hechter 1975), but also by regionalist activists in Brittany (Lebesque 1970), Occitania (Marti 1975) and the Jura (Bassand 1976). Hechter's argument was that relatively advanced and less advantaged groups emerge with the 'spatially uneven wave of modernization' which crystallize and the more fortunate core takes advantage of its situation and institutionalises this 'stratification system'. Consequently, less advantaged groups find that they cannot gain access to power or other resources giving rise to a 'cultural division of labour' which becomes entrenched. The core will have a diversified industrial structure while the periphery is dependent on any industry which does develop geared for export, making it sensitive to international trade. In this respect, if no other, with regard to this theory, a link can be established between regionalism and European integration. Key decisions affecting the periphery are made in the core. Wealth in the periphery consequently 'lags behind the core' (Hechter 1975: 9-10). The 'Celtic fringe' within the United Kingdom, Hechter argued, suffered accordingly. Later, Hechter refined his theory in response to criticisms (Hechter 1985). Scotland was now seen differently. It was argued that there was a 'segmented cultural division of labour', by which he meant that there were some Scots in posts which derived from distinctive Scottish national institutions such as education and the law which were in no way inferior to similar posts in England. In essence, he was renouncing the application of his internal colonialism model in the explanation of the main regionalist force in British politics.

Criticisms of uneven development and internal colonialism have attacked both the empirical and theoretical arguments put forward by Nairn and Hechter (Page 1978; Smith 1982: 20-24; Brand 1985). One problem with these theories is that it is not possible to generalise from the particular cases cited, even if it is accepted that they are appropriate explanations in these cases. If uneven development was the explanation in Spain, it might be expected that Galicia had a stronger regionalist movement than Catalonia, which is not the case. The evidence that capitalist development even approximates with ethnic regionalism is difficult to sustain. In other words, parts of those regions deemed to be underdeveloped or exploited are prosperous, indeed in the vanguard of economic development such as Clydeside in Scotland during the industrial revolution, or at least no worse off or underdeveloped than areas within the core. The emphasis on economic explanations at the expense of cultural and political factors by Nairn and Hechter has been noted (Agnew 1981; Rawkins 1983).

The international context has, however, been important in other respects. Supranational political institutions, the global market place and international business contacts have affected the degree of autonomy which states have and have made boundaries between states permeable. These trends made decisions affecting ordinary people appear more distant and difficult to influence (Ionescu 1989). New regions which crossed borders and transcended individual states became economically significant.
The decline of the European state also played its part in the development of regionalism. The process of decolonisation affected how states were viewed at home as well as abroad. An empire gave people in all parts of the state access to jobs and opportunities. Its demise cut these off. The old established European states were divested of their imperial role and were 'reduced to second-class status well below that of the superpowers' (Smith 1979: 162). In the UK, the 'sun had set on the British Empire at considerable cost to Scotsmen' (Esmann 1977b: 260). The threat of nuclear war and the perception that states could guarantee security was seen by others as more important in damaging European states and allowing sub-state nationalisms to grow in the 1960s and 1970s (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 137). The growing economic interdependence of states and creation of the European Communities offered an alternative international framework which served both to undermine the authority and legitimacy of European states and also to provide some guarantees for small states.

**Regionalism: Insights for the Process of European Integration**

Although there are many, often contradictory, explanations of regionalism, it is nonetheless possible to utilise the insights of some of these explanations to illuminate the study of European integration and the conditions under which a European regional movement can be said to have or can be expected to emerge. The absence of a strong sense of European identity now or recently should not mean that this cannot emerge. The recent case of Northern Italy is an example in Europe of regionalism at the sub-national level which had no obvious historic roots. Regionalism may often be rooted in a cultural identity but need not have had a political meaning. It might be contended that the focus on regions, in this context, is misplaced and that the focus ought to have been on quite different territories, the national states: in effect the regional, or sub-supranational units, of the European Union. An issue in related debates, with some relevance to contemporary concerns in European Union studies, concerns the relationship between state formation and nation-building. Keating maintains that the creation of states involves 'first the acquisition of territory, then the imposition of authority within it' (Keating 1988: 1). Breuilly argues that nationalism was 'more important as a product than as a cause of national unification' in Germany and Italy (Breuilly 1993a: 96). In other words, states precede nations (Breuilly 1993b). The process of creating a state (state-building) has generally been followed by a process of building loyalty to it (nation-building).
II. TERRITORIAL POLITICS AND INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

