"Concepts of European Foreign Policy Revisited: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap"

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Presented at the Panel on
"Developing a Credible Common Foreign and Security Policy:
Practical and Theoretical Perspectives"
Fifth Biennial International Conference
European Community Studies Association
May 29-June 1, 1997

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Introduction

This essay provides an overview of conceptual works on European foreign policy (EFP) (1) and explores the problems associated with conceptualizing the European Union (EU) as an international actor or "presence." It concludes with an analysis of recent moves by scholars to develop a framework for more systematic and balanced analysis of EFP that is less dependent on single explanations and normative assumptions.

For two decades now, a small group of academic specialists has produced scores of descriptive works on EFP but only a handful of conceptual analyses. (2) These analyses have tended to be "pretheoretical" in that they offer explanatory concepts that are not folded into any theory of EFP that enjoys some significant following. However, two recent trends suggest a broadening and improving of conceptual analysis. Beginning to break free of the old, sterile debate over European integration framed by either the liberal-neofunctional or the realist-intergovernmental approaches, scholars have spurred the introduction of new and revised concepts that take into account a more nuanced and rounded understanding of EFP behavior.

These notions include but are not limited to "European interests" to explain foreign policy actions rooted in the origins, ethos, and values of the European project; "Europeanization" to explain the institutionalization of foreign policy cooperation and the two-way impact of national and European foreign policy actors and interests; two-tier bargaining to reveal the importance of national actors who stand at the juncture of domestic interests and international pressures; and "actorness" and "presence" to test the effectiveness of the external impact of EFP. Scholars have also begun to analyze EFP more
systematically by introducing an agenda of research questions and evaluative criteria to measure the impact of EFP on internal and external actors.

The essay begins with a brief review of policy developments which provides a sober backdrop to the theoretical problematique which follows. It ends on a more sanguine note about the potential for progress in conceptual thinking than would have been thought possible a short time ago.

The Policy Problematic

Although the TEU placed the EC and CFSP under the common rubric of the new EU to promote a more rounded and consistent EFP, the EC and CFSP have retained their separate decisionmaking and legal cultures—the effect of which has been to block their "shot-gun" marriage at Maastricht. Their honeymoon was over before it started! The TEU also provided for a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), designated the Western European Union (WEU) as the EU's defense arm, and called on the EU in conjunction with the WEU to develop a common defense policy. However, an independent ESDI has sustained many setbacks and the most one can expect is the possibility of future WEU participation in multilateral peacekeeping and embargo enforcement measures under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). CFSP without ESDI means that the EU will continue to have a largely civilian presence on the world scene with all the different implications that concept has.

EC-EPC Relations: De Facto and De Jure Recognition

For what it was—an informal forum that evolved into an institution—EPC worked well in terms of information-sharing and coordination among the members. Habits of cooperation in a club-like
atmosphere were permitted to evolve. EPC had "socializing effects" on the maverick tendencies of some members and its coordination procedures tended to "narrow down" the range of actions considered by the members. (Hill, 1990: 33) EPC was also popular with national foreign ministries because it depended on them to serve the machinery of collective diplomacy. (de la Serre, 1988:195)

EPC started as a purely interstate arrangement dangling outside the EC and the founding treaties, but over time the communautarian and intergovernmental elements of EFP adjusted to one another, and EPC, which had no assets of its own, began to depend on the EC's resources, expertise, worldwide diplomatic network, and institutional continuity and memory.

EFP has drawn on a de facto interaction between EC and EPC which, despite problems with consistency, worked reasonably well because it was not an explicit, publicly charged issue. Since its participation evolved over time, the European Commission never posed a threat to the less communautarian states. Over time, the EC and EPC have developed a unique and extensive presence in international commerce, politics, and development/humanitarian affairs through a wide variety of actions: from the granting or denying of diplomatic recognition to diplomatic mediation of foreign crises; from cooperation accords with other regional blocs to trade-and-aid concessions for ex-colonies; from leadership in multilateral trade liberalization negotiations to humanitarian assistance to civilians in war zones; from organizing aid to Central/Eastern Europe on behalf of the G-24 to coupling that aid with progress on market reform and democratization; from fostering the democratic transitions in the newly independent states of the former
Soviet Union to executing the Mediterranean Policy; from including human rights provisions in all association agreements with third countries to holding presidential summits with the world's most powerful states; from maintaining a dialogue with "rogue" states in the face of immense U.S. opposition to imposing sanctions against states who violate international norms; and from holding foreign policy consultations with "like-minded" states to coordinating joint foreign policy activities with the United States. (3)

Although over time EPC and EC evolved as clearly two sides of the same coin, EPC and EC activities were not adequately coordinated: neither EPC nor the EC was able to exploit its collective weight. The TEU intended to bring the commercial, diplomatic, and development activities of the EC--rooted in the culture of integration and majority voting--and the foreign policy positions of EPC--rooted in the culture of interstate cooperation and unanimous decisionmaking--under a single rubric. The aim of the TEU drafter was to give the EU a new coherence and consistency, and thus effectiveness, in foreign relations. (4)

However, the TEU drafter inadvertently reopened old wounds by granting de jure recognition to EC-EPC relations, thus touching off a storm of controversy in member states where anti-community sentiment is strongest. Rather than fusing the two foreign policy cultures, the EU has experienced a fierce clash of cultures. (5) CFSP has functioned very poorly since 1993, leading some to question why something that worked, EPC, was abandoned.

Since the CFSP replaced EPC, the EC has continued to implement its own foreign policy activities and CFSP has begun to implement a small number of its own modest joint actions and common positions under new
TEU guidelines. The graduation from EPC to CFSP remains problematic, and the distrust between the European Commission and the new CFSP edifice remains deep. But the world does not wait for the EU to sort out its politics of procedure. (Ginsberg: 1997) The EU—either in the EC, CFSP, or joint EC-CFSP modes—managed to execute a number of actions between 1993 and 1996, ranging from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to the New Transatlantic Agenda and Joint Action Plan; from the free trade agreement with MERCOSUR to renewal of the financial protocols of the Lome Convention; from providing for the civil administration of Mostar to leading the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords; from undertaking a global diplomatic initiative to gain support for the renewal of the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty to placing controls on antipersonnel land mines; and from facilitating negotiations for peace and stability pacts between Central/Eastern European states with border and ethnic disputes to providing the Palestinian Authority with the world's largest aid package.

Hill offers a healthy corrective to the overemphasis on gloom that pervades EFP in the aftermath of the Gulf and Balkan Wars. "The pendulum of events will swing and it will not be long before there is a renewed emphasis on interdependence and on collective action...We should take the longer view and to expect a dialectic relationship between the actors and the system, between the nation-state and the EU institutions collectively, to endure for some time." (Hill, 1996:vi)

"Forcing Change" and "Talking Up CFSP"

Students of EFP warn that as EU members negotiate ways to improve the poor functioning to date of CFSP, they avoid trying to "force change" which is "unnecessarily costly." (Smith, 1996:33) Since the EU's
international capabilities have been "talked up" to the point where a
significant gap exists between what it said it would do at Maastricht
and what it has done since then, the EU is presented with difficult
choices and experiences that "are the more painful for not being fully
comprehended." (Hill, 1993: 306) CFSP has become bogged down in niggling
procedural debates that are metaphors for enduring battles between those
who are comfortable with an integrationist approach to foreign policy
cooperation based on qualified majority voting and an important role for
the EC institutions (Germany, the Low Countries, Spain, Italy, the
Commission, and to a more ambiguous extent France) and those who are not
(Britain, the Nordics, Greece, and Austria).

The battle for CFSP will be waged at the eleventh hour of the
current Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), convened in March 1996 to
reform EU institutions and decisionmaking in advance of eastern
enlargement. This battle is more ideological than rooted in reality, for
EFP has never been a purely supranational or intergovernmental affair.

Integrationists fear an intergovernmentalization of the EC's rich
competences and expertise in external relations. Intergovernmentalists
fear a communautarization of the national foreign policies. The debate
over the future of EFP was suppressed by the evolutionary developments
in EC-EPC relations. CFSP's development is at present completely stymied
as no innovations can be introduced to improve its functioning until
after the IGC is completed and ratified; e.g., Britain would be loath to
establish a new principle of cooperative behavior that could become
-codified at the IGC. CFSP is thus locked into a period of stalemate.

EFP is at a critical juncture. (6) An IGC is clearly the most
important opportunity for governments to determine the future course of
the EU (although governments regularly negotiate and make compromises between IGCs). If governments can agree at the current IGC to make some pragmatic changes without setting off ballistic missiles—e.g., improve interpillar relations, increase the scope of qualified majority voting, develop a forward planning and analysis capability, bring the WEU closer to the EU on questions pertaining to the so-called Petersburg Principles (of multilateral peacekeeping and humanitarian support), and provide opportunities for a "multiple speed" or other flexible approaches to account for an increasingly diverse membership, then CFSP may be set on a trajectory of long term development.

