Lee, Jae-Seung. (1997) "Defining the national interest: Domestic sources of the French European monetary policy during the Mitterrand era". In: UNSPECIFIED, Seattle, WA. (Unpublished)
Abstract
The French European monetary policy during the Mitterrand years evolved through three stages: 1) defining the national interest, 1981-1983 (the first EMS crisis); 2) the deepening of the franc fort policy (1984-1992); 3) the consolidation of the franc fort policy, 1992-1993 (the second EMS crisis). The franc fort policy based on redefined national interest was epitomized by the French "U-turn" of 1983 and consolidated at the EMS crisis in 1992 and 1993. The process of redefining national interest reflected a specific feature of the French policy-making community. The implementation and consolidation of the franc fort policy had been led by technocratic elites. During the crisis period, especially during the 1982-83 EMS crisis, the role of the president and socialist politicians had been dominant. As socialism faded out, the political nature of the EMS decision was taken over by a technocratic decision. The deepening of the ideational consensus among economic elites redefined the French national interest in a way to make an exit from the EMS more difficult. In a later crisis, 1992-93, the defense of the franc was led more by the opinion from technocratic elites, including the economic bureaucrats of Trésor and Banque de France. Elite cohesion based on the Grands Corps system remained intact and facilitated the consensus on the redefinition of national interest. The increased democratic deficit between administrative elites and citizens brought a problem of the legitimacy of delegation. The self-justified delegation and a passive consensus on the European monetary integration came under doubt, leading to the crisis of the Maastricht referendum and the 1995 strike.
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