

**IBERIA AND EUROPE: A POST-COLD WAR UNDERSTANDING IN
SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE DEFENSE POLICIES?**

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***Paper presented at the European Community Studies Association International Meeting, 29 May to 1 June 1997 in Seattle, Washington, USA.**

INTRODUCTION

Spain and Portugal share a common geographic position on the Iberian Peninsula yet have rarely articulated similar defense and security policies. The purpose of this paper is to examine Spanish and Portuguese defense/security policies within the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the West European Union (WEU). As NATO and the WEU adapt to the exigencies of the post-Cold War era, so too must Spain and Portugal in Europe's southern flank. This is especially important given the Iberian Peninsula's geostrategic position and its proximity to Northern Africa. In a more unified Europe seeking consensus on building a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Spain and Portugal can no longer have their backs to each other on issues of defense and security.¹

The historical record shows that Spain and Portugal have often had conflicting defense and security objectives. Yet, with the end of the Cold War, what possibilities exist today and in the near future for Spain and Portugal to articulate common defense/security postures in Europe? While different historical paths have informed how Spain and Portugal sought to protect their territorial integrity, their joint admission into the European Community in 1986 means that today both participate in the same extra-Iberian relations. Concomitantly, both countries have more coordinated intra-Iberian relations due to the dynamic of a more integrated European Union. Spain and Portugal will have to adopt a new style of bilateral relations in the area of defense as well. Both are members of NATO and the WEU. This means that for the first time in history, Spain and Portugal are members of the same alliances. The end of the Cold War in Europe and the European's desire to create a coherent security and defense identity could possibly mark a new beginning in Iberian defense relations.

For the first time, Spain and Portugal--often no longer with their backs to one another--may have a unique opportunity to begin to cooperate on coordinating common foreign and security policies within the European Union framework and NATO. In fact, I shall argue that it will be in both countries' interests (not to mention the EU's as well) to do so--however difficult and costly reaching agreements may be--and

that serious attempts to build consensus will be vitally necessary to secure Europe's southern flank. This paper will be organized into the following sections: (1) Historical background outlining how divergent Spain and Portugal's defense policies have been and why; (2) Spain and Portugal's relations with NATO during the Cold War; (3) Spain and Portugal's relations in WEU and CFSP; and (4) Spain and Portugal's relations with NATO after the end of the Cold War. The conclusion will summarize what the future will hold for greater cooperation between Spain and Portugal within NATO and the WEU.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND²

Both Portugal and Spain were once powerful colonial powers with empires spreading the breadth of the globe. However, these Iberian countries have over centuries had to deal with the demise of their power and to find their places in emerging new world orders. Even though Spain and Portugal share a common historical path during the last hundred years--decolonization, economic underdevelopment, political instability--leading to a bloody civil war in the case of Spain--and long experience with authoritarian rule, both countries took different policies concerning how best to protect their national security interests. Portugal, cognizant of the clearly stronger power of her neighbor, has historically formulated a foreign security policy designed to differentiate its actions from what Spain was doing strategically. Such a policy was easy for the Portuguese to pursue independently as Spain over the course of this century has often been isolated from events happening around her--whether voluntarily pursued for domestic reasons or intentionally imposed from the outside international community. Spain's legacy of latent anti-Americanism has also helped to differentiate itself from Portugal who has traditionally preferred good relations with the dominant naval power, be that the British or the Americans.

Portugal entered World War I on the side of the Allied Powers in 1916 while Spain remained neutral. Both countries were theoretically "neutral" during World War II even though these positions were modified as the war progressed. For example, Portugal allowed Great Britain, and later on the United States, to use the Azores beginning in October 1943 while still professing to be "continentally neutral" and

then established positive relations with the United States as the rising hegemon after WWII. Spain under Franco, on the other hand, “modified” its preferences for the Axis powers after 1941 when it became clear that Nazi Germany would not win the war. At that point, Franco began to emphasize his country’s “anti-communism” position to win favor with the Allied powers. Such differences were confirmed when the Cold War began as Portugal became a founding member of NATO in 1949 and Spain was forced to continue a policy of isolationism as it remained internationally ostracized from 1945-1953.³ Portugal’s foreign policy has traditionally been characterized as “Atlanticist”. For some geostrategic thinkers, this Atlantic identity included an important “African dimension”. It also identified Spain as the major threat to Portugal’s survival and included a defense alliance with the predominant maritime power as vital to the country’s security.⁴ Portugal’s entrance into NATO, therefore, confirms the country’s historic tendency to enter into alliances with external forces to counterbalance Spain’s power on the peninsula. For most of the Cold War, Portugal’s foreign policy has been described as unilateral and, in general, isolationist towards European politics.⁵

Curiously enough, both countries sought special bilateral defense agreements with the United States as well—even if for different reasons. Portugal began its bilateral defense relationship with the US as early as November 1944 over the use of the geostrategic Azores islands during WWII. The agreement was extended several times until a new American-Portuguese agreement was signed on 5 January 1951. This represented a mutual aid and defense agreement and allowed the Americans use of the Lajes airport in the Azores (Terceira). The emergence of the Soviet threat forced Salazar into recognizing the hegemonic position of the US after WWII. Membership in NATO and the special bilateral agreement with the US helped the Salazar regime adapt to the post-1945 world order. This “special” bilateral relationship with the US within NATO granted the non-democratic regime international legitimacy, while at the same time allowing it to be at least tolerated by the NATO allies. In Spain, Franco sought a bilateral defense arrangement with US and the “Pacto de Madrid” was signed in 1953 granting the US use of four military

bases on Spanish territory. By establishing relations with the United States, Franco secured two important objectives. First of all, the agreement granted Franco the international legitimacy he needed in order to be re-admitted into the family of nations from which he had been ostracized since the end of WWII. Secondly, the agreement gave Spain badly needed financial support and led the way to Spain's economic opening up--thereby securing Franco's domestic base of support.

Prior to the Portuguese revolution of 1974, this small Iberian country's primary security objective was to fight to keep control over its colonial empire. Beginning in the early 1960s, Portuguese military forces were fighting wars in Guinea, Angola and Mozambique. Portugal's clear intent to maintain its overseas empire by force--after many European powers had already divested themselves of their colonies--was often severely criticized by the United Nations, her NATO allies and even the United States. While Portugal was fighting a three-front colonial war, Spain began to open up economically and enjoyed significant growth rates in the 1960s--second only to that of Japan. The events of 25 April 1974 led to the end of the Salazar-Caetano authoritarian regime and the beginning of the process of decolonization. Once Portugal and Spain began their transitions to democracy in the mid-1970s, both sought membership into the elite clubs of Western Europe, including their economic, political and defense organizations. Accession into such prestigious groups would help solidify these nascent democratic systems emerging on the Iberian peninsula and at the same time confirm these countries' commitment to fulfilling their European vocation. No longer would Europe stop at the Pyrenees.

Over the course of most of this century, Portugal has historically always had her back to Europe as her neighboring countries--except for Spain--represented development, democracy and decolonization. After the demise of the old authoritarian order in 1974, Portugal sought to establish closer ties with her European neighbors. Membership in the European Community was seen as an invaluable way to help strengthen this small country's position in the international arena.⁶ For the Portuguese, establishing solid relations with both the United States and the European Union were and remain complementary--not

mutually exclusive--to help Portugal to realize its interests in world politics. Some did fear that membership in Europe's elite clubs would limit Portugal's freedom of action and result in a gradual drifting away from the Luso-phone world--some even going so far as to fear the country's very survival as an independent entity on the Iberian Peninsula. On the other hand, there were those who strongly believed that membership in the EU did not question the country's Atlantic vocation. In fact, participation in the EU broadened Portugal's foreign policy horizons to include a "Euro-Atlantic" emphasis--a policy based on Portugal's European roots and Atlantic posture, though not exclusively North Atlantic. This is how the Portuguese synthesize their country's role in the dynamic international structure of state power relations today.⁷

