SECURITY AND INTEGRATION IN MITTELEUROPA:
Towards a New Research Agenda

ADRIAN HYDE-PRICE
Institute for German Studies
University of Birmingham
Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT
United Kingdom
email: a.g.hydeprice@bham.ac.uk

Paper presented at the
European Communities Studies Association (ECSA)
Fifth Biennial Conference
Seattle, USA

29 May-1 June 1997
SECURITY AND INTEGRATION IN MITTELEUROPA: TOWARDS A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA

Adrian Hyde-Price

Abstract

Developments in contemporary Mitteleuropa are of central importance for the future of the European integration process and the reshaping of post-cold war European security. This paper seeks to outline a theoretical framework for analysing what is undoubtedly one of the crucial hinges of change in Mitteleuropa, namely Germany's evolving relationship with the countries of East Central Europe.

The central argument advanced in this paper is that security in Mitteleuropa is inextricably intertwined with the dynamics of the wider European integration process. The aim of this paper is to explore the nature of the link between security and integration, in order to develop a conceptual framework for analysing the changing pattern of German-East Central European relations. The paper is structured into three sections. The first explains why Germany's relationship with the Visegrad countries is of such far-reaching significance for the future of European security and integration. The second section outlines a conceptual framework for analysing this evolving relationship based on the concept of a 'security-community', originally developed by Karl Deutsch and his associates in 1957. The third section seeks to adapt and develop Deutsch's analytical framework by utilising some of the insights of the 'new institutionalism' and of social constructivism. It focuses in particular on the three concepts of interests, identities and institutions, which together provide a set of analytical tools for adapting and developing the concept of a security-community.

It should be emphasised that this paper represents work-in-progress. Its aim is to contribute to the formulation of a conceptual framework for a research programme which is both theoretically-informed and policy-relevant. The work presented here forms part of a much broader and more comprehensive collaborative research programme on the international politics of East Central Europe currently being developed at the University of Birmingham by the Institute for German Studies, in collaboration with the Centre for Russian and East European Studies.

Introduction

This paper is concerned with the dynamics of regional integration and security in a part of Europe previously divided by the East-West conflict. The region in question is Mitteleuropa - or Central Europe, to give it its more prosaic but less normatively-charged name. The use of this German nomenclature may be criticised on the grounds that Mitteleuropa is a term too laden with historical associations and too culturally imprecise. Nonetheless, while these are valid observations, this term is employed precisely because it expresses the ambiguities and tensions in this region that this paper seeks to explore.

---

1 This paper was written during my research sabbatical in Stockholm. I am grateful to my colleagues at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Utrikespolitiska Institutet) for providing such a conducive research environment.
The central focus of this paper is the interaction of Germany and its neighbours in East Central Europe - namely the Visegrad countries of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The specific structural dynamics of this interaction derive from Germany's embeddedness in a 'pluralistic security-community' (a key concept which will be fully explored in section II of this paper). This transatlantic security-community is based on stable liberal-democracies, economic interdependence, institutional integration, a high degree of transnational societal communication and interaction, and shared normative values. Within this pluralistic security-community, war has been eliminated as an instrument of policy, and the balance of power no longer operates\(^2\).

This security-community, whose Eastern boundary was previously formed by the iron curtain, now borders the new democracies of Mitteleuropa. These countries are seeking to build stable democracies, competitive social market economies and to 'rejoin' Europe. In other words, they wish to become part of the pluralistic security-community of which Germany is now a central bulwark. It is with the dynamics of this interaction, between the new democracies of East Central Europe and the transatlantic security community, that this paper is concerned. More specifically, it seeks to develop a theoretical framework for analysing the implications of Germany's evolving relationship with the countries of East Central Europe for integration and security in the Mitteleuropa region.

The reason for considering Mitteleuropa is that this region has long been central to European affairs, and now constitutes a crucial 'hinge' of change in post cold-war Europe. Extending the transatlantic security-community into Mitteleuropa could be a major step along the road to realising the dream of a Europe 'whole and free'. But it could also have potentially adverse and unforeseen consequences for the future of European order. Some worry that it could destabilise the transatlantic security-community, reopen the 'German question' and provoke Russia. The evolving German relationship with East Central Europe thus has important ramifications for the future of international society in Europe.

---
\(^2\) 'One of our findings which challenges a prevailing notion is that a balance of power, designed to prevent any one unit from becoming much stronger than the others, did not have to be maintained among members of a large union or federation. Instead, the development of a strong core, or nucleus, seemed to promote integration if the core area had certain capabilities' (Deutsch 1957: 137-38). For a more recent argument that balance of power has ended in post-cold war Western Europe, see Cooper (1996: 7).
Regionalism in Post-Cold War Europe
The point of departure of this paper is the growing saliency of regional patterns of cooperation and conflict in post-cold war Europe. During the years of cold war bipolarity, the European security system was dominated by one overriding concern: the fear of large-scale East-West conflict between two nuclear-armed alliance systems. This imposed a common security agenda on countries as geographically apart as Norway and Turkey. The division of the continent also severed many long-established patterns of trade and social communication, and channeled these transactions in new and unnatural directions.

With the end of the cold war, however, and the peeling back of superpower 'overlay', long-dormant regional patterns of interaction have re-emerged. In some regions, such as the Balkans and the Caucasus, this has led to a rekindling of deep-seated historical animosities. In other parts of Europe, however, new patterns of regional cooperation and integration have blossomed, often drawing inspiration from past forms of cooperation (Hyde-Price 1991: 252-54). One such region is the Baltic Sea, where the Council of Baltic Sea States (formed in 1992) explicitly harks back to the medieval Hanseatic League (see Spruyt 1994: 109-129). Mitteleuropa is another. Here regional patterns of cooperation and interaction have re-emerged amongst peoples and countries previously divided by the Berlin wall and the iron curtain. As with the Baltic, regional interaction has drawn inspiration from past patterns of cooperation, in this case, from the kaiserlich und königlich (or kaffee und kuchen!) traditions of the Danubian monarchy - once seen simply as the 'jail-house of nations', but now nostalgically admired for its reputed cosmopolitanism and cultural pluralism (Davies 1996: 503-29).

The concept of 'regionalism' has received growing attention in recent years. The problem is that both 'region' and 'regionalism' are ambiguous terms (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995: 38). As Katzenstein notes, 'regional designations are no more "real" in terms of geography than they are "natural" in terms of culture. Geography is not destiny' (1996b: 125). Regions are socially constructed and hence politically contested. For our purposes, however, a region can be defined as 'a set of countries markedly interdependent over a wide range of different dimensions', which is usually indicated by 'a flow over socio-economic transactions and communications and high political salience that differentiates a group of countries from others' (Katzenstein 1996b: 130).
Mitteleuropa constitutes a distinct region by both sets of criteria. Intensifying flows of transactions and communications are particularly evident between Germany and its East Central European neighbours. At the same time, Mitteleuropa has a distinctive culture and sense of identity which gives it significant political salience (Kumar 1992: 441-46). This regional identity is certainly contested and politically ambiguous. In the 1980s when the idea of Mitteleuropa generated a wide-ranging and fascinating debate, it was always defined more in terms of values and attitudes of mind than geography. Yet at the time when communist dominoes were toppling across Eastern Europe, Jacques Rupnik suggested that the idea of 'Central Europe' had been 'one of the major intellectual developments of the 1980s', and that it would 'no doubt be a vital ingredient in the reshaping of the political map of Europe in the post-Yalta era' (Rupnik 1990). In a similar vein, Vaclav Havel, in an address to the Polish Sejm, spoke optimistically of there being a 'real historic chance to fill with something meaningful the great political vacuum that appeared in Central Europe after the break-up of the Habsburg Empire. We have the chance to transform Central Europe from a phenomenon that has so far been historical and spiritual into a political phenomenon' (Havel 1990: 17-19). Mitteleuropa thus constitutes a distinctive region in the tapestry of European international politics, and, moreover, one which has historically played an important role in European affairs.