The alternative is for the EU to remain a partial international actor unable to harness its global economic and diplomatic power to serve collective foreign political and security interests. If the EU fails to make CFSP work as intended before it expands to include new members, the progress made to date in developing EFP will be jeopardized, and the EU may suffer a general reversal in the process of political integration.

What propelled the Europeans to raise their expectations of what they can do together in foreign policy, why is there such a yawning gap between capability and expectations, and what are our analytical tools and criteria for judging progression or regression in EFP? What are the prospects that conceptual knowledge will provide the needed explanations supported by empirical evidence?

The Theoretical Problematique

The policy problem is a theoretical one, for so long as the EU remains an ambiguous international actor, theorists will remain divided
over how to describe and explain this most unusual actor. For even the most determined, the struggle to conceptualize EFP is daunting.

Scholarship: One Trickle, Three Waves

Theoretical work on EFP has generally been meager compared to work on internal aspects of integration. Some blame is apportioned to functionalist theory, which was silent on the external environment just when the EC was forming in the 1950s. Neofunctionalists responded to the sounds of silence on the external dimension, but before their hypotheses began to trickle into the published literature, they too lost their punch as integration theory was either subsumed by broader perspectives, global interdependence and international political economy, squeezed into the safer and narrow confines of regime theory, or left to mold on the university library bookshelf for a future generation to rediscover.

By the 1970s, internal integration began to stall. American theorists lost interest in an intergovernmental Europe (it did not help when Haas, the father of neofunctionalism, declared integration theory obsolete in 1975). Yet interest in the EC's external relations, then in a growth mode, and EPC's debut at the Helsinki negotiations at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe triggered a tidal wave of new, mostly descriptive general works on EFP: see Bailey (1973); von Geusau (1974); Twitchett (1976); Sjostedt (1977); Feld (1977, 1979); Wallace and Paterson (1978); Taylor (1979); Bull (1982); Allen et al. (1982); and Hill (1983).

Passage of the SEA and the impact of the end of the Cold War on the place of the then EC in Europe stimulated the first sustained wave of conceptual interest in EFP (complemented by descriptive analyses): Ifestos (1987); Pijpers et al. (1988); Ginsberg (1989); Rummel (1990);

**Poorly Served by Theory**

The literature yields ambiguous results. On the one hand, there is a general consensus that the EU has an international "presence" (Allen and Smith: 1990) and that it exhibits some of the elements of "actorness"; i.e., it is an international actor in some areas (Sjostedt: 1977) but not in others. On the other hand, there is no consensus over how to measure the inputs/outputs, formulation/execution, causes/effects, and progression/regression of EFP. Despite the renewal of theoretical interest, scholars remain generally dissatisfied with the state of the art. (Weiler and Wessels: 1988) (7) The following conclusions confirm the "theoretical deficit" of EFP studies in the 1990s (Jorgensen, 1993: 212):

--EPC has been "poorly served by theory" (Holland, 1991:2);
--"concepts fail us when we explore the international role of the EC/EU" (Allen and Smith, 1996: 3);
--"integration theory has not been outspoken in the foreign policy dimension of the EC" (Pijpers, 1991: 9);
--EC external relations are "longer on detailed description than analysis" (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1990: 276);
--there are no syntheses of case studies (Jorgensen, 1993: 211); and
--most theoretical work has been "normative...obscuring analysis of what actually has been happening" (Hill, 1993:307).

On what basis is there such widespread dissatisfaction? Theorists are dogged by such problems as:

--defining what the EU is as an international actor, given the EU's lack of historical precedence; multidimensional presence; and alternative legal and cultural traditions underlining foreign economic diplomacy (EC) and foreign policy positions/actions (EPC/CFSP) (8);
--categorizing EU foreign policy behavior, given that it is neither a state nor an international regime and neither an international regime
nor a non-state actor;
--agreeing upon which concepts imported from international relations and
comparative politics are germane to EFP;
--agreeing upon which concepts closely connected to EFP analysis are
most useful;
--identifying appropriate methods of inquiry, criteria for evaluation,
and levels of analysis; and
--placing EFP analysis in a comparative context when traditional
foreign policy analysis and the newer field of comparative foreign
policy recognize only single states as having foreign policies. (9)

Differences over approaches remind the author of a colleague’s
witticism: “what you see may well depend on where you sit, but which
seats give the best view in the house?” (Hill, 1978: 8) Theorists have
been trapped for years over a tedious and static debate from which a few
are beginning to disentangle themselves, i.e., the debate over whether
to approach EFP analysis either from liberal or realist perspectives in
general or from neofunctional or neorealist intergovernmental
perspectives in particular, as if only one had a monopoly of theoretical
insights. Both theories “have something to offer. Our current
predicament is too serious to ignore either.” (Nye, 1987: ix)

Theoretical Concepts of European Foreign Policy Analysis

As the following excursion into the theoretical literature (10)
will show, the field of inquiry continues to be at the pretheoretical
stage. Theorists are developing new and reworking old explanatory
concepts not yet linked in any meaningful way to a larger or even middle
range theory of EFP. However, the old divide between idealism and
realism is being bridged by a variety of reformulated concepts that
yield much more rounded, finessed, and interesting explanations of EFP
than some of their ancestors.

There has been an incremental building of conceptual knowledge of
EFP. Early neofunctional concepts of EFP were either refuted or ignored,
only to be resuscitated and revised at a later date. Similarly, realist
notions of the omnipotence of the state as the only driving force of European integration have been revised to take into account the impacts of domestic and international politics on national decisionmakers as well as the effect of membership in a community of values and norms. Many of the newer concepts identified in this paper enable theorists to examine the impact of EFP on other actors without reference to the "cramping" (Hill: 1993) debate between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism.

The following theoretical excursion: (a) identifies and describes relevant explanatory concepts of EFP; (b) clusters those concepts into four general categories; (c) relates those categories to an input-output model associated with conventional political science analysis of governmental decisionmaking; and (d) attaches a central question to each set of concepts to measure how well each explanation holds up against the empirical record. This approach will facilitate an overall critique of the theoretical state of the art in the concluding sections.

Chart 1 places EFP decisionmaking within the context of the broader international environment from which various pressures force the EU and its member states to respond collectively even though they may neither willing nor able. The decisionmaking "black box" is identified as Hill's "external relations system." Knowledge of decisionmaking requires an understanding of the interplay between national actors (as influenced by domestic and international stimuli) and European actors and "Europeanized" institutional norms and practices. The "system" is influenced by such inputs as national and European actors, European interests and values, habits of cooperation, and international systemic
Chart 1: European Foreign Policy Decisionmaking Model

**international environment**
- international system
- international society

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**inputs**
- politics of scale
- externalization
- European interests/values
- national actors
- international systemic change

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**feedback**
- actorness
- presence

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**External Relations System**

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**Pillar 1 ↔ Pillar 2 ↔ Pillar 3**

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**National Foreign Policies**

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**outputs**
- civilian actions
- common positions
- enlargement

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**feedback**
- actorness
- presence
change. Outputs of decisionmaking include thousands of "civilian" foreign policy actions from enlargement to association, from development aid to diplomatic recognition, and from trade sanctions to special partnerships. To address the impact of outputs on internal and external actors, outputs must relate back to inputs as well as to the international environment. Thus the effectiveness of the "external relations system" depends on the extent to which the EU's "presence" and "actorness" are felt by others which in turn requires that the "system" itself, with all its different layers of decisionmaking as depicted in Chart 1, functions reasonably well. The more the outside world takes EFP actions seriously, and the more effective the EU can be in international relations, the more the EU will evolve into an international actor, however sui generis.

External Stimuli

What are the inputs of EFP? The EU, like single state actors, is influenced by the shifting currents of international politics and the demands of the outside world for the EU to act internationally whether or not it is ready or capable. Foreign crises--embargoes, wars, human suffering--impact heavily on the EU and help explain EC responses. It cannot, nor does it want to, hide from the world even though it does not have the powers and capabilities of middle rank or great powers. However, one could argue that the EU's civilian powers and capabilities have a larger impact on the world than do those of the world's many smaller nation-states. Any explanation of EFP requires an appreciation of how the outside world causes the EU to act in ways that are responsive to such stimuli. (Rummel: 1990) Two concepts, one drawn from integration theory--neofunctional externalization, and one drawn from
international relations theory—international systemic change, provide explanations of how external stimuli influence the EU.

Neofunctional Externalization and Enlargement

Schmitter was intrigued by the impact of external stimuli on the development of the EC's foreign relations. Externalization (Schmitter: 1969; Haas and Rowe: 1974; Ginsberg: 1989) explains why nonmembers press the EC to act as a unit; what effect this outside charge has on the EC; and the outcomes of EC actions that are executed in response to outside pressure. The EC responds to outside pressures related to the impact of the internal market and its policies by either expanding membership to eligible applicants; offering association and preferential trade accords, development assistance, partnerships, and dialogues with other regional blocs; or opposing external demands that it cannot accommodate.