The second branch of territorial politics which offers insights into the operation of the EU is concerned more with government than social movements though the issue of loyalty again arises. As was alluded to in the introduction, the centre is an ambiguous concept. This is likely to be the case in any state (Bulpitt 1983: 53; Rhodes 1988: 48-9). In the case of the European Union, the centre is more ambiguous than in national states if only because it is the sum of the national states who are members and more. The supranational and intergovernmental interpretations of the EU give rise to conflicting views of what constitutes the centre. Before any assessment can be made or any taxonomy proposed of central responses some clarification of the meaning of the centre is required. Viewed as a system of multi-level governance, the EU is seen as a layered polity (Marks 1993). Viewed as an intergovernmental organisation, the EU is again seen as multi-centred with the government of each member state operating within a number of constraints but often able to use EU membership as a means of gaining greater control over its domestic political environment (Moravcsik 1993). A central argument of this paper is that the EU is neither a layered polity nor is it intergovernmental in the sense meant by students of international relations but it is intergovernmental in the sense used by scholars of territorial politics.

Arguing that the centre may be ambiguous or that there are multiple centres is not the same as arguing that there is no centre. The centre or centres will have a number of objectives. Not the least of these is maintenance of territorial integrity. The centre has a range of options available in pursuit of this goal as discussed below. The issue of how the centre responds to its regions has been evident throughout recorded history. However, it must also be recognised that in pursuit of territorial integrity or other objectives the centre will require the assistance of other actors. What emerges from this might be viewed as either a system of interdependence or a hierarchy of power.

Power is a central concept in the study of territorial politics but, as Maass made clear in his seminal work, this was a focus on 'governmental power and political community, not with the entire community power structure' (Maass 1959:10). He further distinguished between the 'areal division of power' meaning the dividing power 'among areas or regions which exist or can be created within the political community' and the 'capital division of power meaning 'dividing power 'among governmental officials and bodies of officials (a legislative chamber, for example) at the capital city of a defined political community' (Ibid.: 10). The distribution of governmental power could, therefore, be divided among official bodies at the capital and among component areas in a number of different ways. Power can be distributed according to the process used in government (legislative, executive, administrative and judicial processes are mentioned) with legislative function assigned to the centre and administration to the regions for example. The functions or activities of government can similarly be assigned with, for example, for policy being a central government function and welfare provision to local government. The division according to constituency could involve a capital division of power with different legislative chambers.
representing different types of constituency (the regions vs. the people collectively) and directly elected provincial, regional or local bodies representing their electorates and particular interests (Ibid.: 11-12). Though a basic typology it is nonetheless an important starting point in discussions of the areal or territorial distribution of power. One significance of this discussion was noted in Hoffmann's comment in the same volume:

Any preference for a certain scheme of areal division of power presupposes a decision on the ends for which power is to be exercised - a decision on the values power should serve and on the ways in which these values will be served. It involves a whole philosophy of government and society. (Hoffmann 1959: 113).