Germany and Mitteleuropa: a 'Hinge' of History
The historic lands of Mitteleuropa have long played a starring role in the wider drama of European history. Events here in the geographic and cultural heartlands of the European continent have had a resonance far beyond the territories of central Europe itself. It was the 'Second Defenestration of Prague' in 1618 which precipitated the trauma of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) - the conclusion of which marked the birth of the Westphalian states system. In the twentieth century, it was conflicts over this region which precipitated the bloodbath of the second world war, and it was in this region that some of the worst acts of the Holocaust were perpetrated. In the late 1940s, conflicts over Central Europe provided the catalyst for the cold war division of Europe. Central Europe subsequently provided the setting for some of the most dramatic flashpoints in the East-West conflict - from Hungary in 1956, to Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980-81. More recently - and more positively - it was the velvet revolutions of 1989 which brought the cold war peacefully to an end. Mitteleuropa thus constitutes a pivotal region in European affairs.
With the end of the cold war, *Mitteleuropa* has once again emerged as a hinge of change in Europe (Hyde-Price 1996: 204-05). While Europe as a whole is undoubtedly changing, as new patterns of interaction and exchange develop across a continent no longer divided by the iron curtain, it is in East Central Europe that the most profound and far-reaching changes are taking place. The new democracies of East Central Europe - namely Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia - are undergoing a unique triple transformation. They are building democratic political systems based on human rights and the rule of law; they are seeking to establish functioning market economies on the ruins of central planning; and they are fundamentally reorientating their foreign and defence policies from East to West. These changes are summed up in the phrase 'returning to Europe', which nicely captures the close relationship between domestic and foreign policy transformation in these countries. The processes of change which are reshaping European order are therefore concentrated in the historic lands of *Mitteleuropa*.

This paper focuses on one of the key elements in the reshaping of *Mitteleuropa* itself - Germany's relationship with the new democracies of East Central Europe. This relationship not only has a major impact on all aspects of the region's triple transformation, it also has significant ramifications for European integration and security as a whole. As the regional great power, Germany plays a decisive role in the international politics of *Mitteleuropa*. Germany is the economic powerhouse of the European economy; it is a leading member of the EU and NATO; and it wields considerable political and cultural influence in *Mitteleuropa*. Yet at the same time Germany is burdened with the legacy of its past - more specifically, with the bitter memories of the barbarism of the Nazi *Drang nach Osten*.

Post-war West Germany's response to the legacy of the past has been to develop a grand strategy consciously focused on shaping its regional milieu. In Western Europe, its 'milieu goals'\(^3\) have involved an emphasis on multilateral integration through NATO and the EU. By rejecting 'possession goals' and *Machtpolitik* in preference for milieu goals and *Zivilmacht*, Bonn has made a major contribution to the emergence of a Kantian pacific union or security-community in the transatlantic area. If the BRD continues to rely on milieu goals and *Zivilmacht* in its dealings with the new democracies on

\(^3\) The concepts of milieu goals and possession goals were initially developed by Arnold Wolfers, but figure centrally in the recent analysis of Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson (1996).
East Central Europe, then this should facilitate the gradual enlargement of this security-community into *Mitteleuropa*. 

As for the small and medium-sized countries of East Central Europe themselves, the importance of Germany cannot be overemphasised. Germany is their gateway to 'Europe'. It is also their major trading partner (with the exception of Slovakia), and a major source of foreign direct investment (for details see Szemlér 1994, and Markovits, Reich and Westermann 1996). Bonn also acts as their tribune and advocate within the councils of the EU and NATO. Last but not least, the *Bundesrepublik* embodies the liberal-democratic values and social market principles to which they all aspire. If the countries of East Central Europe can join a stable pluralistic security-community with Germany, this may well facilitate the building of a Europe 'whole and free'. The asymmetrical relationship between Germany and its eastern neighbours thus has significant implications for the broader process of reuniting the two parts of a divided continent.

**Poland, Mitteleuropa and European Security**

In a speech to the Palais des Académies, Brussels, in September 1993, the then Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt argued that there had been four main sources of tension and conflict in Europe since the Napoleonic wars: French-German relations; Poland's relations with its neighbours; Russia's place in the European states system; and security in the Balkans. The first two, he argued, no longer threatened European security, whilst the last two remained major sources of concern. The key to the solution of all these conflicts was the European Union. It was the 'motor and heart of the new efforts to guarantee security and stability in Europe'.

Bildt's comments prompt a number of observations. First, Franco-German enmity - which resulted in three major wars and which lay at the heart of the 'German question' - has been effectively solved through the integration of Western Europe into a pluralistic security-community. The integration process has created a zone of stable peace in which war, and the threat of war, no longer plays a role. This represents the achievement of the 'pacific union' of democratic republics advocated by Kant in his classic work, *Zum Ewigen Frieden* (1795).

Second, the resolution of what might be termed the 'Polish question' - ie, the relationship of Poland to its neighbours - will also be through a process

---

4'Det finns inger alternativ till den europeiska unionen som motor och hjärta för de nya försöken att garantera säkerhet och stabilitet i Europa' (quoted in Agrell 1994: 46).
of integration. This integration process will involve not just Poland but also the other East Central European democracies who are striving to 'return to Europe'. The implications of this integration for the wider European security system are enormous. Traditionally, the small and medium-sized states of central and eastern Europe have served as 'buffer states' between the regional great powers. As Henry Kissinger has observed, 'the principle cause of European conflicts in the past 150 years has been the experience of a no-man's land between the German and Russian peoples' (quoted in Natashe 1992: 27). However, the resolution of the security dilemmas of the East Central Europeans will be through integration, not through traditional balance of power politics. Relative power capabilities, self-help strategies (such as 'balancing' or 'bandwagoning'), the struggle for survival in an anarchic system - these traditional realist preoccupations fail to capture the richness and complexity of late twentieth century European politics. Instead, security in contemporary Europe is inextricably linked to a process of integration involving not just institutional integration, but growing economic interdependence alongside thickening webs of transnational social and cultural interaction. As EU Commissioner Hans van den Broek has commented, 'Enlargement to the east is in the very first place a political issue relating to security and stability on our continent' (The Guardian, 5 November 1994).

Third, the resolution - through integration - of the security dilemmas of the East Central Europeans will have wider ramifications for European order. This is because involving the Visegrad countries in the European integration process may alter the way Germany perceives and acts on its interests in the wider European states system. For example, it may weaken Germany's postwar Westorientierung and Westbindung. As the BRD develops ever closer relations with its eastern neighbours, some have warned, it may attach less importance to its relations with its traditional postwar Western partners - particularly Paris and Washington. Others have invoked the

---

5 One example of the limitations of realist thinking when applied to Eastern Europe is Miller and Kagan (1997). Paul Schroeder argues convincing that neo-realist theory, with its assumption that 'most unit actors within that system responded to crucial threats to their security and independence by resorting to self-help' does not correspond to the history of the European states system from 1648 to 1945. Furthermore, he argues that '[n]eo-realist theory not only prevents scholars from seeing and explaining the various strategies alternative to balancing, or the different functions and roles of various actors within the system, but even blocks a genuine historical understanding of balancing conduct and the balance of power itself as a historical variable, changing over time, conditioned by historical circumstances, and freighted with ideological assumptions'. Most damagingly, it 'obstructs new insights and hypotheses, leads scholars to overlook or explain away large bodies of inconvenient facts, flattens out vital historical distinctions' (1994: 116, 148).
realist logic of geo-politics to argue that Germany will find itself in a *neue Mittellage* (a 'new middle position') between a stable West and an unstable East, and will have to develop a new foreign policy accordingly. This has been a key theme of the self-styled 'new democratic right' (or 'normalisation-nationalists' as others have dubbed them (Hellmann 1996: 4). 'Some German commentators', Timothy Garton Ash writes, 'have sweepingly asserted that Germany is now back in the old *Mittellage* of the Bismarckian second Reich: that fateful monkey-in-the-middle situation to which a long line of conservative German historians have attributed the subsequent, erratic and finally aggressive foreign policy of the Reich' (Garton Ash 1994: 66-67)

At the same time, Bonn may find it increasingly difficult to manage the growing dilemmas of its *Ostpolitik*. Closer relations with the East Central Europeans may be unwelcome to Moscow, with whom Bonn has also sought to cultivate a special relationship. Many Russians are concerned that Germany's endeavours to develop closer relations with its eastern neighbours will be at their expense. Concomitantly, many in East Central Europe fear that Germany will attach more importance to good relations with the regional great power, Russia, than to their concerns (Baranovsky 1997). These worries have been crystallised by the imminent prospect of NATO's eastern enlargement - the most divisive issue on the European security agenda at the present.

