REGIONAL POLICY STYLES AND REGIONAL PROPENSITY TO GO

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Regional Policy Styles and Regional Propensity to go European

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The discussion of an ‘Europe of the Regions’ and the role of the regions in the European Union is embedded in the overriding debate about ‘Multi-Level Governance’ (Marks 1993; Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 1996). The first round of the discourse was dominated by pointing out the regional as ‘another’ level of government in addition to the European and national level. But it was a meager debate focused on (1) the different - graded - levels of government; (2) the zero-sum-game played by governments shifting around competencies and (3) exclusively posing the question of sovereignty. Without analyzing the causes of the unidimensional view in detail it should be pointed out that the term of ‘multi-level’ predetermined its interpretation of hierarchical ordered sovereign territory. That paper prefers the conception of the European System as an ‘interpenetrated system of action’ similar to its characterization as an integrated system of overlapping, interpenetrating elements which are effecting each other (Hrbek 1993: 85). In contrast, the second generation was opening the debate for wide-ranging questions about the ‘system of governance’ we are facing in the Multi-Level Governance. Governance here is seen as the targeting concertation of a multitude of mostly corporate actors from all levels - supra-national institutions, member-states and the subnational level together - drawing their legitimacy within a policy area from law as well as from their problem-solving capacities. In consequence the territorial scope for political action is enlarged ‘beyond the nation-state’ (Haas 1964) and a complex and confused system of transnational, trans-regional and multi-level decision-making is created which incorporates public-private interest intermediation too. According to that system policy-making means bringing together the relevant actors and managing their conflicting interests. The nature of that system was described as ‘Governance without Government’ (Rosenau/Czempiel 1992; Kohler-Koch 1993) or the German discussion about ‘Regieren jenseits der Staatlichkeit’ (Kohler-Koch/Jachtenfuchs 1996). It tries to track down changes of governance in a space without borders due to European integration.

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1 For the difference of ‘level of government’ and ‘system of governance’ please see Beate Kohler-Koch, Interactive Governance: Regions in the Network of European Politics, in this panel or Kohler-Koch/Knodt 1997.

2 An extreme interpretation of the ongoing process of multi level system could be found within the ‘sandwich metaphor’. The picture indicates that the European and regional level had been strengthened to the national levels disadvantage, see Eser 1991.

3 For the term: ‘penetrated systems’ see Rosenau (1969), who is pointing out that in penetrated systems ‘external actors do not just influence but have a share in political decisions’ (Kohler-Koch/Knodt 1997).
The project ‘Regions as Political Actors in European Integration’ (REGE)\(^4\) was set up in the second tradition described above, being the first international comparative empirical project investigating the changing role of regions in European integration and the changing patterns of regional governance alike.

We assumed that (1) the upgrading of regions will be closely linked to the expansion of transnational networks and the dissemination of patterns of co-operative governance and (2) a change in governance systems may come about when guiding concepts match and when regional actors have strong incentives and/or a superior capacity to use the resources offered by the Community (Kohler-Koch/Knudt 1997).

In contrast to common studies we see the performance of regional governance in European integration not only shaped by the national constitutional setting of a region, endowing it with rights and administrative capacities and the competitiveness of the regional economy but in addition by regional policy styles reflecting policy routines and political practices.

According to our conceptual framework we were interested in a number of factual questions: (1) Is there a shared belief in guiding concepts as propagated by the EU such as (i) the attractiveness of a more important role for regions in European affairs; (ii) the benefits of joining the EU’s competitive strategies; (iii) the superiority of co-operative governance? (2) How did regional actors adapt to the deepening of European integration in terms of (i) administrative reforms; (ii) a revision of lobbying strategies; (iii) getting involved in public-private partnerships? (Kohler-Koch/Knudt 1997).