Externalization, and the related notion of spillover (expansion of functional/institutional tasks), are at work in the growth and development of EC foreign (civilian) policy activities. According to one study (Ginsberg: 1989; 1991), between 1958 and 1990, the EC took 668 foreign policy actions across multilateral, bilateral, security-related, unilateral, and interregional (bloc-to-bloc) dimensions. Of those actions, 490 (or 73 percent) were explained by neofunctional externalization and spillover processes (what Ginsberg calls the logic of integration). Over time, the number of actions expanded, particularly after the 1973 enlargement. In the 1958-1972 period, there were 167 total actions, of which 165 (or 99 percent) were explained by integration. In the 1973-1990 period, there were 502 total actions, of which 325 (or 65 percent) were explained by integration. When the logic of integration is not at work, EFP actions may be explained either by
the impact of international politics and interdependence or by the growing confidence of the EC to assess European interests in the outside world (see below).

Enlargement—a case in externalization—is the EC's most important foreign policy power. It has broad implications for EPP and the role of the EU in the world. Since the EU decides which applicant states join—and under which conditions—and which do not, it has enormous influence over the fates of nations. (Ginsberg: 1997) Externalization explains and anticipates membership expansion; how enlargement itself triggers more foreign policy activity; and the influence nonmembers have on EC foreign policy activity.

As the internal market develops, it is clear to others that they are affected by decisions made elsewhere without having a say. Either the EC addresses the concerns of outsiders or it seals off the common market from outsiders. (Haas and Rowe: 1973) The EU is a magnet for surrounding states, many of whom have determined that the benefits of membership are preferable to the costs of nonmembership (the three exceptions to this rule in Western Europe are Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland).

Each enlargement causes a metamorphosis in the EU's relationship with the outside world. Each enlargement changes the size, geography, composition, scope, and direction of the EU. Enlargement clearly is a trade-off. On the one hand, as the EU grows larger and more diverse, decisionmaking becomes more complicated and common positions are harder to carve out of separate foreign policy interests and traditions. On the other hand, enlargement has made the EU an economic and financial superpower and has generally strengthened the EU's presence in
international relations. Many applicants become committed and energetic members. (Ginsberg: 1997) New members adjust to and mold the EU's international relations.

Enlargement contributes to a strengthening of EC institutions because decisionmaking becomes "virtually impossible" under rules of unanimity. (Keohane and Hoffmann: 1994) Widening the EU to include applicants from southern and eastern Europe, expected over the next decade, is driving the effort at the current IGC to reform EU decisionmaking and institutions, especially in CFSP. Indeed, deepening while widening has been the norm in the EU's history. Most of the member governments--Germany especially--recognize that if the EU does not deepen as a result of the negotiations at the present IGC, but goes on to widen, the EU will buckle under the weight of a membership that could reach 27. Enlargement has been a catalyst for either the creation of new or reform of existing foreign policymaking procedures, mechanisms, meetings, and institutions as the EU is forced to adjust to the impact that its larger size and more diverse membership have on its foreign relationships. (Ginsberg: 1997) For examples:

--in the run-up to the first enlargement in 1973, EC leaders established EPC to better handle the global challenges they faced;
--in the immediate aftermath of the first enlargement, the EU leaders established the European Council to represent the EPC and the EC to the outside world;
--at the time of the second enlargement in 1981, the European Council established the troika, enabling the current Council Presidency to be assisted by the immediate past and future presidents; and extended EPC's remit to the political aspects of security;
--at the time of the third enlargement in 1986, the SEA was concluded, which codified EPC's organic link to the European Council, the European Council's international functions, and the troika concept; committed members to coordinate positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security and to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security; endowed EPC with a small secretariat; and gave the European Parliament powers of assent over the EU's international agreements; and
--just in advance of the fourth enlargement in 1995, the TEU entered into force in November 1993, which finally brought EPC into the
institutional structure of the new EU; gave EPC the new name of CFSP, and endowed it with its first budget; extended the European Parliament's decisionmaking authority over enlargement and international agreements; gave the European Commission the right of nonexclusive initiative in CFSP that it never had in EPC; and charged the European Council with the responsibility of speaking for the EU in world affairs.

An intergovernmental perspective on EFP, found in the following section in more detail, places a different stress on enlargement. Rather than looking at the source of external stimuli and the nature of the pressure on the EU to accommodate foreign demand, an intergovernmental perspective emphasizes the interstate horse-trading that goes into EU decisions about the terms of enlargement. As the EU grows larger and more heterogeneous, neofunctional explanations of enlargement decisions become less useful than intergovernmental ones. (Miles et al.: 1995) National governments engage in negotiations with one another that are guided not by supranational elites shepherding the objective of European unity, but by national elites pursuing domestic interests. It is only with their consent that new institutional structures can be created and policies agreed upon.

Externalization is seen as an important partial explanation of the growth of the EC pillar of EFP. It explains the impact of the outside world on the EU in areas related to the functioning and external effects of the customs union and the impact of the EU on the outside world through such activities as enlargement and other foreign policy actions. Schmitter and associates tried to inject into neofunctional thought the international dimension that had been missing in its earlier incarnation. Despite the explanatory power and parsimony of the concept, externalization has attracted minimal attention among EFP theorists. Critics tossed the baby out with the bathwater. The realists who
acknowledge the EU's existence tend to focus only on EPC/CFSP which jibes with their view of the state, and ignores the EC pillar of EFP, which deals only with "low politics." The problems of EFP have tended to be more pronounced in EPC/CFSP, where the intergovernmental method and unanimous decisionmaking prevail, than in EC, where the integrationist method and qualified majority voting prevail.

Realists are quick to conclude that the neofunctionalists assumed an eventual absolute transfer of sovereignty from the state to the union in foreign and security policy. In truth, Haas and Schmitter foresaw not a single center with overarching authority but a center that included national governments and EC institutions sharing authority, with majority voting as an essential component. (Soetendorp, 1994:118)

Critics of the foreign policy aspects of neofunctionalism maintain that:

--"EPC as such...has been explained in realist terms" (Pijpers: 1988);
--the revival of neofunctionalism is "theoretical archaeology" with little value to contemporary studies (Jorgensen, 1993: 213);
--EPC is "not a product of functional spillover" because supranational actors did not obtain more authority over a policy domain and member states have always disagreed over the extent to which EPC affairs should involve EC actors (Smith: 1996:2);
--neofunctional anticipation that national diplomats assigned to EPC would transfer loyalties from the nation state to EPC level "has not happened" (Pijpers: 1988: 259);
--neofunctionalism does not provide answers to such questions as why, when, and to what extent will a EFP develop; (Pijpers, 1991:13);
--EPC's intergovernmental approach has not been abandoned as functionalists would have predicted (Soetendorp, 1994: 112);
--although neofunctionalism did focus attention on policy elites, domestic politics, and bargaining between states and the EC, "it did not provide either a theory of bargaining or a theory of political choice" (Caporaso and Keeler, 1995:10); and
--too much emphasis was placed on the role of interest groups and elites in maintaining the momentum of integration at the expense of the real authoritative decisionmakers--governments. (Bulmer, 1991:146)

Externalization (and other neofunctional concepts) do not explain interstate negotiations that affect how it will respond to external stimuli. This is largely because the external stimuli it explains is rooted in the existence of the internal market, where decisionmaking
rules are more flexible, than in EPC/CFSP, where states retain control. Although EPC has grown in function and scope of activity, has interacted with the EC in ways that would not have been thought possible in the early 1970s, and has become an EU institution itself, it is best explained in conjunction with other concepts.

International Systemic Change

Neofunctional externalization (and liberal intergovernmentalism as explained in a later section) do not explain the impact of international politics on EFP decisionmaking. The current of global politics influences the EU to respond with policies actions rooted not in the common market but in the international system. Jorgensen (1997:15) argues for much more analysis of the impact on EFP actions of not only international systemic change by that of international society. Clearly the:

--impact of bipolarity affected the ability of the EC to conduct an independent set of foreign policy actions;
--rise of multipolarity opened up doors to the EC for influence in the third world;
--development of global interdependence created opportunities for a larger role in international affairs by "giant middle powers" with civilian means at their disposal (Iffestos, 1987:61) and forced the common market to develop foreign policy mechanisms to cope with, manage, and respond to new external influences;
--impact of the oil cartel actions of the 1970s, which first delivered serious blows to European unity, then forced the EC to reckon with the Arab world and adjust its Middle East policy;
--impact of foreign competition on a stagnant EC economy was the most important catalyst to the Single European Act and its 1992 project;
--development of complex interdependence placed the EU and other like-minded nonmember states, particularly the U.S., into new patterns of cooperation not accounted for by power politics (Featherstone and Ginsberg: 1993, 1996); and
--end of the cold war catapulted the EC into a "European Union" with enormous responsibilities for supporting and stabilizing the democratic transitions of Central and Eastern Europe.