Germany's evolving relationship with the countries of *Mitteleuropa* thus has significant consequences for the wider constitution of European order. Given its central geographical location, its economic weight and its political influence, the evolution of German foreign policy is of major importance for the wider Europe. The competing demands of its *Westbindung* and its *Ostpolitik* means that 'as usual, Germany has to juggle more balls than most' (Joffe 1994: 38). Nonetheless there is broad agreement within the BRD that 'the key challenge for Germany is to come to better terms with its eastern neighbours while staying on good terms with its neighbors to the west' (Hellmann 1996: 23)

**Creating a 'Zone of Peace' in Mitteleuropa**

The problems associated with Germany's changing relationship with East Central Europe are part and parcel of a much broader and more significant question: what are the prospects for building an inclusive and stable *Friedensordnung* - or 'peace order' - in a Europe 'whole and free'? Addressing this question raises a bundle of related issues: what is the basis of international order in late twentieth century Europe; how best can we
conceptualise the nature of contemporary international politics; how are the structural dynamics of international society changing; how are we to conceptualise the blurring of the boundaries between domestic and international politics (and what does this mean for the 'levels-of-analysis' conundrum); how significant are international regimes; what is meant by 'governance without government'; what is the impact of ideas, norms and values on international politics; and how do institutions alter states' perception of their identity and interests?

Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I would argue that many of the major issues facing contemporary European international politics - the significance of the integration process, the changing nature of security, the basis of international order, the role of institutions, the relationship between interests and identities - can best be approached by utilising an adapted version of the Deutschian notion of 'security-communities'.

II: INTEGRATION, SECURITY AND COMMUNITY

With the demise of the cold war, Mitteleuropa has emerged once again as a distinctive region within the European society of states. The re-emergence of Mitteleuropa has high-lighted two key issues - the impact of the integration process on the region, and the changing security environment. The central thesis of this paper is that these two issues are inextricably linked, and that the European integration process provides the means to achieve a stable pacific union in the region. The relationship between integration and security can best be explored by employing the notion of a 'security-community' originally developed by Karl Deutsch and his associates. This section thus focuses of the providing a critical exposition of their work on security-communities.

Political Communities and the Elimination of War
The seminal book Political Communities in the North Atlantic Area (1957) presented the initial findings of a large-scale interdisciplinary study designed to throw new light on an old problem - 'the elimination of war' (1957: vii). The authors believed that by studying the problems 'of building a wider political community', they could contribute to the elimination of war as a social institution. Their study was focused on the North Atlantic Area, defined as all those countries 'bordering upon the North Atlantic Ocean or the North
Sea, along with their immediate land-neighbours in Europe, except the Soviet-dominated countries' (10). Their central concern was with political communities, which they defined as 'social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance' (5). Their research concentrated on the formation of 'security-communities'. These were communities 'in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way'. They defined their main terms as follows:

A SECURITY-COMMUNITY is a group of people which has become 'integrated'.

By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population.

By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'.

By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force (1957: 5).

The authors went on to draw an important distinction between two types of security-community - 'amalgamated' and 'pluralistic':

By AMALGAMATION we mean the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation. This common government may be unitary or federal. The United States today is an example of the amalgamated type. It became a single governmental unit by the formal merger of several formerly independent units. It has one supreme decision-making center.

The PLURALISTIC security-community, on the other hand, retains the legal independence of separate governments. The combined territory of the United States and Canada is an example of the pluralistic type. Its two separate governmental units a single security-community without being merged. It has two supreme
decision-making centers. Where amalgamation occurs without integration, of course a security-community does not exist.

Since our study deals with the problem of ensuring peace, we shall say that any political community, be it amalgamated or pluralistic, was eventually SUCCESSFUL if it became a security-community - that is, if it achieved integration - and that it was UNSUCCESSFUL if it ended eventually in secession or civil war (1957: 6).

These definitions provide the key to understanding Deutsch's concept of a 'pluralistic security-community'. They prompt a number of initial comments. First, it is interesting to note the close connection made between security and integration, particularly as the subsequent study of both security and integration has tended to be pursued separately by very distinct academic communities using different methodologies, epistemologies and ontological assumptions (Wallace 1997: 219-20). As I shall argue, the connection made by Deutsch and his associates between security and integration constitutes one of the key strengths of the approach they pioneered.

Another of its advantages is that it provides a bridge between 'negative' and 'positive' concepts of peace. Some peace researchers, particularly in Scandinavia and Germany, have drawn a distinction between negative peace, defined narrowly as the absence of large-scale inter-state war, and positive peace, defined more broadly as the elimination of structural violence and the development of socially just communities (Galtung 1969 and Senghaas 1971). Whilst the focus of Deutsch and his colleagues was on the negative task of 'eliminating war' (understood as large-scale organised violence), they linked this to domestic political changes delegitimating war, and to greater international cooperation and integration. Their approach - the building of security-communities through integration - thus offers a strategy for creating the preconditions for a positive peace based on responsive and just communities.

One interesting point is that Deutsch et al argued that integration required 'some kind of organization, even though it may be very loose', particularly at the international level. Their work thus provides a bridge to the 'new institutionalism', the concerns of which are very relevant to the Deutschian concept of a security-community (as we shall see in section III of this paper). It also echoes themes raised by the 'english school' and
international regime theory, both of which emphasised the institutional dimension of international politics.

One final point to note at this stage is the importance attached to issues of identity, and the explicit link drawn between institutions and identities. Deutsch argued that 'the way to integration, domestic or international, is through the achievement of a sense of community that undergirds institutions', and that 'an increased sense of community would help strengthen whatever institutions - supranational or international - are already operating' (1957: 7-8). Again, this link between institutions and identities is of central importance to understanding the dynamics of security and integration in *Mitteleuropa*, and is a theme to which we will return in section III.

**Deutsch's Research Findings**

Having considered the key definitions employed by Deutsch and his colleagues, let us now consider their main findings and hypotheses.

Among their general findings, the most important was that pluralistic security-communities were of greater potential significance and were a 'more promising approach to the elimination of war over large areas' than they originally expected (1957: 31). 'Pluralistic security-communities turned out to be somewhat easier to attain and easier to preserve than their amalgamated counterparts' (1957: 29)

A second key finding was that integration and the building of a security-community was a gradual, long-term and uncertain process, involving a whole series of partial steps, false starts and ambiguous policies. Rather than being an 'all-or-none process, analogous to the crossing of a narrow threshold', it involved a 'fairly broad zone of transition', which was far broader and far less easy to discern than the researchers initially envisaged. 'Not only the approach toward integration, but the very act of crossing the integration threshold', were much lengthier and more uncertain processes than had been expected. States might 'cross and recross this threshold or zone of transition several times in their relations with each other', and might 'spend decades or generations wavering uncertainly within it' (1957: 31, 33, 35).

A third important finding was that successful integration involved a process of changing identities and perceptions of interests. The 'sense of community' relevant for integration, they argued, turned out to be
... a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of "we-feeling", trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action in accordance with it - in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making. "Peaceful change" could not be assured without this kind of relationship (1957: 36).

Fourth, Deutsch and his associates argued that integration was not the result of ineluctable processes of social and economic change, but rather of political commitment, effective political leadership and improvements in the administrative competence of states. Technological advances in transportation and communication; increased transnational interaction; deepening economic interdependence - in short, 'globalisation' (or what Deutsch called 'internationalisation'), did lead automatically towards integration (1957: 118-19). On the contrary, successful integration was the result of effective and committed political leadership. The key requirement was for governments and political elites to be responsive to the concerns and needs of other countries in the area. This required 'more and better communication' and an increase in the range and quality of other transactions (1957: 201). It also required 'substantial increases in the political and administrative capabilities of the states concerned', particularly as regards 'mutual communication, consultation, and decision-making, as well as to the control of their own political behaviour in the direction of increased responsiveness to the major needs or most urgent messages of their partners' (1957: 41).

Another key finding - and one of particular relevance to the current debate on NATO enlargement - was that military alliances were 'a relatively poor pathway toward amalgamation, as well as toward pluralistic integration. In and by themselves, such alliances did not seem to be very helpful. To be effective, they had to be associated with nonmilitary steps. Similarly, foreign military threats were often helpful to integration, but were not essential' (1957: 202). Deutsch argued that 'functional organizations of a nonmilitary type are likely to be more effective in promoting integration' because they are 'likely to appear more as sources of reward than as means for distributing burdens' (1957:189). Closely related to this was the finding that 'the presence of excessive military commitments - excessive in the
sense that they were felt at the time to bring considerably more burdens than rewards - had a disintegrative effect' (1957: 190-91).