Central Strategies

Rokkan and Urwin suggest that a first step towards an understanding of the different territorial structures would 'combine information on the historical sources of strain in each territory with information on the strategies of unification distinctive of the state-building elites' (Rokkan and Urwin 1982: 4). Connor has suggested that central elites may seek to build an homogeneous nation by 'fostering acculturation and eventual amalgamation or assimilation and by refusing to countenance cultural or institutional pluralism' (Esman 1977: 380). However, if regionalist groups persist and central elites are unwilling to pay the price of enforced assimilation, then a range of responses are available: studied neglect, ridicule, repression or accommodation in various forms. Accommodation, Connor noted, is more common in the contemporary west and comes in two forms - concessional and structural (Ibid.: 381). The first involves the recognition of 'regional claims of economic deprivation and the provision of subsidies or financial assistance to foster economic development.' (Ibid.: 381-2). In the case of grievances which are more cultural than economic, central elites may 'accept the use of ethnoregional languages in public schools, in local and regional governments, and, for limited purposes, even in the structures of the political center.' (Ibid.: 382). The second involves 'structural adjustments that allow for more regional autonomy or federalism'. (Ibid.: 382) Concessional accommodation does not require changes in the distribution of power whereas this is central to structural accommodation. Concessional accommodation, in other words, involves some degree of decentralisation.

Others have written similarly on the subject. Rudolph and Thompson (1985) suggest a continuum from conservative to radical responses. In their study of government policies and practices adopted in response to ethnic politics in the western world during the 1960s and 1970s, they note that different ethnoregionalist movements have different objectives. Some are 'less concerned with achieving regional self-rule than with expanding their respective region's share of government outputs'. Others are primarily concerned with 'affecting who makes decisions, that is, with the nature of existing political authority'. A third type focuses on 'changing the nature of the regime, the political-constitutional principles and structures regulating the manner in which decisions are made'. The final type may 'challenge the legitimacy of the
boundaries of the multinational political community in which they find themselves and champion independence and/or irredentist goals.' (Rudolph and Thompson 1985: 293-4)

Central governments and those concerned with the territorial integrity of the state may be wary of stimulating regionalist demands by devising regional policies or by establishing regional government contiguous with the area in which the regionalist movement operates. Concessions may raise expectations and create greater demands (Kellas 1991: 58). Governments may encourage an ethnic or regional identity to emerge or develop and thereby create problems for themselves (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 176-9). This applies not only to explicitly regional strategies which backfire but also to policies which have spatially unintended consequences despite being designed or thought to be territorially neutral. An OECD report in 1968 noted that 'national policies that were not designed specifically as regional policies may nonetheless have important differential regional consequences' (1968: 5 in Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 175).

The failure to respond might also, however, have damaging consequences for the centre. This presents it with a dilemma. As Connor remarked, ethnonationalism 'appears to feed on adversity and denial... It also feeds on concessions.' (Connor 1973: 21) The empirical evidence does not point to any obvious strategy to placate regionalist demands (Rokkan and Urwin 1983: 166-92). In addition to what the centre may wish to do, there is the issue of what it can do. 'In the last resort', as Rokkan and Urwin noted, 'everything boils down to cost.' (1983: 188) Though territorial integrity is paramount in the ambitions of central governments and the achievement of economic equality across regions likely to be a goal with a high ranking, the means of achieving either of both of these may prove costly and undermine the achievement of other goals.

**Polity-building by default**

In a seminal article on Canadian federalism, it was argued that from 1867 Canadians had been engaged in more than the construction of the new Canadian state but also in 'building provinces' (Black and Cairns 1966: 27). They argued, against the contemporary orthodoxy, that political integration was not an inevitable consequence of modernization - of urbanization, industrialization, and rising living standards (Ibid.: 39):

The existence of separate provincial governments automatically elicits a more intense pattern of communications and associational activity within provincial boundaries than across them. Mechanisms set in motion by the creation of political institutions permit provinces such as Saskatchewan and Alberta which possessed little sociological legitimacy at their birth to acquire it with the passage of time and creation of a unique provincial history (Ibid.: 40). The roles played by elites in politics, administration and resource-based industries were seen as the most important aspects of province building:

Professional educators, forest biologists, electrical power generation specialists, highway engineers, public safety inspectors and scientists, social workers, and large numbers of skilled program administrators find their lives
intimately bound up with the size and prosperity of provincial governments (Ibid.: 40-41).