Few scholars of EFP have explicitly placed the EU within the wider international system and the vast majority of realist theorists have not discovered EFP as a theory or practice. Those realists who are aware
tend to discount the EU as an international presence and thus do not bother to explain the impact of international politics on it. Pijpers (1988) and Bull (1982) hold that EPC is nothing more than a continuation of the old European alliance system. Neoliberal institutionalists, e.g., Keohane and Nye (1977; 1987), place the EC within the context of an interdependent global political economy. Featherstone and Ginsberg (1996) apply Keohane and Nye's ideal notion of complex interdependence to explain EU relations with the U.S. and other like-minded states. George (1991) takes a world systems perspective to explain the existence of a capitalist bloc of states centered on Germany and its effects on the growing gulf between the world's rich and poor states. Long in Holland (1997) applies the concept of "multilateralism" to CFSP and finds that though CFSP is a multilateral arrangement in a formal sense, it is not an institution of multilateralism in a substantive sense.

The EU continues to take foreign policy actions that are in response to stimuli rooted in the rough-and-tumble world of foreign politics. Examples of actions taken in response to developments and changes in the international system include: active participation as a unit in the OSCE and the G-7 Summits; multilateral sanctions against South Africa and Libya; defiance of the Iraqi demand during the Gulf war that members' missions be moved from Kuwait City; establishment of the Euro-Arab Dialogue; and responsibility for overall aid coordination to Central/Eastern Europe on behalf of the G-24. (Ginsberg: 1989; 1991)

**Indigenous Stimuli**

Neofunctional externalization and international systemic change explain many but not all influences on EFP. Does the EU act as a unit in international affairs with its own regional/collective interests to
promulgate on an international scale? Does the EU's common history and aversion to war, its experiences, ethos, and habits of cooperation, and the convergence of interests of highly integrated states foster "European" foreign policy interests? Turning to such concepts as "politics of scale" (Ginsberg: 1989), "external relations system" (Hill: 1993), "European interests" (Ginsberg: 1989), and "Europeanization" (Smith: 1996), we find some useful explanations of a growing "European" dimension to the EU's international relations.

Politics of Scale

Politics of scale (Ginsberg: 1989) refers to the benefits of collective over unilateral action in the conduct of EFP. It enables members to conduct joint foreign policy actions at lower costs and risks than when they are on their own. Members perceive that they carry more weight in certain areas when they act together as a bloc than when they act separately. Politics of scale is neutral in the neofunctional-intergovernmental debate as it is relevant to either the EC or EPC/CFSP pillar of EFP. Collective diplomacy has enabled the EC to pull more weight at international negotiations, conferences, and organizations. Indeed it was at the East-West CSCE negotiations at Helsinki in the mid-1970s that the world woke up to a unified EC/EPC presence, which had an enormous impact on outcomes.

Politics of scale offers advantages to all members. For the smaller and medium size members, it offers the advantage of acting on a scale far more influential than when acting alone. For Germany, it offers a convenient cover for national foreign aspirations better promulgated on a collective scale. For former colonial powers--e.g., Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Belgium--a politics of
scale offers opportunities to exercise a global influence each lost after decolonization. A politics of scale enhances French and British foreign policies, although less so than for many of the other members given that EPC/CFSP is but one of several fora for their foreign policy actions. (Hill: 1996)

When the EU speaks with one voice in international diplomacy it resonates with others far more effectively than when fifteen separate members speak. When the EU acts as a unit in international politics it carries the combined weight of 380 million Europeans and the richest and most powerful economic and political bloc in the world. It has an enormous impact on the interests and fates of many nation-states who have commercial and political ties to Europe. The incentives of employing the collective weight to pursue national and European interests in the world are likely to endure even if the EU never more fully develops its actor capacity in or presence on the world scene. Indeed Gordon (1996:5) has argued that a criterion for foreign policy integration is when the potential gains from joint action through "increased scale" are greater than the costs of lost sovereignty. Jorgensen, however, expresses no surprise over the existence of a politics of scale at work in EFP because "coalitions and alliances are created with this purpose in mind, so why not expect this to apply to the CFSP?" (Jorgensen, 1997:5)

External Relations System

The EU as an "external relations system" (Taylor, 1982: 41; Hill, 1993: 321) is another explanatory concept that breaks free of the debates over whether or not the EU is an international actor and whether
or not a neofunctional or intergovernmental approach is the most suitable. Since the EU is more than a passive presence in the world but less than an international actor, and given the continuing gap between capability and expectations, an external relations system offers a useful and neutral characterization of the EU’s international relations.

EFP as a system of external relations is a collective enterprise through which national actors “conduct partly common, and partly separate, international actions” (Hill and Wallace in Hill, 1996:5). An external relations systems has three strands: national foreign policies and the EC and CFSP pillars of the EU. Chart 1 adds a third strand--or pillar--Pillar 3 of the EU to the “external relations system,” given its potential to deal with such interstate concerns as drug trafficking, money laundering, movement of criminals, and terrorism. Whereas other approaches tend to lend more weight to the EC or CFSP pillars or instead stress national foreign policies, this concept does justice to “all three parallel sets of activity which are increasing intermeshed and easy to confuse but still essentially distinct.” (Hill, 1993:322) Jorgensen’s concept of “modern European diplomacy” (1997:4) is a variant of the external relations system as it refers to the interplay (or two-way influence) between national and European, EC and EPC/CFSP, and EU and WEU levels of decisionmaking.

Although there is no evidence to suggest a fusion of the three strands into a single EFP, Hill suggests that an effective European presence in the world would involve collective policies covering all strands. At present, there are elements of a collective approach across the strands but the degree and extent of states' commitments to cooperation vary considerably. (Hill, 1993:324) Indeed the inability of
the pillar system to work in EFP relates closely to the clash of foreign policy cultures between the traditional economic diplomacy of the EU and the intergovernmental political cooperation on EPC/CFSP. So long as the external relations system rests on "moving foundations" (Hill and Wallace in Hill, 1996:13), CFSP will continue to suffer as will the goal set at Maastricht to coordinate economic diplomacy and political cooperation under a common roof.

European Values and Interests

When the EU initiates policy actions based not on external stimuli as described earlier, but on its own internal dynamic, interests, and instincts, a European interests or "self-styled" logic is at work. (Ginsberg: 1989) Such diplomatic initiatives reflect a unique European brand of diplomacy and foreign policy molded by an internal dynamic of cooperation among members and common institutions. A European foreign policy interests explanation is also neutral in the neofunctional-intergovernmental debate for it applies to either the EC or EPC/CFSP pillars of EFP.

What interstate bargaining and two-tier analysis of EU decisionmaking (introduced in the section on internal decisionmaking) leave out of their explanatory equations of EFP is the impact of the practices, habits, experiences, and ethos of cooperation molded by a common history and five decades of integration on attitudes and perceptions of decisionmakers. Typical of EC/EPC actions that reflect a "European" quality independent of the existence of the common market or the vicissitudes of international politics include the following:

---special partnerships with other regional blocs of states;
---pursuit of human rights as a condition for association accords;
---development support for Central and Eastern Europe made dependent on progress in democratization;
--ban on imports of baby seal pelts;
--the EU's status as the world's largest provider of humanitarian aid;
--actions in support of Ostpolitik;
--major trade concessions and aid to all former colonies;
--preaccession access by applicant states to EPC/CFSP activities;
--commercial and diplomatic sanctions against aggressor states or states who violate basic human rights, even European states and close associates, e.g., Greece in the 1960s and Turkey in the 1980s;
--maintaining dialogue and links with "rogue" states in the face of extreme pressure from the United States to end such activity;
--peace initiatives in Afghanistan and Middle East;
--support for the Contadora peace process in the face of U.S. opposition;
--status as the world's largest aid donor to the Palestinian Authority; and
--financial support for victims of apartheid in South Africa.

Consistent with the notion of European interests, Lily Feldman is applying the concepts of interstate reconciliation and peace, which have hitherto been focused on the EU's internal decisionmaking dynamics, to EFP. Feldman maintains, in the face of scholarship critical of notions of common European identity, that peace and reconciliation are still relevant within the EU and are values that inform EFP behavior.