Spain began its smooth and peaceful transition to democracy after the death of Franco in November 1975. Led by the cautious hand of King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez, Spain's transition was built on consensus, compromise and stability. The Spanish did not want to replicate the complicated and uncertain course of Portugal's leftist dominated change in regime. Throughout both these transition processes--specifically between March and November 1975--Spain became more important for the US in terms of helping to fulfill important strategic functions on the peninsula. In May 1975, the United States even went so far as to propose that Spain replace Portugal in NATO.⁸ This was due to the internal problems plaguing Portugal at the time, namely the radicalization of the transition and the domination of communist forces. Portuguese relations with the US were put "on hold" (i.e. renegotiation of the Azores agreement) as successive governments were not able to articulate a coherent foreign policy agenda. Meanwhile, the US and Spain renewed their bilateral relationship with a treaty signed in 1976. The United States consolidated what it referred to as a "Zone of Common Interests" with Spain--a maritime area including Portugal, the area of the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, as well as the Balearic, Madeira and Canary Islands. This process of normalizing Spain's relations with US and eventual incorporation into NATO in 1982 came to produce new preoccupations for Portugal's external security. Questions

immediately arose as to what would be the two country's strategic functions on the peninsula. Debate in Portugal began to highlight what was perceived to be its future "inferiority" *vis a vis* Spain within NATO and its bilateral agreements with the US. It is within this context that Portugal reasserted an "Atlanticist" foreign policy. Such a position would help Portugal reaffirm its "special" relation with the United States and, most importantly, serve to differentiate it from Spain. Legacies of anti-Americanism in Spain prevented her from using the US as a counterbalance to Portugal on the peninsula. Instead, Spain has, and will continue to use, the European option as a way to assert Spain's power and influence not only on the peninsula, but on the continent as well.⁹

Over the past twenty years, Portuguese and Spanish positions in these organizations have not always been the same, even if they have become increasingly convergent. Membership in the EU has brought these two neighbors closer together than they had ever been for centuries. For the first time since the end of WWII, these Iberian countries now share the same fundamental options in foreign defense and security policies--especially after Spain joined NATO. Specific bilateral concerns between the two countries are now to be worked out within a multilateral framework. Even though Portugal still feels the need to differentiate itself from its powerful neighbor, both countries recognize that it will be in European fora that their individual national interests can best be fulfilled. That means Spain and Portugal will be willing to compromise and build consensus on issues deemed important to both.

Each has deep ties with Europe but also close cultural and historical links to other parts of the world--Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. However, as Europe becomes more international in its discourse (not merely in economic terms), the more Spain and Portugal's own foreign policy objectives could be met by the European Union. Most importantly, these two Iberian countries will find more reasons to cooperate as they are concerned about striking a balance between the Union's eastward and southward priorities after the end of the Cold War. These traditionally isolationist countries must now learn how to coordinate their security concerns within NATO and the WEU. Both must learn how to act

on multilateral issues within these institutions in order to meet their individual security and defense needs. This will be the greatest challenge to Spain and Portugal in the near future.

Portugal and Spain's relationships with the United States will also take on new forms. The United States has recognized the need to establish a new European security structure and has supported a more independent role for the WEU.¹⁰ As articulated in the Transatlantic Declaration (1995), both sides have agreed to consult each other in all important questions of common economic, security and political interests. Portugal and Spain will find that their relations with the United States will become more "multilateral" and will no longer be secured solely on bilateral military base agreements.

THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND NATO DURING THE COLD WAR

Portugal has been a full participating member since the Alliance's founding in 1949.¹¹ Membership in NATO helped this small Iberian country differentiate itself from its larger neighbor on the peninsula. Portugal's main role in NATO has been providing access to facilities for specific allies or to NATO in general, including air bases, fuel and ammunition bunkers, communications networks, and the subordinate command located outside Lisbon in Oeiras. In fact, Portugal's role in the Alliance eventually became more important--relative to its strength--given the absence of Spain in NATO and France's withdrawal from the integrated military command structure in 1966.

A curious feature of Portugal's integration into NATO is that its area of responsibility did not include all of what the Portuguese refer to as their "strategic triangle"--the Azores, Madeira and continental Portugal. Portugal is the only NATO country whose territory (land and sea) falls under different Supreme Allied Commanders. In 1967, NATO set up a principle subordinate command (PSC) in Portugal (COMIBERLANT) under the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) based in Oeiras. However, in 1982--coinciding with Spain's entrance into NATO--the status of this command was upgraded to a major subordinate command (MSC) with a Portuguese Vice Admiral named as Commander-in-Chief. The name was changed to Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area (CINCIBERLANT).

This position was previously filled by an American rear admiral who was also the head of the Military Assistance Advisory group in Lisbon.

IBERLANT is the only MSC in Europe not under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). This was because its primary role was to defend the Atlantic from both north and south, as well as into and out of the Mediterranean. Portugal's NATO command area of influence, therefore, extended from the north of Portugal to the Tropic of Cancer, and from the Portuguese border to a line approximately 500 nautical miles seaward. This means that IBERLANT did not control the Azores, mainland Portugal and its coastal waters. The Azores fell within the area of responsibility of WESTLANT under a US admiral based in Norfolk. NATO operations in the Azores fulfilled the important function of monitoring Soviet nuclear submarine activity in the Western Atlantic. The air defense of mainland Portugal falls under the Portuguese Air Defense Sector (POADS) which is subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) through CINCIBERLANT.

Throughout the 1980s, the Portuguese pressured her NATO allies to change IBERLANT's area of responsibility to include all the geography of their "strategic triangle". In 1988 IBERLANT was reconfigured to include the Azores and the ocean around them out to twelve nautical miles given Portuguese pressure. Some noted that the change was due to Spain's decision to remain in NATO following the 1986 referendum. IBERLANT remains under the Supreme Allied Commander in the Atlantic (SACLANT).¹² The successful integration of Portugal's "strategic triangle" under the same NATO command structure represents a part of the country's attempt to realize its Atlantic projection. However, the problem of the Portuguese military non-presence in area still must be resolved as it is the army, and not the navy and air force, which continues to be the primary recipient of resources and personnel.¹³

All Portuguese military and political elites agree that CINCIBERLANT remains important for Portugal, especially given the fact there is a Portuguese as commander.¹⁴ Portugal's geostrategic position for the Alliance grew in importance as neither France nor Spain are part of the integrated military command

structures of NATO. The Oeiras base was the only NATO command center in the region. What this meant--for no specific merit of the Portuguese except for their willingness to cooperate fully in NATO--was that Portugal enjoyed greater influence in NATO decision-making circles than would have otherwise been the case. The Portuguese co-located at CINCIBERLANT their naval command to take advantage of the location and the modern communications system Oeiras provided. This "dual-hat" strategy was meant to save time as it would not be necessary to have to move between commands in an emergency. It also allowed for improved and upgraded command and control facilities (at no extra expense to Portugal) which both NATO and Portugal could use. Portugal also received improved military assets and became more involved in NATO military exercises. Even if Spain and France "normalize" their relations with NATO's military structures today, Portugal will still enjoy the advantage of having participated in NATO commands and maneuvers for over 45 years.

Several important foreign policy objectives informed the Portuguese in this realignment of responsibilities within NATO structures especially as the Cold War came to an unexpected end. The most important had to do with Portugal's relationship with the US via the link with SACLANT. Portugal viewed its continued links with the US as fundamental to counterbalance the economic and diplomatic strength of a unified Germany as well as the EU's looking to Central and East Europe as the process of European integration becomes "wider". If the EU's security spectrum does not stop at the Atlantic but extends across it to the North Atlantic, then Portugal is in the middle of the stage and not a small country on the distant edge of Europe. Cognizant that it is a small country--especially if the EU enlarges--Portugal wants to increase its weight in the European theater by strengthening its relationship with the US.¹⁵ Such a priority will become even more important as NATO structures are reorganized for the next century and as Spain and France fully participate in the Alliance' military structures. Not wanting to be eclipsed by neighboring powers clearly stronger than itself, Portugal wants to play a "hinge" role through its geographical location between the US and the rest of Europe--even though the articulation of Portuguese

foreign policy will be more “Euro-Atlantic” and not solely “Atlanticist.”

Spain was not a founding member of the NATO alliance. In fact, it was argued that as the Franco regime was not democratic, Spain could not be considered for membership--a fact overlooked obviously in the case of Salazar’s authoritarian regime in Portugal. The question of Spain’s membership in NATO, therefore, is not considered seriously until after Franco dies and a change in regime begins in 1975. During the transition to democracy, Spanish political and military elites emphasized more the renegotiation of the bilateral defense agreement with the United States than to seek entrance into NATO. However, the course of domestic events would soon change political leaders minds in the early 1980s. Spain at that time was going through a dramatic period in the process of democratic consolidation--economic problems, daily terrorist attacks, establishment of autonomous regions, and growing unrest among the Spanish military. After the failed 23 February 1981 military coup, the center-right Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) government under Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo solicited Spain’s entrance into NATO at the end of that year. It was thought that by having the Spanish military participate in NATO, they would soon adopt democratic ideas, be subjected to civilian control, and no longer threaten the country’s weak democratic institutions. Despite the fact that little political consensus emerged among the major parties at the time--the Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Communist Party (PCE) were vehemently against it--Spain became the sixteenth member of NATO in May 1982.¹⁶

The upcoming elections held in October 1982 gave a majority victory to the PSOE and Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez immediately froze Spain’s further integration into the Alliance structures until the holding of a national referendum. The PSOE’s electoral platform emphasized a deliberately ambiguous position of “OTAN, de entrada, no” which over time was gradually changed to “OTAN, si” given the exigencies of *realpolitik*.¹⁷ Wanting to become members of the European Community, Spain could not enjoy solely the economic benefits of realizing its European vocation without helping to contribute to the region’s defense as well. Therefore, the PSOE eventually held the promised referendum on 12 March

1986--after having already become full members of the EC--and nearly 53% of those voting approved of the government's position.¹⁸ The people supported Spain's membership in the Alliance with certain conditions: no integration into the military structures; no deployment of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil; and the progressive reduction of American troop presence in Spain.