Black and Cairns criticise those, including Deutsch, who had suggested that regional identity would grow progressively weaker (Black and Cairns 1966: 38). However, in another work Deutsch had maintained that 'in trying to gain and exercise power for its ends, the efforts of nationalists may translate a people into a nationality (Deutsch 1953 [1966]: 104). Subsequent work developing the notion of province building has been criticised for producing a concept which is 'too vast and lurid. The concept is highly amorphous and complex' (Young et. al. 1984: 783). They criticise six proposition associated with the concept suggesting that they are generalizations which ignore important exceptions and argue that the provinces may not have affected either state operations or the federal system as depicted in the province-building image, and that inadequate account is taken of the events before 1960 which would suggest greater continuity.¹¹

What is interesting about the literature on province building in Canada is not whether province-building is an over-extended concept or who is right and wrong so much as that it parallels in so many ways many debates on the implications of institution-building at the European level. There are few comparable studies or debates of European regional government and administration because there is no European case of a regional government threatening the integrity of the national state which compares with that of Quebec in Canada (though on Scotland within the UK see Mitchell 1990: 17-38, 1997: 35-65). At issue in the case of Canada and the European Union is the question of the power, prestige and position of national state governments. The conceptual tools involved in studying the creation of a polity, the loyalty given to it by the citizenry and the prospects for reform or, indeed, radical change ought to be the same or similar regardless of the level of government involved.

Territorial Intergovernmentalism

It would be wrong to suggest that centres will offer a regional expression only in response to regionalist pressures. The position of the state at the centre is important in each case. With the possible exception of micro-states, all central governments must take account of diversity manifested in its territories. It would be wrong to see the centre as necessarily in constant dispute with territories within it. The relationship between the centre and the components of the polity will often be harmonious and interdependent. This will be the case even in highly centralised states. Regional government and administration and regional policies exist where no regionalist movements exists. Such regional expressions often owe as much, or even more, to the needs of the centre as to the demands of the peripheries. The goal of spatial equality and the administrative needs of the centre for some form of sub-state level of government should not be ignored. Devolving responsibilities and even power facilitates central policy-making objectives rather than undermines them. Indeed, it may be in the interests of the centre to devolve difficult decisions. When 'confronted with difficult demands it can no longer satisfy alone, central government seems quite happy to decentralize penury!' (Mény and Wright 1985: 7). Examples of this
given by Mény and Wright were Reagan's 'new federalism' and Mitterrand's decentralization programme which, 'although based on radically conflicting philosophies, underline the desire to disengage central governments from certain activities and responsibilities.' (Ibid.: 7).

It is worth noting that even in highly centralised states, there is considerable reliance on sub-state levels of government and administration in policy-making (Gray 1994: 7). As Rhodes has noted, the traditional view of Britain as a unitary state in which 'all policy decisions are taken at Westminster becomes wholly inadequate when we consider local governments' (Rhodes 1985: 34).12 Rhodes views the relationship between central and local government in Britain as interdependent, conceiving the relationship as a 'game' in which certain resources are central to bargaining: authority (or legal resources), money, political legitimacy, informational resources, organizational resources (Rhodes 1985: 42).13 This view of central-local government relations is a complex and heterogeneous set of relationships between different levels of government even within a highly centralized state.

What emerges for Rhodes is a 'differentiated polity with no single centre' (Rhodes 1988: 1). Clearly, this presents a problem. If the United Kingdom is a differentiated polity then few liberal democracies, or liberal polities, could be described differently and the value of the concept becomes almost redundant. It does, however, serve a useful purpose in challenging other models and raises questions as to how else territorial politics in any polity should be conceived. The variety of differentiation is part of the response to this problem. For Rhodes, it is possible to distinguish between different temporal phases in post-war British politics.14 This is done through consideration of the resources available, as discussed above. It is also acknowledged that there are a variety of policy networks with 'distinctive outcomes' (1988: 387). For Rhodes, 'policies towards Sub Central Government must be based on an theory of how the system worked and ...complexity, interdependence, differentiation and disaggregation are its defining characteristics.' (Ibid.: 387-8) Rhodes developed the notion of policy networks with different structures of dependencies (Ibid.: 77-8).15 Networks have been described as a 'meso-level concept' which 'does not explain variations in policy-making and policy outcomes, although it forms part of such an explanation. Mostly, it seeks to describe and explain variations in the pattern of interest intermediation' (Rhodes et. al. 1996; 370).