On some of our main hypotheses we would like to present our findings\(^5\) and discuss possible explanations: (1) the propensity to support an enhanced role for regions in European affairs depends on benefits to be gained and capacities to use them; (2) there is a co-variance between cognitive orientation and established practices and routines; (3) the support for co-operative European government is strong among regional actors that have a long tradition in joint-decision-making and pride themselves of pursuing an open-minded public-private partnership;

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\(^4\) ‘Regions as Political Actors in European Integration’ (REGE) is an international research project I have coordinated and carried out at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES), Universität Mannheim. Team members: J. Grote, M. Knudt, F. Larat, S. Umberti (MZES, Universität Mannheim); external cooperation partners: E. Négrier, M. Lacave, W. Génieys, O. Dédieu (Université de Montpellier, Centre comparatif d’Études des Politiques publiques et des Espaces Locaux); B. Jouve (Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l’État à Lyon, Centre de Recherches Interdisciplinaires Ville, Espace, Société); Prof. F. Morató, J. Etherington, N. Gomez-Mataran (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona); Prof. S. Loughlin, J. Mathias (University of Wales College of Cardiff, European Study Centre). First results have just been published: Kohler-Koch 1996a, 1996b; Grote/Knudt/Larat 1996; Jouve/Négrier 1996; Knudt 1996; Larat 1996. The condensed findings will be published in a book at the beginning of next year, Kohler-Koch 1997. For more details about the outline of the project see Kohler-Koch 1992 and 1995. Results will be published in Kohler-Koch 1997.

\(^5\) The findings are based on a written survey with 1.250 questionnaires being returned, numerous interviews, documents and selected case studies.
(4) when policy styles are close to „network governance“, regions are more likely to be active participants in transregional networks and make effective use of European resources offered (Kohler-Koch/Knodt 1997). The following sections serve to test these hypotheses applying the concept of policy styles.

1  Regional policy styles

The concept of policy styles as we know it from the recent literature is still somewhat imprecise, wobbly and badly in need of clarification. Until recently the discussion about policy styles was bound to the assumption that ‘nation’ matters. It focused exclusively upon the significant differences between nation states in the way administration is implementing regulation and shaping state-industry relations. Debates culminated in the question whether policy-routines of Western European states should be characterized as divergent or as convergent.

Our effort in developing a model of policy styles in this paper aims at relieving the concept of its nation-state bias and developing a useful tool for analyzing the differences of policy making found in the different regions.

The concept of policy styles as it is used here is based on the similar concept by Richardson, Gustaffson and Jordan (1982) and Frans van Waarden (1992). In this literature the concept refers to ‘different systems of decision-making, different procedures for making societal decision’ (Richardson/Gustaffson/Jordan 1982: 2) which are stable over time. One of the particularities therefore is to distinguish the concept from individual decisions. Facing a lack of time and information, the ambiguity of preferences and an imperfect understanding of causal relations actors fall back upon ‘standard operating procedures’ (Richardson/Gustaffson/Jordan 1982: 2) and routinized behaviour in order to reduce complexity. Previous decisions under uncertainty which turned out to be more or less successful will be repeated over and over again. Members of organizations consequently stick to well-known solutions while changes are only admitted in an incremental way.

It is important to note that two dimensions are attributed to routinized behaviour, namely: ‘the government’s approach to problem-solving’ and ‘the relationship between government and other actors in the policy process’ (Richardson/Gustaffson/Jordan 1982: 13). Frans van Waarden sums up the same issue by noting three points: (1) the intervention modus - ‘what’ is the nature or content of policy?; (2) the routine procedures - ‘how’ do policies come about? How do they get formulated and implemented? - and (3) the policy networks - ‘who’ is involved in these processes of policy formulation and implementation? (van Waarden 1995: 335). This notion comes quite close to the conception of a policy style as used in this paper. However, one important dimension is left out in the literature under review, the cognitive dimension.
A cognitive enlargement of the concept assumes that political action is drawing its rationality and legitimacy from the actors’ construction of reality and the definition of the situation. In interpreting reality and situation actors rely on paradigms which comprise the appreciation of a problem and problem-solving strategies. To describe routinized behaviour it is reasonable to include paradigms such as the cognitive orientation into the concept of a policy style. They are embedded in a legal institutional context as developed in table 3. Hence policy styles are defined as a set of long-lasting
- dominant paradigms;
- dominant patterns of actor relationships and
- dominant standard operating procedures
which have been established in a specific field of political action (s. Knodt 1997).