In sum, much more work needs to be done to explore the relationship between a shared sense of European identity and its impact on EFP decisionmaking. Hill is of two minds. On the one hand, the EU rests on a relatively weak sense of shared history and identity partly because of (a) the diverse historical experiences of its members; (b) its institutions which have lacked the influence over education or the ability to create and manipulate stated goals which national governments have had themselves used to strengthen communal identities; and (c) forging of identity and values takes time. On the other hand, Hill urges caution in turning away from notions of common identity and values. Indeed participation in EPC itself helps foster a sense of shared identity, which is the point Smith makes by elaborating the notion of "Europeanization." Hill (1996) and Hill in Regelsberger (1997) writes:
"EPC stimulates a consciousness of and a debate about what Europe ought to be doing in the world"...in fact, where EPC is weak in leverage, it is strong on values...and European diplomacy has steadily become associated in the public mind with a distinct set of principles (1996:9)

Although EPC seemed for much of the time to have a reflexive purpose, that of protecting and promoting itself, it was very active in sponsoring the values that underpinned the whole EC project, e.g., democracy, soft-edged capitalism, a zone of peace between member states, and diplomatic mediation between third parties to undercut the causes of major conflict." (1997:87)

**Europeanization**

Smith (1996) argues that over time EPC has moved closer to the EC and its norms, policies, and habits without itself becoming supranationalized. Smith posits that EPC developed as a peculiar European institution among national diplomats by reinforcing norms of behavior largely established through trial and error and by permitting and legitimizing the involvement of EC actors and processes. Informal EPC norms and EC procedures changed EPC from its original design as a forum for sharing information among governments to a more institutionalized, collective, binding, and community-sensitive system, despite efforts of many states to resist the process. EPC was a system of policy improvisation driven more by group-constructed norms rather than by power or vague notions of interests, according to Smith. As habits and procedures of political cooperation became institutionalized into a corporate body of European values and norms, they eventually caused member states to change their attitudes and preferences despite the absence of enforcement mechanisms.

EPC was institutionalized in such a way to promote the creation of common interests and eventually the establishment of a common identity in world politics. In other words, EPC changed the ways individual
states determined and pursued their interests. An increasingly binding set of behavioral standards emerged from a small set of informal guidelines and states generally considered the opinion of the partners before forming their own. Foreign policies of the members became more transparent and somewhat more predictable to each other, while compliance with positions became more common despite the absence of sanctioning mechanisms.

According to Smith, EFP cooperation was simultaneously institutionalized and "Europeanized" according to "shared norms beyond what was revealed in formal reports and treaties" and it grew far more "sensitive to community processes. However, EPC norms and processes were not supranationalized. The EC did not draw EPC to it; EPC developed and expanded to increasingly overlap with certain functional domains and goals of the EC. Although the EC has developed in part because of the pressures of interest groups, businesses, and a European technocratic elite, these influences played no significant role in EPC's institutional development. Domestic politics, public opinion, and national elections only occasionally intruded on EPC—a point worth remember as Bulmer's two-tier bargaining concept is introduced and critiqued in the following section.

Institutions such as the EC are viewed by intergovernmentalists as mechanisms to lower transaction costs for interstate bargains. However, this view of institutions is too narrow to understand EPC, according to Smith. EPC outcomes rarely if ever involved bargaining, side payments, issue linkages, or any other mechanisms associated with the mere reduction of transaction costs. Bargaining and negotiations are very
important during ideological debates, e.g., at IGCs, but they are only partially applicable to day-to-day foreign policymaking.

The process of Europeanization shows how EPC was gradually allowed to become a part of the EC environment even though deliberations have been conducted as a separate, intergovernmental extra-legal system. It occupied a variable position between the 'ideal types of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.' Smith's work in this area deserves more attention by the wider scholarly community as theorists begin to more carefully examine the decisionmaking processes within the "external relations system." The concept of Europeanization is a healthy corrective to overemphasis on interstate bargaining and opens the door to new, more nuanced theoretical insights into EFP making.

**Internal Decisionmaking**

The task of identifying and explaining inputs and outputs of EFP making is much simpler and more empirically approachable than explaining how decisions are made and by whom and for what purposes. What are the concepts that describe and explain internal decisionmaking in the EU's external relations system?

**Intergovernmentalism**

Cousins of realists, intergovernmentalists place national governments--guardians of state power, interests, preferences, and sovereignty--at the center of EU decisionmaking. Intergovernmentalism has two variants: realist and liberal. Realists such as Waltz and Mearsheimer virtually ignore the EU as an international player because it is not a state. Neorealist intergovernmentalists acknowledge the existence of the EU but only as a convenient forum in which governments meet periodically to negotiate new compacts that enhance state interests
and power. (Pijpers, 1991:31) argues that EPC is "not a new phenomenon...but an updated version of old-style alliance diplomacy. It is difficult to discover original aspects of EU approaches to world politics." Pijpers argues that an "idealized EU" should be avoided and EPC (CFSP) should be put into the framework of the "history of international relations and within realpolitik." (Pijpers: 1991: 31)

Liberal intergovernmentalists accord an important role to supranational institutions in cementing existing interstate bargains and as foundations for renewed integration but affirm that the principal source of integration lies in states themselves. Neoliberal intergovernmentalists tend to downplay the impact of international politics and systemic change on interstate bargaining. For them, the EC has always evolved as a result of its members' interstate bargains, whether the Rome Treaty or the SEA. Each government looks to the EC through the lens of its own policy preferences. (Moravcsik: 1993) Integration only moves forward when member states have "sufficient common perceived interests (government-preference convergence) that the potential gains of integration (through increased scale and the absence of interstate friction) are greater than the costs of lost sovereignty." (Gordon, 1996: 5) In other words, the EU will only adopt a true CFSP when a consensus exists among the EU states that CFSP is in their interests. (Gordon, 1996:12)

Since neorealist intergovernmentalism is based on the notion of state rationality and treats states as independent actors with fixed preferences for wealth, security, and power, all state actions are purposely directed toward achieving institutionally ordered goals and objectives. Consequently, using this perspective, the EU merely
represents an advanced forum for intergovernmental negotiations and bartering among nation-states. (Miles, 1995: 179) EU policy and institutional reform will in part only result from intergovernmental bargaining between member states which are guided by strategic pursuit of national interests.

Since the EU is more than a forum for periodic interstate bargains, a realist intergovernmentalist perspective also has its limits, because it ignores the role of supranational institutions in crafting and facilitating compromises and in overseeing and managing the daily processes of EFP. The neorealist variant ignores why, how, and when national interests converge and to what extent they are shaped by domestic and international politics on the one hand, and the ethos of community membership on the other. Neorealists see no scope for EC-EPC and now EC-CFSP interaction, when in reality the two arms of the EU have practiced a modus operandi that evolved over many years.

Liberal intergovernmentalism acknowledges the role of supranational institutions in greasing the axles of cooperation and maintaining the integration process between IGCs. It has contributed to our understanding of how interstate bargaining at IGCs has influenced the growth and development of the EU. However, critics have cited the liberal variant of intergovernmentalism for overemphasizing the role of national governments in decisionmaking and not explaining with more care

--how stimuli from international politics and economics affect decisionmaking in national capitals (Ginsberg: 1989);
--how domestic politics--the "mainsprings" of fifteen foreign policy interests--and public opinion influence national decisionmakers as they formulate EU policy (Bulmer, 1991: 71);
--how the shared history of war, ethos and habits of voluntary cooperation across time, and institutional continuity unique to a community of states impact on interstate bargaining and convergence of preferences (Hill: 1993); and
--the extent to which change within EPC has occurred over time leading to an increase in use of EC procedures and a subtle erosion of the
exclusive power of national governments in EFP decisionmaking. (Smith: 1996)

The existence of interstate bargains cut at any one point in time is one important explanation of EFP decisionmaking, but this explanation ignores how the process of EFP continues between IGCs, which is why the realist variant of intergovernmentalism does not resonate as fully as it might among students of EFP. Smith and Ray (1993) concluded that neofunctionalism paid too little attention to the role of the state and national power but that the current focus on intergovernmental bargains and unitary decisionmakers overemphasizes the role of the state. Long (in Holland, 1997:198) argues that the shared norms and principles that underlie EFP outputs are more than simply the product of a consonance of domestic orientations as indicated by liberal intergovernmentalism.