As regards NATO, Deutsch's comments were particularly prescient. He argued that policy-makers should be looking 'beyond the glare of the Soviet headlights and into the dark area behind, at a future time when the Soviet threat may not furnish the cohesive force which it did in 1949' (1957: 191). He concluded that the 'most progressive steps would seem to be more and more toward the economic and social potentialities of this unique organization, and toward the greater possibilities that might come from new organs of consultation and decision which could be built into it' (1957: 203).

Finally, it was argued that the most effective appeal for integration was 'the promise that it would result in greater individual rights and liberties, and in greater equality'. This meant not only classical political rights and liberties, but 'particularly the social and economic rights to greater opportunity and welfare' (1957: 202). This was linked to the expectation of economic gains and the promise of economic growth.

Building a Security-Community
In the course of their research, Deutsch and his associates initially identified nine essential conditions for an amalgamated security-community, to which they subsequently added another three:

(1) mutual compatibility of main values; (2) a distinctive way of life; (3) expectations of stronger economic ties and gains; (4) a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units; (5) superior economic growth on the part of at least some participating units; (6) unbroken links of social communication, both geographically between territories and sociologically between different social strata; (7) a broadening of the political elite; (8) mobility of persons, at least among the politically relevant strata; and, (9) a multiplicity of ranges of communication and transaction. And we have found indications that three other conditions may be essential: (10) a compensation of flows of communications and transactions; (11) a not too infrequent interchange of group roles; and, (12) considerable mutual predictability of behavior (1957: 58).

Of these twelve essential conditions for an amalgamated security-community, only three were found to be essential for a pluralistic security-community (or at least potentially so). These were the compatibility of major
values; the 'capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other's needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence'; and 'mutual predictability of behaviour' (1957: 66-67). The other remaining nine conditions were seen as helpful, but less important. This reinforced the view that pluralistic security-communities sometimes succeeded 'under far less favourable conditions than the success of an amalgamated government would have required', and sometimes survived 'unfavourable or disintegrative processes which would have destroyed an amalgamated political community' (1957: 65).

Two other factors which facilitated the emergence of pluralistic security-communities have particular relevance for Mitteleuropa. The first of these is 'the increasing unattractiveness and improbability of war... in the domestic politics of all, or at least of the strongest, of the countries concerned' (1957: 115-16)⁶. This is particularly evident in the Bundesrepublik, where a strategic culture has emerged in the post-war period which is strongly anti-militarist and in favour of a foreign and security policy based on 'civilian power'. Second, pluralistic security-communities, 'like their amalgamated counterparts, benefited from intellectual movements and traditions preparing the ground for them' (1957: 116). The example Deutsch gives is the political movement of Scandinavianism, which prepared the ground for the emergence of a pluralistic security-community among the Scandinavian countries. In the case of central Europe, the emergence of a pluralistic security-community may well be facilitated by intellectual movements and debates in the region associated both with the notion of the 'return to Europe', and of the more contested concept of 'Mitteleuropa'.

The Utility of the Concept of 'Security-Communities'
The concept of a 'security-community' as defined and elaborated by Deutsch and his associates provides a useful and fertile approach to the study of contemporary European international politics. To begin with, it provides a robust conceptual framework for addressing the central issue in contemporary European politics - the nature of post-cold war international order. As Iver Neumann notes, order in world politics remains constitutive of the discipline of international relations, and consequently the 'order/anarchy nexus still remains a, or even the, key question' facing the discipline (Neumann and Waever 1997: 368-69). At the same time, by focusing on the

⁶ This is an important argument which has been made at much greater length and with much greater sophistication by Mueller (1989).
link between integration and security, the concept of a security-community encourages a broad understanding of the nature of 'security' (embracing the political, economic, social and cultural dimensions of security, as well as the military), whilst retaining a clear focus on the central concern of security policy - namely the prevention of armed conflict and resolution of conflicts by peaceful change.\footnote{The central problem of contemporary security studies is how to develop an extended concept of security which embraces its non-military dimensions, whilst retaining its analytical focus and conceptual clarity. Traditional realists like Mearsheimer have such a narrow concept of security that they reach some bizarre and 'unrealistic' policy conclusions - such as arming Germany with nuclear weapons (Mearsheimer 1990). On the other hand critical security studies theorists like Ken Booth define security so broadly that its loses its conceptual clarity and its analytic utility (Booth 1991). Deutsch might not solve this theoretical conundrum, but by linking integration and security, he does at least avoid the pitfalls of both the realist Charybids and the Scylla of critical security studies.}

The concept of a security-community thus provides a useful framework for analysing some of the key issues on the contemporary European agenda. In particular, it helps shed more light on three of the crucial questions facing the future of Mitteleuropa. First, what is the link between deepening economic interdependence and political integration - or what William Wallace has termed 'informal' and 'formal' integration (Wallace 1990). While most analysts would agree that there is no simplistic casual link between the two systemic processes and state strategies, the relationship between economic, technological and social developments on the one hand, and multilateral institutional integration on the other, remains under-theorised.\footnote{During the last two decades integration and cooperation have certainly ranked high in the research agenda of international relations scholars. Given the tacit general division of labor between realists (military security) and liberals (political economy), though, little research has been carried out on integration as an overall state strategy (rather than as a systemic process) since the pioneering work of Karl Deutsch and his colleagues was published.... It is high time to redress these shortcomings' (Hellmann 1996: 29).} This is a particularly important issue for the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, as they seek both to restructure their domestic economies and integrate into European and international multilateral structures.

Second, what is the link between integration and security? This question is pertinent today given the contemporary debate on the relationship between the dual enlargement of NATO and the EU. To what extent are the two processes of enlargement mutually reinforcing? Is one necessary for the other? Does the expansion of the transatlantic security-community into East Central Europe require NATO enlargement, with its associated security guarantees? In postwar Western Europe, the development of a security-community was linked both to economic and
political integration in the EEC/EU framework, and to mutual security guarantees enshrined in Article 5 of both the North Atlantic Treaty (which established NATO) and the Modified Brussels Treaty (which established the WEU). In the Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, a pluralistic security-community developed in the absence of mutual security guarantees (Archer 1996). Modern European history does not therefore provide a clear answer to the question of the link between security and integration. Deutsch's view on this question was that military alliances were not a particularly effective way to facilitate integration into a security-community. He argued that '[t]he task of forming a security-community is different from that of defending an area against outside attack. Although of course integration is one way of achieving a tight community for defense purposes, its main object is internal peace' (1957: 161).

Third, what is the relationship between integration on the one hand, and underlying societal structures and cultural norms on the other? As Deutsch noted, integration into a pluralistic security-community in Scandinavia was facilitated by cultural compatibility and the low political saliency of ethnic and linguistic cleavages. The integration process in post-war Western Europe also took place amongst countries broadly compatible in terms of their way of life and standards of living. With the enlargement of the EC into southern Europe, material and cultural differences between the Mediterranean EC countries and the Northern members became more apparent, but they shared a liberal-democratic political cultural and comparable welfare capitalist economies. In a wider Europe, however, the differences in living standards, political cultural and historical traditions will become even more marked. The differences between the West Europeans and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are much greater than those between the Northern and Southern EU members. How will this affect the prospects for expanding the transatlantic security community eastwards? Will cultural, religious and historical links within Mitteleuropa facilitate the integration of the Visegrad states into the transatlantic security-community? If so, does this mean a new civilisational divide between countries with a heritage of Latin Christendom and those with Orthodox traditions? These questions are particularly significant if one accepts the logic of Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' thesis.

**Security-Communities: Issues for a New Research Agenda**

While the concept of a security-community provides the outlines of a promising framework for analysing the changing patterns of international
politics in *Mitteleuropa*, it would benefit from further conceptual clarification and methodological elaboration. To begin with, further conceptual clarification and development is necessary in order to situate the concept of a security-community more clearly in relation to other analogous notions such as 'stable peace' (Boulding 1978), *Zivilmacht* (Mauell 1997), democratic peace, international regimes, international society, etc.

Second, it might be beneficial to look again at the main findings of Deutsch and his colleagues concerning what they termed the 'essential' and 'helpful' factors determining the emergence of a security-community. Are the conditions they listed as essential still as important as they were perceived to be in 1957? How important, for example, is multilateral institutional integration? Is democracy a prerequisite for a stable security-community? What sort of cultural networks, social transactions and information flows facilitate integration? Which of these various factors are of decisive importance? To what extent is the emergence of a security-community 'over-determined'? Four decades after the publication of *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area* these questions need to be addressed in the light of new evidence and ideas.