The following principles describe Spain's unique relationship to NATO from 1986 to the present time: (1) member of the Atlantic Council with full rights; (2) participation in the Nuclear Planning Groups, Defense Planning Committee and the Military Committee; (3) participation in other NATO committees such as civil defense, budget, etc.; (4) contribution to NATO's military budget reflecting its nonintegration into the military command structures; and (5) participation with NATO forces in the integrated military command structures through a system of "coordination agreements." Spain's Ambassador to NATO, Jaime Ojeda (1982-1985), included these "coordination agreements" as an interesting way to have Spain's troops participate in the Alliance's integrated military exercises.¹⁹ This meant that Spain could incorporate its troops into Alliance maneuvers by relinquishing its operative control and putting them under the disposition of NATO commands. This strange arrangement was more juridical than operative, and in this way, Spain was a full participant--unlike France--in the Alliance's defense committees.²⁰

The Socialist government had defended that a stronger defense relationship with Europe would be one way to decrease Spain's dependence on the United States. Even though the NATO question had been resolved, Prime Minister Gonzalez began to develop the objective of a European defense based on the WEU. Spain and Portugal join the WEU in 1988. At the same time, Gonzalez initiated bilateral talks with the United States to overcome Spain's problem of dependency on the dominant hegemon. By 1988 Spain and the United States sign their first inter pares agreement and the US began to reduce troop commitments in Spain. By 1994 all bases were turned over to the Spanish. Spain has always had problems finding its place in the Cold War NATO structures and dealing with the dominant position of the United States. Yet, Spain was allowed to pursue its own model of continuation in NATO which some allies classified as

confusing. Spain was often viewed as a “free rider and reluctant partner” within NATO circles.²¹ With the end of the Cold War, Spain foresees greater opportunities to play a more significant role in contributing to Europe’s defense. What remains to be defined at this point is how that role will be played. As will be seen later in this paper, Portuguese and Spanish cooperation will be necessary to define a coherent defense and security role for both within the organizational structures of the “new” NATO.

PORTUGAL AND SPAIN THE WEST EUROPEAN UNION²²

The West European Union was recently revived in order to help coordinate European Community security and defense cooperation and to strengthen European links to NATO. The WEU comes out of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 whose founding members were Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Holland and England. The 1954 Paris Agreements revised the Brussels Treaty--thereafter calling it the West European Union--which allowed for the admission of Italy and West Germany. As the United States consolidated its position within NATO during the Cold War, it was NATO and not the WEU which assumed full responsibility for western collective defense. Yet, during the period between 1954-1973, the WEU adopted a political role to help coordinate European Community-Great Britain relations. After Britain became a member of the EC in 1973, the role of the WEU reduced substantially. It was revived in 1984 as a way to help define a European security identity and to produce a gradual harmonization of member states’ defense policies. The Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht in 1991 designated the WEU as the defense arm of the EU and an important part of the Treaty’s second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy.²³ The WEU today is to play two important roles: to be the defense arm of the EU and the European pillar of NATO.

As Spain and Portugal were not members of the European Community, they were not offered membership in the WEU. However, soon after becoming members of the European Community, Spain and Portugal opted to also join the West European Union. Their treaties of accession were signed on 14 November 1988 and were finally ratified on 27 March 1990. From a European perspective, the end of the

Cold War was to breathe new life in to the WEU. At the Lisbon Conference of 1995, the WEU set up a permanent military staff in Brussels. The WEU does not have a standing army but does have access to operational units. These include two forces, one of light brigades, the European Rapid Reaction Force (EUROFOR), and another of naval units, the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR). In the event of an emergency, WEU forces would be formed by drawing units from national forces. EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR are “answerable...as a priority” to the WEU (Forces Available to the WEU--FAWEU) for operations in areas of crisis management, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping--the so-called Petersburg tasks.²⁴ Both Spain and Portugal participate in these forces. NATO could also draw upon these forces if needed.

In the past, WEU joint collective actions have been limited and not very significant. For example, WEU treaty sanctions concerted European actions outside the NATO area of operation. WEU ships were sent to the Persian Gulf in 1987-88 to ensure freedom of navigation and to sweep the area of mines. The US supported this mission and it was hoped that the WEU would then be invested with a new authority and international prestige. This latter hope, however, has yet to be realized. When the Yugoslav crisis broke out in 1992, the WEU failed to react. The WEU did follow UN Security Council resolutions and sent naval units to the Adriatic Sea to enforce the arms embargo against the former Yugoslav republics and to ensure the economic embargo dictated against Serbia-Montenegro. Yet such “military” efforts did little to stop the war waging in Europe’s backyard for over three years. Despite attempts by the EU to strengthen the WEU, it is clear that even after the end of the Cold War, the Europeans still look to the United States (be it in NATO or any other intergovernmental organization) to lead in regional defense issues.

It was against this reality that one Spanish military thinker expressed his reservations about WEU initiatives:

There are three basic problems the question of the WEU raises, and upon which it is essential to reflect: (1) there is a lack of institutional definition regarding its nature, objectives, capacities, and relations with the rest of the organizations that form the latticework of European security; (2) it is severely limited politically as it cannot reach decisions about major security challenges and (3) the WEU suffers military limitations that incapacitate it for any action not having the support of NATO or the US.²⁵

These limitations are understandable given that most European countries--including France--agree that NATO remains the primary instrument for collective defense in Europe. But, at the same time, most European countries want the WEU to some day bear that responsibility. And here is the problem: so long as NATO is strong and the Americans are willing to defend Europe, the EU member countries simply do not have any strong incentives to build an independent, credible and strong WEU. This conundrum becomes even more problematic today as countries want to cut and not increase government spending--especially in the area of defense. If EU members want a defense organization independent of NATO, they will simply have to spend more money.

The European Union countries are also trying to deal with the relationship between the WEU and the EU. Defining adequately and clearly this linkage will be important as the WEU modified Brussels Treaty is due to expire in 1998. As early as 1990 the WEU members began to debate seriously the linkage between the EU and the WEU. It was even proposed that the competencies of the WEU be absorbed by the EU. At that point the EU members were finalizing negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty which included a second pillar on developing a common foreign and security policy. Some members believed that the WEU could one day turn into the military arm of the Union.²⁶ However, divisions emerged among members over the inherent characteristics of the WEU--would it become a supranational institution like the EU or could it remain intergovernmental? As a small country seeking to preserve its interests, Portugal has continuously opted for the WEU to remain intergovernmental, thereby preserving the "one country, one vote" principle. Spain, on the other hand, has not hidden its aspirations of being a "big" actor in Europe and has sought to make the WEU function more like a supranational institution.

Other issues also divided the discussion. Great Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal and Ireland rejected an absorption of the WEU into the EU, fearing a weakening of the NATO Alliance and America's commitment to defend the continent. They wanted to strengthen the links between the Alliance and WEU while at the same time having the WEU maintain its organizational autonomy. These countries rejected making the WEU an executive organ of the EU implementing decisions taken by the Council--especially if veto powers were taken away. Germany and France were in favor of gradually integrating the WEU into the Union's institutional framework. Spain generally supported the Franco-German initiative but with some differences. Madrid wanted to strengthen the defense role of the EU by having a more flexible decision making process (i.e. voting by qualified majority and not unanimously as the Portuguese had wanted) and by granting the European Council an eminent function in defining CFSP. The Portuguese began to express reluctant attitudes towards the realization of a CFSP.²⁷ Clearly, a division had emerged between "Europeanists and Atlanticists" within the EU.

Further differences arose over the perennial debate between large and small states in the EU. Portugal, for example, wanted all states equal in CFSP leading to a specific quorum of member states which have to agree to implementing "a joint action" in Article J.3 of the Treaty. Spanish leader Felipe Gonzalez, however, presented in 1993 a proposal for the creation of a directorate including the major EU countries which earned him the title of "deGaulle of the South." Most importantly, this act illustrated Spain's claim to be a big country--especially for her Iberian neighbors. On this issue, Spain and Portugal disagree. However, both countries will do anything to prevent being marginalized from EU politics and will reluctantly come to some agreements. Both want to be at the heart of the EU as proof of fulfilling their European vocations.