Consociationalism

Consociationalism refers to a political system dominated by a convergence of elites who make decisions based on consensus, i.e., all interests are accommodated before final decisions are made. Often outcomes represent the lowest common denominator. The concept was first conceived by Lijphart to describe and explain how a number of small, highly diverse and fragmented West European democracies, e.g., the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland, managed to maintain governmental stability. A form of consensus politics, consociationalism provided for strict rules of representation in government to protect the interests of all social groups. Since there are neither big winners nor big losers, all benefit from governmental stability. (Slater, 1994: 156) Units with cleavages such as language, religion, and ethnicity can develop joint and consensual decisionmaking strategies, which can be
achieved by establishing grand coalitions of representatives of each of these segments. (Puchala, 1981: 238)

Some scholars have suggested the features of consociationalism are reflected in the workings of EPC/CFSP, which operates by elites on the basis of consensus, balances cultural diversity, and produces outputs that often represent the lowest common denominator. Weiler and Wessels (1988) use the consociational model to explain EPC's relative stability in the face of increased centrifugal forces, equating this stability with the mechanism operating in some of the member states which are divided but still fairly stable. Close cooperation among the EC foreign policy elites, occurring on the basis of consensus and providing consultations and other forms of elite bargains, has managed to limit centrifugal tendencies in a potentially highly divided Community. (Weiler and Wessels, 1988: 243)

Although consociationalism as an explanation of the inner workings of EPC/CFSP warrants further research, scholars have not pursued the concept with much vigor. Hill concedes some usefulness in applying the model to EPC but is uncomfortable with the notion of a small group of elites, not democratically accountable, and operating in secret making decisions in EPC/CFSP that affect the lives of millions of Europeans. (Hill, 1988 217) One skeptic argues that consociationalism has not survived intact to the present. (Slater: 1994) Changing political values, increasing cultural and political consciousness, higher education about what governments can do, and greater complexities of government have brought mass publics into a new relationship with the political establishment. New and rival political elites have emerged. Others argue that consociationalism explains only one aspect of EPC--
institutions and political stability. Weiler and Wessels, according to Pijpers, ignore the fact that cooperation among EU foreign policy elites, which is harmonious indeed, only concerns areas of international relations that do not divide the EU. EPC does not represent a state with deep cleavages and thus cannot be a suitable testing ground for the consociational model (Pijpers, 1991: 16) because it does not deal with defense. A lonely critic of the critics of consociationalism argues that EPC has produced outputs that are more than the lowest common denominator and that domestic infiltration of EPC/CFSP remains minimal (Smith: 1997).

National Actors

Hill (1983; 1996) examines EPC/CFSP not from the perspective of external stimulus, but from the interplay between national foreign policies and collective diplomacy. Hill and collaborators hold that the dialectic between the nation-state and the EU institutions collectively is continually being played out. A national actor approach contributes to a greater appreciation for the multiple levels of involved in EFP practices. Hill and collaborators show how governments use EPC/CFSP to pursue national interests. For Germany, EPC/CFSP is a useful mechanism to assert German foreign policy interests in a convenient multilateral setting so as to avoid impressions of unilateral assertiveness. Schmidt's ostpolitik became EPC and EC's ostpolitik. Germany' close relations with Israel did not allow it on its own to take a more pro-Arab League stance, but through EPC this was possible. For France and other members, EPC/CFSP is seen as one of the chief means of bridling German power. (Pijpers, 1988:25) For Britain, EPC was seen as a means to reassert British foreign policy interests after the decline of its
empire. For the smaller states, EPC is perhaps the most important outlet for pursuing their foreign policy interests, whereas for the largest states, particularly Britain and France, EPC is but one of several important foreign policy fora. What the Hill study does for theory is to provide empirical case studies that document the salience of EPC/CFSP for national foreign ministries and the growing presence of the EU in world affairs on behalf of national and European interests.

Two-Tier Bargaining

Inspired by Putnam's work (1988) on international negotiations, which takes into account domestic and international actors (1988), and consistent with the increasing interest in studies of comparative federalism (Sbragia: 1991), Bulmer (1991) applied the notion of a two-tier bargaining game to EPC. Two-tier analysis focuses on the domestic context of international negotiations and on how national decisionmakers appear at the intersection of the domestic and international game boards. It is not enough, according to this concept, to focus on interstate bargains made by national decisionmakers without grasping the domestic and international constraints under which they operate and with which they fashion policy positions. Thus two-tier analysis is viewed as an alternative to neofunctional and liberal intergovernmental explanations of EU decisionmaking. Two-tier analysis helps explain the distribution of power and decisionmaking between two tiers of governance: (Bulmer, 1991)

--the lower or national tier within which domestic interest groups and political parties seek to influence the making of national "EU" policy and national decisionmakers, who sit at the confluence of domestic and EU currents; and

--the upper or EU tier where collective decisions based on interstate negotiations are made.
Bulmer's analysis, unlike neofunctional logic, holds that the nation-state is the basic unit of the EC; the policymaking process follows the logic of domestic politics; and national governments hold key positions at the juncture of national and EC policies. National governments are often 'prisoners of domestic politics' and international circumstances. Each state has a different set of conditions that shape its interests, policy content, and policy style. European policy represents but one facet of a national polity's activities. (Bulmer, 1991: 148) The pattern of negotiations on EC issues at the domestic level of the member states determines progress on individual policy issues and on integration in general. The EC is not, according to Bulmer, an autonomous political system. (Bulmer, 1991:151) National governments have sought to retain their formal power through unanimity voting and in the EC Council.

Bulmer concludes that a two-tier bargaining model is a useful analytical device for EPC. Two-tier analysis enables us to conceptualize EFP as part of a political system (Jorgensen, 1993:226) with inputs from national actors and their preferences (governments, foreign ministries) in conjunction with domestic politics and from external stimuli (external actors, developments) and outputs or foreign policy actions and positions. In this way, analysts break free of the normative judgments associated with purely supranational/neofunctional and realist/intergovernmental approaches. Two-tier analysis seeks to understand why national governments adopt foreign policy positions in EC/CFSP. Bulmer sees the EC and CFSP are the same tier, representing the attempts of member governments to solve some problems they cannot solve separately. Thus Bulmer opposes a view of the EFP in which its EC and
CFSP pillars are clearly demarcated. By placing EPC/CFSP and the member states in a two-tier context, it is possible to proceed to use a two-tier bargaining approach to understand how decisions are made. (Bulmer, 1991: 89) Bulmer advocates examining EPC as part of a two-tier system of government because such scrutiny facilitates analysis of national foreign and EU policies which come into conflict at the European level.

Two-tier analysis has its critics. Smith (1996:9) argues that at a superficial level everything points to the dominance by governments to the exclusion of EC actors and procedures in EPC/CFSP. As mentioned earlier, Smith maintains that the focus on the role of governments and interstate bargains should not be at the expense of the impact of institutional structures, historical context, and the cumulative impact of deliberations on EPC/CFSP policymaking—impacts the members themselves neither desired nor expected! State preferences were often formed endogenously within the EPC system.

Smith maintains that domestic actors rarely had the opportunity or desire to ratify EPC agreements. Since national decisionmakers controlled the EPC agenda and deliberations always remain secret, there was little public knowledge of much less interest in EPC. Domestic actors had little involvement in the highly specialized work of diplomats. In other words, EPC was "not used as a forum for making side payments, threatening sanctions against each other, or linking issues into package deals that occurred in other EC policy sectors or during IGC" (Smith, 1996:9) The premium in EPC was to avoid power politics and confrontation during discussion. EPC became more directed toward problem solving, rather than on bargaining style of decisionmaking. Governments were not able to monopolize EPC to the extent suggested by
two-tier game and intergovernmental approaches. Administrative structure developed in a way to limit the abilities of heads of governments or their representatives to dominate normal policymaking. EPC outcomes became less based on ad hoc policy discussions than on socializing of lower level administrative officials in the member governments and their permanent representations to the EC in Brussels. By empowering and involving domestic bureaucrats in the EPC process, EPC helped create loyalties among foreign policymakers in the member states.

Supranational Institutionalism

Sandholtz and Zysman (1994:189) examine the run up to the SEA by grouping explanations drawn from domestic politics, national business and governing elites, European interest groups, and supranational institutions responding collectively to shifts in international politics and economics. The Japanese and American challenge to European commerce, technology, and competitiveness exposed many weaknesses in the EU economy and in the fragmented state of the customs union in the 1970s and 1980s. National business elites and their European-level interest groups and the European Commission began working together to find ways to make the EC more competitive. Changes in French economic policy by 1983 meant that the major European economies had converged around similar fiscal and monetary policies. The convergence of policies at the national levels coupled with the active support by European business elites of the leadership role played by the European Commission in fashioning proposals to respond to the external challenges, explain the White Paper of 1985 that served as the basis of the SEA and the 1992 program that governments agreed to at the 1986 IGC.
Thus Sanholtz and Zysman argue that recent integration is best viewed as bargaining between elites in EC institutions, European industry, and the member governments with the European Commission supplying most of the policy leadership.

Critical of the liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of 1992, Sandholtz and Zysman maintain that the 1992 program "did not bubble up" spontaneously from the national political context. Leadership came from outside the national setting, i.e., from the European Commission.

Sandholtz and Zysman naturally do not set out to explain EFP, but they did go some way in providing convincing explanations of how the EU can fashion a collective response to external stimuli. Students of EFP will want to further test supranational institutionalism in other areas of EU relations with the outside world.

**External Impact**

Only recently have scholars shifted their attention to the impact of EFP actions on the outside world (see Holland:1997 and Regelsberger, et al.:1997). What kind of actor is the EU in the world; to what extent is its presence felt in different areas of international relations; and to what extent does the EU as a collective act differently from normal state actors in the world? Three concepts help explain how the EU may be viewed outside the EU: Duchene's "civilian power"; Sjostedt's "actorness"; and Allen and Smith's "presence." Since they are neutral in terms of the neofunctional versus intergovernmental debate, they too offer useful insights.