Third, the key question for a theoretically-informed, empirically-grounded and policy-relevant research programme is how can this revised concept of a security-community be operationalised? What are the most appropriate epistemological foundations, ontological assumptions and methodological tools? Deutsch's research methodology has been widely criticised for its behaviouralist assumptions. His research method involved 'a rather crude quantitative analysis of flows of some kinds of transactions between the countries of the area studied, and the changes in these flows with the passing of time' (Deutsch 1957: 205). He and his colleagues therefore gathered empirical data on trade and mail flows over two generations. They also proposed studying flows of other transactions, such as travel, migration and the dissemination of views. Whilst some of this data would be interesting and relevant to study, a more sophisticated and multidimensional research methodology is required today. A great deal of further thought and collective discussion is clearly required in order to operationalise

---

9 Alan Milward has criticised Karl Deutsch's work on political communities on the grounds that 'the ideas were vague, and like much political writing in the Cold War tended to support the objectives of American foreign policy, strongly in favour of some form of Western European unity, and to play down the existence of dissent from the kind of consensual North Atlantic politics which Deutsch was describing' (1996: 153). The aim of this paper is to provide further clarification and development of Deutsch's ideas, and certainly not to support the objectives of US foreign policy!
the study of security communities in *Mitteleuropa*. Having said this, some initial proposals will be presented for discussion in the concluding part of this paper.

Finally, the relationship between interests, identities and institutions needs further exploration and analysis. All three concepts figure prominently, but not unproblematically, in Deutsch's analysis. Deutsch stressed that the development of a 'sense of community' was not a static process, but a dynamic one. It entailed a process of social learning involving increased responsiveness to others and at least a 'partial identification in terms of self-images and interests' (1957: 129). This emphasis on social transactions, communication and the 'responsiveness' of political authorities all implies that 'interests' are not objectively determined by material structures, but are reflexively constituted through a process of structuration. In other words, an actor's interests are not objectively given, but subjectively perceived: the relationship between the subject and the objective environment is reciprocal and dialectical. Interests and identities are thus mutually constitutive.

At the same time, Deutsch's concern with the institutional and societal dimension of international life provides a link to both international society approaches and regime theory, and to the wider research agenda of the 'new institutionalism'. In the following section, we will look more closely at the issues of interests, identities and institutions, in order to assess their implications for the further development and adaptation of the security-communities concept.

**III: INTERESTS, IDENTITIES AND INSTITUTIONS**

**Interests**

For realists and adherents of the 'power-politics model' of international relations, it is a states interests which determine its fundamental foreign and security policy orientation. These 'interests' are objectively determined by the material resources and physical capabilities of a state - economic, political and military. Accordingly to such perspectives, Germany's policy towards East Central Europe will be determined by its economic, political and military interests and power resources. Similarly, the interaction of

---

10 The concept of 'structuration' is extensively elaborated upon by Giddens (1991). Whilst the concept is not unproblematic, it does serve to capture the elements of reciprocity and reflexivity involved in the relationship between interests, identities and institutions.
Germany and its neighbours in Mitteleuropa will be determined by the material interests and relative power capabilities of the states involved.

This focus on interests as the primary determinant of international political behaviour has a long tradition, and remains influential within the discipline. Hans Morgenthau, for example, regarded the concept of 'interest' as one of the six principles upon which a realist theory of international relations was based. Morgenthau assumed 'that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined in terms of power', and therefore rejected a concern with 'motives' and 'ideological preferences' (Morgenthau 1973: 5) For Stephen Waltz, another doyen of realist thinking, interests also played a key role in determining the foreign policy of a state, but he believed these were structurally determined by the states position in the international system. For Waltz, the decisions of states 'are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by interactions with them', and it is the 'situation in which they act and interact' which 'constrains them from some actions, disposes them towards others, and affects the outcomes of their interactions' (Waltz 1979: 65). Hence,

The texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly. The relations that prevail internationally seldom shift rapidly in type or in quality. They are marked instead by dismaying persistence, a persistence that one must expect so long as none of the competing units is able to convert the anarchic international realm into a hierarchic one (Waltz 1979: 66).

For realists, the texture of international politics can only be understood by objectively determined interests 'defined in terms of power'. Interest is thus the key concept, 'and the one which is unaffected by time and place....The objectivity of interest can serve as a universal starting point for understanding events' (Hollis and Smith 1991: 26). This assumption of the 'objectivity' of interests is shared by many marxists and structuralists, who emphasis the centrality of economically-determined class interests, and by most neoliberal institutionalists who 'continue to treat actor identities and interests themselves as preexisting and fixed' (Kowert and Legro 1996: 458).

However, the assumption of the objectivity of interests - and of their central role in determining a state's foreign policy - is of limited help when it comes to assessing the changing nature of international politics in Mitteleuropa. Neo-realism is particularly unhelpful when it comes to
understanding post-cold war German foreign policy. The neorealist assumptions of Waltz, for example, lead him to predict that Germany’s improved security environment and its enhanced relative power since unification will lead it to pursue a policy of ‘autonomy maximisation’ (Waltz 1993: 62-70). Yet there is no evidence that the BRD is shedding its multilateral and integrationist orientation.

Thus while an analysis of Germany’s material resources and geopolitical location can yield some obvious insights, it provides only a partial and one-dimensional picture of its foreign policy preferences and policies. Physical and material factors are clearly important in shaping and constraining the range of options available to states, but they do not determine how they will behave toward other states. Germany’s relations with the Visegrad states, for example, is inevitably strongly influenced by two inescapable material factors: firstly, the asymmetry in size between them, and second, their economic relations and trading patterns. Yet whilst these material and physical factors have remained fairly constant over the last 130 years, German policy towards its neighbours in Mitteleuropa has demonstrated considerable variation - from the bestialities of National Socialism, to Ostpolitik and Willy Brandt’s famous kniefall in Warsaw. Thus although material and economic ‘interests’ constrain the range of options available to each state, but they do not determine the nature of the evolving relationship.

The preferences and policies of states are therefore only explicable by reference both to objectively determined material structures and the perceptions of those structures. In other words, it is not just material

---

11 One example of this is the impact that German budgetary constraints may have on the EU’s future enlargement. Bonn has been an enthusiastic advocate of eastern enlargement, but without significant changes in EU policies, enlargement will place additional financial burdens on the EU and Germany. Faced with the costs of unification and the stringent Maastricht criteria, however, Germany is unwilling to make further substantial contributions to the EU budget. Hence Germany’s reduced capability to act as Europe’s paymaster will affect the ‘pace and direction of Europe’s future enlargement’ (Katzenstein 1997: 121). A similar analysis of the implications of Germany’s more constrained economic circumstances for its foreign policy has been made by James Sperling (1994)

12 For a evaluation of this second factor from an unreconstructed realist perspective, see Markovits, Reich and Westermann 1996.

13 One important attempt to redress the obvious limitations of mainstream realism’s obsession with material structures and relative power capabilities is Stephen Walt’s influential work, The Origins of Alliances (1987). Walt seeks to modify Kenneth Waltz’s structural realist approach by suggesting that states balance not against power per se but rather against threats. Anarchy and the distribution of power alone are unable to predict which states will be identified as threats. Walt argues that derive from a combination of geostrategic and military factors and ‘aggressive intentions’, in other words, of capabilities and intentions (1987: 22-26). He therefore offers a ‘balance-of-threats’ approach in place of the traditional realist ‘balance of power’ approach.
'interests' that matter, but also the perception of those interests. Interests are not objectively and exogenously given, either by the domestic structures of states or by the nature of the international system. Rather, interests are defined by the actors involved according to their own identity, values and self-perception. In a sense, interests and identities are mutually constitutive - neither can be defined in the absence of the other. At the same time, both are bound up with the societal and institutional context. It is therefore to these other two elements that we now turn, beginning with identity.

Identity
Identity has emerged as one of the key analytical concepts of post-cold war international relations theory. It is a topic which is now 'flashing in neon' (Zalweski and Enloe 1995: 279-80). Once the preserve of social psychologists and, more recently, of post-modernists and their ilk, it is now central to many contemporary debates in international relations. Indeed, it has been argued that one of the things that international relations is 'about' as a discipline is 'identity', and that one of the areas in need of more theorizing is the 'interstice of the interests and identities of human collectivities'. The growing number of people in the field who focus on identities, and particularly state identities, have still to spell out just how identities translate into interests' (Neuman and Waever 1997: 369).