It will, however, become more difficult for Spain and Portugal to ensure their full participation in all EU arenas--political, economic, monetary, defense, judicial, etc. As the EU becomes more differentiated, Spain and Portugal must force themselves to keep up with the process of integration in all its

varying dimensions. Since both these Iberian countries consider themselves “Europeanists”--though in different ways--this could lead to disappointment and a certain redefinition of their role and position in Europe, maybe even affecting participation in common defense and security policies.

Despite these obvious differences, the WEU/EU countries began meeting in “intergovernmental conferences” (IGC) on Political Union to work out their differences. The first official convocation was declared in Rome in December 1990. At that point it was agreed that the EU would respect ties with the Atlantic Alliance as well as the traditional foreign policy positions of some member states (i.e. Ireland and Austria’s neutrality). Discussion began on the concept of “mutual assistance” as well as the future status of the WEU. At that point, the EU members envisioned the WEU as a “cooperation channel between political union and NATO.”²⁸

Spanish leaders have traditionally been aligned with those who wanted a common foreign policy as an expression of European union--“integrationists”--not those who desired an agreement of sovereign states to coordinate foreign policies--“cooperators”--such as the Portuguese. Once the EU enlarged to include Austria, Sweden and Finland, Spain supported a deepening of EU institutions, especially in terms of CFSP. Several reasons informed this position: (1) to increase efficiency and cohesion (need greater economic and social cohesion); (2) to ensure democracy and effectiveness (stress democratic nature of institutions and preserve the relative political weight of country members); and (3) to provide a capacity for international initiative (create CFSP).²⁹ Spain saw the creation of CFSP as a counterpart to the enlargement process. Most importantly, as the Cold War came to an end, Spain saw the need for the EU to create defense tools to deal with crises alone, especially given European failures in the former Yugoslavia. Spain sees the enlargement of the WEU as possible and desirable, but it “must be guided by the notion of convergence towards the EU.”³⁰

While the Spanish look to Europe to fulfill their defense and security agenda, the Portuguese look to the US as a crucial factor in maintaining an inter-European equilibrium and security on the continent, as

well as a way to bolster its position within the EU. Along with Great Britain, the Netherlands and Italy, Portugal remains more attached to the Alliance and less committed to the creation of a strong European defense identity. At IGC discussions, Portugal has continuously argued that the fundamental pillar of European defense remains NATO and that any moves toward establishing a European defense identity within the EU should not affect the transatlantic relationship. The Portuguese want the WEU to be kept as an autonomous organization that would serve as a bridge between NATO and the EU.³¹ The WEU should at an early stage serve as an organ of elaborating and defining a CFSP, guided by directives of the European Council where each country would retain veto rights. The administrative bodies of the WEU have already been moved from London to Brussels which many saw as a first step in the WEU's future integration into the organs of the European Union. At this time, the WEU is revising its existing structures to make it more operational and to help in the formulation of a CFSP. It is already assumed that the European Council will define those policy areas subject to a common policy. The key for the Portuguese is to keep the WEU intergovernmental and for all countries to maintain their veto rights.

Atlanticists in Portugal have slowly begun to accept the development of a security and defense dimension of the EU which would be entrusted to the WEU. However, they maintain the reservation that relations with the Atlantic Alliance not be affected and that the American presence in Europe remain intact. The WEU, therefore, should be redesigned to establish close links with NATO, to deal with European defense matter and to have the Union serve as a bridge between both spheres. Some progress has been made in this area. At the Foreign Minister meeting in March 1991 during the discussion of the possibilities of creating a CFSP, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg and Greece supported the Franco-German proposal supporting a stronger move toward creating a European defense identity and the use of majority voting in decision-taking. Great Britain, Denmark and Portugal held a more reserved position. Ireland has traditionally wanted to maintain its neutrality and the Netherlands stressed the importance of keeping those American ties in Europe.

At the NATO summit in Rome in November 1991, the adoption of the “Alliance’s New Strategic Concept” noted that a European security and defense identity was welcomed but always respecting the Atlantic ties. In the final communique of the North Atlantic Council meeting in Copenhagen in June 1991 the building of CFSP involving the WEU was no longer rejected under the condition that the essential function of the Alliance would not be impaired. It was left to the Europeans to decide “what arrangements are needed for the expression of a common foreign and security policy and defense role-taking into account the necessary transparency and complementarity between the 15 and the WEU on the one side, and NATO on the other.”³²

Under the Portuguese Secretary General of the WEU (Jose Cutileiro), Portugal has set a goal to increase the WEU’s operational and military capabilities. The WEU lacks the lift, command-and-control, and intelligence resources necessary to organize a successful out-of-area operation independently. It has been suggested that the EU hold jurisdiction over all WEU tasks other than collective defense--meaning only those concerning the Petersburg tasks. This would allow EU’s non-aligned countries to join a European common defense structure without changing their neutral status. Notwithstanding such proposals, the WEU is still not operational. The point remains that the Europeans in general have not been able to develop a common approach to Europe’s overall security interests, not to mention defining the elements of a common defense policy. It is understandable, therefore, that within that context Spain and Portugal may still not share similar defense interests.

Under the previous PSD government (Minister of Defense Nogueira), the Portuguese wanted to have a more active role in WEU, even to allow for the participation of NATO forces in WEU operations. Their fight for the Secretary General position--curiously enough against a Spanish candidate (Enrique Baron Crespo)--showed the importance of the WEU in Portuguese security and defense options. By 1994, the Portuguese had realized that EU membership and the Eastern evolution of the EU had begun to change the country’s traditional Atlantic approach to provide for its security and defense. Portugal is against a

multispeed Europe (unless the Portuguese are in the first speed, of course) and have not been expressly profederal in political discourse.

Given some of the operational or technical uncertainties of the WEU, some European countries have organized other military forces to try to deal rapidly with possible regional threats. In 1993, the “Eurocorps” was formed with France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain participating. The Germans and the French first proposed the idea in November 1991 as a form of reinforced military cooperation with joint units as a nucleus for a European Corps and a model for closer ties between the WEU countries. Other European countries saw the purpose a little differently, to decrease the “hegemonial tendencies” of some countries--read Germany. Spain was one of the first European countries to join as it was seen as a way to support the creation of a European security identity.³³ The idea of creating multinational units as a means of tightening political and military ties among member states appealed to the Spanish--especially if dependence upon the United States could be decreased at the same time. By 1999, command of the Eurocorps will go to a Spanish Lt. General.

At first, Portuguese politicians and military criticized the formation of the Eurocorps. From their Atlanticist perspective, the Eurocorps was no more than a French initiative to establish a rival organization to NATO that would lead to a “transatlantic decoupling”. The Bush administration’s criticism of its creation strengthened this perspective in Lisbon. However, as the Clinton administration began to support the idea of a European defense identity (January 1994 NATO summit) and as France attempts to move closer to NATO, this has led to a narrowing of the gap between the pro-European line which Portugal has generally adopted since the signing of the Maastricht treaty and its position on a common European defense.

Portugal became a permanent “observer” within the Eurocorps in 1995, but it has since suspended this limited role. It has also followed the lead of the Spanish by participating in the EUROFOR and the EUROMARFOR. These forces were initiated by Spain, Italy and France in 1992 and are popularly

referred to as the “euroarmy of the south”. As mentioned above, they are considered two military forces “attributed” to the WEU but which can also be “used” by NATO. These will be composed of combined troop divisions whose mission would be to intervene in crises in the Mediterranean and to support UN peacekeeping initiatives. The motive behind forming these new forces stems from the anticipation by southern Mediterranean countries that the north of Europe will gradually show disinterest in crises in the region. Compared to Eurocorps, the EUROFOR/EUROMARFOR will not have permanently stationed troops. Rather, EUROFOR will be composed of about 10,000 rapid deployment troops answerable to a multinational command with a control center in Florence, Italy. EUROMARFOR will be commanded by ship in front of a crisis area. Portuguese participation in these European defense organizations represents a clear departure from traditional Portuguese positions--to avoid direct participation in armed conflicts in Europe.

Portuguese participation does, however, show how they realize that their security interests have changed since the end of the Cold War and that greater multilateral cooperation with her Mediterranean neighbors will only strengthen the country’s ability to protect its national interests. It may be based on this realization that greater Spanish-Portuguese defense cooperation may be anchored in the future. In fact, it could be argued that for the first time Spain and Portugal share a common security concern--that the EU will soon grow to concentrate exclusively on issues affecting central and Eastern Europe. Both Portugal and Spain have emphasized the need to “open up” to the East but, at the same time, to “deepen” with the South. They see the Mediterranean as an integral part of the balance between East and South in the EU.