This is not dissimilar to the four political resources - initiative, institutions, information and ideas - identified by Moravcsik which he argues determine the ability of domestic groups to constrain executives in his discussion of the manner in which the European Community strengthens the state (Moravcsik 1994: 4).16 Moravcsik is, of course, considering a wholly different polity and set of issues. Nonetheless, it is notable that he draws a very different conclusion from Rhodes while utilising a similar set of conceptual tools to analyse the distribution of power. Whereas Rhodes argues that power is more diffuse than is generally assumed to be the case by virtue of the existence of these networks and policy communities, Moravcsik counters the 'diffusion hypothesis' of 'most contemporary [EU] analysts' (Moravscik 1994: 40). EC policies 'tend, on balance,
to reinforce the domestic power of national executives' (Ibid.). Perhaps a more similar set of conclusions is to be found in Mény and Wright's comments on the 'decentralization of penury' mentioned above and also in Bulpitt's analysis of territorial politics in the UK from 1926 to the early 1970s resulted in a 'dual polity' in which,

national and local polities were largely divorced from one another. These contacts which existed...were bureaucratic and depoliticized. In this period the Centre achieved what it had always desired - relative autonomy from peripheral forces to pursue its 'High Politics' preoccupations. (Bulpitt, 1983: 235-6, emphasis added).

Since 1979 and the onset of economic difficulties, however, the centre increasingly intervened in the affairs of local government (Ibid.: 236). The centre's objective of allowing local government some degree of autonomy over 'low politics' does not mean that local government has power, as witnessed in the period since 1979 in Britain, when central government chose to intervene, and it did so very effectively, in the affairs of local government. The high-low politics distinction adopted by Bulpitt is worth noting. It can, of course, be countered that this distinction is tautological: if the issue is dealt with by local government then it is a form of low politics and if it is dealt with by central government it is high politics. Nonetheless, the notion that member state governments 'devolve' responsibility of those matters for which they have lost effective control or which are 'low politics' is at least worthy of some consideration, if only to confound the notion that this is the case.

In some respects, these approaches in territorial intergovernmentalism are similar to those associated with multi-level governance in EU studies (Marks 1992, 1993). The strength of the multi-level governance approach is that it raises questions about the analysis of the resources available to different actors in territorial politics in the EU. A more accurate description of the territorial politics of the EU may be that it is a differentiated polity with no single centre' rather than a system of multi-level governance. The latter implies the existence of levels or layers whereas a 'differentiated polity' evokes a quite different image - vertical as well as horizontal differentiation of power and resources. More significant are the criticisms made by Rhodes et. al. (1996: 372-3). Although links between levels of government multiply, they are 'not necessarily an effective challenge to centralized decision-making' and Marks 'deliberately avoids the theory-laden notion of networks' (Ibid.: 372). Multi-level governance is probably an appropriate metaphor but it requires some fleshing out. Rhodes et. al. are also critical of others who have used the networks approach in the study of the EU (Ibid.: 370-1). Peterson's approach has proved fruitful though he concedes that the 'gap between theories used to explain broad patterns of European integration and those which seek to explain sectoral EU decision-making remains wide' (Peterson 1995: 70). Peterson maintains that his approach has limited value when considering history-making decisions at Intergovernmental Conferences or major policies made in the Council of Ministers but of considerable value in understanding 'second-order' decisions. His framework assumes three levels of analysis: history-making decisions which are taken at the 'super-systemic' level, policy-setting decisions which are taken at a 'systemic' level, and policy-shaping decisions which are taken at the 'meso-level' (Ibid.: 72-74). What remains absent
from this approach is how decision-making relates to institution building and, in turn affects loyalties and identities.