Conceptionalizing a policy style as a patterned behaviour embracing paradigms, actor-relationships and standard operating procedures it seems reasonable to expect a variation among regions that lead to different ways of dealing with European affairs. Apart from affecting regional policy making in general it is assumed that policy styles have a distinct influence upon the way regional actors will react towards a changing environment, too, e.g. upon the way new paradigms or problem-solving strategies offered by the EU are received. Thus regional policy styles are considered to be of relevance for shaping a region’s adaptation to the permanent challenges of the multi-level system.

The hypothesis is that if there are some links between the dimensions of policy style and the European offers then co-operation will be easier. Strong links are believed to exist, if the cognitive orientation of regional actors is close to the European one.

The empirical test of these hypotheses demands a translation of the concept of policy styles just described into an empirical framework of analysis. To describe and identify policy styles different types of styles are elaborated as a heuristic device. Starting from the dichotomy of different systems of governance developed in table 2 we are constructing more differentiated types of policy styles. In that way a top-down model of governing by direction and a model on an equal footing which represents governing by co-operation was elaborated. Thus, regional policy making could be typologized and the question to which extent the interaction structure, paradigms and problem-solving practices of the regional and the European styles match could be answered. The different policy styles described are summarized in the following table:
Table 1  Types of policy styles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>style dimensions</th>
<th>type</th>
<th>governing by direction</th>
<th>governing by co-operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>paradigms</td>
<td>* individual citizenship</td>
<td>* society based on collective representation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* problem-solving through representation and legislation</td>
<td>* problem-solving through co-operation and binding agreements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* top-down problem-solving strategies</td>
<td>* dialogue-oriented co-operative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standard operating procedures</td>
<td>* managing market failure by selective intervention</td>
<td>* activating problem-solving capacities of societal actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* inclusion of social forces in a selective and individualistic manner</td>
<td>* mediation between social forces via broad dialogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* managing policy making through (1) concentration of responsibility at the top management; (2) paternalistic leadership (3) provision of information for the top management</td>
<td>* managing policy making through (1) delegation of responsibility (2) consultative co-operation (3) joint communication and interactive learning between top management and working level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interaction structure</td>
<td>* centralized networks</td>
<td>* decentralized networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* hierarchical relations of private, public and intermediate actors in the region</td>
<td>* balanced relations of private, public and intermediate actors in the region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Modeling two ideal types will be used as a heuristic device to differentiate between the ‘real regional world’ to be detected in the data of the REGE project, interviews and secondary literature. To test our hypothesis and to proof the validity of our approach we will just look at two regions within the same constitutional context: Baden-Württemberg and Lower Saxony⁶.

2 Baden-Württemberg and Lower Saxony - two ways of policy making

Looking at of both regions since the last 20-30 years it can be said that they have developed quite different ways of policy making. Confronted with the ideal types Baden-Württemberg is best characterized as a more hierarchical type while Lower Saxony is closer to the co-operative type. How come?