Yet, this “Europeanization” of Mediterranean policies has meant different things to Spain and Portugal. For Spain, it has meant placing its traditional third world relations with the Arab world into a European context. For Portugal, it has meant the opposite--the “Mediterraneanization” of its external relations. Portugal has begun to build stronger multilateral relations with her Mediterranean neighbors. Prior to becoming a member of the EU, this Iberian country only had significant ties with Morocco--

obviously as a way to counterbalance Spanish influence in the region. Spain has a much broader vision of the Mediterranean which includes the Middle East states. This is not the case for Portugal. Spain also wants to use its Middle East ties as a way to gain prominence as a European power. The best example of this would be the Spanish sponsoring of the first Middle East Peace Conference in October 1991. The Portuguese have begun to place a clear emphasis on strengthening relations with countries of the Western Mediterranean, as well as increasing cooperation with her Southern European neighbors and countries of the Maghreb.

Both Spain and Portugal have also begun to “modernize” their military structures. Portugal has had a more difficult time than Spain in modernizing and democratizing its military forces. Significant changes could be seen after the formation of a Ministry of Defense in 1982. Prior to that time the Revolutionary Council remained the military organ which controlled military activities. Once the Revolutionary Council was dissolved in the 1982 Constitutional revision, Portugal began to assert civilian and political control over its military. This process ended with the election of a non-military president, Mario Soares, in 1985. Once the Social Democratic Party (PSD) won its first majority victory in 1987 and then a second in 1991, the country began the process of modernizing Portugal’s military forces.

Former Minister of Defense, Fernando Nogueira, employed a strategy between 1991 and 1994 which emphasized the three “R”s of redimensioning, restructuring and reequipping.³⁴ He recognized the need to develop consensus on the future of Portugal’s armed forces and defense policies. This, of course, did not make the difficult decisions any easier to take. But it did help make everyone understand—even those forced into early retirement--that due to a shortage of resources, such unpopular positions were necessary. It is interesting to note that the development of such a consensus strategy is quite different from what happens in Spain where debate on the subject does not even exist. The Portuguese Ministry of Defense has taken over defense and military decision making, a power no longer dominated by the General Staff. The General Staff was then transformed into an operational command and headed by the Chief of the General Staff

(CEMGFA). The CEMGFA includes the three service chiefs which it now coordinates autonomously.

There is no room allowed for independent political roles in this military command structure.

The restructuring of Spain's military began in 1994 and was called "Plan Norte." This represented an attempt to deal realistically with Spain's European vision of collective defense options--a business way of resolving national strategic debate. The success of "Plan Norte" will measure Spain's ability and willingness to translate new ideas into coherent and effective action. It may represent the difference between Spanish rhetorical solidarity with alliance objectives and effective Spanish participation in achieving those objectives. Among the Spanish military forces, it is the army's strategic vision that is by definition broader, one that presupposes military power to be only a supporting element in the nation's response to the modern range of security threats.³⁵ Spain's successful reorganization of her military forces and participation in European defense programs will depend upon building consensus domestically (among military and political forces), no longer covered in secrecy.

The peninsular territory remains Spain's strategic center of gravity. This area is included as a base for the successful execution of Spain's interests in three major spheres of action: defense of national territory itself; regional defense with emphasis on commitments to European security and the Atlantic Alliance; and that sphere determined by commitments to the UN.³⁶ Spain's overall strategic military objectives emphasize multilateral commitments, including such theoretical capabilities as deterrence, forward presence, force projection, mobility, readiness and collective defense. Spanish leaders also envision the final completion of the army's progressive abandonment of its territorial presence mission. That is to say, the army will no longer provide government force throughout the territory of Spain. The decrease in this domestic role for the army will be compensated for by greater participation in external missions organized by UN peacekeeping or NATO's SFOR, for example. The Joint Strategic Plan (Plan Estrategico Conjunto--PEC) was approved in March 1995 for the Spanish land forces but the need still exists to coordinate the plan with the other service branches.

**SIZE OF MILITARY FORCES
(IN THOUSANDS)**

	1975	1980	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
SPAIN	n/a	356	314	263	246	198	294	213	210
PORTUGAL	104	88	102	87	86	80	68	122	121

Source: Revista de la OTAN, No. 1, January 1996.

Long before the Cold War ended, Spain and Portugal had been concerned about defense spending. When compared to Spain, Portugal has not made any significant reductions in its defense spending as a percentage of GDP. In fact, Portugal has even increased defense spending at a time when her European neighbors have been trying to cut back on all aspects of state spending to meet the strict Maastricht convergence criteria on debt and deficit.

**DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP
(In constant 1990 prices and exchange rates)**

	AVERAGES								
	1975- 1979	1980- 1984	1985- 1989	1990- 1994	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
PORTUGAL	3.4	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.7
SPAIN	n/a	2.4	2.2	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.5
NATO EUROPE		3.5	3.2	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.3

Source: Revista de la OTAN, No. 1, January 1996.

When the PSOE took over in 1982, Spain's defense spending was about 2.0% of GDP.³⁷ In fact, defense budgets remained at about 2% of GDP from 1983 to 1988--the year of Spain's "normalization" of her international relations militarily. Thereafter, this spending began to decrease to current levels a little above one percent given that the country's international objectives had already been realized.³⁸ The

problem has been that as the military has attempted to reorganize, modernize and participate in international troop deployments, it has had to deal with decreasing financial support. Spain's total defense spending according to NATO sources note above is less than all other NATO members, excluding Luxembourg. The 1991 Parliamentary proposal which established the objective of 2% GDP for defense spending by the end of the century has been greatly affected by governments wanting to cut state spending.³⁹ This has become even more pronounced as Spain struggles to meet the Maastricht criteria of debt and deficit.

Relations between Spain and Portugal are the central issue within the EU and NATO on Iberian peninsula. In general, relations between these two countries have been improving on a large scale. One explanation can be found in the fact that Spain and Portugal have become more interdependent economically. In addition, both countries' willingness to cooperate in defining a CFSP--especially in the Mediterranean--will help build stronger patterns of cooperation "spilling-over" into other areas of the intra-Iberian relationship. Portugal will have to deal with the results of the end of Spanish isolationism and protectionism. Its primary concern will be to prevent the peninsula from being regarded by allied partners as one sole entity coordinated from Madrid. The Portuguese will have to reinforce the idea that there is still peninsular diversity which other EU countries must recognize. Both countries will have to deal with the fact that integration into the EU and WEU has been simultaneous. As their relations "deepen", so too will the opportunities to cooperate on common defense issues in a new European order.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN A POST-COLD WAR NATO

The end of bipolarity, the internal changes taking place within the former Soviet Bloc countries, and the reality of German reunification have transformed the parameters within which European countries have to operate in a post-Cold War world. No longer will countries' foreign policies be defined by the inherent struggle for dominance built into the Cold War. It was within this new, dynamic context that the Americans in the early 1990s encouraged the European Union countries to define their "essential common

interests” which could then be translated into successful joint actions. The Europeans have not been overwhelmingly successful thus far. Hence, the creation of a “common foreign and security policy”--the second pillar of the Treaty on European Union--has yet to become a reality and in many cases still looks rather premature. Attempts to upgrade and reinforce joint policies have thus far not created any special problems for Spain and Portugal, at least not any more than for other members. As the EU enlarges to include some Central and Eastern European countries, what we may eventually see will be foreign policy perceptions and orientations becoming more “regionalized” as the interests of those countries looking to the East of Europe begin to differ from those in Europe’s South.

For Spain, the end of bipolarity facilitated its fuller participation in issues concerning European security.⁴⁰ Spain has defended “complementarity” in common defense (meaning WEU-EU) and other institutions already in existence (such as NATO and OSCE). After the Rome NATO summit, the Spanish see a reformed Atlantic Alliance, “lighter, more flexible less nuclear, more European, more transparent and open”.⁴¹ From the Spanish perspective, NATO has changed. The idea of “double hats” and “separable but not separate” concepts also fit Spain’s positions on relations between NATO and the WEU. To show how Spain differentiates between NATO and WEU, it named an ambassador exclusively to the WEU. Most countries, including Portugal, appoint one ambassador responsible for NATO and WEU. Greater Spanish military participation in UN peacekeeping missions around the world and NATO peace enforcement illustrates how its noninterventionist policies of past have indeed changed. The Spanish defend “integrationism” concerning procedures for reaching decisions (using majority voting)⁴² and “Europeanism” in matters of security and defense. Spain’s defense policies have become increasingly realistic and pragmatic.