Conclusion

The central argument of this paper is that the 'n of 1' problem is overstated. There are bodies of literature which offer insights into the processes of European integration and decision-making. While it may be valid to argue that the EU is *sui generis*, this does not mean that a wholly new set of analytical tools, quite separate from those employed for decades by political scientists are redundant. Key concepts, insights, theories and hypotheses can be applied or tested in the study of the EU which might shed light both on the EU and also on those elements in the discipline from which they are drawn. The parallels in the territorial politics literature discussed above will be obvious, even when not made explicit.

Broadly defined, the study of territorial politics should offer much to students of the EU if only because its subject matter has been concerned broadly with three issues: identities, relations between different levels of government and spatial policy. Many of the problems associated with the study of these matters are evident in the study of the EU. It would be fair to say that many contemporary students of territorial politics have ignored or failed to appreciate the rich literature of the past just as many students of the EU have done the same with territorial politics.

Perhaps the greatest challenge to students of territorial politics, and also to EU students, is how to marry its different elements. The 'region' needs to be unpackaged and it is the relationship between regionalism, regional policy and regional government and administration which remains unresolved. Similarly, it is the relationship between the different 'levels' of decision-making, the policies themselves and how these impact on loyalties and identities which remains most unclear in EU studies. If territorial politics offers one obvious insight it is that institutions can precede loyalty and identity. Polity-building is more likely to come first. However, it should be noted that this observation is largely drawn from literature based on historical research. Institutions established in earlier, often pre-democratic times, have come to win converts and support. This may prove more difficult now. The dynamic nature of institutional development and its implications for any polity and its legitimacy is problematic. As the discussion of province building has shown, this is far from straightforward as any student of the EU knows.
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1 Much of the literature on regional policy in the EU and some on European integration touches on the territorial politics literature I will be referring to. In particular see Rhodes et. al. 1996.

2 There is a problem of terminology here. The term nation-state is commonly used in political science when, arguably, there are few nation-states in Europe - Sweden and Ireland usually seen as approximating that ideal. The term 'national state' is used here in conformity with Tilly (1992: 2-3):

Through most of history, *national* states - states governing multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of centralized, differentiated, and autonomous structures - have appeared only rarely. Most states have been *non-national:* empires, city-states, or something else. The term national state, regrettably, does not necessarily mean nation-state, a state whose people share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity. Although states such as Sweden and
Ireland now approximate that ideal, very few European national states have ever qualified as nation-states. Great Britain, Germany, and France - quintessential national states - certainly have never met the test.

3 The term 'regionalism' will be used in preference to regional nationalism or sub-state nationalism throughout this paper as it has wider application and includes movements seeking less than full independence.

4 The definition given by McAdam et. al. is useful:
   By structure of poetical opportunities we refer to the receptivity or vulnerability of the political system to organized protest by a given challenging group. Characteristically challengers are excluded from any real participation in institutionized politics because of strong opposition on the part of most polity members. (McAdam et al. 1988: 699).

5 The definition of diffusion given used is that given by Heine-Geldern (1968):
   Diffusion means the spread of culture from one ethnic group or area to another.'

6 The term was first used in a study of the behaviour of American soldiers in the 1940s (Stouffer et. al. 1949).

7 Norman Davies, Europe: A History, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.160 cites the case of a Roman general in 146BC appearing at the Isthmian Games to offer the city-states some degree of autonomy. One, Corinth, refused this and was razed to the ground in Carthaginian style.

8 There is a large literature on community power which is more encompassing than that concerned with governmental power. This focus on the more limited conception of power does not in any way imply criticism of the wider literature. See Lukes (1974) and Dowding (1991).

9 Maass (1959: 10) proposes a diagram to explain the the different divisions of power in terms of the capital division of power (cdp) and the areal division of power (adp):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) PROCESS</th>
<th>(2) FUNCTION</th>
<th>(3) CONSTITUENCY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Exclusive</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Shared</td>
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10 They considered the impact of public policy on movements in Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Spain, Switzerland (Jura) and France.