'Identity' itself is one of those essentially contested concepts which litter the social sciences. For this reason it is difficult to define. As one writer has wryly observed, identity is 'a good thing, with a human face and ephemeral character which makes it at once appealing and difficult to grasp' (McSweeney 1996: 82). Yet despite its definitional ambiguities and ephemeral character, 'identity' is increasingly employed by scholars to explain the changing nature and dynamics of international politics. It remains a somewhat 'fuzzy' concept (like political culture or democracy), but

Walt's approach is clearly a major advance on mainstream structural realism. The problem, however, is that his key concept of 'intentions' is left underspecified and undertheorised. Whilst he provides ample evidence that it is ideational rather than material forces which drive alliance formation (at least in the Middle East, his chosen empirical focus), he fails to establish a casual relationship between anarchy and the balance of power on the one hand, and intentions on the other. In his critique of Walt, Michael Barnett suggests that '[i]t is the politics of identity rather than the logic of anarchy that often provides a better understanding of which states are viewed as a potential or immediate threat to the state's security' (Barnett 1996: 401).

14 'Norms and identities typically have two effects. They enable actors by constituting them and thus shaping their interests. But they also constrain actor preferences' (Katzenstein 1997: 117).
nonethess in the contemporary academic debate on international relations it is defined in terms of a number of key properties or dimensions.

First, it is relational and contingent. An identity can be defined only in relation to something or someone else. By defining the collective 'we' and delineating the boundaries against the 'Other', identities involve both inclusion and exclusion. Identities can therefore be either 'positive' (focusing primarily on the 'we' group) or 'negative' (focusing on the 'Other'). Second, it focuses on the normative, ideational, cultural, and subjective dimensions of international politics, rather than on material resources and the structural distribution of power at the systemic level (Buzan 1991: 368). Third, a sense of belonging - of identity in other words - is often seen as being bound up with membership of a political community that offers protection from external threats: identity is thus closely linked to security (Garcia 1993: 13; Clarke 1993: xi). Fourth - with the exception of either hard-boiled structural realists or post-positivist postmodernists - identity is generally seen as being neither objectively determined by material structures, nor the product of a free-floating discourse: rather, interests, identities and institutions are reciprocally and reflexively related (mutually constitutive). Fifth, identity is not static property, but on that is socially constructed. Finally, in all political communities, individuals have multiple identities: identities are not necessarily exclusive, but tend to be plural. In other words, individuals and political communities have many identities, which may be hierarchically structured, or which may coexist and overlap.

The concept of identity, however fuzzy and imprecise it might be, is essential for understanding the dynamics of Germany's relations with the countries of East Central Europe. In the last one hundred and fifty years, it is not so much Germany's physical and material 'interests' in Central Europe that have changed so much as its identity. Germany has long been the regional great power in Mitteleuropa, economically, militarily and politically. Its relative power capabilities and material resources have not changed drastically since the time of Bismarck. What has changed, however, is Germany's perception of its interests - in other words, its identity, its prescriptive values and its role conception.

The 'epistemological break' in Germany's perception of its identity and interests came about as a result of the trauma of total defeat in World War Two and the revelations of the Holocaust. The post-war identity of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland was subsequently constructed around four key elements. First, it was defined in opposition to the Third Reich. For the BRD, Nazi Germany and the 'dark soul' of Germany's authoritarian and militarist
past provided the 'Other', against which post-war west German identity was forged. Second, post-war west German identity was defined in consciously 'European' and 'Western' terms. The emphasis sometimes varied between a (west) European identity and a transatlantic one, but the identity was clearly and unambiguously 'Western', and was given institutional expression through multilateral organisations such as the Council of Europe, NATO, and the EEC/EU. This Europeanised identity also led to an unwillingness to define Germany's 'national interests'. Third, it was closely linked to a number of domestic institutions - namely the constitution, the currency, and social market economy. This produced both a Verfassungspatriotismus (Knischewski 1996) and the development of a 'German national identity closely linked to the deutsche mark' (Katzenstein 1997: 118). Finally, West German identity was linked to a specific foreign policy role conception - namely Verantwortungspolitik (responsibility) rather than Machtpolitik (power politics).\textsuperscript{15} There was a strong public and elite commitment to a policy of peaceful relations with neighbours and reconciliation with former foes, along with a marked aversion to the use of military force for any other purpose than territorial defence - and then only in a multilateral framework.

The end of the cold war and German unification has led to a lively debate on German identity. Many of the central planks of postwar identity have been subject to questioning and critical reappraisal. However, this has not resulted in the sort of sea-change which took place at the end of the Second World War. Some elements of post-war BRD identity have been the subject of lively discussion: for example, whether Germany is primarily a Western or a Central European power. There has also been a growing interest in defining some specifically 'German' national interests, along with a lively debate over whether Germany should now be seen as a 'normal' country. Nonetheless, there are still strong elements of continuity in German identity, particularly in terms of a 'Europeanised' identity and a strong sense of Germany's moral responsibilities.

The debate on Germany's post-cold war identity has opened up an interesting new research agenda, focusing on the discursive dimensions of foreign policy (Hellmann 1996). If the identity of Germany begins to change in significant directions, this may have consequences for its role in Mitteleuropa. This in turn will have implications for the emergence of a regional security-community.

\textsuperscript{15} See for example Genscher (1995: 1016).
Institutions
As we have seen, the postwar interests and identity of the BRD have been inextricably bound up with institutional structures, both domestic and international. The analysis of Germany's role in Mitteleuropa, and of the prospects for the emergence of a regional security-community, thus requires a more detailed consideration of the impact and significance of institutional structures.

The discussion of the impact of institutions on German identity, politics and foreign policy is inextricably bound up with the wider debate on the 'new institutionalism'. The study of institutions is currently enjoying a renaissance throughout the social sciences. This reflects both a backlash against the behaviouralist revolution of recent decades and a rediscovery of an older institutional tradition (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 2). Behaviouralists tended to view institutions as epiphenomenal - in other words, little more than the sum of individual decisions and actions. But in a world in which 'social, political, and economic institutions have become larger, considerably more complex and resourceful, and prima facie more important to collective life' (March and Olsen 1984: 734), it is no longer analytical credible to neglect the social and institutional context.

In political science, the new institutionalism has led to renewed emphasis on how social and political structures affect political behaviour and decision-making (Kato 1996). Although this has sometimes been associated simply with bringing the state back in' (Skocpol 1985), 'institutions' as such are generally understood to involve much more than merely organisational structures. Institutions can take three forms: established structures (or organisations), with a bureaucratic apparatus, a physical location and formalised decision-making processes; formal institutions (or regimes), based on explicit rules and regulations; and informal institutions (or conventions), based on implicit rules and understandings, and involving norms, habits, and routinized patterns of behaviour.

In the discipline of international relations, the new institutionalism has been part and parcel of the more general assault on the discipline's dominant paradigm, structural realism. In a way analogous to the methodological individualism of behaviouralism, structural realism emphasised the conflictual and competitive relations between sovereign states operating in a Hobbesian condition of anarchy. The new internationalism in international relations has encouraged renewed interest in and awareness of the impact of
institutions - broadly defined - on state behaviour. It has also focused attention on the broader issue of 'governance without government' in international politics, and on the nature of international order in an anarchical system.

In part, therefore, the new internationalism in international relations signifies a return to the issues and concerns associated with the Grotian tradition. Like realism, the Grotian tradition conceives of the international system as anarchic (in the sense that there is no supreme authority above states). However, in contrast to realism, this approach argues that the anarchy of the international system is mitigated by institutional arrangements which facilitate international cooperation and understanding. In the modern period, the Grotian tradition has been exemplified by the 'english school' of international relations, for whom the notion of 'international society' is a central concept (Fawn and Larkins 1996).

Like the new institutionalism, the international society approach draws attention to the impact of institutions - defined in terms of both norms and values as well as organisational structures - on state behaviour. The best outline of the international society approach is Hedley Bull's seminal work, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (1977) - an erudite and elegant book which continues to provide a rich seam of ideas and insights for the international relations scholar. Hedley Bull suggested that international society existed when 'a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive of themselves bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions' (Bull 1977:13). Similarly, another leading doyen of the english school, Martin Wight, described international society as 'the habitual intercourse of independent communities', and argued that it was manifest in the diplomatic system; the conscious maintenance of the balance of power; in international law; 'in economic, social and technical interdependence and the functional international institutions' established to regulate it - all of which, he argued, 'presupposes an international consciousness, a world-wide community-sentiment' (Wight 1966: 96-97).