The Portuguese--like her Iberian neighbors--have had to evaluate critically their country’s position in Europe as the Cold War came to an end. No longer faced with a Soviet threat, the old debate over Europe in general--or the South in particular--resurfaced and the Portuguese have had to make some

important choices. The Portuguese “non-belligerence” position in the Gulf War meant that its participation in that collective effort was the lowest among all the European allies.⁴³ Governing elites now realize that if Portugal wants to have political influence in security organizations, their troops will have to participate more actively. This process has led to the “nationalization” of defense issues in Portugal. The Portuguese military have participated in UNPROFOR, IFOR and SFOR operations in the former Yugoslavia.

Out of this debate have emerged two different perspectives among political and military elites. On the one hand, the “Euroskeptics” argue that Portugal’s peripheral position in Europe protects the country from direct involvement in the continent’s regional conflicts. Hence, Portugal should strengthen her ties to Africa, not Europe. Portuguese military actions outside the European domain should take place either bilaterally or with the United Nations (for example, in Angola and Mozambique). On the other hand, the “Euroatlanticists” opine that the country’s borders no longer stop at national frontiers and former interests and efforts in Africa are not decisive in foreign policy decision-making. What really matters for Portugal is participation in the EU and the fulfillment of its obligations directly related to membership. Portugal’s active role in EU foreign affairs would help prevent the hegemony of a few states and the predominance of their interests in the context of the EU, including matters of defense. “Euroatlanticists” are especially concerned about trying to counterbalance Spain’s role in the EU as it aspires to be a “big” player in foreign policy matters. In order to resolve this debate, there has been a tenuous compromise between the two schools as articulated ambiguously in the 1993 “defense concepts” directly related to the European formation of a common foreign and security policy.⁴⁴ The problem remains, however, that as CFSP is ambiguous, a clearer Portuguese defense policy will depend upon a greater clarification of CFSP.

Most political and military leaders agree that recent bilateral relations between Spain and Portugal are good, if somewhat distant, in the defense and security areas. The primary question to be resolved--and it is at the top of the agenda--concerns the future of an integrated Iberian Command for NATO. Given

geography and military assets, Spain could easily claim the leadership role on the peninsula which would be totally unacceptable to the Portuguese. While the Portuguese will be willing to negotiate the future of NATO command structures on the peninsula, what they know that they do not want is an Iberian command under Spain. There is also a growing perception within military circles that the United States favors Spain or at least an "Iberianist" view of the peninsula in geostrategic terms. That is why when Spain joined NATO in 1982, Portugal insisted that it remained linked to SACLANT as Spain's "coordination agreements" were integrated into SACEUR.

But the Portuguese will have to come to terms with a military reality they simply cannot match-- Spain is currently the largest contributor of forces to NATO exercises in the IBERLANT area of responsibility. The Portuguese realize that Spain's military is more prepared, larger and better equipped. The problem for the Portuguese will be that as Spain and France want to emphasize a larger role in NATO, this will probably come at the expense of the Portuguese position (though not in terms of defense) in the organization. Portugal has to deal with Spain's desire to exercise a greater air and naval presence in the Atlantic outside NATO military structures--even if it realizes Spain will be better equipped to do so. But this process may have negative affects on the Iberian relationship for the short term. Portugal does not support a division of IBERLANT into two separate commands, one under a Portuguese (north) and another under a Spaniard (south). The Portuguese also are cognizant that a foreign policy based exclusively on "Atlanticism" would be a form of isolationism for Portugal. Therefore, Portugal will not diminish its commitment to the defense of the European front. It is against this backdrop that Portugal will continue to emphasize its "Euro-Atlantic multilateralism."

NATO itself had to deal with the new exigencies presented in a world no longer dominated by the East-West struggle. At the Rome 1991 NATO summit, the allies reached an agreement approving the New Strategic Concept: "to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter." At this meeting, the sixteen NATO members

created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a forum which includes the full members of NATO in regular session as well as representatives from all partner countries. The purpose of the NACC was to enhance dialogue and cooperation with NATO's partners as promised in the New Strategic Concept. Given the existence of a new situation which demanded a more flexible and cost-efficient approach, the ability to act multinationally and the capacity to build up reinforcements would be of primary importance to the NATO allies. This became the conceptual basis for CJTF.

CJTF is an operational concept which facilitates a configuration for deployment of NATO forces in the new security environment with the criteria set out in the New Strategic Concept: "enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capacity for augmentation when necessary." Non-article V operations may not have an identifiable threat, but risks are still involved considering the success of the mission and the safety of the troops deployed. Greater political oversight would be required. It was agreed in 1994 that CJTF concept would be a means to facilitate the use of NATO's collective assets for WEU/EU missions or for missions with the participation of non-NATO countries. As Europeans remain divided over whether or not to integrate WEU into EU, NATO has felt less compelled to articulate clearly the relations between NATO and the WEU for which CJTF would be instrumental. This has been one way to give NATO's rigid integrated structure operational flexibility required by new changes. NATO's role in operations other than those stipulated in Article V of the Washington Treaty (namely peacekeeping) facilitated the work of NATO and the WEU in a "separate but not separable" framework. Establishing practical cooperation with Partnership for Peace countries also demanded a new approach to the use of NATO's assets and capabilities. By completing CJTF, NATO facilitates the evolutionary process towards a true "European security and defense identity" (ESDI) within the Alliance.

In September 1994, the NATO allies agreed to conduct a "Long-Term Study" to determine changes needed in NATO's organization and resources so that it could effectively adapt its command and force structure as agreed in Rome (1991). Although this study has yet to be concluded--and should be

agreed upon before the July 1997 Madrid summit--the following points summarize some of the possible structural changes: (a) have two Major NATO Commands (MNC) of SACEUR AND SACLANT under American commanders with the possible incorporation of a European deputy SACEUR with special operational responsibilities; (b) change the number of Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) in Europe--one idea has been to reduce it to two regional commands geographically center one to the north of the Alps and one to the south of the Alps; (c) reduce the number of Principle Subordinate Commands (PSC) and adjust them to reflect contributions in geographical areas of national security interests; (d) eliminate Sub-principle Subordinate Commands (SUB-PSC).

The Alliance members are still working out the details of the new military structure of NATO. Both Spain and Portugal agree that changes are necessary. However, the Portuguese are concerned about the second layer of structure and what will happen to their MSC. They are determined to fight to keep it. The Spanish want to receive a NATO command (preferably an MSC) responsible for all of Spain's territory--including the Canary Islands and corresponding territorial waters. The Spanish are pleased with the elimination of the fourth layer (SUB-PSC) structures, as this would mean the disappearance of the Gibraltar NATO command (GIBMED).

Debate in Portugal over the future of its MSC began as early as 1993. This emerged within the context of a constellation of inter-related factors: flat or declining defense budgets, command realignments eliminating certain command structures, implications of CJTF for its MSC, and the NATO long term study on the future of the alliance's structures. At that point, the Portuguese began arguing for a position under SACEUR to increase their territorial (as opposed to maritime) responsibility and presumably their role in NATO. As previously noted, Portugal was the only European country in the integrated military command structure which did not have its main NATO connection to SACEUR. As NATO members began thinking about the alliance's future organizational structures, the Portuguese realized that not having their land mass incorporated into the European NATO command structure held negative implications for the country's

security. In August 1994 it was decided that the status quo ante would prevail--especially as the debate erupted into an internal Portuguese conflict when the Navy and Air Force opposed the Army and could not reach a viable consensus domestically. Most importantly, the "long term study" continues and the Portuguese prudently determined that it would be premature to support serious changes until all the parameters were known. The issue is more complex than the simple location of a MSC. The final resolution of this question involves Portugal's overall strategy to maximize its room for maneuver and influence in a world of bigger and more powerful states.