11 Young et. al. criticise six propositions which came to be associated with province building:
   1. The attitude of the provinces towards the central government has changed: they have come to resist federal incursions more staunchly and have increased their self-serving demands upon Ottawa.
   2. The provinces have greatly increased their financial and human resources both absolutely and relative to the central government.
   3. The scope of provincial public policy has widened enormously and state intervention, especially in the economic realm, has become deep and pervasive.
   4. Provincial policy-making has changed profoundly, to become centralized, planned, and coherent.
   5. Provinces are most closely linked with the resource sectors, and so is province-building.
   6. Province-building conflicts with nation-building: in particular, provincial economic interventions fragment the common market and cause significant welfare losses.

Each of these propositions was challenged in turn by the authors.

12 The notion that the UK is a unitary state is itself contentious. Some would argue that it is a union state (see Mitchell 1997 forthcoming). The unitary-union state distinction was originally suggested by Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin. The union state was defined as one which was 'not the result of straightforward dynastic conquest...[in which] some areas of pre-union rights and institutional infrastructures which preserve some degree of regional autonomy and serve as agencies of indigenous elite recruitment' whereas a unitary state had, 'one unambiguous political centre which enjoys economic dominance and pursues a more or less undeviating policy of administrative
standardisation. All areas of the state are treated alike, and all institutions are directly under the control of the centre' (Rokkan and Urwin 1962: 11). However, though Rokkan and Urwin saw Britain as a union state at its foundation, they viewed the contemporary state as a unitary state. Mitchell (1997) has argued that the contemporary state should be viewed as a union state. See also Rose 1982. Notably, all agree that the UK is a highly centralised state.

Rhodes defines these:

'(1) Authority (or legal resources) refers to the mandatory and discretionary rights to carry out functions or services commonly vested in and between public sector organizations by statute or constitutional convention.

(2) Money (or financial resources) refers to the funds raised by a public sector organization from taxes (or precepted), from service charges and from borrowing.

(3) Political legitimacy (or political resources) refers to access to public decision-making structures and the right to build public support conferred on representatives by the legitimacy deriving from election.

(4) Informational resources refers to the possession of data and to control over either its collection or its dissemination or both.

(5) Organizational resources refers to the possession of people, skills, land, buildings, material and equipment, and hence the ability to act directly rather than through intermediaries.

(Rhodes 1985: 42).

Rhodes (1988: 371-2) distinguishes between four different phases:

'1945-61 was an era of stable external support system, economic growth and apolitisme; 1961-74 was an era of 'stop-go', modernization, and territorial protest; 1974-9 was an era of an unstable external support system, economic decline and incorporation; and 1979-85 was an era of economic recession, bureaucratic control and politicization.'

Rhodes maintained that these structures vary along five key dimensions (1988: 77-8):

- Constellation of interests - the interests of participants in a network vary by service/economic function, territory, client group and common expertise (and most commonly some combination of the foregoing).

- Membership - membership differs in terms of the balance between public and private sector; and between political-administrative elites, professions, trade unions and clients.

- Vertical interdependence - intra-network relationships vary in their degree of interdependence, especially of central or sub-central actors for the implementation of policies for which, none the less, they have service delivery responsibilities.

- Horizontal interdependence - relationships between the networks vary in their degree of horizontal articulation: that is, in the extent to which a network is insulated from, or in conflict with, other networks.

- The distribution of resources - actors control different types and amounts of resources, and such variations in the distribution of resources affect the patterns of vertical and horizontal interdependence.

Moravcsik defines the four as follows:

'Initiative' denotes the authority to introduce (or block introduction of) issues onto the domestic agenda, 'institutions' the procedures by which domestic decisions are made. 'Information' refers to political and technical knowledge, 'ideas' to the supply of legitimate ideological justifications for specific policies.' (Moravcsik 1994: 4).