A. Baden-Württemberg

⁶ A detailed analysis of each of the nine regions of the REGE project (beside Baden-Württemberg and Lower Saxony we selected Catalunya, Andalusia, Lombardie, Sicily, Rhône-Alpes, Languedoc-Roussillon and Wales) can not be done here. For the selection of the regions along the two criteria of national constitutional setting and the competitiveness of the regional economy see Kohler-Koch 1995. However, the selection of two regions with the same constitutional properties will help to concentrate on the dimensions developed above.
The governance structure of Baden-Württemberg was obviously given a long-lasting shape by the policy of Lothar Späth (CDU prime minister 1978-1991), who developed a new conservative model for this region and created the term 'Musterland' (a model region) for Baden-Württemberg. His visions can be summed up with the key words of 'more market', 'individualism', 'technological modernization through technology transfer' (Späth 1985). To cope with economical challenges Späth followed a twofold strategy: (a) to strengthen the market forces through liberalization, e.g. lower tax rates as well as (b) to play an active role as a state above all in technology policy - directing the technology transfer between science and SMEs. The basic assumption undertaking the technological intervention was that technological modernization suffers from a technological gap between offer and demand. The state has therefore to bridge this gap acting as a modernizing agent. To achieve this claim Späth carried out a fundamental reform of the Baden-Württemberg administration which considered the following strategies as relevant: (1) flexible scientific consultation; (2) intensive contacts between (political) administration, firms and science; (3) an active role of the state and (4) an independent international competitive orientation. According to these strategies administrative structure has been reformed as follows - (1) leading and executive branches of administration have been separated clearly; (2) top administration has been strengthened; (3) all in all administrative structure has been pushed toward hierarchy; (4) the Staatsministerium (state chancellery) has been fully developed into the leading ministry and a new system of innovations has been set up as a main pillar of the economic and technology policy of the region. The system is dominated by the intermediate organization of the Steinbeis foundation of technology transfer. During the Späth era Baden-Württemberg government and administration developed into one of the most hierarchical and most centralized ones in the Federal Republic headed by the state chancellery. Its work was supported by a Späth appointed commission consisting of hand-picked members of the scientific and business communities. Members of collective interest representation were not invited to join the exclusive commissions. Their function was to give informational input for policy formulation and legitimate regional policy making. Another means to provide legitimacy to Späth's government was the creation of a regional project and identity as represented by the slogan of the 'Musterland'. According to the regional project the Baden-Württemberg economical structure was characterized as the 'end of mass production' (Piore/Sabel 1989) and the 'land of the SMEs and trade' which is lavishly populated with experts in all sorts of fiddly jobs. The relative success of this region in the south-west of Germany was attributed to these characteristics as well as to the successful policy of the government in supporting this structure e.g. the technology transfer carried out by intermediary organizations such as the Steinbeis Foundation - a picture well suited to legitimate Baden-Württemberg's governance but little correspondence to the empirical economic data (Knott 1996: 69-83; Erdmenger/Fach/Simonis 1988: 247-249). A first change in this style was caused by the great loss of votes for the CDU in the regional elections in 1992. As a consequence of the losses a grand coalition was
established and ministries were reshuffled. While the state chancellery stayed in the conservative tradition of Späth and his successor Teufel (CDU) the ministry of trade and commerce under deputy prime minister Dieter Spörri (SPD) gained autonomy and started initiatives towards a more co-operative policy style. With new concepts like the 'Gemeinschaftsinitiativen Wirtschaft und Politik' (common initiatives economy and politics) the ministry took first steps towards a dialogue-orientation of governance and substituting the magic triangle of firms, scientists and politicians with the classical tripartite constellation. Under these initiatives trade unions, business associations and the ministry are formulating and implementing projects to overcome the recession which started in the mid 1990s.

Up to know these first steps towards a more co-operative style haven't caused a general change of paradigm because of (1) the inertia of the hierarchical, centralist and selective policy style of the administration and political leadership shaped by the Späth era; (2) the persistent system of innovations which is cut off and legitimates itself through the success ascribed to the innovation-model as such and (3) the key role played by intermediary organizations such as the Steinbeis Foundation which are tied closely to the regional government and help to reinforce the system. Because the recent developments caused by the recession which questioned the 'Musterland'-model and the legitimacy of the system of innovations as well as the change of government (the grand coalition was recently succeeded by a CDU/FDP coalition after four years) have not been able to initiate profound change Baden-Württemberg can still be characterized as representing a more hierarchical policy style.

B. Lower Saxony

The identification of a persistent policy style in Lower Saxony is much more difficult than in Baden-Württemberg. First of all very little has been written about the north-west region which has suffered a long time from the economic south-north fall in the Federal Republic (s. Krumbein 1994). In addition, the region was neither shaped by political hegemony nor by a constant party tradition (frequent change of government and coalitions up to six parties) nor does it offer an economic success story like the south-west region. Traditional problem-solving strategies to be considered adequate and worth keeping have not been developed. Rather regional policy has been steadily reoriented under uncertainty and a lot of the time problem-solving strategies from other German regions have been copied. Instead of following established paths Lower Saxony applied a 'trial and error' strategy using the available set of problem-solving strategies in a tool box fashion - particularly in innovation policy. Consequently this lack of traditional problem-solving strategies has caused a lack of a stable institutional logic which would have been able to provide orientation for regional acting.