Portuguese concern for the status of its NATO command has become more exaggerated as the French continue to flirt with the idea of re-entering NATO's integrated military command and after the Spanish voted to do so in November 1996. Curiously enough, the two principle Spanish parties--the Popular Party (PP) and the PSOE-- had finally found consensus on the "normalization" of Spain's relationship with NATO in a post-Cold War world. The PP government--backed by the opposition PSOE-- argued that the full military integration of Spain in NATO "did not go against the conditions outlined in the 1986 referendum."⁴⁵ Both parties justified this position as "the military structure into which Spain will become incorporated will be radically different from that which existed in 1986." A broad political consensus had finally developed on Spain's integration into the military command structure when the parliament voted overwhelming to join fully the new NATO of the next century.⁴⁶

Spanish political and military leaders have outlined the following priorities in order to facilitate Spain's participation into the new NATO structures: (1) the granting of a subregional command that includes the entire Spanish territory as well as the Canary Islands (and the geographical water which separates the islands from the continent--something the Portuguese do not accept as it which would reduce its area of influence in the Atlantic) which will be "conjunto" meaning all three branches report there and "multinational" (CJTF),⁴⁷ (2) the elimination of Gibraltar's NATO command and the granting of control over the straights and the access of submarines to Spain; and (3) the assurance of a significant presence of

Spanish military officers in the chain of command of NATO. These positions have been criticized domestically as being too “provincial.”⁴⁸ Once again, Spain is seeking to fulfill its own domestic and foreign policy agenda too narrowly. Spain needs a coherent position which reflects its desire to build a new NATO which will be “multinational” in its orientation. Some forces in Spain still do not understand what “military integration” means as NATO enters the next century. It is to the resolution of these “conditions” that NATO must work in the coming months. Portugal will be following the debate very carefully in order to protect her own security interests within the newly emerging NATO structures.

In March 1997, Spain proposed that the IBERLANT command in Portugal be one which rotates between a Portuguese and a Spanish admiral.⁴⁹ The Spanish support this option even though they refuse to have the Canary Islands fall under the Portuguese command--obviously not a coherent strategy in redesigning NATO's southern flank. They justify such a rotation scheme with the Portuguese given Spain's navy contribution and the inclusion of Cantabria in its zone of competence. The Portuguese have resisted such rotations given that the admiral in Oeiras is also responsible for the Portuguese navy--an argument similar to that of the Americans over the Naples NATO command and the control of the VIth Fleet. The Spaniards still want their own new subregional command in Spain--at a time when the long term study is supposed to reduce such commands--and they have gone so far as to accept a rotation of leadership over that command among those countries who supply its troops. Spain accepts that a Portuguese officer would take over the command in Spain. However, in return, the bigger Iberian country wants Portugal's air and land forces incorporated into Spain's command. The Spanish justify such a “multinationalization” of their new subregional command since IBERLANT is essentially a naval command.

Portugal will have to plan her foreign and defense policies strategically, yet realistically. As a founding member of NATO, Portugal does not want to give up the privileges gained in that capacity--especially its command over IBERLANT. Yet, the Portuguese realize that the other allies would see no harm in granting a subordinate role to Portugal in view of the glaring disproportion of its armed forces

when compared to those of Spain. In the Allied military establishment (and even within Portuguese diplomatic circles), there is concern about the imbalance between the geostrategic importance of the Azores on the one hand, and the ill-equipment of Portuguese armed forces on the other hand. The Portuguese would also like the US to help clarify the distinction between the two halves of the peninsular geostrategic entity. Hence, the Portuguese have not totally abandoned their country's historical "Atlanticist" tradition. Portugal today cannot even use the historically problematic US-Spanish relations to its advantage as Spanish-American multilateral relations have improved.

What Portugal has done is to develop closer relations with Morocco. This important Maghreb country has increased its diplomatic initiatives towards Lisbon as well. Both Portugal and Morocco agree that the development of a "triangular relationship" will provide more of a balance in the region instead of letting Spain enjoy a monopoly on bilateral relations. Lisbon is not unsympathetic to Morocco's claims to Ceuta and Melilla--the two Spanish enclaves on the Northern African coast--and it has maintained a "pro-Moroccan neutrality" in the conflict still plaguing Western Sahara. While Portugal is looking south, Spain has been looking to Europe and the United States. Spain's navy and air force desire to play a significant role in the Atlantic outside NATO's military structure. Such ambitions may have negative repercussions on Spanish--Portuguese relations. These might also affect the NATO command in the region, IBERLANT.

The Portuguese do not think that the creation of a subordinate command in the Canary Islands under a Spanish senior office would be contrary to keeping a Portuguese admiral as Commander-in-Chief of IBERLANT. Portugal wants to retain control over IBERLANT. Suggestions of dividing the area into north and south commands are not considered positive for Portugal. From a security perspective, Portugal would be driven away from areas vital to its interests and important to its foreign policy--such as access to the Straits of Gibraltar, North Africa and the approaches of the south Atlantic. The Portuguese want to avoid being driven back again into a more exclusive security arrangement with the Americans. An unbalanced Atlanticism would have negative implications in the defense of Europe. Exclusive Atlanticism

today would mean a new form of isolationism for Portugal. Over the longer run, such a strategy would harm the reinforcement of Portuguese-US cooperation itself and it would reduce Portugal's commitment to the defense of the European front.

CONCLUSION

Portugal's former Foreign Minister, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, once stated that his country's "priority interests lie, beyond a shadow of a doubt, in Europe and in the EU".⁵⁰ If this is the case, then the Portuguese now recognize that European interests are Portugal's interests as well. This also means that Portugal's interests may even be the same as Spain's interests. No longer will the Portuguese try "to reach Madrid via Brussels". Today, the Portuguese realize that they can "get to Brussels with Madrid". For the first time in Iberian history, Spain and Portugal share common defense and security concerns in the alliances of which they are active members. Even the Spanish have come to the conclusion that a convergence of interests exists between the two Iberian countries.

Both Spain and Portugal will continue to have good military and defense relations with the United States. What we will see in the short term is a more multilateralism to these traditional bilateral ties. In other areas, we can see that Spain and Portugal are beginning to adopt common policies, especially in peacekeeping missions, dealing diplomatically with the Maghreb, and the articulation of a balanced East-South EU policy after the end of the Cold War. Both now agree on enlarging NATO. Yet, they also fear the shifting of focus within NATO and the EU towards Central and Eastern Europe. The Spanish and the Portuguese have begun to work together to resolve some of the unique problems facing them in the Mediterranean. Prudent in their foreign policy formulation, neither Spain nor Portugal want an enlargement of NATO to instill fear and insecurity in Russia.

Spain and Portugal each have developed different, yet dynamic views of how Europe can cooperate on defense and security issues within the WEU and NATO. Each supports the creation of a common foreign and security policy, even if with subtle differences. Spain has developed a more European-oriented

defense and security policy informed by pragmatism and realism. Portugal's position has become increasingly European, even when traditional areas of foreign policy are at stake. In terms of the development of a common defense policy, Portugal has adopted a prudent, but positive position. It is most concerned with institutional reform. The pragmatic and realistic Spanish perspective and the Europeanization of Portugal's position in matters of defense have helped to merge the positions of the two countries within NATO and WEU. Both have made a positive assessment of their participation in European and Alliance defense structures, as well as in an EU likely to grow in the future. What this will likely result in will be an increasing level of convergence in the defense of an open Europe, capable of stabilizing and helping to consolidate the process of democratic transitions in the East, as well as deepening relations with the South. Both Spain and Portugal share a common European vocation. And it will be upon this common ground that more similar foreign policy issues will take place, especially in the areas of security and defense.

ENDNOTES

1. For general background on Spain and Portugal's relations see Franco Algieri and Elfriede Regelsberger (eds.), Synergy at Work: Spain and Portugal in European Foreign Policy (Bonn: Institut für Europäische Politik, 1996) and Maria Joao Seabra, Vizinhança Inconstante: Portugal e Espanha na Europa (Lisbon: IEEI, 1996).
2. For a good overview of Portuguese-Spanish relations see Jose Medeiros Ferreira, As relações Luso-Espanholas da União Ibérica a Comunidade Europeia, (Lisboa: Livros Horizonte, 1989) and Juan Carlos Jimenez Redondo, Franco e Salazar: As relações Luso-Espanholas Durante a Guerra Fria (Lisboa: Assirio & Alvim, 1996).
3. It is curious to note that Portugal entered NATO without having participated in the drafting of the treaty and even some reservations made by Lisbon were rejected by the drafters. Some of these concerns included references to the UN Charter (of which Portugal was not a member at the time), defense of a democratic model of state, twenty year duration period which seemed too long for Portugal, and fear of becoming involved in a new international struggle between the US and the USSR. Nuno Severiano Teixeira, "Portugal Na Fundacao do Pacto Atlantico," published in Diario de Noticias, 16 June 1983. See Franco Nogueira, Salazar, Vol. IV (1945-1958), (Porto: Civilizacao Editora, 1980).