**Civilian Power**

Duchene envisaged the EC, whose members have set aside the use and threat of force among themselves, as a model of reconciliation and peace
for other regions in the world. Civilian power was introduced by Duchene (1972; 1973) as a designation for the EC's unique role in the world. However, according to Hill (1990:41), Duchene was no pacifist. He expected the EC members to maintain their defensive postures. The EC could, however, become the first major area of the old world where the age-old problem of war and violence could be transformed. (Hill, 1990: 41)

Twitchett (1976:8) defined civilian power as an actor that has no military dimension but is able to influence states, global and regional organizations, international corporations, and other transnational bodies through diplomacy, economic resources, and legal considerations. Ginsberg (1989; 1991) catalogued 668 civilian foreign policy actions taken by the EC from 1958 to 1990, spanning the entire range of diplomatic activities, save defense.

Civilian power is discounted by the realist school in a world of power politics. It was very much a concept that reflected the atmosphere of the time; even Duchene noted that it was "soggy with good intentions." Bull is "bullish" in his criticism of civilian power (Bull, 1983: 115), arguing that

--the EC is not an actor in the international system and is not likely to become one unless it develops a common defense and strategic policy which is very uncertain;
--there is no supranational community in Western Europe but only a group of nation-states whose history is one of endemic mutual conflict; and
--any idea of the Western European nations constituting a security-community or area of peace is wishful thinking, if it means that war between them could not happen again, and not simply that it has not happened in recent decades. (Bull, 193: 163)

Civilian power analysis "comes closest, despite its current unfashionability, to rendering the truth about the EC and its international possibilities. Clearly the concept is inadequate...in its strong element of wish-fulfillment, in the assumptions it makes about the changing nature of influence in international relations, and in the possibility that it is
simply a contradiction in terms...Yet it is worth attempting to rehabilitate (the approach)...because it allows that the EC, and the kind of international relations which it conducts, is essentially _sui generis_, an unprecedented development in world history which must not be cramped by forcing it into inappropriate conceptual models derived from the study of nation-states." (Hill, 1990:54)

Allen and Smith suggest that the notion of civilian power is an attempt to give some focus to the "uncertainty about the credentials of the EC/EU as international actors." (Allen and Smith, 1996:11) Civilian power, like other concepts that attempt to describe the presence of the EU in the world, relies on assumptions about the context within which the EC/EU was located and about the character of the international arena. "The notion of a civilian power which could be seen positively could also be seen negatively as a mere rationalization of military impotence in the face of superpower predominance... (thus) it can be argued that there is at present no settled definition of Europe, and therefore that many of the traditional arguments about the EC/EU as an international actor are obsolete." (Allen and Smith, 1996:11)

On the contrary, Smith (1996), Feldman (1997), Long (in Holland:1997), and Ginsberg (1997) maintain that what makes the EU's impact on world politics so unique is the fact that the EU is not a military superpower. The EU should continue to do what it does well in international affairs: i.e., to foster the values of peace and reconciliation and respect for international law and human rights and to promote international peace and stability through economic development and democratization.

**Actoriness**

Sjostedt (1977) introduced—and Taylor (1982), Hill (1993), and Caporaso and Jupille (1996) revisited—the notion of the EC as an
international actor and the qualities of and prerequisites for international "actorness." Following Sjostedt, Hill defines an international actor as an entity which is (a) delimited from others and from its environment; (b) autonomous to make its own laws and decisions; and (c) in possession of certain structural prerequisites for international action (e.g., diplomatic agents, the legal basis to negotiate and enter into agreements with third parties). (Hill, 1993: 309) The concept of actorness steers away from the neofunctionalist-intergovernmental debate, as well as from the debate over whether or not the EC is a superpower, but does enable us to "chart the EC's changing role in the world." (Hill, 1993:309)

In their case study of EU environmental policy, Caporaso and Jupille propose three criteria for evaluating the EU's actor capacity, building upon Allen and Smith's work on presence: (a) authority—the legal competence to act; (b) autonomy—distinctiveness and independence from other actors; and (c) cohesion—the extent to which it acts in a unitary way externally. (Caporaso and Jupille, 1996:3) (10) The authors conclude that although the EC is technically the agent of its member states, it also demonstrates a certain measure of agency, evidenced by the European Court of Justice's expansion of EC external authority. This has given the EC a minimal means for external action and has encouraged its presence in global politics. The EC has been less effective in fostering the other two conditions for actor capacity—autonomy and cohesion, which have been much more resistant to the development of the EC as an international actor. (Caporaso and Jupille, 1996: 27)

Presence
Hill (1996:13) argued that true actoriness requires not only a clear identity and a self-contained decisionmaking system but also the practical capabilities to have effective policies. Although the EU falls short of anyone’s criteria for effective international actoriness, member states have established a collective presence in international relations. Allen and Smith (1990; 1996) introduced the notion of presence to explain the growing salience of the EU in the international system and to avoid the pitfalls of finding a definition for the international activity of an actor that is not a state. They argue that the EU’s presence in the international scene is significant. Although it possesses relatively few of the credentials of a unified actor, it has “considerable structure, salience, and legitimacy in processes of international politics.” (Allen and Smith, 1996:9) The EU is viewed as having the most tangible presence in the economic sphere. Whereas in the military sphere, the EU is viewed as having a largely intangible presence, in international politics, the EU is viewed as a shaper or filter, molding perceptions of policymakers and others, shaping collective actions and filtering out certain options.

Allen and Smith go on to ask, how does the EU make its presence felt? To what extent can it move from presence to purpose? The move from presence to purpose would require an institutional capacity to translate a required political will into action; a capacity to generate and coordinate decisions; and a capacity to mobilize resources to pay for actions. (Allen and Smith, 1996: 18-19) To pave the way for future thinking and research, Allen and Smith outline three difficult but necessary questions: (a) to what extent can the EU meet the external demand for its international presence?; (b) what is the EU’s capacity to
make its presence felt given that it is not a state and thus is limited?; and (c) is the EU capable of forming the collective will which is a prerequisite for taking responsibility?

Various students of EFP have applauded the notion of presence. The concept contributes to a "critical and nuanced analysis of (the EU's) presence in contemporary international politics and avoids both state-centric approaches and traditional concepts of power." (Jorgensen, 1994: 221) The notion of presence "gets us off the hook of analyzing EPC (now CFSP) in terms of sovereignty and supranationalism, which might lead us to suppose that there was in fact no EFP when common sense and the experience of other states tell us precisely the opposite." (Hill, 1993: 309) Presence emphasizes outside perceptions of the EC and the significant effects it has on both the psychological and operational environments of third parties. (Hill, 1993: 309) Presence is felt many different ways through the wide range of joint foreign policy activities in which the EC/EU are engaged (Ginsberg: 1989) but most scholars maintain that the EU's presence, while real, is incoherent. (Hill, 1995:13)

Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap

The capability-expectations gap that exists in practice has spurred scholars in recent years to recognize their own capability-expectations gap, i.e., the gap between their explanations and predictions of EFP. Scholars are now moving from establishing the existence of the EU as an important phenomenon in the world to evaluating its effectiveness. Before the capability-expectations gap can be narrowed, it has to be understood. To be understood, EPC/CFSP has to be measured. (Hill, 1988:215) To be measured, criteria need to be put
forward and agreed on by which the outputs of EPC and CFSP are evaluated against the objectives of the SEA and TEU.

The essay examined Allen and Smith's criteria for evaluating the EU's movement from presence to a sense of purpose in international relations in general and Caporaso and Jupille's criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of EC international environmental policy. Hill's proposed criteria (1988:215) would define and evaluate EPC in terms of:

--the relative weights of domestic and external pressure affecting EPC;
--extent to which the international system helps or hinder EPC;
--the interrelationship between EC and EPC activities;
--change in procedure and behavior initiated by the SEA (and by implication the TEU);
--managing interdependence on a global scale and a way of "conjoining economics and politics considerations while ruling out use of military force";
--offering a model of cooperation for other states in the international system; and
--balance between common regional interests and objectives, with those of international society more broadly defined.

Gordon (1996:8) introduces a set of criteria to evaluate CFSP's progress to date measured against the objectives of the TEU. To what extent:

--does CFSP contribute to common views;
--does CFSP promote or compel jointly implemented policy even when a single common view does not exist;
--does CFSP act as a binding institutional mechanism;
--does CFSP deal with all questions related to EU security;
--is CFSP integrated or intergovernmentalized;
--is CFSP global or regional;
--has CFSP been articulated or poorly explained;
--is CFSP military or civilian; and
--can CFSP deal with immediate crises as opposed to pursuing long-term goals.

Although analysis of EPC/CFSP based on Gordon's proposed criteria will ideally follow in the future, he remains skeptical that the EU will be able to meet the TEU objectives for a CFSP because it requires a pooling of sovereignty in areas that cut very deeply into what it is to be a state. Gordon set out the conditions under which EU members would
be willing to pool sovereignty in foreign and security policies.