In recent years a co-operative tendency can be identified a co-operative tendency which was reinforced by the coalition of SPD and The Greens and the following SPD government under prime minister Schröder (SPD). In the early 90s a new concept called 'Strategie '95' was initiated. Its aim was to modernize the regional government and especially the ministry of trade and commerce. Under the slogan of a 'dialogue-oriented economic policy' it was tried to
install an integrative Instrument of economic policy by implementing the strategy of 'project-management' into the ministry. Overcoming ressort particularisms members of different ministries were coming together with industry and trade unions to face the recession (due to the privileged location of Lower Saxony after the German unification which has caused a long-lasting economic upturn economical recession has come up very late in the mid 90th). The regional state can be seen as the initiator and manager of this dialogue.

There are good reasons to believe that this co-operative orientation is now well established in Lower Saxony’s government strategies and therefore we will claim the region as close to the model of a co-operative policy style.

3 Adapting to Europe - Changes to match

From the identification of the traditional policy styles of the two regions in question we will now turn to the prime European challenge those regions have to cope with. As it was said before the EU is opening a ‘window of opportunity’ to the regional actors which offers material as well as non-material resources like paradigms and problem-solving strategies. The next step in the analysis will be to have a look at the reception of the non-material resources offered by the EU.

3.1 cognitive convergence

There is a broad consensus that at the core of the EU believe system there is a co-operative orientation. This is transmitted by way of its structural policies as much as through its programs promoting research and development. It is expressed more clearly in the principles of partnership and subsidiarity.

According to the REGE-data the philosophy of efficient co-operation between state and society has come to be the dominant doctrine. The close co-operation between the public and private sectors is judged in a positive way and joining consultative bodies is being appreciated by the different actors as a way of participating in highly relevant decision-making. In particular the role of the state as a moderator between competing interests instead of its performance as an autonomous decision-maker is praised as being extremely useful. Even those who bemoan the costs of a co-operative decision-making process such as waste of time and loss in responsibility still tend to hold an overall positive view of the co-operative strategies. The great majority of the interviewed entrepreneurs, members of business associations, parties, chambers of commerce, bureaucrats and politicians seem to be convinced of the positive effects of ‘joint problem-solving’. This holds true not only for the German cases
but also for the whole sample of the REGE project. That’s why the results of all nine regions are presented below.

To measure the attitudes of the regional actors towards co-operative strategies we asked them about joint problem-solving as practised in the new form of ‘Gesprächskreise’ (a kind of round table).

The graph shows a striking convergence between the various European regions and across different actor categories in the agreement about the usefulness of joint problem-solving strategies. This result is supported by even more of the REGE data. Asked as to ‘which of the following groups should have more influence?’ those in favour of ‘close co-operation between state and economy’ received an unexpected strong majority of positive answers.

**Graph 1**  
*Does joint problem-solving represent a useful strategy?*  
(mean of ranking 1=not useful at all to 6=extremely useful)

Coming back to the German case in particular: besides the prodigious consent about the plausibility of co-operative strategies some differences could be found in judging joint problem-solving which clearly point at traditional regional behaviour and structure as having an effect on the perception of these new paradigms. In Baden-Württemberg the fora of joint decision-making are well known in the administration but not in the private sector. Only few private actors are provided with knowledge over the different fora. But among those private actors who are ‘in the know’ there is a high rate of participation in those circles. The picture of an exclusive and closed shop is coming to our mind. Especially the trade unions have voiced their problems to get access to the fora of joint problem-solving. This exclusive circle seems to
face less transaction costs solving problems together than the more open fora in Lower Saxony.

**Graphic 2**  Should the groups campaigning for close co-operation between state and economy have more influence? (mean of ranking 1=don't agree at all to 6=agree wholeheartedly)

![Radar chart showing influence of groups campaigning for close co-operation between state and economy.](chart)

source: REGE, MZES, 1996

Routinized meetings within an exclusive and selected circle of regional actors have to cope less with time consuming discussions than a circle of more heterogeneous composition. In the Lower Saxony case the regional actors attribute an ad hoc character to the consultative bodies. In contrast to Baden-Württemberg they are described as balanced and less hierarchical with easy access.

In the following chapter the differences emerged so far are further investigated by having a close look at the actor constellations within the regions.

### 3.2 Persistence of actor constellations and interaction in networks

In order to analyse the actor constellation within a given region the networking between actors will be considered. Networks are defined here as social networks in line with Pappi’s (1993) use of the term. They are seen as a quantity of units tied together by social relations of a certain type (Pappi 1993: 85). Networks analysed in the REGE project and in this paper cover both territorial dimension and issue. They reflect the interaction structure of actors within a specific region in the policy area of regional economic and structural policy. In the network-question of the REGE questionnaire interviewees were asked to mark in a given list of organizations those which are important to them and with whom they are in contact.
To show the results of the network analysis we first choose a very common and quite vivid way of presenting the data, the spatial depiction of so-called path distances.\(^7\)

On the basis of a socio-matrix, which shows who communicates with whom, a multidimensional scaling was produced in order to show these relationships in a spatial way. The emerging structure depicts the most important organizations in the centre of the network. They integrate the whole system and link all the parts of the network. Actors in the peripheral parts of a given network communicate with the centre only indirectly i.e. via more central actors. The communication between organizations in the picture is symbolized by darts, and already serves as a heuristic tool for analyzing the interaction of the regional actors which allows preliminary observations about the density of the whole network and the centrality of network actors. Graphics 4 and 5 show the different regional networks.

Baden-Württemberg shows a dense communication structure whereas Lower Saxony's networks indicate a low density of communication\(^8\). The picture of Baden-Württemberg also reveals a higher degree of centrality in contrast to Lower Saxony where the centre is split up\(^9\). To give an overview over the whole REGE sample:

**Graphic 3** public-private networks within the regions\(^*\)
(density and centrality, zero=average)

\*Abbreviations: Baden-Württemberg (BW), Lower Saxony (NDS), Catalunia (CAT), Andalusia (AND), Rhône-Alpes (RA), Languedoc-Roussillon (LR), Lombardy (Lom), Sicily (SIC) und Wales (WAL).


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7 To understand the network term 'path distance', sometimes also called 'social distance': If A and B are directly linked and the same holds true for B and C whereas A and C do not have any direct linkage - A is linked with C only over B and can reach C only by following two ways (from A to B and B to C). Consequently the path distance is two. For the calculation see Pappi 1987: 28-33

8 To give some figures: the density of the network in Baden-Württemberg is 0.21 and in Lower Saxony 0.17 which is the lowest rate in the whole REGE sample. The average density of all the nine regions of the REGE project is 0.27.

9 The same facts are accentuated by the following figures - Baden-Württemberg shows a degree of centralization of 0.64, Lower Saxony a significantly lower one of 0.48. With an average of all nine regions of 0.45 Baden-Württemberg shows the highest centrality comparing in the sample of nine regions.
The most central actors of Baden-Württemberg are the state chancellery and the ministry of trade and commerce. The latter has most recently developed from a more secondary ministry as during the Späth era into a ministry equal with the state chancellery.

Organizations with an x are representing the result of synthesized answers. Thus, we made one answer out of several answers from the same actor typ (e.g. the type of a transfer centre) to yield a joint answer. The way of aggregation was standardized through a fixed pattern. The procedure was necessary for analytical reasons.
Near these central actors we find a bunch of intermediary organizations such as the 'Gesellschaft für internationale und wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit Baden-Württemberg mbH' (GWZ; society for international and economical co-operation in Baden-Württemberg), the 'Landesgewerbeamt' (LGA), the Steinbeis Foundation and the European Centre for Research and Development of the Steinbeis Foundation. All these intermediary organizations carry out service functions for BWs administration and are tied closely to it.