4. Franco Nogueira noted that Spain has always sought “to eliminate any other sovereign unit in the Iberian Peninsula”. See his last work, Juizo Final (Porto: Civilizacao Ed., 1992), pp. 74, 78 and 97.
5. Joao Marques de Almeida, Portuguese Security Policy: Between Geopolitical Culture and Institutional Commitment, (Lisbon: IEEI, 1995), p. 2.
6. Mario Soares, Intervencoes 8 (Lisboa: INCM, 1994), p. 162.
7. Former Socialist Foreign Minister Jaime Gama described this relation in the Preface to Portugal: An Atlantic Paradox by Jose Calvet de Magalhaes, Alvaro de Vasconcelos and Joaquim Ramos Silva (Lisboa: Institute for Strategic and International Studies, 1990), p. 10.
8. See Jonathan Story, “Portugal’s Revolution of Carnations: Patterns of Change and Continuity,” in International Affairs, vol. 52, no. 3, 1976.
9. For a good overview on Spain’s defense relations with the West, see Antonio Marquina, Espana en la politica de seguridad occidental, 1939-1986 (Madrid: Ejercito, 1986).
10. See the declaration of the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO headquarters, Brussels on 10-11 January 1994, in Europe Documents 1867, Atlantic Document 83, 12 January 1994.
11. See Luc Crollen, Portugal, the US and NATO (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1973).
12. While Portugal’s most intense and concrete link with the integrated military command is via ACLANT, there are also links to ACE. The Portuguese Air Force is linked via CIBL to ACE for European air defense under the Portuguese Air Command and Control System (POACCS) and the Portuguese Maritime Buffer and AEW Link (POMBAL). This link provides for the air defense of the land under COMPOAIR reporting to CIBL, reporting to ACE. The Portuguese Army has a mechanized brigade with a NATO commitment in Northern Italy and is forming an air-transportable brigade which will be Portugal’s contribution to the NATO ARCC.
13. See Kenneth Maxwell, “Portuguese Defense and Foreign Policy: An Overview,” in K. Maxwell, ed., Portuguese Defense and Foreign Policy Since Democratization, Camoes Center Special Report No. 3, (New York: Camoes Center, 1991).
14. Under the Allied Command Atlantic in the Iberian area--CINCIBERLANT--(MSC) are other sub-PSC Commands, ISCOMAZORES and ISCOMADEIRA.
15. The Portuguese recently signed a new bilateral agreement with the United States in June 1995. This will be an umbrella agreement to replace the series of agreements originating in the 1951 accord for the bases. It includes base access, defense modernization, and similar features but is broader than all prior arrangements and recognizes that the bilateral relationship should be grounded on more than a fairly limited security relationship.

16. See Fernando Moran, Espana en su Sitio, (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 1990) for background on the political front concerning Spain's accession into NATO. Moran also provides a general outline of the PSOE's position and how that changed once the party came to power. He also shares his own personal disagreements with the party's dominant line on NATO membership.
17. See Felipe Gonzalez' State of the Country address of 23 October 1984 and the "Decalogo" on defense, security and peace. It is in the latter that Gonzalez outlines the nine conditions defining Spain's possible future relationship with NATO.
18. The question was worded as follows: "The government considers it convenient for reasons of national interest that Spain remain in the Atlantic Alliance and that Spain's remaining in this alliance be based on the following terms: 1. Spain's participation in the Atlantic Alliance will not include its incorporation into the integrated military command structure. 2. It will remain forbidden to install, store or introduce nuclear arms on Spanish territory. 3. There will follow a progressive reduction of the American military presence in Spain. Do you consider it convenient for Spain to remain in the Atlantic Alliance according to the terms outlined by the nation's government? The voting results were 52.55% in favor of proposal, 39.8% against proposal and 7.65% issued blank votes. A total of 59.73% of those registered participated in the referendum.
19. In October 1989, the Spanish ship "Descubierta" was the first to join NATO forces to participate in activation number 39 of NATO's Mediterranean fleet.
20. See the Minister of Defense Narcis Serra's speech of "Los Cometidos de Espana" in October 1987 before the Spanish Congress which outlines the six points of Spain's military contribution to NATO's common defense.
21. See Glenn H. Snyder, "Spain in NATO: The reluctant partner," in Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, Spain's Entry Into NATO, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988, p. 140-158.
22. Current membership of the WEU includes the following full members: Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain; observers: Denmark, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Austria and Ireland; associate members: Iceland, Norway, Turkey; and associate partners: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia.
23. The Maastricht Treaty, Article J.4. (Brussels, 1991): calls upon the WEU in general terms to "elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the union which have defense implications." An addendum to the Treaty describes the WEU as the EU's "defense component".
24. "The Lisbon Declaration," WEU Council of Ministers. May 17, 1995.
25. Santiago Lopez Valdivielso, "Reflexiones sobre la presidencia Espanola," Revista Espanola de la Defensa, July/August 1995, p. 18.

26. Article D.2: "WEU is to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications" and in Annex V "WEU is defined as the defense component of the EU and the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance."
27. Memorandum from the Portuguese Delegation, "Political Union with a View to the Intergovernmental Conference," 30 November 1990.
28. Franco-German Proposals on Political Union. Security Policy cooperation in the framework of the common foreign and security policy of political union, February 1991, in Europe Documents, 21 February 1991.
29. See Andres Ortega, La razon de Europa (Madrid: El Pais/Aguilar, 1994), p. 227.
30. Juan de Luis, "Spanish Views on the Future of West European Security and Defense Cooperation," in Peter Schmidt, ed., In the Midst of Change: On the Development of West European Security and Defense Cooperation (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1992), p. 132
31. Anibal Cavaco Silva, Afirmar Portugal no Mundo, Discursos Proferidos durante a Vigencia do XII Governo Constitucional (Lisbon: INCM, 1993), p. 129.
32. See Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Copenhagen, Denmark, 6-7 June in Agence Europe, 8 June 1991.
33. The XXI Mechanized Brigade based in Cordoba is the initial Spanish contribution to the Eurocorps but the plan is to assign the Brunete Armoured Division composed of the XII Armored Brigade from Madrid and the XI Mechanized Brigade from Badajoz in addition to the Cordoba unit. Spain has promised to give 12,000 men to support Eurocorps.
31. See Ministry of Defense, A Defesa de Portugal 1994 (Lisbon: Ministry of Defense, July 1994).
35. Jose Sanchez Mendez, Aspectos operativos y tecnicos ante las nuevas amenazas, (Madrid: Camara de Comercio e Industria de Madrid, 1994).
36. See Directiva de Defensa Nacional 1/92, 27 March 1992 (Madrid: Presidency of the Government of Spain, 1992). See also Argumosa Pila, "El nuevo marco estrategico," Ejercito, November 1994.
37. See Francisco Perez Muinelo, Panoramica del presupuesto de defensa en Espana, 1946-1996, (Madrid: Instituto de Questiones Internacionales y Politica Exterior (INCIPE), 1996).
38. Defense spending figures are calculated differently from the Ministry than from NATO which often produces different numbers. For example, the 1.17% of GDP noted publicly in Spain is roughly equal to the 1.5% used by NATO. See Perez Muinelo.

39. On the role of the Parliament in determining defense issues, see Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, "La defensa que se defiende en las Cortes," Politica Exterior, No. 56, Vol. XI, March-April 1997, pp. 73-85.
40. See Geoffrey B. Demarest, "Spain's Military-Strategic Outlook," in Parameters, Winter 1996-1997, pp. 26-38.
41. Carlos Alonso Zaldivar, "El ano en que acabo un mundo," La politica exterior de Espana en 1991, in Anuario Internacional CIDOB 1991, (Barcelona: CIDOB, 1992), p. 22.
42. Limited negotiations with cooperator countries (UK, DK, Ireland and Portugal) on Maastricht has further constrained the scope to those cases where the Council has previously decided to vote by majority (Art. J.3.2 TEU).
43. See Trevor Salmon, "Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990-1992," International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2, 1992.
44. The Conceito Estrategico de Defesa Nacional was approved by the Parliament in 1993 and it summarizes Portugal's fundamental principles, goals and perceptions in the area of security. The main objectives as stated in this document include the following: the preservation of the Atlantic links, through membership in NATO; the participation in the process of European integration in the domain of security; the Portuguese contribution to multilateral military operations in the context of the United Nations, WEU and NATO; and the role of Portugal in the regional security of the Mediterranean and of Southern Africa.
45. El Pais, 14 November 1996, p. 21.
46. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, VI Legislature, 13-14 November 1996, Numbers 38-39. The final vote was 293 in favor, 23 against and 4 abstentions.
47. The racist comments against the Portuguese over this issue did not help the situation. "The Canarian people will strongly oppose and will not allow the brown-skinned Portuguese to be walking through their streets." Quoted from El Pais, 2 January 1997.
48. See the editorial of El Pais, 31 March 1997.
49. Minister of Defense, Eduardo Serra, in Senate debate on 5 March 1997 as quoted in El Pais, 9 March 1997.
50. Publico, January 9, 1994.