While the new institutionalism represents a return to the themes explored within the international society approach, it has been most closely associated with international regime theory (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 6-7).

---

16 Keohane defines institutions as 'persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations' (Keohane 1989: 3)
In contrast to the international society approach, regime theory has generated a transnational research community embracing scholars from Germany, Scandinavia, Britain and the USA\textsuperscript{17}. The classic definition of a regime was provided by by Krasner. Regimes, he argued, were 'sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' (1983: 2). Volker Rittberger has suggested that they provided the 'building-blocks of international governance' (1993: 9). At the heart of regime analysis, he maintained, is the phenomenon of 'institutionalized co-operation of states for managing conflicts and interdependent problems, instead of relying on self-help strategies, either individually or collectively (alliances), even though self-help action may seem to produce greater individual benefits or less individual costs in the short-term' (1993: 9). Regime theory thus draws attention to the institutional context within which states define their identities and pursue their interests. In particular, it highlights the norms, networks and patterns of behaviour which facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit - a dimension of international life overlooked by the parsimony of structural realism.

Both regime theory and the international society approach highlight the impact institutions can have on state's behaviour. Institutions, it is argued, 'do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that power' (Keohane 1988: 382). They can do this by altering 'the calculations of interest by assigning property rights, providing information, and altering patterns of transaction costs' (Keohane 1993: 29). Over time, commonly-agreed and jointly observed principles and norms become internationalized by the actors involved, thereby reshaping the perception of interests (Rittberger 1993: 19). Institutions and regimes thus facilitate the

\textsuperscript{17}There are a number of close conceptual and theoretical links between regime theory and the international society approach. See Evans and Wilson (1992) and Hurrell (1993). Interest in the English school has been steadily been growing over recent years. As Ole Waever notes, the English school is a respectable, traditional approach which includes quasi-philosophical and historical reflection. It also cross-examines deep institutions in the system, and can relatively easily be linked to postmodernist notions, an emphasis on the cultural colouring of international systems, and especially the general "radical" interest in thinking the basic categories of the international system instead of taking them as mechanical givens. At the same time, the classics of the English School, especially Bull's \textit{Anarchical Society}, offer a comprehensible, seemingly straightforward discussion of the actual system with relatively clear, operational concepts. Thus, the American mainstream can find a moderate and not too dangerous way to extend its institutionalism by using Bull (and reading him almost as a regime theorist or neo-liberal institutionalist). The new wave of English School enthusiasm thus ties in with the attempted rapprochment between reflectivists and rationalists, with the de-radicalization of reflectivism, and the rephilosophization of the rationalists' (Waever 1997: 25).
emergence of a sense of *gemeinschaft* or society, involving both a perception of shared interests and a common identity.

The new institutionalism provides some essential tools for understanding contemporary German politics. Institutions play a constitutive role in defining German interests and identity at two levels - domestic and international. At the domestic level, a number of institutions have played a key role in defining post-war German identity. As we have seen, these include the constitution (the *Grundgesetz*) and the Deutschmark. The social market economy has also assumed an important symbolic role, having generated a 'nationalism of individual entitlement' linked to a 'firmly anchored welfare state identity' (Katzenstein 1997: 122).

At the international level, institutions again play a key role in shaping Germany's interests, identity and foreign policy role. From its very earliest days, the BRD was embedded in a network of multilateral institutions, the most important being the EEC, NATO and the Council of Europe. The multilateralism of German foreign policy, it has been suggested, means that the BRD 'has never conducted a sovereign foreign policy, never a truly national, never even a largely autonomous foreign policy' (Rühl 1992: 741). Germany's institutional embeddedness has shaped Germany's perception of its 'national' interests, generated a distinctively 'Europeanised' national identity, and generated a very 'postmodern concept of sovereignty' (Anderson and Goodman 1993: 62). The 'Europeanisation of the German state', Klaus Goetz argues, 'makes the search for the national, as opposed to the European interest, a fruitless task. The national and the European interest have become fused to a degree which makes their separate consideration increasingly impossible' (Goetz 1996: 40).

**Beyond Westphalia?: Multilevel Governance and European Integration**

The fusion of national and European interests, and the constitutive role of institutions at both domestic and international levels, indicates that a more fundamental change has taken place in Germany and western Europe - the blurring of the boundaries between national and European, domestic and international. Both traditional international relations and comparative public policy have been built on the assumption of different 'levels of analysis' with different logics, structural dynamics and explanatory variables. Yet in contemporary Western Europe, this assumption is increasingly less tenable. The European integration process - both the informal integration of societies and economies, and the formal institutional integration associated primarily
with the EU - is creating new forms of multilevel governance (Jeffery 1997). The consequent 'Europeanisation' of the nation-state is the product of the interplay between changes in relations between European states and changes within each state (Olsen 1996: 245). As Beate Kohler-Koch has argued, as a result of the 'particular combination of losing and pooling sovereignty in the European Union' a 'new mode of governance' has emerged with a 'multi-tier negotiating system' (1996: 170-71).

The blurring of the boundaries of domestic and international, and their fusion in a process of 'Europeanisation', points to the emergence of a new pattern of international politics in Western Europe. The traditional Westphalian states system was constructed around sovereign states existing within an anarchical framework in which international order was established through a shifting balance of power. Although it would be premature to announce (yet again!) the death of the state as such, the development of multilevel governance, pooled sovereignty and multiple identities has significantly changed the character and functioning of international society in Western Europe. Not least it has drastically reduced - if not eliminated - the significance of one of the five key institutions of international society, the balance of power.\footnote{See footnote 2, page 2. Elizabeth Pond has also argued that German interests are being advanced not in a balance of power clash, but in tedious bureaucratic maneuvering in the confederation-plus of the EU and the confederation-minus of the transatlantic community' (Pond: 1996: 36).}

The new, post-Westphalian pattern of international politics in Western Europe can best be characterised as a form of 'new medievalism'. Hedley Bull described this as 'a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty', and suggested that if 'modern states were to come to share their authority over their citizens, and their ability to command their loyalties, on the one hand with regional and world authorities, and on the other hand with sub-state or sub-national authorities, to such an extent that the concept of sovereignty ceased to be applicable, then a neo-mediaeval form of universal political order might be said to have emerged' (Bull 1977: 254-55).

If, as seems to be the case (Hyde-Price 1997), a neo-mediaeval order is developing in Western Europe, then two consequences follow. First, Karl Deutsch's distinction between 'amalgamated' and 'pluralistic' security-communities loses its analytical clarity. The West European security-community, of which Germany is a central bulwark, is something \textit{sui generis}, neither amalgamated or pluralistic. Second, and more importantly, expanding this security-community into \textit{Mitteleuropa} will have complex and
ambiguous implications for the new democracies of East Central Europe. Integrating into a post-Westphalian security-community characterised by 'overlapping authority and multiple loyalty' will not be unproblematical for new states who have only recently regained their political sovereignty and independence. As Johan Olsen has pointed out, processes of 'Europeanisation' may have very different implications and connotations for smaller states than for larger states. Many of the current theories of integration are based primarily on the experiences of the larger European powers. Yet as he notes, 'To the degree that small, weaker and homogeneous countries and larger, dominant, and heterogeneous countries have different institutional configurations, policy profiles, and abilities to learn and adjust, "Europeanization" processes may mean different things to the two types of countries. Theoretical interpretations of European political transformations should pay attention to such differences' (Olsen 1996: 275).

In the case of Germany, it has been argued that the 'Europeanisation' process has enhanced the BRD's indirect institutional power within the EU. Having pursued broadly-based and diffuse 'milieu goals' rather than 'possession goals', the German government has been very successful in shaping the broad structural characteristics of the European integration process. The BRD has managed to encourage a 'process of approximation of domestic German and European structures of government' in a way which entrenches at the European level 'a style of cooperation, consensus-orientated decision-making comparable to that which exists in Germany, and with which German actors and familiar and comfortable'. This helps to complete a virtuous circle in which 'indirect institutional power pays back in systemic empowerment by the configuration of European institutions and the style of their interactions'. In this way, the authors conclude, 'a Europeanised Germany continues to make its distinctive mark on the institutional character of the European Union' (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson 1996: 108-09).