(1996:6) The EU members pool sovereignty when:

--perceived gains of common action through the advantage of scale
outweigh the potential costs of lost sovereignty;
--government preferences or perceived national interests have converged
sufficiently so that the first condition holds (because lost
sovereignty is likely to matter less when EU member governments have
similar interests and ideology); and
--very particular interests of large states remain protected either
through the application of strict limits or conditions to the terms
of integration or through opting out of the state with the particular
interests.

Whether by offering a line of research questions, a set of
criteria for evaluation, or conditions for pooling sovereignty, EFP
analysts have begun to shift their focus of attention from identifying
the existence of the EU as a unique phenomenon in international
relations to evaluating the effectiveness of EFP actions.

**Bypassing the Liberal-Realist Divide**

In some of the member countries, the debate over the EU's future
is cast in terms of the oversimplified extremes of supranationalism or
nationalism when the truth is that the EU is neither a supranational nor
an intergovernmental body but one that combines elements of both. The
EU and EFP have always drawn on both the legitimacy and power of the
member states and the collective assets and interests of the common
institutions in which governments sit. This review has shown that
students of EFP are beginning to bridge the old divide between grand
single explanations of European integration--supranationalism and
realism, and their offsprings, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism
by:

--revising and applying old concepts (externalization);
--coupling concepts (liberal intergovernmentalism);
--bridging domestic and international levels of analysis (two-tier
bargaining);
--synthesizing concepts and levels of analysis (supranational
institutionalism);
---developing new concepts that offer alternative insights into what makes EFP "European" (European interests; Europeanization; external relations system);
---developing new concepts that facilitate investigation into what kind of actor the EU is and the extent to which it has an international presence (actorness; presence); and
---placing the EFP in its global environment (international systemic change).

The art of synthesis is difficult: "different theoretical parts are considered compatible and theoretical wholes are constructed from the parts. If, however, the recipe consists of a little neofunctionalism, some realism, and 500 grams of public choice theory, problems lie ahead." (Jorgensen, 1993:213) Naturally a balance must be struck between a theoretical a la carte approach and an overly general theory. This essay shows that a general theory of EFP cannot be deduced (12) given the historical uniqueness and infinite complexity of EFP. An inductive exercise is preferred because it allows for an incremental building of conceptual knowledge which must precede a full blown analytical-conceptual approach. In the future, a middle range or middle range theories of EFP may be induced from what we know of concepts but that projection goes beyond the confines of this essay.

Confronting the Theoretical Problematique

This essay began on a downbeat note about the theoretical state of the art but is ending on a more upbeat one. The extent to which there is a theoretical problématique, as earlier described, depends on one's expectations. If a theory of EFP is expected, then there will be disappointment and frustration. If one views EFP solely through the lenses of a neofunctionalist or realist intergovernmentalist, she or he will learn very little. Given how multidimensional EFP is, it may never lend itself to a general theory. If, however, a pretheoretical perspective is taken, then the field of inquiry looks quite different:
there is incremental learning. New and redefined concepts offer rich explanations of the inputs and outputs and decisionmaking processes of EFP. Efforts to develop criteria to evaluate the outputs of EFP measured against the objectives set out in the TEU promise to help narrow our understanding of the gap between capabilities and expectations. Although the linking of explanatory concepts into a meaningful analytical framework with a significant following is not yet in evidence, the field is moving slowly in that direction. This essay has shown that explanatory concepts, when categorized into various points along an input-output decisionmaking continuum, resonate more fully than when they are examined in isolation from one another. This inductive approach represents value added over single theories which are too general and single case studies which are too narrow. If EFP analysts can, as accurately as possible, conceptualize and evaluate the EU as an international actor/presence, they will go a long way in framing the policy problems facing CFSP.

Notes

(1) EFP refers to the formulation and execution of the foreign relations and foreign policy activities of both the European Community (EC) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The 1958 Rome Treaty empowers the EC to act in certain areas of international relations. The EC pillar of EFP operates on the basis of an integrated approach. Decisionmaking is shared between the member governments and the EC institutions and based on either qualified majority voting or on consensus (unanimity). An interstate accord in 1970 resulted in the creation of European Political Cooperation (EPC), an informal forum for foreign policy discussion and coordination, connected to but located completely outside EC law and institutions. The 1987 Single European Act (SEA) codified EPC's existence, placed it under the responsibility of the European Council, gave it a small secretariat, and obliged members to foreign policy consultations and coordination. EPC operated on a voluntary and intergovernmental basis: decisions were reached by consensus only. The 1993 Treaty on European Union (TEU) converted EPC into CFSP, brought the old EPC secretariat into the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, and placed the EC and CFSP pillars under the overall rubric of the new EU.

The author wishes to thank Alberta Sbragia, Karl Cerny, and Christopher Hill for their comments of an earlier incarnation of this
paper and Michael E. Smith for organizing the ECSA panel at which this paper was presented.

(2) Jorgensen (1993: 211) opines that the study of EC external relations has established itself as a "relatively autonomous research agenda." Wessels (1994: 9) concludes that an academic community of those whose research interest is EFP has been created.

(3) From 1958 to 1990, there were at least 688 foreign policy actions of the EC and (since 1970) EPC. See Ginsberg (1989; 1991).

(4) This observation is based on the author's 1993 interviews of national officials involved in the TEU negotiations from Germany, Ireland, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Luxembourg, United Kingdom.

(5) Timing was not on the side of the CFSP given the aftermath of the first Danish "no" vote on TSEU ratification, the near-ratification miss in the French electorate, the growing renationalization of EU policy spheres, the anti-European sentiments that have held captive British EU policy, the fallout among the members over how to cope with ex-Yugoslavia, and high unemployment are not conducive to cooperation in such a sensitive sector.

(6) Smith (1996: 33) asserts that the demand for consensus in foreign policy cannot and should not be challenged directly. "Informal norms and practices must develop first, then they may be able to be institutionalized, not the other way around...the danger is that a premature or heavy handed attempt to create a federal system of EU foreign policymaking will lead to the politicization of all EU affairs and even the destruction of all gains achieved." Thus sovereignty over foreign policy cannot always be confronted. "It must be subverted in some cases, through back channels and at lower levels of administration, so that states find themselves producing common interests and conducting joint operations even while they loudly proclaim their sovereign right to refrain from doing so. Member states shout their loudest at an IGC where the system is stripped bare of its informal normative foundations and debate becomes a public ideological battle..."

(7) Bulmer challenges Weiler and Wessels' plea for a general theory of EPC. Instead Bulmer welcomes the lack of a general theory. "The whole enterprise would appear to be about drawing analytical boundaries and creating an exclusion zone around EPC accessible only to EPC practitioners and analysts." (Bulmer:1990)

(8) Some definitions are nondefinitions: they tell us what the EU is not: it is neither a state nor a traditional international organization; neither an international regime nor a non-state actor (Allen: 1978; Ginsberg: 1989). It is not a purely diplomatic phenomenon (Allen and Smith: 1990). Others define the EU as a "civilian power" (Duchene: 1972) which some contest (Bull: 1982). Allen and Smith (1996:3) refer to the EC as a "variable and multidimensional presence," playing an active role in some areas of international interactions (economics and politics) and less so in others (military). Hill defines the EU as a "semi-supranational entity working alongside sovereign states," and as a "genuine international actor in some respects but not all" (Hill, 1993: 308-309).
(9) Foreign policy analysis and comparative foreign policy continue on the whole to have trouble recognizing EFP for what it is given the tradition and expectation that only single states may be international political actors. In his 536-page volume on comparative foreign policy, Hermann (1987) makes only one incidental reference to the EC; although Macridis (1992) has included a chapter on the EC/EU in the last three editions of his book on comparative foreign policies. Allen stress the difficulties experienced when one tries to analyze foreign policy outside the reassuring framework provided by the nation-state (Allen, 1978: 147). Karns and Mingst (in Hermann: 1987) hypothesize that nation-states are influenced by their participation in intergovernmental organizations with consequences for both the substance and processes of domestic and foreign policies and that the impact of IGOs on all states will grow.

(10) Recent surveys of the integration theory literature include Caporaso and Keeler (1995) and Ray and Smith (1993).

(11) In their case study of the global hazardous waste regime, EC authority was challenged, which led it to act against itself. When EC cohesion was weak, its own institutions sought a wider degree of autonomy, although to little effect. When its cohesion was strong it acted effectively on the global stage. In the case of the Earth Summit, EC authority was unclear, because of the wide-ranging nature of the discussions, and on this weak basis there was little room for autonomous action by EC institutions. Lack of cohesion proved to be a decisive determinant of EC capacity to act in this case, for where it lacked the EC was either driven to embrace least-common denominator positions under pressure from third parties, or its member states were driven to unilateral action outside the EC context. (Caporaso and Jupille, 1996:26)

(12) Jorgensen (1997:4) differs. He maintains that to answer the question of the impact of national foreign policies on EPC/CFSP we need the aid of both deductive and inductive approaches.

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