**Graphic 5**  multidimensional scaling of path distances of the interorganizational relations within the region of Lower Saxony

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21 state chancellery Lower Saxony
23 ministry for trade and commerce
25 ministry for social affairs
27 ministry for environment
30 primary administrative division of a 'Land'
32 local administration
34 Branchenverbände (associations of a certain trade)
36 IG-Metall Lower Saxony (trade union)
38 Städte-, Kreis- und Gemeindetag Lower Saxony (associations of the local and district administrations)
40 trade corporation
43 transfer centre
47 Rationalisierungskuratorium der Dr. Wirtschaft (Nds)
49 Euro-Info-Center, BIC
56 university of applied science

22n ministry of the interior
24 ministry of finance
26 ministry of science and art
28 other ministries in Lower Saxony
31 district administration
33 BDI - Landesverband Lo-Sax (association of German industry)
35 DGB, Landesbezirk Lower Saxony (trade union)
37 other trade unions in Lower Saxony
39 chamber of commerce
42 Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale (bank)
46 NATI - Niedersächsische Agentur für Technologietransfer
48 EG-Hochschulbüro Hannover/Hildesheim
55 university

Source: REGE, MZES, 1996; Grote 1996; Krackhardt/Blythe/McGrath 1994; in: Knodt 1996a

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11 see previous footnote
The LGA is a unique organization in Germany and actually a part of the administration of the Land - especially the ministry of trade and commerce - but was transformed into a service organization for the business sector. Together with the GWZ, a joint service organization of the private and public sectors focused on foreign relations, it is located in the 'Haus der Wirtschaft' (house of business) in the vicinity of the ministry of trade and commerce. The 'Regierungsbeauftragte' (governments representative) for technology transfer who is a member of the ministry of trade and commerce, is at the same time chairman of the Steinbeis Foundation and of the Steinbeis Europe Centre as well as being member of the supervisory board of the GWZ. The government representative for Europe of the ministry of trade and commerce is deputy chairman of the Steinbeis Foundation. The chairman of the GWZ on the other hand serves a curatorship at the committee of the Steinbeis Foundation.

Compared with Baden-Württemberg the regional network of Lower Saxony shows some remarkable differences. Even at first glance we notice a double centre - the ministry of trade and commerce on the one hand and the ministries of social affairs and science as well as the state chancellery on the other side are shaping the picture of a bi-centred region. The relatively central position of the district administration is caused by the fact that regional economic policy in Lower Saxony is carried out mainly at the local level - which is unique in the Federal Republic. In contrast to Baden-Württemberg where the trade unions are located far away from the ministries in Lower Saxony they are placed near the network-knot surrounding the ministry of social affairs, etc. The intermediate organizations such as the Niedersächsische Agentur für Technologietransfer und Innovation (NATI - Agency for the transfer of technology and innovation in Lower Saxony) do not show the same degree of integration into the public system as in the Baden-Württemberg case. Even though NATI is connected to the ministry of trade and commerce the organization never functioned just as a mediator for the administration as the Steinbeis Foundation did in Baden-Württemberg.

Thus it seems to be only Baden-Württemberg which succeeded in shifting public duties to semi-public organizations while tying the latter closely to the public sector. Summing up, the Baden-Württemberg network could be characterized as a hierarchical and state dominated structure whereas the network of Lower Saxony shows a split up and more polarized character where especially intermediate actors are in a weaker position. In addition to the innerregional networking the REGE questionnaire allows us to take a look into differences in the networking from the regional level towards the national and the EU level.

The regional actors were asked whether their answer to the challenges of the EU has been an 'development of the old paths' (via Bonn) or the 'finding of new paths'. The answers to this general question were very similar within the regions. The majority of actors in both regions stressed that they had to find new paths. 70% of the public actors in Baden-Württemberg found that their strategy towards the EU resembles the option of 'finding new ways'. In Lower Saxony 66% of the public actors agreed with this option.
If we now take a look at the connection of the regional actors to the EU level a clear difference between both regions can be seen. Baden-Württemberg is much better connected towards the EU and the national level. The lowest value of the whole REGE sample can be found in the case of the private actors in Lower Saxony. Only 1% of the private actors have contacts to the EU level. Looking in at the 'reputation' results it shows that 13% of the private actors in Lower Saxony consider this level as important but are obviously unable to build up their own contacts. In contrast 11% of the private actors in Baden-Württemberg have been able to establish communication channels toward the EU level.

The networking of the two regions towards the national level shows a higher level in both regions but again Baden-Württemberg outscores Lower Saxony.

All in all Lower Saxony is less connected to the EU and national level than Baden-Württemberg. In respect of the EU level the private actors show the lowest connectedness value of the whole sample. If they want to reach the EU level they will either have to rely on their public sector contacts or build exclusive problem oriented and ad hoc communication. However, a problem specific communication strategy to the European level is hardly a promising alternative as it is badly adapted to the main problems of EU policy making i.e. complexity and shortage of time.

**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>reputation</th>
<th>EU-level</th>
<th>national level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>public actors</td>
<td>private actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Saxony</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tot. all 9 regions</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- average</td>
<td>0.16 - 0.41</td>
<td>0.13 - 0.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>external networks</th>
<th>EU-level</th>
<th>national level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>public actors</td>
<td>private actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Saxony</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tot. all 9 regions</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- average</td>
<td>0.05 - 0.20</td>
<td>0.01 - 0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: REGE, MZES, 1996; Grote 1997

Therefore access of the regional level to the EU level is more or less exclusively concentrated on the public actor’s contacts towards the commission and the information office

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12 For reading example: consider the first number of the table 'external networking' (0.19) corresponds to: 19% of the public actors in Baden-Württemberg having marked organizations they are in regular contact with which are located at the EU level.

13 By comparison: (1) average of all nine regions and (2) lowest and highest value of all nine regions; see Grote 1997.
of the Land. The lack of communication between private actors and the EU level might be caused by the low degree of interaction within the region where (1) the different actor categories do not consider each other as relevant actors, (2) semi-public actors are insufficiently integrated and (3) the various actor categories seem to be 'weak' - in the sense of a lack of capability for strategic action - and unable to build up redundant external ways of interest representation.

In Baden-Württemberg both public and private actors show a far better networking at any level and every actor category. Even the private actors develop their own 'ways to Brussels'. They use (functional) channels of their own contacting business associations at the EU level regularly but also communicating with European public actors - they even make use of the national representation of the Federal Republic.

4 conclusion

According to the hypothesis we set up above the analysis has shown the following results:

(1) There is an overwhelming conceptional and cognitive convergence among the regional actors in all nine regions. The - not at least from the EU - propagated philosophy of public-private partnership in joint problem-solving and a new mode of dialogue-oriented governing by co-operation is widely shared.

(2) Cognitive convergence is not reflected in similar interaction structures between regional actors within the two regions analysed. We rather found a divergence of decision-making structures. Referring to the different systems of governance introduced at the beginning and to the ideal types of policy styles elaborated the Baden-Württemberg system of governance is a hierarchical one whereas Lower Saxony should be described as closer to the network type of a governance system which has established over time.

(3) The paradox of convergence of cognitive orientation and divergence of decision-making and interacting structures points to the fact that we have to be careful concluding from the agreement and support for a paradigm to its consequent conversion into regional decision-making structures.

(4) Taking up the hypothesis that when policy styles are close to 'network government', regions are more likely to be active participants in transregional networks Lower Saxony must have been in an advantage situation. The region has offered a lot more linkages towards the European co-operative orientation than Baden-Württemberg. But this hypothesis cannot be verified. However, it has been shown that cognitive links have been a necessary condition but it is not enough to make use of European resources offered. At the same time there has to be the capability to transform this orientation into a new behaviour interacting with regional and transregional actors. Doing so the regional actors have to consider each other as relevant, able to contribute to an adequate problem-solving and worthwhile being convinced of the own orientation. In Lower Saxony the required capacity of strategic interaction is not given.
Especially the private actors were not able to build up communication channels to the EU level. The public actors were not able to incorporate the private and especially the semi-public actors into joint problem-solving as it would be expected by the dominating co-operative orientation. It is obvious that institutional logics which are stable, reinforced over time and are provided with 'strong' actors like Baden-Württemberg on the other side are able to compensate lacking cognitive orientation. Yet they have not produced any 'lock-in' effects as one of the danger of routinized and stable behaviour.
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