---

19 This analysis clearly straddles the point at which neo-realism meets liberal-institutionalism - or what has been termed the 'neo-neo synthesis' (Waever 1997: 18). In particular, it embraces the views of 'influence-orientated realists' (rather than 'autonomy-maximising realism') and 'rational' (or 'weak') institutionalism. According to influence-orientated realism, rather than simply seeking to maximise their autonomy as Waltz predicted, states will seek to maximise their on collective decisions in international politics. Hence some institutions will be seen less as a restriction on national autonomy than as an opportunity for effective and efficient pursuit of 'national' interests. This echoes themes found in the realist theory of hegemonic stability, which suggest that an aspirant regional hegemon will support and encourage international institutions if this serves its own interests (even if other states benefit at the same time). See for example Grieco (1995 and 1988), and Rittberger and Schimmelfennig (1997: 9-11).
Yet whilst Germany clearly benefits from the institutionalised cooperation, multilevel governance and pooling of sovereignty which characterises the European integration process, the smaller states of East Central Europe might not be so advantaged. As Laszlo Kiss has argued in an article outlining the case for a new research agenda on the implications of security and integration for the small states of central and Eastern Europe,

The small states are extraordinarily sensitive to both supranational and nation state integration, and in both cases the point is how the sovereignty available or acquired could be redistributed or preserved on supra-, subnational and national levels in a new European architecture (Kiss 1996: 238).

A key issue for future research on security and integration in Europe must therefore be the implications of the European integration process for the national identity, sovereignty and security of the smaller post-communist states of Mitteleuropa. Some interesting differences have already emerged, for example, between Czech and Polish attitudes towards supranational integration. Research on the development of a security-community in central Europe must therefore consider the different implications of the integration process for small and large states in Europe.

**Interests, Identities and Institutions: Theoretical and Methodological Problems**

Deutsch's pioneering work on security-communities provides an ideal framework for analysing the dynamics of security and integration, particularly if the three concepts of interests, identities and institutions are used to enrich his discussion of the emergence of a 'sense of community'. Nonetheless, the claim that interests, identities and institutions are reflexive in character and mutually constitutive raises a number of difficult methodological and theoretical problems.

The most serious and intractable problem is the relationship of identity to interest, of norms to material structures. As Risse-Kappen has observed, 'ideas do not float freely', unencumbered by any physical reality (Risse-Kappen 1994). Similarly, identities do not develop, exist and evolve in a material void. Thus 'a more synthetic conceptualization of the interaction between the material and interpretative worlds remains necessary' (Kowert and Legro 1996: 491).
Second, if interests, identities and institutions are mutually constitutive, than how is one to explain change in foreign policy behaviour? If interests are both constituted by identities, and identities by interests, how can one explain shifts in policies and preferences? What are the causal factors explaining foreign policy change: material or ideational? Realists, marxists and liberal-institutionalists give priority to economic, military and geopolitical factors: social constructivists and post-positivists, on the other hand, tend to privilege ideas\textsuperscript{20}. The problem remains: how are we to conceptualise historical contingency - especially rapid non-incremental change?

Third, how can we judge what are the most significant and politically relevant identities? There are a plethora of possible identities, some existing comfortably side-by-side, some in tension with one another, others more hierarchically structured. How are we to specify and measure these various identities, and how can we conceptualise their relationship to one another? Explanations for the hierarchy of different identities are very underdeveloped at the moment, and require further elaboration if the concept of identity is to have any operational research utility.

These problems are undeniable serious, but they do not, I would suggest, invalidate the whole approach. They are problems shared by many other methodological approaches and other social science disciplines. Indeed, the first problem - the relationship of ideas to material structures - is one of the constitutive issues of modern philosophy, and the best attempt at a solution is still arguably that of Kant. I would therefore argue that the three concepts of interests, identities and institutions provide a useful set of tools for probing the intriguing relationship between norms, structures and behaviour. They are particularly helpful in shedding light on issues and processes left in the shadows by either conventional realism or post-modernist critical theory.

IV: CONCLUSION

Elements of a Research Design
The aim of this paper has been to outline an analytical framework for a research project on the relationship of security and integration in

\textsuperscript{20} Barnett argues that 'far from suggesting the primary of identity and the irrelevance of material forces, I recognise that both are important explanatory variables, though with different casual weight at different moments. Sometimes identity politics will figure centrally; at other times a strategic logic might provide an exhaustive explanation' (1996: 447). This is an elegant formulation of the conundrum, but the central theoretical problem remains unresolved.
Mitteleuropa, focusing on Germany's relations with the new democracies of East Central Europe. By way of conclusion, some initial thoughts on operationalising this research programme will be offered. The objective is to develop a research programme which is theoretically-informed, empirically-grounded and policy-relevant.

The central question to be addressed is whether a security-community is emerging in Mitteleuropa. Is the integration process bringing about 'dependable expectations of peaceful change', or multipolar instability increasingly in Central Europe. More particularly, is German policy motivated more Zivilmacht and milieu goals rather than by Machtpolitik and utilitarian economic concerns? This raises four more specific quesions:

• to what extent is a 'sense of community' emerging in the region?
• are states (particularly the new post-communist democracies) developing their capacity for responsiveness?
• how are patterns of communication and transactions evolving in the region?
• how are existing organisational structures and institutions channelling these transactions, exchanges and communication flows?

Research on these questions needs to proceed along six main avenues:

1. **Public Opinion Surveys.** Ascertaining and evaluating the attitude of Germans and their neighbours in East Central Europe to each other; exploring the extent to which a 'European' or regional identity has emerging alongside - or perhaps in place of - a national identity; assessing the balance between European and national identities; evaluating attitudes towards the integration process and the loss of state sovereignty; perceptions of security and insecurity. A key source of data will be the Eurobarometer. Some useful preliminary work on these issues has already been undertaken by the Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien (Oschlies 1996).

2. **Elite Interviews/Surveys.** The attitudes of policy-makers, opinion-formers and other elite groups to these questions needs to be examined, and then contrasted and compared to public attitudes.

3. **Foreign Policy Discourse Analysis.** As has already been noted, the field of foreign policy discourse analysis offers some interesting and relatively new avenues for investigation (Hellmann 1996). This should cover the worldviews, principled beliefs and casual beliefs of key foreign policy elites in Germany and its neighbours in East Central Europe. One obvious limitation of this approach is that it is not what policy-makers say that matters, but what they do - especially given the tendency for many of them to say one thing and do another.
4. **Trade Flows, Investment Patterns and Economic Relations.** Given the growing importance of international political economy, and the development of its analytical tools, an analysis of the changing patterns of economic exchanges is essential (Szemlér 1994).

5. **State-level Policy-Formation and Implementation.** The theoretical framework presented in this paper assumes that the state cannot be seen simply as a rational unitary actor with exogenously determined interests. It is therefore essential to study the interaction of bureaucratic interests within the state administration; the influence of shifting constellations of societal interests; and the emergence of transnational and transgovernmental actors (Risse-Kappen 1995).

6. **Multilateral Institutions and the European Integration Process.** The final avenue of research will be the functioning of international institutions; their impact on the constitution of state's interests and identities; and their affect on states' behaviour. A linked issue will be the character of the European integration process; the evolution of multilevel governance; and the emergence of a post-Westphalian system of European international politics.

This is clearly an ambitious research programme. As Helen Wallace has remarked, the problem with Karl Deutsch's attempt to set security integration in the context of the full range of transactions across state borders is that 'enquiry along these lines required both polymaths and huge amounts of empirical data' (Wallace 1997: 219). Nevertheless, as Helen herself notes, to take the easy way out by studying integration, security and societal change independently of each other is no longer an adequate response to the complexities of regional and pan-European integration. It is for this reason that a multidisciplinary and international collaborative research programme is currently being developed at the University of Birmingham to investigate the impact of integration and security on Mitteleuropa. The purpose of this paper has been to elaborate a conceptual framework for this research programme. Any comments and critical observations would be most welcome.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


- 35 -


Goetz, K. (1996) 'Integration Policy in a Europeanized State: Germany and the Intergovernmental Conference', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 3, 1:


Havel, V. (1990) 'Return to Europe', *East European Reporter*, 4:2, 17-19


Katzenstein, P. (1996b) 'Regionalism in Comparative Perspective', Cooperation and Conflict, 31, 2: 123-159


- 38 -


Rupnik, J. (1990) 'Central Europe or Mitteleuropa?', *Daedalus*, 119:1 (Winter 1990), 249-78


Senghaas, D., ed. (1997) *Friden machen*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp

Senghaas, D. (1971) *Kritische Friedensforschung*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp


- 39 -
Szemlér, T., ed. (1994) *Relations Between Germany and East Central Europe Until 2000: Prospects and Policy Options*, Budapest, Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences


